MODES OF RELIGIOSITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNITY COHESION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION AMONG BRITISH SUNNI MUSLIMS:

AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY

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By

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Abstract:

This thesis explored the relationship between religious diversity, formation of religiosities and their impact on the perception and attitude towards integration of the Muslim communities into the wider British society among select group Muslim activists, faith leaders and associated with the transnational Islamic revivalist groups in the UK. The main focus of the study was on finding out ways in which religiosity of participants shapes their views on community cohesion and social integration within the secular and religiously diverse British society.

This study utilized an empirical case study design to explore its key questions including several qualitative data collection instruments and analysis procedures. The study sample included participants selected from major transnational movements based in two cities in the UK. Participants' religiosity has been explored through adopting the semi-structured 'Muslim Subjectivity Research Model' suggested by Sahin (2014). The impact of religiosities on the formation of perception and attitudes towards community cohesion and social integration among the study participants were explored through a semi structure 'Integration' focused interviews (IFI) designed by the researcher.

The data analysis revealed the overwhelming presence of 'foreclosed modes of religious subjectivity' among study participants. The participants with a foreclosed religious subjectivity exhibited a literal and ahistorical conception of Islam and were found to be less likely to identify them with the wider society and engage with social and community integration and cohesion. There was only one participant whose religiosity showed clear exploratory features that emerged as a result of his attendance to a critical postgraduate programme in Islamic Education designed to enable Muslim faith leaders to become reflective practitioner.

The study discussed the significance of the results and their implications in detail and offered further research and policy recommendations.

Declaration

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the Institute of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other education Institute in the United Kingdom or overseas. Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of The Institute.

Signed …  …… Date …**1st of March 2017**

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DEDICATION:

This thesis is dedicated to the all the seekers of knowledge.

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First of all, I would like to say that writing this thesis would not have been possible without the help of God. I thank God sincerely for blessing me with the opportunity, knowledge and patience to complete this research that I hope will benefit many academics, Muslims and the society in general.

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ABBREVIATIONS TABLE:

Abbreviation	Meaning
AH's	Ahl-e-Hadith
B.A.	Bachelor of Arts
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic groups
BMG	Bostock Marketing Group
CMEB	Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain
CS	Case Study
IF	The Islamic Foundation
IFE	Islamic forum of Europe
IFI	Integration focused Interview
ISB	Islamic Society of Britain
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JIMAS	Jamiyyat Ihya Minhaj As Sunnah
JUIH	Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind
JUP	Jami'yat-e Ulama-e PakistanM.A.
M.A	Master of Arts
M.B	Muslim Brotherhood
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
MET	Muslim education trust
M.Ed	Master of Education
MIHE	Markfield Institute of Higher Education
MSIS	Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule
MSS	Muslim student's society

OSI	Open society institute
PCT	Personal Construct Theory.
SCS	Self-Characterisation Sketch
SSI	Semi-Structured Interviews
TJ	Tablighi Jamaat
UMO	Union of Muslim organisations
UKIM	United Kingdom Islamic Mission.
YM	Young Muslims
YMO	Young Muslims Organisations
YMUK	Young Muslims United Kingdom

1.1 Chapter One Introduction:

The study aims to investigate the types of *religiosities*[1] present among the contemporary Islamic *Sunni revival* [2]movements in the U.K and to explore critically their implications and impact on community cohesion and social integration within the context of contemporary British society. The study investigates the personal experience and interpretation of Islam within the context of secular multicultural, multi faith British society among a selected group of Muslim activists, faith leaders and members of mosques who belong to diverse transnational Islamic revival movements based and operating in 20th / 21st ce UK. The main focus of the study is to examine how the religiosity of participants shapes their views on community cohesion and social integration within the secular and religiously diverse British society.

This study utilizes a *qualitative case* study design to explore its key questions. This includes several data collection instruments and analysis procedures. Participants' religiosity has been explored through adopting the semi-structured '*Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule'* [3](MSIS) suggested by Sahin (2014). The impact of religiosities on the formation of perception and attitudes towards community cohesion and social integration among the study participants are explored through a specially constructed semi structured 'Integration' focused interviews (IFI).

The study aims to highlight the diversity among British Sunni Muslims concerning their religious observance by tracing the historical roots of their religious traditions and how these religious differences make an impact on integration of the Muslim communities into British society. There are several important challenges facing the Muslim communities in Britain like poverty, Islamophobia, racial discrimination, educational under achievement, which all have significant impact on their interaction and integration with the wider British society. This study however aims to examine how personal religiosities and diversity of religious affiliation to particular transitional Islamic movements inform their perception and attitudes towards Muslims' integration into the wider secular and religiously plural British society. Muslims in Britain are a large and growing community composed of a mosaic of different ethnic, linguistic, cultural and geographical backgrounds yet religion appears to be a central dynamic shaping their individual and collective identities.

This research by empirically exploring the diversity within the religious observances of British Muslim communities offers a distinctive way of investigating how faith shapes and influences the perception and interaction of British Muslims towards the wider society. A

most recent Green Paper (2018) by the government on how best to integrate communities in the UK clearly recognises the role of personal, religious and cultural values and attitudes on this significant area of social policy. It must be noted that empirical study of Muslim religiosities are very rare. The diversity and difference of religious observance within Muslim communities and the impact of distinctive patterns of religiosities on their views on integration to the wider British society have not been studied in detail.

Muslims mainly belong to two broad Islamic denominations recognised as *Sunni* [4]and *Shia*[5]. Sunnis make up the vast majority with estimates ranging from 80-85% Muslims throughout the world (Sookhdeo, 2008). This study will focus only on Sunni Muslims. Sunni Islam is made up of several theological traditions as well as practical schools of thought. Most importantly there are distinct politico-revivalist movements within the Sunni Islam that have direct bearings upon a large number of mainstream Muslims in the UK. Sunni Muslims practice their faith by observing the legal framework provided by the four schools [6] of law that were established during the classical period of Islam. A large number of Sunni Muslims exhibit loyalties towards diverse religious revival movements that have different socio-political focus and agenda. Commonly found among British Sunni Muslims are Barelwi, Deobandis and Salafi movements.

The Majority of the British Muslims are migrants from the south Asian sub-continent. The Muslims who originate from South Asia are influenced by Biradari[7] kinship networks, which denote a hierarchal system of clan politics dominated by connections and family ties to the Sub-continent (Sookhdeo, 2008). This model continues to be key facet of social life in British Muslim families. In the British context, Muslims became increasingly aware of their religious affiliations after the Rushdie Affair 1989, the tragic events of 9/11 in the US and the 7/7 bombings in London. Thereafter politically motivated Islamic movements began to have an impact on the lives of young members of the community.

After the tragedy of 9/11 and 7/7 the indigenous population of Britain felt that Muslims' conservatism and traditionalism and their attachment to their home countries have hindered the integration of the younger generations into mainstream British society (Sookhedeo, 2008).

British Muslims comprise a rich, vibrant and diverse group of communities. Whilst most are born into the faith, British Muslims also are from indigenous white English and those of multiple heritages. The majority of Muslims have their roots in South Asia and have brought

with them to the UK the traditions and groupings of the Indian Sub-continent. British Muslims are mainly Sunnis and broadly divided into two groups; the more spiritually inclined Sufi Barelwis and the more 'puritanical[8]' Deobandis as mentioned above. There is a long history of conflict between the members of the Deobandis and Barelwis which have been brought into Britain. It should be noted that both groups are amorphous and show a significant degree of internal diversity (Zebiri, 2008). Barelwis represent a reassertion of the more populist expressions of the Sufi traditions, which had been denounced to varying degrees by the *Deobandis* and the *Ahl-e-Hadith*. Consequently, most *Barelwi* polemics have been directed strongly against these two groups rather than outsiders (Nielsen, 1995). The Salafi movements are present in all Muslim communities worldwide and appear in Western countries. These include the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates and the Salafi organisations in particular the Ahl-e-Hadith network.

The literalist Salafi groups, on the other hand, are traditionalist puritanical movements which generally avoid getting involved in politics while they often elaborate a very harsh theological discourse toward reformists and Islamist movements (Nielsen, 1995). *JIMAS (Jamiyyat Ihya Minhaj As Sunnah*) was instrumental for the spread of Salafism in Britain. Jimas which originated in the Sub-continent as the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, its theological roots go back to the 18th century and the renowned scholar Shah Waliullah of Delhi (d.1762). It is problematic to assume that all actors known as 'Salafis' in their respective contexts can be analysed as parts of a single transnational Salafi movement.

The different religious groups are intensely suspicious of each other and do very little to integrate amongst themselves (Nielsen, 1995). There is a strong possibility that they are in danger of imparting division which developed in the history of the Subcontinent Islam which could seriously undermine any efforts they might make towards developing a truly native version of Islam in Britain (Geaves, 1996).

Ansari's study (2004) reveals the diverse aspects of the communities and outlines their historical contribution in shaping modern British society over the last two centuries. He draws the reader's attention to the Rushdie Affair and the anti-war marches which have only increased the hostility between the Muslims and the indigenous population. As discussed above there have been many official reports and studies since the tragic events of 9/11 and 7/7 on radical Islam and its diverse ideological and socio- political expressions worldwide.

Intra-community relations are largely driven by the religious denominations; they are split along sectarian, denominational and geographical lines, and particularly in relation to the countries of origins. Mosques are generally associated with specific communities such as Pakistanis, Indian Muslims and Bangladeshis or the split is based on their association on transnational Islamic revival movements.

Not all of the members of the community arrived in the UK with an automatic loyalty to these movements. This had to be won in the early period of community formation and settlement. The sectarian segmentation of mosques have been most noticeable in the fierce rivalry for mosque control that was mostly played out between the Deobandis influenced outreach movement, the Tablighi Jamaat, and the Pakistani Sufi orders known as the Barelwis.

The Times newspaper recently (2015) highlighted issues of sectarianism that have been bubbling in the UK for some time. According to L. *Moosavi* (2005), British Muslims have been mostly concerned over the past decades dealing with Islamophobia, and debating the war on terror, Israel and Palestine. These used to be issues which Muslims united around, regardless of Shia or Sunni affiliation. But these unifying issues are disappearing. There has always been a division, but the problem is that it is so pronounced at the moment, the home country conflicts have forced people to their side of the spectrum, and people are feeling their sectarian identity really matters. It is believed that the bigger divides in the UK are within Sunni Islam, rather than between Sunni and Shia.

In Britain, the conflict amongst Sunni Muslim communities revolves mainly around anti-Sufis and Sufis, reformist thought [9]and the Sufi way of life. The former always criticises the latter for innovating (*bid'ah*) religious rituals. Geaves (1982) states that essentially, organisations that are critical of Sufism fall into two categories: those opposed to Sufism in any form such as the Wahhabi and Salafi movements, and those opposed to popular Sufism as represented in shrine worship such as Tablighi Jamaat and the Deobandis ...and some other reformed Sufi *tariqas* (some *Naqshbandis* [10]*and Tijaniyya*)[11].

This research will examine the diversity within the religious observances of British Muslims and critically consider how faith acts in the life of Muslims who are part of the wider British society. Intra-communal religious conflicts and their impact on Muslims integration to the wider British society have gradually been recognised by researchers and wider policy makers. However, it appears that no rigorous study has been undertaken to examine the religiosity and

its impact on Muslim's integration within the wider British society. The current study aims to address this lacuna within the field.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

Within the above presented context and background, the current study aims to explore the following central questions:

1: What are the main features of the religious observance (religiosity) among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

2: How do historical, social and political dynamics shape the religiosity among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

3: How does the difference in religious observance (religiosity) of the members of the transnational Sunni movements' impact on their perception and attitudes towards integration into the wider British society?

The study adopts a qualitative case-study approach to explore its main questions. A case study is a holistic inquiry that investigates a cultural phenomenon within its natural settings. Bell (1999) explains the case-study method as an umbrella term for a "family of research methods'' the case study method allows the researcher to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989).

This research utilises a '*purposive sampling'* [12]strategy which is a form of non-probability sampling (Polit and Hunglar, 1999:284). It will be used to select the cases and study participants in order to explore the central research questions in-depth. The persuasive sampling is based on convenient way of accessing the cases and participants that are of interest, relevant and easily accessible (Descombe, 1998:44).

The advantage of purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to home in on people or events, (Dane,1990:30) which have good grounds in what they believe, which will be critical for the research. In this sense it might not only be economical but might also be informative in a way that conventional probability sampling cannot be (Descombe 1998:44). These cases are selected from two main localities: Birmingham and Peterborough.

Birmingham and Peterborough are major centres for Muslim population. One finds a number of masjids in both of these cities that stress the diversity with variety of Sunni tradition. Diverse groups of Sunni Muslims (mainly Deobandi, Barelwi, Jamaat-e-Islami and Salafi groups) are selected through identifying relevant prayer halls, Masjids and community centres. The study participants were selected among imams, Masjid managers and activist affiliated with the major transnational Islamic movements in the UK. Eight imams /managers of Masjids and members of different political reformist movements from two different localities were interviewed. As a male researcher protocol and religious customs will create difficulties to get female respondents. The positions of imamate and Masjid manager are held by males therefore it was not possible to interview a female activist which in its self is a difficult task as mentioned above. The main data was gathered through conducting semi-structured interviews[13], observations, documented analysis, attending lectures and seminars organized by the selected religious revival movements. Interviews were conducted with imams, group activists and committee members of these groups.

1.3 The Personal and Professional context of the study:

This study represents the personal journey of the researcher. The broad and diverse nature of the revival groups and the type of religiosity they produce in their members and its effects on integration and social cohesion resonates with his experiences and personal interests.

He was born into a traditional South Asian Muslim family who were practising and was exposed primarily to the Islamic religion through the supplementary masjid *madrasah* system in the U.K. Then spending seven years in Pakistan where pursuing secondary school and college, Therefore, the researcher is inherently and intimately connected to the faith via heritage. Thus, it can be stated that from a relatively young age, the researcher was encouraged to work within the Islamic ethos to develop and pursue future goals and aspirations Thus, each phase of the researchers academic and professional experience was undertaken to gain knowledge and a level of expertise in the subject areas that he was particularly intrigued with at that time.

The desire to read for a psychology degree at the undergraduate stage was to learn about human behaviour,

Thus, with increased vigour, searching through the large body of literature on the topic, he soon realised that there was immense talk about the failure of the Muslims to integrate,

comparatively the other communities from similar ethnic backgrounds like the Sikhs and Hindus who were far more integrated, so it was presumed the difference must have something to do with religion and it has been highlighted in many publications and media that religious beliefs were the factor effecting Muslim's integration and social cohesion. Also the Muslim's third and fourth generation were more religious than people of different faiths who were becoming less and less religious with each generation. So after discussions with the supervisory team it was agreed to look at the different transnational Sunni revival movements and the religious diversity among them and what type of religiosity they are developing in their members and how it is effecting the integrations and social cohesion. As the researcher is an insider to the field of investigation he also noted that there was a lack of group cohesion and the different groups were propagating their ideologies and at the same time negating the ideologies of the other revival movements which was causing tension and this could be detrimental to a peaceful co-existence.

The researcher re-examined his objectives and tried to decipher the meaning of 'group member's development' through the revival group's agenda. The researcher dedicated a year to discussing the notion, the literature and eventual focus of the study with Sahin before identifying the debate of integration of Muslims into the wider British society 'to be enmeshed within the psychological notion of 'religious subjectivity[14].

Hence, this research project represents a personal response of a Muslim intellectual born and raised in the UK, to a fundamental issue identified to be central to individual development. In working within the topic of group cohesion and integration and the role of religiosity the researcher is confident that he has finally discovered an area of interest that deserves a greater proportion of his future life's attention and dedication.

1.4 Organization of the Study:

This study consists of nine chapters including introduction and conclusion chapters. The present chapter offered a broader introduction of the study, its background, rationale and central research problem.

Chapter Two deals with the migration of Muslims to the U.K looking at its historical aspects it aims to contextualise the Muslim presence in the UK, beginning with examining the significance of the concepts of migration, diaspora and transnationalism, and looking at

various economic, educational, political, social achievements and cultural transformations and settlement.

Chapter three explores the four Islamic movements which are part of this study, however before that the research touched upon the inception of the movements what were the conditions that lead to the development of the movements will be discussed. This will help understanding the conditions which were conducive for the inception and development of these movements. Rest of the chapter will explore above mentioned four Islamic revival movements, JI/MB, Deobandis/TJs, Barelwi's and Salafis respectively.

Chapter four focuses on the background of the development of the Islamic revival movements of the 19th century British India how they emerged in the U.K context and the aim is also to explore different aspects like the movements and the type of religiosity they develop among their members and what role they play in the integration of the Muslims into the wider secular British society. This will facilitate to set the ground on which the study will be conducted because there is not much research in the area.

Chapter five introduces the Muslim community in the U.K in terms of the revival movements and their working patterns and mission in the UK. The chapter then maps out the religious diversity of Muslims in the U.K by profiling of their overall patterns of religious tendencies.

The chapter six introduces the 'exploratory' aspect of the research method, which encompasses an analysis of the central research questions and the review of literature. The qualitative-interpretative- ethnographic approach is then discussed including a focus upon the Case Study design. The chapter then delineates the research design encompassing the sampling of 'Case Study' participants through both a 'purposive' and a 'non-probability', homogenous sampling process; the 'data collection instruments' with specific focus upon the utilisation of the Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule (MSIS), Semi Structured Integration focused Interviews (IFI) to extract data from study participants. The chapter will then discuss the methods by which the captured data (Data Analysis) is analysed before declaring adherence to the practice of ethical procedures and the 'insider' status of the researcher. The concluding sections of the chapter highlight the limitations and problems encountered with conducting this research.

The analysis of the data garnered from the empirical case studies is presented in chapter seven. The derived data identifies the types of religiosity observed among the study

participants in relation to the training of the groups and the religious subjectivity developed and its effects on integrations. One of the main objectives of chapter is to explore, if the development of a particular mode of religiosity can be attributed to a specific style or styles of educational leadership as broadly parlayed by the literature review. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated towards presenting the analysis of data through identified religiosities.

Chapter eight discusses the significant findings extracted from the analysis of the data, literature reviewed. The overall conclusions and recommendations of the study are presented in chapter nine.

CHAPTER 2: Muslim Communities in the UK

Introduction:

2.1 British Muslims:

The main aim of the study is to critically examine the relationship between diverse forms of Islamic religiosity observed among the members of the dominant Sunni traditional Islamic movements in the UK and their views concerning Muslim integration to the wider secular British society. In order to contextualise the study, the chapter will discuss the history of Muslim migration and settlement in the UK. This chapter will offer a background discussion including the demographic data and spatial distribution, socio-cultural structures and differences amongst British Muslims in order to understand the communities' internal dynamics and the problems they face. The available statistical data on the situation of British Muslims is used to identify and understand the problems and challenges facing British Muslim diaspora[15]. Muslims in Britain is a vast topic that and covers many areas. This chapter offers a brief outline of the basic history and general information relating to their current situation. This chapter contextualises the Muslim presence in the UK, beginning by examining the significance of the concept of 'Diaspora' which is important because its terminological scope widened with later additions, such as 'guest-workers'[16], 'immigrants', and so on (Vertovec, 1999).

2.1.1: Islam and Muslims in Britain:

The sociologists and anthropologists[17] who studied minorities in Western societies in the 19th and early 20th century have largely focused on the ethnic and cultural identities of these communities and have ignored their religious and faith-based collective identities. It appears that it was the prevalent social trend at that time. As a consequence, most of the sociological and anthropological studies of 1940s and 1950s have concentrated more on race, colour, and ethnicity of these minorities than their religious affiliation. This has resulted, most of the time, in failure to grasp the true nature of religious minorities and understand issues and challenges they have been facing in the societies they live in. Hence, the presence of religious minorities in these societies including Britain has posed a crucial question to social scientists. They have struggled to understand the salience of religion as a central marker of identity. Indeed, this dilemma has become more problematic when it comes to define the term

`Muslim minority', as Muslims always tend to prefer to identify themselves by their religion above all other identity markers namely ethnicity, language, colour, and race.

Muslims in Britain started to attract attention after the 2nd World War, when masses of immigrants from various countries of Commonwealth were looking for job opportunities in the United Kingdom. "This process is perhaps best characterized in terms of the '*pull' factors* [18]which attracted Muslims to Britain, and the *'push' factors* [19]which forced them to leave their countries of origin." At the time after the 2nd World War, huge changes in economic and social sector took place in the United Kingdom. Given the economic rise of Britain, most indigenous workers hold a highly qualified position and due to this fact there was an entire lack of unskilled workers to do manual or shift work. On the other hand, situation in the South Asian subcontinent, from where most Muslims come from, was disconsolate. High unemployment, poor living conditions and bad education are some of the so called 'push' factors which forced Muslims to find better life in Britain. Furthermore, the colonial links between Britain and territories mostly inhabited by Muslims served as a bridge and allowed Muslims free access to the United Kingdom. However, this situation dramatically changed with the implementation of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. Since that, complicated times have started not only for Muslims in Britain but also for British government, who were obliged to handle with on-coming difficult situation.

2.1.2 The Muslim Diaspora in the UK:

Britain has a sizeable established Muslim community that is highly visible in the larger towns and cities, while many smaller towns also have communities of Muslims.

The Muslim diaspora in the UK contains various people who express a diversity of complex forms of Islam, each constituting a small part of the global Muslim community (*ummah*). Muslims population shows strong ethnic diversity, comprising Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Africans, and so on (Ansari, 2004; Gilliat-Ray, 2010. Between 1950 and 1960 one could say that Muslim communities had already appeared but were not necessarily permanent. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslims came increasingly to believe that their future lay in Britain and as a result began to see the need of protecting their identity within the public arena. As Gilliat (1994: 7) points out, in the minority situation, boundaries are important mechanisms for communal preservation. This applies whether the community shares the same faith or not.

Muslims had come and visited and traded these shores in the 1700's. Some historians argue that the arrival of the Muslims to these shores occurred much earlier than the 1700's, Al-Idrisi visited Britain during the 11th century (Watts, 1972:21). It is recorded that many Emissaries from Persia came to Britain as early as 1238. There is evidence of Muslim presence in Britain under the Tudor and Stuarts (Matar 1998:45).

As Lewis (1994) states, Muslim presence in Britain goes back at least three hundred years to the activities of the east India Company, when people from the Indian subcontinent were first recruited into the British navy also known as lascars. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 a large number of Yemenis were recruited in the merchant navy. At the time when the Second World War started they numbered at 20% of the navy (Lewis 1994:11).

Great influx of Muslims to Britain took place after the First World War casing death destruction and economic ruin. As a result, there was a vacuum in labour and other industries. In order to fill this vacuum from the British Empire were brought to these shores as a result thousands of Muslims migrated to Britain. The second time the mass migration took place was after the Second World War. Since the Second World War Muslims have migrated to Britain in much larger numbers and most of them from the sub-continent, Middle East, Africa and Cyprus.

In the 1970's the families of the migrant Muslim workers joined them as well as many political refugees. Today it is estimated that there are over 2 million Muslims (MCB report, 2011) living in Britain. At present the numbers are high, making Islam the second largest denomination after the Church of England.

In the early 1960's the construction of the Mangla Dam [20]displaced approximately 100,000 people, primarily from Mirpur. The admission of labour immigrants into Britain was arranged at Government level. The majority of immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent were illiterate. They were usually offered badly paid jobs and consequently were associated with the lower working class. In comparison the first generation of Arab immigrants from Iraq, arrived as students. As they grew into the British professional classes and experienced professional respect in their work, these individuals were able to support themselves. Therefore, they were less inclined to isolate themselves from wider society (Ansari 2009).

Most South Asians settled around industrial areas, where they worked predominantly in newly established industries and textiles. They came to work here to improve the socio-

economic situation of their families back home. Both the host society and the Muslim immigrants themselves considered their residence in Britain to be temporary. Consequently, neither made a substantial effort to create facilities for extended cultural and religious links between the communities. With the family reunion process during the 1960's and 1970's this situation changed drastically. As the immigrants decided to settle in Britain, and to bring their families into the country, the new communities began to establish facilities to accommodate their social, cultural and religious needs. Nielson (1994) described this process in 1984 in the following way: The focus of economic activity and social and cultural identity gradually moves from the villages of the Punjab and Sylhet to the inner city of London, Birmingham and Bradford. With the family moves also the focus of religious identity. We see the appearance of Muslim worship and action relating to the context of Britain while grandparents and older generations were absent in the immigrant community, adults along the 'horizontal line' were numerous. South Asian households are, due to the family structure, larger than those of British society

In Britain, the immigrants, often peasant farmers, were generally from rural regions such as Mirpur in Pakistani administered ‘Azad’ Kashmir and Sylhet in Bangladesh (Ballard, 2002: 5). Operating as international commuters, men came to industrial cities for a number of years to earn money and send remittances home before returning there only to be replaced by a kinsman.

Roger and Catherine Ballard’s migration model (1977: 51) illuminates that, following the pioneers and the international commuters, migrants began to bring their wives and children to the UK and this process continued until the 1980s. Gradually, this process encouraged Muslims to see themselves as ‘settlers’ rather than ‘sojourners’ (Lewis, 1993: 37). However, the need was still existing for “networks and institutions which would allow them to carry on practicing religion and culture” (Joly, 1995: 7). Initially, in the early days of migration and in locations where the numbers of Muslims remained small, mosques were shared, as a process of ‘fusion-cooperation’ temporarily over-rode ethno-cultural and sectarian origins. However, as numbers grew, so did the reproduction of ethnic and sectarian affinity or ‘fission-fragmentation’ (Lewis, 2002: 56; McLoughlin, 2005a:540),

Mosques and Islamic schools were a sign that Muslims desired to preserve their religious identity. By 1985, the number of registered mosques was 314, and that figure had risen to 452 by 1990 (Nielsen, 2005: 46). Nowadays, it is estimated that there are about 1500 mosques

(Charity Commission, BMG Surveys of Mosques, 2009), serving Britain's 2.7 million Muslims.

As McLoughlin (2005a: 540) states, "the idea of congregation can become more significant than in the homeland, as public meetings for worships provide an opportunity for socialising." In similar vein, Stephen Barton (1986: 179) reports that the mosque he studied in Bradford was a refuge for Muslim immigrants from the stresses of life in British society. In addition to the conventional functions of the mosque (prayer, preaching, religious education), some other roles such as "library, publishing, resolution and consultation centre, social gatherings, marriage, and so on" (Joly, 1995: 75) have been added in Britain. Mosques have also become a sort of representative political medium between local authorities and Muslims, linking with various departments of social services, such as schools, prisons, the police, and hospitals, as well as maintaining interfaith-dialogue with other religions. Consequently, mosques in Britain have become a nerve centre of community life for Muslims in Britain, functioning as a place of worship, a supplementary school for both children and adults, as well as a meeting point for socio-cultural events.

Other important institutions are the supplementary mosque schools (*madrasa*) or traditional seminaries where most of the faith leaders (imams) are trained. In the formative stage of institutionalisation, imams were found among migrants or imported from migrants' countries of origin to work in Britain. Although this continues under the watchful eye of government by "tightening entry controls" (Birt, 2006: 694-5), community leaders have established educational institutions (Islamic seminaries) for training students in the traditional Islamic sciences with a view to producing British-trained imams and religious teachers. There are now at least 25 seminaries in the United Kingdom, one having been established in the 1970s, three in the 1980s, eighteen in the 1990s and three in the 2000s (Birt and Lewis, 2010: 94). Seminaries are organised in terms of South Asian sectarian traditions. Seventeen seminaries belong to the Deobandi tradition; five are Barelwi, and a handful from other groups like the Indian originated Nadwa and Egypt originated Azhar.

Muslims in time over the centuries have given mankind so much in relation to prosperity, technology, science, maths and civilization. Western Europe freely borrowed from Islamic sciences, philosophy, medicine and the arts developed during the tenth to the fifteenth centuries in Spain. This development was directly responsible for the renaissance in the west. It led to much advancement which can be seen today in the West.

If one was to look at the Muslims of Britain who have been part of this island for centuries as to what contribution have they made? The answer to this question will be that the Muslims have made minimal contribution, if any, with more negative rather than positive. The image that the media portrays of the Muslims is not healthy. The achievements that the Muslims made in this country in different spheres of life are not very encouraging.

In Britain the wider society tends to perceive 'a Muslim' as working class, as the economic position and location of dwellings of many Muslims in Britain has apparently changed little in the thirty or forty years since their grandparents or great grandparents immigrated here. Despite this, the move of the family from a peasant lifestyle in a developing country to Britain has, in the main, resulted in better education for the children and a higher standard of living. According to Kints (2001: 36-40) the majority is still concentrated in the semi-skilled and unskilled sectors of manufacturing and service industries.

However, an increasing number of young Muslims now go on to further education, including university. Muslims born in Britain, but of South Asian origin, are becoming more numerous in the professions, for instance, in teaching, law, medicine, business and journalism. The original economic migrants tended to be male and to work in mills, factories and so on, sending money back home. Even today, money continues to be remitted. As the families arrived, small businesses were set up and they continue today. Typically, they include groceries, *halal* butchers, clothing and fabric shops, taxi firms and, especially amongst the Bangladeshi community, restaurants and take-aways. In 'Asian' areas entire streets of such businesses now exist. Some of these businesses have now become chains, indicating the greater wealth of the families concerned. The various migrant groups, including the Muslims, are gathered together in relatively small areas of particular towns and cities (Geaves,1994: 70).

Muslims arriving in Britain were concerned with preserving their own community structures and identities at the expense of fully understanding the environment they had come to. This often led them to become insular and isolated from society. With few exceptions, the Muslim community, individuals, leaders and organisations, did not see opening up and introducing Islam to the host population as a major concern. Therefore, examining and understanding the problems and issues facing the host population was not seen as necessary. This foresight would probably have enabled Muslims to see their role in Britain as one of being able to present solutions to social problems. Not only that, it would have helped prevent the negative

aspects of wider society impacting on their own communities. Instead British Muslims today are also faced with rising drug related evils, low educational achievement, domestic problems, family breakdown, crime and imprisonment. The position of Muslims in Britain is also determined by the nature of the population that migrated to the UK. The socio-economic factors, rural background, educational levels, types of employment and strata of society they entered all influence their circumstances today. This is demonstrated by a comparison between Muslims in North America and those in Britain. The former was from professional backgrounds and so established themselves in a different context within the American economy and society. Admittedly certain experiences were shared between these diaspora communities but there are also substantial differences.

Among the South Asian community there is a triple identity, first as Muslims with their origins in a distant homeland such as Pakistan, second as British citizens and third as members of the universal *ummah.* There remains a strong identification with the original state and local community of origin that helps to perpetuate the defensive boundaries despite continued and increasing participation in the economic, business, professional and bureaucratic life of the country in which they live.

The various issues Muslims are confronted with can be divided into several categories. In education and the economic sphere, they are suffering from low educational achievement and have the highest rates of unemployment relative to the rest of the population. Socially, divorce rates are increasing, family breakdown is more apparent and the youth are involved in gang/territorial wars. Furthermore, Muslims are now more than ever involved in drug abuse, leading to criminality, where they are now overrepresented amongst the prison population".

The South Asian Muslims are the dominant group within the Muslim diaspora in the UK. According to the 2011census Muslims who identify themselves as of Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi origin make up 60% of the Muslim of England and wales of the 2.7 million. 38% per cent of Pakistani 15 per cent of Bangladeshi and 7 per cent Indian.

The 2011 Census shows that Muslims form 4.8% of the population of England and Wales. There are approximately 77,000 Muslims in Scotland and 3,800 in Northern Ireland (Hopkins 2017). The Muslim population in England and Wales has increased from 1,546,626 in 2001 to 2,706,066 people in 2011 (1,159,440 or 75% increase). The Muslim population is larger than all other non-Christian faith groups put together.

2.1:3: Patterns of migration and settlement:

During the 1950s and 1960s Britain, like other European countries, Britain experienced severe labour shortages in the period of reconstruction following the Second World War and encouraged labour migration from former colonies and from the poorer countries of Europe.

The majority of Muslim population in Britain originates from South East Asia. The main Muslim communities in Britain are those of Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis. In addition there is a considerably smaller number of East African Asians who emigrated from their country of origin a few decades ago and settled down in the African countries of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda and later emigrated from there to Britain. Some originated from some of these East African countries like Uganda. Because of this detour via Africa to Britain they are called "twice immigrants[21]" (Bhachu, 1985).

The majority of direct immigrants came from relatively compact geographical regions in the Punjab, and the Gujarat Sylhet District in Bangladesh and Mirpur in Azad Kashmir[22]. The Punjab has provided by far the largest inflow. The great majority of Pakistani Punjabis are Muslims, and there is small Christian minority. However, the majority of the Indian Punjabis are Sikhs. Some of the Gujaratis in Britain have connections with East Africa (Werbner 1990). In the case of Britain, the first post-World War II immigrants came first from the ranks of people displaced after the war, then from the Caribbean, then from certain parts of the Indian subcontinent (Rex and Moore 1967). Many of the latter migrants followed earlier pioneers who helped them find jobs and accommodation, and who formed the first links in a chain of further migration by kin and acquaintances from their towns and villages in India and Pakistan. Nearly all were men. The process of chain migration meant that settlement was often clustered, with groups from a particular village or area seeking to live close together in cheap old houses in Britain's industrial heartlands (Rex and Moore 1967). Most such families subscribed to the 'myth of return'[23], believing that when the men had made enough money through hard work and frugal living in Britain, they would go back to Pakistan on a permanent basis (Dahya 1972,1974; Anwar 1979). Wives and children of migrants had in most cases stayed in the subcontinent while it was still easy for men to travel back home quite frequently.

However, by the early 1960s it became clear that the British government was intending to restrict entry (through the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962) [24]and this led to a rush of further immigration before the door was closed. From 1962 onwards the bulk of immigration

to Britain from the Indian subcontinent consisted of the wives and other dependents of earlier male settlers, despite fears over the potentially damaging effect of life in Britain on the cultural and moral well-being of women and children (Robinson 1986). Many of the early migrants went to work in old established centres of industrial production. This soon led to the growth of settlements inhabited by people who had come from the same village or area in Pakistan or Bangladesh, a pattern strengthened further by family reunion (Anwar 1979; Ballard 1994). Places of worship, shops, businesses and community centres were built up around them; encapsulated patterns of settlement made it possible for many people to live entirely amongst their fellow migrants (Dahya 1974; Anwar 1979; Robinson 1986).

Further immigration to Britain occurred due to upheavals in the Indian subcontinent, the Arab world and other regions such as Cyprus and Africa. The revolution in Egypt in 1952 and in Iraq in 1958 forced political refugees to find a new home in Britain and other parts of the world. The Iranian community in Britain increased due to the Iranian revolution. Those who came to Britain settled primarily in and around London. Some continued their political activities with respect to their home countries from the British capital. With the oil boom of the 1970's a large number of Arab entrepreneurs established their companies as well as a second residence in Britain. It was calculated that by with the arrival of immigrants from the New Commonwealth in the 1950's and 1960's, ethnic minorities became more visible and changed the colour of life in Britain. Britain has become irrevocably multi-racial and can no longer be regarded a purely 'white society'. Immigration is temporary or permanent. Labour immigrants did not originally intend to settle in the new land, whilst refugees have little control over their departure and return. Therefore, reasons for leaving one's country are essential in determining the process of adaptation to the new environment.

However, the situation changed drastically when families of the immigrant workers started to join them; for example, in many cases a whole village immigrated to Britain. It soon becomes clear that, though the first generation never gave up the dream of returning home, in fact they were here for good. It is because of this process of permanent settlement that the situation of immigrant communities became problematic, for many of the cultural practices of these communities did not fit in with those of the host culture which was not ready to acknowledge and recognise the cultural sensitivities of the incomers. As mentioned above, British studies of the immigrants were generally done under the umbrella term `race', and `ethnicity' that clearly indicates the desire of the host culture to define the immigrant communities in terms of the politics of assimilation. Nevertheless, it seems that most people within the South Asian

communities in Britain rejected the assimilation option. The first generation of Muslims who came to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s initially went into manual work in the manufacturing industry; textiles and metals. But since the mid-1970s there has been a major structural change in the British economy; a general shift in employment trends away from manufacturing to service and knowledge-based sectors.

In the following section the major characteristics of the Muslim communities in the UK will be discussed in detail. 2.2.4 British Muslims in numbers:

According to the latest census data Muslims are the second largest religious minority group in the UK:

Table 2.1: Religion in the 2011 Census:

Religion	Total Population	%
Christian	33,243,175	59.3
Muslim	2,706,066	4.8
Hindu	816,633	1.5
Sikh	423,158	0.8
Jewish	263,346	0.5
Buddhist	247,743	0.4
Any other religion	240,530	0.4
No religion	14,097,229	25.1
Religion not stated	4,038,032	7.2
All	56,075,912	100

The increase in the Muslim population is consistent with other faith groups and migration patterns. For example, the Hindu population has increased by 48% between 2001 and 2011. Immigrants have a younger age profile and hence are more likely to start families for example Poland is the most common country of birth for non-UK born mothers in Britain (20,495 babies in 2011).

Muslims form 4.8% of the population in England and Wales. The population has increased from 1.55 million in 2001 to 2.71 million in 2011. There are 77,000 Muslims in Scotland and 3,800 in Northern Ireland. • The Muslim population is larger than all other non-Christian

faith groups put together. • 47% of Muslims are UK-born. (Consensus 2011). The majority of Muslims (76%) live in the inner city conurbations of Greater London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside. Muslims form 12.4% of London's population. • There are 35 Local Authority Districts with a Muslim population of 10% or more. There are about 70 wards with a Muslim population of 40% or more. • The Muslim population of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets has increased from 71,000 in 2001 to 88,000 in 2011 (19%). The increase in London as a whole is 35%.

The Muslim population is highly ethnically diverse with adherents from all racial backgrounds it comprises of 68% Asian (1.83 million of 2.71 million) and 32% non-Asian. 1 in 12 is of White ethnicity (8% of the Muslim population) of the 56.1 million population of England and Wales, 48.2 million are in the 'White' ethnic category, and 7.9 million in the rest. (Consensus 2011).

Table 2.2: Country of Birth of Muslim Population

	Muslims			Muslim Population Change		
Country of Birth	2001	%	2011	%	2001-2011	%
United Kingdom	718,226	46.4	1,278,283	47.2	560,057	48.3
Republic of Ireland	1,135	0.1	3,677	0.1	2,542	0.2
Other Europe	68,451	4.4	162,292	6.0	93,841	8.1
Africa	144,706	9.4	275,812	10.2	131,106	11.3
Middle east & Asia	599,848	38.8	977,037	36.1	377,189	32.5
The Americans & the Caribbean	5,422	0.4	7,991	0.3	2,569	0.2
Antarctica & Oceania (including Australasia)	494	-	966	-	472	-
Other	8,300	0.5	8	-	-8,292	-0.7
All	1,546,582		2,706,066		1,159,484	

33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or under in 2011, compared to 19% of the population as a whole. Only 4% of the Muslim population is 65 years+, compared to 16% of the overall population. In a decade from now there will be approximately 190,000 Muslims in the 65 to 84-year-old age band. (Consensus 2011).

There are about 260,000 Muslim married households with dependent children 35% compared to 15% for the overall population. This is consistent with the younger age profile. Muslims are less likely to be cohabiting than the population as a whole, reflecting the cultural and religious values of the Muslim community. There are over 77,000 Muslim lone parent families with dependent children. There are also over 135,000 one-person Muslim households. (Mcb Consensus report 2015).

46% (1.22 million) of the Muslim population resides in the 10% most deprived, and 1.7% (46,000) in the 10% least deprived, local authority districts in England, based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation measure. In 2001, 33% of the Muslim population resided in the 10% most deprived localities. Observation • There are well-established correlations between neighbourhood deprivation and poor general health, and between low family income and educational underachievement. These are not exclusively Muslim concerns and the impact is felt by individuals and communities irrespective of ethnicity or faith.

The Muslim community is ethnically diverse with significant numbers of Muslims from every ethnicity category recorded in the census. The largest ethnic category is 'Asian'. One in twelve Muslims are from white ethnic groups and 10% are from black ethnic groups. The ethnic diversity is increasing as the proportion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims is falling and the proportion of Muslims in the 'Black African, Black other' and 'Asian other' is rising. Table 3: Ethnicity of Muslim Population Muslims Muslim Population Change Ethnic Group

Geographical Distribution:

76% of the Muslim population live in four regions: London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire and The Humber.

Table 2.3: Muslim Population by Region:

Region	All	Muslims	Muslims as % of All Population	Muslims as % of Overall Muslim Population
London	8,173,941	1,012,823	12.4	37.4
West Midlands	5,601,847	376,152	6.7	13.9
North West	7,052,177	356,458	5.1	13.2
Yorkshire and The Humber	5,283,733	326,050	6.2	12.0
South East	8,634,750	201,651	2.3	7.5
East	5,846,965	148,341	2.5	5.5
East Midlands	4,533,222	140,649	3.2	5.2
South West	5,288,935	51,228	1.0	1.9
North East	2,596,886	46,764	1.8	1.7
Wales	3,063,456	45,950	1.5	1.7

Age Profile the Muslim population, in common with the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population, has a different age profile to the rest of the population. It is younger than the overall population with a much greater proportion of age 15 years or under, and a much smaller proportion over 65 than in the overall population. 33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or under in 2011 compared to 19% of the overall population; only 4% of Muslims were aged 65 or over compared to 16% of the overall population. The median age of the Muslim population is 25 years, compared to the overall population's median age of 40 years. A comparison of the Muslim population between 2001 and 2011 indicates that while there have been significant increases in the Muslim population at all ages the population does seem to be getting older overall: the 25- 64 age group seeing the biggest gain in both absolute numbers (604,222) and in their share of the overall Muslim population (from 44.3% to 47.7%), and the 16-24 age group seeing the biggest fall in their share of the Muslim population (from 18.2% to 15.3%). This along with the growth in the 0-4 age group suggests

that the Muslim population is increasingly shifting from school age towards young and middle-aged adults.

Table 2.4: Change in Muslim Population Age Profile 2001-2011:

	Muslims				Muslim Population Change	
Age Group	2001	%	2011	%	2001-2011	%
0 -4	176,264	11.4	317,952	11.7	141,688	80.4
5 -15	346,596	22.4	577,185	21.3	230,589	66.5
16 -24	281,628	18.2	414,245	15.3	132,617	47.1
25 -64	685,636	44.3	1,289,858	47.7	604,222	88.1
65 plus	56,502	3.7	106,826	3.9	50,324	89.1
All	1,546,626		2,706,066		1,159,440	

In ten years from now there will be approximately 190,000 Muslims in the 65 to 84-year-old age band, based on a simple extrapolation of the population in the 55 to 74 year old age band in 2011, not taking into account mortality and emigration.

Table 2.5: Muslims in 55 to 74-year-old Age Band, 2011:

Age Group	Muslims	Muslims as % of Overall Muslim Population
55-59	75,000	2.8
60-64	46,890	1.7
65-69	33,457	1.2
70-74	33,742	1.2
	189,089	

2.4 Employment of Muslims:

Muslim population in fulltime employment is 19.8% compared to 34.9% in the overall population. The number of Muslims who are unemployed is 7.2% compared to 4.0% in the overall population.

29% of Muslim women between the ages of 16 to 24 are in employment compared to approximately half of the overall population 43% of the 329,694 Muslim full-time students are female; there are a number of local authority districts where the population of Muslim women in full-time education exceeds men. Muslim women in the 16-74 age band, 18% are 'Looking after home or family', compared to 6% in the overall population. (Consensus 2011).

The increased number of Muslim women in full-time education is leading to career expectations and aspirations for many, and the demands of looking after the home and family is reflected in the significant proportion of women not economically active. For many this is because family responsibilities after marriage take priority. Furthermore, Muslim women seeking employment are not finding commensurate support and equal opportunities. 71.2% of Muslim women aged 16-24 are not in employment (MCB Census report 2015). This analysis which released by the MCB is very biased not mentioning the fact it's not just due to inequality that Muslims women are lacking in employment but it's a result of number of factors like cultural and sometimes wrong understanding of religion and imposing the concept of purdah and the families not allowing them to work but it is changing with time.

The higher levels of unemployment amongst Muslims as compared to the overall population are the outcome of numerous factors; however there is now enough evidence of the double penalty faced in entering the labour market of racial discrimination as well as Islamophobia. (MCB Consensus report 2015).

2.4.1: Education & Qualifications of British Muslims:

There has been a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications from 2001 to 2011: from 39% to 26%. The percentage of Muslims (over 16) with 'Degree level and above' qualifications are similar to the general population (24% and 27% respectively). • Few young Muslims take up apprenticeships (0.7% of the Muslim population in the 16-24 year old age band; for the population as a whole it is 3.6%). (Consensus 2011). The percentage of Muslims (over 16) with 'Degree level and above' qualifications is similar to the general population (24% and 27% respectively). • Few young Muslims take up apprenticeships (0.7% of the Muslim population in the 16-24-year-old age band; for the population as a whole it is 3.6%). There has been a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications from 2001 to 2011: from 39% to 26%

The proportion of Muslim adults with degree level and above qualifications is similar to the general population, at 24% compared with 27%. In the last census, there were 329,694 Muslim full-time students, of which 43% were women. However, just 5.5% of Muslims have jobs defined as a "higher professional occupation", compared with 7.6% of the overall population. Economic activity among Muslims is lower than the overall population as a whole. In 2011, 19.8% of Muslims were in full-time employment, compared with 34.9% of the overall population.

Despite high numbers of Muslim women in full-time education, the findings show that within the 16 to 74 age band, 18% of Muslim women are "looking after home and family", compared with 6% in the overall population. Half of all Muslims live in the most deprived local authority districts in England an increase since 2001, when the figure was one in three.

Take education as an example, the academic attainment level of many Muslim children remained unacceptably low compared to their white peers and many other immigrant minorities especially Hindus and Sikhs. In 1983 the Swann committee observed that in the majority of schools it visited 'there was a strong feeling that Muslims migrant pupils as a group were under achieving 27% of Pakistani and 51% of Bengali's possessed no formal qualification and Turkish Cypriot were singled out as giving particular concern (Ansari 2004:304).

In 2004 a third (33%) of Muslims of working age in Britain had no qualification, the highest proportion for any religious group. They were least likely to have degrees or equivalent qualification (12%).

Take the labour market and one will see the unemployment rate for Muslims are higher than those for any other group or religion. In 2004 Muslims had the highest rate of unemployment in Britain at 13 %. This was about three times the rate for Christian men at 4%. Unemployment rates for men in other religious groups were between 3 and 8 %. The proportion of Muslims in the 'Higher professional occupation' category is 5.5%, which is comparable to the overall population – 7.6%. There is greater comparability in the 'Small employers and own account workers' category – 9.7% in the Muslim population and 9.3% in the overall population. • There are a number of London boroughs where the population of Muslims in the 'Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations' category exceeds the number in the 'Never worked and Long-term unemployed' categories.

Men and women of working age from the Muslim faith are also more likely than other faith groups to be economically inactive. Among men Muslims had the highest overall levels of economic inactivity in 2004, 31%, compared to Christians at 16%. Likewise, Muslim women were more likely than other women to be economically inactive. 69% of Muslim women were inactive. Christian women were least likely to be inactive 25%.

Muslim prisoners constitute an increasing proportion of prison population. Since 1993 the number of Muslim prisoners has risen threefold, from 2,106 in March 1993 to 6,136 in June 2003. There are currently over 7000 Muslims in British prisons. In total Muslims make up 10% of the prison population and rising.

There are number of reasons that can be attributed to these situations. The low achievement that the Muslims have made can be due to fact that the Muslims who came and lived in Britain had no formal education they were illiterate. Another argument is that almost all the Muslims living in Britain are from poorer working class families therefore their achievement level is low. Research finding support the view that there is a strong correlation between low academic achievement and social factors like high level of poverty, ghettoisation and residence in deprived neighbourhoods, parental unemployment and parents employed in unskilled or semiskilled jobs (1).

There is a wide range of other factors that may, either singly or in combination contribute to low achievement levels. Social class and levels of fluency in English are key issues linked to attainment, as are more nebulous factors, like parent expectations, peer group pressure individual motivation and school effectiveness. (Haque British Muslims and Education 2000 minority Ethnic attainment. Pp.21-22).

2.4.2 Homeless and Prison Population among the British Muslims:

While 2.2% of the overall population are in hostels or temporary shelters for the homeless, this is 5.1% within the Muslim population. For Census purposes, the enumeration of the prison population applies to persons serving a sentence of 6 months or more or who are convicted but not sentenced. The Muslim prison population is disproportionately large, including offenders in the younger age bands. Table 16: Muslims and Institutionalised Population in prison establishments, June 2012; More up-to-date data on the prison population is available from the Ministry of Justice. These indicate that there were 86,067 people in prison in England and Wales as of July 2013, approximately 0.15% of the overall

population. Muslims account for 4.8% of the overall population and 13% of the prison population in England and Wales (including both British and non-British nationals). The proportion of the Muslim population in prison (0.42%) is not dissimilar to persons in the 'Other Religious Group' category.

Muslims of 'Asian or Asian British' ethnicity who comprise 68% of the overall Muslim population form 41% of the Muslim prison population. Muslims of the 'Black or Black British' ethnicity comprising 10% of the overall Muslim population, form 31% of the Muslim prison population. It would therefore be wrong to generalise that Muslims in detention are predominantly of Asian ethnicity. Since the Stephen Lawrence inquiry there has been greater awareness of the over-representation of African Caribbean young men in prison, with contributory factors such as an institutionally racist criminal justice system; there are however broader issues of social disadvantage at play as well.1

Table 2.6: Muslims and Institutionalised Populations:

Establishment type	All	%	Muslim	%
Prison service	51,659	5.5	4,838	15.5
Approved premises	1,150	0.1	81	0.3
Detention Centres and Other Detention	11,565	1.2	1,364	4.4
Hostel or Temporary Shelter for the Homeless	20,868	2.2	1,587	5.1

Table 2.7: Prison Population by Religion:

Religious Group	Prison Population	Prison as % of All Prison Population	Religion Group's Prison Population as % of its population in England and Wales
Christian	43,176	50.2	0.13
Muslim	11,248	13.1	0.42
Hindu	456	0.5	0.06
Sikh	777	0.9	0.18
Buddhist	1,756	2.0	0.67
Jewish	252	0.3	0.10
Other Religious Group	1,077	1.3	0.45
No religion	25,269	29.4	0.18
Not recorded	2,037	2.4	0.05
All	86,067		0.15

2.5: Inequalities faced by British Muslims:

Just under half (46% or 1.22 million) of the Muslim population lives in the 10% most deprived and 1.7% (46,000) in the 10% least deprived, Local Authority Districts in England, based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation measure. In 2001, 33% of the Muslim population resided in the 10% most deprived localities. Research from a very recent project showed that Muslim households have a higher risk of poverty than members of other religions. The project documented the risks of poverty in different religious groups, and investigates some of the main potential causes and barriers. The authors find major differences in the prevalence of poverty between people of different religious affiliations. Muslims were most likely to be found in poverty (50 per cent).

A large proportion of the Muslim population, like the BME population, live in the poorer, deprived neighbourhoods. There are well-established correlations between neighbourhood deprivation and poor general health, or between low family income and educational underachievement. These are not exclusively Muslim concerns and the impact is felt by individuals and communities irrespective of ethnicity or faith.

2.6: Housing Tenure among British Muslims:

28% of Muslim households live in social housing as compared to 17% of overall households. A much smaller proportion of Muslim households own their own property outright as compared to the overall population 15% as compared to 31% overall. A much greater proportion of Muslims are living in privately rented accommodation 30% of Muslim households as compared to 18% overall. 35% of households of the Bangladeshi ethnic group reside in social housing as compared to only 13% of the Pakistani ethnic group. 41% of households of the Pakistani ethnic category reside in property that is owned with a mortgage (or loan or shared ownership), which is higher than the overall population (34%). While 31% in the overall population own their residence outright, this applies to only 9% of the Bangladeshi ethnic category population. This suggests that the 'right to buy' option has not b

Labour Market and Education 6.1 Economic Activity/Inactivity:

1 in 5 (19.8%) of the Muslim population is in full-time employment, compared to more than 1 in 3 of the general population (16-74 years old).

Table 2.8: British Muslims and Economic Activity:

	All	%	Muslims	%
Economically Active In Employment				
Employee: Part-time	5,701,111	12.5	236,206	13.0
Employee: Full-time	15,858,791	34.9	358,413	19.8
Self-Employed: Part-time	1,220,761	2.7	71,452	3.9
Self Employed: Full-time	2,823,552	6.2	99,466	5.5
Full-Time Students	1,077,353	2.4	65,759	3.6
Unemployed				
Unemployed	1,802,620	4.0	130,553	7.2

(excluding Full-time students				
Full-Time Students	334,167	0.7	37,801	2.1
Economically Inactive				
Retired	9,713,808	21.4	104,959	5.8
Student (Including Full-Time Students)	2,397,348	5.3	240,248	13.3
Looking After Home or Family	1,796,520	3.9	247,729	13.7
Long-Term Sick or Disabled	1,783,292	3.9	93,179	5.1
Other	987,457	2.2	125,164	6.9
All (ages 16-74)	45,496,780		1,810,929	

According to the data displayed in the above table, excluding students, the rate of unemployment for Muslims is nearly doubles that of the general population (7.2% compared to 4.0%).

The higher levels of unemployment compared to the overall population are the outcome of numerous factors, however there is now enough evidence of the double penalty faced in entering the labour market – of racial discrimination as well as Islamophobia. The Employment Equality Religion or Belief Regulations introduced in 2003 (and subsequently subsumed in the Equality Act 2010) were intended to address these very issues. Work is now needed to assess the impact of the imposition of positive duty on the public sector and inquire on the steps taken by appropriate agencies (e.g. the Equality & Human Rights Commission) in discharging this duty. The MCB has anecdotal evidence of a glass ceiling for management positions in sectors such as the media, with higher turn-over for BME employees. It has raised the issue of staff diversity with the BBC Trust. However further research is needed on the experiences of Muslim men and women in reaching and staying in the higher management positions.

2.9: Education & Qualifications percentage among British Muslims:

There has been a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications from 2001 to 2011: the 2001 Census indicated 39% with no qualifications, with 26% ten years later.

Table 2.9: British Muslims and Highest Level of Qualification

	2001				2011			
Highest Level of Qualification	All	%	Muslims	%	All	%	Muslims	%
No Qualifications	10,937,042	29.1	390,164	38.6	10,307,327	22.7	465,434	25.6
Level 1	6,230,033	16.6	122,509	12.1	6,047,384	13.3	245,043	13.5
Level 2	7,288,074	19.4	149,652	14.8	6,938,433	15.3	206,940	11.4
Apprenticeship	-	-	-	-	1,631,777	3.6	11,775	0.7
Level 3	3,110,135	8.3	94,630	9.4	5,617,802	12.3	179,253	9.9
Level 4 & above	7,432,962	19.8	208,241	20.6	12,383,477	27.2	434,742	24.0
Other Qualifications	2,609,192	6.9	44,918	4.4	2,570,580	5.7	268,742	14.8

Approximately a quarter of Muslims over the age of 16 have 'Level 4 and above' (i.e. degree and above) qualifications, which is only slightly lower than the general population. While 26% of Muslims have no qualifications, the percentages for Hindus and Sikhs are 13.2% and 19.4% respectively. The trend is also reflected in the proportion of the population with Level 4 qualifications and above: while 24% of Muslims have attained this level, it is 44.6% and 30.1% for Hindus and Sikhs respectively. The educational profile of the Muslim population in general therefore lags behind the Hindu and Sikh communities. Very few young Muslims take up apprenticeships (0.7% of the Muslim population in the 16-24-year-old age band; for the population as a whole it is 3.6%). There are a greater proportion of Muslims in educational halls of residence and similar facilities compared to the overall population: 60%

compared to 41%. This reflects the higher participation rates in higher education. Researchers have also pointed out a lower proportion in the Russell Group universities.

Muslim women in the 16-74 age band, 18% are 'Looking after home or family', compared to 6% in the general population. This might be due to the younger age distribution of the Muslim population resulting in higher fertility as well as the increased likelihood for Muslim households to be those with dependent children.

Table 2.10: British Women Looking after Home and Family by religion:

Religious Group	All Women (16-74)	Women 'Looking After Home or Family' (16-74)	Women 'Looking After Home or Family' as a % of All Women
Muslim	1,296,776	231,344	17.8
Hindu	395,579	33,521	8.5
Sikh	209,115	13,451	6.4
All (Female Ages 16-74)	28,502,536	1,614,326	5.7

British Asian Muslim families attach a great deal of importance to education. However, many parents, while wanting their daughters to receive education, are worried about the perceived corruptive influence of a largely secular society (Basit, 1995a). Schools are seen as a means of upward social mobility, but also a potential threat to pubescent daughters (Afshar, 1989). Nevertheless, Shaw (1994) observes that most young British Muslims, while giving the appearance of being thoroughly 'Westernised' in the sense of being fluent English speakers and holders of educational and professional qualifications, are often still committed to cultural distinctiveness and upholding their community's moral and religious identity.

2.12: CONCLUSION:

This chapter has discussed the significance of religion (Islam) in the lives of many Muslims settled in the UK. Islam contributes to the shaping of Muslim identities at both personal and collective levels. As for many young Muslims, Islam continues to provide them with a sense of belonging and affirmation that they are part of a worldwide Muslim society, *umma*. The chapter has also drawn attention to the fact that Islam is being increasingly perceived by the wider society as a threat. This has led to a gradual emergency of Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims. The rest of the chapter has analysed socio-economic status of the Muslim community in the UK, through exploring the data relevant data generated by the last two Censuses (2001 and 2011).

It appears that Muslim communities perform poorly on many of the socio-economic and educational assessment criteria. The overall picture is of a faith community that is growing in size, with an ethnic and socioeconomic diversity that is a microcosm of the changes in society at large. These concerning socioeconomic profile of the community have negative consequences for their desired integration into the wider society. Particularly the role of religion, which has a significant impact on the lives of British Muslims and they see issues around integration, gains importance to be explored further. Since the religious observes of the communities have roots in the historical migration process, it is crucial to examine further the emergence of the transnational Islamic movements in the migrants' country is of origin. This is the main task for the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3:

Major Islamic Revival Movements in the UK and their Historical Emergence in the Indian Subcontinent.

3. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the emergence of the Sunni Islamic revival movements within the context of British India. The nineteenth century saw the colonisation of Muslim lands by Western imperial powers, namely the British, French, Dutch, and other European nations. This in turn led to the transformation of Islamic societies in economic, political, social, and cultural terms. The aim of this chapter is to explore historical and cultural origins of the four major transnational Islamic movements operating in the UK which is the focus of the current study. The emergence of the movements and their theological and socio-political discourses will be explored in order to frame the research topic in its wider historical context.

3.1 Emergence of the Islamic Sunni revival movements in the Indian Subcontinent

The majority of Muslim minority communities in India belong to the mainstream Sunni Islam and reflect overwhelming features of diverse traditional Sufi spiritual traditions. However, a belief emerged amongst the religious scholars that the reason for the nation's colonial decline in political authority was due to the abandonment of true Islamic teachings alongside the contamination of many religious practices due to Hindu influences. This belief gave rise to *puritanical revival* [25]and reform movements such as the Ahl-e Hadith, the Deobandi and Jamat-e-Islami movements materialised afterwards in response the political situation in the 1930s.

Their focus was for religious *revival or reform* [26]to bring about changes to the community to form an ideal Islamic society according to their own perceived vision of 'ideal Islam'. The spiritually inclined Barelwi movement was founded as a reaction to these puritanical movements. The Barelwis sought to defend many of the practices which other movements considered to be innovation or even a form of blasphemy (*shirk)* in Islam. But before delving into details of the movements, their strategies, study of their visions, and their ideologies, it is important to explore the political and societal climate that allowed these movements to emerge. It is also imperative to explore socio-political and religious climate of the British

India, firstly to analyse how the spaces were created, and secondly to note which dominant factors invited the emergence of the Islamic movements.

The fall of the Mughal Empire (1526 -1857) in the nineteenth century and the subsequent emergence of the British colonial power was a deeply worrying incident for Indians, chiefly for the Muslims of India. In 1739, the decline began after the Battle of Karnal (1739), won by the Persian leader Nader Shah. During this period, Muslims began the development of 're-evaluating their ideals, organisation, priorities, and practices' (Robinson 1988: 4). Prior to this period religion was basically a highly localized affair, even matters of individual conduct and individual salvation. Their defeat at the hands of the British in 1857 was a rude awakening for the Muslims of India. This in turn promoted numerous separate reform and revival movements, each aimed at restoring what its leaders considered to be the reason behind Muslim regression. Religious leaders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries promoted internal reform as a response to Britain's colonial rule of India. They reasoned that if Muslims had lost political power after so many centuries of rule, it was because they had been religiously neglectful. Had they been "good" Muslims, they would have maintained resilience, and the British would never have been able to invade their home lands. (Sanyal, 2005:19).

The Mutiny of 1857 [27]was crucial in shaping the awareness and outlining the future role for the *ulama* of the sub-continent. First, it dismissed any misconceptions of lingering Muslim power, and brought into focus the weakness of the Muslims of India. The *ulama (*religious scholars) believed that this weakness was the result of spiritual decline and a desertion of the Islamic code of life a departure from both the form and spirit of the Shari'a. Ensuing reform efforts aimed at improving individual adherence to Islamic rulings, creating a community both watchful of detailed religious law and committed to spiritual progress. It is significant to note that the ulama did not resort to blaming the enemy for the failure suffered by Muslims, but rather sought to introspect, recognising a decline in religious knowledge and adherence as the root of the failure.

Religious knowledge had once been the concern of limited elite. However, the colonisation of India led to a number of trends emerging amongst the Muslim masses. One such movement, known as the Aligarh Movement, was founded by the influential modernist Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d.1898). He forwarded the notion that Muslim revival could be achieved only by assimilating Western culture, acquiring a Western education, and reinterpreting Islam based

upon reason as understood in modern Western philosophy. In other words, he sought a modernized, secularized version of Islam that would be in conformity with modern science and notions of progress.

3.2.1 Diversity in Islam and Islamic revivalism

Islamic revivalism enjoys a wide spectrum of thought with a diverse variation of ideas. These ideas contain differences based on the perspective and outlook of various scholars, but a shared theme throughout all theorists is the idea of the returning to the fundamental values of Islam. However, the questions as to when, in what form, and how the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism has emerged are all still under continuous discussion.

Islamic thought is multi-layered with several extending branches of ideology. It would be too voluminous and thus outside the scope of this research to consider the many different branches, sects and denominations in historical Islam. Therefore, this study will concentrate on the Sunni branch, which constitutes the majority of Islam's adherents, both in India as well as the wider world. Even Sunni Islam is also not streamlined or singular; it contains various different groups which may seek different policies for the same goals. This occurs due to the vast disparity of interpretation and proposed solutions stemming from sectarian differences and numerous legal Schools amongst Sunni scholarship.

Despite the theoretical unity conferred by membership of a single *ummah*, or world Community of Muslims, there have, since the earliest days of the Islamic polity, been divisions within the family of Islam. Early sectarian differences coalesced into the majority Sunni and minority Shi'a divisions. The development of theology and law from the first century of Islam led to the emergence of four Sunni Schools of law, as well as Shi'a ones for each of the Imami sects. In the succeeding centuries, splits and reform movements have brought about further subdivisions. Sufi brotherhoods were instrumental in the spread of Islam and the development of the mystical tendency within the faith. More recently, the nineteenth and twentieth century reform movements in the context of British India led to further divisions in sub continental Islam (Metcalf 1982; Sanyal 1996).

A core tenant in Islam is unity in diversity. But in reality, Muslims have arguably never been united in their history. Unity in diversity, the proclaimed special possession of true Islamic consciousness, is a mirage. Muslims have been historically averse to the idea that different

human interpretations of organisational and cultural performance of religion need not detract from the more common and superior notion of submission to God.

Sectarianism is inevitably dogmatic and thereby confers the assurance of superiority upon its adherents. People are always attracted to the self-assurance of being 'elect' or 'chosen'. By means of adherence to an elect creed, of course, one is guaranteed both rectitude and salvation (Hamid, 2016). Sectarianism also provides identity. Indeed, there is a general presumption amongst Muslim scholars as well as Western academies that all Muslims can be pigeonholed according to their sectarian identity. When resources and access to power are at stake, it may be valid to assert a particular identity.

The nineteenth century witnessed fundamental changes in Islamic thought throughout the world. Shah Wali Ullah Dehliwi (d.1762) was the pivotal father-figure of the nineteenth-century South Asian Muslim reform movements (Sanyal, 2005). Precisely during that time, the seeds of many dominant Islamic reformist and revivalist movements were implanted in Indian soil, and many of those movements have an alleged influence on the present-day Islamic militancy and grassroots activism around the world. Most of these Islamic movements have been influenced either by internal reform movements, such anti-Sufi, Wahhabi and Salafi movements, or arose in the face of rising neo-Hindu Shuddhi movement in British India.

It is widespread in the subcontinent that almost every Islamic movement, whether it is religio-social, religio-political, or religious educational and missionary, will attribute their activities to Shah Wali Ullah Dehlvi. They assert themselves as true heirs of his intellectual legacy, claiming to complete his intended mission. Sectarian visions do not emerge full-formed; they fashion historical narratives to explain the jostling for power and authority, which is often based on worldly affairs, with ideological, doctrinal, and creedal meaning. Johan Siebers notes, "a sect constitutes as alternative and incompatible reading of revelation against the orthodox ruling one", a reading it sees as more likely to deliver the justice it seeks". (Zaman, 2012: 22)

Rather than discussing all the traditionalist movements within the context of Subcontinent Islam, this study focuses on the Deobandis (including Tabligh-i Jamaat), and the Barelwis. They are analysed as patterns of traditionalist discourse which emerged in early modern India, since both have been influential in shaping Muslim religious belief, practice, and patterns of authority in the context of Britain. Revivalist movements such as Ahl-e Hadith

and Jammat-e-Islami will also be included in the analysis. Due to the limitations of this study, reformist- modernist movements originated in the region will not be discussed further.

3.3 Islamic revivalist movements of British India:

The roots of India's Islamist challenge can be traced back to late nineteenth century, where the seeds of dominant reformist and revivalist movements were implanted, namely: The Deoband, (Tablighi Jamaat), Ahl-e Hadith, and Jamaat-e-Islami. In due course, these movements have transcended the political boundaries of the subcontinent and have manifested at home and elsewhere. Arguably, Shah Wali Ullah Dehliwi' s idea set in motion a new trend in Indian Islam, inspiring a reformist Islam in the country while paving the way for numerous local and transnational Islamic movements.

The most prominent Shah Wali Ullah inspired movements in India are discussed below under three broad categories: 1) Pietist movements (Deoband school, Tablighi Jamaat, and Ahle Hadith); 2) Politically inclined movements (Jamaat-i-Islami-Hind); and (3) The spiritually inclined preservationist-traditional movements namely the Barelwi movement.

The Ahle Hadith, who in their extreme opposition to practices such as visiting the Prophet's grave, were labelled 'Wahhabi'. The 'Wahhabis' were followers of an iconoclastic late 18th-century reform movement in today's S. Arabia from their key ideologue Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.1792).

From colonial times until today, it is worth noticing that the label 'Wahhabi' is often used to discredit any reformist or politically active Islamic group. Another group that emerged during these years was popularly known as the 'Barelvi' movement, from the key figure Ahmad Raza Khan (1856 - 1921). Although they engaged in the same process of measuring current practice against Hadith, the prophetic traditions, it was more open to popular customary practices. These orientations, namely the 'Deobandi', 'Barelvi', or 'Ahl-e Hadith' movements, would come to define sectarian divisions among Sunni Muslims of South Asian background until today including the majority of Muslim communities in the UK.

3.4 Political conditions that led to the development of the Deobandi movement

After nearly a decade of events following 1857, coinciding with the downfall of the Mughal Empire and the advent of British colonial rule in India, the followers of Waliyu'llah and Sayyid Ahmad resurfaced in an organized way. The Darul Uloom, the Islamic seminary, in

Deoband was founded in north India in 1866. The perceived large-scale moral and spiritual degeneration among Muslims paved the way for the establishment of this institution. The Darul Uloom was established by two Islamic teachers, Muhammad Qasim Nanaotawi (1833-1880) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1826 – 1905). Their primary purpose was to rectify the perceived lack of religious education among the Muslims of British India.

The Deobandi movement was founded in 1867 in search of a more neo-traditionalist means of being Muslim in British India, accepting a reformed vision of Sufism expressed in various traditional spiritual traditions. Aiming to detach as much as possible the non-Muslim state, it is argued that the Deobandi *ulama* successfully produced a synthesis of both *shari'ah* (law) and *tariqah* (spirituality), the two main streams of Islamic tradition (Metcalf, 1982). Interestingly, both founders of the Deobandi movement, Mawlana Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi (d. 1880) and Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905), were members of the Chishtiyya tariqah. In addition, both Nanautavi and Gangohi were students of the Hadith teacher, Shah Abd al-Ghani Mujaddidi (d. 1878).

The rationale driving the traditional seminary approach is connected to the establishment of the Deobandi movement, which was developed as a reaction to the burgeoning influence of the British in India (Birt and Lewis, 2011:91; Gilliat-Ray, 2010:12). Sahin (2013:2) perceives this Muslim rejoinder to have been shaped by a defensive legal-political hermeneutics. The madrasah at Deoband was the outcome of this reactionary approach, and is now considered a continuation of Shah Waliullah's movement under a different strategy.

3.4.1 The inception of the Deoband Madrasah

The Deoband madrasah has modest beginnings. It has started under a pomegranate tree in the compound of an old mosque, with one teacher and one student. However, from its very inception the school was unlike earlier madrasahs; it emerged as part of an efflorescence of religious revivalism in nineteenth-century India. Although the pattern of reform was not confined to the Deobandis, they were its most important exemplars. Their first priority was the preservation and dissemination of the religious heritage, understood in the classical sense of authentic religious belief and practices the precondition for the transmission to new generations of a true Islamic formation. To this end, they created a network of financially independent seminaries, separate from traditional sources of aristocratic patronage, which was considered a diminishing asset in the new environment of British India.

Participants in the Deobandi movement (and its offshoots) have, for the most part, sought personal goals disconnected from state politics, the attainment of piety, religious knowledge, or even moral sociability. Instead, and have been more concerned to confront other Muslims as opposed to the 'West'. This is significant, as the 'West' is seen as a source of corruption to general Muslim masses (Metcalf, 2002).

The founders of Deoband knew such institutions well. Many of them, including three Deputy Inspectors of the Education Department, were government servants, while some others had attended British style educational institutions. They had thus gained close familiarity with the methods employed in the running of these institutions, and chose to compete with them on equivalent terms; the movement had a strategy by which to influence the social order (Metcalf 1989:92).

Ansari observes that the development of Deoband scholarship was based upon an understanding that Islamic norms must be interpreted literally in accordance to the scriptures of the Qur'an and *hadith* [28]literature (2004:347). Furthermore, the objective of the Deobandis was to preserve and disseminate the religious and theological heritage to a generation reared under the duress of colonial rule. Thus, the seminaries were explicitly designed to cater for the Muslim masses. The Deobandis dominated the sectarian environment and were often embroiled in fatwa-wars against rival sectarian movements, in particular their most notable counterpart, the Barelwi movement (Metcalfe, 1982).

From its inception, the Deobandi School was opposed to the more modernist approach of Syed Ahmed Khan [29](d.1898), who wanted to mainstream the marginalised Muslims. Deobandis wanted to protect and preserve 'true' Islam which had been handed down to them over the centuries. Its leaders generally identified true Islam with the one propagated Waliullah's movement the Deoband School remained antithetical to the ideas of Syed Ahmed Khan, partly due to Ahmed Khan's proximity and fondness to the British and Western scientific education.

The Deobandi scholars and schools refer to the purist and reformist interpretation of the Hanafi School of Law in Sunni Islam. It has now spread through an estimated 2,000 schools in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and beyond. The Deobandi cultural style has been frugal and text-based, fighting against "impermissible innovations" (bida') for the "true Islam". This leads the Deobandis to polemically attack most other traditions of Islam as well as non-Muslims. Their political approach is split between oppositional polemics and a Pietist

yearning for learning. Although Deobandi leaders were against the religions of the Hindus and Christian British, they considered the biggest threat to true Islam to be the social-cultural and spiritual practices of folk Islam.

Deoband became the name of not only an institution, but of a particular orientation towards religious knowledge as well as the method of its transmission. It came to signify commitment to a particular legal methodology and style of institutionalized spirituality. As Barbara Metcalf elucidates, the *ulama* and their schools were Deobandi. Increasingly, the name of Deoband came to represent a distinct style, a *maslak*, of Indian Islam. Ulama were, and continue to be, defined as Deobandi because of their association with Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband. Affiliation can arise by having studied in the school, one of its affiliated madrassahs, or any madrassah modelled after it. This is because of their commitment to traditionalism, in particular the legal and spiritual orientation fostered at the institution. The founders of the school gained support by utilising various types of new technologies, from printing presses to the post office to railroads; they shifted from a reliance on increasingly constrained princely patronage, to readily-based contributions. Deoband spun off some two-dozen other seminaries across the sub-continent by the end of the 19th century.

Originally intended to be a reformist movement, Darul Uloom Deoband became the most pivotal institution for Islamic learning in India. It largely emphasised individual spiritual discipline, but opposed any veneration of saints, even though the movement was rooted in the tradition of some Sufi orders. The Deoband's influence spread far and wide in due course, becoming more pervasive than any other contemporary Islamic movement. Arguably, the Deoband's influence spread due to two of its inspired offshoots, Tablighi Jamaat (TJ, though an independent movement, has motives similar to the Deoband's dawat o tabligh wing), and the Jamiatul Ulema-i Hind (JUIH, Association of Indian *ulema*).

The Deoband movement was not overtly apolitical, though it strictly adhered to the principle of keeping politics at bay. Although the Deobandis are labelled by Barelwis as being 'Wahhabi', they never sought to eliminate Sufism, but rather intended to integrate it into an obedient religious life (Metcalf, 1982:145). Thus, the Deobandis emphasised the importance of all Islamic knowledge accumulated over the centuries, following established Sunni Schools of law in both beliefs and practices.

The first hundred years of Darul Uloom witnessed large numbers of Islamic graduates flocking to India from places such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, and

Malaysia. The dawat o tabligh (preaching and propagation) wing of Darul Uloom Deoband, which has been most active in post-independence India, was initiated against the rise of the Hindu Shuddhi movement, aimed at the conversion of Indian Muslims to Hinduism.

3.5 Tablighi Jamaat:

The Tablighi Jama'at (TJ) is a global missionary movement of Sunni Islam originated in India. By various accounts, it is the largest transnational Islamic grassroots movement in the world. Estimates of its followers range between 12 and 80 million people (Masud, 2014). As a missionary-based, activist-oriented informal grouping, TJ aims to teach Muslims "how to become true Muslims" (Masud, 2000). It is a pietist movement working for the faith renewal among Muslims. It gained its traction through the demise of the Khilafat Movement[30]. It grew as a movement to purify the Meo tribes of Mewat during the communal competition in early twentieth century India, eventually becoming the most widely-followed movement in the Muslim world. TJ shares an interest in the fundamental religious reform but peddles its programme across a much wider social base. It is particularly well known for its practice of 'apolitical' proselytisation, calling 'lapsed' Muslims, not to Deobandi madrasas, but rather to Deobandi mosques. In a growing number of Muslims countries, it has transcended communities of South Asian migrants, establishing a solid presence. It has become a major force in orthodox Islam, strengthening conservative and Pietist attitudes. It refuses to take a pragmatic stand on social or political issues, though it strongly impacts them in various ways.

The origins of the Tablighi Jamaat go back to Mewat, north India, and the Deobandi tradition originated from the Dar'ul Uloom madrasah in Deoband, Uttar Pradesh. The movement was formed in 1926 by one of the teachers in a Deoband madrash, Mualana Muhammad Ilyas Khandhalawi (d.1944). Today, it is active in almost every country where there is Muslim presence. One scholar observed that TJ had spread to 165 countries (Faruqi, 1992:43).

Origins of the Tablighi Jamaat stem from the same ideology as the Deobandi. However, they sought to take Islam to the peasant uneducated Muslims through their missionary work. When Maulana Muhammad Ilyas laid the foundations of this movement in Mewat in 1927, Hindu movements of Shudhi and Sanghtan were at their peak. The objective of Hindu movements was to bring the neo-Muslims back to the fold of their ancestral religion. Sikand (2002) identifies it as the key-factor in the launching of the Tablighi Jamaat movement. Darul Uloom Deoband had established a department of "Safeguarding and Proselytizing Islam"

(shoba-e-tableegh-o-hifazat-i-Islam). In some ways, it represented an intensification of the original Deobandi commitment to individual regeneration, distinct from any explicit political programme. The Tablighis put their weight wholly towards reshaping individual lives. Their primary focus is the hereafter, giving little importance to this present worldly life.

There are parallel movements in other faiths. Its methodology of missionary work is akin to the Christian Jehovah's witnesses, but unlike the Jehovah's witnesses, they do not seek to convert non-Muslims. Rather, they aim to shepherd less committed Muslims back into the fold of practicing Islam, inviting them to join the group's missionary work (Bowen 2014:3). The Tablighi Jamaat does not approach non-Muslims themselves; the idea is that non-Muslims should feel an urge to emulate their good character and thus should be approached. This is the "Method of Proselytizing non-Muslims". (Masud, 2000) Tablighi Jamaat nonetheless took its impetus from a desire to move the dissemination of Islamic teachings away from the madrasa, the heart of Deobandi activity, to inviting 'lay' Muslims, high and low ranking, learned and illiterate, to share the obligation of enjoining others to faithful practice. It also differed from the original movement because it eschewed debate with other Muslims over jurisprudential niceties and resultant details of practice. The Tablighi Jamaat's primary aim is to propagate and reform those Muslim who are not active in their religious observance. They believe they can only pass the Islamic call to those of other religions once they have made these non-practising Muslims active in the religion.

Another noteworthy aspect of the Tablighi Jamaat's work is that the majority of its activities are for men only. Female jamats are far more infrequent than the males Jamaats. While men tend to make use of the mosques, females stay at the homes of other Tablighi member's homes. Using the mosque is seen as unrealistic, as 40% of Deobandi mosques do not admit women (Nasqbandi, *source Bowen 2014*). A pattern emerged whereby participants are called to spend one night a week, one weekend a month, 40 consecutive days a year, and 120 consecutive days a year, at least once in their lives engaged in Tablighi missions.

Women would generally work among other women. Occasionally, they would travel with their men folk on longer tours. Although Tablighis in principle were content to use any mosque as their base while traveling, over time, specific mosques throughout the world have come to be known as 'Tablighi mosques' (Bowen 2014). Periodic convocations were also held with no formal bureaucracy or membership records, it is hard to calculate the exact number of Tablighi participants, but towards the end of the 20th century, annual meetings of

perhaps two million people would congregate for three-day meetings in Raiwind, Pakistan, and Tungi, Bangladesh, and large regional meetings were regularly held in India. (Bowen 2014).

Despite its low-tech and old fashion methods, the Tablighi Jamaat has proven highly successful in recruiting Muslims. Correcting the religious actions of the common Muslim remained the focal point of the movement, as initiated by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. He yearned for the masses to return to their religion, but acknowledged that seminaries and convents were not enough. Only those who were already close to religion, he argued, would come to such places. Thus, he thought it was necessary to go from door to door and sincerely ask the people to study the religion. Since then, his movement's target audience was the common Muslim, and the organisation was structured accordingly.

The TJ believe that the modern world is in a state of ignorance. They therefore attempt to bring about a change by infusing its followers with Islamic values and practices. The TJ movement is essentially conservative in outlook and orientation, with a strong aversion to rational sciences. According to Jorgen Nielsen, (1999:53) TJ acts as the "active pietism of the Deoband movement" with TJ providing the foot soldiers (missionaries) and Deoband providing the mosques.

3.5.2 'Tarbiyyah' systems of the TJ:

TJ invites common Muslims to join missionary walks (*gasth/jawla*), which are conducted in the local neighbourhood, as well as travelling to other cities and countries. For this purpose, they form missionary groups (*jama'at)* of five to ten people headed by a leader. They visit a local mosque where they reside and sleep. From there, they invite Muslims from the local neighbourhood for prayer and inspirational talks (*bayan),* during which they call volunteers for further missionary travels following the same pattern. There is a fixed roster of missionary tours for followers which are cumulative and undertaken in ascending order; three days, forty days (*chilla*[31]), four months (*grand chilla*), and seven or twelve months. After exhausting the local neighbourhood, other cities and countries are targeted for a missionary sortie *(khuruj*). Those who complete the grand *chilla* are considered to be components of spiritual elite. In many countries, special congregations are held for them. After returning from their travels, they are expected to provide a report (*karguzari*) on the local conditions

and results of their missionary efforts. The Tablighi preachers are easily recognisable by their flowing white grows, untrimmed beards, and traditional headgear.

The Tablighi understanding of Islam is put forward in six points[32]. Their leader and followers regard these points as the essentials, but their critics accuse these points of being reductionist and uneducated. Other recommendations have been grouped in sets of four points, aimed at providing guidance to new members. They include the things to avoid (question, desire, spend, and take from others without express permission, rejection of criticism, competition, and pride). Religious education *(ta'lim)* is considered another pillar of Tablighi activism. Tablighi workers are required to read essays written by Maulana Muhammad Zakariya (1898-1982). In addition, every Muslim is encouraged to learn how to read the Qur'an in Arabic with correct pronunciation.

Founded in the context of the highly sectarian background of South Asian Islam, the Tablighi Jama'at seeks to unite Sunni Muslims on the basis of the reformist and purist tradition of the Deoband seminary founded in 1866. However, the TJ is heavily criticised by activists of the rival Barelwi tradition for its defence of Deobandi creedal concepts. The movement came into being in response to reclamation efforts of Hindu missionary groups attempting to re-convert nominal Muslims back into the fold of Hinduism, to which their ancestors had allegedly belonged. The TJ emphasises face-to-face encounters when communicating the Tablighi message. The use of new technologies, cassettes, videos, and websites are all disparaged. The TJ publishes its literature with emphasis on a narrow range of texts, relying primarily on oral traditions and narratives.

The TJ has no formal criteria for membership, with multi-level participation from full time missionaries, to semi-skilled part-time and full-time workers, as well as well-educated professionals and businessmen. The TJ seek people who can devote time or money to travel with the Jamaat, whether regularly or occasionally, to pray, congregate, and listen to the discussions. TJ is headquartered in Raiwind (Pakistan) where it hosts its annual gathering of over three million adherents every November. After which, Tablighis are sent out to different places throughout the world. The TJ's secrecy of activities partly flows from its dynastic flavour. The available information (Hamid 2016) suggests that its Emir (top leader) presides over a *shura* (council), which plays an advisory role.

Metcalf (1982) argues that a lack of involvement in politics does not necessitate the TJ's shunning of facilities offered by the state. When needed, TJ never hesitates to utilise

governmental assistance to secure permits for buildings and meetings, as well as visas for travel. She is of the view that, given the exigencies and opportunities presented by state recognition, TJ seems to have adopted a higher institutional profile in the West than in its origin of South Asia.

Metcalf believes that with its focus on individual character, TJ works well within secular regimes, implicitly fostering privatisation of religion associated with the modern liberal state. Worldly affairs do not concern TJ, as they believe in changing individual belief and behaviour as opposed to the state. They thus remain disengaged from non-Muslim communities and avoid theological debates. Metcalf opines that the apolitical nature of TJ resembles the privatisation of religion in a secular state, since the members are completely aloof from modern discourses. (Hamid, 2015:13). With its conviction that any country under non-Muslim rules was *dar-ul-Harb*, it also joined other Islamic radicals in obstructing the integration of the common Muslims into the social and cultural mainstream of the country of their residence.

3.6 The Ahl-e Hadith/Salafis

Similar to the Tablighi Jamaat, the Ahl-e Hadith (AH) movement has been influential in the subcontinent, the Ahl-e Hadith (AH) are the *salafis* of the subcontinent. They have active ties with Saudi salafis and strong diaspora links. Literally translated as the "People of the Tradition of the Prophet," AH are termed *ghair muqallid* [33](non-conformist) by rival Islamic movements, mostly due to the movement's non-conformism to any of the four Schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Ahl-e Hadith, which challenged the customary Indian Islamic ethos and associated practices, was founded by Sayyid Nazir Hussain (d1902), who belonged to a family of judges that practiced at the Mughal court**.**

The Ahl-e Hadith was the first modem reform movement to systematically challenge the cosmology of the Indian Sufi orders, in particular Shaykh Ibn Arabi's concept of the Unity of Being, *wahdat al wujuud.* These `anti-Sufis' were of the opinion that it was incumbent upon Muslims to revert back to the primary textual sources of Islam: the Qur'an and Hadith, rejecting not only the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, but also all aspects of devotional Islam. Rahman argues that the Ahl-e Hadith "constitute almost a complete break with the medieval past and seek to resuscitate the pristine Islam of the earliest centuries" (Rahman, 1966: 205).

Most of AH's followers originated from the higher strata of society in the initial years of its formation. Although not as widespread in India as TJ, this revivalist group grew over the years as a major Islamic movement in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Middle Eastern countries. Ahle Hadith had its origins in early nineteenth century north India; The AH movement was launched to revive Islam on the basis of its fundamental principles (Sikand, 2005).

As Olivier Roy (1994) argues, modern Salafis seek a 'deculturation' of Islam as practiced by the majority of Muslims. They seek to remove its folk customs and de-link it from national and regional cultural additions by arguing that a strict constructionist interpretation of the Quran and *Sunnah* is sufficient to guide Muslims for all time and through all contingencies, and that these sources are perspicuous. Alongside these beliefs, they feel that Muslims should practice *al-wala al-bara* [34]towards non-Muslims and therefore not develop any kind of friendship with people who are regarded as disbelievers. Contemporary Salafis have concentrated their energies on the correction of religious beliefs and practices from within Muslim societies. Salafi critics often use the term Salafi interchangeably with the term 'Wahhabi', which is derived from the name of the nineteenth century reformer Muhammad ibn 'Abd al Wahhab (1703-92). Al-Wahhab and his followers were noted for their violent puritanical zeal to purge the Arabian Peninsula from the cultural traditions, which they believed were polytheistic practices. Salafis themselves reject 'Wahhabi' as a designation, claiming they follow the Salaf al-salih and do not identify themselves through the veneration of the eighteenth century reformer (Hamid, 2016: 52)

Wahhabism's contribution to Salafism lay in its strengthening of a xenophobic attitude towards foreigners as well as its sectarianism towards non-Wahhabi Muslims. On the basis of the principle of loyalty and disavowal, Muslims were called upon to distance themselves from other Muslims who do not adhere to Wahhabism. A true believer could only express his belief and sincerity of his faith by demonstrating open enmity towards 'idolaters' or even sympathisers of idolaters (Hamid, 2016:52)

Ahl-e-Hadith is not apolitical, and in fact many of its followers have actively participated in politics, aiming to restore the Caliphate. The defining feature of Salafism is the insistence on correct, religiously 'pure' belief and action. The desire for religious purity is articulated in the discourse of purity of belief, body, and social interactions. This is manifested in the continuous state of boundary maintenance between Muslims and non-Muslims, and even between pure and impure Muslims. The idea of theological purity encapsulated in the slogan

of returning to the Quran and *Sunnah* is one of the more familiar catchphrases in the linguistic repertoire of Salafis. Oftentimes, its use indirectly hints at the impurity or deficiency of the non-salafi Muslims.

In Salafi thought, the idea of following the Sunnah is closely linked to the constant vigilance against *bid'a,* which is, according to them, an ever-present threat to the true prophetic example. They blame Muslims historically for allowing newly converted peoples to retain vernacular customs that allowed syncretism and all manner of religious innovations to challenge the Sunnah. Therefore, as Roy (2001) argues, modern Salafis seek a 'deculturation' of Islam as practiced by the majority of Muslims by removing its folk customs and de-linking it from national and regional cultural additions. This is done by 'arguing that a strict constructionist interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah is sufficient to guide Muslims for all time and through all contingencies, and that these sources are perspicuous.

Most AH followers were originally comprised of the higher strata of society in the initial years of its formation. The Ahl-e Hadith originated in the early nineteenth century in northern India. The movement has inspired personalities such as the pioneer of the Barelwi movement Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921). The founders of AH insisted that Muslims revert back to the original sources of their faith: Quran and Hadith. AH was launched to revive Islam on the basis of its fundamental principles.

3.7 The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

In contrast to TJ and other pietistic movements, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), originally based on a political Islamist ideology, emerged in the last decade of British rule in India. Unlike all previous Islamic movements in India, JI was the first politically organised Islamic reformist movement. It came into existence in August 1941 in Lahore under the leadership of Syed Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979). He formed JI as an alternative to both leading political parties of that time, the Congress Party and the Muslim League. He envisioned the supreme purpose of Islam to establish the sovereignty of God on earth, or in other words, an Islamic State. He argued that the principles and modalities for setting up God's government on earth were outlined in the Quran and the Hadith.

In contrast to TJ's apolitical character, JI propounded Islamic theocracy and gradually became influential in many Muslim countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as in West Asia and many Southeast Asian countries. One leading scholar has categorized JI in

contrast to other contemporary Islamic movements as integrationist. In other words, it seeks to establish an Islamic State through participation in the constitutional political processes (Mausood, 1992).

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is one of the most effectively organised religious-political movements, playing a critical role in shaping the nature and content of Islamic political discourse in Pakistan. It was conceived as a holy community with a high standard of ideological commitment, a limited membership, and a well organised hierarchy. Its leadership has always been educated and intellectually well-armed to influence the popular mind on issues relating to the Muslims and the Muslim world. It has produced more activists than ideologues. JI believes that the interests of Muslims can only be protected by pursuing Islamic principles through the transforming of the social order by political means. According to Mawdudi, Islam is a complete way of life, regulating all aspects of life; the *Shari'ah* does not recognise any division between state and religion, a Western invention (Geaves, 1996:183).

Mawdudi's political vision is based on religious doctrines that hold the notion that "God alone is sovereign" (Robinson, 1988:18) as their nucleus. Men have gone astray because, "Nationalism, secularism, and Western models for democracy are all based on the idea of sovereignty of people" (Geaves, 1996:183). Furthermore, he noted problems in Islamic faith and history. He argued that "Original true faith had been corrupted by later accretions, leading to *Jahiliyyah* (ignorance, paganism in pre-Islamic faith) and *kufr* (disbelief)" (Nasr, 1996:59). All worldly matters directed the Muslims' attention from the divine to the mundane. Political power is essential to change this situation and reveal Islamic faith. The state is merely God's vice-regent (*khalifa*) on earth (Robinson, 1988:18).

3.7.1 The Formation of the J.I

The South Asian Jamaat-I-Islami is considered the second oldest Islamist movement after the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood. Although founded by a gathering of 75 men in Lahore on the 24th of August 1941, its ideological foundation was grounded a decade earlier when Sayyid Abu I-A'la Mawdudi (1979) began to develop the first self-contained modern theory of an Islamic State. Mawdudi is considered the sole driving force of the movement, and his influence persists even until today, even if not always directly visible in daily life.

The ideology that Mawdudi began to sketch out in the subsequent decade rested on the assumption that the Western political conceptions of secularism, nationalism, and democracy

are completely incompatible with Islam. Being well aware of the requisites of his time, however, Mawdudi did not opt for a verbatim return to the practice of the original Muslim community. Instead, he thoroughly engaged with the modern Western world, even though he was very critical of its practices. The outcome was the first systematic outline of a modern Islamic State and a reinterpretation of Islam as an all-tremendous influence on contemporary Islamist thought.

This understanding of Islam is what allows JI to fit into Mawdudi's theoretical framework; it was conceptualised as a small avant-garde within the wider Muslim community (Umma). Its purpose was to ensure the transition of the letter to an Islamic polity as imagined by Mawdudi. The carefully chosen term 'Jama'a' is noteworthy, signifying 'community' on the one hand, and 'society' on the other. In a process that Mawdudi described as a persistent and non-violent Islamic revolution (inqilab- I islami), the avant-garde would eventually grow into the entire Muslims community. The JI founded in august 1941 was thus understood as a motor of social and political change as well as a small-scale model of the Islamic State. Of course, as an avant-garde who already believed and implemented righteousness, they were prepped for leadership in the state-to-come; righteous leadership would be granted to those who form the core of the newly established Islamic movement. Those who consider themselves most equipped to bring about a revolution in leadership thus claim a monopoly of righteousness, with Mawdudi himself as the exemplary figure. It is understandable that in order to ensure this monopoly to the avant-garde, its number had to be kept to manageable confines. For that reason, the JI maintained the number of its permanent members of the so-called pillars (arkan) quite small for a long time, instead aiming to increase its number of loose supporters (Muttafiqan) as Mawdudi himself had specified.

Mawdudi gained a religious education but was not from among the ulama. He criticised the ulama's view about the closure of the gate of *ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning). He advocated that this door was still open and that whoever had a qualification in Islamic sciences could exercise *ijtihad.* He also "derided the ulama for their moribund scholastic style, servile political attitudes, and ignorance of the modern world." (Nasr, 1996:116).

Mawdudi is considered to be one of the most important ideologues of Islamism worldwide. His work has been translated into numerous languages and is continuously republished throughout the world. Some of his core ideas have demonstrably had an impact in shaping the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1966) and his spiritual successors. Mawdudi's importance was even

acknowledged by the Saudi religious and political establishments that co-opted him to the board of trustees of the international Islamic University of Medina, as well as the constitutive assembly of the Mecca-based Muslim World League (RAI, rabitat al-Alam al-Islami). Today branches of JI are found in almost all South Asian states with Muslim populations. To perceive the movement as a simply transnational one is problematic, as every national branch has developed different outlooks and doctrines due to their respective political circumstance. Thus, one may consider the movement transnational only insofar as the general acceptance of Mawdudi's ideological framework. However, one must clearly distinguish between the JI, AH, and Deobandis, in both methodology and belief. The roots of the development of distinct branches however were already laid before the partition of India in 1947. JI always had a political dimension, and has been especially active during various military dictatorial regimes. To embody this ethos, he founded the *Jamaat-e-Islami*, a politico-religious party whose aim was to place trained cells of righteous members in positions of social and political leadership with the objective of transforming Muslim countries into Islamic States. The party appeals, as Islamism does elsewhere, to the products of expanded tertiary education in the cities.

3.8 The Barelwi Movement:

The Barelwi movement was one of several revivalist groups to have emerged in British India during the late nineteenth century. Like their rivals, the Barelwis today have a large following in South Asia, as well as in Britain and other parts of the world where South Asian Muslims have migrated. The formative period of this movement occurred in the late 19th century and early 20th century in North India under British colonial rule. It is a period of time that coincides with the formative leadership of Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921). He drew upon earlier movements but saw his expression as unique in defending traditional beliefs and practices (Williams, 2000).

The Barelwi label themselves as the Ahl-i-Sunnat wa al Jama'at (the People of the prophetic tradition and the community). The Barelwi movement is one of several renewal or reformist streams, such as the Deoband and Ahl-e Hadith, originating from the same time and colonial context. The Ahl-i-Sunnat, however, held more preservationist convictions for traditional Islam. Their interaction with these other streams and indeed with the British government was distinctly apolitical (Williams, 2000:127). Ahmad Riza Khan directed his considerable energies and abilities towards opposing anyone who was critical of traditional Muslim

practices and beliefs. Generally speaking, Barelwis are primarily concerned with devotional matters and thus promote attendance at gatherings that praise the prophet.

The Ahl-i-Sunnat wa Jama'at movement is popularly known as the Barelwi movement from the place of origin of its figurehead, Ahmad Riza Khan [1856-1921] in North India, Bareilly. It emerged as a preservationist/traditionalist movement in parallel with reformist groups such as the Deoband and Ahl-e Hadith in the context of 19th century India under British rule (Robinson, 1988). The Barelwis assert an Islamic devotionalist tradition with its roots in Sufism, which leads to several features standing out as distinctly Barelwi characteristics like visiting shrines, emphasis on Mawlid, *urs* ext.

The Barelwis claim that they are Ahl al-sunnat wa al jamaat, or people and community of the prophetic path. They therefore grant themselves the sole legitimacy of orthodox Islam (Sanyal, 1996: 166; Geaves, 1996: 103). This allows them to counter the reformist groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations (*bid'ah*) and cultural accretions. On the contrary, they accuse the Deobandis and Jamaat-i-Islami of being Wahhabi. This kind of "fatwa war" (Lewis, 2007:40) is still on-going.

The Barelwi tradition is the most local and contextual of the various expressions of Islam in South Asia. Its founder, Ahmad Riza Khan (1856-1921) is of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. As a member of the Qadiri sufi order, Ahmad Riza used his considerable scholarship to defend the legitimacy of the popular world of shaikhs and shrines, where devotees come to seek the help of pirs (living and dead) as intercessors between themselves and God (Lewis, 1996). The central importance of having a pir as a spiritual guide is reflected in the Urdu language, where to be baay-pir (without pir) has the connotation of being vicious, cruel, and pitiless.

The Barelwis' main raison d'être was the defence of spiritual rituals against the reformist critique of the Deobandis and other traditionalist. The group ulama not only maintained a separate identity from other emerging streams of a more reformist character, but also established its own madrassahs to form future leaders. In relation to political activities, the personal and Pietist orientation of its first leader led the movement to avoid action that could have been interpreted as confrontational with the ruling powers. Drawing support from largely rural and less educated constituencies as opposed to the urban classes of the Deobandis, it was the pirs and their devotees who constituted the very core of popular Islam. It was they who generated and propagated devotional songs in vernacular languages, and who rooted Islamic teachings in the minds of the rural majority. The Ahl-i Sunnat defended its

conservative religious practices against those advocating reform, offering a return to the early models of Islamic purity and authority (Lewis, 1993).

The Barelwis are often described as a reaction to other reform movements such as the Deobandis and Ahl-e Hadith (Geaves, 1996: 95), but Metcalf (1982: 296) argues that "like the other two, they offered religious guidance to their followers." The Barelwis used their legal scholarship "to justify Islam as it had been handed down a custom laden Islam which was closely tied to the Sufi world of the shrines where believers sought help from saints to intercede for them with God." (Robinson, 1988: 8). Unlike the Deobandis, the Barelwis were not so hostile to their colonial rulers for the threat they posed to Islamic culture (Geaves, 1996:95).

The Barelwis are distinguished from the other reformist groups (Deobandis, the Ahl-e Hadith, and others) by their attitude towards the relationship of the transcendent to this world. While the other groups reject Sufism or Islamic mysticism, either wholly or in part, denying the importance of saintly mediators, miracles, and other manifestations of the holy in the here and now, the Barelwis embrace everything associated with Sufism as an intrinsic part of their identity. That being said, like the others, they share a strong focus on the Prophet Muhammad as a model of correct behaviour and an example of the virtues that every Muslim should strive to cultivate and live by. These groups relate to the devotional tradition of Sufi-related Sunni scholars and Schools that centred on the activities of Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921). Their focus was on saints and their shrines, all of which they justify with reference to the Quran and the Prophetic traditions, the Hadith. Their cultural style has been exuberant, and their politics were often marked by loyalty to the powers that be during the colonial period and, afterwards, the independent secular state. In the political arena, the Barelwis are represented by the Jami'yat-e Ulama-e Pakistan (JUP, Party of Religious Scholars of Pakistan, founded in 1948) (Sanyal, 1996).

Ahmed Riza Khan's teaching places, above all, great emphasis on the pre-eminence of the Prophet. He stressed this Sufi concept, the light of Muhammad, which is derived from God's own light (Metcalf, 1982:301; Robinson, 1988:9; Geaves, 1996: 95). He denied the charge of the 'Wahhabis' that this theory compromised the unity of God. Instead, he insisted that the Prophet was himself light, "present and observant (*hazir u nazir*) in all places. He was human but his humanity was of a different order from that of other men. He was also given unique knowledge of the unknown (*ilmu'l-ghayb*)." (Metcalf, 1982:301). All these understandings

are based on the chapter of *Najm* in the Qur'an, which give details about the Prophet's attributes (Metcalf, 1982:301). Therefore, the Prophet could be called upon to intercede (*tawassul*) for human beings with God (Robinson, 1988:9). Furthermore, the Barelwis showed a great deal of respect for Sufi orders and *awliya* (Sufi *pirs* and saints), such as Abdu'l-Qadiri Jilani, "who lived in the twelfth century and was regarded the last great *ghaus* [helper] which is coming from the Prophet and his rightly guided caliphs and his descendants through Ali, Hasan and Husain" (Sanyal, 2005:94).

The Barelwis focused on daily religious life instead of opening schools. However, after the death of Ahmed Riza Khan, and the success of the Deobandis encouraged them to establish schools in order to train ulama. In the meantime, the movement spread its institutions both inside and outside South Asia. As with the Deobandis, the Barelwis insisted on following the four schools of law in Islamic beliefs and practices.

3.9 The sectarian rifts between Sunni Muslim groups that originated in the Indian Subcontinent.

The conflicts surrounding different Islamic movements have not helped Muslims in reaching a consensus as to what should be the ideals of the religion, or how improvements can be made to strengthen the community. As a result, there is not a single strong Muslim political or religious grouping. The newly founded Sunni Dawat-e-Islam has challenged TJ's growth and has substantially curtailed the TJ's influence on British Muslims. These inherent differences have jeopardised two things which would hinder the future growth of Islam in sub-continent and beyond: the larger Islamic goal of building a community of believers in the immediate future, and the institutionalisation of Islam in various facets of public life, especially in a minority political setting.

Contrary to popular perceptions, most Islamic movements do not strive for the greater unity of Muslims (the so called Ummatic notion of Islam), even if they find consensus at times, especially when Islam is perceived to be under attack. In the Muslim world, there is no unanimity among Muslims regarding various facets of Islam. Muslims are as divided as followers of other religious groups. There is a significant degree of animosity and competition among various groups, each aiming to dominate the other.

The sectarian rift is clearly visible, as Deobandis are in conflict with Sunni-Sufi centric movements, such as the Barelwis, particularly when it comes to Islamic practice and

observances. However, unlike Pakistan, in India these two movements have never directly confronted one another with violence or killings. Similarly, the ties between TJ and Ahl-i Sunnat, affiliated to the Barelwis tradition, are not cordial, and followers of these movements often clash with each other. A significant development took place in Gujarat in early 2002 when TJ became embroiled in a confrontation with the dominant Ahl-i-Sunnat wa al Jamaat (Barelwi) leadership over mosque holdings.

The major players in this field are networks of religious scholars and schools. Their religious and political groups and parties create separate traditions and milieus within Pakistani (and south Asian) Islam stemming back to centres and activists in North India, long before independence. These milieus have acquired partly hereditary endogamous features of sects or clans with a large and continuously growing number of subsidiary outlets. Their missionary efforts are directed as much at non-Muslims as at each other in the struggle for a larger share a control of the "Islamic field".

Mawlana Riza argued on the basis of certain verses of the Qur'an, as well as Hadith and fiqh scholarship, that God had invested the Prophet with these and other qualities (Sanyal, 1995: 201-2). Therefore, any denial of the Prophet's attributes was understood by Mawlana Riza as denial of some of the daruriyat al-din (fundamentals of the faith). Mawlana Riza often referred to himself as Abd al-Mustafa (slave of the prophet, or literally 'slave of the Chosen One'). Unlike Mawlana Riza, the Deobandi ulama consider it blasphemous to refer to someone as a 'Slave of the Prophet'. According to Thanavi, to keep names like Ali Bakhsh (Gift of Ali), Husayn Bakhsh (Gift of Husayn), or Abd al-Nabi (Slave of the Prophet) is an act that amounts to kufr (disbelief) and shirk (polytheism).

Interestingly, Sanyal (1996) considers the fierce debates between the Ahl-e Sunnat (Barelwis) and the Deobandis to have been a reaction against the common ground that they shared. Initially, the points of difference between the two were very minor, and there was a very real danger that the two movements would have been unable to continue their existence as separate entities had they not chosen to highlight and exaggerate these points of disagreement. In fact, despite the fact that they wrote relatively little against them, the real 'other' of the Ahl-i-Sunnat was the Ahl-e-Hadith. Of all the groups that the Ahl-e-Sunnat referred to as 'Wahhabi', i.e. followers of the extreme Arabian anti-Sufi Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Ahl-e Hadith were perhaps the only ones that fulfilled the name in an Indian context.

However, the main debate between the Deobandis and Barelwis was based around the question of the Prophet's 'knowledge of the unseen'.

Ahl-e Hadith has been blamed for the growing intra-Muslim sectarian strife in India in recent years (Yoginder Sikand, 2006). AH is accused of being instrumental in fuelling intra-Muslim rivalries, reinforcing negative stereotypes about non-Muslims. Ahl-e Hadith even issues directives to its followers to stop visiting Sufi shrines, not to use amulets, and even not avoid Sufi music. Ahl-e-Hadith has been producing literature targeting other Muslim sects; the funds for these activities are evidently coming from their Saudi patrons. (Hamid 2016). As a result of the increasing divisions within AH as well as its sectarian tendencies, the more deep rooted issues of community education, communalism, and poverty are side-lined as they fight over petty issues of rituals and doctrinal differences.

3.9 Conclusion

The chapter has explored the historical emergence of the main transitional Islamic movements that have originated in the Subcontinent which through the post Second World War economy-focused migration have come to shape the religiosity of many Muslims in the UK. The chapter further discussed the political, historical and religious dynamics behind the rise of these revivalist/reformist movements within the backdrop of the 19th century colonial India. The next chapter will examine the historical process by which the contemporary Islamic Sunni revival movements came to be established in the UK and examine formation of their members' religiosity and its impact on the way in which they view social integration and community cohesion within modern British society.

Chapter 4

The Profile and Impact of Main Transnational Sunni Islamic Revival Movement in the UK

4.1 Introduction:

The religious life of contemporary Muslims continues to be shaped by a number of Islamic revivalist and reform movements that through post Second World War migration process have become truly transnational and global. Having reviewed the background of Deobandis, Barelwis, the 'Islamist' Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Ahl-e Hadith in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on their establishment and institutionalisation within the context of UK. The chapter will also discuss the renewed sectarian debates and competition among the traditional and reformist Sunni movements in Britain who all try to claim that they represent 'the true' Islam hence aim to shape the religious agency of British Muslim youth. The chapter will also explore the gradual recognition of faith as a significant source of collective identity among ethnically and culturally diverse Muslim population in Britain.

4.2 Islam as an overarching collective identity for ethnically diverse British Muslims:

Intense competition exists among main Muslim groups in Britain today who claim that they represent the most authentic and authoritative interpretation and practice of Islam (Ray, 2010:54). Both traditional and reformist movements claim legitimacy by contesting the right to present true Islam, transmitting their methods and teachings to indigenous-born young Muslims (Geaves, 2009:102). Traditionalists in essence advocate the virtue of the past with strong adherence to four Sunni Schools of Law, whereas the reformists claim to purify religious beliefs and practices influenced by customs and mystics in order to return to pure Islam practiced by the first three generations of Muslims. The complexity of the intra-Muslim relations amongst these Sunni movements sometimes increases to the extent that sub-groups of Sunni Islam radically fight each other; excluding one another from the main branch of Islam and even excommunicating one another from the religion. For instance, Salafi thought in Britain is well-known for its enmity towards Sufi practices, and thereby the Barelwis are once again found in the centre of controversy and conflict.

In the context of Britain, according to Geaves (2009:102), traditional Islam [35]is under threat from better organised reformist movements that differ from each other in their agenda and,

hence, cannot form any unity. A number of movements have gained traction; the pre-modern reform movement Wahhabiyah (Birt, 2005), twentieth century reformists including Salafiyah (Meijer, 16:2009), and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as more radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajirun (Taji-Farouki, 1996; Wicktorowicz, 2005; Gilliat-Ray, 2010) have become a significant and increasingly important phenomenon in that context, with interesting crossovers and conflicts between them.

These latter two marginal groups are the main instruments of "global Islam" (Roy 2004:177), targeting second or third generation, indigenous-born, native-language speaking Muslim youth, motivating them to adopt into 'neo-Wahhabi' tendencies (Geaves, 2009:102). They criticise Sufi-laden traditional Islam and dominant religious identities of the first and second generation Muslims in the West. The reproduction of ethnic and sectarian rivalry between the reformist and traditionalist movements prevents any contribution to potential development of a uniquely British or even Western form of Islam (Geaves, 2009:105).

Considering Muslim Diaspora in Britain is therefore a key concern of this thesis, in particular the study of how Islam is interpreted and performed in the new settings of the Muslim Diaspora, characterised by its 'ethnic' and 'sectarian' diversity (Lewis, 1994:56). By the late 1990s, Islam was in the process of becoming institutionalised in Britain through a population drawn from many parts of the Muslim world. This was due to their own religious establishments, regional and national organizations, and with some recognition of specific Islamic requirements in aspects of public life.

There is a widespread perception that Muslims in Britain have become more religiously observant and visible. The third and even fourth generation Muslims have become even more observant of their faith than the first and second generations. This is substantiated by the increased number of Mosques in major cities, daily news stories about Muslims, religious conservatism, and even radicalisation. The emergence of a distinct Muslim identity in Britain has received much attention in academic and public circles. Various events have contributed to the development and strengthening of an individual and collective sense of belonging based on Islam rather than any other defining feature. These have included incidents particular to Britain, such as the Rushdie (1989) affair, and international political scenes such as the Gulf wars in 1990.

Before a specific Muslim identity became apparent in Britain, most Muslims were classified with ethnic labels as Asians, South Asians, or 'blacks'. This was more likely a reflection of

their shared experience of racism and discrimination as immigrants in Britain. Working under this broad umbrella, ethnic minority communities aimed for many of their common socio-economic and political concerns as minorities to be addressed more effectively. The solidarity of greater numbers would increase the probability of better representation at local and national levels. As a result, the label 'black' reflected the political struggle of all non-whites in Britain.

The inadequacy of the term 'black' in fully describing what British-Asians feel is one of the reasons that some researchers have rejected this identity. The specific ethnic background, and in particular religion, is not sufficiently explicit in the broad term 'black'. Another primary critique of this notion was that it ignored discrimination based solely on culture (Modood, 1994), such as the distinction between African, African-Caribbean, and other minorities.

The realisation that certain service provisions (health care, counselling, adoption, food, and education) and similar facilities were inadequately dispensed using the classification of (South) Asian further subdivided this identity. This, as well as the events of 1989, brought a specifically Muslim identity into focus. In 1989, a controversy surrounding the book *The Satanic Verses* highly politicised the Muslim presence in Britain, marking a watershed in their development and experiences in British society.

Once Muslims entered the public arena, numerous events acted as catalysts to further entrench the notion of Muslim-ness in the minds of people. Not long after the Satanic Verses affair, the first Gulf war took place in 1991. This again served to highlight the presence of Muslims in Britain, and for many non-Muslims, it strengthened the connection between 'unfriendly' Muslims abroad and those living within the UK. Efforts to establish state funding for Muslim schools, the second attack on Iraq, genocide in Bosnia, and most significantly the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11/9/2001 have all accentuated debates on being a Muslim in Britain.

In many such debates, the 'loyalty' of Muslims to Britain has been questioned, and the compatibility of living according to Islamic precepts in a non-Muslim country has been discussed. To counter any accusations of not being 'properly British', especially with regards to the generations of Muslims born, educated, and working in Britain their entire lives, a consciously British Muslim identity has been forged. That said, there have of course been other, less reactionary reasons for this development, such as the genuine desire to live an Islamic life whilst appreciating the British social, cultural, and political structures.

Distinguishing culture and religion is becoming an increasingly common practice. Jacobson (1998) illustrates this clearly in her study of young British Pakistanis in London. Her findings note, "Not only that young British Pakistanis are tending to differentiate between religion and ethnicity as sources of identity, but also that, in doing so, they are stressing that the former plays a more significant part than the latter in their lives. This is most likely due to what she describes as the clear-cut and pervasive nature of religious teachings, compared to ethnicity which is perceived to be semi-permeable. This echoes what Nielsen (1995) predicts to be the appeal of religious identity in a constantly changing world. The boundaries that are constructed around ethnicity and those around religion tend to be defined by different levels of rigidity. Whilst ethnic or cultural boundaries are permeable, thus allowing intrusion or erosion, religious boundaries remain clear-cut and impenetrable, and can therefore protect and enhance attachments to Islam.

Jacobson's (1998) comments do not necessarily entail religion being unable to adapt to changing circumstances, but rather that the fundamental beliefs remain constant. This then provides young British Pakistanis (Muslims) a tangible resource from which they can develop their identity. Jacobson (1998) acknowledges that the respondents did not have full control to exercise a straight choice between being Muslim and being Pakistani or Asian, not least because they are very closely tied together. However, she suggests that religion and ethnicity were seen as separate or alternative factors in the respondents' self-descriptions.

Associating with Islam and using Islam as a resource for identity construction also enables young Muslims to reject the narrow set of values used by their parents for self-description (Vertovec, 1998). Their parents may have viewed ethnicity and regionalism as equal, if not more, important than religion. However for subsequent generations, religion has often been the key factor in determining one's identity.

The publication of Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses,* in 1988 is commonly considered as a defining moment for British Muslim identity; it is seen as a sign of the emergence of an Islamist identity in Britain (Keppel, 1997:123). Muslims were previously only viewed as part of a general Asian community (Metcalf, 1996:67), despite the fact that Muslims were, and still are, racially diverse likewise, their activism was perceived as being limited to race issue.

It must be noted that there were various global political shifts that had repercussions for Muslims in Britain. The first one was the 1979 revolution in Iran alongside its subsequent

competition with Saudi Arabia for influence among Muslims communities through its financial support for institutions and construction of mosques. As Islam is a community-orientated religion, this seeking of religious identity sought out like-minded others to share their experiences. Islamic revitalisation groups provided opportunities to express what French scholar Olivier Roy (1998) called a globalised 'deterritorialised' Islamic identity. In other words, it was a decultured, universal Islam that expressed varieties of a born-again religiosity which transcended ethnicity, culture, and space.

For a variety of reasons, there was an apparent trend amongst some young Muslims towards an identification of choice of religion over ethnicity or culture. This issue differed from that of whether identities were shifting and situationally determined. Some of these reasons were related to external political factors; others were linked to an emerging distinction between religion and culture. Several studies noted a trend of some young people identifying themselves as Muslims rather than Pakistanis or Asians (Gilliat, 2010). In effect, Islam was used by some young people as a resource in managing disagreements with their parents. In such cases, members of the younger generation (and indeed some older writers) deployed religious arguments to support their own views, discounting their parents' version of Islam 'as culturally bound and inauthentic', substituting it for a scriptural, universalistic version stripped of 'cultural' features, which was thus presented as 'true' Islam (Gilliat, 2010).

4.3 Muslim Diversity in Britain

Muslims in Britain are a diverse tapestry, reflecting various strands from across the world. They comprise a population of nearby three million people, (consensus, 2011) approximately 70% of which are from South Asian backgrounds, alongside those from Arab, African, Persian, and Southeast Asian heritage (MCM Report, 2015). Nearly 50% are the children or grandchildren of first generation settlers of the 1960s and 1970s. The Islamic tradition, while containing a core normative set of beliefs and practise, possesses a rich internal diversity of different theological currents, schools of jurisprudence, and philosophical and spiritual trends that a developed over time and space. When researching Muslims in non-Muslim countries like Britain, "Many Islams" or "Muslim communities" (from different geographies and cultures) are often found in the same location. It is thus important to note that Muslims are not a monolithic group acting uniformly on all fronts.

4.3.1 Cultural, Sectarian, and Class Divisions within British Muslim communities

As evidenced above, the Muslim community in Britain is far from homogeneous. Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Arabs, North Africans, Iranians, Turks, Malaysians, Africans, and others, all have their own communal life. Their different cultural background must be distinguished from Islamic culture and belief itself. Most of these ethnic groups have formed their own ethnic organisations. These ethnic divisions are as such un-Islamic (Hamid, 2015). The first generation of immigrants does not make such a distinction between Islam and cultural traditions. Instead, religion is frequently employed to legitimise cultural traditions. Therefore, a threat to cultural values is often perceived as a threat to Islam. Both in the Muslim world and in Britain, many of these ethnic communities are again subdivided into 'sectarian groupings'. Examples of such groups include the Barelvis, Sufis, Deobandis, Tablighi Jamaat, Ahl-e Hadith, Modernists, Revivalists, Jamaat-i Islami, and the Shi'ite Muslims. However, until today these divisions have made it virtually impossible for Muslim minorities to create unity among the Islamic community. The strong interdependency within the communities makes it very difficult, especially for the first generation, to penetrate sectarian boundaries. The competitive spirit between the sectarian groups hampers the formation of a cohesive community.

As well as cultural and sectarian divisions, the Muslim community is also divided according to the class structure. The British social class stratification according to occupation (professional, intermediate, skilled non-manual, skilled manual, partly skilled, and unskilled) differs entirely from the Asian class structure, which is determined by income (wealth-business elite, professional status-elite), and religious family background (familial pedigree relating them to the Prophet's family, or a family of religious elite) (Ansari, 2004). The British class system has thus upset the traditional Asian structures.

In Britain, these regional differences were maintained due to chain migration and the pattern of settlement. Since South Asian immigrants usually settled close to family members and friends, the mosques tend to function not only as places of worship, but also as community centres. Most mosques have a local character, and some contain a number of social activities. They serve as centres to maintain and reinforce shared memories, values, and goals located in the place of origin. It is while embodying a strong localised ethnic ambience that for the Muslims, especially those from the subcontinent, many mosques in Britain have become a 'symbolic representation of the land of Islam' (Joly, 1995:75).

The *Biradari* system is another significant class system derived from the forefathers of South Asian British Muslims. As such, it is the elders who place more importance on the *Biradari* system as opposed to their children, who value other social interactions like affiliations more. *Biradari* is largely influential in patriarchal Asian Muslim societies around the UK, especially amongst the elder generation. Backroom deals in private corridors determine all aspects of life in the community, ranging from politics to marriage. *Biradari* will never be eradicated completely within the Muslim community. That beings said, its influence is diminishing over time. The *Biradari* system, in all its forms, is officially in decline. This can be attributed, at base, to a gradual yet significant change in mentality as generations change.

4.3.2 Diversity in religious observance within British Muslim communities

There are more than 1,000 mosques in Britain. Most are small in size (Bowen, 2015). Some are large and purpose-built, and many are located in terraced houses. The first mosque in Britain was the Liverpool Mosque, founded in Woking in 1889. It was an early centre for Islamic activity in Britain (Lewis, 1994:12). In Britain, the mosques have often been an instrument of sectarianism has become clear to increasing numbers.

It is not enough to be 'born a Muslim' and that religion has to be more than an accident of birth; that it has to be founded on knowledge and experience. This is a developing trend in the way British-born and educated Muslim children question their parents' outlook (Geaves, 1994:89). Most mosques have not responded positively to the challenge of modernity, nor have they come to terms with the society in which their Muslim community now lives. The imams were recruited from the same villages or districts where the disruption of religious practice was only temporary. Mostly ill acquainted with the English language, these imams perpetuate local rituals and customs for the first generation, which is home oriented; these traditional imams provide spiritual shelter from an alien environment Geaves 1994:91).

Despite this capacity, "85% of the estimated 2,000 British imams are foreign born" (Birt, 2006:694). The *madrasah* graduates take positions in the "prison and hospital chaplaincies" (Birt, 2006:698). According to Oliver Roy's analysis, in the aftermath of political Islam's failure (Roy, 1994), 'neofundamentalism' has taken on an active role, its ideologues specifically seeing this failure as "an opportunity, not a loss". The Muslim youth in the West were targeted to create a "universal religious identity" disconnected from any specific culture, far from any traditionalist tendency of religious identity. In summary, the

reproduction of ethnic and sectarian rivalry between the reformist and traditionalist movements prevents any contribution to potential development of a uniquely British or even Western form of Islam (Geaves, 2009:105).

Among Muslims, there are different strands of Islam and regional solidarities. This degree of diversity is a factor that has hindered the formation of a strong British Muslim block. Yet, for second and third generation British Asians, their Muslim identity is more salient than their ethnic or regional affiliation. Findings from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (2011) showed that religious affiliation of one's family is the most important source of self-identity among Britons of South Asian origin. Modood (1992) contends that this is a result of a strong sense of community as much as strong personal faith.

The organization of Muslims in the UK began in the 1960s. Mosques have been the most important institutions in this regard. Organisation in that era evolved locally around ethnic groups, often intending to provide practical help and support in terms of housing, employment, immigration, or welfare. Leaders of these local communities were largely self-appointed, with limited legitimacy in reflecting the real needs and interests of local Muslim communities. Thus, their role in these communities was a matter of influence rather than actual power.

From the mid-1900 onwards, many second-generation British Muslims who wanted to take their faith seriously and participate in collective religious activism were drawn to four dominant religious orientations; the reformist Islamist UK Islamic Mission UKIM (YM), the salafi-oriented JIMAS, the Ahl-e Hadith movement and the Deobandis, and the preservanist Barelwi movement. The Pan-Islamist movement [36]Hizb ut-Tahrir and the neo-Sufi 'traditional Islam' network emerged during the mid-1990s.

The factors behind the creation of such plural discourse fundamentally relate to the ethnic and religious divergence of the Muslim community in the UK Muslim Diaspora. Research pertaining to Muslim communities in Britain by Lewis (1993) and Geaves (1994) has been especially important in terms of defining different religious tendencies in this regard. Examples include the differences between Muslims influenced by the Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat, Barelwi, and Jamaat-e-Islami movements that are at the focus of current inquiry.

In Britain, the anxiety of first-generation Muslims in their religious feeling "from total lapse of religious observance" (Barton, 1986:177) eventually shifted their self-perception "from

being sojourners to settlers" (Lewis, 1994:56). They established mosques and educational organisations in an effort to preserve their religious identity. However, despite being a dynamic process, this transplantation routinely witnessed a reproduction of "ethnic" and "sectarian" divisions that already existed in the homeland (Lewis, 1994:56; Geaves, 1996:160). As Ramadan (1999:100) pointed out, fundamental contemporary problems are intertwined with emotions, feelings, fears, and other psychological and social inferences which often make it difficult to identify the exact and objective nature of the problems themselves. The inter-generational stress between first-generation migrants and the second and third generations has contributed to this (Geaves, 1996:218).

This gradual transition was expressed through communal concerns regarding securing halal meat, places of worship, and how to ensure the transmission of religious valise of their children. Among the key areas of the development of a faith-based identity was education. Those of an activist inclination realised that their children were spending most of their time in school, and that after school religious education provisions in mosques were inadequate to balance the 'non-Islamic influences' of the state education system. Initially using houses converted into mosques the first arrivals were not so interested in the establishment of religious institutions, as they expected to return to their homeland with their earnings (Geaves, 2007:15). Thereafter, as the community developed and families joined the migrants, there was a proliferation of religious institutions throughout Britain.

4.4 British Muslims and divers expressions of Islamic revival and renewal

There are many different typologies that are utilised in describing the Islamic revival movements. Most recognised classifications adopt versions of a tripartite split, categorising Islamic activism into ideological responses to Western colonial encounters such as traditionalism/fundamentalism and modernism/secularism. Esposito categorised them as conservative, neo-traditionalist Islamic reformist, and secularist attitudes (Hamid, 2016:10). Clearly, Islam is one religion, but its textual sources permit a plurality of readings. Muslim academic Tariq Ramadan produced a comprehensive categorisation of Muslim global activist trends thus far: 'scholastic traditionalism', 'salafi literalism', 'salafi reformism', 'salafi political reformism', 'liberal' or 'rationalist' reformism, and Sufism. This account of the major tendencies in contemporary Islam, which will be discussed in detail below, is far from exhaustive, but it has the merit of elucidating the scene by demonstrating some nuances. This provides a contextual benefit to the reader, as opposed to an over-simplifying reading with a

binary categorisation of "liberals" against "fundamentalists", "radicals", and so on. The situation is much more complex, and the boundaries more subtle (Ramadan, 1999:244).

A closer examination of their discourses reveals that these Islamic tendencies share far more in common than they would admit. This is unsurprising given the shared textual sources, histories, religious references, and experience of living in Britain as minority faith communities. For instance, scholastic traditionalist from south Asia such as the Deobandi and Barelwis, though bitter enemies, actually share a common adherence to the Hanafi School of Law. They both revere many of the same historical figures such as Shah Wali Allah, and even subscribe to the same Sufi masters. These tendencies also have internal factions that contain both hard-liners and pragmatists in a state a dynamic tension. While they would all agree on the need to be pious Muslims; that Islam is the prescribed way of life, and that the aim is a cohesive global ummah, they would differ on what the priorities of Muslims living in Britain should be, how best to bring about internal reform, the degree of integration possible within a majority non-Muslim society, and the possibility of British Islam.

4.4.1 Scholastic Traditionalism

This is a tendency that has some adepts in Europe and is also present in different regions throughout the Islamic world. Reference to the scriptural texts, the Qur'an and Sunnah, is fundamental for the partisans of this trail of thought. However, they refer rigorously, at times in an overtly exclusive way, to one or other of the standardised schools of law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali, Zaydi, Ja'fari, and so on. Moreover, they do not allow themselves any right to differ from the juristic opinions established within the framework of the school in question. The Qur'an and Sunnah are the sources as mediated through the understanding and application thereof laid down by the accepted Ulama of the given School. The margin of interpretation of the texts is thus very narrow, not permitting any development. Numerous currents enter, in one manner or another, into this type of reading of the sources texts. Whether the group in question are the Deobandis, the Barelwis, or the Tablighi Jama-at, it is the same traditionalism coupled with an insistence on elements of worship, dress code, and the rule for the application of Islam. In doing so, sole dependence is placed on the opinion of the "ulama", which is viewed as codified. The sources in question are primarily between the 8^{th} and 11^{th} century, and any source outside this scope is regarded as baseless and an unacceptable "modernisation" (Ramadan, 1999:239).

Their concern is primarily with worship and they do not envisage, within Europe, any social commitment, civil or political. Their reading of the Texts, and the priority given to strictly traditional practice makes them disregard, even refuse, any involvement in European society, a domain in which, quite simply, they do not see themselves as able to participate.

4.4.2 "Salafi" Traditionalism

In contrast to the first type, the "Salafi" traditionalists, in their approach to interpreting texts, refuse the mediation of the schools of law and their respective "ulama". They identify as "salafi" to signify their concern of following the "Salaf", which is the term for the first three generations of Muslims, as confirmed by the prophet. The interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah is thus conducted in a direct manner, breaking from the confines marked out by the Schools. They are most distinguished by their literalist approach, which, while insisting on reference to the texts, forbids itself of any interpretative reading. This school of thought is in direct correlation to those who were once called Ahl al-hadith, who opposed interpretations based on the search for an underlying aim or object *(qasd*) as opposed to the purely literal text-based reading.

The doctrinal stance of the "salafi" traditionalists and of their groups in Europe is the refusal of any type of involvement is any space regarded as non-Islamic. The concepts of *dar al-kufr* (the realm of non-believers) and *dar al-harb* (the realm of war) remain operative and are responsible for the relationship or lack thereof, between the Salafis and their social environment. Their relationship is primarily defined by separation and a literalist practice of the religion protected from European cultural influences.

4.4.3 "Salafi" Reformism

The reformist "Salafis" and the traditionalist "Salafis" share the desire to depart from the confines marked out by the schools of law; they wish to rediscover the pristine energy of an unmediated reading of the Quran and Sunnah. They too, therefore, relate attribute themselves to the "Salaf" with the aim of bypassing the commentaries that accord a unique authority to the interpretations of the 8^{th}-10^{th} centuries. However, despite their similar insistence to refer to the primary texts, they distinguish themselves from the traditionalists by leaning towards a reading based upon the aims and objectives of the law and its jurisprudence (fiqh). Nearer in this respect to the Ahl al-ra'y School[37], they hold that the practise of ijtihad[38] is an objective,

constant, and necessary assumption for the application of fiqh to every epoch and every place.

Most reformist "Salafi" movements present in Europe were born out of the influence of the reformist thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who enjoyed a wide hearing in the Islamic world. Al-Afghani, Abduh Rida, Al Nursi, Iqbal, Ibn Badis, al-Banna, al-Fasi, Bennbi, Al- Mawdudi, Qutb, and Shari'ati are amongst the well-known proponents of this thought (Ramadan, 1999:241). The arrival of reformist "salafi" intellectuals in Europe followed the repressions that took place post-independence, such as the Muslims brotherhood in Egypt and Syria in the 60s and 70s.

The first in the legalist tradition of the most famous "salafi" reformists is to adhere to the application of reformism in the European context. The original school of thought continues to be a point of reference in that the methodological approach to the texts remains open to the possibility of interpretation. Therefore, the necessary application of ijtihad is required in response to the ever-changing contexts of modern society. Reformist "salafi" thought is widely diffused in the West, and a number of groups are influenced by its manner of reading, in turn borrowing and adapting the methodology (Ramadan, 1999:242).

4.4.4 The Political and Literalist Salafiyya

This is the second current to recently overwhelm the Islamic world. Initially attached to the reformist legalist school, some "*ulama*" and intellectuals drifted into strict and exclusively political commitment. They retained nothing of the reformism except the concept of social and political action, which they in turn married to a literalist reading of the texts with a political action. The management of power, the caliphate, authority, and the rule of law became the priority. Tending towards radical revolutionary action, their focus is the opposition of governments, even in Europe; to fight for the establishment of the "Islamic State" and ultimately the caliphate. Their discourse is sharp, politicised, radical, and opposed to every notion of collaborative involvement in European societies. The largest movements of this description in Europe are Hizb at-Tahrir or al-Muwwahidun. They call to jihad and oppose the West by every means, regarding it as *dar al-harb*. These currents, which secure much of the public attention, nevertheless represent less than 0.5% of the Muslim population resident in Europe (Ramadan, 1999:243).

4.5 Deobandis in Britain

As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, the traditionalist Deobandis "tried to be as independent as possible of the British state" (Modood, 1992:145). Thus, they focused their effort internally on education by establishing religious seminaries throughout Britain. The overwhelming majority of seminaries, 17 out of 25, belong to Deobandis (Birt and Lewis, 2010:94). As early as 1967, the Deobandi ulama founded the Majlis Ulama UK, an organisation designed for organising conferences, planning tours of visiting preachers, printing calendars and posters to establish correct times for prayers, and so on (Geaves, 1996:163). Through the *dar al-'ulums* and graduates from these schools, the Deobandi movement has contributed extensively to the supply of imams and religious teachers. Modood (1992:145) notes that 'through active proselytization they build up a mass following as well as an international reputation in Islamic learning'.

Yahya Birt states that a primary challenge of the movement is to appeal to a younger British-born constituency that is actively disembedding 'pure' religion from what is seen as the composite religio-cultural Islam offered by their parents. Another chief challenge is to respond to emergent Salafi and Islamist critiques of following religious scholarship (*taqlid*) and failing to take Islamic politics seriously (Birt, 2005:184).

Despite being characterised as 'isolationist' (Lewis, 2002:219), in the last decade the Deobandi movement has expanded its interaction and cooperation with the wider society. The impact of a new generation of activists has been vital in working with local schools and colleges, promoting community liaison with the police, MPs and policy makers, publishing Islamic literature, public lecturing on Islam, engaging in interfaith, and maintaining a support group for drug and alcohol abuse (Birt, 2005:189).

Deobandi Islam is the dominant branch of Islam in the UK with 44% of British mosques following its teachings (Bowen, 2015). Perhaps due to its size, it is a school of thought which incorporates a diverse range of views, practices, and sub-groups. It therefore cannot be pigeonholed into a neat category marked moderate or extreme. That being said, it has its own jihadi offshoots based in Pakistan but with links in Britain. Yet in its founding seminary in India, its leading scholars issued a fatwa denouncing suicide bombing and killing civilians. Most Deobandi scholars share the notion of a conservative interpretation of Islamic law.

Most Deobandi leadership roles are occupied by Guajarati Indians rather than Pakistanis. This is most likely due to the fact that the Guajarati immigrants in the UK are predominantly

from religiously conservative urban backgrounds, whereas those of Pakistani origin are typically from rural parts of Pakistan. Furthermore, Guajarati immigrants arrived from former colonies in East Arica, often with commercial backgrounds, relatively high levels of educations, and managerial skills to run successful voluntary organisations. The first and most influential Islamic seminary in the UK is the Darul Uloom al-Arabiya al-Islamia, more commonly known as Darul Uloom Bury. It has approximately 350 male students aged 13-25 who study GCSE alongside A levels and traditional seminary classes (Lewis, 2007). Upon completion, they qualify as imams, and those who continue for an extra two years become muftis. Its founder and long-time principal, Sheikh Youssef Motala, was commissioned by his teacher Sheikh Mohammad Zakariya.

Another important British seminary opened in 1982 is the missionary wing of the Deobandi movement, the Tablighi Jamaat. It is based on the same site as the Tablighi jamaat headquarters in Dewsbury. The founders of the original Darul Uloom Deoband in India neglected secular subjects and only concentrated on religious subjects. However, over time such attitudes changed in both Deoband India and the UK. The primary focus still remained on religious sciences, but the Deoband Darul Uloom began teaching English language, journalism, and modern sciences. In England, some of the changes were the result of tougher registrations imposed by the Government.

4.6 The Tabligi Jamaat in the U.K

The Tablighi Jamaat is an international movement of laymen for faith renewal. Through the use of preaching tours, the movement expanded rapidly throughout the subcontinent before spreading globally after the Second World War. In Britain, the movement had a major impact in creating the core institutions of Islamisation in nascent Muslim communities. The mosques, *madrasahs,* and seminaries were in alliance with the Deobandi scholarly movement. Its leadership in Britain was dominated by Gujaratis, although it has since developed a wider ethnic appeal. Its stance has been anti-political and it has concentrated on the expansion of its programme of faith renewal. That being said, it has remained traditionally averse to publicity of any kind.

The Tabligi Jamaat (TJ) is a Deobandi missionary movement, becoming one of the largest Muslims groups in Britain. Muhammad Yusuf, Ilyas's son and successor, had been credited with the transnationalisation of TJ. Yusuf consolidated the movement in South Asia

following the vivisection of the subcontinent, transcending the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh borders. Tablighi Jamaat began a worldwide programme starting in the 1960s following the influx of immigrant populations to America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Both American and UK-based TJ wings have maintained close working relations with the movement's Indian headquarters. However, as a result of the total isolationism of TJ followers (who are sometimes accused of being obscurantists), coupled with their staunch practices within the host societies, TJ has made little impact in the US compared to Canada and the UK, especially among the immigrants and lower social classes.

4.7 Jamaat-i Islami / UKIM

Like India, Britain has a Muslim minority, and the same change of emphasis is evident here too. As with the other organisations and movements analysed in this study, Jamaat-i Islami entered Britain with the migrants from the subcontinent in the post-1946 period. There are, however, organisations in Britain which are inspired by the teaching of Maulana Mawdudi and the work of Jamaat-i Islami. The most similar organisation to Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent is the UK Islamic Mission. This is unsurprising as it is the oldest dawah organisation in Britain and was established by first-generation migrants whose concerns were still located in their countries of origin (Geaves, 1996).

In the UKIM, Jorgen Nielsen identifies four separate organisations which he claims to have been developed by Jamaat-i Islami for specific purposes. He identifies these organisations as The UK Islamic Mission, Young Muslims UK, The Islamic Foundation, and The Muslim Educational Trust. However, all four organisations claim to be fully independent of each other as well as from Jamaat-i Islam in the subcontinent. Although they were all once part of The UK Islamic Mission, with the exception of The Islamic Foundation. The focus here will be on the UKIM, as they have built mosques and established links with the Muslims in their localities.

The organisational structure of the UK Islamic Mission is also derived from the Jamaat-i Islami model. The organisation is run by a president in consultation with a shura comprised of ten members. Both the president and the *shura* are elected by the membership every two years. They responded by creating institutions such as the Pakistani JI-influenced UK Islamic mission (UKIM) founded in 1963, the Middle Eastern Muslim brotherhood (MB)-inspired Muslim student's society (MSS) founded in 1962, and the federation of student Islamic

societies (FOSIS) in 1963. As Islamic institutions with clear ideological goals, they sought to create a network of like-minded activist organisations that would cater for the children of the first generations settlers and overseas students in 1960s (Hamid, 2016:6).

The UKIM has over forty branches around Britain (Bowen, 2015). Most of these branches administer a mosque, usually staffed by imams recruited from overseas. The branches are grouped into four zones: The Midland, Scotland, North, and South zones, each with its own president. The presidents are responsible for planning, overseeing, and guiding the work of the branches in their respective zones. All UKIM branches provide facilities for men, women, and children (UKIM website). The UKIM works in the fields of education and welfare. Its educational work includes seminars, exhibitions, and courses about Islam for young people and community groups (UKIM web page).

The UKIM views itself as an ideological movement with the aim of reviving Islam in its comprehensive form; all dimensions of human life must be guided by appealing to Islam. In its publications, the UKIM proclaims a rather missionary approach. Statements like developing an outreach to the society at large in order to share Islam, and taking a lead in changing individuals and society with all its dimensions are just two examples that suggest the missionary motivation of the UKIM, although it denies such intentions. Even if a peaceful struggle over ideas is at the core of modern democracies, the statements by the UKIM do not allow one to conclude that the UKIM can become a promoter of Euro-Islam. Much more, the UKIM's understanding of Euro-Islam is one of Islamisation through ideas and discussion.

UKIM intended to provide members and supporters of the JI with a base to continue spreading the ideas of JI founder Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-79). JI-inspired intuitions such as the Muslim education trust (MET) created in 1966, and the Islamic foundation in 1973. Such organisations were at the forefront of efforts to provide religious education extra resources. This was to compensate for the absence of Islamic instruction in the state sector while simultaneously promoting the ideological perspectives of the JI and MB. In the 1970s, UKIM established the young Muslims UK (YM) in the mid-1980. The Bengali membership of UKIM formed a separate organisation in the late 1970s, leading to the creation of Dawatul-Islam and the Islamic forum of Europe (IFE) alongside its youth wing the young Muslims organisations (YMO) in 1978. In addition, the union of Muslim organisations (UMO) was established in 1970, attempting to act as a national interlocutor for Muslim political and civic

concerns to government. In this respect it could be viewed as a predecessor to the Muslim council of Britain (MCB) launched in the is-1990s (Hamid, 2016:7).

This is much closer to the aims of Jamaat-i Islami Hind, which is to be expected, as the overt political aims to transform the state that dominate in Pakistan cannot be paramount in Britain. It was also expected that the UK Islamic Mission concentrated its efforts on education. The central aim of Maulana Mawdudi is the establishment of Islam practised in its entirety, of a pristine purity. It is still the central plank of the UK Islamic Mission's aims (Geaves, 1993). To achieve this goal, the UKIM is involved in dawah work amongst the Muslim community, distributing literature and holding monthly seminars, public meetings, and annual conferences. The Mission, however, has responded primarily to the concern of the Muslim population in Britain, namely that their children should not lose their identity in the face of the host nation's predominantly secular culture. As a result, they established supplementary evening and weekend schools in the mosques. UKIM is currently teaching over five thousand students, employing over two hundred teachers.

Similar to Jamaat-i Islami in other parts of the world, the UKIM is also involved in social welfare activities. These take a different form, one specific to the needs of the community in Britain. They also provided a number of other services such as visiting Muslim patients in hospitals, assisting in the provision of halal food, teaching religious obligations, visiting Muslim prisoners, and visiting Muslims in nursing homes. More recently, they began implementing dawah activities among non-Muslims; activities include but are not limited to mosque open days and awareness weeks.

There is no doubt that the UK Islamic Mission is very closely modelled on the subcontinent Jamaat-i Islami. Tanzeem Wasti acknowledges that the majority of the membership is still highly influenced by Maulana Mawdudi's ideas, but suggests that there should now be a comprehensive in order to sufficiently acknowledge the contemporary situation (Geaves, 1993).

4.8 Ahl-e Hadith/Salafis in Britain

Pinpointing the rise of the Salafism in Britain or the precise entry of Salafi ideas into the UK is speculative; only a few mosques formally associate with the movement, from which the most prominent is the Green Lane Masjid in Birmingham. According to a British admirer of Abd al-Wahhab’s writings, it is a doctrine which has proved particularly attractive to Muslim

converts: it is simple, pure and monotheistic in that it calls them to the worship of Allah alone. As a result, it attracts many converts due to the simplicity of the message (Bowen, 2014:57).

The term Wahhabi is seen as a derogatory label on the basis that it implies that those influenced by ibn Abd al-Wahhab's ideas are followers of the man rather than the followers of Allah and His messenger. Followers of this thought prefer to be called Salafi, which in this context means followers of the pious predecessors, in particular the first three generations of Muslims, as instructed by the prophet Muhammad.

Salafism in Britain is influenced by the South Asian Salafi movement called the Ahl-e Hadith. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching emphasised using the Quran and hadith as a source of guidance rather than having an unquestioning trust in the judgement of the scholars. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab instructed to respect the traditional Schools of Sunni jurisprudence, himself following the Hanbali madhab, but warned of blindly following them.

Some Salafis go further than ibn Abd al-Wahhab in their scepticism of the traditional schools of thought. The founders of the Ahl-e Hadith movement, for example, refused to follow a madhab altogether. The scripturalist and literalist version of Islam has enjoyed a significant yet modest UK presence since the early 1990s. It largely adopted a quietist posture, focusing on non-violent moral reform, rejecting conventional forms of political organisation and action. The need for beliefs and practices to be textually justified meant that Muslim mystics who claimed to have access to esoteric knowledge were also challenged by al-Wahhab. Ibn abd al-Wahhab's credibility as a scholar enabled him to question the religious establishment.

The organisation that became instrumental in spreading Salafism in the early 1990s was JIMAS, formed in 1984. Its long-time leader Manwar Ali (Abu Muntasir) is considered by some to be the father of salafi dawah in the UK (Hamid, 2016). He is credited for helping spread Salafism among Muslim youth through his countless speeches at study circles, mosques, community centres, and universities across the country. Abu Muntasir's leadership brought the organisation to national prominence, attracting individuals such as Usama Hasan, Surkeel Abu Aaliyah Sharif, and converts such as Abdur-raheem green and Abdul Haqq Baker, who would in turn become high-profile Salafi figures. (Bowen, 2015:56). The Ahl-e Hadith has been under the influence of the Saudi Salafi movement, and petrodollars have evidently played a significant role in changing the followers to the extent that many of them

prefer to call themselves Salafis rather than Ahl-e Hadith in order to stress their closeness with the Saudis.

The global spread of Wahhabism has been associated in recent decades with the scholarship of the traditionalist Nasr al-Din al-Albani (D.1999), the former Grand mufti of Saudi Arabia ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (D.1999), and Shaykh Muhammed Ibn al-‘Uthaymin (D.2000). At the centre of the global Wahhabi mission is the Islamic University of Medina, which boasts over 5,000 students from 139 countries (Bowen, 2015). Its junior counterpart in this mission has been the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, although the latter is more specific for producing judges of indigenous *shari’ah* courts. The policy of the Islamic University of Medina is to allocate approximately 85% of its places to non-Saudis. The same theological controversies that are normally provoked by aggressive Wahhabi missionaries are now transpiring in North West China, Russia, and Britain (Birt, 2005).

Wahhabism is therefore a strand of Salafiyah that has become influential and powerful through the ambition of a state seeking local and regional legitimacy. Financial resources deriving from Saudi Arabian oil wealth in the past four decades have fuelled the ambitions of its rulers to assume religious leadership of the Muslim majority states. This has in turn enabled the spread of Wahhabi ideas beyond the kingdom (Birt, 2005). Indeed, from the 1970s onwards Saudi Arabian backed projects were presented through ‘missions’ (da’wah) such as the building of mosques and Islamic centres as well as the large-scale publication of books that propagate Wahhabi thought. They deliberately targeted Muslim minorities living in the West, including Britain.

4.8.1 Salafiyah/Al-e-Hadith within the UK Context

As the quest for an ‘authentic’ Islam was particularly evident in Muslim countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the context of contemporary Britain also provided an important catalyst for a similar effort among Britain Muslim today. Brown’s observations regarding Salafiyah in nineteenth-century Egypt contain parallels with that of contemporary Britain. By the mid-nineteenth century, the rejection of taqlid [39]and the promotion of ijtihad had taken hold among reform-minded men of religion in various parts of the Middle East. Historical circumstances, particularly the spread of secular education and secular legal systems, coupled with the resulting disfranchised secular education and legal systems and the disenfranchisement of many ulama provided these ideas with a new-found vigour.

Social and economic dislocation provided certain segments of the religious elite reason to reject the religious status quo. Rejection of *taqlid* proved a popular tool both to oppose more conservative 'ulama' in their positions and also to appeal to young men of secular education who sought to understand the reasons for the apparent weakness of Islam in the face of Western power. They thus urgently felt need to 'catch up' with the West, and combined with the latent power of the traditionalist thesis, an assurance was provided; namely that all could be set right by returning to the unadulterated *Sunnah* of the Prophet to create a powerful reform movement (Brown, 1996:30).

Although the circumstances and context are vastly different, the upheavals created by mass migration of Muslims to Britain in the post-Second World War period, particularly from predominately rural and uneducated backgrounds, have created the conditions where the same quest for 'authenticity' has once again become significant. Muslims born and raised in Britain have sought answers to the dilemmas and tensions that arose when confronted with a powerful and often contradictory combination of social influences. For example, there is rarely a meaningful overlap between secular education in mainstream schools, and religious education in *makatib* delivered by religious leaders from South Asian villages and towns. This dissonance can cause some degree of educational confusion. Similarly, the conservative cultural traditions of parents and grandparents are not sufficient against the direct or perceived experience of Islamophobia.

Salafiyah thought, articulated by charismatic religious authority figures, become a powerful evidence-based tool to counter the 'traditionalism' of the parental and grandparental generations. These leaders have been effective in promoting a form of Islam that is perceived as authentic, relevant, pure, and powerful. This current of thought has proven popular with converts and second-generation South Asian British Muslims. They appeal largely to those circa 18-30 years of age, living in proximity to key Salafi centres in Britain. Most followers of Salafiyah were raised on non-Salafi belief systems. That being said, a new generation of born-Salafis are beginning to emerge; embracing Salafism has involved major renegotiations of identity and lifestyle for born-Muslims and converts alike (Inge, 2001:73).

The discrepancies between what young Muslims understood from textual ideals and what they saw practised in Muslim communities motivated them to deepen their knowledge and share it with others. As young Salafis began to challenge traditional Barelwi and Deobandi imams, hostilities would rise to the extent of being physically ejected from their mosques.

Abu Muntasir became involved with the HISMs organisations (Harakat Islah al-Shabab al-Muslimin – 'movement to reform the Muslims youth'), which was ideologically close to the Ahle Hadith trend. Muhammed Abdul Karim Saqib, director of the al-Hijrah Muslim girls school in Birmingham, originally led the organisation, and Abu Muntasir later assumed the HISAM leadership. Disputes between Saqib and Abu Muntasir led the latter to form JIMAS, a split that represented the first significant moment in the growth of British Salafism (Bowen, 2015:56). Visually, this was actualised through dress forms; male members of JIMAS became conspicuous for combining a Saudi-style headdress, army fatigues, and boots. Many Salafis adopted a patronymic, prefixing Abu or Umm (father or mother) before the name of their eldest child (Bowen, 2015:57).

The movement organised itself in Britain in the 1970s under the leadership of the Birmingham imam Mawlana Mahmud Ahmad Mirpuri (1946-88), also a Medina alumnus. Much of the late Mawlana's polemical attention was focused on the reforming Sufi practices and beliefs that were British-born Medina graduates grew impatient with what they viewed as a lack of dynamism and relevance. They became frustrated with what they perceived to be an unwillingness to prefer English over Urdu, and as a result formed the Jam'iyat Ihya'Minhaj al-Sunnah (JIMAS), or the Association to Revive the Way of the Messenger, in 1984. Its organisational headquarters moved to Ipswich, and thereafter conducted much of its pioneering work in London. However, it was only in 1995 that tensions in the Wahhabi circles in the Gulf became apparent in Britain when a breakaway faction was formed in Birmingham under the leadership of Dawud Burbank, a convert and alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina. While JIMAS broadly accepted the Ikhwani criticism of the Saudis, and has remained supportive of the Ikhwani scholarship as well as some of the jihad movements of the 1990s, the Birmingham group remained strictly loyal to the Saudi insistence that the priority was not political reform, but groups' work to a attain a cross-ethic appeal (Birt, 2002:174).

4.8.2 The Spread of Salafism in Britain

The spread of Salafism was further accelerated by a combination of the mass circulation of a Saudi government funded translation of the Qur'an, returning graduates from its universities, and lifestyle magazines like al-Jummah. The Salafi perspective portrayed a seemingly intellectually rigorous approach to religious commitment. They championed an evidence-based approach, free from the corruption of folkloric religions, the 'wishy-washy'

alternatives offered by YM, or the hyper-politicisation of HT. Compared to YM and HT, Salafis seemed to be taking their religion more seriously (Hamid, 2016:59). As a result they largely attracted young second-generation South Asian Muslims in addition to a significant number of black and white converts (Hamid, 2016:59).

This impact was largely related to the disruption of homogeneous ritual spaces such as the established South Asian mosques criticised by the Wahhabis for what they described to be unfounded ritual practise. In particular, this ritual contestation centred around the correct performance of the canonical prayer in congregation, various forms of which have become markers of three sectarian allegiances, as was the case in British India. As a result of this aggressive recruitment, the *dawah* provoked significant religious reactions from the established South Asian sectarianisms. In short, the Wahhabi critique forced all groups to accelerate the shift in their religious discourse away from an implicit trust in received religious authority (*taqlid*) towards direct proofs from the Qur'an and Sunnah. Hence, British Islam became predominantly scripturalist. This is, of course, a general feature in Muslim societies globally; however, it is perhaps underemphasised that petrodollar Wahhabism has a key agent of this change in recent decades. (Bowen, 2015).

The attraction of the Salafi movement in Britain amongst young Muslims can be attributed to number of different factors. Funds are distributed among mosques to spread the Saudi Salafi message via the massive distribution of Salafi literature; students are sponsored to study in Saudi universities, especially the Islamic University of Madinah; and so on. In Britain, the Muslims who had associated themselves with Sufi Islam were losing ground to the Salafi movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The shift is often attributed to the influx of money from the Saudi government in an attempt to proliferate its version of Islam in Britain. The chief approach utilised was the use of scholarship; they would sponsor the studies of young Muslims who are interested in furthering their religious studies. The Saudi government would provide prospective undergraduates with full university fees, air tickets, and accommodation. Yahya Birt states that there were hundreds of such students who had been sponsored by the Saudi government in the 1980s, many of which have since become active in preaching in the UK.

Wahhabism's long-term influence in Britain is likely placed in ritual and personal religious space. Even political engagement in the diaspora begins to emphasise local concerns as well as global fabulations (Birt 2002:179). In reality, Salafi thought is more complex; all Salafis

share the desire to return to the two primary sources of Islam, namely the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. They seek to discard the accretion which has become attached to their religion. They seek to avoid music, movies, and television, asserting that music is strictly forbidden. Their trousers are always above their ankles, as per the literalist interpretation of the prophetic narration that any piece of clothing below the ankles [out of arrogance] will be in the hell-fire (Inge, 2016). In the same vein, females normally wear a full face cover *(niqab*) when they go outdoors.

At least half of the women that encountered Salafism at this early stage in their religious seeking initially resisted it, preferring livelier and 'friendlier' groups and approaches. (Inge, 2017) Part of the reason for this was Salafism's 'image problem'; among British Muslims, Salafism referred to by many of its followers as 'the saved sect' is often regarded as an extremist mentality that encourages sectarianism, imposes draconian restrictions on women, and distorts 'true' Islam (Inge, 2002).

Notwithstanding the above, Salafis are indeed a diverse group which can be divided into three main categories: *Pietistic Salafis* believe that salvation can only be achieved through correct faith, religious rituals, and a strict adherence to the principle laid down in the Qur'an and Hadith. They are also known to prefer literalist interpretations. *Political Salafis* believe that Muslims should strive to establish an Islamic State, and those living in Muslims states should abide by the sharia code. *Jihadi Salafis* advocate the taking up of arms to overthrow un-Islamic regimes by force.

Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006) states that the Salafis do not believe in the use of logic in the religion. They view the role of scholars as simply deducing the truth that lies within the Quran and Sunnah. There is thus no room for interpretive differences of religious pluralism. As Wiktorowicz observed, a distinguishing feature of Salafi hermeneutics has been the minimisation or elimination of the role of the human intellect in interpreting the two primary sources of Islam.

In the early 1990s, Salafis became involved in on-going disputes between differing Muslim currents in Britain. They objected to the practises of other Muslims who followed the Deobandi or Barelwi school of thought. Such Schools were more traditional, having been developed through centuries of cultural involvement and diversification of theological and juristic differences. Such differences were based on divergent local customs and were thus influenced by the relevant contexts. Salafis largely targeted the Barelwis due to their

theological ritual practices such as the celebrations of the birthday of the prophet or other sufi saints, as well as seeking spiritual assistance from dead spiritual personalities.

Mehmood Naqshbandi, (Bowen,2014) a close observer of the British Muslim scene, notes why the Salafi doctrine is successfully drawing adherents. He asserts that its call for the believers to follow the two original sources free form cultural and traditional ritualistic trends is attractive. It is impossible to predict whether the abovementioned trends will continue, but Bowen calculates that half of all the mosques could be Salafi controlled within a generation.

4.9 Barelwis in Britain

The other traditionalist movement, the Barelwis, are representatives of the traditions of Sufi mysticism, originating from the Indian subcontinent. In Britain, those associated with the movement are likely amongst the largest of the British Muslim working class constituencies: "The majority of Pakistanis in Britain are Barelwis" (Modood, 1992:145). Flexibility is a feature of their behaviour, as is a more positive attitude to the state (Robinson, 1988:10). The Barelwis do not view living under a non-Muslim state as a threat. Modood states:

"Unlike the Deobandis, they are not apolitical but they, unlike the fundamentalists, have no political grand plan; under the Raj they cooperated with and were favoured by British rule. Their religious passion is usually aroused when their doctrines and forms of worship are denounced by Deobandis and fundamentalists as un-Islamic historical accretions. This intense sectarianism has led to and continues to lead to serious violence in Pakistan and there are not many towns in England which have mosques and have not witnessed such a clash. In Britain, the Barelwis are divided into several regional groups and in terms of networks associated with particular *pirs* (Sufi masters) and orders such as the "Qadiris, Chishtis, and Naqshibandis" (Geaves, 1996:101).

4.9.1 Sufism in Britain

Sufism is present in the British landscape. It is very diverse whether, belonging to the Naqshbandi, Qadiri, Shadhili, or to any number of the many other turuq (pl. of tariqa). Sufi circles are essentially oriented to spiritual life and mystic initiation. That does not mean that the initiates (murid) do not have any communal or social involvement whatever; indeed, the converse is often true.

Scriptural texts often have a profound meaning which requires, according to Sufi teachings, time for meditative reflection and understanding. It is a call to the inward life, far from agitation and discords. The text here is the ultimate source because it is the way to remembrance (*dhikr*) and to nearness (*taqarrub*): it is the only route to the experience of nearness. The turuq are circles of initiation largely internally organised with a particular hierarchy stemming from the initiate to the guide (*shaykh*). Each order has its particular mode of operation (Ramadan, 1999:244).

4.9.2 Different Expressions of Sufi Islam in the UK

The Barelwis are not one unified body, but can rather be viewed as fragments of different groups, each group with an identity based on their spiritual leader or pir. Hostilities between these groups can occur, although fragmentation and division continues to be a hallmark of the movement.

Haras Rafiq (Bowen, 2015) states that Sufism promotes an aspect of Islam that is more moderate and has been more proactive in the fight against extremism in comparison to groups such as the Muslim council of Britain, which has links to the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami. He also stated that the Sufi movements who have affiliations with the Barelwis comprise of a much larger proportion of Britain's Muslims than the combined affiliates of the MCB. According to the data collected by muslimsinBritain.org, the Sufi oriented groups control nearly 39% of Britain's mosque. (Bowen, 2014).

The Sufi mosques and organisations with origins in the Indian subcontinent tend to regard themselves as part of the Barelwi tradition. A movement established in Bareilly in the nineteenth century after its founder sheikh Ahmed Riza Khan. This movement was a reaction to the other puritanical movements which emphasised the Muslims' need to return to their former glory through purifying their Islam from any innovation. These movements were critical of the cultural practises that crept into Muslims' religious acts. Practices like shrine visits, Sufi and saint venerations elevated their position to sainthood thereby making their graves to places of pilgrimage. The puritanical movements like the Deobandis and Salafis of the Indian sub-continent regarded this as contravening the monotheistic principles of Islam.

4.9.3 Sufi Influences

In Britain, around 90% of the Sufi masjids are run by the Barelwi movement or are affiliated to the Barelwis. This is to be expected, as the majority of the Muslims in Britain are from the subcontinent, primarily from the Mirpur district. They migrated to Britain in the 1960s, mostly as male labourers. Initially, they saw their presence as temporary but by the 1970s their wives and children joined them. When they realised that their presence was of a more permanent nature, they began to establish mosques to establish the congregational prayers. These mosques provided Quranic education for the young children. The Barelwi migrants' spiritual leader began paying annual visits to the UK to meet their followers. Some even settled here and established their own mosques. As a result, the aforementioned pirs developed their tariqahs in the UK.

While attachment to the subcontinent tariqas remains strong among the first generation community, a new trend emerged whereby second and third generation Muslim migrant communities are looking beyond the subcontinent, taking spiritual leaders from other places around the globe, in particular English speaking scholars of Arab descent. The sheikhs who lead the tariqas are experts in Sufi spirituality, also known as tasawwuf. Using tasawwuf, they hold to the notion of esoteric knowledge with followers believing that the sheikhs have had conversation with God or the prophet.

There are a number of Sufi tariqas present in Britain; among the major ones are the Chishti, Naqshbandi, Qadri, and some recent ones emerging such as the Tajani and Shadilli tariqas. Tariqh means method; the followers are taught these methods by their pir with the ultimate goal to fight against one's ego, surrendering oneself to God, and become a better being. In Britain, three factors have worked together to temporarily overcome the ordinarily disparate nature of the Barelwi tradition: reaction to the publishing of Salman Rushdie's book, the Satanic Verses; fears for the future of the younger generation; and the arrival of resident charismatic *pirs* in Britain who are forming powerful groups of Barelwis amongst British Muslims (Geaves, 1996:105-6).

4.10 The transnational Islamic movements in the UK: strategies and orientations

This subsection aims to present a brief comparison of these movements and their orientations and strategies in the UK. It is possible to say that South Asian traditionalists have especially maintained 'isolation strategies', sometimes leading them to be hopelessly adrift from

contemporary life (Geaves, 2007:23). Differences in the details of religious life are still reproducing a culture of polemics, with one group accusing another of deviating from orthodoxy. For example, Barelwis identify themselves as Ahl-as Sunna wal-Jama'at (Geaves, 2009:102). In other words, they attribute themselves to the people of the Prophet's way and community, claiming legitimacy and authenticity as true representatives of Sunni Islam in the UK. This allows them to counter the reformists' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations and cultural accretions. By contrast, the Barelwis accuse other reform groups such as the Deobandis and Jama'at-i Islami as being Wahhabi, not showing respect to the prophet or the saints.

There are still on-going debates between the Barelwis and Deobandis resulting in each group's arguments and justification for its belief and practices. The main discussion pertains to the perception of the Prophet Muhammad, particularly in matters such as celebration of his birthday or his attributes as mentioned in the Qur'an (Metcalf, 1982:301; Robinson, 1988:9). On the one hand, the Barelwis identify themselves as true representatives of Sunni Islam in the UK. This allows them to counter the reform groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations and cultural accretions, on the other. They also accuse the reform groups of being Wahhabis. The 'ulama' of Bareilly *dar al'Ulum* in general have issued *fatwas* that declare that Wahhabism as outside the fold of Islam (Geaves, 1996:103-4).

The debates in 19th century India (Metcalf, 1982:301) transferred to Britain are still alive among the South Asian Muslim communities. In essence, traditionalists advocate the virtue of the past with strong adherence to four Sunni Schools of Law, whereas reformists always maintain their claim of purifying religious belief and practices influenced by customs and mystics. The intra-Muslim relations amongst these Sunni movements sometimes becomes more complex, with each sub-group of Sunni Islam fighting each other, excluding one another from the main branch of Islam, and even excommunicating one another. For instance, Salafi thought in Britain is well-known for its enmity towards Sufi practices, and thereby the Barelwis are found in the centre, against not only reformist rhetoric from the Arabs, but also from their own ethnic Muslim fellows from the Indian Subcontinent (Geaves, 2000:53-4).

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the emergence of four main transnational Islamic revival movements in the UK whose religious narratives have had a great impact on British Muslim communities. The chapter has explored the theological, political and cultural discourse of these movements and specifically focussed on examining their influence in shaping the religiosity of the Muslims in particular their youngsters. The next chapter explores the historical, socioeconomic and religious dynamics informing the debate over Muslim integration in the UK.

CHAPTER 5

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE UK

5:1 INTRODUCTION:

This chapter discusses the main, often contested, issues informing the debate over integration of Muslims in modern multicultural and multi-ethnic Great Britain. The first part explores the definitions and models of social integration in connection with the different Muslim identities with a special reference to the second and third generation Muslim young people who appear to be both adapting European society's social norms and at the same time remain loyal to their religious values. The chapter discusses the views of the main transnational Islamic movements in the UK on Muslim communities' integration within the secular and multicultural Britain. A substantial part of the chapter focuses on exploring the dynamics that complicate and hinder the process of Muslim integration into the wider British society.

5:2.1 Modes of integration

This chapter adopts a typology developed by political scientist T. Modood (1997) as a starting point of inquiry. Tariq Madood has defined five modes of integration as follows:

5:2:2 Assimilation: the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, and the preferred result is one in which the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible. A more recent definition suggests assimilation as the "attenuation of distinctions based on ethnic origin". There are three similar terms that inform us about the process we are identifying as "assimilation." They are: assimilation, acculturation, and incorporation. All three relate to what happens when groups of individuals having diverse cultures enter into continuing contact in which they share experience and develop a common cultural life (Allport 1964: 61).

5:2:3 Individualist-integration: only sees any institutional adjustments for migrants or minorities as those of individual claimants and bearers of rights as equal citizens. Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognised or supported in the public sphere.

5:2:4 Multiculturalism: the processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as involving groups as well as individuals and working differently for different groups. The concept of equality is central. Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from individualist-integration and cosmopolitanism because it explicitly recognises the social significance of groups, not just of individuals and organisations.

5:2:5 Cosmopolitanism: 'Difference' is positively appreciated but it is denied that groups exist or, alternatively, accepted that they exist but should not be given political recognition. Cosmopolitanism is maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority individuals, to mix with, borrow and learn from all.

Even today, when some politicians use the term 'integration', they actually, consciously or not, mean what here has been defined as assimilation. Assimilation seeks to erase difference so that the occasions for discrimination and conflict are not allowed to take root. Assimilation as a policy has come to be seen as impractical illiberal and inegalitarian. It was as early as 1966 that Roy Jenkins, the then UK home secretary, declared that in the view of the British government integration is 'not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Jenkins 1967: 267). 'Assimilation' as a term has come to be dropped in favour of 'integration'.

5.3: Multiculturalism: plural identities in a single society

Multiculturalism is where processes of integration are seen as two-way, as involving groups as well as individuals, and as working differently for different groups (Parekh 2008; Modood 2007). In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the 'multi'). 'Culturalism' refers to the fact that the groups in question are likely not just to be marked by newness or phenotype or socio-economic location but by certain forms of group identity. The integration of groups is in addition to, not as an alternative to, the integration of individuals, anti-discrimination measures and a robust framework of individual rights. Multiculturalism, like most concepts, takes different forms in different contexts and at different times. For example, it has been differently understood in the Netherlands and in Britain

Those who originate the policy may start with one meaning, as for example, Roy Jenkins did in relation to race and culture. Then others, including latecomers to the debate, may push it or extend it in other directions by, for example, making religion central, as Muslims in Britain

have done (Modood 2005). Equality is central to multiculturalism, as it is to other conceptions of integration. Post-immigration minorities are groups differentiated from the majority society or the norm in society by two factors: on the one hand, negative 'difference', alienness, stigmatisation, stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination and racism, on the other, by the senses of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The two together are the key data for multiculturalism. The differences at issue are those perceived both by outsiders or group members from the outside in and from the inside out to constitute not just some form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority that diminishes or makes difficult equal membership in the wider society or polity. Multiculturalism has recently been defined as 'where ethnocultural-religious minorities are, or are thought of, as rather distinct communities, and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness.' (Emmerson 2011).

There are indications that from an adjustment point of view integration and segregation appear to be the most positive forms of acculturation (Rudim, 2003). This suggests that preserving a tie of their own ethnic group and culture has a positive influence on the psychological and social adjustment of immigrants and minority members (Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, 2013). The least favourable position is the marginal and the assimilation ones. Both positions imply a kind of denial of the complex reality of living with two or more cultures, whereas acceptance of this is considered a prerequisite for effective coping.

A marginal orientation is traditionally associated with psychological and behavioural problems and stress, and assimilation seems to be related to psychological costs such as cultural alienation, depression, fear, and loneliness. Both forms of acculturation involve breaking off the emotional ties with one's own ethnic community and culture has positive influence on adjustment and well-being. People who distance themselves from their ethnic community must often pay for this with isolation, insecurity, and broken networks, while at the same time acceptance by the majority group is often partial, temporary or conditional.

Yet there is some initial evidence, such as research by Phinney and colleagues (2007) among several ethnic groups in the United States. Overall, their findings indicate that a secure ethnic identity is indeed associated with more positive attitudes towards other ethnic groups and more mature multicultural thinking. The results of two other survey studies conducted in the Netherlands provide further evidence. One of these included adolescents of Turkish and Moroccan origin. It was found that those with more achieved ethnic identity were more positive with cultural diversity than those in ethnic identity diffusion. The same was found in

a study among adolescents with a Surinamese background. Among them, a more mature ethnic identity was associated with a more positive attitude towards native Dutch and the Dutch society. Thus, a more secure ethnic identity appears to be associated with higher openness and acceptance of cultural others. It provides the confident basis for meetings others, rather than being an uncertain inner bastion that constantly needs to be repaired and defended (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012).

5.3.1: Failure of multiculturalism?

A debate around the failure of multiculturalism has started with the mainly conservative politicians. This argument suggests that traditional multiculturalism only deals with the individual and does not address the need that new minorities have group rights and recognition as a means of asserting citizenship within European countries. Most recently, the groups in question have been defined not racially but according to religion. This is not only an external definition, but also and more importantly, a self-definition that marks what sociologists have started calling the post-secular age in Europe.

The most important proponent of group rights in Britain is Tariq Modood (2007). Over the last two decades, he has analysed, critiqued and suggested changes to British multiculturalism, particularly as it impinges on Muslims who make up a significant majority among British minorities. He rejects the argument that religious and ethnic groups should be treated differently under multiculturalism, making the case of ethno-religious groups. Modood also rejects multiculturalism as it is now constituted on an individualist basis. Modood defines four elements that should make up a multicultural policy: race, ethnicity, cultural heritage, and religious community. While there is an overlap among these categories, they are all modes of differentiation. For him, multiculturalism has to address not the individual but the collective.

Thus a group could be defined not just through religion but through any of the above categories that designate difference. The assertion, re-imagining and negotiation of difference is central to group formation and evolution and thus to multiculturalism. The aim of such a reformulated multiculturalism, according to him, is not the eventual erasure of difference but its transformation into something for which civic respect can be won. Since group identities are stigmatized, he sees identity discourses and the remaking of group public identities as being central to this transformation. Ultimately, Modood would like to see a British model of

communitarian pluralism in place which would help with the process of claims-making through political mobilization and policy outcomes. Group rights and communitarianism are very controversial, not surprisingly, as they go against the history of secularism, the European of religious wars that marked its history from in the 16th and 17th centuries, and also a xenophobic attitude to foreign religions that are seen as non-European. A fear of social fragmentation is often cited as a reason for resisting group based claims-making. This is coupled with Islamophobia, both historical and contemporary, post-colonial arrogance and race and class prejudice. Having listed these obstacles to religious groups is not to dismiss them. Prejudice is rooted in history and self-identity as well, and unfortunately, people cannot be insulted out of their beliefs. The only recourse is constant debate in the language of law and rights discourses, and the application of constitutional and other laws to cover minorities fairly.

The fear of separatism and social fragmentation is the formula that Modood (2007) suggests: "communitarian pluralism plus claims making", which they see as an extension of Anglo-Saxon style multiculturalism. Within Britain, a milder term such as diversity is seen as more acceptable than "difference". But according to many communitarians, difference is central to defining identity, and having a clearly defined identity central to equal and participatory citizenship. The "backlash" against multiculturalism has many reasons, some conjectural and others historical, but the fear of excessive alterity and the governability of difference is certainly a part of it.

5:4: Religion as a social identity

Religion is a particularly powerful social identity because it is based on a system of guiding beliefs (Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). These guiding beliefs are fundamental to how believers interpret their experiences into meaning. The reason these belief systems function as a social identity is because of the importance of relevant group membership to self-concept (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Religious identity affects how the followers view the world, and how they interact with the social context they operate in. Members of a religious group feel an eternal sense of uniqueness, affiliation, and belonging to the religious well observed and succinctly argued group. In addition to sharing common beliefs, their religious membership is essential to their self-concept. This creates strong bonds between followers of a common faith. The uniqueness of religion makes it a social identity that for many exceeds the importance and salience of other social identities (Verkuyten & Yildiz,

2007). The moral authority religion holds over its followers is undisputable (Wellman & Tokuno, 2004): Religion not only deals with what is "sacred", it is also unique because it offers answers to the "ultimate issues in life" (Pargament, 1997, p. 25). As a result, religion is an extremely salient social identity that heavily influences the worldview of the followers.

5.4.1 Young British Muslims 18 – 25 years

Muslim young people also provide an important context for understanding identity development as the result of negotiating inner and outer factors shaping their lives. It appears that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain do less well than native and other migrant youth in terms of educational attainment and labour market integration (2011 census). They often abandon school or professional training before completion and have higher than average rates of unemployment. While this does not necessarily indicate an inability to integrate but, rather, points to important aspects of discrimination, what Heath and Cheung (2007) have aptly called the "ethnic penalty this trend is often portrayed in the media as a "proof" of the failure of Muslims to adapt to Western liberal free market democracies.

Immigration results in specific challenges to reduce or remove particular differences between newcomers and natives. This is what is meant by immigrant integration. There are real stakes involved in ensuring that third and fourth generations migrant offspring experience the same life chances as their peers. When this does not happen successfully and smoothly in education and employment, for example, the odds worsen in terms of settled disadvantage giving rise to segregation, mistrust and grievance. Where gaps are successfully closed, we can speak of a successfully integrated society that has extracted real, lasting benefits for all through immigration.

More recent work has also shown intolerance of faith in Britain, especially anti-Muslim public sentiment, sometimes referred to as 'Islamophobia'. The OSI research (2001) suggests that religious discrimination against Muslims remains a critical barrier to full and equal participation in society. European-born Muslims, particularly women, were more likely to perceive higher levels of religious discrimination than Muslims born abroad. European-born Muslim men identify the police as a key source of unfair treatment and discrimination. For Muslims, the persistence of discrimination and prejudice affects their sense of national belonging. OSI found significant levels of interaction between people from different backgrounds, with European-born Muslims reporting the most. Frequent contact occurred at

work, schools, shops, in public spaces such as transport and parks, and in the home. The majority of European-born Muslim women had frequent contact at home with people outside their ethnic group. The results run contrary to the view that Muslims live parallel or segregated lives, or do not feel a sense of belonging or attachment to the city and country where they live. It suggests that discrimination remains an important barrier to belonging, but one that many are overcoming.

Muslims are not integrated into the mainstream labour market (OSI Report 2001, consensus 2011). They face higher unemployment rates and higher poverty rates than the general population. Those who are employed are often in marginal and low-paid jobs, this carries a greater risk of unemployment. Low-paid jobs also lead to segregated or parallel working lives.

Different groups of immigrants to the UK show huge variance in employment rates, earnings, residency, friendships, and so on. It is meaningless to report that immigrants and natives are not integrated because the key indicators point to big, aggregate differences. Incisive analysis of immigrant integration needs to disaggregate migrants according to factors which may influence their integration outcomes in particular their origin country, length of residency and skill levels. We should also not lump together different forms of migration the pattern of integration outcomes is likely to be very different for refugees who have claimed asylum in Britain than labour migrants coming to Britain for work. Many studies seeking to establish causation of a particular integration gap start with the assumption that much of the gap will be inherent to the group, but also that the majority society (through laws, customs, attitudes) are responsible in part for the underachievement, once intrinsic characteristics such as human capital have been accounted for (Heath and Cheung, 2007).

Fear of and hostility towards immigrants, and to Muslims specifically, are exacerbated by concerns about security, both in terms of international relations and transnational Islamist terrorist causes and in terms of networks that can be attractive to some second generation Muslims and converts, and that have actual and potential recruits in Europe Fear, polarisation and conflict are likely to get worse if there is a prolonged economic recession as both ethnic minorities and those whites most likely to swing to extreme right views are most vulnerable to job losses and cuts in public services and welfare budgets (Searchlight Educational Trust 2011).

5:5 Islam as an overarching collective identity

As discussed in the previous chapters, some traditional Muslims oppose Western modernization. The religious identity crisis of modernity is met by a strengthening of the salience of traditional Muslim identity, and their response is to defend the traditional perception of Muslim identity against the values of Western modernity. Modern fundamentalist Islamic discourse is characterized by a particular Muslim identity of Wahhabism (Haddad, 1982, p. 83). Their response is to disregard reformist Islamic reinterpretations and purify Muslim identity by returning directly to the traditional sources of Islam, the Quran and the Sunna.

Madood found that minority identification does not necessarily imply a loss of national identity. Indeed, the most common pattern in our sample of minorities was to hold strong national and minority identities at the same time. Since this is most likely to lead to positive psychological adaptation to the majority society this should be encouraging for all concerned about minority alienation. Moreover, Muslims are not more likely to have a separated (strong minority only) identification than any other groups in fact the opposite is the case. And while there are between 10 and 25 per cent who are 'marginalised' in identity terms across the minority groups, this is most likely among Caribbean's, and least likely among Indian Sikhs. It was clear that while generational change in the patterning of identities was more of a continuum than a step change; it was unequivocally in the direction of maintaining majority identities more and minority ones less. In particular, we see that the probability of having a 'separated' (minority group only) identity, decreases in the UK born generation of minorities.

The focus was on issues such as colour-racism, poverty, educational underachievement, drugs, crime, and children brought up by single mothers. Having now seen the development of tight, patriarchal kinship networks, educational overachievement amongst South Asians (though there is simultaneous educational underachievement amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, especially males) and the upward social mobility of Indians and Chinese, not to mention a disproportionate number of millionaires and billionaires from those ethnic groups, we see how flawed the original taken-for granted paradigm was in relation to Britain. This is related to the second bias. The British secularist bias is more European than American. Until the 1990s, few social scientists or policymakers foresaw that the issues conceptualised by 'race', 'ethnicity' and 'multiculturalism' were going to be dominated by aspects of religion. Nor did they foresee that this would be brought about by the power of British ethnic minority agency and its transnational connections. Despite those social

scientists who always see power in top-down ways through class and/or racism. Even if members of ethnic minorities are fully integrated in terms of legal rights, access to employment or education that does not mean they have achieved full social integration.

5.6: The Integration of Muslim Immigrants in Britain

Global debates such as the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy also extend to the situation of British Muslims and their integration. The debate over integration is essentially structured around the question of the compatibility of religion and national identity. Religion is conceived as the element preventing a full integration, as shown by the belief held by European general populations that removing public signs of religiosity is necessary for integration (Guest, 2010).

General populations in Spain, Germany, Great Britain and France all identify first with their country rather than their religion. On the contrary, Spanish, German, and especially British Muslims tend to identify first as Muslims rather than with their nationality, at a level similar to that in Pakistan, Nigeria and Jordan and at a higher level than Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia; in 2006, this was the case for 81% of British, 69% of Spanish, 66% of German Muslims but only 46% of French Muslims (Guest 2010).

The increasing Muslim identification as mentioned earlier has brought about increasing feeling of belonging to the ummah, or the "global community of the faithful", which includes all Muslims. This is an essential element in connection with international issues. Two global trends can be identified in this regard; a diasporic Islam linked to the country of origin and transnational Islam emphasizing the relation to the *ummah*. European Muslims are mostly to be situated in the second trend, and this is especially mirrored in younger generations' experiences. The re-islamization of youth without linking to the parent's homeland but defined by the adherence to transnational Islam and the emergence of radical Islam activism at the same time lead to an "infernal couple "the association of Islam with terrorism and suspicions regarding Muslims' loyalty, which adds another constraint for integration. The situation of European Muslims is apprehended through the international context so that Islam constitutes not only a foreign, external threat but also a domestic threat, from within. The political participation of immigrant or ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, is itself perceived as a threat. Muslims themselves are increasingly perceived as a threat from within and constructed as the "other". The threat to secularism is particularly emphasized through Muslims' apparent lack of integration and multiple allegiances.

Though the perception of religious "otherness" as a threat concerns a minority of general population, the latter are more likely than European Muslims to think that people with other faiths threaten their way of life, and this is especially the case in the UK. This implies, for example, a portrayal of Muslims in the media as a threat from within or a fifth column despite the fact that for example, for British Muslims, a stronger sense of Islamic identity does not necessarily mean a rejection of British identity, as there is an accommodation of the "universalism of citizenship claims with particularism of their ethnic identities" and no conflict between transnational Muslim identity and British citizenship (Madood 1999).

Education was seen as a solution of problems, such as segregation or public misunderstanding. Education and schools should have mediated the extensive change in understanding migrants and ethnic minorities. Thought that knowledge of English language would improve the relationship between indigenous people and newcomers, the large emphasis was placed on education. It is obvious; better British public get to know about ethnic minorities, the more they will understand their behaviour and the gap between them will reduce.

Overall then we see that dual identities are the 'typical' acculturation pattern for the UK's ethnic minorities. Holding a strong British identity increases over generations as the tendency to have a strong minority identity reduces. We also see that those who appear to be most a risk of marginalization, in these terms of identity acculturation with the greatest proportion maintaining neither strong minority nor strong majority identities, are the Caribbean group a group which is recognised as being socially, geographically and in employment terms the most 'assimilated' (Peach 2005), but which may, in line with other findings, contain a section that feels alienated by a society is still strongly stratified along racial and ethnic lines (Heath et al. 2007). There is substantial heterogeneity in identity formation and strength across ethnic minority groups and within the UK majority. The 3rd 4th generation is moving towards greater 'assimilation' in identity with strengthening endorsement of the British identity; and this appears to be especially the case for British Muslim minorities

5:7:1 Becoming British

Despite the extraordinary amount of interest and research on the meaning of Britishness and obtaining British citizenship, there is little consensus on what it means to become British. Of course, the eligibility criteria for naturalization are clear: five years' residency (three for

spouses), allowance for dual citizenship, jus soli for second-generation migrants, as well as meeting "good character" standards. But the membership dimension of citizenship what it means to become British's frustratingly vague. British identity is quintessentially inchoate and regularly re-defined. The United Kingdom is, by definition, the unification of multiple national communities. And as a subset, Great Britain sews together the different nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Multiculturalism (and multiracialism) may have "officially" begun with the arrival of Jamaican immigrants on the Empire Windrush ship in 1948[40], but it is not surprising that British citizenship is a complex idea, and that diversity is a key challenge to its meaning. Until 1962, British colonial subjects enjoyed equal citizenship with those born in Britain. Moreover, because the only common unifier among Britons is subject hood to the Crown, not citizenship, defining a set of common values in an age of migration is a unique challenge Britain has been multinational for much longer.

The first legal step in defining British citizenship was the British Nationality Act of 1948[41]. This Act did not so much positively define a category of British membership, but instead preserved connections of subject-hood with other Commonwealth states as they were breaking off to define their own categories of citizenship.

Since the conversion of a subject status to a citizen status occurred so belatedly, migrating to Britain from any of the Commonwealth countries did not result in a distinct transformation of a migrant's status. Rights conferred by the state were equal and relatively expansive. Overseas subjects and Commonwealth citizens were even more removed from the concept of citizenship than European migrants to Britain were, because they were exempt from the oath of allegiance to the monarch and even this requirement for naturalization, the closest citizenship requirement to resemble membership criteria, was perfunctory. It was not a ceremony; rather it was sworn in front of a magistrate or declared on naturalization paperwork Classifications of subject hood significantly changed in the approximately three decades between 1948 and the next significant British Nationality Act (1981). [42]The most significant of these changes appeared in the Commonwealth Immigrant's Act (CIA) of 1962 and the Immigration Act of 1971[43]. However, it was not until the BNA 1981 that the first definition of "British citizenship" appeared.

This represented a new stage in membership requirements. Applicants for citizenship through naturalization were required to possess "sufficient knowledge of the English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic language." However, the practice of assessing this criterion was ad hoc.

Successful completion of naturalization paperwork was often sufficient evidence of proficiency. There are great differences between this definition of British citizenship, and the civic integration criteria that today define the contours of contemporary British citizenship. The 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (NIA) stipulated that in addition to the language requirement, applicants for citizenship must now demonstrate "sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom." Originally, this was separate from the language requirement, though policy would later fuse the two together. The NIA did not articulate how such knowledge would be demonstrated or assessed. Instead the act stated that "a person designated by the Secretary of State" was empowered to "determine sufficiency of knowledge" and "accept a qualification" of sufficient knowledge of a language. Also, the Act states that the laws which "makes provision about citizenship ceremonies, oaths and pledges shall have effect."

5:7.2: Are shared values enough for the Muslim integration?

It is important to point out that although the UK society has quite a problematic attitude towards Muslims, due to the increasing Islamic extremism and other factors, other communities such as Jews or Irish are integrating successfully into the British society. Due to the fact that the United Kingdom in the last century passed through radical changes, the white Anglo-Saxon model as the only existing model in the UK is not any more valid. The United Kingdom is a country and living organism with various ethnic minorities and cultures, with their customs, religion and food It is obvious that these communities were successfully integrated into the British mainstream due to the fact that in the time of their immigration into the UK they have already shared some of the common or similar values and behaviour. These immigrants have partially originated from the same European background, share similar rule of law, and understand the human equal rights. As Mustafa Malik pointed out, "For over time, the offspring of European Catholic and Jewish immigrants have largely assimilated into host-country, Muslims are unlikely to do so.

Are Muslims able to wholly integrate wholly into the British mainstream? Why are British Muslims sometimes seen by the government and general public as partially incompatible with the British society, their culture and values?

5.7.3.1: Firstly, the most visible factors of Muslims inability to wholly integrate are the rising terrorist atrocities and the UK-born extremists. The Islamophobia is nowadays very often inflected term and this fear of Islam seems to continue.

5.7.3.2: Secondly, the housing segregation, community ghettoes and parallel lives are the by-products of the lack of social cohesion in the society. This situation is most visible in northern cities such as Oldham, Bradford or Blackburn, where the urban riots in 2001 took place.

5.7.3.3: Thirdly, media are playing one of the key roles in supporting the anti-Muslim sentiment. With their shouting headlines about terrorism, extremism and radicalism, the general public is learned mainly about the negative side of Muslim's communities from the media reports.

The other phenomenon which obstructs the successful integration is the socio-economic status of Muslims communities. Due to the lack of English knowledge and poor education, Muslims are nowadays minority with the highest rate of unemployment. Unemployed Muslims youths with no expectation for better future are more predisposed to seek help in extremism or radicalism.

5:7:4 Geographical segregations as a result of Multiculturalism?

The role of community is even more important as it serves as a place of safeness and supports the 'we' feeling among them. Despite of government effort to wholly integrate Muslims to the British society, the Muslims unity partially causes to perceive Muslims as a 'they' or 'others' (Hopkins 2009). As it was already mentioned the majority of Muslims living in the UK comes from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh and these creates the longest established communities. It is not by chance that these Muslims, even living long time in Britain, are less integrated than the newcomers. Preserving their culture and way of life, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are unintentionally building ghettoes and walking rather to segregation than integration. The community ghettoes were largely criticised by Trevor Phillips who stated "that Britain is 'sleepwalking to segregation'." In his speech from 2005 he pointed out that these unconsciously created ghettoes are a by-product of multiculturalism's and hence should be replaced by integrationist's sharing common values is not simply the result of multi-culturism it is a by-product of many other factors ie employment education ect (Hopkins 2009).

Instead of living together, parallel lives of British and Muslims are a result of the multiculturalists' effort to support differentness and uniqueness of ethnic communities. Although these disturbances caused many difficulties, it was realized that Muslim communities and generally their segregationist behaviour is caused by the discourse of multiculturalism and by misunderstanding and the only solution to this phenomenon is to involve Muslims to the British society and try to rebuild their communities; to pull down the wall between Muslims and the rest of the society (Ansari, 2002).

The discussion over the Muslim identities in the UK seems to be more complicated as Muslims are the most diverse and fragmented group of immigrants in the UK. They came from different parts of South Asian subcontinent and Africa and settled in various parts of the UK. Although the prevailing number of Muslims belongs to working class, there appear also groups of high qualified and upper-class Muslims.

For majority of British inhabitants, the need to identify themselves or searching for their own identity is not as urgent as in the case of minorities, particularly Muslims. The question over identity is even more vital for young Muslims born in the UK. Despite speaking good English, wearing modern clothes, listening western modern music, Muslim youth are still more or less facing discrimination, ethnic or religious. Due to the fact that Muslims are still sometimes seen as the 'others', they started to ask themselves who they are and where they belong if not into Britain. It seems that some of young Muslims found answers on these questions in their religion, Islam. "The 'return' to religion is a partial resolution of an internally 'felt' paradox of both 'being' British and the externally imposed 'threat' to be British." The situation over Muslims religion identity might be described in relation to the situation of minorities in America. Several researches had shown that even the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants in America had fully assimilated into the mainstream, these had also returned back to the religion of their parents to search for their own identity.

However, in the case of Muslims, the religion identification seems to be more problematic as the general attitude to Islam became rather questionable after the terrorist attacks such as London bombing in 2007. However, the opinion of young Muslims on Islam differs considerably. As for some Muslims the return to religion values is vital, for many others religion identity is not important at all. For majority of Muslims, particularly young, are nowadays typical multiple or hybrid identities. It means that they feel to be part of British society and have already adopted the British way of life, yet they are still aware of the

country of their origin, its customs and faith. This phenomenon is recognizable in all communities in Britain. As the data from 2011 Census indicate, the place of birth influence national identity notably. 91 percent of Muslims born in the UK identify themselves as British in contrast to Muslims born outside the UK. Researchers (Gest 2010) often point out that the identification and awareness of young Muslims play key role in the process of integration. Knowing who they are and where they belong and so understand themselves help young Muslims better integrate to the UK.

Muslims and non-Muslims share similar views in relation to their level of trust in the city council and government. Trust in local political institutions is higher than national institutions. The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in their levels of trust in Parliament is significant and should be of concern. The majority of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents are involved in mixed ethnic and religious organisations. The OSI research (2001) finds many positive initiatives taken by officials at the local level to engage with ethnic and religious organisations in their city. These initiatives may account for one striking finding from the OSI survey: respondents involved in same-ethnic/religion civic organisations are significantly more likely to trust their city councils than those involved in mixed organisations

5:8 Islam and its influence on Muslim integration

After the terrorist attacks in 2001, nothing exasperated the perception of Muslims as much as their religion, Islam. This term is constantly inflected in media or government sessions, and although George Bush (2001) in his speeches mentioned that "Islam, as practiced by the vast majority of people, is a peaceful religion, a religion that respects others", there is a prevailing tendency to 'demonize' this religion. As 2005 and 2007 Pew Surveys indicate, over 60 percent of respondents have denoted Muslim religion as the most violent in the UK. Despite of the effort to fully integrate Muslims to the British society, Islam for many people seems to be a large obstruction on the way to the successful integration. For majority of Muslims, religion is firmly footed and connected to their everyday life while the secularized British society makes a distinction between their private and public life. According to British National Party, Muslims in Britain may only become British if they will change their perception of Islam and forget about their *umma*, religion identity. In other words, British Muslims should abandon their religion due to the incompatibility with secularized and westernized Britain. Muslims religion suffer from a large misunderstanding, either it is

perceived as a threat to British society or something very strange, different and difficult to understand. As it was already mentioned, Muslims represent the most diverse ethnic minority in the UK and also their perception of Islam varies. Majority of Muslims in the UK are Sunnis, however, the Sunnis are even divided into smaller sub-groups or sects as Deobandi or Barelwis, Salafis extra and as it is suggested, some of these groups may incline to radicalism or extremism. Due to this fact Islam seems to be more incomprehensible and difficult to understand.

5:8:1 The *Ummah* as global identity

When dealing with the Muslims identity it is worthwhile to discuss further the term '*ummah'* and its implication to the general perception of Muslims. The definition of the *ummah*, as some scholars described, is 'imagined community' which might be compared to a nation. Muslims in Britain might perceive themselves as British or Scottish, however, as the concept of the *ummah* evokes a 'we' feeling among all Muslims communities, Muslims are aware of being part of global community. Moreover, this 'we' feeling and loyalty to Muslims global identity is by some people criticized to create impediment to successful integration to the UK.

However, the perception of the *ummah* is sometimes seen by media or some politics as rather problematic on the ground of present conflict situation in the South Asia and Africa. Media and some researchers point out that due to the *umma*h concept global events such as recent conflict in Libya have direct impact on local identities of Muslims, their shaping and political actions such as protesting in marches. British Muslims are very often generalized; Muslims are homogenized and sometimes seen as the potential terrorists. It is important to points out, that for majority of Muslims the concept of the *umma*h is rather more symbolic than everyday practice. In spite of being aware of this concept, the *ummah* do not influence their daily life in the UK. The *umma*h should not be seen as a threat or some barrier to successful integration, this concept lasts for centuries and the main aim of the global identity is to help Muslims cope with new life in the UK giving them feeling that they are not alone.

Important question is the compatibility of the Islamic culture with the "British-ness". The opinion of the Islamic political movements on this regard also differs widely from each other. Some Muslim scholars and groups argue that legal framework of modern European countries provide freedom of worship and freedom of conscience, so Muslims can fit in these societies without facing any major obstacle. Moreover, supporters of this wing rely on the fact that

Islam consists in itself the obligation of the Muslims to respect the social contract and to be "a committed good citizen" who abides the laws and policies. Furthermore, rejecting the notion of the minority or the second class citizenship in Europe, Muslims are considered to be equal members of the society. Other wings having more radical attitude towards the compatibility, supports the argument that in the case of the non-suitability of the European values to particular cultural desires of Muslims, this can be changed by re-considering so called dominant values of Europe.

Observers see Muslims in the west as generally retaining a primary loyalty to the *ummah*, strengthened by the Islamist resurgence, while developing a secondary loyalty to their respective nation states. The first generation of impoverished Muslims in the west, lacking Muslim cultural facilities, tried to assimilate to some extent on their desire to improve their economic status. The better-off second and third generation are however, rediscovering their Islamic identity, helped by a well-established western Muslim infrastructure constantly reinvigorated from Muslim states by injection of funds, imams, and radical ideologies, that is why there is growing discrete Muslims participate in the social, economic and political mainstream of their adoptive countries, they carefully nurture at the same time a distinctive Muslim culture. They demand that western states adapt to the Muslim presence by adopting a pluralist communal type of political structure, in which each religion community is a recognised autonomous group under its religious leadership and law.

5:9: The negative impact of media and Islamophobia

Media plays one of the key roles in the process of Muslim integration to the British society, however, as researches signify, this role inclines to demonize the picture of British Muslims rather than simplifies Muslim integration. Negative perception of Muslims in the UK nourished by the media goes hand in hand with growing threat of Muslims, and particularly their religion, so called Islamophobia. Typical feature of portraying Muslims in media is their homogenization; Muslims are often described only as Muslims, not by their names or profession. A 2008 survey concerning portrayal of Muslims in British media has revealed the tendency to focus rather on Muslim differentness as in the case of their religion or culture (Guest 2010). The main topics concerning Muslims were dealing with extremism, terrorism and these were followed with religion and culture. Moreover, the most frequent words used when discussing Muslims were extremist, suicide bomber, radical or fanatical with very few positive words. The impact of media on Muslims and their communities in Britain is often

disregarded. However, prevailing negative attitude nourished by the media affecting Muslims, as they are more aware of their differentness and their position of outsiders in British society. As the media portray mainly negative sides of Muslim community, emphasize radical or extremist's individuals rather than effort of majority to integrate, it is not by chance that Muslims in the UK often feel to be insecure and viewed as disloyal to Britain.

5:9:2 Islamophobia

Social scientists have coined the terms "Islamophobia" and "Muslimophobia" to analyse these phenomena (Allen 2009) Islamophobia is the irrational fear of and prejudice against Islam as a faith and a culture without any discrimination between different Islamic religious currents. Muslimophobia is the irrational fear of and prejudice against Muslims as individuals, assuming that all people who are nominally Muslims experience their identity and faith in the same fanatical way that involves, among other things, the fusion of religious and political power, the subjugation of women to men, and certain other customs that are incompatible with dominant Western values such as forced and under-age marriages, homophobia and anti-semitism issues seen as emblematic of Muslim incompatibility with European secular and liberal democracies. Olivier Roy (1994) has been theorising on the potential of Islamic terrorism for over a decade the radicalized young people are in no way the vanguard or the spokesmen of the Muslim population, and in particular, that there is no "Muslim community" in France. Radicalized young people, who rely heavily on an imagined Muslim politics (the *ummah* of earlier times) are deliberately at odds with the Islam of their parents, as well as Muslim culture overall. They invent an Islam which opposes itself to the West. They come from the periphery of the Muslim word. They are moved to action by the displays of violence in the media of Western culture. They embody a generational rupture (parents are now encouraged to call the police when their children leave for Syria), and they are not involved with the local religious community and the neighbourhood mosques.

These young people practice self-radicalization on the Internet, searching for a global jihad. They are not interested in the tangible concerns of the Muslim world, such as Palestine. In short, they are not seeking the Islamization of the society in which they live but the realization of their pathological fantasy of heroism ("We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad," claimed some of the killers at Charlie Hebdo). Roy points to a very interesting and relatively new phenomenon: the intertwining of local challenges of socio-economic integration with global this is a significant geopolitical issues, which actually appears to be an

offspring of the urban violent radicalisation that Emerson and co-authors observed in 2009.This new tendency, however, is now exacerbated and taken to new heights. There seems to be a tension between an increasingly interconnected world and locally/nationally rooted integration processes. Local socioeconomic grievances and the marginalisation of second third and third generation migrant youth thus are projected as localised expressions of global discourses of the "clash of civilisations" type. Marginalised youth is drawn into jihadist terrorism or far right-wing extremism and racism as local tensions or inequalities are interpreted with a global inequality lens.

The literature shows increasing discrimination against Muslims as a result of terrorism (Goel 2010), and negative impacts of this discrimination on Muslim immigrants' health (Johnston and Lordan 2011) and labour market outcomes (Shannon 2012). However, there is little evidence on the impact Fundamentalist-Islamic terrorist attacks have on the integration of Muslim immigrants in Western societies

5:9:3 Muslim political participation

Muslim political participation in British government is important part of their integrationist process. Although the sphere of political participation has been largely underestimated, there is a growing political awareness particularly among young Muslims. As Shamim Miah (2017), an experienced youth worker, pointed out, "the average Muslim youth on the street, even if unemployed and with no qualifications, will quite easily give a sophisticated deconstruction of media bias, foreign policy, war on terror and policing" (Allen 2014). Muslims involvement in British government varies, from lobbying or their own political party to the participation in British political parties. In 2000, "over 200 Councillors, two Members of the House of Commons, four Members of the House of Lords and one Member of the European Parliament" were part of British political system (Gest 2010). However, the Islamic Party of Britain has been the only Muslim political party since 1989. Although the Muslim political participation seems to grow slowly, there is prevailing tendency to criticize British Government for representation of the whole Muslim community only by a few members with different opinions and attitudes.

As the Muslim community is not homogenized one, there needs to be a wider range of Muslim voices constituting different opinions and political views. Concerning Muslim political participation in Britain, there remains one topic which needs to be discussed further,

namely Muslim attitude towards democracy. The opposition argues that Islam is not compatible with democratic and secularist model of western states and in essence is ideal in itself. Democratic values are not alien to Muslim world and Islam is in its essence democratic. Moreover, when taking up a Citizenship Pledge that is required for approving the British Citizenship, Muslims are swearing loyalty to democratic values and British law: "I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen." (Nationality Act 2002)

Since however, we are especially concerned with the integration of Muslims rather than the foreigners from various countries into British society, we cannot automatically assume that all of these million 'possible Muslims' look to Islam as the primary basis of their orientation to social and political life. Many will choose 'Pakistani', 'Indian', 'Bangladeshi' or 'Punjabi', 'Gujerati' or 'Bengali' as their primary identity and may not be much concerned with or influenced by religion. Some may even see themselves as primarily 'Asian' or 'Black'. In this case the number of Muslims would have to be reckoned as considerably less than a million.

A further point has also to be noted. This is that of those who do claim to be Muslims, most would say that they are 'plain and simple' Muslims. They say their prayers, try to follow the teachings of the Qur'an, try to give their children a Muslim education and with varying degrees of frequency attend a mosque. It is not therefore to be assumed that if there are, say, 750,000 in Britain, that there is a number of people to whom the narrower and more specific teaching of the major Muslim sects may be attributed. The problems of counting 'Muslims' therefore are very similar to those involved in counting Christians.

With all this said, we have to do two things before we can consider the processes through which Muslims become integrated in British society. First we do need a look at the doctrinal influences which are brought to bear on Muslims by various Islamic sects and teachers. Secondly we need to look at non-religious factors involved in the mobilisation of the Muslim community.

Although the circumstances and context are clearly different, the upheavals created by the mass migration of Muslims to Britain in the post-Second World War period, especially from predominately rural, uneducated backgrounds, have created the conditions where the same quest for 'authenticity' has once again become significant for some. Muslims born and brought up in Britain have sought answers to the dilemmas and tensions that arise when

confronted with a powerful and often contradictory combination of social influences. For example, there is rarely meaningful overlap between secular education in mainstream schools, and religious education in makatib, sometimes delivered by ineffective religious leaders from the South Asian villages and towns of their parents and grandparents. This dissonance can cause some degree of educational confusion. Similarly, the conservative cultural traditions of parents and grandparents are no defence against the direct or perceived experience of Islamophobia.

Many young Muslims claim that assimilation into the indigenous white culture, or the British way of life is hard to do. Thus, it can be seen that the situation is not a straight choice between assimilation and being isolated. Younger South Asian Muslims are beginning to see that greater integration, while maintaining an ethnic and Islamic identity as not only desirable but also possible. Embracing Islam as a religious experience, rather than a cultural heritage, is providing increasing numbers of young Muslims from Muslim families with an alternative to the pressure to assimilate into British culture. On the other hand, to take on fully the cultural norms of either the indigenous culture or the minority ethnic culture does not appeal to them.

The Islamic teaching is based on faith in the Oneness of God, and on the five pillars of Islam, and it has to be applied. Thus, a Muslim's life is bound by faith, and must be directed and controlled by rules that allow people to live together in peace. It is often assumed that, as modernisation sweeps across the world, traditional religion will lose its grip on culture. So there is clearly a question as to how a religion like Islam, which is based on conscience and justice and a revealed code of behaviour, can come to terms with an ethos which puts aside the past and exalts in (individualistic) diversity (Ahmed, 1992: 6).

The existence of racism and specifically Islamophobia coupled with a desire to be distinct from non-Muslims appears to have been a push factor for Muslims thinking about their own identity. The position of Muslims can be seen as becoming more stable and influential, so optimistically the impact of Islam on non-Muslims would be positive and greater.

Second and subsequent generations of Muslims find themselves interacting with non-Muslims in a greater and more diverse number of setting compared to their parents (for example, university and different employment). This greater interaction may lead to a better understanding of society from the Muslims point of view and for non- Muslims it will increase their knowledge of Islam. Many of the practical considerations as well as religious and cultural issues which the first generation of migrants faced in Britain are less of a concern

for subsequent generations. The fears which early immigrants had about preserving their religion, culture and identity still exist today but not necessarily in the same way. A greater confidence amongst Muslims born and brought up in Britain means they perceive themselves as part of society and the `myth of return' is no longer a consideration for youngest British Muslims. (Ahmed 1992:197).

Although the issues of identity and integration of Muslim immigrants in Western societies start to receive considerable attention in the economic literature (e.g. Bisin et al. 2008; Georgiadis and Manning 2013), no studies have used a panel structure to estimate changes in the integration of Muslim immigrants over time. Goel (2010) estimates the changes in perceptions of discrimination among Muslims following September 11. Goel (2010) takes advantage of a set of interviews conducted before and after the September 11th attacks to estimate how Muslim looking immigrants to Australia perceive intolerance, relative to other immigrants. She finds that Muslim-looking immigrants report higher intolerance and discrimination than other immigrants.

What has been the impact of these trends on cultural integration? The theoretical and empirical literature is divided between theories of cultural integration, suggesting that migrants gradually absorb the values and lifestyles of their countries of destination, and theories of multiculturalism, which suggest that enduring traditions, shared identities, and deep-rooted values persist for many minority groups for many decades, or even for centuries.

The idea of ‘segmented assimilation’ developed by Portes and Zhou (1993) holds that minority groups integrate at different rates; in particular, professional and entrepreneurial immigrants usually assimilate their host society’s values much faster than those at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy or jobless. It is therefore unclear whether patterns of successful integration, for example observed for professional and middle class Jewish, Hispanic or Asian communities in America, also hold for Muslim minorities in Europe, who often come from far poorer developing societies characterized by lower levels of education and literacy. As Bisin et al argue, groups rates of assimilation typically differ due to factors such as reservoirs of human capital (educational, vocational, and linguistic skills), economic capital (socioeconomic status, economic resources), and social capital (social and organizational networks).

Ethnographic studies of disaffected Muslim youth, such as Bangladeshis in the UK, report that these groups are turning to revivalist Islam in reaction to political and cultural alienation

from the West. Analysis of the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that Muslims integrate less fully, and more slowly, than other non-Muslim migrants (Asians, Hindu and Caribbean). In spring 2006, Pew surveys compared public opinion in four European countries (Britain, France, Germany and Spain) alongside Muslim minorities in these countries, reporting that both groups perceived a sense of growing Islamic identity and concern about Islamic extremists. The majority of Europeans expressed doubts that Muslims coming into their countries wanted to adopt their national customs and way of life. A subsequent Pew survey in fall 2008 reported that many Europeans also viewed Muslims in an increasingly negative light, especially in France, Germany and Spain. As mentioned earlier, the incidence of radical protest involving inter-communal violence, and cases of outright terrorist incidents involving small groups of militant Muslims, lends further plausibility to the divergence argument.

If the multiculturalism thesis is correct, then where substantial cultural differences exist between countries of origin and countries of destination, migrants will express values that are closer to those predominating in their country of origin, rather than to those of their destination. Moreover, any significant cultural differences among majority and minority populations are not be expected to diminish among second and third generation migrants; indeed, if alienation from the West has occurred then this could even potentially strengthen Muslim identities among younger populations.

Nevertheless, substantial national differences are apparent, and the gap between Muslim and Western societies is particularly large. They do not concern fundamental disagreement about whether democracy is a desirable form of government. But they do involve tolerance of sexual liberalization and women's equality and tolerance is a particularly crucial aspect of a democratic political culture. Do such cultural differences necessarily lead to tensions or even clashes? Under high levels of existential insecurity, xenophobia and intolerance are particularly intense.

It appears that the second third generation has found its own way of defusing the tension created by parental expectations and the pressure to assimilate. Identity entails a rational choice within the limits of one's value system. An individual can choose to emphasise certain values and neglect others without risking a crisis of identity. As the majority of young South Asians have grown up in a tight-knit and caring family network, these young people are aware of the fact that if they chose to assimilate to Western culture thus abandoning their

South Asian traditions as well as their religion, they would become subject to attack from their own community. When subjected to racist attack from wider society the community would no long provide shelter and refuge. Total assimilation is the riskiest form of integration and there is no guarantee that wider society will accept the young people fully. Therefore, it has to be acknowledged that the priority of young Muslims is not to lose the support of their family and community.

5.9.4 Islamic Revival movements' attitude towards Muslim integration in the UK

As discussed in the previous chapters, the Ahl-e-Hadith is more radically conservative on the doctrinal front than the Deobandis. Theologically, it bases its beliefs on the Qu'ran and the Hadith only, by-passing the valuable law schools. Its practical teachings are as conservative as the Deobandis. Apart from this, however, Ahl-e-Hadith has significant international connections. It is strongly connected with the Salafi movement in Saudi-Arabia which led to the installation of the Saudi monarchy and its leaders have a particularly close intellectual, as well as financial relationship with the Saudis

In trying to develop a political sociology of Islam, however, we do not simply have to consider possible relationships between a religious community and 'the world'. We would also have to consider the question of the relation between Islam and Christianity, Muslims often still regard the issues posed by the Crusades as living ones and Orientalist scholarship has perpetuated the attitudes of the Crusades towards Islam. Thus even though there are moderate sects which reach out for cooperation with Christianity, probably the predominant view is that Islam has to be protected from attack by Christians.

The actual problems which have confronted Muslims in Britain have not taken the form of demanding a clear and total stand on the whole of the existing order, or on relations with Christianity as a whole. Rather they have arisen in relation to quite specific problems, and have to see how the different Muslim groups handled these problems, including those of the attitude of violence and rioting, those concerned with education of Muslim children, those concerned with the question of blasphemy as exemplified by the Rushdie affair, and those relating to Muslim political loyalties at a time when Britain became involved in a war between two predominantly Muslim countries. However, to notice that the mobilisation of the Muslim community is not solely in terms of different sects and denominations represented by the mosque. There are other non-religious bases for division and cooperation and, before we

can understand the reaction of Muslims on the contentious issues mentioned we must consider these other forms of mobilisation and the way in which they interact with the various doctrinally based groups.

Nielson (1999) added another problem is the tendency to essentialise the 'Muslim'. In reality, Muslims have multiple and wide-ranging identities devotion to Islam does not preclude loyalty to the Manchester United football team, for instance, nor does it presuppose a particular form of Islam. Moreover, by reducing Muslims to their religious identity, one hinders their integration in society because many of the obstacles to integration are, according to Ambassador Boomgaarden, 'neither Christian, Jewish nor Islamic problems but, rather, problems for all groups in our society' such as unemployment and lack of education (Nielson 1999).

5.9.5.1: The attitude of Baralwis towards integration

The Barelwi practise a traditional form of Islam in which Sufism and veneration of Muhammad play a large part. Linked to the Barelwis are a number of Sufi orders. While most sub-continent Muslims belong to the Barelwi stream, they are not as well organised and vocal as their less numerous rivals, the Deobandi. Most Barelwis would aim at a UK Muslim community with its own autonomous institution under Islamic shari'a, similar to the status Muslim had during the British Raj in India. Unlike the Deobandis, they are not apolitical but they, unlike the fundamentalists, have no political grand plan; under the Raj they cooperated with and were favoured by British rule. Their religious passion is usually aroused when their doctrines and forms of worship are denounced by Deobandis and fundamentalists as un-Islamic historical accretions

5.9.5.2: The attitude of Deobandis towards integration

Deobandis are stricter in their faith than Barelwi; they are puritanical reformers who reject Folk-Islamic Sufi practices and seek to interpret the Quran literally. The Taliban in Afghanistan were a spin-off from the Deoband movement. Deobandis are closer to Saudi Wahhabi Islam and to the modern Islamist movements, especially the Jama 'at-I Islami and the Muslim brotherhood. They have benefited much more than the Barelwis from Saudi funding and support. Deobandis aim not just at an autonomous Muslim enclave in Britain, but at the Islamisation of British society and at the political dominance of Islam in Britain.

Various Muslim leaders recommend that Muslims seek to live in physical proximity to each other, creating areas of Muslim concentration that can bear the infrastructure of mosques and institutions and the autonomy needed to guarantee the survival of a separate and clearly identifiable Muslim community. However, the community must at the same time engage in proselytise to the non-Muslim society around it.

5.9.5.3: The attitude of Salafis toward integration

This idea and allegation can most acutely be seen through the Islamic concept of *Al-Wala' wal Bara*' (WB) translated as "Loyalty and Disavowal", which appears as central in the ideology of modern Salafism. In this study, the term "Salafism" refers to a religious inclination or tendency towards a set of ideas and identity. These ideas and identity are subscribed to by modern Salafis who advocate strict adherence to their understanding of Islamic practices as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad (d. 632), the final prophet of Islam and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors.

Due to the importance of practising WB, especially in the current period where Muslims are struggling to maintain Islam's authenticity and legitimacy amidst an onslaught of foreign values and belief systems as a result of a series of conquests, colonialisations and the current wave of globalization, modern Salafis begin to propagate and author books on the subject of WB.

In modern Salafism, professing wala' is to manifest a deep sense of loyalty to the Muslims by being attached to them, loving them, maintaining bonds of brotherhood with them, assisting them, and empathizing with them. Without this, there is no meaning to a Muslim community (*ummah*). One the other hand, bara' translates as total disassociation from all that displeases God. This includes *kufr* (disbelief), shirk (apostasy), *kuffar* (plural of *kafir* which means non-Muslims or disbelievers), *bid'ah* (religious innovations), and even un-Islamic political systems) such as democracy, secularism and nationalism according to some modern Salafis. In addition, modern Salafis seek to perform *bara'* from "infidels and infidel practices" by not befriending them (especially the Jews and Christians) and avoiding their cultures and traditions which they believe could tarnish the purity of the Islam they envision. This was justified by taking a literal understanding of the many Qur'anic verses such as: "Do not take the Jews and Christians as your friends/protectors…"

In putting the concept of WB into practice, modern Salafis distinguish certain activities that amount to the wrong type of loyalty and develop a framework for Muslims to adhere to. Activities which Muslims should refrain from include: Imitating non-Muslims in their dressing, language, morality and culture. Such imitation invariably invests Muslims deeper into that culture and leads them down a deviant path. Living in the lands of non-Muslims (*dar al-harb*) and not immediately moving to the lands of Muslims (*dar al-Islam*). Some Salafis argue that *hijrah* (migration) to Muslim lands is an obligation upon every Muslims. Residence in the land of non-Muslims will invariably lead Muslims to befriend and show loyalty to them. Seeking aid, assistance and comfort from the non-Muslims. This is a form of mandatory disassociation according to some Salafis.

Observing the holidays, festivals and celebrations of non-Muslims this includes congratulating them during those seasons or attending their functions. Salafis consider these to be expressions of love and acknowledgment for the non-Muslims. Voting and taking part in democratic political election. Some Salafis argue these activities form a part of un-Islamic judgement which is forbidden (haram) for Muslims to participate the concept of WB in modern Salafism is understood and manifested quite differently by modern Salafis. Although all Salafis recognize the importance of WB, they differ in the understanding of the concept, and practically how it should be applied and manifested.

The social aspect of the concept is seen by the Salafis as one that forbid Muslims to befriend the non-Muslims especially the Jews and Christians; and this is based on the Quranic verse of 5:51 mentioned earlier. Also Muslims are obliged to avoid any activity deemed by the Salafis as un-Islamic and posed a threat to the religion. Some of these activities include imitating non-Muslims in their language, dressing, names and culture. Also seeking assistance from non-Muslims. Some Salafis advocate the idea of *hijrah* to Muslim lands or from the *dar al-harb* (abode of war) to *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) as they believe it is the most viable solution for the dilemma faced by the Muslims. The idea of *hijrah* has however been given its exclusive interpretation and dimension by the Salafis. Basically, Salafis use the concept of *hijrah* in favour of the isolation of minority Muslims from the larger non-Muslim community.

5:10 Non-Religious Factors shaping Muslim minority communities in the UK

The sense of Muslim identity is often merged with or expressed through ethnic, cultural, regional, linguistic and national identity and what is taken to be the Muslim voice is often of

a complex interlocking network of associations. Moreover, community organisation is not always spontaneous and independent. British society and the British state at national and local level finds it necessary to communicate with ethnic and with religious minorities, selects leaders with whom it is willing to talk, and sometimes itself creates ethnic minority organisations to represent the community.

The primary basis of social organisation in the Pakistani community is the extended kin group known as a Biradari. The senior kinsman speaks for this group. Even in Pakistani villages, however, individuals need to look beyond the Biradari to patrons at village level who can help them in dealing with the outside world. These relationships are reproduced and modified after migration to Britain. The old kin and village leaders still operate but individuals will now necessarily turn to those who speak English or who have access to or connections with British society. There is likely to be a significant struggle for leadership involved in the performance of this broker's role and a claim to community leadership might well rest upon having performed it.

Another facet of the Muslim community organisation, however, turns on the role of the Middle Classes. Britain is a deeply class-divided society in terms of income and education especially and there has emerged, mostly in London, a professional and business Muslim bourgeoisie who have little knowledge of or relationship with the humble Muslims and their imams who are to be found in inner-city cottages and mosques in the provinces. They have a direct relationship with the British bourgeoisie and ruling elites and are much concerned to strengthen that relationship. Very often they have nothing but contempt for the simple and, as they see them, largely superstitious Muslims in the poor inner city areas and the provinces, and they have very little difficulty in representing their own Islam as a not very troublesome matter for the British. While such contacts may be an important part of the total picture of Islam in Britain, however, there is no connection between them and the life of the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Britain. Unfortunately, there are many British people in public life who will imagine that the problem of Muslim integration has been solved because of the gracious interaction of metropolitan bourgeois elites, whereas in fact the working class majority of Muslim continue to feel ghettoized, alienated and hated (Guest 2010).

It should be noted that Muslim groups, whether religious or secular, are made capable of more effective organisation insofar as they have financial resources. To some extent such

funds are provided by members' subscriptions or in the case of the mosques, by religious dues of the faithful. But it is a peculiarity of the situation of the Muslim immigrant community that it can look to another rich source of funding in the governments and religious foundations in the oil-rich states of the Middle East. Such funding has been generously given but it would be unrealistic to suppose that it comes entirely without strings. Middle Eastern governments and religious groups in the Middle Eastern countries feel that it is important to build up their support across the Muslim world and, not least, amongst Muslim immigrants in Britain. Saudi-Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Libya thus all become important players in the British situation acting through the groups which they finance. Which country finances which group cannot be entirely clear since the accounts of Muslim organisations are understandably not available to researchers, but it is probably true that Saudi-Arabia is the major source of funding for most groups but that the Barelwis enjoy less of this kind of financial support than other groups.

5.10.1: The Integration of Muslims in a Multicultural Society

In 1968 the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, declared himself in favour of the integration of ethnic minorities and defined integration as 'not a process of flattering uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'. We must now ask how far it is possible for Muslims to be integrated in terms of this definition.

It should be noted that Jenkins does insist on one political value which should be part of a shared culture, namely that of 'equal opportunity'. The notion of a culture in two separate 'domains', that of the public political domain which is shared and should not be questioned by any group, the other the private domain of the family and the community. The question then becomes that of finding out how far British people and their politicians on the one hand and Muslim minorities on the other are willing to accept this 'two domains' thesis and what they would see as falling within each of the domains.

In fact these difficulties are considerably less far-reaching than they appear to be. The first question is that of political loyalty. On this there seems that Muslims do in principle accept that Muslim citizens have a duty to the British state, including the duty to perform military service. Problems might clearly arise if Britain went to war against an Islamic state, but, in any clear-cut case of this kind, the state would have the right to deport or detain those who were manifestly disloyal as well as the duty to extend to conscientious objectors the same

right to a hearing as has been extended to other individuals opposed to wars for religious reasons.

A more difficult-but related issue is that of the secular state. The difficulty in defending the present British position is, of course, that Britain is not a secular state. It has an Established Church whose Archbishop crowns the Queen. The Queen is declared to be the 'Supreme Governor' of that church, and Christianity has a privileged place in the schools.

One question which might well be discussed here is how far the institutions of the public domain should be described as 'secular'. Some would see the notion of equal opportunity as implying nothing more than a set of convenient 'rules of game' of no moral significance. In fact, if we were to confront most Muslims not with the question 'Do you accept the secular state?' but rather with the alternative 'What do you think about our social and political institutions?' we should find that we shared many common values. Equally it is not the case that the education which we offer our children is morally neutral and it might well emerge in discussion that many of the values we are trying to achieve are in fact shared between religions.

Another important area of argument concerns women's rights. It is generally thought by Western feminists that the Islamic way of life simply involves the exploitation and oppression of women. Muslim thinkers and leaders on the other hand see Western sexual life as wholly corrupt and promiscuous. In fact there is much in the Qu'ranic and Muslim tradition which is based upon the idea of an enhanced status for women and Muslim leaders would find in dialogue with Western feminists that they were very far from simply defending sexual promiscuity.

Lastly there is the question posed by the Rushdie affair: 'Has anyone the right in a multicultural society to denigrate and blaspheme against the religion of another group?' Here the first reaction of many British intellectuals has been to say that freedom of speech is an absolute value. Yet clearly it is not. Racial incitement in Britain is illegal. Could it not be argued that incitement against a religion is equally so. The argument against Rushdie is not that the Muslim religion should enjoy a privileged place as a religion. Many would agree that even the Anglican Church should not have that protection. What Rushdie's book does infringe is the not often considered third principle involved in Jenkins' definition of integration, namely that of mutual tolerance.

All in all, one cannot be optimistic that the integration of Muslims in Britain will be easy. However there is still considerable scope for dialogue which is prevented by prejudices on both sides. On the British side there is the widespread dismissal of all Muslims as fundamentalists and on the side of Muslims there has been an unwillingness to extend their thinking to deal realistically with the problems of Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim society.

They did not live in the same area, go to school together, work in the same places or occupations, or share social and cultural activities. As a result they lived in fear of each other, had no real knowledge or respect of others and could easily be pushed into conflict by extremists. They had no opportunity to challenge stereotypes, confound myths and to see the human face of the 'other'. There were no shared spaces and no reason to venture out of their comfort zones. They lived in self-confirming worlds, reinforcing prejudices and stereotypes Schools are one of the few safe places, to meet others and to learn about different people and share experiences. Segregated schools mean that many young people never experience difference and emerge into a multicultural world with little or no cultural navigation skills. They are not equipped for the modern world. But if schools are divided so too are parental networks, with little or no opportunities to break down barriers between communities by meeting at the school gate, sharing facilities at the school and through cross-cultural friendships for children's parties, school sports and extra curricula activities. A divided school invariably means a divided community.

It is necessary to be clear about how a radicalised discourse on segregation implicates all visible minorities living in the UK, but in practice targets Muslims. Johnston et al (2007) when looking at educational performance in Bradford and Leicester have articulated that 'Indian students in Leicester are more likely to attend highly segregated schools than are Pakistanis in Bradford more significantly the research goes on to state that this high level of segregation for Indian heritage pupils does not affect their KS3 or GCSE performance. Therefore, the question arises as to why segregation is an issue of concern for those interested in material inequality, as research demonstrates that Indian pupils perform well despite living in highly segregated areas. Indeed, Leicester has been cited as a model multicultural city with 'pride in their community' and its policies recommended for adoption elsewhere. It seems that segregation is only negative when it comes to Muslim groups; it becomes a problem for Pakistanis in Bradford but not for Indians in Leicester. Recognition of this specific targeting comes from the unexpected quarter of Trevor Phillips.

Immigrants in Britain have faced a variety of government politics towards them: assimilation in the 1950s; interrogation in the 1950s; cultural pluralism in the 1970s; and since then multiculturalism. Multiculturalism supposedly recognises and respects the enormous differences in identities and in cultural diversity among the many communities in Britain. It seeks to combat racism and religious hatred, and to offer asocial justice and equality of opportunities to all.

While Muslims as a whole register low on most social scales including employment, education, and health, there are significant differences between Muslims depending on their countries of origin. Muslims from the Middle East seem to be doing better than Muslims from Pakistan or Bangladesh. This indicates ethnic, cultural and regional causes rather than purely religious ones.

South Asian Muslim communities tend to be concentrated geographically, mainly in core inner city areas. For some at least this is in conformity to a deliberate strategy of the local Muslim community, rather than simply a personal choice made for comfort or convenience. It is also noteworthy that since medieval times Muslims have tended, when possible, to live within the circle of influence of the mosque, not just in a metaphorical sense but also in the literal, physical sense of grouping their dwellings close around the mosque building. When the more affluent move out, they often move only as far as the edges of those areas. This segregation leads to many inner city schools being almost totally Muslims, the pupils thus having minimal interaction with non-Muslims. It also creates areas where Muslims individuals may have a large numerical dominance in local government, housing departments etc. This is in marked contrast to Hindus and Sikhs who tend to be much more disappeared in the majority society.

Philip Lewis (1999) notes that while the mass of Muslim young people in the inner cities is not involve with any Islamic organisations, they have to manage multiple identities, and may drift in different directions. An increasing number is turning to radical Islamism as the solution to their identity crisis.

Other Muslims however have chosen to focus on the goal of integrating into the wider UK society, while not losing their unique identity, by taking what is best from Muslim and British traditions and welding them together. Many individual Muslims recognise that they are a minority in a Judaeo-Christian heritage secular majority culture, and are happy to enjoy the liberties and economic opportunities offered them. These want nothing more than to integrate

in their host society while enjoying the freedom of practising their religion. A 2004 report by the Islamic Human Rights Commission, based on feedback from more than 1,000 British Muslims, found a high level of Muslim satisfaction with the UK and that almost 80% of respondents saw little or no contradiction between Islamic values an being a good British citizen.

Many find a tolerable equilibrium which enables them to function within their complex situation, but some are influenced by radical Islamist preachers and organisations that totally reject western society which is seen as the main enemy of Islam. A number of young Muslims have rejected the traditional Islam of their parents but embraced the puritan Revivalist-Islam of the Islamist radicals. They reject all man-made laws and systems as infidel; and hold no allegiance to any specific country but only to the worldwide Muslim community.

An underlying assumption of this project was that economic deprivation, unemployment and social exclusion are the main causes of radicalisation among the Muslims in Britain, yet these reasons seem at most to be a marginal cause. Other social groupings in Britain suffer from similar disabilities, yet have not resorted to violence and terror. As has been seen, the immediate trigger for rising Muslim alienation is government policies since the 11 September 2001, such as the anti-terror bill and Britain's involvement in the American-led fight against Muslim terrorism around the world, including the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Some Muslims argue that their children can develop a true Muslim identity, and to be protected from the negative influences of a permissive secular society only if they are educated in Muslim schools. They claim the Islamic ethos taught in such schools makes their pupils into better British citizens with a highly developed moral life view and a sense of duty to society. They also fear their children will suffer a cultural and identity clash if exposed to non-Muslim values and ethos at school. Others state that while sate school offer better facilities and up to date technology, they cannot provide Muslims pupils a sense of belonging and a peace of mind necessary for active learning.

The social isolation of Muslim communities in inner cities, and the poverty and unemployment prevalent there served to drive some Muslim youth either into crime or into Islamic extremism or into both.

While other groups have usually embraced British culture and its loyalties, even while in some cases maintaining a cultural distinctiveness (e.g. elements of Jewish community), some sections of the Muslim community appears to be in the process of developing a parallel society, a society which has its own institutions and is based on religion.

Little doubt exists over the strength of the relationship between religion and identity. Few studies in the existing literature report evidence of positive correlation between identity formation and religiousness evidence from the existing suggests that religion is positively correlated with identity formation (Sahin). This implies that identity achievement is highly related with internalization of religious commitment. Besides, there is evidence suggesting that religious attendance is related to identity commitment choices of foreclosure and achievement, whilst, identity diffusion is associated with lower rates of religious attendance. Religion might serve as a powerful influence on an individual identity assuming that the person involved is deeply religious or significantly committed to his/her religion. The influence of religion on identity formation may also work through parental influence. Children whose parents are significantly religious are more likely to be significantly religious themselves.

The commitment to religion and consequent influence on identity formation works through parental influence in this particular case. The influence of religion on identity formation might also arise from community influence. Assume that members of a particular community are mostly religious. It would be the case that, most people would adhere to the norms of the community. If it is the case that the norms of the community is binding on most, if not all the members of the community, then, religion might play significant role in identity formation. The strength of the linkage also depends on the period covered. Religion seems to be more forceful in the 19th century compared with the modern society 21st century. In the past, most societies tend to be deeply religious. This implies that the influence of religion on identity in such societies would be strong.

5:11 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the complex issues informing Muslim integration in Great Britain. The chapter first explored the sociological and political literature on the central concepts of integration and assimilation in detail. The second part of the chapter focused on examining the diverse views on dynamics such as ethnicity, social class and faith in shaping the

integration of Muslim minority communities in the UK. The chapter has emphasised the significance of faith in the collective self-understanding (s) of British Muslim youth and the implications of this religious self-identification on their perception of social integration in the UK. A set of negative dynamics such as Islamophobia, social and economic exclusion, racism have also been discussed. The chapter further examined the views of transnational Islamic movements active in the UK concerning the Muslim's integration into the wider secular and multicultural British society. The next chapter will discuss the methodological issues related to the empirical case design of the study including data collection and analysis procedures.

CHAPTER 6:

Research Methodology

6.1 Introduction

This study examines critically the relationship between diverse forms of Islamic religiosity observed among the members of the dominant Sunni traditional Islamic movements in the UK and their views concerning Muslim integration to the wider secular British society. This chapter discusses the research methodology, details of the research design and the broad theoretical lenses used to investigate the central questions of the inquiry. The chapter introduces the 'qualitative case study' approach adopted in this study. The sampling procedures and the main data collection methods and analysis procedures are discussed in detail. The study uses two distinctive instruments of data collection. First, participants' religiosity has been explored by using Sahin's *Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule* (MSIS) that is a widely used psychosocial model of assessing formation of Muslim religiosities among Muslim youth. This model is informed by a deeper phenomenological philosophy and is critical of the structural developmental theories of identity development. The second data collection instrument is a specially constructed semi-structured interview protocol, *the Integration-Focused Interviews* (IFI), used to explore participants' perception of Muslim integration within cotemporary British society. The main issues related to research ethics and the limitations of the study are presented.

6.2.1 Research Questions

This inquiry focuses on the fowling central questions:

1: What are the main features of the religious observance (religiosity) among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

2: How do historical, social and political dynamics shape the religiosity among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

3: How does the difference in religious observance (religiosity) of the members of the transnational Sunni movements' impact on their perception and attitudes towards integration into the wider British society?

6.3 Methodological Framework of the Study: Qualitative Case Study

The core aims and objectives of this study are to examine the religiosity of the study participants and what role it plays in informing their views of integration into the wider multi-religious and secular British society. As explained in the introductory chapter the study distinguishes between religion and religiosity: the former refers to the a body inherited secret texts, teachings and the latter refers to how these religious beliefs and teachings have been explored by the members of these religious traditions. The research strategy is of qualitative methodology which caters for the data collection and its analysis simultaneously and the development of the theory and continuous reformation of the questions at hand.

This research is qualitative research which utilises an "inductive, investigative strategy to produce a richly descriptive product" (Merriam, 2002, P.5). The purpose is to analyse the data collected from interviews and observation of lecture, speeches and public gatherings to formulate a theory, in contrast to the deductive quantitative method of data following theory. (Saunders et al, 2009). Therefore, the qualitative method recognises that the world is neither objective, nor quantifiable, as is the case with the quantitative method (Maxwell: 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2009).

Therefore, the philosophical position of this study is orientated towards the 'Phenomenological 'as opposed to the 'Positivistic'. This approach entails the researcher to become a part of the study and to subsequently decipher and interpret the experience through an interpretive-ethnographic approach (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that aims to explore the structures of human experience and consciousness through following a rigorous method description. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl (d.1938) and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers. Phenomenology has been influential in enabling modern social sciences to go beyond the limitations of positivism[44] that simply insists on following methodological procedures of natural science in exploring social phenomena.

This research study is also exploratory by nature, which may be defined as the initial research into a hypothetical or theoretical idea. This is where a researcher has an idea or has observed a phenomenon and seeks to understand more about it. An exploratory research project is an attempt to lay the groundwork that will lead to future studies, or to determine if what is being

observed might be explained by a currently existing theory. Most often, exploratory research lays the initial groundwork for future research.

6.3.1 Research Design

The choice of the research methodology is influenced by the researcher's theoretical perspective and also his attitude towards the ways in which the data will be used (deductive or inductive approach) (Gray, 2004). It should also explain the rationale behind the selection of the methods adopted (Crotty, 1998). The present study has undertaken to use Case Studies as a research methodology to reach the overall aim of the research

There are number of different research designs that can be used in a study. Design is defined as the programme that guides the investigator in the process of collecting analysing and interpreting observations. Kerlinger states one of the main purposes of research design to provide research questions (1973:300). Therefore, it is expected that the research design adopted in this research be will facilitated to obtain valid answers to the main research questions. Research design is the blue print to achieve the required results for the study. The research design is concerned with turning a research question into a project (Robson1999:38).

Research design of the study is based on a Case Study approach that is exploratory, ethnographic and interpretive. These features are discussed below in detail.

6.3.2 Case Study

This study adopts the Case Study design in exploring its central research questions. Bell explains the Case-Study method as an umbrella term for a family of research methods'' (1999:10) The case study method allows the researcher to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989).

Case studies provide a special way of collecting, organizing, and analysing data to gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information about each case of interest. The case study method allows people being interviewed to describe experiences in their own language, rather than the researchers'. A characteristic of case study research is the combination of data collection methods, such as interviews, questionnaires, and observations; however, there are critics of case study method (Tellis, 1997) who believe that the study of a small number of

cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Others feel that the intense exposure to study of the case biases the findings making them subjective and generalisation, although there is some truth in this statement it can still argued that case studies can be used to propose new theories.

Case study research, through reports of past studies, allows the exploration and understanding of complex issues. It can be considered a robust research method particularly when a holistic, in-depth investigation is required. Recognised as a tool in many social science studies, the role of case study method in research becomes more prominent when issues with regard to education (Gulsecen and Kubat, 2006), sociology (Grassel and Schirmer, 2006) and community- based problems are the focus of a research project (Johnson, 2006)

Qualitative case study methodology provides tools for researchers to study complex phenomena within their contexts. When the approach is applied correctly, it becomes a valuable method for research to develop theory, evaluate programmes and develop interventions. This qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood.

Through case study methods, a researcher is able to go beyond the quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioural conditions through the actor's perspective. By including both quantitative and qualitative data, case study helps explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation (Tellis, 1997) however this study will only utilize the qualitative approach.

Case studies, in their true essence, explore and as a research method investigate contemporary real-life phenomena through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships. Yin (1984:23) defines the case study research method "as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used".

Both (Tellis, 1997) and Yin (2003) base their approach to case study on a constructivist paradigm.[45] Constructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one's

perspective. This paradigm "recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but does not reject outright some notion of objectivity. One of the advantages of this approach is the close collaboration between the researcher and the participant, while enabling participants to tell their stories.

Through these stories the participants are able to describe their views of reality and this enables the researcher to better understand the participants' actions (Lather, 1992). According to Yin (2003) a case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer "how" and "why" questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.

The multiple-case design, on the other hand, can be adopted with real-life events that show numerous sources of evidence through replication rather than sampling logic. According to Yin (1994), generalisation of results from case studies, from either single or multiple designs, stems from theory rather than on populations. By replicating the case through pattern-matching, a technique linking several pieces of information from the same case to some theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975), multiple-case design enhances and supports the previous results. This helps raise the level of confidence in the robustness of the method.

6.3.3 Ethnographic Method

The current study follows a broad ethnographic approach to social research. Ethnography is the study of social interactions, behaviours, and perceptions that occur within groups, teams, organisations, and communities. Its roots can be traced back to anthropological studies of small, rural (and often remote) societies that were undertaken in the early 1900s, when researchers such as Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1922) participated in these societies over long periods and documented their social arrangements and belief systems.

Ethnographers typically gather participant observations, necessitating direct engagement and involvement with the world they are studying. Owing to the complex nature of social life, ethnographers need to record a variety of elements in their field notes. The central aim of ethnography is to provide rich, holistic insights into people's views and actions, as well as the nature (that is, sights, sounds) of the location they inhabit, through the collection of detailed

observations and interviews. As Hammersley (1996) states, "The task of ethnographers is to document the culture, the perspectives and practices, of the people in these settings. The aim is to 'get inside' the way each group of people sees the world. The key features of ethnographic research during their observations, ethnographers routinely use informal or conversational interviews, which allow them to discuss, probe emerging issues, or ask questions about unusual events in a naturalistic manner. Because of the "casual" nature of this type of interview technique it can be useful in eliciting highly candid accounts from individuals. The utilisation of an ethnographic approach justifies the descriptive account of the culture and society the imams or manager experienced whilst nurtured by the groups they are affiliated to. Vital data relating to communication, social interactions and the group training process experienced by imams or Masjid Manager can only be deduced from participants.

However, the serious criticism levelled against work of this nature is in its subjectivity and thus, *"authenticity"*. (Evers and Lakomski, 1996) Commentators have argued that although the personal perspectives of participants are vital in constructing their worldview and experience, it nevertheless must adhere to rigorous social scientific practice and standards. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983).

Therefore, the contextual comprehension of the cultural paradigm with which ethnographic research is so fixated can be deciphered by focusing upon the ethnographic approach enables the encapsulation the religious culture. Therefore, the focus of ethnographic research is to comprehend the phenomena from the perspective of the observed (Denscombe, 2007). The ethnographer should be a "bricoleur, a jack of all trades, one that uses whatever tools are required to gain an in-depth understanding of the subject and should not be a slave to a single method" (Whitehead, 2004, p.7).

6.3.4 Interpretive Method

As a phenomenological descriptive study the inquiry follows the interpretative paradigm in social research. The main goal of the interpretivist is to understand the meaning of the social situation from the point of view of those who live it. The inquirer must interpret the event, understand the process of meaning construction and reveal what meanings are embodied in people's actions. It is important for the interpretivists to find out the subjective meanings or

realities which stimulate people's actions in order to understand and make sense of these actions in a way that is meaningful for the research participants (Saunders et al., 2003)

Adopting an interpretivism paradigm, the researcher entered the social-religious world of the participants to engage with them and collect in-depth information regarding social cohesion and integration. From the gathered data collected the researcher made interpretations to serve the overall purpose of the research which was intended to help facilitated the Muslims integration into the wider secular multi-faith society. Neutrality and objectivity will be held at all times.

6.4 Sampling procedures adopted in the study

Generally, two approaches of sampling are used in social sciences research. The first is probability sampling and the other is non-probability sampling.

This research will adopt the non-probability sampling method. Many strategies can be used to create a non-probability sample. Purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling. This is the type of sampling that will be used to select the groups who will be interviewed. With this type, the sample is "hand-picked" for the research. A purposive sample is a sample selected in a deliberative and non-random fashion to achieve a certain goal in a focus group, i.e. to consciously seek out respondents at both ends of a spectrum to insure that all viewpoints are adequately represented. This sampling also preferentially recruits subjects who have the best knowledge and experience in the area at hand.

The advantage of purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to home in on people or events, (Dane 1990:30) which have good grounds in what they believe, which will be critical for the research. In this sense it might not only be economical but might also be informative in a way that conventional probability sampling cannot be (Descombe, 1998:44). Another point is that phenomenology is well suited to purposeful sampling. This type of sampling permits the selection of interviewees whose qualities or experiences permit an understanding of the phenomena in question, and are therefore valuable. This is the strength of purposive sampling.

In this research the participants being Imams and Masjid managers. In utilising the case study method, the focus of research is centred upon a small sample population so that they *"are particularly informative"* (Saunders, 2009, P.233) and provide the insiders perspective.

The sampling strategy utilised to acquire data from the MSIS and IFI was non-probability purposive (judgemental) sampling. Purposive (judgmental) sampling enables the researcher to select participants that are directly related to the objectives and purpose of the research question. Therefore, the sample is homogeneous as it focuses on a specific sub-group in which all the sample members are similar hence enabling the researcher to explore and examine the group to a greater level of detail. However, it also allows for the examination of the complexity of interpretation found amongst a group of people with shared ideals, norms and careers. The participants engaged in this study and selected for the MSIS and SSII component of the empirical research were primarily identified by the researcher due to the fact they the participants from imams and managers and also revival group leaders and activist who had been through the groups training programmes.

The researcher, in being invited to engage, participate or observe these events introduced his research and desired objective to the other attendees and requested for willing participants meeting the criteria of being a member of the masjid leadership to make contact for further details. After a number of potential participants who we best suited to the field work were requested to give some of their time so they can be interviewed. Their command of English was considered and also their affiliations to the groups were also kept in mind.

The interviewees were asked question about their religious experience and they attachment to their revival movement and how they facilitated integration and social cohesion. Different literature that these different groups produce will be surveyed and analysed. Mostly these groups criticise each other in their publications such as magazines and books as well as in sermons [*khutbahs]* delivered by the Imams which are mutually critical. There are however limitations in the sampling methodology. A sample is expected to mirror the population from which it comes from. However, there is no guarantee that any sample will precisely be representative of the population from which it comes from. This is known as sampling error.

The interviews were electronically recorded with the consent of the subjects. The interviews were type recorded with the permission of the participants. An electronic audio copy of the interview was also made available to the participants as an electronic file. The interviews were then transcribed and sent to the participants. Upon their agreement of the accuracy of the data the interviews were then subjected to analysis. In an attempt to offer a balanced and objective interpretation the researcher chose to employ both literal and interpretive reading of

the data collected. Once the data analysis is completed contact was made with participants for accuracy and final authorisation so as to commence with their publication in the study.

6.5 Data Collection Instruments

Pen, paper, tape recorder and questionnaires were used for data collection. Sahin's *Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule* (MSIS) and the *Integration-Focused Interviews* (IFI) were utilised.

6.5.1 Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule (MSIS)

In order to understand the participants *"religiosity"* and *"subjectivity"* firstly Sahin's *Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule* (MSIS) was utilized (Sahin, 2014, P.69).)

MSIS suggests a thematic framework to explore the subjects' religiosity. It is modelled on Marcia's (1960) identity status model which is grounded in Erikson's theoretical framework of identity development in the human life-cycle (Sahin, 2005). Three tools are fundamental to the MSIS which are 'Sahin-Francis attitude questionnaire, self-characterization sketch with the semi-structured interview' which in this case was the Integration Focused Interview.

The measurement of religiosity according to Sahin suggests a model for the interpretation of personal attitudes towards the *'belief in'* and *'practice of'* a specific faith system. The level to which this has been informed by critical or reflective practices is entailed in the notion of 'subjectivity'. In order to measure the imam's attitudes towards Islam Sahin-Francis was employed. The questionnaire appropriated the psychometric structure of the pioneering work by Leslie j. Francis on the measurement of attitudes towards religion (Sahin 2013:73).

Sahin sees this to be the constant dialogical process that interprets the self through a personal narrative, which means *"we continuously reinterpret our sense of self according to our changing life conditions"* (Sahin, 2002, P.118).

The adoption of this methodological tool allows for an in-depth examination into the development of an individual's psychosocial and religious personality. Modes of religious subjectivity are identified by investigating the process of exploration and commitment in the ways the subjects interpret Islam in their lives.

The data provides a lot of evidence that allows for determining the subjectivity of the individuals, Muslim religiosity and how it is articulated and how it will effect integration and

social cohesion. In this study the primary tool used was the (IFI), which was subsequently aided and supported by the original two components, the Sahin's MSIS which includes an a Self- Characterisation Sketch, an attitude towards Islam scale and the actual identity interviews (Sahin, 2014).

6.5.2 Self-characterising sketch

Then participants in the initial introductive meeting they were given the MSIS questionnaire and the self-characterisation sketch exercise to complete it in their own time and return them at the appointed time of the interview. Self- characterisation sketch is modelled on Kelly's *Personal Construct Theory* (1966) it is a very useful tool in aiding in gathering essential data in order to analyse the religious development of the subject. It will facilitate in exploring the religiosity of the participants and in turn their understanding regarding integration and social cohesion.

6.5.3 Sahin-Francis Attitude towards Islam scale

Participants attitudes towards Islam were measured using the Sahin–Francis attitude Questionnaire, derived from Leslie J. Francis' work on quantifying an individual's attitude towards religion, can be utilised to collate data on a subject's attitude towards Islam (Suddahazai 2015). The questionnaire which is referred as 'You *and Your Faith* by Sahin consists of 23 questions rated on a five point Likert scale (agree, strongly agree, not certain, disagree, disagree strongly) which was based on Francis scale of attitude of Christianity, (Sahin, 2014, p.34). Despite the fact it is a very helpful instrument for explorations into a specialised study on Muslim identity formation and religious subjectivity, this 'quantitative' method has only been utilised as a supporting reference mechanism and therefore, informs the data analysis process. The subjects, who were selected in this study, had already demonstrate a high commitment to the Islamic faith.

The second aspect of the attitude to Islam was the 'Self-Characterisation Sketch'

(SCS) based upon Kelly's (1957) *Personal Construct Theory (PCT).* It was a useful tool that helped to garner essential data which was used in order to analyse the historical aspects of the subject's religiosity.

6.5.4 Measuring Modes of Islamic Religiosity and Subjectivity

The final part of the multi-layered MSIS consists of an IFI that acts as a valuable tool to create and support the phenomenological framework for this study. The MSIS is based upon Marcia's (1966) 'identity status' model, which is developed from Erikson's theoretical framework of identity development in the human lifecycle (Sahin,2005). MSIS suggests a semi-structured interview in order to attain data regarding the participant's understanding of Islam and the way they relate their personal religious understanding to the wider environment.

For the purposes of this study the primary tool used was the Integration Focused Interviews (IFI), which was subsequently bolstered and supported by the original two components, the Sahin-Francis Questionnaire and Self- Characterisation Sketch. (Sahin, 2013)

James Marcia (1966) introduced a four-fold typology that aims to explore the processes of *'commitment'* and *'exploration'* and appropriate a mode of religious subjectivity. The four fold typology is summarised below in Table 6.1

Table 6.1: Marcia's Modes of Religious Subjectivity

	COMMITMENT	NO COMMITMENT
EXPLORATION	**Achieved**	**Moratorium (Exploratory)**
NO EXPLORATION	**Foreclosed**	**Diffusion**

The data analysis procedure used in this research shows us the subject's religiosity and it can be categorised into four typologies based on Marcia's (1966) identity status model which are (diffused, foreclosed, exploratory and achieved). The data collected through the MSIS, SSI self-characterisation sketch and observation dairy will be used to identify the participants' religiosity in accordance with Marcia's model. All the relevant data that is collected and analysed.

Marcia's work is structured around establishing an identity *"that is conceptualised as a stage of ego growth in late adolescence"* (Sahin, 2014, p.86) and is not separate from the experiences of the individual. Although identity formation is noted to be an on-going process,

the researcher is able to assess and apply Marcia's four identity statuses in order to better understand the subjects interviewed and apply the theoretical implications of a specific internal structure. Therefore, each mode must be identified as a possible life-view built on religiosity that identifies the subject's religious journey thus far with a comparison to their understanding and experience of integration and social cohesion (Sahin, 2014, p.85-90).

In this *study*, the principle aim is to determine the participants' religiosity by determining the 'exploration' and 'commitment' demonstrated through answers relating to the foundational comprehension of the fundamental components of the Islamic faith: Belief *(i'tiqad),* Acts of worship (*ibadat),* Social Responsibility (*mu'amala*t) and Morality/ Ethics (*akhlaq).* The interview attempts to understand if their personal perspectives on the fundamental Islamic tenets have been developed through an informed 'exploratory' process or distinguished by its dearth in 'exploration' and thus 'foreclosed'. These modes of subjectivity essentially provide a reference as Erikson (1968) had postulated to the observance of a unique identity allowing for and recognising diversity of expression that has been developed as a result of the participants' training and education given by the revival groups and thus environment.

Therefore, religious commitment informed by exploration, indicates the 'achieved' mode of religiosity, whereby exploration without religious commitment is designated the 'moratorium' mode of religiosity. However, 'commitment' that lacks exploration is deemed to be the 'foreclosed' mode of religiosity, whilst a complete absence of 'commitment' and 'exploration' signifies the 'diffused' mode of religiosity. The analysis of the data has been conducted by directly adopting Sahins (2014) criteria for analysing the participants' modes of religiosity developed upon Marcia's earlier framework. (See Appendix V for criteria for evaluating subjectivity).

Table 6.2 Sahin-Marcia Modes of Establishing Religious Commitment

	DIFFUSED	**FORECLOSED**	**MORATORIUM**	**ACHIEVED**
COMMITMENT	**Low**	**High**	**Low**	**High (relatively)**
	Low	**Low**	**High**	**High**

6.5.4 Integration Focused Interviews (IFI)

The final part of the field work was the SSII. This qualitative research interview is a construction site for knowledge. An interview is literally an inter-change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest" (Kvale, 1996:14). Qualitative interviews are effective research instruments for getting deep insights about how people experience, feel and interpret the social world (Mack et al., 2005). The research methods literature (e.g. May, 1997; Saunders et al., 2003) has largely identified three different forms of interviews (structured, semi- structured and unstructured interviews). Dawson (2002) argued that the semi-structured interview is perhaps the most widespread type used in qualitative research. In this kind of interview, the researcher pre-establishes a set of questions to know more information about specific issues and sometimes identify new issues that were not originally part of the interview. It is characterised by its flexibility in which the researcher can add or remove questions from the schedule based on the results of each interview. Also, Saunders et al. (2003) indicated that the investigator is not requested to follow a specific order of questions but can vary the order depending on the flow of the conversation.

Interestingly, semi-structured integration interviews give the researcher the opportunity to 'probe' for more detailed information by asking the respondent to give more clarification to his answer. This is significant for those who adopt a phenomenological approach because a prime concern is focused on understanding the meanings that the respondents ascribe to various phenomena (Saunders et al., 2003)

The use of IFI, is a powerful data collection technique when utilised in conjunction with a case study method (Collis and Hussey, 2009) as the data is descriptive and verbal in essence.

The interviewing process is geared towards the narrative with regards to the 'why' and 'how'. Thus, the researcher is collating a multiple number of interpretations as opposed to discovering the correct interpretation (Yin, 1993). The ability of this technique to derive a wide berth of information and data from the research subjects eventually leads to a greater subjective comprehension of the issue. Thus, the researcher is able to postulate and deduce the holistic as well as specific nuances. The imam or managers in accordance to their group nurturing have come to see social cohesion and integration to the wider British society.

The IFI were carried out with imams from four different masjids from the four different revival groups (groups discussed in the previous chapters). From the city of Peterborough and same was done with imams from Birmingham. Before the interview was carried out a pilot

was conducted on an associate who also is an imam in Peterborough. A pilot study iss defined as a small preliminary examination of methodology and the use of planned data gathering techniques with a restricted sample Brown (2001). Pilot interviews questions ensure a non-biased results and a novice researcher becomes acquainted with the procedures and the required steps during the interview procedures. As it is an exploratory study one interview was enough.

The IFI were recorded under the present socio-political culture at first some hesitance was show by the participants on seeing the recorder but after a brief explanation and reassurance of the confidentiality and anonymity they agreed to go ahead. All the interviews were recorded and hand notes were taken. The interviews were transcribed and were shown to the participants before they were used for the study. IFI was a very effective way of engaging in an informal way of communication with the participants and deducing the understanding of the imams in regards to their religiosity and its role in facilitating the integration into the wider British society along the line highlighting the core research question. The interview setting were varied four interviews were carried out the respective imam's office each interview was over one and a half hour three interviews which were of the group activists/managers were done in my office. One interview was done at the group leaders house and it was done over two spread times as the interviewee had to leave for a meeting and on the second occasion its was once again done in his house.

6.5.5 Keeping the research diary

An empirical research diary is an essential part of the research process; this can be about the feelings and experiences of the researcher himself or of the participants. The researcher will keep his own diary to keep note of all his experiences, feelings, thoughts, reflections, facts and situations he has gone throughout the fieldwork process. The diary will be mainly unstructured and informal.

6.6 Data analysis techniques

There are many different types of qualitative data analysis. The method that one uses will depend on their research topic, researcher's personal preferences and the time, equipment and Finances available to him/her. Also, qualitative data analysis is a very personal process, with few rigid rules and procedures.

6.6.1 Formats for analysis

However, to be able to analyse your data you must first of all produce it in a format that can be easily analysed. This might be a transcript from an interview, a series of written answers on an open-ended questionnaire, or field notes or memos written by the researcher. It is useful to write memos and notes as soon as you begin to collect data as these help to focus your mind and alert you to significant points which may be coming from the data. These memos and notes can be analysed along with your transcripts or questionnaires.

6.6.2 Thematic analysis

When data is analysed by theme, it is called thematic analysis. This type of analysis is highly inductive, that is, the themes emerge from the data and are not imposed upon it by the researcher. In this type of analysis, the data collection and analysis take place simultaneously. Even background reading can form part of the analysis process, especially if it can help to explain an emerging theme.

6.6.3 Comparative analysis

In this method, data from different people is compared and contrasted and the process continues until the researcher is satisfied that no new issues are arising. Comparative and thematic analyses are often used in the same project, with the researcher moving backwards and forwards between transcripts, memos, notes and the research literature.

6.6.4 Content analysis

Using this method, the researcher systematically works through each transcript assigning codes, which may be numbers or words, to specific characteristics within the text. The researcher may already have a list of categories or he or she may read through each transcript and let the categories emerge from the data. Some researchers may adopt both approaches. This type of analysis can be used for open-ended questions which have been added to questionnaires in large quantitative surveys, thus enabling the researcher to quantify the answers.

6.6.5 Discourse analysis

These methods look at patterns of speech, such as how people talk about a particular subject, what metaphors they use, how they take turns in conversation, and so on. These analyses see speech as a performance; it performs an action rather than describes a specific state of affairs or specific state of mind. Much of this analysis is intuitive and reflective, but it may also involve some form of counting, such as counting instances of turn-taking and their influence on the conversation and the way in which people speak to others.

The analytical technique that will be used for this research will be thematic and comparative.

6.6.6 Data Analysis

The data analysis process derives data from the MSIS and SSII is deducted through a process of dialogue. Developing Categories derived from the review of literature, these category nouns identify the highlighted themes. The study identified four themes from the literature review around which the interview questions were formulated informally during the course of the individual IFI. The use of probing questions allowed for more variable data to be examined as the interviewed participants became accustomed and comfortable with the interview process.

6.6.7 Deductive Approach in data analysis:

A researcher begins by collecting data that is relevant to his or her topic of interest. Once a substantial amount of data has been collected, the researcher will then take a breather from data collection, stepping back to get a bird's eye view of her data. At this stage, the researcher looks for patterns in the data, working to develop a theory that could explain those patterns.

Yin (2003) recommends that in adopting existing theories and literature in formulating research objectives, the theoretical propositions utilised can aid the organisation and conduct of the data analysis phase. Therefore, the central components of the research such as themes and issues can be identified through the literature and contrasted with the empirical findings.

The deductive approach utilised is based upon the *"two-stage data analysis"* procedure as developed by Saunders et al (2009, P.149) there is no standardised procedure for analysing such data. Despite this, it is still possible to group data into three main types of processes: • summarising (condensation) of meanings; • categorisation (grouping) of meanings; • structuring (ordering) of meanings using narrative.

This summary profiles will compress long statements into briefer statements in which the main sense of what has been said or observed is rephrased in a few words (Kvale 1996). Through summarising the researcher became conversant with the principal themes that have emerged from the interview or observation. Once a summary of the key points that emerge from the interview or observation and its context, a copy was attached to the set of the written-up notes or transcript for further reference (Robson 2002).

This stage entails the categorisation (grouping) of meanings; developing categories and, subsequently, attaching these categories to meaningful chunks of data. Through doing this you will begin to recognise relationships and further develop the categories you are using to develop this. You will also develop and test propositions, by doing this one will be able to draw conclusions as well as analyse quantitatively.

6.7 Ethical Issues

The research is based on the voluntary participation. The researcher explained the aims of the project to the participants gained their consent and ensured confidentiality, anonymity and right to withdrawal at any point from the study. It is important to safeguard the needs of the research participant. The principle of voluntary participation requires that subjects are not coerced into participating in research and as such informed consent is necessary. Alongside this the participant must be guaranteed confidentiality and right of withdrawal at any time.

It is vital that the researcher does not allow personal bias or experiences to influence matters. The researcher must, at all times, remain open and transparent about their research and should welcome criticism with an open mind. Full acknowledgement through referencing and previous studies is a core element to research in order not to deceive or take credit for work belonging to other researchers. The data which was transcript' coded analysed was presented to the participants so they can have validated it. This helped in avoiding major discrepancies in the data and also allowing the participants the chance to preview the information before completion. Another ethical concern was of the threat of bias and subjectivity and their impact on reliability and validity (Bassey1999). In this research all possible efforts were made to minimise this bias and subjectivity**,**

6.8 Insider/Outsider Issue:

Insider research is that which is conducted within a social group, organization or culture of which the researcher is also a member. While insider research has its roots in ethnographic field research in the disciplines it is used in of anthropological and sociological research (Sikes & Potts, 2008),

Simplistically, insider research has been defined as the study of one's own social group or society (Naples, 2003, p. 46). A similar definition is provided by Loxley and Seery (2008), in the social sciences, who claim that insider research is undertaken by members of the same group, who share characteristics (cultural, biological, occupational, etc.). These definitions are rather vague; an early definition by the sociologist Robert Merton (1972) states that the insider is an individual who possesses a priori intimate knowledge of the community and its members. Hellawell (2006) notes that, based on this definition, having knowledge of the community does not imply that one must be a member

6.8.1 Insider:

Insider researchers often do not have to worry about orienting themselves with the research environment and/or participants. Unlike outsider researchers, insider researchers are free from the effects of culture shock; they are able to blend into situations without disturbing social settings (Aguiler, 1981). Furthermore, they have a pre-existing knowledge of the context of the research (Bell, 2005). With regards to participants, insider researchers have the "ability to ask meaningful questions and read non-verbal cues," as well as the ability to "project a more truthful, authentic understanding of the culture under study" (Merriam, 2001,). Furthermore, insiders are able to "understand the cognitive, emotional, and/or psychological precepts of participants as well as possess a more profound knowledge of the historical and practical happenings of the field" (Chavez, 2008, p. 481).

Unlike the outsider researcher, who may be unfamiliar, or at least less familiar than an insider researcher with the social group or culture under study, Aguiler (1981) writes that for the insider researcher, interaction is more natural and they are less likely to stereotype and pass judgment on the participants under study. Because they are familiar with the group and social setting, insider researchers know how to approach individuals.

Usually happy to talk, often welcoming the opportunity to discuss issues with someone who understands (Bell, 2005) this was true to an extent as the different groups in this studies have

different indicators of people association based on their appearance like clothes having a beard or size of the beard even the researcher is from the Muslims community therefore automatically one will assume him as an insider but this is not the case. As the subjects will have their own perception of the researcher based on his appearance and can be treated as an outsider or from a different rival Islamic movement. Aguiler (1981) reiterates this, noting that difficulties with gaining access may be the result of participants perceiving the researcher as a cultural member but social stranger. This predicament may call for impression management; as high expectations are placed on the performance of the researcher to gain the subjects' trust. Chavez (2008) cites this as a complication of the insider status; as large amounts of impression management may be required to maintain rapport and/or identity.

One clear disadvantage then, of insider research, when compared to outsider research, is the lack of detachment from the field; insiders must face the task of managing the influence of being both the researcher and the researched (Chavez, 2008). It has been suggested that this may be "mitigated" by collecting reflective personal data. Van Heugten (2004) suggests "stream of consciousness writing," interviewing oneself and talking with others about their experience. Insider research is frequently accused of being inherently biased, as the researcher is considered to be too close to the culture under study to raise provocative questions (Merriam et al., 2001). Indeed, "The selection of a topic that clearly reflects a personal interest and the selection of colleagues as subjects raise the spectre of insider 'bias'" (Van Heugten, 2004, p. 207).

Researcher bias in this context would refer to the process whereby the researcher's personal beliefs, experiences, and values influence the study methodology, design, and/or results. The insider researcher must then be wary of projecting one's own views onto participants, or the data analysis threat to objectivity may be hard for the insider researcher to obtain due to the high level of subjective involvement. It is argued that the inherent bias of insider research challenges the positivist stance that research be objective (Workman, 2007). Likewise, as Sikes and Potts (2008) acknowledge, a common criticism of insider research is the extent to which it can be considered "objective" and thus scientifically reliable and valid.

Patton (1990) asserts that the insider's privileged access (closeness) may indeed compromise their ability to engage critically with the data. A strategy that was employed to counter the risk of bias was to maintain objectivity, neutrality and detachment (Patton 1990). This helped in obtaining reflexivity and objectivity.

Due to the current socio-political climate in the UK, the issue of Islam as a faith-religion and political ideology has been vilified and portrayed by the some of the mass media as an impeding threat to Western values. The resultant outcome of this negative scrutiny has witnessed the rise of a vitriolic and suspicious attitude towards its adherents, the Muslims. Conversely the rise of 'Islamaphobia' as a perceptible attitude has adduced a culture of fear and inherent mistrust of the outsider looking into contemporary Muslim issues. Thus, the resultant outcome has led to restricted access to Muslim institutions, lifestyles and opinions. (Suddahazai 2015).

The researcher can be classified as an insider researcher due to his background. This insider-status has allowed for an exploration and discussion on the subject of revival groups and the role they have in social cohesion and integration.

However, in the role of the researcher as the primary gatherer of data, there are a number of ethical issues that require consideration. The most cynical allegation levied at such an approach is the possibility that the researcher could be denigrated as a mouth-piece or apologetic. This form of bias must not be confined to the researcher but also to the altered behaviour of participants' reactivity. The study identifies this phenomenon to be cognisant to the Hawthorne effect, thus stipulating that the participants may behave differently under controlled conditions in order to impress or influence the research.

Therefore, in order to maintain the integrity and validity of this research, the study adhered to the principle of trustworthiness. To achieve this, aim the study maximised the variation of participant experiences by selecting from a diverse community and geographic locale. (Merriam, 2002) Also member-checking strategies were employed to verify experiences and narratives (Crotty, 2003) by asking other students attending the same institutes to verify their experiences.

A further and major strategy that was employed to counter the effects of bias was to maintain neutrality and detachment (Patton, 1990). The aim of such an approach was to develop an objective attitude, which could only be attained by adopting the principle of reflexivity. This implied that both the researcher in question and participants comprehended their own personal perspectives in deciphering and interpreting the societal norms. Thus, any experience deemed to be real by the subject can be classified as reflexive. This justifies why participants belonging to similar groups and generals explicate a different reality to their peers. Therefore, in phenomenological and in particular, ethnographic orientated research, the

perception of the individual is garnered and valued rather than technical definitions based upon generalised data. (Saunders et al, 2009) The practical embodiment of reflexive practice is in the awareness of being reflexive.

This entails an incumbency upon the researcher to meticulously record personal opinions, biases and preconceptions during as well as post and pre interviews. The validity of the analysis drawn from the field study can be adduced to the diverse data collection methods. This allows for the possibility of a multiple number of perspectives to be considered. Therefore, the ability to triangulate data reduces the subjectivity and bias in interpreting the data (Yin, 1993).

6.9 Limitations of the Study

Despite the interesting findings of this study of the complexity of the nature of data gathering and analysis in relation in the UK, this study has encountered a number of constraints which are necessary to acknowledge.

Access: attaining access to the imams was a serious issue due to their busy schedule it was very hard to meet them. Also finding suitable and willing participants was very difficult it was even more difficult to find imams who had proficiency in English.

Another limitation of the current study can be seen in the size of the sample due to the scope and time of the study. However, a much larger sample would be likely to provide more generalized results. Moreover, in seeking to conduct the empirical research the study was thwarted by several factors that encompassed: Due to socio-political climate there is a sense of mistrust**:** The popularisation and intense scrutin**y** of Muslims and Islam in the UK by the media (‘war on terror’, rise of Islamophobia, ‘Trojan- school scandal’, etc has created a blanket of fear and suspicion of ‘outsiders’ to the educational institutes (even though researcher is an inside researcher). Due to cultural and religious sensitivities it wasn’t possible to interview females and due to the same reasons even observation of female gatherings was not possible.

6.10 Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the thesis's theoretical and practical approach strategy and offered a justification regarding the different decisions and processes undertaken throughout the research journey. The study's theoretical approach was informed by constructionism interpretivism and phenomenology. A qualitative approach had been used to reach the overall aim and objectives of the study as it is characterised by its ability to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomenon being investigated from different angles and by using multiple sources of evidence (triangulation), including: semi-structured integration focused interviews, direct observation and document analysis. The chapter presented the details of the central data collection tools and procedures of the data analysis. Issues related to the research ethics and limitations of the study are discussed. Next chapter presents data analysis and main findings of the study.

Chapter 7 Data Analysis:

7.1 Introductions:

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the role and impact of the contemporary Islamic Sunni revival movements in the U.K concerning the social cohesion and integration of Muslim communities into the wider British society. The study by adopting a qualitative case study framework explored the views and perception of selected group of faith leaders and activities who belong to the transnational Islamic revival movements operating in the U.K. The study aims to examine participants' attitudes and perception of living in a secular, multicultural and multi-faith society. Furthermore, the research particularly focuses on understanding how the religiosity of participants shapes their views on integration, social cohesion and living in such a diverse social context. This chapter presents the main findings of the study. The chapter will briefly reiterate the data collection/analysis procedures and discuss the thematic frame of presentation followed to structure the chapter.

7.1.1 Data collection procedure for modes of religious subjectivity:

Before, discussing the data collection procedures it is important to stress that the current research aims to explore the following central research questions:

1: What are the main features of the religious observance (religiosity) among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

2: How do historical, social and political dynamics shape the religiosity among the members of the transnational Sunni movements in Britain?

3: How does the difference in religious observance (religiosity) of the members of the transnational Sunni movements' impact on their perception and attitudes towards integration into the wider British society?

This chapter presents the results of the qualitative empirical case study conducted to explore the central research questions. Two sets of data were separately collected; the first set of data relates to the overall patterns of religiosity observed among the study participants, and the second set of data concerns their views, attitudes and perception regarding the integration and social cohesion within the context of British Muslim diaspora. The data on the religiosity of participants was gathered through Sahin's 'Muslim Subjective Interview schedule (MSIS)

(Sahin, 2014). The MSIS is composed of a trilateral empirical strategy to gather and assess data in order to measure the subject's religiosity. MSIS entails a self-characterisation sketch, an attitude toward Islam scale, and a psychosocial instrument on understanding the formation of religious identity'. The MSIS is based upon Marcia's (1966) 'identity status' model, which is in turn developed from Erikson's theoretical framework of identity development in the human lifecycle (Sahin, 2005). MSIS suggests a semi-structured interview framework in order to attain data regarding the participant's understanding of Islam and how this understanding informs their wider life-world. The formation of religiosities are identified through inviting participants to discuss a relevant religious (Islamic) issue whereby the main psychosocial patterns and processes exhibited by the participants alongside 'a commitment - exploration continuum' are used to understand the nature of their religious identities. Sahin (2014) offers offer a set of assessment criteria used to identify presence or absence of commitment and exploration processes that have been discussed in detail in the methodology chapter. Because the current study is focused on issues around Muslim perception of integration in to the wider society themes and sub-themes around the main topic were used to facilitate the semi-structured interviews.

The main procedures informing the application of the MSIS can be discussed as follows: Each participant first completed, "the attitude toward Islam scale" and a "self-characterisation sketch" which took approximately 10-15 minutes. After that the M. S. I. S (the semi-structured interview session) proper started. On the whole, each interview took approximately 45 to 60 minutes and interviews were tape recorded. Each participant was individually interviewed. The taped interviews were also individually scored by following the criteria discussed in chapter five. Thus, each participant's overall mode of Islamic subjectivity/religiosity was identified.

7.1.2 Data collection procedure for integration and social cohesion

The research explored the second main set of questions cantered around exploring participants' views concerning social integration and cohesion through a semi structured interview protocol called 'integration focused interviews' (IFI). Like MSIS, the individual IFI were tape recorded. It must be noted that under the present socio-political reality at first some hesitance was show by the participants on seeing the recorder but after a brief explanation and reassurance of the confidentiality and anonymity they agreed to go ahead. All the interviews were recorded and hand notes were taken. The interviews were transcript and were

shown to the participants before they were used for the study. SSII was a very effective way of engaging in an informal way of communication with the participants and discerning the understanding of the faith leaders (imams/masjid leaders) in regards to their religiosity and its role in farming their views on integration into the wider British society along the line highlighting the core research question. The interview settings varied, four interviews were carried out in each imam's office, four interviews done in my office and each interview was over one and a half hour long.

7.2 Sample of study

The study sample consisted of a selected group of masjid imams, masjid committee members and activist from the four movements, the Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi and the UKIM. The majority of South Asian originated British Muslims have direct and indirect association with these main transnational Islamic movements. Most of these movements have also originated in Subcontinent and as a result of the post Second World War migration have established their branches in the U.K. The IFI were carried out with imams from four different masjids that are run by the four selected revival groups (groups discussed in the previous chapters).

The participants were faith leaders (imams), members and activists some of whom have served on the Mosque committees too. All of the study participants were based in two main locations, the cities of Peterborough and Birmingham. This research has adopted the non-probability purposive sampling method. This is the type of sampling used to select study participants is utilized because of the easy access format it offers in terms of engaging the hard to reach populations with such a sensitive research. As discussed in the methodology chapter, having such a sample of convenience does not take away the authenticity and the wider applicability of the results of the study. It must be noted that the study sample in fact reflects the features of the wider population of Muslim faith leaders operating within the context of British Muslim society. As such it does provide qualitative kind of generalizations often discussed within the literature on qualitative and ethnographic methodology.

7.3 Pilot study

Before the interviews were carried out a pilot interview was conducted with an imam currently leading congregation in a local mosque in Peterborough. The aim was to test both

the religiosity and social integration related interview content and make sure they work with the targeted group and generate the required data to engage with the main study questions.

A pilot study is defined "as a small preliminary examination of methodology and the use of planned data gathering techniques with a restricted sample" Brown (2001). Pilot interviews questions ensure a non-biased results and a novice researcher becomes acquainted with the procedures and the required steps during the interview procedures. As it is an exploratory study one interview was enough. The pilot study was helpful in getting the wording and phrasing of the questions revised so that they are understood clearly by the respondents. As such there were few changes introduced to both the content as well as the style of posing the questions. Because the current research has identified the discussions over the Muslim integration into British society as a theme through which participants' religious world view is also assessed, it was important to see whether such a topic would generate enough data to identify the patterns of association between religiosity and living in a largely secular and multifaith society. The pilot study indicated that the Sahin's MSIS is applicable to discern patterns of religiosity among Muslim adults and the main fourfold type of religiosity originally reported by Sahin have been observed. As a result of the pilot the changes and revisions were introduced.

7.4.1 Sahin's Muslim Subjective Interview Schedule (MSIS)

The MSIS provided an insight into the development of the individuals' religious subjectivity; therefore the data analysis of the case studies has been categorised in accordance to the modes of subjectivity revealed by the data analysis. The participants in the initial introductive meeting were given the MSIS questionnaire (in appendix) and the self-characterisation sketch (in appendix) exercise to complete it in their own time and return. Thereafter the semi structured interviewed was conducted to decipher the religiosity of the participants. Self-characterisation sketch is modelled on Kelly's personal construct theory (1966) it's a very useful tool in aiding in gathering essential data in order to analyse the religious development within the lives of the participants. MSIS facilitates exploring the religiosity of the participants and in turn their understanding regarding integration and social cohesion.

According to the model, the case study participants were assessed on continuum of commitment and exploration (Sahin2014) with commitment being evaluated with respect to the participants' adherence to the orthodox Islamic beliefs and practices. The MSIS reveals

a*'four-fold typology'* of religiosity, This consists of either a 'foreclosed', 'achieved', 'diffused' or a 'moratorium' mode of subjectivity. The analyses of the interviews are not presented individually as separate cases but through the fourfold type of religious subjectivity. Each mode of religious subjectivity is illustrated through discussing the relevant cases. The M. S. I. S generated quite a substantial amount of data on the religious life-world of participants. Each participant's religious life world is represented under the relevant discourses of Islamic subjectivity. The analysis of the data has been conducted by directly adopting Sahins (2014) criteria for analysing the participants' modes of religiosity developed upon Marcia's earlier framework. (See Appendix V for criteria for evaluating subjectivity)

7.4.2: 'Integration Focused Interviews' (IFI).

The IFI formulated the second section of the overall empirical Case Study as it allowed for an in-depth exploration and identification of their religious subjectivity and their understanding and stances on group cohesion and integration into the wider secular British society. The focus of the SFI was exploratory thus, there were no fixed questions but they were guided by identified themes as per the literature on which a discussion was initiated.

The data collected through the dialogical interview procedure wanted to capture the participants' worldview and a narrative of their experience on Muslims integration in the U.K

The data analysis process used for integration and group cohesion generated data from the semi structured integration interview (IFI) with questions on integration and social cohesion this is deducted through a process of dialogue. The use of probing questions allowed for more variable data to be examined as the interviewed participants became accustomed and comfortable with the interview process. In the IFI a deductive approach in data collections was adopted

Once a substantial amount of data had been collected, the researcher took a breather from data collection, stepping back to get a bird's eye view of the data. At this stage, the researcher looked for patterns in the data, working to develop a theme that could explain those patterns.

The deductive approach utilised is based upon the *"two-stage data analysis"* procedure as developed by Saunders et al (2009, P.149) there is no standardised procedure for analysing such data. Despite this, it is still possible to group data into three main types of processes: • summarising (condensation) of meanings; • categorisation (grouping) of meanings; •

structuring (ordering) of meanings using narrative. This summary will compress long statements into briefer statements in which the main sense of what has been said or observed is rephrased in a few words (Kvale 1996). Through summarising the researcher became conversant with the principal themes that have emerged from the interview or observation. Once the key points that emerge from the interviews, a copy was attached to the set of the written-up notes or transcript for further reference.

7.4.3 Presentation of Data

The data analysis is presented separately for each case, one of the eight participants in two separate sections. The first section deals with the data analysed from the MSIS to demonstrate the types of religiosities observed among the study participants. The second section of the data analysis will present the data which was collected and analysed from the IFI and it will be presented under the theme of integration and social cohesion.

7.5 Modes of Religious Subjectivity observed among study participants

The study sample consisted of eight individual case studies and analysis revealed that out of the four religious subjectivities only two of them were mainly observed among the eight participants; seven participants were assessed by using the afro mentioned criteria suggested by Sahin (2014) to showing overwhelming tendencies of a foreclosed religiosity some of which has exhibited few exploratory features coming through when discussing in secular topics. The analysis revealed that that only one study participant was assessed with an overall exploratory mode of religiosity.

7.5.1 The Foreclosed mode of religiosity

The foreclosed mode identifies the individual that demonstrates strong religious commitment, which is not informed by a process of exploration and questioning. According to Sahin (2005) this passive and depersonalised belonging implies that the individuals merely inherit the tradition of their predecessors without a conscious effort. Therefore, failing to reflect upon their heritage and contextualise it within the context of contemporary life. Out of the eight interviewees that completed the MSIS and the IFI process, all eight subjects showed high levels of commitment to the faith but seven showed little or no exploration regarding the actual practice and understanding of the ideology of the established Sunni tradition or the ideology and the context in which the movements were initiated and the therefore were

deemed foreclosed. The overall features of foreclosed and exploratory modes of religiosity will be described and then the cases exhibiting these types of religiosities will be presented.

7.5.2 The Exploratory Mode of Religiosity

This mode of religiosity is informed by a clear process of self-exploration that informs one's religious commitment which in turn shows a more grounded personal perception of faith. According to Sahin (2014), the exploratory mode of religiosity demonstrates a personal endeavour to construct a religious worldview with the explicit recognition of the existence of other divergent and contradictory perspectives. One of the participants, after MSIS analysis, revealed significant features of such an exploratory mode of religiosity.

7.6.1 Case study 1 Salafi Movement Participant 1: Taha.

Self-Characterisation:

Religiosity section

Taha was born in Iraq to Kurdish parents was of 42 years of age, as a child he went to school in Iraq as he describes it he was fortunate that he learned Arabic which is unusual for children from Kurdish background in Iraq, he studied in a school in Sulemaniyyah and later went on to medical college in order to do medicine but he dropped out after his association with Salafi scholars and he perused in learning Islamic Studies. He came to the U.K in 2006 as a Iraq refugee. At present he is an imam in a salafi masjid in Peterborough.

When he was asked about the role of Sharia in the U.K context he replied:

" Everybody should be able to follow the rules of Islam regardless of culture, sharia is from Allah for humans so it should be ok our Muslims should have no problems in following them and its rules in their lives even in this so called modern period our Salaf had an answers which they left for us".

Taha seemed to be thinking that an uncompromising commitment to Islam would make it easy to avoid the possibility of tension produced by the challenges of modem life. He felt any change and new situation that did not comply with the Shariah should be removed from a Muslim's life. He was certain that Islamic rules do not change according different life

situation. Life conditions themselves in any society should be made compatible with the rules Shariah. It seemed that the tradition of the Salafi had an answer for anything and everything for Taha.

7.6.2 Recruitment into the movement

This theme also will help explore the questions about the participant's perceived aims and objectives in becoming part of this specific Islamic movement, and also the reasons for the activists to join the movement. This also provided the means to decipher whether the new members on joining had really explored the movement from all angles or was the reason behind joining the movement based on an emotional reason due to peer pressure or other personal and social factors. Understanding the recruitment processes will also give an indication on what type of mind-set are attracted to the movement and assess the role of the specific education process known as 'Tarbiyyah', offered by the movement, in shaping members' religiosity, world view and their understanding of social cohesion and integration within the context of secular British society.

When he was asked if he belonged to any Islamic movement he said:

"Brother I wouldn't say I am part of the any movement…. but I would say I follow the way of the salaf and I am very proud of it. As a child I learned from the shayyukh in our local masjid they were salafi, the more I read and learned I found the taste and beauty of Islam in this way, (Taha).

This response suggests that his initiation into the movement it se[46]ems it happened as part of his socialisation and upbringing that he said as a child he came across the shaykhs teaching in his local masjid. It raises a few points; one, if these shaykhs happen to be from any other movement would Taha not be a salafi, and secondly, it shows from his part there was no exploratory effort. When discussing about the authenticity of his movement Taha's justification lies in the fact that they base it on the two primary sources of Islam through the understanding of the Salaf (Pious for Father's).

"I would say we follow the true understanding of Islam which is to stick to the Qur'an and Sunnah from the salaf not to follow other things like the ikhwan who follow the people like they do with democracy, music, and they think they will change after they have power it's like

deceiving people we don't believe in that we think be straight with people from the start. (taha).

Taha seems to suggest that they are following the true understanding of Islam exclusively while others are deviant of the truth. It seems he is very critical of the Ikhwan he thinks they are deviant and are deceiving the people and that's how they are trying to come to power.

"*O yes without doubt because people being influenced by different philosophy and what do we call it ideologies so people are for example influenced by secularism they are standing against my ideas so I have to struggle I have to even explain basic things to them about Islam that this is what you are thinking is against Islam totally against the basic of Islam and those are following Islamic politics or Jamti islami as they are following their leaders blindly sometimes even when the idea is against a clear ayah or hadith just because the Jamma or the leader of the jamma said so"*

Taha exhibited a very committed and a highly dedicated approach to Islamic faith but despite this he is deemed to be foreclosed as his experience with his shayks leads him to criticise and questions practices which are not familiar to him.

A person of the foreclosed mode of religiosity reveals a strong religious commitment but it is without any real exploration. The foreclosed mode of religiosity is the extension of the tradition passed over to them by their teachers, leaders. This high level of commitment towards religious values and a minimum of active involvement appear to lead to a passive and depersonalised belonging to one's faith (Sahin 2005).

"We follow the salaf that is our aim to follow them and spread their message to people Is to… bring the people to the way of the salaf understand it and from the smallest thing to the biggest thing.bi silmi kafa nothing has to be ignored I am not one off the type to concentrate on the shrikh of graves and ignore the other things and bring back the ummah to the way the salaf of this ummah used to understand every aspect of Islam.

Taha seems to suggest that we should follow Islam in its totality and that can be done only through following the way of the Salaf without questioning it, it seems he is receiving his Islam in total obedience mode with complete trust to the authority of the tradition practiced by his teachers.

It became quite apparent that Taha showed features of a foreclosed mode of Islamic subjectivity and it seems he had a strong authoritarian legalist and literalist approach to Islamic Shariah. One of his responses to the question was when he was asked if the shariah can be reinterpreted for a new context:

"*I heard some weird fatwas like in Korea there because the people are eating dogs meat that's fine be with them and when you come to Europe you can shake the hand of women because people are doing it so don't worry do it because it is the culture of the people I am not doing just because they are doing it I follow what the prophet said to me and I behave that they are respecting me even more and I practices that for many times for when I face any women and she's comes to me to shake my hand with me I put my hands on my chest and I say am really sorry and I can't shake hands with you so I didn't lose anything while am practicing my Islam"*

He did not see any problems, issues or difficulties of practicing religion or the religious interpretation which was construed in a total different context to the one he is now. He was certain that the tradition which was developed by the Salaf fourteen hundred years ago had answers for everything and only by following them literally we would be on the correct path.

7.6.3 Views about Integration and social cohesion

Taha saw Britain as his home and was willing to take the necessary measures to allow making contact outside of the Muslim community.

Taha felt grateful for Britain and its people for allowing him to come to this country as a refugee he had strong attachment to Britain. When asked about his identity and if one can be Muslim and British his response was:

"I feel all three. The prophet was Arabi Hasahmi and also a Muslim so we can be more than one so I feel Muslim British and middle eastern…"(Taha).

So he did not have any problem with being Muslim, British or Middle Eastern but initially at the beginning of the interview he did say he would describe himself as a Muslim from the Middle East.

On the question of the concept of the universal ummah he stated that:

"All the Muslims around the world are one Umma one brotherhood if Muslims are in pain in any part of the world I feel their pain" (Taha)

This strong sense of a united 'ummah' would explain why Muslims are more likely to be affected by events occurring all over the world that involve their co-religionists than the followers of any other religion or societies are unlikely to understand Muslim indignation at events occurring in other parts of the world, especially when the perpetuators are Western nations and may then take this to be a lack of 'Britishness' or as a result of divided loyalties.

7.6.4 Cooperation with others in society

When the researcher posed the question on integration and co-operation with the non-Muslims he replied:

"Yes there are verses in the Quran we have to have bir with them qisth with them adala with non-Muslims and the prophet dealt with the Jews in medinah how he dealt with them how forgiving he was…. Yes, we need integration and Muslims are trying but we need to note that the white people also have issues with integration as they move out of the area were others move into I've witnessed it myself so it has to be both sides then integration can be achieved" (Taha).

He clearly highlights the issue of white flight as he sees as not a Muslim problem but an issue with the white people moving out. So he thinks that a meaningful social integration can only be achieved if both parties play a more positive role it's not propagative of the Muslims but the indigenous white community needs to embrace the Muslims and other non-white migrant communities.

"Yes we are part of all the fields in the British society we work as doctors' nurses' teacher in our jobs we can talk to people tell them we are part of society". (Taha).

In the above statement he highlights that Muslims are making contribution in all walks of life in Britain.

"Had six who became Muslims in our masjid so far and after explaining to them about Islam for those people they converted to Islam…. we have books in many languages in my office to give them dawah work. (Taha).

Another pattern that was observed was that integration is seen more of 'dawah' activity to call others to become Muslims. That they have to interact with people so they can give Dawah to them and then hopefully convert them and that is the ultimate goal for the movement as it can be seen from the above response of Taha.

"As long as I can I try my best to provide my help yes they come to me asking for books leaflets about Islam and sometimes they want to be Muslims and Allhamdulliah our doors are open they can come for advice on Islam and become Muslims that should be our final goal…."(Taha).

This is as Taha has mentioned their open days are for inviting others to their programs which are Dawah orientated activities.

"we need to improve our language and we don't only focus on Christianity because many people in Britain don't believe in it most are atheists so I have learned about evolution and so on" (Taha)

This response also seems to be about dawah and the best means to convert someone as he focuses on theological issue as he wants to learn about the theory of evolution or how to criticise it so it would make his dawah more effective. There is no mention about learning from the culture of the wider society but how to critique it not realizing maybe one can learn from it or benefit from it. This seems like Taha thinks there is nothing one can learn from the culture or religion of the wider British society.

"When I practice Islam and don't do the bad things which Allah has forbidden me to do then I show to them this is who I am when I'm good to anyone help the old people one day I might have an impact on one off them and they might become Muslim" (Taha).

Once again his response shows it is all about conversion, and how best to convert the non-Muslims to Islam with no desire to learn from each other or bridge the differences and build a better society on mutual understanding rather than converting others.

On the question on voting he said:

"*It is a rule a basic thing so to mix with kufar concepts especially in our countries like having democracy is something out of argument…. NO democracy is something else and shurah is something else Allah didn't agree with democracy" (Taha).*

As for the political process of this country, Taha did not agree with it, to him democracy was a non-Islamic concept alien to the earlier generations of Muslims and he believed some people equate it with shuarh (consensus in Islamic legal thought) but shurah is something different to democracy as he stated above. He believes Allah disagree with democracy it is invitation to Islam. Taha shows that he never endorsed politics or democracy he sees Britain as the early meccan period of the prophet's life where they need to use peaceful methods of proselytizing and spreading the word of Allah.

7.6.5 Islamophobia and the role of media in integration of Muslims

The media and its role in creating a picture of Islam in the minds of the British public was a major issue which cropped up repeatedly even though no question had been asked on the media specifically. Respondent felt that negative media portrayal has implications for the community. As well recognising the institutional discrimination towards Muslims, the Muslims in the U.K have also been victims of Islamophobic incidents from name-calling and spitting to defilement of a mosque post-9/11.

He highlighted many incidents in which Muslims faced discrimination name calling like being called Taliban or Al Qaida and of the older congregation members felt intimated when they were walking to the masjid alone early morning or at night. Some members were also concerned that as long as they were Muslims they would not be accepted as British citizens.

When he was asked if the Muslims in the current situation with the rise in Islamophobia how the Muslim community feel living in the U.K he said:

"Elders who would normally pray in the masjid at night or early morning don't do so now due to physical threat" (Taha).

"Post 9/11 life as a Muslim is tough. There is open media persecution, harassment and sense of continuous pressure. Being British and Muslim is somehow considered to be a separate identity." Some of the congregation told the Taha that as a result of prejudices against Muslim post-9/11 and 7/7:

"...young people are having a hard time in education and job opportunities". This, together with being seen with distrust and suspicion,

This was a very worrying response. It showed the insecurity Muslims were feeling as a result of the discrimination they are facing. This alienation can have a profound consequence of the social and economic well-being of a community, as well as the psychological health of its members. The community on the receiving end will then develop its own distrust of the non-Muslim majority.

Even though he felt they were seen in a negative light by non-Muslims he still saw Britain as his home. Maybe it was this very discrimination that made them firm in their Britishness as they felt they were being treated unfairly as they belonged here as much as anyone else. However, when asked if his feelings of living in Britain had changed he answered:

"as a British Muslim, I have more freedom to practice Islam than Iraq which is a Muslim country despite what the media says and lies" (Taha)

The findings from data showcase that Media plays a major role on shaping misconceptions of Islam. It is true that there is some basis to these misconceptions but the media were abusing their role in society and exaggerating events; increasing misconceptions of Islam.

The main impact of 9/11 and 7/7 and the other incidents of terror on British Muslims seemed to be that Islam and Muslims were criticised more, however at the same time understanding of Islam and Muslims also increased. Before Muslims were alienated from society and thought to be outsiders with no real understanding of their faith or their way of life. Following these incidents, people became more likely to look into Islam out of curiosity. This, in some cases, meant the misconceptions were rid of and the public understandings of Islam and Muslims increased but it many cases the effects were the opposite.

7.6.5.1 Summary

One would assume that Taha has an overall positive attitude to integration despite the fact that he is seen as a foreclosed individual in his religious personality as he is practicing and promoting interaction with the wider society. However, a closer look at the case reveals a different pattern. To him interaction has one purpose and that is the ultimate goal for him to convert others to Islam.

It seemed Taha in his foreclosed religious subjectivity had strong literal and ahistorical features which were shaping his understanding and his views on integration and social cohesion. He thinks a strong iman (faith) was the seed to be enough for Islamic teachings to

be implemented in any socio-historical context. As such, Islam, being the only such "uncontaminated" religious tradition, has superseded all other religious traditions therefore salvation could only be achieved by following Islam which is based on his understanding any other path was deemed to lead to failure in the ultimate end. Therefore it was his responsibility to convert people so he can save them from eternal damnation.

7.7 Case study 2 participant Faisal (Salafi)

Religiosity of the participant

Faisal (37) was born and raised in the U.K and he is one of six three male siblings and three female. His parents are migrants from Punjab Pakistan. His schooling was from the UK Birmingham till the age of 16 then he went to college and there he did a degree in management from Aston University. His education and profession where he works as a manager is the reason he has become the manager of the masjid committee. His Islamic education was initially from a supplementary school type madrasah but now he does and has done one two tuition with the imams of his masjid.

When he was asked if the established shariah and its rulings had any relevance in the British context he said:

"Islam has the solutions for everything it is from God, and we must follow it without any hesitation and most importantly the belief in qadar (predestination) is a fundamental belief of Islam so we must accept or ulemas of minhajs teaching without any questions ".

Faisal religious thinking was exhibiting strong ‘Taqlid’, blind following and imitation, features which in his mind characterised the perfect nature of Islam even though the Salafi groups do say they don’t accept Taqlid off the four imams but they do follow their scholars without really questioning them sometimes they will ask for reference from the sources but they will say the Taqlid of the Salaf is the way forward. Faisal mentioned the Quranic verse ‘He had ordained Islam as the perfect life style for humanity for all eternity’, which he strongly suggested Islam would always be compatible with all and any situation. He was told by the scholars from his movement who had given reference from the primary sources so he should simply accept them. As a result he refrained from commenting on issues such as human freedom, creativity etc.

When asked how he joined the movement he replied:

I wouldn't say I joined a movement rather I "realised" and became a true Muslim. I gave up relying in human but turned to Allah except all the madhabs around me were either newly invented or baseless. I only found faith and truth and trust in answers from the Quran and Sunnah, and the only way to get the right of the Sunnah is to follow it to its base and ensure it is "sahih" and not "da'ef"… I believe people with my aqeedah are named salafi's as in followers of the salaf us saliheen that is the true Islam for me.

Faisal from his response shows he is devoted to the faith of Islam he is highly committed to Islamic tenets and he choices to be part of the salafi movement but in his surety he says that he has not joined a movement but he's a born again Muslims so this would mean that he was not a true Muslims but an untrue Muslim if such a thing exists and now he is a true Muslim which also mean that he implicates anyone who doesn't follow his way or as he would say the way of the Salaf which he and his movement's scholars have understood then you're not a true Muslim.

"I "realised" and became a true Muslim"

He also demonstrated that he has an understanding of the aspect of the theological struggle between the different revival groups which is primarily on the concepts of aqeedah (theology/core beliefs) and he is of the followers of the salf us saleheen, and not accepting anyone else as a true Muslims who follows anyone of the four Sunni schools of thoughts therefore he would be classified as foreclosed. An analysis of his self-characterisation sketch and the MSIS and IFI indicated that he was brought up in a family who were culturally Muslims and in his youth he had explored the British lifestyle but later after experiencing some bereavement he took an emotion change in his attitude and became religious,

"*My life was a little of track, born and bred in England it's very hard to stay on track nevertheless a lot of wrong decisions later and with the loss of three father figures in a matter of a year it knocked me senseless. I gave up relying in human but turned to Allah"*

It seems from his response that his initial decision to become religious was not based on any rational but it was an emotional decision. His decision of joining his present movement was not thoroughly exploratory as he showed no signs of learning about the movement he was joining.

It is indicated from the data collected that he seems to be diffused in his early life and then through limited exploration he came across different movements but now after going through the Tarbiyyah of the Salafi movement which is used as a framing and mobilisation technique by the all the movements he is not welling to explore further and he's developed and very foreclosed Islamic subjectivity.

7.7.2 Recruitment into the movement

"my movement helped in shaping my personality it made me a better person more respectful to my parents and it made me avoid bad company and to refrain from haram things you know like drinking TV media in general and even their novels so called literature its full of obscenity" (Faisal)

It was interesting to see that the perception of the western culture was seen in negative light and as secular non–religious and most be avoided at all costs this is a clear sign of a foreclosed religiosity.

Similarly, Fasial's justification for joining the movement was due to his belief that they were the only true followers of the Islamic way of life and it was also based on the fact that they held strongly into the Qur'an and sunnah and the first three generations of Muslims (*salaf us saliheen),* and there is no endeavour to construct a religious worldview with the explicit recognition of the existence of other divergent and contradictory perspectives.

"With the loss of three father figures in a matter of a year it knocked me senseless. I gave up relying in human but turned to Allah" (Faisal).

Faisal's faith in life helped him to cope with a serious family tragedy he mentioned that he lost three father figures in a short space of time. During this troubled time, he briefly appeared to have entered into a theological questioning mode, but it did bring him to Islam and trying to make sense of faith in such a critical period of his life. However, his personal questioning mode appeared to have led him to becoming practicing and he tried to understand his religion from his local masjid but he didn't feel content with that and after some exploration he entered the Salafi movement.

When asked why he preferred the salafi movement over other movements he said:

"All the madhabs around me were either newly invented or baseless. I only found faith and truth and trust in answers from the Quran and Sunnah, and the only way to get the right of the Sunnah is to follow it to its base and ensure it is "sahih" and not "da'ef" which is determined by the salaf only no point in new wishi washi intepratations… (Faisal).

When he highlights the point on evidence he means evidence for the Quran and Sunnah but it has to be from the salaf's interpretation as he does not accept it as evidence if it is from anyone else's interpretation as there is no need or room for new interpretation on any issue the Salaf had consensus.

"different groups talk of reinterpreting the Quran to fit in to the modern times but to me and my Jamaat it's against shariah we have to follow the Quran and Sunnah and its interpretation only from the Salaf's therefore no need for new interpretations of the Quran are needed or allowed" (faisal).

He seemed to be quite happy with the way Islam was practiced in his own movement. His foreclosed nature of Islamic subjectivity appeared to have been formed as a natural extension of his movement's teachings. He said that he had followed Islam perfectly by adopting the way of the Salaf and his group's scholars which symbolises following the prophet's life style. As far as he was concerned there was no need for him to engage in a different or new interpretation of Islam.

7.7.3 Perception of other Muslims and Islamic groups

Faisal demonstrated that he has an understanding of the aspect of the theological struggle between the different revival groups which is primarily on the concepts of aqeedah and he is of the followers of the salf us slaiheen, and not accepting anyone else as a true Muslims who follows anyone of the four Sunni schools of thoughts his response when asked about other Islamic movements Faisal describes:

"The Deobandis including Tablighs and Barelwis are ahl-i bid'ah (people of Bidah).

For the former group, he claims,

"*They invent things about awliya or Sufism, (faisal)*

He maintains, with regard to the Barelwis, that

"they openly go to Shrines and ask help from dead people, my mum and aunty used to go to these shrines but now Allhamdullillah they stopped and these people act like mushriks (pagans) of Mecca and like Hindus of our time it's probably because we lived with the Hindu culture and it has affected us." ,(faisal).

Thus, according to the Faisal, these groups invent *bid'ah* in religion and violate the creed of Salaf saying that the reason for them not going to the prayer in their masjid or sending our children as one of the questions posed the point of student exchange he's response was simply that the Barelwis are "*mushrik and group of bid'ah"*.

Faisal seemed to be thinking that an uncompromising foreclosed commitment to Islam made it easy to avoid the possibility of tension produced by the challenges of modem life. In other words, any change and new situation that did not comply with the Islamic legal framework should be removed from a Muslim's life. He was certain that Islamic rules do not change according different situation. Life conditions themselves in any society should be made compatible with the rules and regulations of Islam; Islam had the answer for everything for him all solvation would come by following the Salaf otherwise you're on the wrong path this is a clear sign of a foreclosed person.

7.7.4 Integration and social cohesion

Faisal was a second generation migrant.

"I've been brought up as a British Muslim, even though such a thing might not exist in words some might say but that's what I feel: A British Muslim" (Faisal).

Faisal had a strong attachment to Britain and he felt more at ease in Britain then he would in Pakistan which was his parents place of birth and had a stronger connection to the U.K. he felt challenged that he was questioned about his identity and he felt that people showed signs of confusion about him being a British Muslim.

" *Religion is just different to nationality and being asked to choose… It's just kind of weird if someone asks you: 'Are you a Muslim or are you British?' and you cannot compare or you cannot put one thing [above the other]. But this is happening a lot lately". (Faisal).*

It seems he is finding it difficult to make sense to the wider society and to himself as he is constantly questioned about his identity and he as observed this more frequently lately compared to before.

It makes you really feel like an outsider when they ask you to choose [between Islam and Britain]. Why should I choose? Nobody asks you to choose between being a Church of England and a British. One is religion and the other is geographical" (Faisal).

For Faisal where he communicated a strong sense of belonging to the Muslim ummah, For example, Faisal said that belonging to the ummah meant

"No... I was born and I belong here and I am here to stay I prefer livening in U.K I have all my family and friends here I feel Birmingham is part of me and I have strong attachment to it more than any other place but I have an attachment to the Muslim Ummah too" (Faisal).

He was also most emphatic in expressing his belief that Britain was his home.

It was interesting to see that this Faisal had also felt strongly about his British identity. But also had an understanding and a belief in the world wide Muslims community the ummah. This shows that there was a possibility of holding dual or triple identities like identifying himself as British, Pakistani and Muslim.

It can be suggested that Faisal had strong attachment to Britain as he was born and brought up here and felt more comfortable in the U.K then another country even his parent's country of origins he had frequently gone there but found it hard to settle there and the culture and people seemed bit different to the one he is used to therefore he felt more comfortable in Britain.

Regarding interaction with the wider society he said:

"Our masjid has a policy to interact with the British society to spread the message of Allah… we need to make it more effect and do some sort of research before we give dawah we should try to maximise the conversion rate" (Faisal).

…and also he believes more research is needed from the masjid committee to make their dawah more effective.

"The Ulema say we can only stay in this country if we are doing Dawah or we have to go and live in a Muslim country"(faisal)

When he was asked to explain the meaning of dawah he said:

"dawah is fard on every Muslims living in the uk what I mean by dawah is we need to preach to the indigenous people and other non-Muslims and other Muslims with the wrong aqeedah try to convert them to the truth of Islam this is their only salvation"(faisal).

Once again Faisal is stating that they interact with the wider community from their masjid but again like Taha it's about converting the people he also see their responsibility to convert other Muslims who have a different aqeedah to his .

7.7.5 The role of the Media in social cohesion and integration

The media and its role in creating a picture of Islam in the minds of the British public was a major issue which came up in the interview with Faisal there was a change in the way Muslims felt they were seen by non-Muslims:

"People automatically assumed I was some sort of extremist since I visibly look like a Muslim. It was obvious that people felt uncomfortable in my presence this is partially due to the media hype and this led to immense problems based on "...the merest claim by non-Muslims that you were acting suspiciously" (Faisal).

Faisal addressed the fact that many of them felt that they were seen with *"...suspicion and distrust"*

Faisal like Taha highlighted many incidents in which Muslims faced discrimination name calling like being called Taliban or Al Qaida and of the older congregation members felt intimated when they were walking to the masjid alone early morning or at night. Some members were also concerned that as long as they were Muslims they would not be accepted as British citizens.

"Post 9/11 life as a Muslim is tough. There is open media persecution, harassment and sense of continuous pressure. Being British and Muslim is somehow considered to be a separate identity."

"...I'm more wary of white English people as you can see they are against you at times and out to get you or they might give you physical harm most of them only know us through the media" (Faisal).

This was a very worrying response. It showed the insecurity Muslims were feeling as a result of the discrimination they had and still are facing. However, when asked if his feelings of living in Britain had changed he answered:

"No... I belong here and I am here to stay this is the country of my birth this is part of my identity so where else can I go!" (Faisal).

Despite seeing incidence of racism and Islamophobia he felt safe and comfortable in Britain and having more rights to observe his religious believes without any fear of persecution. He did feel things have changed since 9 11 lots of reports of attacks and he felt the elder who walk to the masjid for years are now praying at home especially night pray due to this fear.

Shut the media up (legally restrain and underpin) for a start! Second bring real Islam into the education system and third promote Islam in an open forum. (Faisal).

The attacks, combined with continual negative media portrayal of Muslims have left a lasting effect and will continue to do so until this (negative media portrayal) stops."

Faisal was also aware of and concerned by, the extent to which the media is responsible for shaping attitudes towards Muslims, and felt that the media was abusing this position.

"The media misrepresents and incorrectly quotes Muslims"

In summary, it appears that Faisal's overwhelmingly foreclosed mode of Islamic subjectivity was shaping his understanding and he was insisting on not having an "interpretation" of Islam. He believed that with Islamic shariah with its divine origin, ruled out the possibility of adulteration with human ideas and thoughts; in his view what he was implementing in his life was an undiluted divine message which was transmitted to him by the tradition passed on from the salaf us saleheen with no room for reinterpretation.

One would assume that Faisal had a positive attitude to integration despite the fact that he is seen as a foreclosed individual but as he is practicing and promoting interaction but a closer look reveals a different pattern. He was very much like Taha to him interaction had one single purpose and that is the ultimate goal for him to convert others to Islam. He was also insisting on guiding Muslims who had different understanding of Islam than his group.

7.8.1 Case study 3 the Deobandi movement, participant Zahoor's religious subjectivity

Zahoor is 52 years of age he was born and raised in Britain. He is the oldest sibling of seven. He parents came from the state of Azad Kashmir in the early sixties. He received his early education till the age of 16 from his local state school in between he had a few trips to Azad Kashmir therefore he is fluent in pothwari and Urdu. He was born in a very strict Barelwi family. But he would describe himself as cultural Muslims who was practicing but with little understanding who he was confused with many things that were part of his upbringing.

"*I think it was in university I was typical Barelwi person when I went to uni back in 84 I came across people of this group then through them you know they were good they would look after you give you food and stuff and if you're a student it the best thing you can have"*

"My understanding was not based on Deobandi and I was raised as Barelwi I was a just cultural Muslims and it was wake up call for me when I went uni when you been to school and uni and materially ou are doing ok then what is the purpose of life that sort of question it comes from Allah"(zahoor)

Zahoor shows committed and conscientious approach to his Islamic faith; he has a very high attitude on to commitment to Islamic practices. He thinks that the Islamic worldview is centred on the fundamental of Islam and the ultimate purpose of life of this world is to achieve the favour of Allah for the Ahkira (after life).

"you are doing ok then what is the purpose of life that sort of question it comes from Allah and your here for sort time and you die so the real life is the afterlife (ahkira) and this life as the hadith says that this life Is a prison for a mumin and is paradise for a non-Muslims" (zahoor)

For zahoor the purpose of Islam and it pillars is to benefit humankind's fate in the next life as this world really is meaningless and a place of trial and tribulation. Ultimately he was of the view that Islam can be understood and comprehended through the real understanding which can only be based on the dissemination of the tradition was is verified by the ijaza system and anything else is deemed as information therefore one has to make sure he learns from a traditionally trained scholar who has a unbroken chain from the Shaba and ultimately the prophet himself and one should never learn from others like the orientalists who have no real knowledge but only information.

"I think the traditional method of teaching Islam will remain I think the concept of sanad its important the whole sort of thing that holds and underlines the truthfulness of the Islamic message is the sanad and if you remove the sanad away from it then you obviously one of my teachers once mentioned that there are people who are teaching Islam a PhD level in western universities they will teach information not knowledge then he definite it and he said knowledge is subbah and information and the fact that it comes from the time of prophet who was taught by Allah through jabreel and then it came to the shahba and the tabi and tabi tabheen and there is a whole silsala if you look people who finish at bukhari or Muslim and even Quran you get ijaza and the concept of ijaza is very very strong without it no knowledge can be authenticated"(zahoor)

After spending number of years in the 'Tablighi Jamaa' movement he perused his course on Islamic education but he would only learn from teacher who had a traditional background from a madrasah system which has an approach of disseminating knowledge thorough the ijaza system.

It can be suggested form his understanding that for him knowledge is the memorisation of Tafasir, Hadith and other Islamic sciences which is typical of the traditional madrasah pedagogy where no use of critical analysis, so he declines to give any thought to analysis or critique of the tradition as he believes the Ulema of the past where the giants in their fields his thought is based on the fact they were more able then us and we have no right or knowledge to judge their works especially the works on the Tafasir or hadith science as the works on the hadith had the consensus of the ummah for centuries as he has stressed in his above statement and the hadith science had gone through rigorous analyses in the past and it stood the test and after this process it received universal acceptance in the Sunni thought.

He deems other approaches as non-Islamic and non-beneficial *despite* his isolationist approach to education and his non exploratory entry to the movement would deem him as a foreclosed individual.

7.8.2 Recruitment into the Movement

Zahoor joined the Tablighi movement while he was studying at university in Birmingham.

"I became to think about my purpose off life I was not content with the Barelwi understanding with which I was brought up the commitment and the simplicity of the Tabligis let me to the movement their effort for Islam is immense" (Zahoor)

Zahoor from his statement seems to be not happy or content with his life and was looking for answers which were not answered by the Barelwi movement but they were answered by the TJ movement he was impressed by their simplicity and hospitality.

It can be observed form his statement that he has a puritanical approach and he sees Islam has been affected by cultural and folklorist practices and innovations which need to be eradicated and its needs a purification. This he believes can be achieved by returning to the Quran and Sunnah with the true understanding developed over the years by scholars.

"I got to study with some great teachers and all I can say is that they are leaders of our din… They have multiple ijzas from different great scholars in many different Islamic sciences with unbroken chains going back to the Prophet himself to me that's the most important thing and that's what kept the religions intact and authenticates our religion. (Zahoor).

Zahoor expressed that there was a climate in the madrasah where he studied which encouraged not to question or think deeply about what he called "complex topics" in faith such as the concept of predestination. He was advised to accept it as an article of faith and preoccupy himself to practise religious rituals.

"Allah has planned everything it's all written down as the hadith states that before anything was created Allah created the pen and told it to right everything that will happen from now till the day of Judgement. We should stick to His book and His prophet's hadith so really nothing can be changed; this shows the strong belief in predestination and the helpless in the humans" (Zahoor).

When the interviewee was probed further in this area of pre-destinations he reconciled his thought and understanding by simply saying

"*It's a complex thing which we humans with our limited understanding can't comprehend*" (Zahoor)

(…and he just asked to move on with the next questions.)

Zahoor preferred his group's rather milder interpretation of Islam. As he explained in fact Tabligh like other less radical contemporary revival Muslim movements do not deny that an Islamic state is necessary but focuses much more on propagating, explaining Islam to Muslims. In his view Tabligh aimed at preparing the infrastructure in order to create a

psychosocial readiness for such a situation to take place. In a sense they are gradualists rather than revolutionaries.

"*at the moment we need to address the Muslims only change them then focus on other projects like converting non-Muslims or focusing on political ends" (Zahoor).*

Unlike the two previous participants he felt that at the moment our efforts for Dawah should only focus on changing other Muslims and bringing them to the true understanding of Islam and it's not the right time to give dawah to non-Muslims.

7.8.3 Perception of other Muslims

When asked if he faced any difficulties when he joined the T.Js?

"I *had lot of opposition as I chose a different path then I was brought up, I had problems on Eid days I would do it one day and my family would do it the next and I was called a Wahabi… I had many debates with my cousins and they would get very heated then I realised that there is no point so I thought let it be and over time it became less now. (Zahoor).*

As it can be noted from Zahoor's response he had faced lot of opposition and it created tension from his family who didn't support him in his change of school of thought and he was initially very vocal in defending his position but with time realised it's not very productive so he eased up a little.

By and large all the interviewees from all of the movements believed when asked about the reality of many Muslim groups who are in conflict with each other in their understanding of Islam, the predestinarian features of their religious thinking had become apparent. They related or give some kind of indication to a prophet's hadith which states that only one of the groups contesting over the true Islam will be saved in the Hereafter:

"Yes I know but it was the prophet p. b. u. h. who in the very beginning foretold that Muslim society will be divided into many groups and only one would they be on the true Islamic guidance. Our aqeedah and our following the quran and Sunnah that's the right and only path of salvation" (Zahoor).

"Yes my aims are to promote the true understanding of our deen to people as you know many things have come into Islam that should not be part of Islam so we need to purify it from them

and spread the true understanding of Quran and Sunnah to the Muslim community" (Zahoor).

He believed many wrong practices had come into the lives of Muslims which were not from the Islamic teachings and this teaching need to be cleansed.

When asked what his views were of other Islamic revival movements he said:

I think salafism is a youth thing they don't comprehend nuances of the Islam so I think when they are young very aggressive and emotional but with age and experience one changes (Zahoor).

He was critical of the salafi:

Zahoor thinks the salafi movement attracts young naive people and it lasts till they became mature and with maturity it fades away.

7.8.4 Integration and social cohesion

When he was asked about the coexistence of Muslims with non-Muslim he said:

Yes, they can coexist, right from the beginning people have lived and have respected the differences within each other as shown by the four schools of thought. In today's society we are missing the term tolerance; communities need to be respectful of each other..." (Zahoor).

Here in his response Zahoor is indicating that tolerance is the key to coexistence and that there will be differences as there were differences before among the Muslims, and these differences are mundane and the focus should be on the bigger issue faced in the contemporary world.

"Currently we are living through some very challenging times as the microscope is right above the Muslim communities across the world. We are being portrayed in a negative manner and our religion is under attacked from all sides our children have become too westernised losing their deen. (Zahoor)

He felt that Muslims especially young Muslims, who were born and bred in in the west, were in danger of mixing cultures. He thought this eventually would lead them to adopting Western life style, clubbing, and free mixing drinking. As such, the Muslim community was experiencing a big danger which could only be guarded against if the boundary between

Islam and the rest of the cultural representations were kept apart and clearly marked. He also felt that the media was playing a negative role in creating a negative image of Islam and Muslims which he believed in not healthy for integration.

"You can be loyal to your lord and live in a non-Muslim country upholding your religious beliefs, pleasing Allah SWA whilst working and contributing to the society you live in. Following the Law of the Land is also part of teaching our people". (Zahoor).

Zahoor shows from his reply there is no problem for Muslims to live and contribute to the society and abide by the law of the land. Actually he believes its incumbent upon Muslims to be law abiding.

When asked about integration and interaction with the wider non-Muslims society his reply was:

"Yes, we do need to interact with the non-Muslims at work, yes we can but with caution, but socialising with them is off limits as they go clubbing drinking free mixing with females so we need to protect ourselves from that and specially our children growing up in the uk they might lose their religion if we don't protect them" (Zahoor).

He suggested that it was important to engage with his work colleagues at work but he would not interact with them after work he couldn't socialise with them as they we drinking and free mixing with females and he believed that the younger generations should be kept away from socialising with the non-Muslims or they will lose their religion.

When asked about movement which is the T.J movement which means the propagating group what was their role in the UK he said:

We have a set methodology for dawah we need to focus on changing Muslims first then the wider non-Muslim society will change by looking at us you extinguish the fire in your own house first before you go to your neighbour's house" (Zahoor).

Zahoor exhibits the idea that free mixing with the wider secular society at the moment can cause many problems, unlike the two Salafi subjects he believes like his movement that we need to perfect the Muslims first and once that is achieved then we can showcase Islam and convert the public from the wider society.

7.8.4.1Summary

Zahoor was religiously foreclosed participants as religiously foreclosed individuals are the least likely to differ from their movement leadership in their interpretations of Islam therefore he avoided interaction with other cultural representations within the society as this was in line with his movement's beliefs. Unlike the two previous participants he avoided preaching or giving Dawah to non-Muslims as his movement's had the understanding that first Dawah should exclusively be given to Muslims at this stage in time. Due to his foreclosed mode of Islamic subjectivity he was not willing on having an "interpretation" of Islam. In their religious thinking Islam, with its divine origin, ruled out the possibility of contamination with human ideas and thoughts; in his view what he was implementing in his live was an undiluted divine message which was transmitted to him by the tradition with the ijaza system holding it tightly together and if one was to remove the ijaza system that would destroy the whole authenticity of the tradition.

7.8.5: Case study 2 Deobandi/Tablighi Subject two Amjad

Self-characterisation:

Amjad was 35 years of age born into a family of Pakistani background and part of the Deobandi masjid in Birmingham; he was born in the U.K. He went to school in Birmingham from where he left with A Level. Now he is self-employed working in the import exports industry. He joined the T.J movement in his twenties and he is a committee member in his local T.J masjid.

His religious journey began after his father's death which turned him to God and Islam as born into a Pakistani Mirpuri background he was from the Barelwis as is everybody is from his region.

When asked how and when he started practising Islam he said:

"When my father died I was very upset. but my mother was strong and I realised her strength came from her belief in Islam and therefore I started going to the masjid the imam said to me that as I was told in my early years of study at the madrasah that things are preordained as the Hadith says that four or five things are preordained and one of them is when one will die and how they will die so the imam was right but end of the day we will all die so that made me understand and it gave me sabr" (Amjad.)

Amjad return to his faith helped him comprehend his loss and the believe that he had constructed in his childhood re-emerged and it made him coop with the situation and it was a blessing for him

"I think my sheikhs taught me what is essential for me to know about Islam. My sheikh always references it to the Quran and Sunnah and he knows the Islamic tradition very well. "when you start questioning everything critically I may get confused this critical thinking is a western thing and we should respect our sheikhs but the sheikh's should provide references if they are questioned. (Amjad.)

Amjad's Islamic subjectivity was shaped clearly by his movement it was clearly seen that he did not believe in the interpretation of Islam as far as he was concerned Islam was the 'deen' religion of Allah for all times that was not to change. Amjad didn't realise that there was room for reinterpretation and the understanding of Islam or the tradition that we had which was passed on to us from actually the understanding of people before us and it was contextual and interpretive understanding of those people and it was not applicable for people of all times. His overall personality was displaying a foreclosed mode of religious subjectivity.

On being asked about can we challenge the religious that have been passed down to us from our elders in the form of the tradition he replied:

"*Brother, Islam is a complete of life for all times and situations, the Ulema have given as a well-structured tradition which is free from mistakes we need to hold on to the tradition that's where our success is". (Amjad)*

Amjad explained that due to his lack of Islamic knowledge he could not judge or be critical of the traditional scholars as he was in no position to do so and he was happy to continue with his sheikh who offered him excellent knowledge of Islam and he was keen on developing his knowledge of Islamic studies.

When asked does he follow his teacher/sheikh blindly He said that:

"yes *one should be quietly listening to the sheikh, never arguing with him" as in secular universities or even colleges students are encourage to argue debate with the teachers but in Islam respect for the sheikh as one the conditions of learning and if you argue with the sheikh you lose barakah in knowledge"* (Amjad).

The above statement of Amjad indicate that he was not interested in questioning or willing to critically analyse the tradition that was passed on to him by his elders or teachers.

Amjad thought that engaging in a process of personal investigation and learning about Islam was challenging and would possibly lead him to confusion as he did not have enough time in his life or the understanding of the Arabic and original sources of Islam. Therefore, we should leave it to trusted scholars as he had known how trust worthy his teacher was so he would just find it easier to ask him instead.

"*We should leave it to the ulema who understand the deen better than us lay people we should follow what they tell us*"

He also added that he did not anticipate any change in his Islamic understanding he believed it to be fixed.

Amjad's facial expression and the tone in his voice indicated that he did not feel comfortable with the interpretation of Islam that was disseminated to him questioned, this is atypical sign of a foreclosed mode of religiosity whereby a person organises his world-view as an extension of the life-world of his parents or culture his/she is brought up in, in his case it was the interpretation of his scholars of his movement that should not be questioned as for him it was from God.

7.8.6 Recruitment into the Movement

His religious journey began after his father's death which turned him to God and Islam as born into a Pakistani Mirpuri background he was from the Barelwi background as nearly everybody is from his region.

How and why he joined T.J movement he said:

I came to my movement and found the true path not our parent's path which is contaminated by Hindu Sikh culture. But now I'm very happy with my teachers.

Amjad as he stated attracted to the Tablighi movement because he felt he was not finding satisfactory answers from or cultural Islam or the Barelwi movement which his parents were part of consciously or sub-consciously and he had not learnt much about Islam from them as a child when he went to their evening madrasah and his parents way was contaminated with non-Muslims cultural practices.

Amjad return to his faith helped him comprehend his loss when his father died and the belief that he had constructed in his childhood re-emerged and it made him cope with the situation and it was a blessing for him.

"I returned to deen but my local masjid was not fulfilling my needs and it was creating questions in my mind which were only answered by the T.Js….. my contact with the T.Js came due to my friend being from the T.Js"

His initial introduction to the T.J's was due to his friend. Amjad believed in receiving Islam in a total obedience mode with complete trust to the authority of the tradition and the sheikh but from others who he didn't know about or trusted he would firstly not listen to them and if he did he would critically engage with their arguments. It appeared that his foreclosed religiosity was significantly shaped by his revival movement.

7.8.7 Perception of other Muslims

What are his views are of other Islamic movements he said:

"see *brother now a day you have lots of so called scholars who are misguiding people look at the Sufi Barelwi imams misguiding ignorant Muslims we need to be careful of them if I come across of one these people I will make sure I get reference from them and I will always get it confirmed from my sheikh or else I will not accept it" (Amjad).*

In his response he is criticising the other groups especially the Barelwis for their teaching and how they are misguiding people and also he was not acknowledging other teachers as scholars, and how his is very careful in taking from other scholars here it seems they use the exploratory critical approach to other scholars but when it comes to their own movement or their teachers they become very foreclosed in their approach and accept everything.

"brother you see I found my sheikh and I've seen it with him he has evidence for whatever he's says so we should rely on scholars like him who are learned with multiple ijazas in many different sciences see as lay people we don't have enough tools or time to understand for ourselves" (Amjad).

Amjad liked his groups' approach in their mission compared to some other rival revival movements whose only focus is on creating an Islamic government. He believed that his movement's focus was correctly on building Muslim minds not just governments and he was

also critical of the other movements who were focused on giving dawah to non-Muslims much like zahoor, he believed that dawah work should at this moment in time be exclusively for Muslims and later when this mission is completed we can focus on non-Muslims it was a clear reflection of the T.J ideology as when they were established they were coming across the suddhi movement therefore they only focused on the peasants who were nominal Muslims.

"Our jammat focuses on Muslims and we don't think it's the right time to proselylthesis to non-Muslims once the Muslims start following Islam in its true form then they will change by just watching us and some groups just focus on the khalafah but that likewise will emerge once the Muslims start practicing Islam." (Amjad).

7.8.8 Integration and social cohesion

Amjad appeared to be strongly rejecting the possibility of developing a hybrid identity that would allow him to have a sense of relatedness to both the values of the wider society and his own culture He seemed to be quite categorical in his interpretation of the British part of his identity; it was British because he was born in Birmingham, it signified a geographical rootedness rather than a cultural belonging. However, he grew up in a nearly exclusively Muslim community and the British aspect of his identity actually meant a strong identification with his local community in Birmingham. As far as he was concerned "white man's culture" was secular and against the fundamental principles of Islam. He was even critical of learning Islam from non-Muslim teachers.

"In the end of the day we have different religions, be adopting to their language English and one day possibly forgetting our own language and our parents' countries, but Islam, our religion will in the end help its, reminding gives us our identity of a ummah". We should never mix ourselves with the others obviously sometimes we don't have a choice say like work but remember we need to protect our deen…. "(*Amjad)*

On asking him about Dawah as the movement he was part of are called the Tablighi Jamaat (the Dawah group) he said:

"Brother listen dawah as they say charity starts from home so we need to change the Muslims first then after that we will deal with the non-Muslim society at the moment our kids are losing their religion" (Amjad).

Amjad believed that the secular liberal culture of the U.K was encouraging immorality the culture of sex rock and roll was as he termed the modern form of *Jahiliyya* and Muslims especially the youngsters who were attracted towards it should try their best to keep away from it.

"we need to safeguard our children from the western pop rock and roll culture and teach them the deen there's too much free mixing between the sexes in this country" (Amjad).

When asked does he think he will leave this society which has so many ills his response was:

"Despite this country having these problems it was still one of the best country to live, look at our Muslim countries they have corruption no law and order so I'm safer here" (Amjad)

He had reservation and he was aware that there was the danger of free mixing of males and females and it could be seen in the Muslim community as well and it was the influence of the secular British society so he believed a boundary needs to be built between Muslims and the non-Muslim society and the interaction should at its minimum. But as far as him moving to any Islamic country he wasn't so sure due to the lack of security the corruption in the Muslims world.

7.8.9 Government Legislation/ Prevent Policy and integration

Amjad felt that government legislation, under the name of anti-terrorism and security, was discriminatory against Muslim and was leading to preconceived negative notions of Islam and Muslims. He had come to know about prevent from one off his shykhs speeches where he was very critical of this government initiative.

"There are too many angry Muslims out there along with angry non-Muslims, we need more people out there smiling and working with the extended communities and showing that we're a religion that cares for all…the prevent policy is targeting Muslims indiscriminately" (Amjad).

Muslim community in 21st century multicultural Britain are feeling their loyalty to the country is being questioned in terms of their integrity, positively contributing to their local community and being a law abiding citizen in this country. This reckless policy which has been in the Westminster is creating distrust within Muslim community with local and central government. This has led to a sense of exclusion by the Muslim community.

When asked if he is more integrated than his parents his response was:

"I do feel more integrated than my parents; this is due to the language aspect and growing up" (Amjad).

That a stronger and more assertive Muslim identity emerged as Muslims born and brought up in the UK became more confident to claim their rights as British citizens. He mentioned that their generation integrated to a certain extent in that they speak fluent English, have attended British schools and work among wider society, which could best be circumscribed by partial acculturation. Expressed a strong desire to practice his religion but do not feel that the interaction with wider society is problematic.

"But this does not mean that my religion aspect has watered down in any way. My religion means the world to me but I feel the both can happily go hand in hand without compromising either".

7.8.10 Summary

In conclusion, the analysis of the religiosity and social integration related data revealed that Amjad showed strong foreclosed features of religious identity which in turn were hindering him to have a meaningful identification with the wider society. He appeared to have no serious problems with living in a multicultural society as long as the boundaries of each culture were respected and clearly marked. Analysis of Amjad's responses to the question asked in the SSII interview revealed that he did not have a real contact with multicultural society he only had limited contact which was through his work other than that he had no contact. He seemed to be in and not necessarily part of the wider society. This did not make him think that there was hostility between Islam and other cultural representations. However, he was clear that by keeping themselves separate they could preserve their distinct identities and respect each other. It was those who wanted to mix cultures that in his view were creating tensions and problems in the society.

7.9 Case study three The Barelwi movements Zahid

Zahid is 42 two years old and was born in the U.K all my schooling was done in the U.K. I Went to college and then I went to university did a teaching degree now I teach maths and IT in a local secondary school in Peterborough. He was born into a very religious family with and strong attachment to the spirituality leaning Barelwi movement. At present he is a

member of the masjid in Peterborough and he is also the head of the masjid education committee.

"But I am part of the Barelwi masjid committee in the education committee it wasn't something I decided on or something that I explored but my decision was based on more or less on the fact that I grow up into a Barelwi family. One thing I would say culturally inherited it from family" (Zahid).

From his response which indicates that he has not fully explored the movement to which he belongs but its due to the fact that his family was Barelwi therefore he is an active member of the Barelwi movement to it's a sign of foreclosed mode of religiosity.

"Critical thinking is not right the elders know more than us so they developed this from the sources so we cannot challenge them. We learn from them so no need to be critical this critical business is a thing of the western world Islam doesn't work like that some things you just follow as the Quran says listen an obey. As it has unbroken chains that go to the companions and the prophet so it cannot be wrong and who are we brother who can challenge our elders who have spent their live in this work now a days people read a few books and think they can critique the great scholars, who wrong and arrogant "(Zahid).

Zahid believed Islam in its pure form was given to us by our predecessors through the traditionalist scholars who preserved it as it was revealed to the prophet by God and it has been transmitted to generations after generations by the traditional scholars and explained by these great scholars. Zahid's religious thinking appeared to be strongly ahistorical; not only the Qur'an but the Sunnah and the tradition, but also the historical response and reception of it had been divinely guided and controlled. This tradition and these scholars of old were beyond critical analysis and our only role was to memorise it and pass it on to the next generation. It seemed he wasn't willing to critically engage with the tradition therefore he is seen as a foreclosed subject.

"it's about cleaning the heart yourself tazkiyyah e nafs through the waziffah zikr gatherings through muwlid and focus a lot on the attributes of the prophet creating that understanding and visualising it and engaging yourself and developing the love of the prophet and understanding his miracles ext"(Zahid).

Zahid's description of the organisation's overarching aim of promoting a moderate, peaceful form of Islam that is infused with the notions of love, spiritualism and harmony. Activists of

the movement when describing their agenda, always mention all or some of these terms without due negligence. This is to counter to a large degree the negative perception of Islamic movement's especially the Salafi movements to which the Barelwi movement is a reaction to.

7.9.1 Recruitment into the Movement

From his self-characteristic sketch MSIS and SSII Zahid did join the movement based on a conscious decision but it was largely based on the fact that he was born into a Barelwi family.

When asked why he joined the movement he replied:

"Joining the movement wasn't something I decided on or something that I explored but my decision was based on more or less on the fact that I grow up into a Barelwi family (Zahid).

The single most apparent characteristic demonstrated by Zahid was his veneration and zealous adoration for the personality of Prophet Muhammad (s) and other great saints. It seemed his entire basis for his discussion began and ended with adulating the prophet's personality. This reflects on his ideas and the practical implications of those visions, which are mainly based on the love of the Holy prophet and a continuous connection with His personality. It appears that the aims and objective of the Barelwi movement is centred on personal character reformation based upon an idealised model of the Prophet Muhammad (s).

Sufism is about Tassawaff. The Sufism is at the heart of the Barelwi movement it's about the miracles of the Awalliyah of Allah the saints the scholars and they spread Islam through the ages from place to place it is this love they create in people and they are very effective in their methodology and make them better people and to educate through the educated people. Sometimes you can get non-Muslims who are scholars of Islam but imaan is not in their hearts" (Zahid).

Zahid tried to refrain from calling himself a Barelwi but he liked to be called ahl e sunnat wa jammat, the label Barelwi is normally used as derogatory term by calling themselves ahl e sunnat they try to legitimacy that they are the true Muslims and the rest are not. He did highlight the different sub-groups among the Muslims and said they are *Ahl-e Sunnah wa jammat* the rest are not therefore they are deviant as he believed that the only saved sect among the Muslims was one and that was the Ahl e sunnat.

"Love of the Prophet is our biggest motto, which attracts people towards us, though sometimes people come to us through our welfare work,".(zahid)

7.9.2. Perception of other Muslims

He clearly reflects the identity or the main difference of his movement from the other movements; he mentioned this difference to separate *"Us" from "Others".*

Zahid was also complaining about sectarian divisions within the Muslim community over simple issues of these sects. Most importantly, he was aware that many of the extreme Muslim groups were advocating a complete separation of Muslims from the wider society until the rest of the society was converted to Islam.

The figure of the prophet his respect is central point in zahids understanding.

"…I was inspired by this system (Sufism) they are not strict about Islam… otherwise today people are enforcing Islam on the gunpoint...I came here basically for my own islah… basically when you meet people they say something else in the public but in private they are totally different. In this movement they have the character, simplicity, and honesty…" (zahid)

In terms of attracting and recruiting people to the movement, Zahid states that there is no overt strategy the 'tariqa' employs. It is common knowledge especially within community that the Sufi based Islamic movements is orientated towards the reformation of personality and character. So they naturally attract new members seeking to find the path towards self-betterment and development. Further still as the Sufi movements do not enforce or coerce people in their religious volitions, an increasing number of ordinary people perceive it as a viable and plausible alternative to the political and militaristic movements in UK.

Zahid was critical of the other groups understanding of Islam. However he was implying that the groups and the classical Islamic Education at mosque supplementary schools had failed the youth in not being able to provide them with an adequate understanding of Islam in integrating into the society. Clearly for Zahid it was not just the negative influences of the wider secular culture that produced this growing disinterest towards practicing and learning about Islam among young Muslims like him. The Muslim community itself was pointed at as being a cause behind the emergence of this condition. When asked whether he would consider consulting with an Imam or committee in his local mosque about the difficulties that the young Muslims experienced in growing up in the British society he said

“What’s the point I and many of my friends have tried but the imams and the management seem not to pay any attention to our concern for the youth” (zahid).

7.9.3 Integration and social cohesion

It seems that the communities that make up the totality of society that have been leading segregated parallel lives.

When questioned about integration in the U.K he replied:

"*They do not realise that we are the first real generations of European Islam. Where we live is part of us. yes we are surrounded by non-Muslim culture, but there is a lot that can be reconciled with Islam such as many democratic values, respect, justice, freedom of expression, human rights etc.. "(Zahid).*

However, despite these wider isolationist policies that both the Muslim community and the wider society have developed towards each other British Muslims are increasingly feeling the impact of multicultural polity on their self-understanding as it can be seen quite clearly in Zahid’s case.

Zahid was also aware of the difficulties that were associated with living in a multicultural society. He was aware of the challenges of non-Muslim society to his Islamic identity. However, he strongly expressed that he preferred to define himself as a British Muslim. Zahid clearly developed a strong identification with Peterborough and was feeling as a British Muslim it was observed from in the researcher’s field diary as well as interviews most of the younger movement members like Zahid who were born and breed in the U.K and had been to their parent’s country of origin and had negative experience considered Britain more as home and Pakistan or Bangladesh less so and didn’t want to go there again.

“Peterborough is my home I was born here for me it the best place to live Pakistan its strange to me, despite the fact we as a community face many challenges” (Zahid).

"People from these other movements are talking about how life in the west is bad and morally decadent what they called the world of Jahiliyya, ignorance. But they don’t want to talk about the relatively better quality of living standards here in the west. I was just puzzled and felt that we Muslims are doing nothing but always condemning the other, instead of looking

at bad things in our community... but Sufism is more about self-purification not too much is discussed about politics it's all corrupt" (Zahid)

He felt there was too much rejection of Muslims from the wider society, racism and discrimination. But what he was most concerned with was the fact of radical transnational Islamic movements' interest in recruiting young British Muslims in order to make them instruments of their own ideological causes.

Muslims in particular Zahid observed that Christian norms were bent towards society rather than the other way round and that this adjustment has not prevented its decline. Therefore, Muslims fear that Islam would have to face the same destiny if Muslims tolerate the relaxation of religious observance.

"Islam doesn't integrate with their way of thinking like we have prohibitions which seem abnormal like free mixing dress code and stuff. They (the Christians) have integrated women's role homosexuality which are prohibited in their society somehow which feel they had to fit into society… we as Muslims accept the Quran as the word of God, for what is right or wrong means different things to Muslims and non-Muslims ie the issue of alcohol things are forbidden in Islam but allowed in other non-Muslims communities but if you look at all sources like the bible and other scripture its similar to our sources and these things are forbidden for them to" (Zahid)

Zahid was critical of wider society's stereotyping of his community. He expressed that sometimes non-Muslims did not want to understand Muslim culture and simply expected them to behave like them and change they scripture like the other religious communities had done before. He was also very cautious not to claim that everything was alright within his community. He was in favour of a more dialectal option in dealing with his community and the challenges of wider secular society:

"Muslims are portrait as a threat to the U.K and seen as different from the rest of the communities in the U.K I know there are many problems with our community but there is also good in the Muslims community I think we need to engage in a dialogue between the different communities" (Zahid).

7.9.4 Summary

In conclusion, the analysis of MSIS revealed strong features of a foreclosed religiosity observed by Zahid. He did have some reflective and exploratory features when, particularly, the discussion was on the wider secular British society.

Zahid was critical of the other groups understanding of Islam however he was implying that some of the groups were too focussed on politics but the need is to change their hearts. Clearly for zahid it was not just the negative influences of the wider secular culture that produced this growing disinterest towards practicing and learning about Islam among young Muslims like him. The Muslim community itself was pointed at as being a cause behind the emergence of this condition. He expressed that sometimes non-Muslims did not want to understand Muslim culture and simply expected them to behave like them and change they scripture like the other religious communities had done before. He was also very cautious not to claim that everything was alright within his community. He was in favour of a more dialectal option in dealing with his community and the challenges of wider secular society:

7.10 Participant 6 Bilal Barelwi: religious subjectivity

Bilal was born in Pakistan and came to England with his mother when he was 2 years old and was raised in the U.K. He is one of five male siblings and three female his parents are migrants from Punjab region of Pakistan. His schooling was from Peterborough till the age of 16 then he went to college at the same time he became a hafiz with his father who is a teacher in and runs a supplementary hifz school and then went to Pakistan to study Islam now he is working as an imam.

Bilal describes his early exposure to Islamic education with great assurance and recalls the experience as a ‘blessing’ as he was introduced to the ‘din’, religion of Islam, before he could be contaminated by the wider society. He was able to begin his initial studies from his father who is a Quran teacher with his father he memorised the whole Qur’an. Then he mentioned that he always had a desire to learn more about Islam so his father took him to Pakistan where he lived and studied for eight years. He did the *ali,mmyah* course in a Barelwi madrasah in Karachi. In his praise of his madrash he commentated:

Here the Islamic education system encompassed the living company of the Ulema and Sheikhs, whom would not only teach in the classrooms but would engage the students in active duties ranging from debates, memorisation to lesson plans understanding mantak

which is logic. Thus, he identifies this experience to have 'changed' or transformed his lifestyle and intellectual perspective.

"Once on the 'alim course I began to really understand and see the legalistic and the Usul behind the practices we do in Islam. I realised the role of the Prophet (s) and how everything really can be understood by following his Sunnah. This process had a huge impact on my life and it changed me, I went from someone with an interest in Islam to someone who began to love his din and realised how much I still had to learn."

Bilal demonstrates an extremely devote and committed approach towards the ritualistic ethos of Islamic obligations. His perspective on the Islamic worldview and what it entails are centred on the fundamental tenets of the faith and the love off the Prophet and the awliyyah are corner stone to his faith. The result of Bilal's theological training and experience is evident from his confidence in introducing and discussing such technical terms as Tawhid, Aqeedah, Tassawaff and fiqh.

He sees the purpose of his movement is his case the Barelwi movement to be the crucial lens through which Islam can be understood and realised. Therefore, he scored highly with regards to his attitude and commitment to the faith; however Bilal has been deemed to be a foreclosed individual despite his rather devoted approach towards Islamic education.

"The scholars of the traditional sciences have always said you need to hold firmly to the Quran and Sunnah and the right scholars with the right aqeedah and you will always be on the right path. So we should always find someone who has or an institution like mine which teach us the din" (bilal)

He advocates that Islam can only be cherished through a systematic understanding of the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (s) by someone with the right Aqeedah and how is trained in the classical traditional way. This can only be attained if one is able to find the right 'Sheikh' to provide that guidance otherwise the individual is likely to go astray and distort the teachings of Islam. Thus, he is particularly blunt in arguing for a correct understanding that only the traditional trained teachers from his madrasah or similar madrassahs and their approach to Islam can provide.

There are many other Islamic movements those who practise Islam why he did not join any other movement, Bilal's reply was "

Barelwi movement and the Barelwi aqeedah creed the Barelwi's highlight the aqeedah creed of the religion I linked all the aqahid of Barewlism to the time of the shahaba and the time of the prophet himself whereas don't get me wrong the Deobandis don't go back fourteen hundred years they do but in some of their writing in their books I did find this part of statement doesn't link back to the shahbah or the salafhi salaheen or the iyymaah of the mashaibs nothing so I found something new which wasn't related to the time of shahaba or the salafhi saleheen throughout the fourteen hundred years history that we have so after studying all that it is something new…..(bilal).

He himself comes from traditional religious background, but now as a of the imam and a alim in his interview he stated he was fed up with the traditional ulama too, this also reveals that how the movement is concerned with the youth and aware of that how the youth is important for the movement.

The Barelwi's claim that they are *ahl al-sunnat wa'l jama'at* or people and community of the prophetic path this allows them to counter the reformist groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations (*bid'ah*) and cultural accretions. On the contrary, they accuse the Deobandis and Jama'at-i Islami of being Wahhabi. This kind of "fatwa war" is still on-going. As it was observed form their groups masjid speeches or online YouTube talks and fatwas.

There are many other ways and practices to express love for the Holy Prophet in this movement and in sub continental devotional Islam, though many are criticised as innovations by the Deobandis and other Salafi movements, celebration of Mawalid or birth of the Holy Prophet is one of the most celebrated event by the Barelwis in the U.K, it is called Eid-e-Milad, on the day of 12th Rabbi-ul-Awal of the Islamic calendar. Mainly people organise processions and gatherings to celebrate it, This all shows how they are making their ground in the society in the presence of many other movements a speciality they offer they this it is unique and much needed.

This reflects their ideas and the practical implications of those visions which are mainly based on the love of the Holy prophet and a continues connection with His personality, this also reflects that how they want to introduce an active affiliation with Him, this active affiliation which includes many practices and ideas are supported by mixture of their ideology and action plan.

In Bilal's religious thinking there was no place for ambiguity and uncertainty. In his view, diversity of opinions, interpretations, had no room and he was critical of the salafi movement who held the view that we need to reinterpret the two sources and the tradition of the four schools of thought. Therefore they were signifying deviations from the truth. He appeared to be approaching religious plurality with such a monolithic strategy; the tradition was superior to new interpretations precisely because they were mixed with human interpretations and with no consensus. Religious content appeared to be treated as too sacred to be rationally explored and engaged with. This seems that his religiosity was of foreclosed

In addition, he seemed unhappy with the extremely politicized nature of the transnational Muslim organization and their anti-Western discourse. He felt that these radical groups were not interested in the personal faith development of their members but wanted them to mould their personality in their fundamentalist ideology he states:

"People from these other movements are talking about how life in the west is bad and morally decadent what they called the world of Jahiliyya, ignorance. But they don't want to talk about the relatively better quality of living standards here in the west. I was just puzzled and felt that we Muslims are doing nothing but always condemning the other, instead of looking at bad things in our community... but Sufism is more about self-purification not too much is discussed about politics it's all corrupt" (Bilal)

7.10.1. Perception of other movements

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Bilal thinks that the Barelwi movement is the most authentic of all the contemporary movements therefore he is part of them, and he has established a link between his movement and the Prophet.

The Barelwi's claim that they are ahl al-sunnat wa al jama'at or people and community of the prophetic path this allows them to counter the reformist groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations (bid'ah) and cultural accretions. On the contrary, they accuse the Deobandis and Jamaat-i-Islami of being Wahhabi. This kind of "fatwa war" is still on-going. As it was observed form their groups masjid speeches or online YouTube talks and fatwas.

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In addition, he seemed unhappy with the extremely politicized nature of the transnational Muslim organization and their anti-Western discourse. He felt that these radical groups were not interested in the personal faith development of their members, but focused on political agendas

"Love of the Prophet is our is our central idea that's our focus, which attracts people towards us", (Bilal)

Once again Bilal is showing that the centre off all their activities is the love of the Prophet.

7.10.2 Recruitment into the Movement

How he became a part of his movement his reply was:

"My background is religious and is Barelwi my parents are of that category. I was always inspired to and I always wanted to go to Pakistan to study more and this is the reason I spend eight years of it my life there, Barelwism is based on the love and respect for the Holy Prophet….." (Bilal)

Bilal despite his comprehensive theological training and practice, However, from a subjective perspective it can be suggested that he demonstrates some signs of exploration and reflection as he claims to have changed with regards to his educational exposure.

Bilal was of the opinion they behind the establishment of the Barelwi movement was the love, respect and reverence of the prophet

"I think the aim was to highlight of the writings or his Ahmed Raza poetry it was to highlight the love of the prophet it could different aspects like the teaching and education but if I look at overall Barelwis I would say it would the love of the prophet". (Bilal)

His frequent references to the importance of following the prophet's life style (*Sunnah*), celebrating the prophet's birthday (Milad Nabi), indicated that his religiosity was in line with the Barelwi revivalist Sufi movement.

"Lately I have been reading about the prophet's seerah he is my role model in my life not some so called celebrity. I think every Muslim should aspire to follow the prophets.

During the data analysis process, it was realised that activists of this movement were more conscious about the personality of the Holy Prophet; the centre of their discussion was the personality of the Holy Prophet. Almost every activist expressed some elements of this notion,

"*the zath of rasoolllualh after Allah and with that they were getting victories in the world and when the west saw that they said what is and what is giving the strength it was the love of the prophet and the west wanted to take the love out of the people and in the love of the prophet this why we don't have unity Allah knows whether it was the west or east someone put the split and what people agreed on." (Bilal).*

7.10.3. Views of on social integration

Bilal believed integration is imperative for a productive cohesive society but he thinks it's a two process were the indigenes populace can play a major role

"Yes if David Cameron the prime minister is saying that Muslim women if they don't learn to speak English what's that he's segregating he's targeting that's worrying and I don't think Muslims have failed to integrate and look at government we have councillor's MP's and it might be slow but we are integrated and I would like to say the media is trying to segregates the Muslims from the other people.

Bilal is critical of Cameron's statement when he said Muslims women need to learn English or else they will not get British nationality he feels it is targeting Muslims and this type of discrimination is counterproductive for and cohesive society and he is questioning the role of the media that they are dividing the communities.

"We have predominated white areas and when Muslims families move into to that then they move out then whose segregating them not Muslims. This Muslim family moved into that area and they move out then the how would the Muslims feel".

Bilal like Taha is suggesting that there is white flight which is a serious problem in having an integrated cohesive society so integration is a two-way process.

"My background is religious you can say, but it is moderate. "We want to introduce the moderate face of the religion in the British society to the non-Muslims; we should not force Islam down people's throats but use rational arguments and logic". (Bilal)

Bilal is against forced conversion and thinks we need to develop skills of logical arguments to attract the non-Muslims to Islam.

"No not really but conversion and passing the message of Islam is our duty… We need to have open days we don't need force them to convert them but if they do convert then Allhamdullillah its good we need to show them our good character tell them to be Muslims they will look at your goodness and come to Islam. (Bilal).

Once again a similar pattern is emerging which was seen in the previous movements that integration is seen as a process of giving Dawah and ultimately conversion as Bilal is emphasising on converting the people through these interactions.

7.10.4 Summary

In conclusion, it appear that Bilal perceived the purpose of the Barelwi school of thought to be the ultimate lens through which Islam can be deciphered and comprehended. Bilal scored highly with regards to his attitude and commitment to the faith; however, Bilal has been deemed to be a foreclosed individual despite his rather devoted approach towards Islamic education. He advocates that Islam can only be appreciated through a methodical understanding of the Quran and *Sunnah* of the Prophet (s). This can only be attained if one is able to find the right 'Sheikh' with the right *aqeedah* to provide that guidance otherwise the individual is liable to err and distort the teachings. Thus, he is extremely forthright in arguing for a correct understanding that only the traditional teachers and their approach to Islam can provide.

In Bilal's case a similar pattern is emerging which was seen in the previous movements that integration is seen as a process of giving Dawah and ultimately conversion as Bilal is emphasising on converting the people through these interactions.

7.11.1 Case study four The UKIM: Kabir subject two

7.11.1.i Religious subjectivity

Kabir is 45 years old masjid manager and an imam who also teaches in his masjid. He was born and breed in Bangladesh he studied in Bangladesh where he obtained master's degree from a university. He has along affiliation with the *Jamat-i-Islami*. He came to the U.K to study and he gained master's degree in Islamic studies from the University of Loughborough.

Hence he is adamant in declaring the Prophetic Sunnah as the only viable model that should be adopted, as was the case with his own revival movement but he does demonstrate that there can be different interpretations of what Sunnah encompasses but within the limits of the traditions that have come to us from our elders.

Although Kabir places great emphasis on religious texts as the ultimate source of knowledge, he recognises the need to contextualise the Islamic teachings to a limited point but he is adamant that the tradition that has been passed on to the Muslims from the first few generation has withstood the challenges of the time and has gone through regress examination

"We are in no place to challenge the established tradition" (Kabir).

However, there is room for reinterpretation in certain aspects of the Islamic teaches only as far as certain social economics or new fields of research are concerned he fails to explore and discuss the tradition and the educational process and its validity in the contemporary context. On being asked whether there was any need to employ critical thinking with regards to Islamic educational tradition he demonstrates strong signs of foreclosure by reacting defensively in tone and attitude:

"*Reflection is allowed upon different things, that is what the Quran states. For generations we have a great tradition and history which goes back to the Prophet, so why do we have to question everything... So if you apply the knowledge of the two main sources then you will get a solution many Muslims they think everything West says is amazing not realizing they got it*

from the Muslim, they begin to preach about being critical…why would I want to be critical about Islam when I know it's from the Creator of all knowledge.

Although demonstrating a devoted attitude towards his faith, he is characterised by his lack of desire for exploration, thus deeming him to be foreclosed as he suggests there is no room or need for him or anyone else to challenge the corpse of the established tradition which has become the orthodoxy or Sunni Islam. He seems to be happy with the way the religion is understood and practiced by his group, but he does believe that his group needs to remodel their methodology in the British context and they cannot use the method which is used in the Muslim countries.

7.11.2 Recruitment into the movement

His response when he was asked how and when he joined the movement:

I was born and brought up in a family which was part of Jamaat and after studying at their madrassah and their masjid i eventually became a member of Jamaat.

Kabir's journey into his movements wasn't through exploration but it was due to the fact he was born in a family who had strong affiliation with the Jamaat-i-Islami.

"…If I was not in the Jamaat, I think perhaps where I am sitting today I would not be sitting here… because Jamaat has taught us how to ask questions… how to behave… even how to sit if I was not in the movement, which nurtures so deeply… I don't know where I would have been today." (Kabir).

Even though they stress that the UKIM is an independent movement with no affiliations but despite this when he referred to his movement kept referring to it as Jamaat which means Jamaat Islami.

7.11.3 Religiosity and views about other Muslims

When asked what his views are about other Muslim groups he said:

I think there is not much difference between our movement and other movements we all are trying to cater for our younger generation educational opportunities and their spiritual development but ideologically maybe there was a belief in some other groups that they didn't

believe in integration but now it's changing all groups more or less believe in this fact that we are part of the British society and our group is at the forefront of that, (Kabir)

Kabir is open to the to the fact that the other groups are also doing a decent job in catering for the development of the Muslims youth and now their approach towards the wider society is changing and they are more willing to contemplate the fact that they can integrate but he does stress that his movement is at the forefront of this initiative and others are catching up.

7.11.4 Integration and social cohesion

On being asked about his views about living in the U.K:

"No... I wasn't born here in the U.K but I have made it my home for over ten years and I belong here and I am here to stay I prefer livening in U.K I have all my family and friends here I feel this city of Birmingham is part of me and I have strong attachment to it more than any other place. (Kabir).

Kabir had a strong attachment to Birmingham and felt at home in Birmingham.

The English people are sometimes not very well educated. They assume that because some people migrate here to the uk then, you have to forget about where your heritage, you have to behave like English. I am not going to forget about my heritage and where I come from. It plays a big part in my life. (Kabir.

Kabir is critical of the English people he believes they are not well versed in understanding the fact when people migrate to a new country they can't shun their culture, language or religion its part of their identity, and by having this in their lives it's not going to affect integration.

His response to the question on integration and interaction of the Muslims in the U.K:

In medina when the prophet migrated to Madinah and how he united people of medina and how he build a welfare state, so for the welfare of the people we will be united but individually you can have your own culture or religion so we are living in similar scenario where we are living in a multicultural society it's a global village when it comes to religion people should have the freedom to practice their religion and we have models in later times where khalifas accommodated people of other religions. The media only highlights the negative aspect of Muslims (Kabir).

He cites the example of the prophet that he lived in a mutli-cultral society and contributed immensely in making it a welfare state and the situation is similar in the U.K. Kabir is saying people need total freedom to practices their religion wherever they live.

Kabir feels the media are uninterested in getting to know the Muslims in their midst properly. They feel the media is frequently using stories of extremism or terrorism and are using terminology that links with this behaviour with their faith but when similar patterns were seen in other faith communities their behaviour was not related to the perpetrators faith so they noticed these inconsistencies in the media reporting and this poses a question mark on the integrity of the media.

"interaction is very important but it's not like you lose your religious values as I said it's not about assimilation it's a two-way thing understating each other and highlighting the common grounds between the people" (Kabir).

Kabir believes integrations can only be achieved if all the different communities engage with each other, the Muslims cannot make it happen on their own the indigenous community need to share the responsibility and facilitated integration for the different minorities.

"wider society they have more of a responsibility to create more opportunities for minorities to interacted not that you need to imitate them so we need to mix more with each other if they are socializing with a drink we can join them and instead of drinking alcohol we can drink juice or coffee." (Kabir).

In this statement he is highlighting a similar thing that wider society need to play and active role and make a positive contribution and facilitate integration

Likewise, kabir is also open to such programmes which develop group cohesion and facilitated integration. As he gives examples from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and how he lived in a pluralistic society and that in his life the Muslims have a perfect role model.

"I also feel that I can communicate more effectively with non-Muslims about our religion and have a better understanding than the previous generation we need to give more effort in our dawah and convert the people of other religions that should be our ultimate goal"

Like the other subject from other movements kabir also is interested in converting the non-Muslims and feels that is the ultimate goal of integration. It seemed from kabir's responses that he was very open to social cohesion and integration and he was very active in his daily

life in promoting it but in the end he said that all this needs to be done and it will lead to a more effective Dawah which as he said is our ultimate goal in this country.

7.11.5 Summary

In conclusion, analysis of Kabir 'two data sets gathered through MSII and IFI, demonstrate a devoted attitude towards his faith, but despite this he is characterised by his lack of desire for exploration, thus assessed to be foreclosed as he suggests there is no room or need for him or anyone else to challenge the corpse of the established tradition which has become the orthodoxy or Sunni Islam. He seems to be happy with the way the religion is understood and practiced by his group, but he does believe that his group needs to remodel their preaching methodology in the British context and they cannot use the method which is used in the Muslim countries.

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7.12: Case study The UKIM Shahid

7.12.i Religious subjectivity

Shahid is a 42 years of age, was born in Pakistan and came to the U.K at the age of 23. In the U.K he worked in a school teaching Urdu and he had also done many small courses on teaching and learning. He learned about Islam from his school and college in Pakistan. He became a member of the Jamaat e-Islami in his college years. Currently he is a leader of the UKIM Peterborough. Recently he had done MEd in Islamic Education course from MIHE which was validated by the University of Gloucestershire at the time.

The M.Ed. programme has obviously influenced his thought process to a degree whereby he is ready to explore and question the sacred Islamic traditions and inherent beliefs as contained in the established texts and traditions. Although he does not reject nor dispute the validity of the texts and Islamic knowledge, he is able to conciliate certain beliefs and practices in

accordance to his contexts. Therefore, it is agreed that Shahid demonstrates the achieved mode of religiosity whereby his commitment and attitude towards Islamic practices is complemented by his continuous exploration and research into the faith. He was surprised by the diversity and openness of his M.Ed. programme and course supervisor, the M.Ed. programme, but enhanced through an investigative journey into the sources, history and practice. Thus, he was aware of the role of knowledge in Islamic thought and its relation to the Quran, not only etymologically but also through content and context, became more acute and purposeful.

When he was asked if there was room for new interpretation of Quran and Sunnah despite that fact there is the established tradition he replied:

"Of course, knowledge is the central key to Islam. But I learnt that knowledge could not be confined or defined in accordance to any one perspective. Even including the Muslim perspective because it's only an interpretation and understanding of the din by people in a certain time and certain era. So it's always changing and we need to keep in touch with that change or education itself will become meaningless."

Shahid states that he has really developed his understanding after completing the M.Ed. programme which complimented his previous believe of the traditions and that the unanswered questioned it left in his mind, arrived at this realisation:

"The course and what it entailed really opened my eyes towards investigating the faith... Considering that I had already studied Islam through Jammats educational courses and my personal interest of reading books about Islam from different prospective say like the modernist or the orientalist where the main Islamic sources were already being critically evaluated and I was aware of this and it was a little surprising that our teacher Dr Abdullah himself a Muslim trained in traditional Islamic studies , also employed this and encouraged it in a way whereby we were questioning the truth of the sources this develops mature faithfulness" (Shahid) .

Shahid felt that in order to arrive at a more coherent, authentic personal identity they should be able to understand the role of these cultural practices in their lives. In short, in their interaction with Islam, parental culture and the wider secular culture there appeared to be phenomena of critical engagement, an active process of seeking to achieve a personal understanding and meaning while discerning their core values.

Shahid had an exploratory mode of Islamic subjectivity saw a clear difference between the interpretation of Islam within the traditional narrative and a conception of Islam that was based on the study of its scripture and teachings and he did acknowledge the fact that we need a reinterpretation of the scripture to better understand it and to make it compatible with our context as for many youngsters were losing the relevance of it in the British culture.

7.12.2 Recruitment into the movement

Shahid felt that Islam and its understanding of it which was disseminated by his movement was defiantly the right path for him to follow as he sees it as the best possible option from him compared to the other movements narrower understanding of Islam but he had questions about many aspects in the movements methodology that really needed a careful investigation and exploration.

*I really felt that I grew in my understanding of Islamic education and its importance in forming Islamic thought its significance to Islamic history, this really was the tarbiyah method the Quran wants to deploy to nurture and developed the students so they can think for themselves and relate the Quran or the hadith to their own realities." (*Shahid*)*

"…After joining this movement they encouraged me to get education if it wasn't for the Jamaat I would have been like many of my friends Whatever respect I have in the society is because of the movement," (*Shahid)*

Shahid clearly feels a sense of indebtedness to his revival movement for helping him to achieve his career aims and goals. The movement did not only provide him a platform to preach his religious and political views but also allowed him to gain an education.

It seems that his movement has presented its members with opportunities that allow them to live a higher more fulfilling life that entails not only material benefits but a sense of self-satisfaction due to the political social aims of the UKIM.

7.12.3 Perception of other Muslims

Shahid was approaching his community and the wider society with such a critical attitude he had a clear awareness of the diversity within the Muslim community both in terms of ethnicity and in different interpretations of Islam that exist within the community. He was disturbed by a lack of a meaningful dialogue among members of the different movements

locally and nationally complained that people rarely had contact with each other and hardly even prayed in each other's Masjids. Despite this he was very articulate and seemed to be trying to create a personal sense of being Muslim. He wanted to understand the theological differences that created such a diversity of interpretations among Muslims in his local community.

I think there are various methodologies which can be followed and the Ummah is in need of different approaches we shouldn't limit our thinking. I also believe there are valid differences of opinions in terms of ideology and most of the groups today have an ideology i recognise to be from what stems from a valid difference of opinion. (Shahid).

Shahid acknowledges the fact that the other groups what they follow is ok within the paradigm of Islam as he says its difference of opinion but despite that he does recognise the point that his movement has the soundest most complete methodology.

However, with our movement i find that we aim to focus on the Sunnah as a whole and the essence off it rather than just smaller issues such as beard and clothing etc which some people deem to be Sunnah and fight over (shahid).

the other movements they have very limited objective they have personal spiritual reformation programmes and they don't have no holistic programme to reform the society due to its political dimensions and its personal dimensions that this Jamaat claims to have" (shahid).

Shahid was quite open about the fact that he believed his movements work was holistic and comprehensive compared to other movements which only focused on the one or two aspects of Islam and ignoring the other dimensions within the religion. But despite this he acknowledged that all movements have played a role is educating the masses.

7.12.4 Integration and social cohesion

When asked about integration and social cohesion his response was:

I think we need to intensify our approach we had some baggage that we carried from Pakistan and that understanding of isolation to some extent have and the understanding of us and them and that is a barrier we need to interact in the wider community on all levels. I

think we can intensify our efforts with the intention that we want this society a better society we must see this as opportunity to do something better for society. (Shahid).

Shahid was open to engage with the wider society do enhance integration. He believed that Muslims had certain cultural or religious tradition that were brought over from the countries of origin that were detrimental to cohesion and integration and therefore the Muslims need to look at themselves and bring about a change in their understanding to facilitated integration.

"Scholars and Imams need to reach out to their local community and work with all multi-faith groups through workshops and show that we are peaceful and loving Muslims (Shahid).

Shahid discusses in his response about the activities they do in their masjid classes and he mention that they carried out citizenship initiatives to make the masjid students aware of their role and responsibilities in building and better more tolerant society.

we did something called the citizenship were we kind of give the overview of what it is to be a good citizen and to respect other religious and communities and how we need to be the builder of the society rather than the destroyer of the society how it is important to engage with people from all spheres of life…. (Shahid).

He believes that the Muslims need to engage more and play a more positive role in shaping and building a more tolerant society.

While talking about their projects he states:

we had police coming in giving them lectures and what their role should be and also how they can help overcome the evils that exist in our society and on that level and from a Islamic point of view in how the prophet lived when he was in Makkah and in medinah that was a purely multicultural society with people from different backgrounds (Shahid).

Shahid is highlighting how their masjid engages with different institutions like the police to combat evils in or society ad his is showing that the prophet is a great example for us as in medinah he lived in a multi religious society in peace and harmony.

"….and yes from 9-11 onwards we see a political awareness and religious awareness and there also is the intergenerational kind off increase perception in the Muslim activist they have to integrate within the western context to see we are not all the same and Islam does not instigate what is portrait in the media" (Shahid).

Muslims need to do more and present the real face of Islam to Shahid is stressing that we need to create political and religious awareness and need to do more to integrate into the wider British society. He is also critical of the media and is suggesting the British society needs to understand each other at a personal level rather than rely on the media.

7.12.5 Summary

Overall, the above description shows presence of strong exploratory features in Shahid's overall personality and his religiosity. Despite the fact that he was committed to Islam he appeared to be engaged in interpreting Islam in the reality of growing up in a multicultural and secular society. He was in the process of creating a personally appropriated understanding of Islam, as discussed by Sahin (2014), which would help him grow into his faith but also accommodating cultural diversity within the wider life-world. His exploratory religious subjectivity appeared to be making him adopt a questioning mode while learning about Islam. Issues around gender inequality, segregation, for example, were some of the main themes frequently problematized in his religious discourse. Awareness of being British Muslim, a clear differentiation between the Sub Continent culture of their parents and a study-based understanding of Islam were mostly observable in Shahid.

7.13. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results of Sahin's M. S. I. S which was designed to explore participants' mode of Islamic subjectivity that is observable within their overall religious life-world. The analysis of the cases in the study strongly support the applicability of Sahin's psycho-social research model developed to explore formation of Islamic religiosity among a select group of Muslim faith leaders and activists. Modes of Islamic subjectivity were discerned by investigating the experiences of commitment and exploration in the religious life-world of study participants. The analysis of the data gathered through M. S. I. S revealed two major modes of Islamic subjectivity present in the religious life-world of study participants.

The most commonly observed mode of religiosity within the participants was foreclosed with seven out of eight being foreclosed. There was a common pattern that the participants across the board from all four movements had foreclosed modes of religious subjectivity bar one (Shahid). It was interesting to see why he had an exploratory religiosity it seemed that as he suggested that completing the MEd programme had shaped his exploratory religiosity and he

experienced a clear transition towards constructing an exploratory perspective about his religious and educational self-understanding.

The data gathered through the IFI that a majority of participants make a strong claim to both Islam and being British. Also the data gathered through the IFI revealed different approaches and understanding regarding aspects of integration and social cohesion, which the study uniquely classifies as:

1: *Isolationist approach to integration and social cohesion*: According to this position, the ideas of social cohesion and integration are a threat to Muslims religious beliefs so the best way to safeguard and protect ones Islam, *iman* is to avoid contact with the wider secular society. This was clearly observable among the case belonging to the T.J movement. They believed the superiority of Islam and its purity was not only against other religious traditions but included the secular liberal interpretation of life that developed in the west. They depicted the outside non-Islamic culture to be Jahili society for them secular culture with its liberal attitude to morality, encouragement of premarital sex, drinking culture was the modern Jahiliyya that the Muslims should be keeping away from.

2: *A pragmatic approach to the interaction and engagement:* This position suggests a positive attitude toward social integration with the hope of converting the others to Islam and it shows no interest of intercultural and inter-religious learning process where by people can learn to relate to each other and create a dynamic integrated cohesive society.

3: *A pluralist pro integration approach*: this stance shows a real interest in interaction and engaging for an intercultural and inter-religious learning process which people starting conversations among the cultural multiplicity in the life-world of people can nurture relating to each, how to relate to each other in a dynamic social context.

In the next chapter, the main significant findings revealed by the data analysis will be highlighted and discussed further in order to contextualise the overall findings of the study.

CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS:

8.1 Introductions:

The chapter aims to highlight the most significant findings of the study and contextualise them through a reflective, comparative discussion that includes references to the relevant previous literature. The personal observations and reflections in the fieldwork diary of the researcher collected while visiting and meeting with the selected religious movements in diverse locations such as masjids and Islamic centres where the participants had their study circles.

The study has generated a rich data set providing a first-hand account of diversity present among Sunni Muslim communities in the UK. The procedure and methods for conducting the research were discussed in the chapter six, which stipulated that the participants from the four main revival Sunni movements to be examined in the UK context would be analysed within a case study framework. Thus the data analysis gathered from the participants belonging to one of the following main Sunni religious movements: Salafis, the Barelwi's, the Deobandis/Tabligis (TJs) and the UKIM.

The chapter will first discuss the findings that relate to the formation, nature and implications of the participants' religiosities then move on to the exploring the impact of such religiosities and on their perception, views and attitudes towards Muslim integration within secular and multicultural British society.

8.2 Religiosity of the participants

The Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule (MSIS), developed by Sahin (2014), was utilised to discern modes of religiosity observed among the study participants. The MSIS proved to be an effective tool as it sought to measure subjective attitudes that were either formed as a result of 'self-exploration' (exploratory mode) or inherited as a set of axiomatic truths from cultural, family or educational influences from the revival movements (foreclosed). However, in analysing the data the study found that the mode of subjectivity remains context- dependent: participants may appear to demonstrate a particular mode of subjectivity with regards to religion for example but may display a completely different mode of subjectivity with regards to another topic. For example, participants exhibiting strong signs of foreclosure in their religious belonging when discussing issues around the wider secular

society started to show reflective and questioning attitude that would put them into an exploratory mode of subjectivity. This complexity informing the resolution of the modes of religious subjectivity has already been noted by Sahin (2014) while applying the research model with the participants living within the Muslim majority context of Kuwait.

It appeared that the coercive power of 'traditionalist' Islam disseminated by the movements has shaped the subjectivity of the masjid imams and the masjid committee members in all of the movements. It became quite evident from the data that the foreclosed mode of religious subjectivity was the most commonly observed religiosity pattern among the study participants as the data analysis revealed that seven out of eight had a foreclosed religiosity.

The religiously foreclosed participants were the least likely to differ from the views of their revival movements' leaders and teachers in their interpretations of Islam. However, the most important finding about the participants with the foreclosed mode of Islamic subjectivity was their insistence on not having an "interpretation" of Islam. This significant feature of the foreclosed religiosity has been also identified by Sahin's foundational study where he explored the formation of religious subjectivity among sixth form college Muslim students in the UK. In their religious thinking Islam, with its divine origin, ruled out the possibility of contamination with human ideas and thoughts; in their view what they were implementing in their lives was an unadulterated divine message which was transferred to them by the tradition, Religious texts and teachings, in general, the interaction between the text and the reception of it by the successive generations of Muslims was envisioned to be a passive process in which a fixed religious content was only to be repeated.

Thus religious thinking in those with a foreclosed religious subjectivity had strong literal and ahistorical features. A strong iman (faith) was the seed to be enough for Islamic teachings to be implemented in any socio-historical context. As such, Islam, being the only such "uncontaminated" religious tradition, has superseded all other religious traditions. This belief could be and is a major hindrance in establishing a truly pluralistic society and this has a direct correlation to having a genuinely integrated society. The foreclosed religiosity was also a hindrance in true group cohesion among the Muslims as the foreclosed participants held the belief that theirs was the only true understanding of Islam and all others were unauthentic or deviant.

8.2.i Foreclosed religiosity, integration and social cohesion

Religiosity does shape the way people will integrate into the wider secular British society. As seen from this study and other studies (Sahin 2014, Khan 2015) the *tarbiyya* system and the madrassa's of the revival movements are producing foreclosed mind-sets which is understandable from the movement's point of view that they are producing members of this subjectivity so they can carry on the mission of the movements without any questions or objections. However, this type of subjectivity will produce individuals with not very mature or confident personalities who will always look at the leadership for answers and instruction. The religiously foreclosed participants were the least likely to differ from their movement leadership in their interpretations of Islam and avoided interaction with other cultural representations within the society. Foreclosed members held the view that they had the only truth and all other paths to God or the betterment of the society were wrong. As such, the foreclosed religiosity had direct impact in the way one viewed the issues concerning the Muslim integration and social cohesion within a wider secular society.

The data analysis revealed that the foreclosed members would either avoid mixing with the official systems and wider society which they saw different to theirs and often perceived as a threat to their way of life. As result they would adopt an isolationist approach to the wider society, such as the Deobandis/TJ members or they would try to affect and in some cases covert the wider society into their way of thinking like the Salafis/UKIM. Clearly the foreclosed religiosity posed the most significant challenge to social integration and cohesion as they strongly felt that Muslims should keep themselves apart from the negative influences of the wider society.

8.2.ii Exploratory religiosity integration and social cohesion

Shahid the only participant with features of an exploratory religiosity had the awareness of cultural and religious diversity within the society helped him to go beyond the assimilation/isolation or living in two reified sets of cultures. Shahid was gradually developing what Sahin (2014) referred as 'a multi-layered sense of relatedness and belonging' to the world around him. He was trying to interpret Islam in such a diverse contextual reality through creating a multiple relatedness matrix of belonging. He was aware of the difficulties attached to developing such an accommodating attitude towards cultural diversity.

However, Shahid (exploratory) was critical and open about his perception and advocating a much more reconciliatory view towards Islam and the West. In fact, his awareness of being British Muslim was orienting him towards a much more constructive way of imaging the interaction between Islam and the West, for his life-world now had become a meeting point of the cultural practices of these worlds: *"They do not realise that we are the first real generations of European Islam. Where we live is part of us. yes, we are surrounded by non-Muslim culture, but there is a lot that can be reconciled with Islam such as many democratic values, respect, justice, freedom of expression, human rights etc"(Shahid)*.

8.3 Integration and social cohesion

The concept of integration needs to be understood from a holistic perspective. Segmented views lead to partial analyses and, therefore, to partial solutions. The concept of social cohesion has proved to be a useful instrument in understanding integration. Social cohesion refers to the way in which various parts of society, whether communities, age groups, income groups or regions, relate to one another. The more social cohesion there is, the more likely a society is to be stable and to remain stable. In modern inclusive liberal democracies, where society is made up if diverse cultures, ethnicities and religious traditions, this is a precondition for growth, social order and solidarity. Social cohesion implies that no communities or groups are excluded from participating fully in a society. This makes it understandable why social cohesion has become a key notion in discussions over issues related to immigrant and integration. Immigrants and their descendants sometimes referred to as 'ethnic minorities' appear to have become a barometer for the success or failure of social cohesion.

The Muslim community's increasing feeling of being marginalized by the wider British society and particularly the alienation of many young Muslims from their communities and from the wider society is creating a fertile ground for these extreme movements to recruit them for their own causes. Young Muslims who are in the process of constructing their identities and sense of belonging can easily be attracted to these groups in the hope of finding affirmation of their distinctiveness and channel their frustration.

This can develop a foreclosed Islamic subjectivity. As such the dynamic and emergent nature of their religious subjectivity can be frozen into a stagnant and rigid faith structure blocking

their personal development and hindering them from relating meaningfully to the wider society.

The study also found that particularly member with an exploratory identity as suggested by Sahin (2014) strongly rejected being assimilated into the cultural norms of a wider secular polity and also to be completely absorbed into the culture of their parents or the tradition blindly. The only case with an exploratory religiosity in this study, Shahid, felt that he had to find way of initiating an internal conversation among the different cultural practices that define their life worlds.

"We need to have get together of people of different religious, cultural backgrounds so they get to know each other first-hand" (Shahid)

It appeared neither traditional Islamic Education disseminated by the groups Tarbiyyah or the mainstream education was empowering group members to successfully deal with such difficulties that were produced by this process and in helping them to develop a mature sense of belonging.

8.3. ii Political participation and integration

One factor seen to be a good indicator of integration is suggested to be political participation of the diverse minority communities. The Muslim movements covered in this research have diverse attitudes towards participation in secular democratic political system. Some Muslim groups like the Salafis claim they do not vote on religious grounds. Consequently, this can explain Salafis' weak involvement in political issues (Inges 2016). Moreover, since purist Salafis do not identify with western social customs, and more generally with Western moral codes, they tend to leave west to join Muslim countries where they believe they will be able to practise true Islam and experience real religious freedom (Wiktorowicz 2006). Whereas the country of their residence stops being their country and then get a new identity strictly based on a religious feeling of belongingness to the world-wide Muslim community, the *umma.*

Like the Deobandi movement it is in their interest to develop members with foreclosed Islamic subjectivities so they can follow their methodology and ideology without ever posing any questions or challenges for the leadership. Their avoidance of the western norms is part of their 'tarbiyya', special indoctrinatory type of religious education, and the only allowance

they give their members to interact with the wider secular society is for the purpose of conversion. Many scholars in such movements believe the only Islamically legitimate reason for their residence in the western world is due to the purpose of Dawah, the opportunity of calling others to Islam.

Yet, unlike Deobandis and other Islamic movements in the UK which seek to strengthen the Islamic identity of Western Muslims, the UKIM do not advocate isolation from mainstream society. On the contrary, UKIM urge Muslims to actively participate in politics, but only in so far as such engagement is necessary to change it in an Islamic fashion (Geaves 1982). It must be noted UKIM follows the position of Jamaat Islami and Muslim Brotherhood movements who strongly advocate use of political means in order to change the western secular political order in Muslim majority countries. According to al Qaradawi, who is a well-known religious leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, Muslims in the West should adopt "conservatism without isolation, and openness without melting." (Yusuf al Qaradawi, 2000). Finding the balance between cultural conservatism and active socio-political interaction is not easy, but the Jamaat see themselves as those capable of defining how Muslims can be loyal to their faith and yet active citizens of European secular democracies. Once again they interaction is realistically limited to Dawah activity and conversion as one can interpret from their name UKIM (United Kingdom Islamic Mission).

8.3.iii Media and its effects on integration

The foreclosed religiosities, across the broad form all the revival movements in the study, felt that the media was the biggest protagonist in spreading anti Muslims and anti-Islam lies and it was the single biggest obstacle in blocking true integrations as it gave rise to white flight and Islamophobia with the wider British secular society. It is true the media needs to be more mature in its news broadcasting and it needs to avoid stereotyping Muslims but there are many things the Muslims need to address to achieve true harmony and integration. This negative perception of the West is primarily constructed through the media representations, largely communicated to them in the forms of Islamophobic documentaries and news programs on the media which depict Islam in a negative light.

All the group members except for the member of the Deobandis and in particular the TJ saw it as a challenge that they should rise to and proactively counteract the negative perceptions of themselves and their communities by talking to their non-Muslim peers and allowing them

to get to know their system of belief rather than the media. They felt scared that the media was giving too much air time to the extremists they argued this would undermine social cohesion and integration of Muslims into the wider society.

This increasing anti-Islamic feeling in the West possibly will push many young Muslims to become attracted to growing radical Islamic movements in the hope having their Islamic identity affirmed.

"The media misrepresents and incorrectly quotes Muslims creating a negative image of Muslims and Islam" (Faisal).

The minority of Muslims in Britain who do view Britain with contempt frequently explain their disaffection as a result of being labelled as outsiders and are told they do not belong the British society. Thus, the inability to appreciate British Muslims as typical citizens can actually create the very atypical citizens that are feared in the first place. Muslims want to be part of British society but their marginalisation may lead to some retreating to the margins.

"Muslims are portrait as a threat to the U.K and seen as different from the rest of the communities in the U.K" (Zahid).

In order to improve the image of Islam in the West, Western politicians, scientists, and the media have to acquire more adequate knowledge of Islam in general and on modern developments in the Muslim World in particular. Preserving tense relationships based on assumptions such as the clash of civilisations, the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, and the a priori rejection of Islamic political movements does not bode well for the realisation of good international understanding between both parts of the world and between Muslims and non-Muslims in general.

Despite the plethora of scientific discussions and political debates on Islam in the West, the knowledge of both the religion itself and of Islamic movements in particular may be fairly described as superficial (Ramadan 2012). Nearly every Islamic movement is characterised as fundamentalist, with merely a distinction between militant and non-militant movements at best. The reality is that such movements are much more complex and deserve more scientific and political attention in order to understand their motivations and ideologies. Islamic religious political movements differ, among other points, in their goals, degrees of organisation, militancy, political involvement and the international character of their support.

It was interesting to note that the two participants from the Deobandi movement saw the secular, western society in the negative light as anti-religious or anti Islam. Furthermore, they thought that the secular society a hedonistic driven by desire self-indulgence and a threat to the Muslims in general and the Muslim youth in particular.

"We should never mix ourselves with the others obviously sometimes we don't have a choice say like work but remember we need to protect our deen…. "(*Amjad)*

"At the moment our kids are losing their religion" (Amjad).

This was in line with the fact that the Deobandi movement's inception was based on this premise that the Muslims must keep away from the British established institutions if they want to persevere their religion (Metcalf 1984). The Deobandi movement was built on the premise that they need an alternative system of education therefore they boycotted the British educational institutions and established their own schools with an isolationist approach (Robinson 1981).

As it can be seen from this research and previous studies that the Deobandis system of education or the tarbiyya system overwhelmingly produces' foreclosed religious subjectivities which are understandable that this type of subjectivity will guarantee the preservation of the movement amongst the British Muslim diaspora. The same desire informs the mission of other Islamic movements in this study.

8.3 iv Islam's perceived hindrance of Muslim integration

Some academics such as Phillips (2006) suggest that religion of Islam is the reason for the failure of Muslims to integrate into the British society as it is not compatible with the secular democracy. Such perspectives base their view on the fact that Muslims do less well compared to other migrants such as the Sikh and Hindu communities that come from similar backgrounds. It is suggested that Hindus and Sikhs are doing much better than Muslims in education, economics labour market and housing, ignoring many nuances and realities (2011 consensus). The real reason behind such a stark difference is that Muslims came from regions in Subcontinent that were least developed. For example, most of the Muslims are from the Mirpuri district which was a princely state, the Maharaja, with very limited means of education or any real infrastructure in comparisons to the regions where Sikh and Hindu communities originate (Ballard 1982). As stated above, the issue of the avoidance of Ribba,

usury/interest also plays a big part in terms of the engagement of the community with the wider capitalist economy. This, as a consequence, negatively affects Muslims in use the mortgage system for their housing or setting up their own business. Therefore, the government needs to provide Muslims with sharia based loans to engage them with the economy which is crucial to facilitate social mobility within the community. There is an initiative of Sharia compliance loans but many Muslims avoid this as they believe it's the same thing as riba but with a slight change in terminology.

8.4 Spatial integration

The ghetto like residential settlement is commonly identified as a visible sign of non-integration. A prevailing view is that Muslims tend to cluster and develop very strong 'bonding capital' (with kith and kin) at the expense of 'bridging capital' with other non-Muslim groups and communities. The 2011 census tells us that 4.8 per cent of the population self-defines as Muslim (over 2.7 million of the UK population), and it is true that a considerable percentage of British Muslims are concentrated in certain local authorities in East London, the North West, Birmingham and West Yorkshire. But it does not follow that this clustering is tightly configured and nor does it mean that the pattern is fixed. If we analyse the demographic distribution using the Index of Similarity, which measures ethnic group concentration, the broad tendency is actually for Muslims to be less separate than other religious groups, and indeed to be more likely to display a pattern of dispersal (e.g. settlement away from family of origin).

Muslims and non-Muslim immigrants, however, differ in terms of several demographic and socio-economic characteristics which could in principle be correlated with their different observed attitudes towards religious identity and integration, and hence explain the stronger resistance to integration for Muslim immigrants in the UK. In particular, Muslims are on average less educated than the majority of the society, with a lower household income, and with more than a double probability to be unemployed. Muslims also live in more ethnically-segregated areas, which have higher unemployment rates (consensus 2011).

8.5. The concept of Ribba and its effects on spatial integration

Likewise, as mentioned above, the Ribba (Interest) issue also has a direct effect on housing as the statistics have shown (consensus 2011). It appears that Muslims have a higher percentage in regards to renting houses compared to the national average and also the Muslims who do

take a Ribba- based loans are advised by their scholars they can only take it under strict conditions. They further suggest that even if a loan is taken it should be paid off as soon as possible. The more conservative Ulema/religious scholars are even totally against such interest-based loans and don not allow it under any circumstance. This trend can be explained by the concept of 'spatial integration' that Muslims reside in cheaper areas to avoid taking interest therefore they resort to renting preferable where the extended family resides.

There is an option of Islamic mortgages but that has not been very popular with the Muslims to its higher return then the conventional loans. More research needs to be carried out to see the correlation between spatial integration and Ribba. The economic recession after 2008 and the huge hike in most British in most British university tuition fees in 2012 had a particular effect of Muslim students and stopped many Muslim youths from entering universities due to the fear of Ribba. It made job opportunities more restricted extra qualification can provide a competitive advantage yet after rise in fees in universities made it harder for Muslim students to study for a degree (Inges 2016).

The 2011 Census data shows that many British Muslims tend to live in inner cities formerly rundown areas with high levels of housing deprivation. Among the key issues is overcrowding and poor housing quality. It is clear that there are too few affordable properties that can accommodate Muslim families which are larger than the national average. The Census further showed that, compared to all other faith groups in Britain, Muslims are more likely to be living in social rented accommodation and they are more likely to suffer the effects of living in housing with limited access to a bathroom and lack of central heating. All this is an indicator of low income and the avoidance of taking interest based loans. Overall the census data indicates that many Muslims in Britain suffer from a range of cumulative economic, educational and employment disadvantages. The effects of one kind of deprivation are often compounded by others. In the past decade it has become easy for policy makers, politicians, and the media to inaccurately and unhelpfully associate this poverty and the clustering of Muslims in disadvantaged areas, with deliberate self-segregation.

8.6 Kith, kin Baraderi concept and segregation

The presence of unresolved forms of ethnic and religious discrimination, which appear predominant in culturally diverse and mixed environments, and perhaps more acute towards successful members of the minorities, may actually be the initial locus to look at for the

design of a sensible integration policy. The fact that the Asian communities still have strong family links which means they want to live close to each other. So what researchers tend to overlook when they talk about segregation are the positive sides, the strong bonds and family ties which exist." Muslims tend to live in wards with a high level of relative deprivation and a high minority ethnic concentration (Lewis, 1994, 2007).

Hindus and Sikhs, on the other hand, live in wards with quite high concentration but a low level of deprivation. Among Indians and African-Asians, Sikhs live in wards with a slightly lower level of relative deprivation than do Hindus. For minorities, being educated to A-level standard or higher reduces the level of deprivation. Individuals with higher incomes are less likely to live in deprived wards.

Higher unemployment rates amongst Asian Muslims have thwarted their overall economic progress and holding back their social mobility. Only a small proportion is moving up the ladder to occupy managerial or professional occupations.

There are multiple factors behind this lack of progress vis-a-vis the Muslim community. Some are internal and they need to be seriously addressed by the community itself. Muslims originate from the four corners of the world and have varied socio-economic Muslim students in mainstream British schools perform less well on standardized tests than do white students, the main reason to encourage them to go to higher education is to get a better job. Students whose parents have a qualification of higher education background also have a tendency to go to higher education, combined with a cultural acceptance that leaving the educational system is inappropriate

8.7. i Muslims compared to other religious migrants

When comparing Muslims and other religious immigrants and the level of integration and social cohesion it is important that we have to consider the fact that the proportion of Muslims mainly from the sub-continent with no qualifications still remains high. The younger generation in particular has made significant progress in higher education even though they have the following disadvantages compared with white students. Firstly, the social status of their parents is generally low which might be an obstacle in applying for university entrance, since some universities limit the number of ethnic minority students. Secondly, since their languages and cultures are different from those of Britain, they need to make extra effort to adjust to school, and thirdly, even though there are several acts against

discrimination which provide for equal opportunity, they still have to face discrimination in school.

Evidence from the Commission for Racial Equality Runnymede Trust, Joseph Rowntree Foundation and academia suggest that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffer the most disadvantages in all aspects of life in Britain, including education underachievement.

Those who claim that the migrant Sikhs and Hindus who also come from the Sub-continent, like the majority of Muslims, but their educational achievements are much higher in compression to the Muslims counterparts and also they have had more spatial integration it's not matter of simple comparison between religious affiliation therefore more studies need to be done to determine the real reasons of this apparent difference.

But whilst the Gujaratis (Hindu) and the Doabi Punjabis (Sikhs) have generally been spectacularly successful members of other two major components of the South Asian population namely the Mirpuris and Sylhetis who are overwhelmingly Muslims have lagged some way behind (Ballard 1982).

Hence, as briefly discussed above, migrants drawn from areas with a long-standing history of agricultural prosperity, as in the case of the Jullundur Doab in Punjab, and the Saurastra region of Gujerat also found they had richer resources of social cultural capital particularly in terms of educational experience and technical skills than those who arrived from much less agriculturally prosperous (and so much less economically developed) areas such as Mirpur and Sylhet.

British Mirpuris present a very different picture. they have generally achieved much less in the way of occupational, residential and educational mobility, not least because the niche in the employment market on which They had come to rely collapsed at just the time when they were facing the heavy addition expense of family reunion. Very few have been able to emulate their Sikh counterparts by moving upwards and outwards, with the result that in residential terms they are still overwhelmingly concentrated in under-resourced inner-city areas. In broad terms Mirpuris are very much more 'deprived' than Sikhs.

Mirpur has been much less fortunate too located in an area of low hills just above the plains proper; it enjoys a higher annual rainfall than Jullundur, but is much more densely populated per cultivable acre. In the past its broken terrain provided some shelter from marauding invaders, but today that is only a hindrance. Communications are poor, and although the land

is fertile, irrigation is difficult: Historically the District was severely disadvantaged by its incorporation into the Maharaja of Kashmir's notoriously exploitative kingdom. Not only were his subjects more heavily taxed than their directly ruled neighbours in British India, but infrastructural investment was minimal. Nor has the District fared much better since then. Nationally given these wide ranging differences, it is hardly surprising that Jullunduri settlers should have been more swiftly upwardly mobile than their Mirpuri Muslims counterparts.

Jullunduris were much more likely to possess marketable craft and business skills, and also to be literate at least in Punjabi, and sometimes in English too. Sikh inflows were college graduates their higher levels of skill and education have proved invaluable in the struggle to obtain better jobs.

In the wake of such experiences, and having poor socio-economic backgrounds, it is scarcely surprising that Mirpuris are a great deal more socially disadvantaged than the Sikhs and the Hindus.

The extent to which Muslims are integrated into the economic mainstream in America is in stark contrast to the position of Muslims living in four major Western European nations. Surveys of Muslim populations in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain conducted in 2006 as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project found Muslims to be much less affluent relative to the general populations of those nations. If the religion was the sole reason for the difference between the Sikh and Hindu communities in comparison to the Muslims in regards to integration, then the same pattern would be true for the American Muslims. Yet however useful and necessary it may be to begin with such a perspective, the time has come to insist that it does not provide a sufficient basis for understanding all dimensions of difference. Specifically, such materialist arguments cannot explain therefore further research needs to be done by looking at cultural and socio-economic background before comparing them and making premature suggestions that it is their religious background and Islam in particular that hinder their integration to wider western societies.

8.8 Inter-faith cooperation, dialogue and social cohesion

There have been instances of co-operation between Muslims and other faith communities. However, it must be stressed that rather than dialogue there has been a strategic stepping away from religious differences to enable the greater good of the community. Interfaith

initiative is quite common even some the study participants mentioned that they were very active in the inter faith dialogue *"I am part of the Peterborough inter-faith council" (Zahid)*

It appears that these initiatives are actually conversion tactics as it was suggested by the participants that different groups see encounters with 'others' opportunities introducing them to Islam and convert them to their particular interpretations of Islam.

On the surface of it seems interfaith is contributing to social cohesion and integration but the reality is quite to the contrary; it seems to a convenient tool for conversion. Most of partners in such dialogues actually see members of other groups as misguided and destined to Hell and in need of salvation. Meanwhile, it is important to note that Muslims and specially the revival groups need to be familiar with the concept of salvation beyond Islam. This is a debate which was prevalent among the classical scholars such as Al Ghazali and others. These scholars appeared to be of the view that those who were not Muslims can attain salvation in the next life if they lived and life of a pious person regardless of their religious affiliation. On the other hand, as the reality of Islamophobia within Western society shows, there is a rather similar negative depiction and stereotyping of Islam and Muslims by many Westerners.

What this picture reveals is the fact that neither Muslim communities in West nor Western society have been learning from each other's' culture or appear to have engaged in a genuine dialogue. It seems that the different communities which are part of society that have been leading segregated parallel lives. There is the emergence of a new trend which is the interfaith groups but from the respondents of our participants it seems these groups are more interested in recruiting/converting each other rather than learning from each other. These interfaith are primarily between Muslims and Christian the two main missionary religions. From the data collected there was no indication of Muslims Jewish or Hindu or other religions interfaith groups and also there is a need to have similar groups which engage with atheists or agnostics or any other form of theists.

This obsession with maintaining and propagating a pure understanding of Islam has produced a strong tendency toward isolationism too. Any interaction with nonbelievers is viewed as an opportunity for the nonbelievers to infect Muslims. Although interactions for propagation are permissible, purists see little benefit to dialogue and exchange beyond those needed to spread the faith. After all, if all knowledge and guidance are in the sources of Islam, nonbelievers

offer nothing. To think otherwise is to question the supremacy of Islam, something that signifies disbelief (Wiktorowicz 2006).

As Sahin argues (2016) the dialogic Qur'anic principle of at-taaruf, literally "knowing each other", is the key educational principle advocating mankind to enter into an intercultural and interreligious dialogue. According to this principle the Qur'an explains that humanity is created in different nations and given different languages, not be deliberately misled and left confused, but enter into a process of learning from each other.

"*.. We have created you as males and females and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another. Verily the most honourable among you are those who are God-conscious.... (Quran"49: 13)*

This concept needs to be understood and adopted in as the premise of these interfaith groups. However, despite these wider isolationist policies that both the Muslim community and the wider society have developed towards each other British Muslim are increasingly feeling the need of multicultural polity on their self-understanding.

This concept needs to be introduced into the Tarbiyyah programme of the different revival groups this understating will facilitate true integration and create a pluralistic society. Currently with the Tarbiyyah of the groups which seem to be developing foreclosed subjectivity this type of concept are hard to incorporate into the groups programmes, and hard for the members to accept as it can be seen for the point of view of the acceptance of the Muslims of different movements. So the groups need to redefine their Tarbiyyah programs and produce members with exploratory mind-set so they can accept this concept of salvation beyond Islam.

It is clear that assimilationist approach disguised under insincere calls for integration of Muslim communities and cannot be sustained and it is not in the interest of either the Muslim community or wider society to isolate themselves from each other. What this study has shown is the fact that a majority of revival group members/leaders make a strong claim to both Islam and being British. However the isolationist, often unstated, assumptions behind the multicultural education obviously is not going to bring about a mature multi-layered mode of belonging among the communities that make the totality of society. An intercultural and inter-religious learning process which people starting conversations among the cultural

multiplicity in the life-world of young people can nurture relating to each, how to relate to each other in a dynamic social context.

8.9: Diversity in religious observance and its effects on social cohesion among Muslims

The possibility of intra-faith dialogue in the Muslim diaspora is indeed subject to the necessity of a "culture of dialogue" or an "ethics of how to disagree" (Suleiman, 2009: 42). This is because sustained attempts at interaction across the most significant Muslim religious and ethnic divides in the context of national level representation of Muslim communities have so far failed, as we have witnessed in Chapter 2. However, Islam still becomes the main identity for many Muslims in Britain at times when they have been attacked as such by others, for instance during the Rushdie affair (Ansari, 2004: 4) but also more significantly since '9/11' and '7/7', or to a lesser extent whenever there is a strong need to communicate on an issue of rights or recognition with the wider society.

The place of intra-Muslim interactions in the life of Sunni Muslims in terms of religious beliefs, practices, and the representation of Muslim communities to the wider society. The reality of religion in the british context is where the Muslim society consists of multi-ethnic and diverse religious components. Ethno-cultural differences and different religious orientations prevent Muslims from pursuing any possible intra-faith dialogue at the local level. The need for 'an ethic of how to disagree' is the key element for the Muslim communities to practise intra-faith dialogue. (Geaves, 1996:218) has contributed to this he has warned of "sectarian influences endangering any effort towards creating a truly indigenous Islam" and together with the lack of a single religious authority for all Muslims in Britain this seems to be the biggest obstacle for developing a Muslim Diaspora (Geaves 1986).

Ethnic and religious diversity amongst Muslim communities can lead to 'exclusivism', so that some Muslims may criticise other Muslims from different backgrounds, claiming that they show a type of deviancy from the true path. It is no exaggeration to say that this is the general character of Muslims living in Western countries (Sahin, 2017). In an effort to counter such attitudes, contemporary reformist Tariq Ramadan emphasises that one of the priorities for Muslims living in Europe is 'intra-community dialogue a variety of social, ethnic and religious values and approaches means that Muslims can never be a homogeneous faith community in Britain. Customary and culturally mixed religious practices and beliefs,

the power of ethnicity over religion, misconceptions and prejudices, all play a crucial role in this. Typically, in the early stages of settlement, Muslims of different backgrounds engaged in a temporary fusion of perspectives out of necessity, for example in terms of sharing the same mosque space. However, when communities grow, and material self-interest and competition for scarce resources are at stake, the common bonds of Islam are often trumped by other bonds.

The definitive works of Lewis (1993), Geaves (1996), Birt (2011), and Hamid (2011) about 'sectarian' aspects of South Asian Muslim communities in Britain are primarily helpful in terms of understanding the religious tensions between Muslim communities. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a schism between the reformist Deobandi-Tablighis, Islamist Jama'at-i-Islami, and Sufi-oriented traditionalist Barelwi groups

Based on my personal experience (as insider) and based on fieldwork research carried out from 2012, I have barely come across fellow Muslims who say that "besides us, other Muslims are practicing true Islam." Instead, what they claim is based on simplistic labels such as 'innovators', 'imitators', also in their inner circles.

Muslims are everywhere especially in the diaspora, and can witness diversity in terms of practicing their religion. This is one of the advantages (and disadvantages) of being in the Muslim Diaspora. Thus, the representation of the Muslim community in the UK is in some ways a miniature of the whole Muslim community of the world.

This policy of isolation to avoid corrupting influences is applied to other Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Often the followers are asked to avoid interactions with what perceived to be deviant sects, which are defined as any groups that do not follow the purist interpretation of Islam. There is thus very little intra-faith dialogue as well. The following statement voiced by one of the study participants, Faisal, clearly illustrates this point;

"we need to stay away from deviant sects"(Faisal).

Traditional, spiritually motivated Barelwis and reform-minded Deobandi/Tablighis were unwilling to come together in Mosques, even for prayers, because of this each of these groups started building up their own mosques. Up to now there is the on-going debates between the Barelwis and Deobandis, with the result that each group has its own arguments and justification for its beliefs and practices. The main discussion for the Barelwis revolves around the perception of Prophet Muhammad, in matters such as Milad , or his attributes as

mentioned in the Qur'an (see Metcalf, 1982: 301; Robinson, 1988: 9). The Barelwis identify themselves as true representatives of Sunni Islam in the UK. This allows them to counter the reform groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations and cultural accretions. They also accuse the reform groups of being Wahhabis. The *'ulama'* of Barelwi *dar al'Uloom* in general have issued *fatwas* that declare that Wahhabism is outside the fold of Islam (Geaves, 1996: 103-4).

The Barelwi's are often described as a reaction to other reform movements such as the Deobandis and Ahl-i Hadith (Geaves, 1996: 95).However, Metcalf (1982: 296) argues that "like the other two, they offered religious guidance to their followers." The Barelwi's used their legal scholarship "to justify Islam as it had been handed down- a custom laden Islam which was closely tied to the Sufi world of the shrines where believers sought help from saints to intercede for them with God" (Robinson, 1988:?). One of the study participants, Bilal, suggest that;

Yes, if the other movements are there the Barelwi movement has to exit too" (Bilal).

Clearly this is in line with the argument presented by Metcalf and Geaves that they are a response to the other movements.

In this study look at the four different movements in terms of their ethnic and religious orientation, it can be seen that there is diversity amongst the British Muslim community that exists in terms of belief and practices at a local scale. In fact, having a multi-ethnic Muslim population with different religious orientations in the same locality is an opportunity for Muslims to know each other better and to be aware of other religious beliefs and practices among the whole Muslim community which is in harmony with the Qu'ranic concept of *Taaruf*. This is one of the major advantages of residing as Muslims in a non-Muslim country, and it teaches Muslims to learn about the flexibility of Islam and also its universality. Also the absence of religious authority has had a crucial role and importance in bringing about the further disintegration of the Muslim communities in small localities, whether in religious practices or in the representation of Islam in a non-Muslim environment.

Salafi teachings actually encourage followers to understand their journey into Salafism as a radical identity renegotiation. They specify such strict conditions for a person to be considered a truly Muslim that even someone brought up as a Muslim no longer believe that

they deserve to be identified as such (Inge: 2017:62) this goes in line with what Faisal mentioned that

"*I was a born again Muslim"* (Faisal)

After joining the Salafi group and his previous self was not a true Muslim. Referring to 'becoming Muslim' or 'reverting' striking an interesting similarity with 'born again' Christian-narrative.(Inges:2017:62).

They come to the *dawah* Salafiyya (Salafi mission) through their disappointment with these forms of Islam which they later see as "false." Salafis justify their negative view of the Muslim "other" by referring to the magical elements they find in Tablighi Islam or the Muslim Brotherhood's taste for accommodation and politics. For example, they call the Islam of Muslim Brotherhood "Islam light" and claim that the *Ikhwan muslimoon* (Muslim Brothers) are, in fact, *ikhwan muflissin* (Corrupt Brothers) who have given too much value to politics (Inges 2016). Purists level similar criticism at Jihadis, adding political violence to the list. Purist Salafi groups consider themselves the cream of Islam. The failure of political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood to claim political power and the repression of Islamist parties serve as evidence that this is a deviant method because God provides success to those who strictly follow His path. Salafis who form political organizations are frequently label Ikhwanis (Muslim Brothers) or Bannawites (followers of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood). Citing the use of non-Islamic methods to promote the creed, purists level two significant charges against the politicos and jihadis.

"true understanding of Islam which is to stick to the Quran and Sunnah not to follow other things like the Ikhwan who follow the people like they do with democracy music and they think they will change after they have power it's like deceiving people we don't believe in that" (Taha).

They feel they do not belong to oppressed social classes because they have joined a kind of sacred caste that is the elite of society in reference to the famous and much debated hadith (prophetic report) that Muslims will divide into seventy-three factions all of which will end in hell except for the one Allah saves because it had stayed faithful in the face of temptations. Many Salafis like other groups think they form that only group destined for eternal salvation, because they have resisted the allure of "new" gods such as money, democracy, or

secularism. Having been saved, they have to be grateful toward Allah and obey His Laws. This exclusive feeling is very different from a more reconciliatory view suggest by the Muslim Brotherhood which insists on the need to unify Muslims and to come to an agreement with all of them so that Islam and Muslims restore their glory.

The system illustrates an approach to religious learning that Salafis and many other Muslim groups share with other religious fundamentalists of other faiths. They regard the correct religious teachings as a technical transmission of authentic information directly or indirectly via trustworthy mediators from the original sources to students. Therefore, the material cannot be questioned it can only be retrieved road out explained memorised and applied. "In effect teachers and scholars see themselves as archaeologists, retrieving information that they convey" (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

The framing process for the movements which was achieved by constantly creating a somewhat boundary between us and them expressed mostly by indirect undertones, cynical remarks in a mocking way (Inges 2016). This was mostly done in open large conferences but sometimes in highly explicit way that descended into derogatory remarks about other groups. In their private sessions or inner religious circles, the perception of the other can become more negative indeed.

"Likewise, being members of a universal Muslim community (*ummah*) also exhibits important aspects of self-awareness and understanding" (Geaves, 1996: 54) in religious identity. Therefore, the representation of Islam in the U.K at the local and national level is, in reality, which is far from the universal norms of the "ideal *ummah*" The name of the Islam as a symbol being shared, but the values attributed are diverse.

8.10: Conclusion

One of the main findings of the study indicates that the modes of Islamic subjectivity among the study participants was foreclosed but as seen from the exploratory participants that the foreclosed religiosity can be changed to exploratory with the aid of open systematic 'tarbiyya', educational programmes like the one Shahid had experienced while doing his MEd programme.

The data analysis also revealed that the participants with an exploratory mode of Islamic subjectivity felt that their understanding of Islam differed significantly from that of their

revival movement. The participant in the exploratory mode of religious subjectivity was in the process of moving away from experiencing Islam as an extension of their parental culture towards moving to become self-consciously Muslim.

Education provisions as organised in revival movement's mosque supplementary schools or full time madarasahs appeared to be where the foreclosed subjectivities were reproduced. Moreover, even the higher Islamic education such as seminary training does not appear to have contributed to the development of a mature Islamic subjectivity among the graduates of these institutions (Khan, 2015). On the contrary, the religious education provision appeared to have failed to enable members to have an adequate knowledge and understanding of Islam. In the light of these findings it is absolutely imperative to re-examine the organisation of Islamic Education in terms of curriculum design and teaching methods. Most importantly its conception of educational /pedagogic process must be scrutinised. The findings concerning the religious life-world of participants confirms the view suggest by Sahin (2014) make it necessary to re-think the traditional Islamic Education provisions and its teacher/text centred discourse.

Government and media must in concert with the revival movements support the development of exploratory minds who can and are willing to seriously critique Islamic doctrines and history which is the interpretation of the traditional Islamic education and the educational system, and reinterpret Islamic sources in a way that legitimates human rights, individual's freedoms, tolerance peace and. The government must recognise that they have a choice whether to help the Muslims develop individuals with exploratory religiosity or back traditional conservative foreclosed Muslims in achieving their goal of communalism in achieving their goal of integration. They should also consider the possible responses of majority society and encourage them to learn the culture, religion and the mind-set of the minorities.

The danger of the fragmentation of British society is growing. There is a need to facilitate the multicultural mosaic with a broader vision of integration that enhances social cohesion and ensures that all members of British society accept the basic principles on which this society has been built, it has to be realised that equality of individuals before the law, individuals freedoms, human rights and religious liberty, democracy and tolerance are fragile qualities and could easily be damaged by totalitarian tendencies of any kind including Islamic totalitarianism. In order to improve the image of Islam in the West, Western politicians,

scientists, and the media have to acquire more adequate knowledge of Islam in general and on modern developments in the majority Muslim World in particular. Preserving tense relationships based on assumptions such as the clash of civilisations, the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, and the a priori rejection of Islamic political movements does not bode well for the realisation of good international understanding between both parts of the world and between Muslims and non-Muslims in general.

It was argued that the Qur'an encourages critical appropriation of faith and being critically faithful is at the centre of its educational philosophy. What is needed is to re-familiarise the Muslim groups educators with the Qur'anic approach to Education by the effectiveness of traditional Islamic revival movements in communicating Islamic values to movement members should be investigated and `learner-centred' teaching methods not just the text centre or the teacher centred methods should be introduced in order to enable members to develop a more adequate personal understanding of Islam. To develop the ability to relate their faith to the wider British society rather than to replicate the literal version of Islam from their countries of origin or even the historical Islam they inherited from they elders.

The increasing cultural and religious plurality within the contemporary globalised world makes it necessary that an awareness of critical education should be present in religious nurture and religious education that takes place within faith communities that make up the totality of society. Critical education is the key to remind us that we have to find ways of relating to each other and through being critically open to learn from each other.

It should be emphasised that criticality and dialogue in the contemporary multicultural world that we live in should be part of religious education in its different forms. These qualities are not exclusive to multi-faith RE or secular education but necessary conditions for teaching any form of value system in multicultural society. The educational principle of *ar-taaruf*, getting to know each other, in Islam already encourages Muslim Educators to nurture an inter-cultural, inter-religious openness in the life-world of Muslim children and youth (Sahin, 2014). The Qur'an encourages critical appropriation of faith and being critically faithful is at the centre of its educational philosophy. What is needed is to re-familiarise the Muslim educator with the Qur'anic approach to Education.

The main overall finding of the study suggests presence of strong link between participants' modes of religiosity and their attitude towards living and integrating within contemporary secular and culturally diverse British society. As such it is crucial to look at the dynamics

shaping religious subjectivities within the translational Islamic groups operating within the context of Britain and wider Europe. Formal and informal Islamic education provision and together with the experience of wider social factors such as Islamophobia, socioeconomic deportation have all gain importance to address as they have direct bearings upon Muslim's integration or isolation from the wider society.

As such the present study suggest that the Islamic movements must rethink the Islamic Education provisions, ways in which they try to communicate Islamic values to their members. Above all, the religious question within the Muslim community, i. e. the perception of Islam in the life-world of its young generations, must be faced. Without facing these important issues, under increasing economic deprivation, alienation from their faith and from the value of wider society will push them away from developing a mature personality, self-esteem and self-confidence. Without a constructive educational intervention programme it is highly likely that the exploratory process could result in a foreclosed mode of religious subjectivity. This mode is characterised by a rigid faith structure which can great a barriers in the establishment of a truly integrated cohesive society. From an Islamic Education perspective the real task is to help move beyond this foreclosed mode and facilitate emergence of a mature sense of Islamic understanding. A critical/dialogic Islamic Education that takes the lived-out reality of British Muslim faith leaders seriously can help them both grow into their faith and relate to the wider society meaningfully (Sahin 2002).

The next chapter presents the overall conclusions, implications and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Study

9.1 Conclusions

This thesis aimed to explore the relationship between religiosity and views and perceptions towards integration of the Muslim communities into the wider secular and multicultural British society. The study sample consisted of a selected number of activists, mangers and faith leaders who were part of the existing transnational Islamic reform movements in the UK. As such the study examined the impact of transnational Islamic movements in the UK in the formation the religiosities of its members and their views concerning the Muslim integration in the UK.

The study adopted an 'empirical qualitative case study' methodology that utilised a review of the literature and conducted semi-structured interviews via the religiosity-focused Sahin's Muslim Subjectivity Interview Schedule (MSIS) and integration-focused interview (IFI) protocols. The study demonstrated the applicability of the MSIS as an empirical research design method to explore Muslim religiosities with the study participants. Furthermore there was also support for Sahin's suggestion (2014) that the model may produce different shades of the religiosities and often presence of more than one type of religiosity among certain group of samples.

The review of literature revealed that there existed a minimal amount of research into the formation of religiosity, identity and contemporary Muslim thought on the issue of social cohesion and the role of the Islamic movements in integration. There exists however, a rich body of literature on Islamic revival movements on their historical background and ideological development.

An in-depth investigation of the movements revealed that they were propagating a refined version or interpretation of Islam which had been formed as a response to the Western colonisation of India and other majority Muslim states in the 18th and 19th centuries. Data gathered from the empirical field study in chapter eight and the discussion upon the findings in background chapters shows that majority bar one of the participants from these movements demonstrated 'foreclosed modes of religious subjectivity. The participants with a foreclosed religious subjectivity all had a literal and ahistorical conception of Islam and were found to

be less likely to identify them with the wider society even when they showed signs of interactions it was based on intra faith which was more or less trying to convert people. The main implication of the present study is that Muslim group leaders must rethink the Islamic Education provisions, ways in which they try to communicate Islamic values to their members and British Muslims in general whose life-world is informed by a strong cultural and religious multiplicity.

This study utilized an empirical case study design to explore its key questions including several qualitative data collection instruments and analysis procedures. The study sample included participants selected from major transnational movements based in two cities in the UK Peterborough and Birmingham. Participants' religiosity has been explored through adopting the semi-structured 'Muslim Subjectivity Research Model' suggested by Sahin (2014). The impact of religiosities on the formation of perception and attitudes towards community cohesion and social integration among the study participants were explored through a semi structure 'Integration' focused interviews (IFI) designed by the researcher.

The data analysis revealed the overwhelming presence of 'foreclosed modes of religious subjectivity' among study participants. The participants with a foreclosed religious subjectivity were found to be less likely to identify them with the wider society and engage with social and community integration and cohesion. There was only one participant whose religiosity showed clear exploratory features that emerged as a result of his attendance to a critical postgraduate programme in Islamic Education designed to enable Muslim faith leaders to become reflective practitioner.

The evidence garnered from the research showed that foreclosed religiosity was over whelming the type of mind set developing in the members this can be a cause for concern as it doesn't develop confident mature individual that can face the challenges of modernity and they fail to contextualise the understanding of the religion of Islam which is very much compatible with the western democracies. The one exception Shahid who was of an exploratory religiosity in his case it can be determined that he had gone through university and done the MED in which they critically engaged with the Islamic tradition that can be deemed the reason for his exploratory mind-set as he highlighted himself.

The only participant with features of an exploratory religiosity had the awareness of cultural and religious diversity within the society helped him to go beyond the assimilation/isolation or living in two reified sets of cultures. Shahid was gradually developing what Sahin (2014)

referred as ‘a multi-layered sense of relatedness and belonging’ to the world around him. He was trying to interpret Islam in such a diverse contextual reality through creating a multiple relatedness matrix of belonging. He was aware of the difficulties attached to developing such an accommodating attitude towards cultural diversity. However, Shahid (exploratory) was critical and open about his perception and advocating a much more reconciliatory view towards Islam and the West. In fact, his awareness of being British Muslim was orienting him towards a much more constructive way of imaging the interaction between Islam and the West, for his life-world now had become a meeting point of the cultural practices of these worlds.

Despite the plethora of scientific discussions and political debates on Islam in the West, the knowledge of both the religion itself and of Islamic movements in particular may be fairly described as superficial. Nearly every Islamic movement is characterised as fundamentalist, with merely a distinction between militant and non-militant movements at best. The reality is that such movements are much more complex and deserve more scientific and political attention in order to understand their motivations and ideologies. Islamic religious political movements differ, among other points, in their goals, degrees of organisation, militancy, political involvement and the international character of their support.

Review of the literature on the movements revealed that Islamic Revival Movements have many layers and dimensions in their origins, for formation and further development into different phases. They rarely emerge and create short term policies but invariably formulate long term objectives which evolve and are adapted to changing circumstances and needs. Identity of these movements is marked by different actors both internal and external, such as what movements’ actors believe about themselves, how other rival movements perceive them, how they are viewed by the general public and how they are understood in the global context. All these factors put effects on the movements and on their activities, because movements do consider all these factors as being self-conscious.

The review of literature alongside the empirical study uncovered issues that, although beyond the remit of this exploration, yet it provides a fantastic insight into the Muslim community in the UK. Most of the interviewees in the research relayed great reservations of British and secular society. The main fears they shared were centred upon the issues of immorality, godlessness and political conflicts in Muslim-majority nations. They also cited the increased cases of Islamophobia, anti-Islamic/Muslim tirades in the mass media and the projection of

hostile comments by governmental figures as clear evidence for an anti- Islamic/Muslim conspiracy.

9.2 Recommendations

As this is an exploratory study, it was indeed limited in terms of its empirical reach. The main purpose of this study was to investigate new body of research into this very relevant field of study. Therefore, in the light of the above findings the study concludes by offering a number of recommendations to do further research:

1. There is a critical need for a greater number of empirical studies that focus upon understanding the formation of Muslim religiosities in the UK by including larger samples from Sunni Muslim groups as well as the minority Shia communities. The '*tarbiyya',* Islamic Education, strategies used in these transnational networks over a longer period of time and scope would be a central focus on these empirical researches.

2: The current study included only male participants. Future studies need to explore the experiences of the female participants looking at what type of religiosity is developed among them and its effects on integrations and social cohesion.

3: The study recommends that future research that examines Muslims who have no group affiliation with any religious movements to see what type of religiosity is developed among them and their views on integration and social cohesion in the wider British society.

The study also makes the following social policy recommendations:

1. Muslim communities cannot be addressed purely by ethnicity cultural categories. The official government policy toward social and cultural integration in the UK should take into account the significance of faith (Islam) in the formation of social and cultural attitudes of young Muslims living in the secular and multicultural British society.

2. The policy makers need to seriously consider the negative impact of growing Islamophobia and other structural inequalities such as poor housing, unemployment and educational underachievement in becoming major hindrances preventing integration of young Muslims in the UK.

3. Faith leadership plays a significant role in the formation of religiosities among Muslim youth in the UK. Therefore, the training of Muslim faith leaders in the UK context presents crucial educational challenges that require a close cooperation between Muslim communities and the related educational policy makers.

9.3: Limitations of the Study

Despite the interesting findings of this study of the complexity of the nature of data gathering and analysis in relation in the UK, this study has encountered a number of constraints which are necessary to acknowledge.

Access: attaining access to the faith leaders (imams) was a serious issue due to their busy schedule it was very hard to meet them. Also finding suitable and willing participants was very difficult it was even more difficult to find imams who had proficiency in English.

Another limitation of the current study can be seen in the size of the sample due to the scope and time of the study. However, a much larger sample would be likely to provide more generalized results. Moreover, in seeking to conduct the empirical research the study was

thwarted by several factors that encompassed: Due to socio-political climate there is a sense of mistrust: The popularisation and intense scrutiny of Muslims and Islam in the UK by the media ('war on terror', rise of Islamophobia, 'Trojan- school scandal', etc has created a blanket of fear and suspicion of 'outsiders' to the educational institutes (even though researcher is an inside researcher). Due to cultural and religious sensitivities it was not possible to interview females and due to the same reasons even observation of female gatherings was not possible**.**

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APPENDIX I:

Glossary

'alim----------scholar

'ulama----------plural form of scholar

'isha----------the last prayer of the day after about 2 hours sunset

'urf----------custom

'amal----------deed

'adala----------justice

Adha----------Sacrifice

Adhan----------call for prayer

Ahadith----------the plural form of *hadith*

Ahl-e-sunnat wa al Jamaat'----------*at* people and community of the prophetic path

Ahl-e_Hadith----------the people who follow the sayings of the Prophet/salafi group
from the sub-continent

al-ahkam----------legal verdicts

akhlaq----------moral

al-Muhajirun----------the immigrants

awliya----------the Sufi saints or friends (of Allah)

ayat/ayah----------A Qur'anic verse

bid'ah----------innovation

Dawah----------mission

Daiyah----------preacher

dar al-ulum----------religious seminar/school

dars-i nizami----------the syllabus of Farangi Mahall in the 18th century India

dhikr----------remembrance of Allah

dua----------pray

durud sharif----------an invocation which Muslims make by saying specific phrases to tribute Prophet Muhammad

'eid al-adha----------Sacrifice feast

'eid al-fitr----------Ramadan feast

'eid----------feast

Fard----------compulsory

Fatawa----------legal rulings, plural form of *fatwa*

Fatwa----------legal opinion

Fiqh----------jurisprudence

Fiqhi----------jurisprudential

Hadith----------the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad

Hafiz----------someone who has memorised the entire Qur'an by heart

Hajj----------pilgrimage

Halal----------allowed

Haram----------forbidden

Hazir u nazir----------present and observant

Hifz----------to memorise

Ibadat----------religious practices

Ijazah ----------a graduation certificate given to the student in traditional religious education

Ijma----------consensus

Ijtihad----------Individual 'effort' in deriving interpretations in Islamic law

Ikhlas----------sincerity

Ikhwan ul Muslimin----------The Muslim Brothers

'Ilm----------knowledge

'Ilmu'l-ghayb----------The knowledge of unseen

Imam----------religious leader or someone leading to prayer in a mosque

Isnad----------the chain of transmitters of a hadith

Jahiliyyah----------ignorance

Janaza----------funeral

Jumah khutbah----------Friday sermon

Jumah----------Friday

Kalam----------word or theology

Khalifa----------vice-regent

Khutbah----------sermon

Kufr----------disbelief

Kafir----------disbeliever

Madhab ----------the path/method

Madhahib----------the plural form of *madhab*

Madrasah----------school

Maqasid al-Shari'a--------the aims of Islamic law

Masjid ----------mosque

Maslak ----------theological position

Mawlana----------a religious leader or mosque imam

Mawlid/milad----------birthday

Mian sahib----------sufi poet from Mirpur

Milad un-Nabi----------the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad

Mufti----------a qualified scholar who issues legal opinions

Mujaddid----------reviver

Mujtahid----------a qualified scholar who exercises *ijtihad*

Muqallid----------follower of a particular school of law

Mushrik----------someone who attributes a partner to Allah

Nafil----------not compulsory

Namaz----------prayer

Nikah----------marriage

Pirs----------Sufi masters

Qari----------*S*omeone recites Qu'ranic verses or poems

Subbah----------association

Sadaqa----------charity

shoba-e-tableegh-o-hifazat-i-Islam---Safeguarding and Proselytizing Islam

sahabah----------the friends/companions of the Prophet Muhammad

salaf----------the predecessor

salaf u salihin----------the rightly predecessors

salat o salam----------greetings and prayers

sanad----------chain of transmission

Sharia----------Islamic Law

Sheikh al-Islam--------the grand religious leader

Sheikh----------mosque imam or sufi leader/ Scholar

Shirk----------associating Allah with someone or something

Shura----------consultation

Sirah----------the biography of the Prophet Muhammad

Sunnah----------the acts, sayings, and approvals of the Prophet Muhammad

Sunni----------the main branch of Islam

Tafseer----------Qur'anic exegesis

Tajweed----------to pronounce and read Qur'an properly

Takfir----------to blame someone for being infidel

Taqlid----------to follow/imitate a path or someone

Tarbiyah----------educational training

Tariqat----------Sufi Orders

Tasawwuf ----------Sufi way of life

Tawassul----------supplicating Allah through an intermediary

'Ulama----------scholars

Ummah----------universal Muslim community

Urs----------death anniversary

Usul al-fiqh----------methodology of Islamic jurisprudence

waqf ----------religious endowment

Appendix 2

Example of Interview Process for Data Gathering,

Included in this Appendix are the following:

1. Completed Self Characterisation Sketch by "Shahid"

2. MSIS Completed Questionnaire for "Shahid"

3. Transcript of IFI with "Shahid"

Interview Tools

MSIS: Sahin-Francis attitude towards Islam questionnaire

Please complete part one by placing a tick in the box which is true for you. When you come to part two, please remember there is no right or wrong answer, we just want to know your honest opinion. Your answers will be confidential.

PART ONE

1. **What is your sex? Male** ☐ **Female** ☐

2. **How old are you? 16** ☐ **17** ☐ **18** ☐ **19** ☐ **19+** ☐

3. **How often do you perform salat?**

Five times everyday ☐

Several times a week ☐

Every Friday ☐

Sometimes ☐

Never ☐

PART TWO

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the sentence carefully and think, "Do I agree with it?"

If you **AGREE STRONGLY**, put a ring around.....AS

If you **AGREE**, put a ring around.....A

If you are **NOT CERTAIN**, put a ring around.....NC

If you **DISAGREE**, put a ring around.....D

If you **STRONGLY DISAGREE,** put a ring around.....DC

1. **I find it inspiring to listen to the Quran** **AS A NC D DC**
2. **I know that Allah/ God helps me** **AS A NC D DC**
3. **Saying my prayer/duas helps me a lot** **AS A NC D DC**
4. **Attending mosque is very important for me** **AS A NC D DC**

5. **I think going to the mosque is a waste of my time** **AS A NC D DC**

6. **I want to obey Allah/God's Law/Shari'ah in my life** **AS A NC D DC**

7. **I think mosque sermons/Kutbah are boring** **AS A NC D DC**

8. **Allah/God helps me lead a better life** **AS A NC D DC**

9. **I like to learn about Allah/God very much** **AS A NC D DC**

10. **Allah/God means a lot to me** **AS A NC D DC**

11. **My understanding of Islam is the same as that of my parents** **AS A NC D DC**

12. **I believe that Allah/God helps people** **AS A NC D DC**

13. **Prayer/Salah helps me a lot** **AS A NC D DC**

14. **I feel that I am very close to Allah/God** **AS A NC D DC**

15. **I think prayer/ Salah is a good thing** **AS A NC D DC**

16. **I think the Quran is out of date** **AS A NC D DC**

17. **I believe that Allah/God listens to prayers/duas** **AS A NC D DC**

18. Allah / God doesn't mean anything to me **AS A NC D DC**

19. Allah / God is very real with me **AS A NC D DC**

20. I think praying/duas does no good **AS A NC D DC**

21. Belief in Allah/ God means much to me **AS A NC D DC**

22. I find it hard to believe in Allah/God **AS A NC D DC**

23. I am happy to be a Muslim **AS A NC D DC**

24. I love to follow the life/Sunnah of the Prophet **AS A NC D DC**

PART THREE:

Semi-structured interview to explore modes of Religiosity among study participants.

(Self-characterisation sketch)

Dear participants

I want you to write a sketch of yourself in third person as it you were the principle character in a play. Write about yourself from the point of view of your close friend who knows you intimately and sympathetically. In your character sketch include an amount of the development of your personal faith throughout your life.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP

APPENDIX 3

Case Study 1 – Zahoor:

Self-Characterisation Sketch

Zahoor is 53 years old. He was born and raised in the UK and is the eldest son of Muslim migrants from Kashmir (Pakistan. He received his formal schooling up to the age of 16 at local state school in Peterborough and then spent three years in university in Birmingham. Then went Egypt to learn Arabic before returning to the UK to enrol on a seven year ‘alim programme at a Dar al Ulum in England. Zahoor has recently graduated [2012] and is a part time teacher at a masjid in Peterborough.

zahoor would describe his time at the Madrasa as a blessing you know as he very much enjoyed his time there. He was Alhamdulillah blessed to be with a Ustad who was a great Sheikh and he spent much of his time with him teaching him not just the basics of the Din but also what it meant. So once zahoor had come back from university he knew that he wanted to be an ‘alim and so he went to Egypt and once he came back in the UK he went on the ‘alim

course. He was, firstly, introduced to the proper study of the Quran through study of tasfir and the hadith, fiqh and the key aspects of the four Madhabs and the great Imams and how their interpretation was better than ours because they were the earlier scholars and obviously closer and more in touch with the truth then we are now.

So this education was not really like the secular school or university education because zahoor also attended regular school and that was just dunya related and today it's basically a form of Kufr were they preach there is no God. So the education he got from the Dar al-'ulum was really the information about what to do for the akhira, which is what counts at the end of the day. This is the true ilm of the din. So Islamic education really changed him. His Sheikh had always said that if you stick to the Quran and Sunnah you would always be on the right path. So he believes that we should always find someone who has the ilm on the din to teach us and really be with those who are following the din otherwise we may be led astray. He realised this once on the 'alim course and began to really understand and see the Akhram and the Usul behind the practices of Islam. He realised the role of the Prophet (s) and how everything can be understood by following his Sunnah. So Zahoor changed and went from someone with an interest in Islam to someone who began to love his din and realised how much he still had to learn.

APPENDIX 4:

Criteria for Evaluating Subjectivity Criteria/guiding principles for scoring the psycho-social process of exploration and commitment (Sahin, 2013, p 90-91). Criteria/guiding principle for understanding the process of exploration include:

1. Active interest in seeking to increase ones knowledge and understanding of Islam

2. Activity directed towards information-gathering about various alternative choices to becoming a Muslim, including the possibility of becoming non-religious ad openness to the ambiguities associated with being a young Muslim in a multicultural context.

3. The weighing of advantages and disadvantages in appropriating a certain interpretation of Islam in one's life.

4. The emotional tone with which one expresses attachment to Islam and how one articulates the ambiguity in one's religious life.

5. Whether or not the participant wishes to make an early decision about commitment to or engagement in religious practices

6. Willingness to reflect and reconsider an early commitment emerged under the influences of parents, Peer group or significant others (Teachers, group leaders).

7. Attitudes towards different historical and contemporary interpretations of Islam and degree of awareness and acknowledgment towards the religious, cultural and ideological-political diversity within the wider society. Guiding Principle/ criteria to determine the character of a participants' commitment:

1. Personally appropriated relevant information concerning aspects of Islamic religiosity

2. Activity directed towards implementing the chosen elements of Islamic religiosity in one's life; the actual effort of practising the teaching of Islam

3. The emotional tone of Islamic Self-Expression and the desire to reach a resolution of ambiguities in one's religious life

4. Identification with core values of Islam and being able to project these values into one's personal future.

5. Resistance to being easily swayed from being Muslim; bringing to a closure the process of weighing alternative lifestyles and coming to a decision about one's position towards Islam.

It is interesting to consider that Sahin's MSIS model constitutes a nominal-typology accepting the combination of placement on the dimensions of exploration and of commitment. Although each mode processes a relative independence but they do not fall into a simple developmental sequence. A mode is defined within a flexible framework which does not possesses strictly defined qualities associated with the idea of structure; invariable, fixed hierarchal regularities. Thus it is possible, as stated earlier, that some features of the four models can be observed with varying degrees of significance in one's overall religious life-world. Nevertheless, the fourfold model acknowledges the flexible aspect of religious subjectivity, but it asserts, at the time, that each of the modes can help define overall character and features of being religious in relation to a specific person. (Sahin, 2013, p224)

END NOTES

[1] the study distinguishes between religion and religiosity: the former refers to the a body inherited secret texts, teachings and the latter refers to how these religious beliefs and teachings have been explored by the members of these religious traditions.
Text teachings and the later refers to how these teachings have been explored by the members of these religious traditions.

[2] Islamic revivalist movement generally characterized by moral conservatism and they attempt to implement Islamic values in all aspects of life and these movements intended to bring about religious reform in Muslims societies**.**

[3] For information please refer to chapter 6

[4] The Sunnis are the largest branch of the Muslim community, at least 85 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. Sunni life is guided by four schools of legal thought Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali each of which strives to develop practical applications of revelation and the Prophet's example.

[5] the Muslims of the branch of Islam comprising sects believing in Ali and the Imams as the only rightful successors of Muhammad and in the concealment and messianic return of the last recognized Imam

[6] Sunni life is guided by four schools of legal thought Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali each of which strives to develop practical applications of revelation and the Prophet's example named after its founders.

[7] Biradari defined as “brotherhood” originated by the Persian word Baradar meaning “brother”. Among South Asian Muslims especially in Pakistan and India. in Pakistani society biradari plays the role of most important force, stronger and significant than religion, ethnic or any ideological causes. Political alliances and parties in Pakistan are normally based on biradari system not ideologies

[8]

Islamic puritanism movements are the movements compelling to return to the teachings of Quran and Sunnah, as the pure teachings of Islam and abandon even abolish other teachings outside the teachings of Quran and Sunnah.

[9] Contemporary Muslim reformist thought is a complex and diverse phenomenon consisting of a number of discourses and actors with different reform agendas and priorities. Perhaps its lowest common denominator is the idea that various aspects of the inherited premodern Islamic tradition, especially aspects of Islamic law, with respect to its underlying worldview assumptions, episteme, and various methodologies underpinning this body of knowledge, are not adequately equipped or need serious reform/rethinking in meeting the many challenges Muslims are facing today,

[10] The most distinctive characteristics of the Naqshbandi order are the tracing of the *silsila,* or initiatic chain, from the Prophet Muhammad to abu bakr al-Siddiq, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad; use of the silent invocation of Allah (*dhikr*); and a strong adherence to the *shariʿa* . The first figure of importance in the history of the Naqshbandiya is Yusuf Hamadani (born 1048).

[11] is a sufi (order, path) within Sunni sm, originating in North Africa but now more widespread in West Africa Its adherents are called **Tijānī** Tijānī place great importance on culture and education, and emphasize the individual adhesion of the murid.

[12] For further details on this concept are provided in the 6th chapter.

[13] Details and definition of this are provided in the 6th chapter.

[14] This notion is further discussed in the 6th chapter.

[15] The classic definitions of diaspora relate it to a group's consciousness of, and connection to, places and people elsewhere, whether in terms of a homeland or other historic centres of dispersal

[16] A person who lives and works in a foreign country for a limited period of time doing low-paid jobs**.**

[17] The scientist that deals with the origins, physical and cultural development, biological characteristics, and social customs and beliefs of humankind.

[18] There are many economic, social and physical reasons why people emigrate and they can usually be classified into push and pull factors. More jobs Better jobs, Higher wages the promise of a "better life all these are pull factors.

[19] Push factors are those associated with the area of origin, pull factors are those that are associated with the area of destination Economic push factors tend to be the exact reversal of the pull factors: Overpopulation, Few jobs, Low wages

[20] Mangla dam is located on the Jhelum River in the Mirpur District of Azad Kashmir in Pakistan.

[21] Twice migrants' is a term that is used for people of South Asian origin who have migrated to the UK from countries other than those in South Asia. Typically, these migrants are descendants of people of Indian origin who were settled in British colonies.

[22] Azad Jammu and Kashmir translation: Free Jammu and Kashmir abbreviated as AJK and commonly known as Azad Kashmir, is a nominally self-governing polity administered by Pakistan. The territory lies west of the Indian-administered state of Jammu& Kashmir.

[23] It was a believe especially among Pakistani first generation that one day they will return permanently to their homeland of Pakistan once they have saved enough money or established for themselves and regular income in their homeland.

[24] The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 was an Act of the uk parliament before the Act was passed, citizens of commonwealth nations had extensive rights to migrate to the uk. In response to a perceived heavy influx of immigrants, the government tightened the regulations, permitting only those with government-issued employment vouchers, limited in number, to settle.

[25] These movements felt that the religion of Islam practiced by the people had been contaminated by other custom which were not part of Islam therefore they wanted to cleanse the rituals and practises from the foreign elements. In this context the Deobandi, the Ahl-e hadith are considered as puritanical movements.

[26] Islamic revival (*ihya*') refers to the support for an increased influence of Islamic values on the modern world as a response to secular trends they aimed to reassert 'original' Islamic values. Accordingly, a return to Islam in its purest form is seen as the solution for the ills of Islamic societies and modern society as a whole.

[27] Or the war of independence as the people of British India called it.

[28] A collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet Muhammad which, with accounts of his daily practice. Hadith is the second major source of guidance in Islam after the Quran.

[29] The Aligarh Movement was the push to establish a modern system of education for the Muslim population of British India during the later decades of the 19th century

[30] The Khilafat movement was an agitation by Indian Muslims, allied with Indian nationalists, to pressure the British government to preserve the authority of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of Islam after World War I.

[31] It's a form of seclusion in a majisd or an Islamic centre where the TJ members stay over the weekend or forty days or four to six months.

[32] 1. **Emaan** : Our belief should be firm that " There is no other to be praised except Allah, and Mohammed (s.a.s) is His rasool "Its means that we should not do shirk (associating anyone else with Allah) and follow Islam according to sunnah of Rasulullah (s.a.s)

2. **Namaz** : We should establish salah which is a real one as Rasulullah (s.a.s) and sahaba had established.

3.**Ilm and Dhikr** : We should gain knowledge. We should know Faza'il (virtues) of good deeds and also Masa'il (how to do deed). We should remember that just gaining knowledge is not enough.
Therefore we should do Dhikr (remembrance) of Allah. So that Allah comes to our mind before every act. And we can judge what is halaal and what is haram.

4. **Ekraam al-muslim** : honouring our Muslim brothers and sisters. one should benefit others by sacrificing oneself. Never think bad about them nor should keep jealousy about our ummah.

5. **Ekhlas** : It is our Sincerity towards Allah. Whatever we do we should do only for the cause of Allah. So, whatever deed we do we should remember that Allah (swt) is watching us and we are doing the deed for Allah(swt).

6. **Dawah & Tabligh** : Its ones duty to invite and convey Islam to people of this world as the prophet Mohammed (s.a.s) is the last prophet, and no other prophet is going to come now. Then every Muslim should think then who is going to call people towards Islam. We should spend all our wealth and health to spread Islam.

[33] Someone who doesn't follow any of the four established sunni school of law is called a ghair-muqallid.

[34] Al-wala' wa-l-ba) is a concept in Islam, literally "loyalty and disavowal", which signifies loving and hating for the sake of Allah. Al-wala' wa-l-bara' is referred to as holding fast to all that is pleasing to God, and withdrawing from and opposing all that is displeasing to Allah, for the sake of Allah. Therefore not having any intimate friendship with non-Muslims.

[35] The Deobandis and Barelwis will be put into this category. Traditional Islam holds the view that one needs to hold on to one of the four school of Sunni Islamic law and not to cut off from the tradition that was developed over time.

[36] Pan-Islamism is a political ideology advocating the unity of Muslims under one Islamic country or state often a Caliphate or an international organization of all or most Islamic nations with Islamic principles.

[37] Ahl ar-ra'y or *aṣḥāb al-raʾy*, advocates of *ra'y*, 'common sense' or 'rational discretion') were an early Islamic movement advocating the use of reasoning to arrive at legal decisions. They were one of three main groups debating sources of Islamic law in the second century of Islam, the other two being *ahl al-kalam* (speculative theologians) and ashab al-hadith.

[38] Islamic legal term meaning "independent reasoning," as opposed to taqlid (imitation). One of four sources of Sunni law. Utilized where the first two sources the Quran and Sunnah are silent.

[39] Imitation conformity to legal precedent, traditional behaviour, and doctrines.

[40] *Empire Windrush* is best remembered today for bringing one of the first large groups of post-war West Indian immigrants to the United Kingdom, carrying 1027 passengers and two stowaways on a voyage from Jamaica to London in 1948

[41] The British Nationality Act 1948 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that created the status of "Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies" (CUKC) as the national citizenship of the United Kingdom and

its colonies. The Act, which came into effect on 1 January 1949, was passed in consequence of the 1947 Commonwealth conference on nationality and citizenship, which had agreed that each of the Commonwealth member states would legislate for its own citizenship, distinct from the shared status of "Commonwealth citizen" (formerly known as "British subject"). Similar legislation was also passed in most of the other Commonwealth countries.

[42] For more info check legisislation.gov.uk

[43] The Immigration Act 1971 is an Act of the parliament of UK concerning immigration. The Act, as with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and that of 1968 restricts immigration, especially primary immigration into the UK. It introduced the concept of *partiality or right of abode*. It was also partly passed to legally clarify the rights of Commonwealth citizens within the United Kingdom in preparation for future membership of the European Communities which the UK became a member state on 1 January 1973 which gave new automatic rights to EC member state citizens.

[44] a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.

[45]Constructivism as a paradigm or worldview posits that learning is an active, constructive process. The learner is an information constructor. People actively construct or create their own subjective representations of objective reality.