When Governance Fails to Govern: Rethinking Audit Quality and Firm Value in Weak Institutional Environments

Angsoyiri, Dramani, Alkaraan, Fadi ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6607-5692, John, Judith and Al Bahloul, Mohammad (2026) When Governance Fails to Govern: Rethinking Audit Quality and Firm Value in Weak Institutional Environments. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 19 (3). p. 225. doi:10.3390/jrfm19030225

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Abstract

Corporate governance reforms in emerging and frontier markets frequently assume that strengthening board oversight, audit committees, and ownership monitoring will improve audit quality and enhance firm value. Yet, in weak institutional environments, these mechanisms often function symbolically rather than substantively. This study rethinks the governance–audit–value nexus by integrating Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, and the concept of symbolic governance to explain why governance may appear structurally robust while failing to constrain managerial discretion. Using panel data from Ghanaian listed firms between 2015 and 2023, the analysis shows that audit committee independence and board independence are negatively associated with both audit quality and firm value, indicating that formal independence without expertise, authority, or enforcement capacity does not translate into meaningful oversight. By contrast, institutional and managerial ownership positively influence both outcomes, suggesting that incentive alignment and informed monitoring can substitute for weak formal governance. Foreign ownership improves firm value but does not consistently enhance audit quality, while macroeconomic conditions such as inflation and GDP growth further shape firm performance. The study advances the literature by reconceptualising governance effectiveness in weak institutional environments, demonstrating that governance mechanisms may exist in form without functioning in substance. The findings underscore the need for governance reforms that prioritise enforcement capacity, board expertise, and audit committee competence rather than structural compliance alone.

Item Type: Article
Article Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Corporate governance; Audit quality; Firm value; Symbolic governance; Institutional weakness; Emerging markets
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance > HG4001 Finance management. Business finance
Divisions: Schools and Research Institutes > School of Business, Computing and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Rhiannon Goodland
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2026 10:55
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2026 11:15
URI: https://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/16194

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