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ABSTRACT

During the 1970s and 1980s New Zealand was the site of an array of social and political struggles over issues centred on colonisation, gender politics, economic and social policies, international relations and state power. The single biggest protest movement centred on the question of sporting contact with South Africa and found full force during the 1981 Springbok rugby tour. This paper considers the range of protest movements and campaigns during this period and examines the reasons behind the priority given to the campaign against apartheid sport. In doing so it will examine the significance of rugby in New Zealand and its relations with South Africa, and show how 1981 provided a focal point for a wider set of social frustrations associated with broader social and political change.

Ten years on I can’t be sure about who won the tour war or even quite what was at stake.... That final violence seemed an unavoidable, sought, even just conclusion for both protesters and police. The 1981 demonstrations became a major blowout of idealistic concern, after which liberals were passé and the Kiwi and South African worlds so changed that all the pain and passion were rendered largely irrelevant. 2

The scale and intensity of the discontented winter’s campaign against the 1981 Springbok tour, the extent of respectable New Zealand’s involvement in mass direct political action, and their confrontation with state power in a material and personal sense has overshadowed the politics of the 1970s and early 1980s to become seen as unique - even if, like Tony Reid, there no is longer any certainty about the reasons for and effects of that confrontation. It is almost as if, in popular memory, the tour has become a singular event through which New Zealand, as a nation, had to go to reach maturity, or is an unrealised promise of a new world. This summer of maturity, in which the sun of York is an amnesic popular memory, has buried the tensions of the era and the resulting widespread social protest in the ocean-deep bosom of nostalgia. These nostalgias, one a liberal-Left nostalgia yearning for a more just world, the other a conservative nostalgia seeing the attainment of national maturity, operate by denying the political context of the anti-tour campaign and the significance of the historical frame of the 1950s and the post 1984 era.

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented to ‘The End of Sports History?’, the 1999 Conference of the Australian Society for Sport History, Queenstown, New Zealand, 1-5 February, 1999.
This sense of quantum leap associated with the trials and tribulations of the campaign against apartheid exposes the amnesia of popular memory that forgets, or is encouraged to forget, each generation’s action to constrain state power - be it on the waterfront in 1890, the mines, railways and wharves in 1912 and 1913, the dole queue in 1932, or the waterfront again in 1951. It also ignores the tensions of the 1970s and 1980s, and the widespread social protest they provoked. The New Right ravages of the Fourth Labour Government have overshadowed all but the near civil war of 1981. A key element of this ‘overshadowing’ is that the power of the consensus around the New Right drive begun under the Fourth Labour Government and continued through more recent National Party and Coalition governments has embedded the notion that there is no alternative - opposition to the framework seems either futile or utopian, or both. The intensity and relentlessness of the New Right drive and the associated sense of powerlessness is accompanied by a sense of betrayal by Labour held by many in the oppositional movements who believed they shared a vision of liberal egalitarianism or social democracy with the Labour Party.\(^3\) Embodied in this imaginary shared vision, was a reliance on the state to act as an agent of the transformation sought by dissident politics.\(^4\) There is a nostalgia on the liberal-left about the period before 1984 when it is held that there was a vision of something different, when oppositional forces had not been incorporated into state structures, or crushed by the less fettered power of the consensus of the powerful.

Only the campaign against apartheid sport has risen above the blandness of pre-1984 politics to stand out. The anti-apartheid activity of 1981 was the zenith of a sixty year era of discontent at sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa. The discontent between 1921 and the mid 1960s was largely expressed as a sense that the New Zealand Rugby Football Union was effectively importing apartheid by agreeing not to select Maori players for tours to South Africa. In 1960 the anti-tour movement’s central slogan was ‘No Maoris (sic) No Tour’. Starting in 1949 voices began to be raised against the practice of apartheid in South Africa. By the time the All Blacks toured South Africa in 1970 with three Maori and one Samoan player in the team the campaign was organised around the demand for the total sporting isolation of apartheid. Despite these sixty years of opposition, little had prepared New Zealand for the intensity and extent of protest in 1981. The tour had came to represent all that was wrong with the country: the arrogance of the political leadership, the pattern and effects of colonial

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dispossession, the maintenance of patriarchal power. Most of all, opponents saw the tour as representing an elite that seemed to be endorsing apartheid as legitimate.

The opposition campaign was potent because of rugby’s metonymical role in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Critical analyses of New Zealand rugby have held it to embody the nation as a Pakeha masculine entity. These analyses have focused on rugby as the sport as a site of national celebration and valorization, the continuation of a masculinist frontier ethos, or the outcome of a particular pattern of colonization. Regimes of cultural power in Aotearoa/New Zealand are fully imbricated with rugby union. Rugby is seen as significant, if not instrumental, in building the nation. The character and ability claimed as the arbiters of national membership are tested only in competition with other nations: usually in sport or in war. In one view of New Zealand history the young colony proved its mettle against the home countries during the 1905 All Black tour of Britain, and gained maturity on the battlefield at Gallipoli in 1915. Sport is a worthy substitute for war and a precursor for the national worthiness the war proves, whilst also preparing young men for combat. In the years before 1987 and the launching of the the Rugby World Cup began, and international series between New Zealand and South Africa was held by many to be the world championship of rugby. In both New Zealand and South Africa, rugby union was the game of the dominant group and was seen to encapsulate the characterisitics and traits of nationhood.

This view of a national past connects with a yearning for the pre-1984 conditions to build a more specific nostalgia that sees the events of the tour as necessary. It is this sense of the necessary that is linked to the tour-as-maturation analysis. This sense that the tour was necessary for national maturation was clearly revealed during the 1994 Springbok tour. In 1981 the Springboks had a special relationship with the Waikato provincial rugby team. Having lost the first game to Waikato in 1956, the South Africans saw the game in 1981 as the chance for revenge. It was as if the Springbok victory over Waikato in 1965 had been forgotten. That desire remained unfulfilled as an occupation of the rugby field by protesters lead to the game being cancelled. The first big match of the tour had been prevented and the resulting turmoil exposed a schism in attitudes to rugby and nation. Writing in 1994 of the 1981 cancellation, a week before the Springboks were due to play Waikato for the first time in 29 years, Gilbert Wong noted that “Godzone was redefined that day.” Wong’s sense of fundamental change is explicitly linked to the maturation argument by suggesting that this event created the conditions for what Hamilton City Councillor Margaret Evans called “a

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tremendous growing up with the dawning recognition of the renaissance of the tangata whenua [people of the land, Maori] and the acceptance that we have many issues of our own to talk through.” Other commentators and participants are not so specific about the cancellation of the Waikato game as Wong and Evans preferring to see a wider and more complex series of changes running through and resulting from the events of the tour. For some, the effects of the tour are conservative. Former Police officer and National Party Member of Parliament Ross Meurant argues that the tour “was probably a force for good. The turmoil was the price we had to pay at the time for the preservation of democracy as New Zealand knows it.” Journalist Tony Reid suggested this complexity when he argued that “the sheer scale of the Springbok tour disruption permanently altered psychological and tactical relationships between the state, the rugby world, the wider citizenry and the police.” The key and problematic word in this assessment is ‘permanently’ in that Reid undermines the amnesia of the popular by immediately stating that the 1981 tour was, in this sense, similar to the effects of the 1951 Waterfront Lockout. The widespread view is that these changes are caused by or result from the tour, and seem to link to a quest for an origin or a spark. A more historically informed assessment of the era would expose the tour as a concentration of the conditions that promoted this series of changes, but would not and could not use the tour as the explanation.

Although the quest for origins is not in and of itself nostalgic, there is a sense of glorying attached to the events of the winter of ‘81. Meurant, considering his time as senior member of the Red Group, a special unit travelling with the Springbok party, has described the tour as “halcyon days” pointing to the sense of “togetherness” and “team spirit” within the unit. It is worth noting, however, that not all share this glorying and some are contemptuous of it. From the other side of the gap between police and protester, Wellington Marshalls’ Committee convenor Alick Shaw resisted the tendency to reminisce noting that “the nostalgia of the returned protester is even more tedious than that of the returned soldier, and with rather less justification”. Shaw reflected more openly a tendency running through comments by many in the protest leadership during this ten years after recap. There is a sense that the scale and intensity was something that developed unwillingly, that the times were difficult and that there were so many other things that could have been done during that time. Central to this is a rejection of the sense that these were the good old days, the ‘wasn’t it great’ element of the

7 Wong ‘Boots, Batons, Fists’
8 Alastair Morrison ‘The Moment Meurant Regrets’ The Dominion 18 July 1991, p 11
9 Reid ‘The Days of Rage’ p 28
10 Morrison ‘The Moment Meurant Regrets”
nostalgia of the returned protester Shaw implies.

Although every twenty to thirty years Pakeha New Zealand has taken action against excessively exercised state or class power, the events of 1981 are a break from earlier patterns of political struggle and resistance. There are four distinguishing characteristics:

- the events follow a longer period of activism than had previously been the case;
- the campaign was not run by trade unions focusing explicitly on working people’s concerns;
- women were actively involved in organising and leading anti-tour action, not in the ‘ladies auxiliary’, while raising and gaining support for feminist concerns in a broader political movement; and
- the campaign saw the active involvement of Maori at all levels and a growing focus on colonial relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Interpretation of the nostalgic view and perception of maturity is aided by a consideration of Europe in 1989. Events during this year saw a growing debate and awareness about the meaning and significance of history.

Building on these European events, in 1992 Francis Fukuyama published his celebration of capitalism, ‘The End of History and the Last Man’. Fukuyama argues that collapse of the Soviet Union represented the defeat of socialism and the victory of capitalist power. It was the end of a 200 year struggle and an absolute victory for capitalism. As the ‘defeat of communism’ allowed liberal capitalism to be constructed as the only viable model for social and economic organisation, History ended. Fukuyama recently has argued that the collapse of communism proves the fundamental error of the left - the assumption that equality is both a desirable objective and proof of historical progress. His argument now is that inequality is the motor of progress because it both drives the capitalist economy and is ‘right’.

Fukuyama’s declaration of the End of History now seems as premature as the often proclaimed End of Ideology. The ongoing crisis of finance capital and effects of the falling rate of profit, beginning with the collapse of Asian economies in 1997, is the most recent of many events suggesting that capitalism has not been as victorious as Fukuyama and his ilk would hope. History is still alive.

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It is not just the present crisis of capitalism and the continuation of a class struggle that undermines Fukuyama’s position. The past itself suggests that he is merely one of many to argue that we have entered a post-historical era. Neithammer’s review of declarations of post-history shows that there is a more widespread disenchantment with nineteenth century, or even post-Enlightenment, philosophies of history that lies behind assertions of the end of history by writers as diverse as Junger, Heidegger and Baudrillard (the English translation of the original 1989 book was published the same year as Fukuyama’s).\textsuperscript{15} At the heart of this recurrent proclamation lies not the end of history, but the apparent collapse of a particular historical project. He calls for an engagement with the “legacy of bourgeois individualism [that dispenses] with its ideal of greatness and power” to find a space for action within and against its structures.\textsuperscript{16} In the wake of the campaign against the 1981 Springbok tour, this space was squeezed to near disappearance by the inability of increasingly demobilised social and political campaign groups to resist the ethos of ‘bourgeois (sovereign) individualism’ at the core of the New Right political project.

At the same time as Fukuyama’s book appeared, a new understanding of the events of Eastern Europe was developing. In this framework, the reassertion of the independence of nations in the former Soviet bloc was being understood as the ‘Rebirth of History’ as each of the states that (re)emerged ‘rediscovered’ its national past.\textsuperscript{17} The period from 1945-1989 was seen as a period without history, 1989 therefore represented the rebirth of history. This development had a number of disturbing corollaries as anything to do with the Soviet era was rejected as nationality and nationalism were reasserted, including the rampant national-chauvinism seen most horrifically in the former Yugoslavia, and significant setbacks for women’s social and citizenship advances of the Soviet era.\textsuperscript{18} In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the nostalgic view of the events of 1981 that Shaw regrets, when considered in the context of the 1970s and early 1980s, suggests an unfulfilled Rebirth of History in the yearning for a reinvention and recreation of struggle. The complexity of this view of 1981 lies in its interface with the maturation argument that suggests that there will no longer be a need for struggle: there is, in this sense, a concurrent rebirth and end of history.

After a long period of apparent economic growth and social inclusion, Aotearoa/New Zealand

\textsuperscript{16} Neithammer 	extit{Posthistoire} p 149
\textsuperscript{17} see Misha Glenny \textit{The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy} London, Penguin 1993
became aware in the late 1960s of diversity and difference as women began to demand recognition of and further inclusion in non-reproductive life, and as Pakeha New Zealand came to confront a Maori presence that was real and was now. It seemed as if nothing had happened since World War Two except the 1951 Waterfront Lockout, the 1954 Royal Tour and three South African rugby tours. The strength of the consensus around this perception meant that even many of those at the heart of the dissident lives of the 1950s see it as a bleak and grey time, as a changeless and ahistorical time. This perception and the reality were quite different. The period was characterised by continuing population shifts from South to North and from country to city, the later especially so for Maori. At the same time, there was an ongoing peace movement, moral panics associated with the invention of the teenager, a vigorous equal pay campaign and growing opposition to sporting contact with South Africa.

Tensions and dissent began to manifest themselves more openly late in the 1960s, following a pattern similar to that seen in much of the rest of the capitalist world - opposition to the war in Vietnam and a broad anti-imperialism. As with much of the rest of the international experience, this dissent was remarkably non-reflexive failing to recognise the specificity of local colonial conditions and the politics of class and gender. The dissident campaigns of the long 1970s began with anti-war protest in the late 1960s (which itself built on the peace movement and anti-apartheid campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s) and was maintained until the campaign in support of homosexual law reform in 1984-85. Manifest in this period was a fundamental shift from affinity to identity politics. These tensions and dynamics began to be played out during the 1970s, but the gap in relation to colonialism remained significant as seen in the responses to Awatere’s essays on Maori sovereignty in 1982 and 1983. The campaign against apartheid sport brought these concerns to the fore.

19 see, for example, Anna Hoffman Tales of Hoffman - Part One Wellington, A Bumper Book. 1998.
This anti-apartheid movement, the most intense of those dissident campaigns, reached its zenith in 1981 when countless people took to the streets to oppose sporting contact with South Africa. As expected, protest activity took place in the major centres - but the stories abound of the dozen or so people who marched in Eltham on July 3, or the ten in Kaikohe on May 1. Before the tour began, the anti-tour movement tapped the 51% opposition to the tour, according to an early July Heylen public opinion poll. There was enormous confidence and genuine belief within the anti-tour movement that the tour would be stopped, if the movement remained disciplined and focused on the objective. Hamilton anti-apartheid activist Mike Law spoke for many at the May 1981 HART, the New Zealand Anti-Apartheid Movement, National Council meeting - “I’m convinced we’re going to win this one, provided we don’t drop the ball in next few months”.

This confidence lasted until the police attack on protesters in Wellington’s Molesworth St on July 29th. This brought the realisation that the tour would not be stopped, but it could be disrupted, police resources would be stretched to breaking point and no tour would ever happen again. Molesworth Street was a sign of changing police tactics. By August 1 in the provincial centre of Palmerston North, the army had joined the police in ensuring no rugby grounds were invaded again.

There was a widespread feeling that the campaign against the tour was part of something bigger. There had been a series of major anti-government campaigns over the previous five years, Muldoon's National Party government was increasingly unpopular and looked certain to loose the 1981 election - despite the year long electoral campaign involving a royal tour and the visit of the Springboks. Even staunch and long term National Party supporters were turning against Muldoon and his ‘style’, which many found objectionable in contrast to the recollected image of former Party leaders Keith Holyoake and John ('Gentleman' Jack) Marshall. Significantly, the breadth of opposition gave rise to a widespread feeling that change was possible: campaigns against apartheid and for improved reproductive rights for women, increasing awareness of Maori colonial dispossession, and demands for improved social services were all premised on a notion of improved equality and precisely and explicitly reject the argument the inequality is the key to progress.

Despite this sense of progress through a quest for egalitarianism, deficiencies remained in the broader progressive movement. Alongside the colonial and gender based gaps within the various dissident trends of the 1970s was its increasing isolation from the trade union movement. This isolation from trade unions can be seen as part explanation for the longevity

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24 Chapple 1981 p 43
of this period of political struggle. Distinction between these socio-political struggles and the trade union movement meant that the various campaigns, during the period the Labour was in opposition, generally avoided the constraints of ‘Labourism’ and electoralism. At the same time, though, there was a general failure to develop a class analysis of events and to involve working class organisations or people. This was to prove fatal to these campaigns once Labour came to power.

By 1981, although the leadership of the trade union movement called for opposition to the tour, workers’ support for this position remained weak. The exception to this is in the Wellington where a strong activist union membership had been active in broader social movements for several years. During 1981 a number of factory committees against the tour were formed, mainly in Wellington’s Hutt Valley. A number of those involved in these committees went on to become leading anti-tour activists.25 The other key exception, although less obvious that Wellington, was in Auckland where an organized leftist union leadership was able to build some working class support of the anti-tour campaign, and the Trade Union Centre was the headquarters for the anti-tour coalition. A more general trade union response was seen in late February 1981 when the National Union of Railwaymen had announced its opposition to the tour and stated that its members would not provide any support for the touring party. Within three weeks NUR branches in Tauranga, Gisborne, Ashburton, Stratford, Lower Hutt, Hawera, New Plymouth, Timaru and Christchurch had either dissociated themselves from the national position or opposed it.26 The NUR was not alone in its isolation from the anti-tour movement: the 9000 members of the Canterbury Branch of the Engineers Union, the largest affiliate of the Federation of Labour, opposed any moves to ‘interfere’ with the tour.27 They were joined in this position by the Auckland branch of the Allied Liquor Trade Workers’ Union which rejected the FoL stance.28 While the Engineers’ Union was one of the most conservative unions, the NUR had a tradition of strong action on a broad range of issues, as did the Drivers’ Union. Yet even within this more militant group there was considerable support for the tour. After a strong anti-tour vote in 1980, a similar resolution in 1981 saw considerable debate within the Wellington Branch and a much closer vote. Branch Secretary Jackson Smith described the supporters of the tour as “quite a hefty number” although the resolution attracted a clear majority.29

27 Auckland Star 24 February 1981.
28 New Zealand Truth 14 April, 1981.
29 Auckland Star 14 April 1981.
This division exposed two tendencies within the trade union movement. The first was the trade union abandonment of mass action and the politics of class struggle. In the second, the resulting concentration on legislatively constrained industrial instruments meant that there was a basic failure to confront broader cultural issues or cultural politics. As a result, other than in Wellington and to a lesser degree Auckland, anti-tour debates within the trade union movement were played out in terms largely defined by a wider polity and encapsulated a non-class-specific position on the tour. The outcome was a trade union movement isolated from the anti-apartheid movement and a weakened anti-tour campaign.

The campaign against the tour, however, saw the assertion of a public political persona and attempt to build links with other sectors by both Maori and a range of feminist tendencies within the dissident networks. This gave broader life to the movement and demanded a focus on more general social dynamics interacting with the rugby-apartheid nexus at the core of the 1981 campaign.

The women's movement in New Zealand followed a trajectory very similar to those in other first world countries. Early work centred on identifying the nature of women's liberation as opposed to women's rights with major campaigning around the question of equal pay.30 As the 1970s saw a rapid emergence of new groups, there was also a clear diversification within the movement with interest groups forming, Maori and lesbians organising separately, and significant differences developing. The predominant themes running through the women's movement's activities by the late 1970s were sexuality, reproductive rights and violence against women.

Maori women and lesbians criticised elements of the movement in ways heard in other first world nations. Women's liberation was seen to be colour blind assuming that Maori and Pakeha women shared common interests that were more significant than the differences between them. Discontent among Maori and Pacific Island women's groups grew and in 1979 they attacked to United Women's Convention as the 'White Women's Convention' before moving to organise the National Black Women's Hui in 1980.31 In addition, there was a clearly identifiable lesbian community within the movement by around 1980.32 By the beginning of the 1980s, these differences were becoming too difficult for the movement to manage. The 1979 United Women's Convention proved to be a test for unity that the movement failed: no-

31 Dann *Up From Under* pp 23, 33-39. A hui is a meeting, gathering or assembly.
32 ibid p 31-33
one offered to organise another.

Other differences were beginning to become clear at this time. While the liberationist tendency split over the question of censorship in anti-pornography politics, the reformist tendency with its women’s rights orientation divided over its tactical options.33 A femocratic tendency has been, at first appearance, highly successful with women in senior positions in government and the bureaucracy, and a range of other consequences. It is this element of the women’s movement that strikes so many visitors, along with a discourse where official New Zealand English seems to have lost much of the gender specific terminology prevalent elsewhere.

A significant factor in this seeming naturalisation of liberal/reformist feminism was the willingness of many New Zealanders during the 1980s to consider and accept elements of the critique of hegemonic nationality and masculinity to emerge during and as a result of the scrutiny of rugby in 1981.34 As a result, there has been a significant shift in national imagining and a resulting acceptance or tolerance of non-hegemonic forms. The assertion of feminist anti-rugby politics during 1981 raised issues outside the question of apartheid that anti-tour organisers had not considered in any great detail.35 While the extent of support for and the impact of groups such as Women Against Rugby is hard to assess in 1981, by the time of the proposed 1985 tour to South Africa, WAR had organised in Wellington.36 Whether a significant number of women actually withdrew their domestic support for rugby is much harder to assess, however there is anecdotal evidence from provincial and rural areas of a clear gender split in attitudes to both rugby and sporting contact with South Africa. WAR was seen by many active in the anti-apartheid movement as a significant move towards more explicit sectoral organisation within the movement and as a means to broaden its appeal.37 The nostalgic reimagining of nation and masculinity of the 1990s, however, suggests that this acceptance of diversity manifest during the mid to late 1980s is being reconsidered as does the manufacture of a new, hegemonic, biculturalism.38


36 Unity 8(5), 7 May 1985. p 1

37 Unity 8(5), 7 May 1985. p 7

Maori have played a crucial role in the depiction of New Zealand identity, New Zealand was held to have the best race relations in the world, and among Pakeha the notion of one nation held strong. The reality is more that Pakeha and Maori lived apart with a clear rural/urban divide where contact between Maori and Pakeha communities was almost non-existent. The answer to Sinclair’s 1971 question about why New Zealand’s race relations were ‘better than’ elsewhere is simply that they appeared so good because Maori and Pakeha stayed apart. The move by Maori to the cities during the 1950s and 1960s changed the situation as contact between Maori and Pakeha increased, and as Maori became more isolated from their quotidian association with hapu and other traditional structures. Maori politics changed, becoming less polite than had been the case.

The Maori Organisation on Human Rights, formed in 1969, and Nga Tamatoa, formed in 1970 were the first of a series of groupings dissatisfied with the traditional approaches of lobbying, requesting, petitioning and, as they saw it, failure. Campaigns began around land rights, Pakeha appropriation of Maori cultural icons and artefacts, language protection, civil rights and institutional racism. The tactical approach relied on direct action and mass protest, and the strategic objective was fundamental social change rather than limited or short-term reform. This was a clear shift in Maori politics, and the emergence of a new civil society politics.

This emerging, vocal Maori polity presented problems for many Pakeha: the common belief was that the answer to Sinclair’s question was a combination of superior colonists and superior natives. New Zealand’s claimed exemplary race relations was a key element of the national image, yet here was a broad based series of Maori opinions clearly stating that the one-people approach had not worked. Public (Pakeha) attention was focused on the new spirit in Maori politics during a series of events between 1975 and 1979. The Maori Land March of 1975 directed attention to the past, the history of land theft and the inability of any systems to deal with the problems this caused. The Third Labour Government (1972-75) had introduced the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 instituting a mechanism to deal with breaches of the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi after 1975. Many Maori pointed out that most of the land had

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39 Hapu is usually translated as ‘extended family’. It is the primary political and organisation element of Maori society.
41 The Young Warriors.
42 The Treaty of Waitangi, signed between Maori and the Crown in 1840, legitimated colonisation, gave guarantees of certain Maori rights and placed certain obligations on the Crown to protect Maori. Its provisions
already been appropriated so the injustices of the past could not be dealt with. The National Party victory in the 1975 general election, however, reasserted a political force firmly wedded to the one-people notion. The 1977/8 occupation of Takaparawha (Bastion Point) in central Auckland by members and supporters of Ngati Whatua, the traditional owners of the land, directed attention to the issue of land rights. The forced removal of protesters 507 days later by police with army support focused critical vision on the power of the state and its intransigence.\textsuperscript{43} A nearly concurrent occupation of a golf course in Raglan made it clear that the issue of land theft was widespread and in need of urgent attention. Finally, the attack by He Taua\textsuperscript{44} on a mock haka party staged by engineering students at Auckland University in May 1979 revealed that the issue was more than just land rights.

The occupation of Takaparawha exposed the diversity of Maori approaches to political action. A number of Ngati Whatua kaumatua\textsuperscript{45} publicly called on those occupying the land to withdraw and continue negotiations with the Crown and developers planning luxury apartments on the site. This public dissension was later seen in other campaigns. The most significant of these was the ongoing action around the annual Waitangi Day celebrations, a commemoration of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. For Maori leaders from Tai Tokerau, hosting these events was an honour. For many others, a century and a half of breaches of the Treaty provisions by the Crown and settlers made the rallying cry for protest ‘The Treaty is a Fraud’. Emerging from this political debate, Awatere’s Maori sovereignty articles prioritised colonisation over class, and challenged the liberal-Left to reconsider its history and its past.

During the early 1980s a change in attitude to the Treaty of Waitangi began to emerge. The call for Maori sovereignty coincided with a reassessment of the Treaty, and its promise of te tino rangatiratanga.\textsuperscript{46} A new argument emerged that the Treaty should not be considered fraudulent, but had not been honoured by the Crown or by Pakeha. Justice could be achieved by honouring this agreement which guaranteed Maori sovereignty, and gave the Crown rights to govern. The step from this to the vision of a bicultural polity is philosophically small, but politically and emotionally enormous. The Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 allowed consideration of Treaty breaches back to 1840. This contributed to a fundamental shift in


\textsuperscript{45} Male elders.

\textsuperscript{46} All the characteristics of chieftainship or sovereignty
Maori-state relations and, by the early 1990s, a higher degree of Maori incorporation into state networks.

Maori politics merged closely with the campaign against the 1981 Springbok tour. For some Maori, the anti-tour campaign presented an opportunity to have Pakeha “turn their eyes from overseas racism to te take Maori.”47 Awatere contends that it was the most significant event in Maori history since World War 2 and allowed many Pakeha to realise that New Zealand's racism was “different in degree but not in kind from what was happening in South Africa.”48

The intense focus on issues of race and racism, and the passions these generated through the involvement with rugby union, created an environment conducive to a more comprehensive assessment of New Zealand's colonial experience, and the position of Maori in contemporary society. It also coincided with a shift in political focus from issues abroad to those at home. Increasingly high rates of unemployment and an ongoing economic crisis, growing concern about nuclear testing and the presence of US nuclear vessels in New Zealand waters and other existential concerns combined to make the campaign against the 1981 tour the last mass movement dealing primarily with issues outside New Zealand. A dynamic focus on colonial relations brought political struggle home in a way that had not been seen before 1981.

As the crisis of the final years of the Muldoon government intensified there was a change in perspective among key elements of the Pakeha protest movement leadership. Writers associated with the magazine The Republican attempted a theoretical and practical meshing of ideas of Maori sovereignty with Western Marxism.49 The formerly Maoist Workers’ Communist League, the second largest Marxist grouping in the country and influential in a number of social movements, abandoned the Leninist notion that a single party could lead the revolutionary struggle in favour of a coalition of forces united around a programme addressing contradictions based in capitalism, colonialism and patriarchal dominance.50 Events

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surrounding the tour challenged the hegemonic identities New Zealand had adopted and, at least during the final Muldoon years, prepared fertile ground for intensified protest actions.

Despite these shifts on the left, the key factor in the changing dynamic and impact of the dissident networks was increasing support from the Labour Party, which lost the 1981 election by one seat, and could smell victory. Labour gave support to a number of movements, especially those around reformist feminism and anti-nuclear politics. Labour’s 1984 election victory provided the impetus for a resurgence of ‘Labourist’ politics in the dissident groups where the ‘don’t rock the boat’ attitude demobilised dissent and undermined resistance to Labour’s New Right agenda. Kelsey has convincingly argued that it was only the political imperative to resolve the historical claims against breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi that undermined that political-economic drive.\textsuperscript{51} Despite this, the focus on historical claims itself has effectively demobilised Maori anti-colonial politics.

For the purposes of considering events in regard to the Springbok tour, protest movements in some other areas are significant. Rising discontent around environmental issues, especially the campaign around the National Party’s 1981 election strategy - Think Big, contributed to the sense of struggle against growing state power and totalitarianism. This sense was fed by campaigns against significant other National Party legislation that increased the power of the state. Legislation in 1976 and 1978 weakened the ability of trade unions to protect workers, in 1977 strengthened the Security Intelligence Service, and in 1980 the National Development Act gave the government the power to over-ride public consultation requirements for planning permission. These moves came on top of dawn raids on Pacific Islanders’ homes in the quest for immigration permit overstayers, and built on a widespread sense that dissent was no longer tolerated.\textsuperscript{52} The era saw increasing trade union campaigns and mass public protest around cuts to social programmes, especially education funding, that fed into a sense of national crisis. The economy was seen to be troubled with rising unemployment, stagflation and declining living standards with an ineffectual policy response. Crucially for many, even its traditional supporters, the government was seen to have no way out of the crisis choosing instead to mount a series of populist campaigns, around gangs, welfare ‘cheats’, ‘subversives’ and others, instead of effective policy initiatives.


The anti-apartheid movement built on this growing sense of discontent and struggle. The profile and significance of rugby union is crucial to an effective understanding of the high profile of this component of dissident politics. Rugby union is an integral part of New Zealand's national identity situated at the nexus of strands involving the maintenance of colonial power, a sustained hegemonic masculinity operating through both patriarchal and fratriarchal sites, common-sense capitalist rationality and generational dominion. Rugby union is imbued with traits valued by the discursive codes privileged by these modalities.

The social relations of rugby continue to assert this hegemonic role in such a way as to make both rugby and the nation sacred. Despite its ambiguous relationship with other identities of both modernity and post-modernity, the nation exercises considerable moral and emotional sway over self-imagining. The identification of the All Blacks as nationally representative in all ways when combined with rugby watching as a scopophilic activity serves to fetishise both the nation and the characteristics with which rugby is imbued. The All Blacks are thus both totemic and fetishistic. These processes conflate to grant rugby in general and the All Blacks in particular a sacrosanct position in the iconography of New Zealand.

Rugby's significant role in New Zealand's received hegemonic national identity and the traditional importance placed on competition with South Africa combine to make attendance at All Black-Springbok matches akin to visiting the temple. This secular sacredness meant that these contests needed to be isolated from the profane world of politics and the sacrilege of those who would challenge those identities. By the end of the 1970s, the doubters of these identities had been granted voice and were being listened to. Against this cultural assault, the defence of rugby contact with South Africa protected the highest manifestation of national, totemic identity assertion, and restated the value of the received version of national imagining against those agnostics and heretics who would challenge its veracity. It was the strength of the conviction of those who would defend the traditions that made the 1981 tour protests so intense. Tour opponents had made the tactical decision that the tour could be stopped so set out to do just that, while tour defenders saw it as the last stand against blasphemy. It was the polyvalent nature of that tradition, and the deeply ingrained place of rugby within the national and masculine imagining, that allowed that political struggle to stand in for a much wider set of social and political changes.

In seeking to stop the tour the anti-apartheid movement was striking a blow at New Zealand’s hegemonic identities. It has become a veritable truism that the capitalist world saw the rise of an intensely politicised popular protest movement during the 1970s. It is a myth (in the Barthesian sense) premised on the centrality of 1968 as a turning point in modern world
history. It is associated with the invention of youth as a political and social rather than life-cycle entity and perpetuates a notion of prosperity and economic well-being. This myth invests a student rising in Paris and a party convention in Detroit with an impressive array of consequences around the world. There is a sense that New Zealand History as written and understood inflates the significance of the long 1970s, which coincides with the young adulthood of that new group of historians emerging from the expansion of university access from the late 1960s, at the expense of the previous two post-war decades. This is not to imply that the 1950s and early 1960s were not characterised by a lower level or form of political action than either the late 1940s or the long 1970s, but to argue that the drama and significance of this era of political action presumes and intensifies an perception of dullness about the earlier decades, and is in part premised on a need to find an origin in some sort of ‘big bang’.

New Zealand has not escaped this fable. The question of ongoing sporting contact with South Africa gave rise to the biggest mass political movement of the 1970s and 1980s in New Zealand. This anti-apartheid movement, however, has a sensibility extending back to 1921, and as a post 1960 activist network built on the peace and anti-nuclear movement of the post-war years. Accompanying the anti-apartheid protests were other issue-based protest movements. Only the campaign around the Homosexual Law Reform Bill in 1984 and 1985, a threat to hegemonic masculinity rivalling the protests against the rugby tour, provoked a sense of social division comparable to the question of sporting contact with South Africa. This, in itself, is telling: masculinity's wagons were secure in their circle.

The anti-apartheid movement took many years to develop shifting focus from its pre-1960 identity centred on a ‘No Maoris No Tour’ campaign to a position completely opposed to any contact with apartheid by the mid 1970s. These shifts mirrored changes in the international...
campaign, and in New Zealand represented a change from the position that saw apartheid as threatening good domestic race relations to one that saw ongoing domestic colonial oppression as well as the need to support the Southern African liberation movements by isolating apartheid. A planned Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in 1973 had been cancelled by Kirk’s Labour Government, and ‘sporting freedom’ had become key part of National’s successful populist election campaign in 1975.\textsuperscript{56} Their electoral success meant that there was a resurgence in action against apartheid sport. The World Softball Championships in January 1976 was followed by an All Black tour of South Africa in June and July which rising saw the re-emergence of an increasingly widely supported anti-tour feeling.

The South African tour could not have come at a worse time: in coinciding with the Soweto rising it was a public relations disaster for the NZRFU and Government. Although the Montreal Olympic organisers managed to avoid a boycott over the presence of Taiwan, the vast majority of African states stayed away because New Zealand did not.\textsuperscript{57} By 1981, when it was clear that the increasingly unpopular Muldoon government was using the tour as an election tool it seems that wide ranging frustration had laid the basis for a well supported protest movement.

During the 1970s, opposition to sporting contact remained limited in New Zealand. The common-sensical ideology that sport and politics were separate had wide support, and the cultural significance of rugby made these tours a crucial event for many New Zealand men. New Zealand’s self-satisfied complacency that it was still the world’s social laboratory, that it had the best race relations in the world, and that women had little about which to complain had been questioned, but little else had happened to shake those beliefs. Throughout the later 1970s, however, the questioning grew louder and in some specific areas, particularly regarding colonial and patriarchal relations, actions defied those certainties. The anti-apartheid movement still had a small core of activists, primarily in the main centres, but there was an increasingly sympathetic constituency for its message. The factors Pearson identifies as preventing action against the 1956 tour - the dominance of rugby in the national self-image, latent racism that made apartheid tolerable, and lack of appreciation for anti-colonial and Black nationalist feeling - had been weakened.\textsuperscript{58} Rugby certainly remained a crucial element in the hegemonic national identity, but increasingly public discussion of racism in New Zealand, and

\textsuperscript{56} W. David MacIntyre ‘From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free’ in Geoffrey Rice (ed) \textit{The Oxford History of New Zealand} (2ed) Auckland, Oxford University Press. 1992. pp 520-538
several years of high profile activity around anti-colonial issues had severely undermined the hold the other two factors had over political opinion.

These circumstances, and the growing international isolation of South Africa, served to make apartheid a crucial issue. Along with the rise in Maori politics, other concerns arose during the 1970s to sharpen the issue of ‘race’. Rising unemployment and increasingly restrictive immigration controls had led to concerns about Pacific Island ‘overstayers’ resulting in deportations, dawn raids on Pacific Island households by Police and immigration officials, and Pacific Islanders being questioned in the street. Yet in 1978 Immigration Minister Frank Gill defended policies that allowed migration by Rhodesian and South African whites. This reinforced the image of increasingly racist state policies derived from government opposition to boycotts of South Africa and from the growing awareness provoked by Maori protest. In conjunction with a growing women’s movement this was fertile ground for the anti-apartheid movement to grow.

By the end of the 1970s, the campaign against contact with apartheid combined a number of elements facilitating broad support. It retained a strong focus on an international issue while also prioritising ‘race’ as the basic contradiction. Furthermore, the most high profile target of the campaign was rugby union. In combining these dynamics, the anti-apartheid movement could draw support from those concerned about matters of international concern, women critical of patriarchal and fratriarchal cultural mores, and Maori seeking to focus on issues of domestic racism as well as build support for black struggles. In addition, the growing international isolation of apartheid and the increasingly strong boycott movement increased the number of sportspeople opposing contact, albeit often from self-interest. Others were concerned that New Zealand was increasingly out of step with world opinion and risked becoming a pariah, especially in a world where market diversity was crucial for an exporting nation. Finally, the tour was to held in an election year: an election it was widely expected National would lose. In a climate where even traditional supporters were turning away from National in favour of third parties, the irony of this political use of sport was apparent to many. Simply, 1981 was a period of intense social tension with the Springbok tour focusing widespread discontent on a single event.

This singular focus is crucial to understanding the consequences of the anti-tour movement.

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59 Ross ‘New Zealand Overstaying Islander’
The debates within and around the movement during late 1981 and 1982 centred on two broad issues, both of which came to a head at a particularly fractious HART Annual General Meeting in November 1982. The first was the question of support for the liberation movements: HART had consistently taken a position of non-sectarian support for the South African liberation groups, unlike other national groupings in both Australia and the United Kingdom which supported positions advanced by the African National Congress. The upshot of the November meeting was weakened non-sectarianism and a weakened movement. The second, and in the long term more difficult, debate was the issue of 'domestic racism'. Maori and other supporters of the anti-tour campaign became increasingly frustrated at a perceived failure by the anti-apartheid movement to confront issues arising from a national colonial past. Looking back after ten years, Alick Shaw noted this problem when he noted the movement’s singularity: “It was set up as a single issue organisation, not a political movement. You couldn’t just take these thousands of people and turn their attention to domestic racism or whatever.” Shaw’s observations direct attention to the problems of campaigns to come. Although the anti-tour campaign was important in raising issues about New Zealand’s race relations and colonial history, it was neither solely responsible nor was it sufficient to promote or provoke a political movement. In some ways it was easier to consider the question of apartheid: there was less involved in terms of a (re)examination of identity that would result from a reassessment of national history required by a political movement addressing issues of domestic racism.

Subsequent political struggles ranged across a number of issues with the most consistently high profile being the question of colonial relations. The symbol and focus of this struggle, the Treaty of Waitangi, became equated with the totality of the issue, and the high profile of historical grievances has directed focus to those concerns. However, the vibrancy of political debate and struggle in the immediate post-tour period promised far more in terms of changing colonial relations. In effect and in popular memory, the anti-tour campaign was, as has been said of May 1968, “a turning point in history where history refused to turn: as a beacon of the future it revealed nothing so vividly as the past.” Memory of that past, of that promise and of its potential for change has been expunged as the demobilisation of politics allowed and cause by the New Right’s Borg-like ravages where resistance seems futile has further sapped

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61 Kate Coughlan et al ‘Battle of the Boks’
62 The extensive literature and intensity of cultural and political debate concerning the effects of moves to address historical grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi is testament to the difficulties of reassessing a national history and the orthodoxy of identity it has produced. These same difficulties were exposed by the outrage expressed by many in letters to the editor columns and elsewhere after the Television New Zealand broadcast of the revisionist history of the New Zealand Wars during June and July 1998. This series was presented by James Belich and based on his 1986 book The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict Auckland, Penguin.
the potential of campaigns of struggle and the quest for equality. As the vision Fukuyama represents retains its social and political power and as Neithammer’s call to historical action is squeezed as a political option, the dual nostalgias that view of the campaign in 1981 as containing either the potential for the rebirth or the actual end of Aotearoa/New Zealand history are exposed as a denial of both the historicity of the 1950s and the nature of post-1984 politics and history.