Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity?

Basiddiq, Husam and Hussainey, Khaled (2012) Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity? Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 13 (3 SRC). pp. 284-297. doi:10.1108/09675421211281344

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Purpose – This paper aims to extend and contribute to prior UK research on the association between information asymmetry and dividends propensity. It seeks to investigate the impact of the number of analysts following firms, a proxy for information asymmetry, on dividends propensity. Design/methodology/approach – Using a 282 UK FTSE‐All Share non‐financial/non‐utilities firms with fiscal year ends on 2007, the paper uses a multiple regression model to investigate the association between dividends and analysts following. Findings – The paper finds that after controlling for firm‐specific characteristics, there is a significant negative association between the number of analysts following firms and dividend propensity. The finding suggests that higher coverage of financial analysts for UK firms reduces levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which results in lower dividend propensity. These findings are consistent with agency theory and pecking order theory, but inconsistent with signalling theory. Originality/value – The paper contributes to prior research related to the drivers of dividend propensity by being the first UK study to examine the association between dividend propensity and information asymmetry.

Item Type: Article
Article Type: Article
Additional Information: [Original String]: Basiddiq, H. and Hussainey, K. (2012). ‘Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity?’ Journal of Applied Accounting Research. 13(3), Accepted (publication date December 2012).[ABS rank 2*]
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dividend propensity, Information asymmetry, Analysts following, Dividends, Information disclosure, United Kingdom
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HG Finance > HG4501 Investment, capital formation, speculation
Divisions: Schools and Research Institutes > School of Business, Computing and Social Sciences
Research Priority Areas: Applied Business & Technology
Depositing User: Ineke Tijsma
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2015 18:44
Last Modified: 05 Aug 2023 15:55

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