Beyond bias in performance measurement and rewards practices: The role of informal networks in social inequality within Global Professional Service Firms

Melhem, Muntaser J, Darwish, Tamer K ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1815-9338, Abdelqader, Muath ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0698-1367, Mowafi, Omar and Abdeldayem, Batool (2025) Beyond bias in performance measurement and rewards practices: The role of informal networks in social inequality within Global Professional Service Firms. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies. (In Press)

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Abstract

Purpose – This paper examines how institutional complexity shapes unintended changes in performance measurement and rewards practices within the subsidiary of a global professional service firm operating in the Middle East. Using an institutional logics lens, it examines how macro-level contradictory logics influence the reproduction of these practices at the micro-level. Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilizes a single case study research design and inductively examines the enactment of centralized performance measurement and rewards practices diffused by the global, Western-based headquarters. Findings – It shows that actors predominantly invoke informal institutional logics to navigate formal performance measures and achieve targets. This dynamic realigns performance measurement and rewards practices with local institutional norms, transforming them into mechanisms that systematically reproduce social inequality among employees. The latter emerges from the misalignment between local cultural norms and global management accounting practices, rather than from organizational actors’ (un)intentional efforts to manipulate performance management and measurement systems. Research limitations/implications – The paper contributes deeper insights into the how and why unintended consequences of performance measurement and rewards arise in emerging markets. It extends the literature by introducing the concept of decoupled complementarity, which explains how formal practices are maintained in appearance but strategically reshaped by informal institutional logics in contexts dominated by informality. Originality/value – Contrary to existing research that suggests informality undermines formal management accounting practices, this study reveals that their implementation in emerging markets depends on informal interventions aligned with broader socio-cultural and institutional contexts. While these interventions help achieve organizational objectives, they also unintentionally reinforce social inequality by embedding management accounting practices within these frameworks. Keywords: Management accounting; performance measurement and rewards; MCS; unintended consequences; wasta; informal institutions; institutional logics; Middle East

Item Type: Article
Article Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Management accounting; Performance measurement and rewards; MCS; Unintended consequences; Wasta; Informal institutions; Institutional logics; Middle East
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5001 Business
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5001 Business > HF5549 Personnel management. Employment management
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5001 Business > HF5601 Accounting. Bookkeeping
Divisions: Schools and Research Institutes > School of Business, Computing and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Tamer Darwish
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2025 09:18
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2025 11:30
URI: https://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/15194

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