Examining offending behaviour following receipt of a Business Crime Reduction Partnership's place-based exclusion sanction

Abstract

This article examines the post-sanction offending behaviour of individuals who received a warning or exclusion from a Business Crime Reduction Partnership (BCRP) in England. Noteworthy desistance occurred following the receipt of the warning (76%) and the exclusion (37%). Displacement of offending was observed, with most of those who continued to offend doing so only at business premises away from where they received their initial sanction. Variation in post-sanction offending behaviour was explored according to offender age and sex, offence time and whether the offence concerned theft, violence, abuse or alcohol. Higher rates of recidivism were observed among male offenders and those committing abuse offences, higher rates of displacement among those who committed theft offences, and the most varied and unpredictable offending among those that continued to offend post-exclusion. The findings presented here highlight the importance of holistic, multi-sector BCRPs that make information on offenders easily accessible to their members.

Key words:

Crime prevention, place-based ban, exclusion, desistance, displacement, business crime reduction partnership.

Word count: 8,140

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Introduction

Place-based exclusions or bans are a widely used punitive measure. The principle of removing from a location an individual who has committed or poses a risk of committing a prohibited act underpins a range of legal, civil and privately enforced sanctions. Such sanctions have key criminological concepts and principles in common. Firstly, they are underpinned by key three criminological theories. Rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) presents the case that a criminal act follows an analysis of effort, risk and reward. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) prescribes that crime occurs where there is a convergence of a suitable target, a motivated offender, and the opportunity for a crime due to an absence of a capable guardian. Deterrence theory states that it is the perceived likelihood of getting caught that is the most significant deterrent from committing a crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Apel, 2013). A collectively enforced exclusion sanction system is designed to increase a community's communal vigilance, reducing the opportunity for particular acts or behaviours, increasing the risk of being caught, and, in turn, deterring individuals from committing such acts. Secondly, their design draws upon principles of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997) and ideas of defensible space (Newman, 1972), operationalising spatially-targeted powers to control and restrict behaviours and movements. Removing an individual from an area where there is potential to commit particular prohibited behaviours will harden targets (Tilley, 2002) reduce opportunities (Felson and Clarke,

1998) and increase effort and risk while reducing rewards (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). As a result of this, and like many contemporary criminal justice strategies, such sanctions are 'pre-emptive' in nature (Zedner, 2009); based on an assessment of prior behaviour, bans are used as a means of social and behavioural control, preventing offenders from committing further undesirable acts through an increase in risk and reduction of opportunity.

Bans of this nature have been used extensively to tackle several specific crimes and associated behaviours. A major increase can be observed in the use of legally imposed banning in response to alcohol related crime and disorder in the night time economy (Palmer and Warren, 2014). In England and Wales, in addition to the range of licensing conditions and enforcement powers that individual venues can exercise through the Licencing Act 2003, legal sanctions such as Criminal Behaviour Orders, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), Dispersal Orders, Curfew Orders and Alcohol Disorder Zones have all been used to remove known offenders from city centres or particular residential areas following an incident of illegality or an act of prohibited behaviour.

Bans have also been used in response to retail crime. The British Retail Consortium (BRC) estimates the total annual cost of retail crime in Britain to be £900 million (BRC 2019). Retail theft by customers was estimated to be over £700 million for financial year 2017-18 (BRC 2019), but theft committed by employees is also a problem for the sector (Clarke and Petrossian 2013). The prevalence of violence and threats against businesses has been observed to be extensive in retail settings (BRC 2019; Harrell 2011; Hopkins and Gill 2017). Such crimes can impact upon employee wellbeing as well as have financial consequences for a business (Burrows and Hopkins 2005). Indeed, the BRC (2019) identified violence, abuse and customer theft as the most significant types of crime that businesses can fall victim to as well as the issues that businesses most commonly prioritise through their crime reduction efforts.

Place-based exclusions are used as criminal or civil punitive measures or issued by private organisations in response to these issues. 'Private public locations' such as shopping centres, airports, schools and universities often have their own security services responsible for issuing and enforcing some form of banning order (Schuilenburg, 2015). Shopping centres, in particular, have been the foreground for embedded processes of surveillance and exclusion. Social controls are used in this setting 'to exclude those who are considered undesirable' and to cause visitors to surrender certain civil liberties (Miler et al., 1998:105). Schuilenburg (2015:285) labels the sanctions used in such environments as 'selective exclusions', imposing rules of behaviour for those entering these public-private spaces.

Banning sanctions are also used by crime reduction partnerships and other collectives and community groups. Those involved will identify undesirable behaviours and set parameters for bans issued to those that commit such acts. Bans that exclude individuals from the premises of all those involved in a partnership can be identified as 'contractual governance' (Crawford, 2003: 479), where social obligations materialise themselves as 'forms of parochial control'. Many of these sanctions are civil or non-legal measures separate from criminal penalties and carry authority based on 'the covenant that has been locally agreed between the municipality and the participating parties' (Schuilenburg, 2015:280). Such agreements are often a defining characteristic of a pub-watch, shop-watch or broader Business Crime Reduction Partnership (BCRP) scheme, where information on offenders is shared between members to ensure that exclusions can be enforced across the locations of all involved. BCRPs will commonly bring together businesses that share a location, but that are from a wide range of commercial sectors and trade in either the day time or night economy hours to collectively enforce a sanction system that punishes behaviours such as theft, violence, abuse and alcohol related disorder (Safer Business Network 2019). Although BCRP members may be affected by these issues in different ways and at different times (see Ceccato and Armitage 2018b), through this partnership model

shared is the view that these behaviours need to be tackled and that they are the concern of the business community as a collective.

Despite their widespread use, there is mixed evidence concerning the effectiveness of place-based bans as a means of crime control. Legally enforced exclusion sanctions such as Football Banning Orders used by the police when tackling football related crime and disorder can serve the function of controlling certain supporters (Hopkins, 2014) and have been found to be highly effective in some circumstances (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011). In relation to alcohol related crime, however, Søgaard (2018) notes that although patron bans are commonly viewed positively by authorities, little research exists on the behaviour of patrons post-ban. In their discussion of police-imposed area bans in Australia, Farmer et al. (2018: 438) note how parliamentary debates typically justify their use and their effectiveness, but that such debates are accompanied by a 'lack of evidence presented to support the underlying assumptions that banning directly improves the safety of other patrons'. There is also mixed evidence concerning the extent to which crime is displaced by location bans. In relation to alcohol related disorder, for example, Crawford and Lister (2007) note that the nature of problem-drinkers can mean that place-based powers are likely to displace rather than resolve such issues. At the same time, there is a growing body of literature arguing that crime displacement does not often occur (Guerette and Bowers, 2009), is not an inevitable outcome of a crime prevention intervention, and that diffusion of crime control benefits is at least as likely (Johnson et al., 2014).

The need for further enquiry in these areas is just one part of a wider dearth in evidence concerning the tackling of crime against the commercial sector (Gill, 2018: Hopkins and Gill 2017). With businesses making extensive use of this approach to crime control particularly in relation to theft, violence, abuse and alcohol related crime, there is a need for studies that monitor the use of bans, provide meaningful measurement of their effect on the behaviours of individuals (Farmer et al., 2018), consider the role and responsibilities of guardians in tackling

retail crime and the effect of environmental dynamics on retail crime (Ceccato and Armitage 2018a) and draw conclusions about the overall effectiveness of place-based exclusions. It is here that this article makes its contribution.

Background and focus of study

This article seeks to increase understanding of how individuals behave following the receipt of place-based bans. By examining levels of desistance and displacement and analysing certain characteristics of post-sanction offending, it offers insight into the effectiveness of such mechanisms and into the challenges that those using these sanctions can encounter. The article presents a detailed examination of a place-based banning sanction used by a BCRP in South West England to tackle shoplifting and theft, alcohol related disorder, abuse and violent offences and a number of other specific behaviours. In this article, these behaviours (listed at Table A) are referred to as 'offences', and those who commit them as 'offenders' who have breached the terms of acceptable behaviour according to the partnership. The BCRP, 'Gloucester City Safe', launched in 2014, operates as a not-for-profit company in the city of Gloucester and the surrounding areas. Its members include retail businesses, restaurants, pubs, bars, nightclubs, supermarkets, transport providers, entertainment facilities and other public and private organisations (Gloucester City Safe, 2019). Members pay a subscription fee to have access to a secure information sharing web platform and radio network and agree to enforce collectively a banning policy that sees offending behaviour in or near to one member's premises punished with an exclusion from all member premises.

Table A: All categories of offence recorded by the partnership

Begging	Infringement/Breach of ASBO
Begging persistent	Joyriding
Kerb crawling	Misuse of ID
Noise nuisance	Other
Rough sleeping	Possession of offensive weapon
Street drinking	Racial abuse
Attempted theft	Section 35 dispersal issued
Being on the premises while banned	Smoking, underage or in prohibited area
Criminal damage/Graffiti/Vandalism	Underage intoxication
Possession of drugs	Unlicensed street trading
Possession with intent to supply drugs	Unlicensed taxi cab
Breach of police bail	Drunken and disorderly behaviour
Breach of Section 35 dispersal order	Harassment/Threatening behaviour
Going equipped to steal	Verbal abuse
Hate crime	Robbery
Illegal gambling	Theft
Inappropriate sexual contact	Assault/Violence/Affray

The partnership's sanction system has two tiers. A first offence is met with a warning or 'yellow card' whereby an offender will be made aware that continued offending (as defined by the partnership) will result in a 12-month exclusion from all member premises. A ban, or 'red card', is issued when an individual that has received a warning continues to offend at any member location, or in some instances where multiple offences were committed in quick succession without the opportunity for a warning to be issued. Both sanctions apply for a period of 12 months. Upon receiving a sanction, individuals are issued with a list of businesses to which the condition applies. Business involved in the partnership display a sticker at their customer entrance to aid with this. After a sanction has been issued, images and personal details of an offender are shared among members via email and made available on the web platform to facilitate collective enforcement. The BCRP employs a manager, whose responsibilities include deciding when to issue the warning sanction, maintaining the information sharing platform, administrating memberships and managing procedural aspects of all sanctions. It is the manager along with a police officer who will, wherever possible, issue an exclusion sanction to an individual in person. The partnership's governance is the responsibility of a Board of Directors and all decisions to issue exclusions are taken by an independent Management Board.

Drawing upon four years of data concerning the offences recorded by the partnership and the exclusions that were issued, this article seeks to answer the following research questions: (1) Do people desist from offending after they are issued with (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction? (2) What can be observed about the offending behaviour of those who continue to offend after receiving (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction in terms of offence type, location, and time committed? And (3) can offender/offence information recorded by the partnership be used to predict the occurrence of further offending following the receipt of (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction? Under each research question, the behaviour of all offenders from the four-year period is considered before variation is explored according to seven specific variables: offender age and sex, whether the offence was committed during day time economy trading hours (6am – 6pm) or night time economy trading hours (6pm-6am), and whether the incident was an alcohol, violent, abuse or theft offence. Difference in behaviour according to offender sex and age is explored to determine whether these factors can play a part in sanction compliance. The remaining variables were selected to explore whether the partnership's sanction system experiences greater or lesser success when used to tackle offending during the day time or night time economy trading periods, and when used to combat these specific types of offences.

Methods

This research employed a quantitative methodology to examine the partnership's offence and exclusion data. These data comprised 4935 offences committed by 2080 individual offenders at 115 locations occurring between September 2014 and August 2018. Each offence record includes information on the offender, the offence committed (which could have involved instances of one or more of the 34 offence categories listed at Table A), the time and location at which it occurred and whether a warning or exclusion sanction was issued.

The offences committed by sanctioned offenders were coded to facilitate statistical analysis of offence type, location and time of day and whether offending ceased, remained the same, or changed after an offender was issued with a warning or exclusion sanction. Descriptive statistics (expressed as frequencies and percentages) and inferential statistical tests (chi-squared tests, independent sample t-tests, and one way ANOVA tests) were used to examine variation in offender behaviour within the sample according to the seven variables of interest (offender sex and age, whether the offence was committed during day time or night time trading hours, and whether the offence concerned theft, alcohol related disorder, abuse or violence). Logistic regression was employed to determine whether these same variables can be used to predict the occurrence of further offending following receipt of the sanctions.

Findings

During the data collection period, 1303 individuals received warnings and 329 received exclusions (307 continuing to offend following the receipt of warning and 22 receiving an exclusion without prior warning). Of the offenders that received sanctions from the partnership, 781 (60%) were male and 519 (40%) female with their ages ranging from 10 years to 84 years (with a mean age of 30). There were 1362 sanctions issued for offences committed during the day time economy trading hours (6am – 6pm) and 290 sanctions issued for offences committed during the night time economy trading hours (6pm – 6am). Of these offences that were punished with sanction, 75 were alcohol offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of 'drunken and disorderly behaviour' or 'underage intoxication'), 116 were violent offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of 'Assault/Violence/Affray'), 219 were abuse offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of 'verbal abuse' or 'harassment/threatening behaviour'), and 1251 were theft offences (recorded by the partnership as incidents of 'theft' or 'attempted theft').

Q1: Do people desist from offending after they are issued with (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction?

With such widespread use of place-based banning sanctions, this question was included to generate insight into the extent to which such sanctions are adhered to following their receipt. Of the 1303 individuals who were issued with warnings, 996 (76%) committed no further offences after receiving this sanction. Table B illustrates how similar volumes and percentages of offenders who desisted or continued to offend following the receipt of the warning can be observed across the offender/offence variables. Chi-squared tests for independence indicated a significant association between sex and offending following a warning ($p<0.001$), with 11% more female offenders (83%) desisting following receipt of this sanction than male offenders (72%), and between abuse offences and offending following a warning ($P=0.041$), with the highest rate of continued offending post-warning sanction (30%) observed here. Chi-squared tests for independence indicated no significant associations between the remaining variables and continuing to offend following a warning. The highest rate of desistance following the receipt of the warning can be observed among those who committed a violent offence (81%). The percentages of offenders that continued to offend following a warning issued during the day time or night time trading hours, or for an alcohol or a theft offence were similar to the percentage of offenders that continued to offend post-warning within the sample as a whole (24%). Descriptive statistics show mean age in years is slightly lower for offenders that desist after a warning sanction (28.4) compared to those that ignore their warning and continue to offend (31.7). An independent samples t-test indicated a significant association between complying with a warning sanction and mean age ($t (1117, n=1119)=-3.481$, $p=0.001$).

Table B: Desistance from offending following warning sanction

Variable		Sample (*n*=1303)		Activity following warning		
		Sub-sample	% of total sample	Desist	Continue offending	p-value
Full sample		1303	100	996/76%	307/24%	
Age (mean years)		1119	86	28.4	31.7	0.001
Sex	Male	781	60	565/72%	216/28%	0.000
	Female	519	40	429/83%	90/17%	
Trading hours	Day time economy	1074	82	819/76%	255/24%	0.737
	Night time economy	229	18	177/77%	52/23%	
Alcohol offence	Yes	58	4	45/78%	13/22%	0.833
	No	1245	96	951/76%	294/24%	
Violent offence	Yes	97	7	79/81%	18/19%	0.227
	No	1206	93	917/76%	289/24%	
Abuse offence	Yes	164	13	115/70%	49/30%	0.041
	No	1139	87	881/77%	258/23%	
Theft offence	Yes	1011	78	778/77%	223/23%	0.415
	No	292	22	218/75%	74/25%	

Desistance rates following exclusion were lower than following the warning sanction. Of the 329 individuals who continued to offend after receipt of a warning or who were excluded without prior warning, 123 (37%) committed no further offences. Table C illustrates the volumes and percentages of offenders who desisted or continued to offend following the receipt of the exclusion across the offender/offence variables. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association between the trading hours during which the offence was committed and offending following an exclusion (p=0.035), with 14% more night time economy offenders (49%) desisting following receipt of this sanction than day time economy offenders (35%). Although chi-squared tests for independence indicated no significant associations between the remaining variables and continuing to offend following an exclusion, noteworthy variation occurred across the percentages of offenders in these sub-samples. The highest rates of desistence within the remaining variables can be observed among those who received an exclusion for a violent offence (58%) or an alcohol offence (47%). A higher percentage of female offenders (43%) desisted following their exclusion than male offenders (35%). The highest rates of continued offending post-exclusion sanction can be observed among those sanctioned for abuse offences (71%) and theft offences (64%). Descriptive statistics show mean age in years is slightly lower for offenders that desist after an exclusion sanction (30.7) compared to those that ignore their exclusion and continue to offend (32.2). However, an independent samples t-test

indicated no significant association between complying with a warning sanction and mean age (t (287, n=289)=-1.044, p=0.297).

Table C: Desistance from offending following exclusion sanction

Variable		Sample (*n*=329)		Activity following exclusion		
		Sub-sample	% of total sample	Desist	Continue offending	p-value
Full sample		329	100	123/37%	206/63%	
Age (mean years)		289	88	30.7	32.2	0.297
Sex	Male	233	71	82/35%	151/65%	0.177
	Female	95	29	41/43%	54/57%	
Trading hours	Day time economy	288	81	93/35%	175/65%	0.035
	Night time economy	61	19	30/49%	31/51%	
Alcohol offence	Yes	17	5	8/47%	9/53%	0.397
	No	312	95	115/37%	197/63%	
Violent offence	Yes	19	6	11/58%	8/42%	0.057
	No	310	94	112/36%	198/64%	
Abuse offence	Yes	55	17	16/29%	39/71%	0.164
	No	274	83	107/39%	167/61%	
Theft offence	Yes	240	73	87/36%	153/64%	0.484
	No	89	27	36/40%	53/60%	

Q2: What can be observed about the offending behaviour of those who continue to offend after receiving (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction in terms of offence type, location, and time committed?

Across the four year data collection period, there were 307 individuals who offended again after the receipt of a warning and 206 who offended again after the receipt of an exclusion. The importance of this research question is twofold; firstly, it is this group of offenders on which the sanctions were having little or no effect as a means of crime control, and, secondly, in line with other studies (Home Office, 2001, 2003, 2004), it was this small proportion of offenders in the sample who were responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of the total offences recorded by the partnership. Over the four-year period there were 4935 offences recorded by the BCRP committed by 2080 individuals at 115 locations. Although the mean number of offences committed by an offender was 2.4 (with the standard deviation at 5.4) the mode and median number of offences was one, illustrating the uneven distribution of offending across the offender group. The large majority of offenders (1553/2080, 75%) only committed one offence, but the highest number of offences committed by a single person was 70. A group of 34 individuals (2% of all offenders), each committing 20 or more offences, were responsible for 1254 (25%) of the total offences recorded by the partnership.

Analysis of the offences committed by those who continued to offend post-sanction provides valuable insight into offending activity. For each offender, comparisons were made between the offence which resulted in their sanction and their further offences in terms of the offence type (from the 34 offence categories), location (from the 115 businesses involved in the partnership), and whether the offence occurred during day time economy trading hours (6am-6pm) or night time economy trading hours (6pm-6am). For each individual offender, their post-sanction offending behaviour was coded according to whether the offence type, location, and time period stayed the same as it was for their sanction offence ('repeated only'), changed and was not repeated ('other only'), or was repeated in some instances but different in others ('repeated and other'). This analysis was conducted both for all those that continued to offend post-warning and post-exclusion and also within these two groups against the seven specific offender/offence variables (offender age and sex, the trading hours during which the offence was committed, and whether the incident was an alcohol, violent, abuse or theft offence). The results for post-warning offending behaviour are displayed at Table D and for post-exclusion offending behaviour at Table E.

Descriptive statistics show mean age in years for those that continued to offend after receiving a warning across the sub-samples ranged from 30.7 to 33.5, not varying hugely from the mean age for all offenders that ignore their warning and continue to offend (31.7). One way ANOVA tests confirmed that there was not a significant difference in mean offender age for post-warning offence type ($F(2, n=270)=0.434$, $p=0.648$), offence location ($F(2, n=270)=0.227$, $p=0.797$), or offence trading hours ($F(2, n=270)=0.693$, $p=0.501$). When considering all those that continued to offend post-warning, a majority both repeated their offence type and committed other types of offences (52%). This behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association ($p=0.019$) between sex and post-warning offence type, with 40% of female offenders only repeating the type of offence for which they

received a warning (compared to 24% for male offenders and 29% for the whole sample). Other chi-squared tests for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.001) between whether or not the offence concerned theft and post-warning offence type, with 33% of offending activity following theft offences only involving further theft ('repeated only', compared to 16% for non-theft offences and 29% for the sample as a whole), and between whether or not the offence concerned abuse and post-warning offence type, with just 16% of post-warning offending activity following abuse offences only involving further abuse offences.

For all who continued to offend post-warning, a large majority (70%) would commit further offences only at locations other than where they committed the offence that resulted in receiving a warning sanction. This volume of premise level displacement was present across all of the sub-samples. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.017) between whether or not the offence concerned theft and post-warning offence location, with 74% of offending activity following theft incidents being carried out at other locations (compared to 58% for non-theft offences and 70% for the sample as a whole).

A majority (60%) of all those who committed post-warning offences did so only within the trading time period during which their initial sanction offence was committed. Again, this behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.003) between the trading hour time period of the sanction offence and of the further offending. Of those who received warnings for offences committed during the day time economy trading hours, 62% continued to offend only during the same trading hours, with the equivalent finding for night time economy offending at 52%. Although both are majorities, this still means that 38% of those that received their warning for an offence committed during day time trading hours and 48% during night time trading hours went on to commit offences during the opposing trading period. Another chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association (p=0.01) between sex and post-warning offence

trading hour time period, with 71% of male offenders only committing post-warning offences during the trading hours in which their original offence was committed (compared to 55% for female offenders and 60% for the whole sample).

Table D: Post-warning offender behaviour

Variable		Sample (*n*=307)		Offence type				Offence location				Offence trading hours			
		Sub-sample	% of total sample	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value
Full sample		307	100	88/29%	60/20%	159/52%		37/12%	215/70%	55/18%		184/60%	24/8%	99/32%	
Age (mean years)		270	88	32.0	32.8	31.1	0.648	32.4	31.8	30.7	0.797	31.0	33.5	32.6	0.501
Sex	Male	216	71	52/24%	46/21%	118/55%	0.019	27/13%	144/67%	45/21%	0.081	119/55%	22/10%	75/35%	0.01
	Female	90	29	36/40%	14/16%	40/44%		9/10%	71/79%	10/11%		64/71%	2/2%	24/27%	
Trading hours	Day time economy	255	83	79/31%	45/18%	131/51%	0.06	27/11%	185/73%	43/17%	0.083	157/62%	14/6%	84/33%	0.003
	Night time economy	52	17	9/17%	15/29%	28/54%		10/19%	30/58%	12/23%		27/52%	10/19%	15/29%	
Alcohol offence	Yes	13	4	2/15%	4/31%	7/54%	0.423	1/8%	9/69%	3/23%	0.812	11/85%	0	2/15%	0.162
	No	294	96	86/29%	56/19%	152/52%		36/12%	2016/70%	52/18%		173/59%	24/8%	97/33%	
Violent offence	Yes	18	6	5/29%	5/29%	8/44%	0.648	2/11%	13/72%	3/17%	0.978	13/72%	1/6%	4/22%	0.548
	No	289	94	83/29%	55/19%	151/52%		35/12%	202/70%	52/18%		171/59%	23/8%	95/33%	
Abuse offence	Yes	49	16	8/16%	5/10%	36/74%	0.004	7/14%	28/57%	14/29%	0.070	27/55%	4/8%	18/37%	0.741
	No	258	84	80/31%	55/21%	123/48%		30/12%	187/73%	41/16%		157/61%	20/8%	81/31%	
Theft offence	Yes	233	76	76/33%	36/16%	121/52%	0.001	22/9%	172/74%	39/17%	0.017	139/60%	17/7%	77/33%	0.763
	No	74	24	12/16%	24/32%	38/51%		15/20%	43/58%	16/22%		45/61%	7/10%	22/30%	

Descriptive statistics show that mean age in years for those that continued to offend post-exclusion across the sub-samples ranged from 28.0 to 35.6, showing some variation from the mean age for all offenders that ignored their exclusion and continued to offend (32.2). However, one way ANOVA tests confirmed there was not a significant difference in mean offender age for post-exclusion offence type ($F(2, n=176)=0.904$, $p=0.407$), offence location ($F(2, n=176)=0.978$, $p=0.378$), or offence trading hours ($F(2, n=176)=0.206$, $p=0.806$). When considering all those who continued to offend following receipt of an exclusion, a majority both repeated their offence type and committed other types of offences (77%). This behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples, although chi-squared tests for independence indicated that there were not significant associations between the variables.

A majority (66%) of those that continued to offend following an exclusion would commit further offences only at locations other than where they committed the offence that resulted in receiving a sanction. This behaviour was observed across all the sub-samples with the exception of alcohol offending. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association ($p=0.012$) between whether or not the offence concerned theft and post-exclusion offence location, with 71% of those that were excluded for committing theft carrying out further offending only at other locations (compared to 51% for non-theft offending and 66% for all post-exclusion offending).

A majority (53%) of those that continued to offend following an exclusion committed further offences within both trading time periods. Again, this behaviour was observed across all of the sub-samples, with the exception of alcohol offending. A chi-squared test for independence indicated a significant association ($p<0.001$) between the trading hour time period of the exclusion sanction offence and of the further offending. This is noteworthy as it means that 54% of those that received their exclusion for an offence committed during day time trading hours

and 81% during night time trading hours went on to commit offences during the opposing trading time period.

Table E: Post-exclusion offender behaviour

Variable		Sample (n=206)		Offence type				Offence location				Offence trading hours			
		Sub-sample	% of total sample	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value	Repeated only	Other only	Repeated and other	p-value
Full sample		206	100	25/12%	23/11%	158/77%		7/3%	136/66%	63/31%		85/41%	11/5%	110/53%	
Age (mean years)		176	85	31.5	35.6	31.7	0.407	28.0	33.0	30.9	0.378	31.6	33.8	32.5	0.806
Sex	Male	151	74	17/11%	19/13%	115/76%	0.503	6/4%	94/62%	51/34%	0.07	58/38%	10/7%	83/55%	0.248
	Female	54	26	8/15%	4/7%	42/78%		0	42/78%	12/22%		26/28%	1/2%	27/50%	
Trading hours	Day time economy	175	85	23/13%	18/10%	134/77%	0.411	6/3%	120/69%	49/28%	0.158	79/45%	4/2%	92/53%	0.000
	Night time economy	31	15	2/7%	5/16%	24/77%		1/3%	16/52%	14/45%		6/19%	7/23%	18/58%	
Alcohol offence	Yes	9	4	0	1/11%	8/89%	0.516	1/11%	4/44%	4/44%	0.234	7/78%	0	2/22%	0.072
	No	197	96	25/13%	22/11%	150/76%		6/3%	132/67%	59/30%		78/40%	11/6%	108/55%	
Violent offence	Yes	8	4	0	2/25%	6/75%	0.295	0	5/63%	3/38%	0.807	4/50%	0	4/50%	0.735
	No	198	96	25/13%	21/11%	152/77%		7/4%	131/66%	60/30%		81/41%	11/6%	106/54%	
Abuse offence	Yes	40	19	1/3%	3/8%	36/90%	0.063	2/5%	21/53%	17/43%	0.132	17/43%	2/5%	21/53%	0.982
	No	166	81	24/15%	20/12%	122/74%		5/3%	115/69%	46/28%		68/41%	9/5%	89/54%	
Theft offence	Yes	153	74	21/14%	13/9%	119/78%	0.077	3/2%	109/71%	41/27%	0.012	63/41%	8/5%	82/54%	0.990
	No	53	26	4/8%	10/19%	39/74%		4/8%	27/51%	22/42%		22/42%	3/6%	28/53%	

Q3: Can offender/offence information recorded by the partnership be used to predict the occurrence of further offending following the receipt of (i) the warning or (ii) the exclusion sanction?.

This question was included due to the benefits for partnerships that could arise from being able to identify individuals who were more likely to ignore sanctions, and from knowing when additional information sharing or protection measures might be valuable for members. Logistic regression was used to examine whether data could be used to predict offenders continuing to offend or not (dependent variable) following the receipt of the warning (test one) or the exclusion (test two). The predictor variables considered here were offender sex (coded as 0=male, 1=female) and age, whether the offence took place during the day time (coded as '0') or night time economy (coded as '1') trading hours, and whether the offence concerned alcohol, violence, abuse or theft (in each instance coded as 0=no, 1=yes). For test one, concerning post-warning behaviour, the full model was statistically significant, x^2 (7, N=1303) = 36.168, p<0.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between people that did and did not continue to offend following the warning sanction. There was great variability in the behaviour of the offenders, however, and the Cox & Snell R Square (0.032) and Nagelkerke R Square (0.048) values indicated that less than 3% of the variability in the data is explained by this set of variables. Despite this, the model still correctly classified 75.8% of cases in the data. Sex (p<0.001) and Age (p<0.001) were found to be significant variables in the prediction of further offending. The B value of -0.668 indicates an increased likelihood of male offenders continuing to offend following their warning sanction. The Exp(B) value of 1.019 indicates an increase in the likelihood of desistance as the offender's age increases. The trading hours during which the offence was committed, and whether the offence concerned alcohol, violence, abuse or theft all did not appear to be significant predictors of whether an offender would continue to offend following the receipt of a warning sanction. These findings are illustrated in Table F.

Table F: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of further offender following warning sanction

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Sex	-.668	.157	18.177	1	.000	.513	.377	.697
Age	.019	.005	13.292	1	.000	1.019	1.009	1.029
Trading hours	0.24	.272	.008	1	.929	1.024	.601	1.747
Alcohol offence	-.119	.376	.100	1	.752	.888	.425	1.854
Violent offence	-.276	.324	.724	1	.395	.759	.402	1.433
Abuse offence	.461	.255	3.268	1	.071	1.585	.962	2.612
Theft offence	.103	.282	.133	1	.715	1.108	.637	1.928

For test two, concerning post-exclusion behaviour, the full model was not statistically significant, x^2 (7, N=329) = 12.981, p=0.073, indicating that the model was not able to distinguish between people that did and did not continue to offend following receipt of the exclusion sanction.

Discussion and conclusion

The findings presented here suggest that this place-based sanction system can be a useful tool for tackling specific types of crime and disorder. The analysis offers valuable insight into the behaviour of offenders following the receipt of these sanctions, an area where there is currently little available evidence (Farmer et al., 2018; Søgaard, 2018). With 76% of offenders committing no further offences following the receipt of the warning sanction, this aspect of the approach can be recognised as successful. This finding lends itself to arguments concerning deterrence theory, that it is the perceived likelihood of being caught in future, in this instance heightened through the information sharing process that follows the issue of a warning sanction, that is the most significant deterrent from committing a crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Apel, 2013). However, it is also conceivable that individuals in this group could have been less likely to offend again for other reasons and that the sanction itself was not an influencing factor within their decision to desist.

The effectiveness of the place-based exclusion was not as extensive in this instance as the widespread use of this approach might suggest. For those that continued to offend post-exclusion in particular, the deterring effect of the sanction, its support at point of issue from the

police and its collective enforcement appeared to have somewhat limited effects on their offending activity. Roughly half (49%) of those that received an exclusion for an offence committed during the night time economy trading hours, an alcohol offence (47%) or a violent offence (58%) committed no further offences, as opposed to 37% for the sample as a whole (37%),

There was noteworthy variation in offender behaviour according to sex and age. Following receipt of the warning sanction, 83% of females committed no further offences compared to 72% of males, echoing findings in Graham and Bowling (1995) and Flood-Page et al. (2000) and supporting their arguments concerning the variation in processes leading to desistance for males and females. Although the mean ages for those that desisted from offending post-sanction were lower than for those that continued to offend post-sanction by 3.3 years following the warning and 1.5 years following the exclusion, in line with arguments in Laub and Sampson (2001) and Warr (2006), logistic regression revealed that rates of desistance appeared to increase with age across the sample as a whole, also echoing claims that shoplifting is more prevalent among adolescent populations (Hayes and Blackwood 2006; Hunter et al. 2018).

The findings offer unique insight into the displacement of offending and into the behaviour of those that continue to offend post-sanction. A large majority (70% following warning and 66% following exclusion) would commit further offences only at locations other than where they committed the offence that resulted in them receiving a warning sanction. Higher levels of such behaviour were observed among those that received a sanction for theft (74% post warning and 71% post-exclusion). Although the sanction system may well be hardening the target of the premises where the sanction was issued (in line with Tilley, 2002), this level of displacement between member premises is a noteworthy limitation of the approach and highlights the likely fact that making offenders aware of which businesses are involved in the partnership and making this visible to offenders at premise entry points does not appear to be deterring certain

individuals. A majority of those that continued to offend post-sanction would both continue to commit the type of offence for which they received their sanction and commit other types of offences (52% post-warning and 77% post-exclusion). It was rarer for a continuing offender to only commit one type of offence, and those who committed larger numbers of offences showed the greatest variation in offence type and time of day of their offending. Because of this variation, it was not possible to identify predictor variables through logistic regression for those that commit the greatest volume of offences.

These findings have specific implications for crime reduction partnerships employing a place-based exclusion sanction system. The high level of displacement observed here supports the calls made elsewhere for effective information sharing between those involved in a partnership (Bamfield 2018; Gill 2018). Members are unlikely to be aware of the risks posed by individual offenders (and to subsequently take measures to protect themselves) without data sharing platforms and procedures in place granting them timely access to this information. Moreover, for business communities to understand fully the offending behaviour of individual offenders and the great diversity in offence type and time of day at which they offend, BCRPs need to collect information on multiple types of offences and bring together business that operate during the day time and night time economy trading periods to share their collective knowledge and experience. In line with arguments in Stafford and Hobson (2018), the findings presented in this article highlight the value of broad, multi-sector BCRPs that include businesses from every commercial sector and that trade during any time period, and that seek to tackle and share information on all types of crime and disorder to which their members can be exposed. However, even when employing this approach, the BCRP examined here is still experiencing limited success in some regards. Considering this issue through the lens of Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), it is clear that there is wide variation in individual offender assessment of effort, risk and reward. The exclusion sanction employed here is a significant

deterrent for most, but it is given little or no heed by others. Prolific offenders that ignore their sanctions and continue to offend are causing this partnership and its members significant problems. The logistic regression analysis included in this paper illustrates how the chaotic and varied offending of this group makes accurate predictions about their behaviour difficult to arrive at (using this data, at least). Moreover, this variation means that partnerships may struggle to identify tailored, factor-specific strategies for tackling such offending.

This study has been affected by several factors that remain problematic for researchers in this field. As with all information on crime, the partnership's data only contains the offences that it recorded. Other offences will have occurred that were not reported or that were not recorded by the BCRP's manager following a judgement on their severity or suitability. There is also no available information on offences that occur at non-BCRP member locations within the partnership's area of concern, or at other nearby locations. As a result, this study has been unable to offer insight into offending displacement beyond the BCRP member locations, or into whether those who had no further offences recorded against them following receipt of a sanction desisted from all further offending or simply desisted from offending against those involved in the BCRP.

Other limitations arise from the approach employed here and the data that was used. The decision to focus on the more prevalent crime types, and on the crime types to which place-based exclusion sanctions have been used most commonly in response to, may have resulted in factors associated with other crime types being overlooked. There were also a number of offenders who were never issued with a sanction as their identify was unknown, meaning that their behaviour post-sanction could not always be observed. Another limitation of this study is that it draws solely upon the data collected by one partnership in one area and therefore cannot be regarded as representative of other locations or place-based banning sanctions. Finally, the predictive potential of the regression analysis conducted in response to the third research

question was somewhat limited. Further data on offender behaviour post-sanction is required for significant predictions to be made concerning this.

Although noteworthy, these limitations do not negate the value of this study's contribution to the literature. The insight into the design, operation, benefits and limitations of the warning and exclusion system used by this BCRP and into the behaviour of individuals post-sanction presented here will be of interest to those involved in crime reduction partnerships and in other collectives or organisations that employ similar mechanisms, as well as to researchers examining these issues. The activity and operation of such partnerships and the offending that they are subject to remain relatively under-researched topics, however, and there is great need for further study of the various crime reduction practices employed in this domain to ensure that partnerships can draw upon research evidence when conducting their activity.

Acknowledgements

The Author thanks Gloucester City Safe for facilitating access to the data, and J.R. Stafford for assistance preparing the data for analysis.

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