The Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes Requirements for Peacekeepers: A Case Study of the UN Observer Group Lebanon

Marc Philipp Wettstein

A thesis submitted to the University of Gloucestershire in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor in Business Administration in the School of Business and Technology

November 2020

Word Count: 75,237

Abstract

WETTSTEIN Marc Philipp. The knowledge, skills, and attitudes requirements for Peacekeepers: A case study of the UN Observer Group Lebanon. Under the direction of Dr. CARTER Adele and Dr. BRADLEY Andrew.

Research in the UN peacekeeping context highlights the challenges of peacekeeping missions and indicates that participants need specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) to be effective. The extant research covers aspects of the interoperability between the actors in the field, as well as diversity among peacekeepers and how it affects the performance of daily activities by contingents from different countries. Furthermore, the importance of having military personnel capable of performing efficiently in a complex, diverse and cross-cultural working environment is apparent from studies conducted by armed forces on specific cross-cultural KSAs. Yet, no KSA-specific research has been conducted in the context of UN Military Observers (UNMOs). Thus, it is of great importance to develop a UNMO-specific KSA model to close this gap. In May 2017, over 95,000 uniformed peacekeepers from 128 countries were deployed across 16 missions; 1,569 of these individuals were UNMOs (UN, 2019a). UN Military Observers usually operate unarmed in remote areas with fragile security conditions (UN, 2019b); the difficulty of accessing this specific environment could be a reason for the lack of research. This thesis presents a case study performed in the context of the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) while I was deployed as a UNMO. The data collection is based on 30 semi-structured interviews. A focus group with subject-matter experts is used to review the preliminary findings. The objective of this research is to develop a KSA model for UNMOs in the context of the OGL. The KSAs in the UNMO context can be defined as ‘knowledge, skills and attitudes that officers need to enable them to operate in partnership with all the actors in the mission and to contribute to the success of the mission’. The thesis presents a conceptual competency model for UNMOs with clear description of the model’s components, practical recommendations for UN pre-deployment training centres (TCs) and UNMOs, and with that contribute to the overall knowledge in the peace and security studies.

Acknowledgement

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other education institution in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University.

Signed:  … Date: November 2020

DOI: 10.46289/9SE5B7NE

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

1.1 Background 1

1.2 Research Context 4

1.3 Research Purpose 5

1.4 Research Significance 6

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 7

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Initial Conceptual Model 8

2.1 Culture and Models 9

2.2 Cross-Cultural Competence and Associated KSAs 15

2.3 Diversity and Inclusion, Teamwork, and Associated KSAs 42

2.4 Conclusion to Chapter 2 49

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 56

3.1 Researcher's Positionality 56

3.2 Research Approach 63

3.3 Ethical Considerations 80

3.4 Conclusion to Chapter 3 82

Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Discussion 84

4.1 Learning and Experience 86

4.2 Behaviours, Attitudes, and Personality Traits 97

4.3 Military Skills and Knowledge 108

4.4 Professionalism 114

4.5 Communication 124

4.6 Teamwork 143

4.7 Diversity and Cultural Awareness 160

4.8 Cultural Specific Knowledge 172

4.9 Cultural and Situational Variables 177

4.10 Conclusion to Chapter 4 183

Chapter 5: Research Conclusion 188

5.1 Responding to the Research Questions 190

5.2 Contributions 194

5.3 Research Limitations 197

5.4 Researcher Bias 198

5.5 Potential Areas for Future Research 199

5.6 Conclusion to Chapter 5 199

Appendix

Appendix A.	UN pre-deployment training	212
Appendix B.	Specialised training materials for UN Military Observers	213
Appendix C.	UNTSO performance evaluation form (Structure)	214
Appendix D.	Intellectual stream in CCC, IQ and GM	215
Appendix E.	List of cross-cultural competence instruments	216
Appendix F.	KSA of inclusion (ISM)	219
Appendix G.	Teamwork relevant maladaptive personality traits	221
Appendix H.	Favourable personality traits for UNMOs	222
Appendix I.	Research sampling details	223
Appendix J.	Research interview guide	225
Appendix K.	File naming convention for data collection	226
Appendix L.	Interview Log	227
Appendix M.	Research consent form of chief OGL	228
Appendix N.	Research consent form for interviews	229
Appendix O.	KSA Model for UNMOs: Relationships	230
Appendix P.	UNMOs KSA with short description	233

List of Acronyms

AO	Area of Operation
APC	Armoured Personnel Carriers
B5M	Big-Five Model of Personality Traits
BL	Blue Line
CCA	Cross-Cultural Adjustment
CCC	Cross-Cultural Competence
CCK	Cross-Cultural Knowledge
COGL	Chief Observer Group Lebanon
CQ	Cultural Intelligence
CQS	Cultural Intelligence Scale
DBA	Doctor of Business Administration
D&I	Diversity and Inclusion
DSR	Daily Situational Report
EQ	Emotional Intelligence
ELF	English as a Lingua Franca
FFM	Five Factor Model of Personality Traits
FREP	Faculty Research Ethics Panel
GLOBE	Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness
GM	Global Mindset
GT	Grounded Theory
HE	Higher Education
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IB	International Business
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IDV	Individualism vs. Collectivism
IES	Intercultural Effectiveness Scale
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
IS	Information Systems
ISM	Inclusion Skills Measurement Profile
IVR	Indulgence vs. Restraint

KSAs	Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes
KSAO	Knowledge, Skills, Abilities and Other traits or factors; Knowledge, Skills, Abilities and Other personality characteristics
LA	Language Assistant; Liaison Assistant
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LP	Language Proficiency
LTO	Long Term Orientation
MAS	Masculinity vs. Femininity
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OCEAN	Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (Personality Traits)
OGL	Observer Group Lebanon
OP	Observation Post
PB	Patrol Base
PDI	Power Distance Index
SA	Situation awareness
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SQ	Social Intelligence
TC	Training Centre
UAI	Uncertainty Avoidance Index
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNTSO	United Nations Truced Supervisory Organisation
US	United States of America
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

List of Figures

Figure 1: UN spectrum of peace and security 1

Figure 2: UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) deployment map 4

Figure 3: Cross-cultural competence in IB 18

Figure 4: Adapted cross-cultural competence model for army leaders 32

Figure 5: Cross-cultural competence military conceptual model 33

Figure 6: Four-layer model of diversity 44

Figure 7: Initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs 55

Figure 8: Research approach 65

Figure 9: Coding 77

Figure 10: Preliminary conceptual competency model for UNMOs 78

Figure 11: Focus group product 79

Figure 12: Core category relationships 80

Figure 13: Knowledge, skills, and attitudes model for UNMOs 185

Figure 14: Interview guide (Appendix) 225

Figure 15: Interview log screenshot (Appendix) 227

Figure 16: Research consent form of chief OGL (Appendix) 228

Figure 17: Research consent form for interviews (Appendix) 229

List of Tables

Table 1: Civilian versus military context 16

Table 2: Categorised cross-cultural competence 21

Table 3: Military contingent versus military observers 34

Table 4: Additional KSAs based on CCC models for military 36

Table 5: Cross-cultural competence primary assessments 39

Table 6: Categorised diversity & inclusion competence 45

Table 7: Categorised teamwork competence 47

Table 8: Preliminary knowledge, skills, and attitudes' inventory for UNMOs 51

Table 9: Philosophical approach 61

Table 10: Five qualitative studies 64

Table 11*:* Data generation plan 67

Table 12: Data generation - interview participant overview 70

Table 13: Participants 71

Table 14: Question Matrix 72

Table 15: Low-level concept 76

Table 16: Category overview 86

Table 17: Categories link to FFM 108

Table 18: Category relationship 185

Table 19: UN pre-deployment training (Appendix) 212

Table 20: UNMO specialist training materials (Appendix) 213

Table 21: UNMO Performance Evaluation Form (Appendix) 214

Table 22: Intellectual stream in CQ, CCC, and GM (Appendix) 215

Table 23: Assessment of cross-cultural competence (Appendix) 216

Table 24: KSA of inclusion (Appendix) 219

Table 25: Teamwork personality traits scale (Appendix) 221

Table 26: Potential impact of personality traits (Appendix) 222

Table 27: Focus group participants list (Appendix) 223

Table 28: Data generation – participant country of origin (Appendix) 223

Table 29: Data generation – participant rank (Appendix) 224

Table 30: Data generation – participant function (Appendix) 224

Table 31: Data generation – participant team (Appendix) 224

Table 32: Data generation – participant age (Appendix) 224

Table 33: Category relationship (Appendix) 230

Table 34: Learning and experience (Appendix) 233

Table 35: Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits (Appendix) 233

Table 36: Military skills and knowledge (Appendix) 234

Table 37: Professionalism (Appendix) 234

Table 38: Diversity and Cultural Awareness (Appendix) 235

Table 39: Communication skills (Appendix) 236

Table 40: Teamwork (Appendix) 237

Table 41: Cultural specific knowledge (Appendix) 238

Table 42: Cultural and situational variables (Appendix) 238

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

In recent decades, multinational forces have developed at an unprecedented rate (Orna-Montesinos, 2013). These forces have supported international interventions including those of the Gulf Wars, Afghanistan, and the coalition against the Islamic State. During the same period, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have increased drastically becoming large and diverse. The UN spectrum of peace and security is defined by specific activities at different phases. Figure 1 highlights these phases (UN, 2017-L1.2).



Figure 1: UN spectrum of peace and security

In this model conflict prevention encompasses mainly diplomatic measures. Peacemaking activities typically apply diplomatic means with the objective to bring the conflicting parties to an agreement. Peace enforcement is when the UN Security Council, using Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorise force to enforce resolutions. This may be applied in a context where a state is unable to maintain security and public order or to enforce an existing resolution and ceasefire. Peacekeeping aims to preserve peace when the conflict ends; it pertains to the implementation of a peace agreement. In the case of peacekeeping, the UN Security Council apply Chapter VI of the UN Charter (UN, 2008). In this case, the authorisation to engage armed forces is with the consent of the conflicting parties. However, force may be applied on the tactical level to impose the mandate; in UN jargon, this is called a robust mission. This case study

is in a peacekeeping context. Peacebuilding is the long-term process to create and eventually ensure a lasting peace by addressing the root causes of the conflict.

The peacekeepers are civilian, police, and military personnel. As of 31 May 2017, more than 95,000 uniformed peacekeeper personnel from 128 countries were deployed across 16 missions, compared to 12,000 in 1996 and 20,000 in 2000. This group consisted of 79,471 troops; 12,254 police officers; 1,569 military observers; and 1,987 staff officers (UN, 2019a). The UN military personnel are composed of formed units or contingents, staff officers, and UN Military Observers (UNMOs). Formed units may be infantry, aviation, engineering, and various support or hospital units (UN, 2017-L1.7). Staff officers are individual military officers mainly serving within the force headquarters. UNMOs are officers who normally operate in small teams. The teams are composed of personnel from various countries, and to ensure diverse perspectives and impartiality, officers from the same nation do not operate together. Moreover, all military branches (i.e., army, navy, and air force) are force providers for UNMOs. They are generally unarmed and operate in isolated areas with fragile security conditions. Core duties of UNMOs are to observe, monitor, and report on cease-fire agreements; to assess and verify specific cases; to negotiate and mediate between parties; and to liaise and coordinate with actors in the field. Where possible, UNMOs are incorporated into the force command structure (UN, 2019b-L1.1).

To ensure that a mission is effective it is essential that peacekeepers are able to work with all actors involved in the mission as well as with the local population. Rubinstein, Keller, and Scherger (2008) referred to these different interactions as horizontal interoperability (i.e., within the mission as described above, as well as with other partners in the field, including local institutions, governments, and non-governmental organisations [NGOs]) and vertical interoperability (i.e., interaction with the local population).

The actors participating in peacekeeping (i.e., horizontal interoperability) of an integrated mission are highly diverse. This diversity can for example be in conjunction to the mission components (i.e., civilian, military and police), nationality, age, gender, and religion. These differences present many challenges which may result in success, frustration, or mission failure (Bove, Ruffa, & Ruggeri, 2020). Accordingly, research within the peacekeeping context has been conducted, for example, on horizontal interoperability to understand the challenges in coordinating civilian and military

components of missions (Rubinstein et al., 2008); on diversity among the peacekeepers and its effect on operations (Alzaben, 2014; Bove et al., 2020; Nzitunga & Nyanway-Gimeh, 2016; Odoi, 2005); and on the variances of performing daily activities by contingents from different countries (Ruffa, 2014). None of the research has focused on UNMOs.

However, the armed forces have mainly focused their research on vertical interoperability (Gallus et al., 2014), specifically on cross-cultural knowledge (CCK), skills, and attitudes (KSAs) to develop adequate training for future deployed armed forces personnel (Caligiuri, Noe, Nolan, Ryan, & Drasgow, 2011; Hardison, Sims, Ali, Villamizar, & Mundell, 2009; O'Conor, Roan, Cushner, & Metcalf, 2010). Additionally, since English is typically the *lingua franca* (ELF) of peacekeeping missions and international coalitions, research on the linguistic impact on operations has been conducted by both non-native and native English-speaking armed forces (Andreeva & Andreev, 2013; Gratton, 2009; Orna-Montesinos, 2013; Poteet et al., 2008; Sintler, 2011).

Other industries such as nursing, hospitality management (Grobelna, 2015), education, and international business (IB) have performed research on cross-cultural or intercultural KSAs, diversity and inclusion (D&I) KSAs, and teamwork KSAs. However, the outcome of a conflict situation may differ depending on whether it occurred in a military or civilian context. For example, the outcome of a situation in hospitality management may be a dissatisfied client, whereas in a UN mission, a conflict situation could result in death. Despite the different potential outcomes, the KSAs needed in highly diverse environments may have similarities independent of the specific context. Research performed in other industries is thus of interest for this study.

Specific research on KSAs for UNMOs has not yet been conducted, possibly due to the challenge of accessing this environment. Also, the UNMOs context differs to previous research in the sense that it is a military context, but the unit is highly diverse (e.g., cultural background, military components, age, gender), furthermore this research focuses on KSAs that cover the full spectrum of interoperability (i.e., vertical and horizontal).

Therefore, it is important to address the UNMO context, to develop or adapt a KSA model for this specific context, and to close this knowledge gap.

1.2 Research Context

This case study is based on the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). The OGL are administrated by the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was the first UN military mission and is the military observer organisation across Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. The UNTSO with headquarters (HQ) in Jerusalem was organised with two outposts (OGL and the Observer Group Golan), as well as four liaison offices in Damascus, Beirut, Ismailia, and Jerusalem (UN, 2020b). Figure 2 depicts an adapted UNTSO deployment map (UN, 2020a).



Figure 2: UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) deployment map

During the research data generation (2014-2015), the UNTSO force were 382 in total, composed of 146 uniformed personnel, of which the majority were UNMOs from 33 contributing countries, 88 international civilians, and 148 local civilians. The UNMOs' rank in mission was either captain or major. The OGL were composed of 55 UNMOs from 25 contributing countries, five international civilian staff from five different countries, nine local civilian staff, and another 13 local civilian staff acting as language assistants (LAs). The OGL are an unarmed and low-profile organisation which were well-embedded in the local population. Its key tasks are to conduct patrols of the Blue Line (BL) and villages; investigate violations; liaise on the ground with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and appropriate civilian authorities; and, if requested, support activities of UN special envoys or special representatives.

The OGL are under operational command of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL). Both organisations' HQs are in Naqoura. The OGL operate in the area of operation (AO) of UNIFIL in south Lebanon. The AO is bordered to the north by the Litany River, to the south by the BL, to the east by Syria, and to the west by the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 2). The AO is approximately 1,060 square kilometres. During the research, UNIFIL were organised into two sectors (i.e., brigades) with a strength of more than 11,000 peacekeepers in total (i.e., 10,490 uniformed personnel from 36 contributing countries, 257 international civilians, and 591 local civilians). Additionally, several other UN agencies, including the United Nations Mine Action Service, the World Health Organization, United Nations Children's Fund, and various NGOs operated in the same AO (UN, 2016a, 2016b; UNDP, 2004).

Due to this diversity of actors, the potential for conflict in such a mission is high. The military observers must be able to cooperate with many actors in the field. Their interaction starts within the team itself, where UNMOs from different nations lead patrols. Furthermore, the officers interact with other UN troops and the local armed forces daily and have extensive contact with international and local civilian employees, UN agencies, local authorities, and NGOs.

1.3 Research Purpose

As an attempt to contribute to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping mission, the research objective is to revise and adapt cross-cultural competence (CCC),

communication, D&I, and teamwork models to generate a framework which is appropriate for UNMOs in Lebanon. Therefore, this case study has been designed to answer following three research questions:

1) What knowledge, skills, and attitude requirements are important and effective for UN Military Observers?
2) What behaviours would likely enable or prevent the effectiveness of UN Military Observers?
3) How can training centres improve the selection of UN Military Observers?

1.4 Research Significance

This study identifies the competency necessary for UNMOs to more effectively pursue a UN endeavour to improve the peacekeeping operations (Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017). Accordingly, this study contributes to the overall knowledge in the area of peace and security studies.

The UN has established a set of core values and competencies to establish common expectations and define how their personnel can contribute to a high-quality job performance. The core values are ‘integrity, professionalism, and respect for diversity’. A competency is a set of skills, attributes, and behaviours; the UN defines both core and managerial competencies. The core competencies for all UN staff include ‘communication, teamwork, planning and organisation, accountability, client orientation, creativity, commitment to continuous learning, and technological awareness’. The managerial competencies are ‘leadership, vision, empowering others, building trust, managing performance, and judgment and decision making’ (UN, 2017-L3.1). In addition, specific UNMO training is available which is limited to the UN conceptual and legal frameworks and specific operational skills, thus do not cover the full scope of the needed KSAs (see Appendices A and B). The UNTSO performance evaluation form aligns the UN-defined categories (e.g., core values, core competencies, and managerial competencies) with job-related competencies including military bearing, professional military skills and knowledge, and reliability (see Appendix C). The UN definitions and training material provide a helpful overview of what may be required by UNMOs, yet there is no specific KSA model for UNMOs defined and therefore it is important to close this knowledge gap.

The study aims to help UN peacekeeping effectiveness by providing a better understand of the competence needed by UNMOs in the context of the OGL. In addition to the improved effectiveness of UNMOs in operations, a deeper understanding of the KSAs could lead to an improved selection and evaluation of candidates, as well as to better training which allows a more tailored financial and time investment in future UNMOs.

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis

To respond to the research questions, the thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic and context, background, and purpose. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature, key models, and relevant theoretical frameworks exploring theories of culture, CCC, cross-cultural communication, D&I, and teamwork. The findings of the literature review are integrated into an initial conceptual competency model for UNMO with an associated preliminary KSA inventory. Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology and establishes ontological and epistemological perspectives for the study. This case study relies on qualitative methods and provides the rationale for selecting specific research techniques. Chapter 3 also outlines the data collection, processing, and analysis methods. Chapter 4 provides the results of the data analysis and discusses the findings, which includes data from interviews, personal notes, document review, and a focus group. Emerging from the discussion and analysis of the study's findings, this chapter concludes with a revised conceptual competency model for the UNMOs in the context of OGL. Chapter 5 reviews whether the study answers the research questions, reviews the contributions, and the limitations of the study, and identifies areas for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Initial Conceptual Model

The aim of this chapter is to develop a conceptual competency model for UNMOs which integrates key theories and models critical to this case study. Theories and models typically focus on a specific topic and are not sufficient to understand the full scope of this case study. In consequence, several areas were critically reviewed to be able to build on current knowledge and to create a framework for the particular and specific context of this study. Due to the international working environment of a UN mission, cultural difference and cross-cultural competence (CCC) models, including cross-cultural communication, were reviewed. In addition, D&I models were examined due to the high degree of diversity in age, gender, military branch, and background of an observer group. Finally, teamwork models were reviewed due to the organisational setup of an observer group.

This research is focused on a military context; nevertheless, the literature review included industries such as international business (IB), higher education (HE), healthcare and hospitality management, as these contexts with their diverse teams also face cross-cultural challenges. Aspects of psychology were reviewed to understand the potential behaviours and personality traits which may be beneficial or detrimental in the context of this case study.

In the literature, the definition of KSA is not unanimous. The term is often defined as either knowledge, skills, and abilities (O'Neill, Goffin, & Gellatly, 2012) or knowledge, skills, and attitude (Turnbull, Greenwood, Tworoger, & Golden, 2010). Additionally, KSAO is another common acronym which refers to knowledge, skills, abilities, and 'other' traits, factors, and personality characteristics (Gallus et al., 2014). In this research, KSA is defined as knowledge (know), skills (do), and attitudes (be) to address the behavioural aspects needed in a cross-cultural environment (e.g., a UN mission). To be able to understand the KSAs needed in a diverse cross-cultural environment, a review of the definition of culture and associated models is appropriate.

2.1 Culture and Models

The objective of this section is to understand the broader concept of culture prior to reviewing the specific KSAs needed to operate successfully in a cross-cultural environment. In business research, the models of culture primarily refer to Hofstede's model of culture, the Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, Fons Trompenaars' 7-D model, and Schwartz's universal values model (French, 2012). These classical models identified cultural value dimensions and assessed and compared countries on those dimensions. They are based on a quantitative approach, typically applying large-scale questionnaires and statistical analyses. Hofstede's model was developed with four dimensions and then expanded to six (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010):

- Power distance (PDI): the degree of inequality in a society.
- Individualism versus collectivism (IDV): the degree to which the interest of the individual versus the group prevails in a society.
- Masculinity versus femininity (MAS): the degree to which gender roles are defined or overlap in a society.
- Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): the degree of anxiety in case of ambiguity.
- Long- versus short-term orientation (LTO): the degree to which perseverance and sustained effort are valued over short-term gains.
- Indulgence versus restraint (IVR): the degree to which the perception is that one can act as one pleases versus that one's actions are restrained by social norms.

Hofstede et al. (2010, pp.103, 286) argued that there is a negative correlation between power distance and individualism, as well as indulgence and long-term orientation. This suggests that the understanding of the hierarchy may depend on the officers' IDV and that officers from a collectivist country may be less participative in the decision-making process if not in charge. This could also suggest that officers with high IVR (i.e., indulgence) would be more focused on achieving short-term improvements or goals.

The initial four dimensions (i.e., PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI) were developed using the data of a large-scale survey (i.e., 100,000+ participants from 66 countries) conducted at IBM in the early seventies and was enhanced later with the LTO and IVR dimensions. Hofstede's model recognises both collective and individual patterns and

concludes that culture is an important individual differentiator. In addition, Hofstede presented a model of culture at different levels of depth; this multi-layered onion concept included values, rituals, heroes, and symbols. Nevertheless, these types of models must be used with caution to avoid stereotyping. For example, in a collectivist culture (e.g., Japanese), individuals act similarly to those in an individualistic culture (e.g., the US). Triandis (2001, p.39) referred to such individuals as idiocentric (i.e., individualists who are principally concerned with internal rather than external attributes). Conversely, allocentric people in individualistic cultures think, feel, and behave like those in a collectivist culture.

Furthermore, Hofstede et al. (2010) argued that the individual scoring of the dimensions varies depending on social class, education level, and occupation and thus could change alongside the socioeconomic factors of a developing country. This is currently happening in many countries worldwide (e.g., China, India, and Eastern European countries) and thus suggests that some of the scores may no longer be representative. Additionally, if the scoring variation depends on factors other than culture, this could also imply that occupational groups (e.g., military) may have job-related norms, values, and patterns which distinguish them from other groups.

Additionally, Hofstede et al. (2010) identified three levels of uniqueness in mental programming: a universal and inherited level, a cultural level specific to a group, and a specific individual personality which is inherited and learned. By learning, an individual changes over time, and an evolving society would likewise score differently over time. This supports the constructivist idea that culture is a dynamic product of society, as opposed to the essentialist view that culture is static (Blanchet Garneau & Pepin, 2015). The assumption for this research is that culture is dynamic; thus, the competence to operate in a cross-cultural context such as a UN mission extends beyond specific cultural aspects.

McSweeney (2002) and others critiqued Hofstede's model for its assumption that individuals have a common national culture and for its sampling methodology. However, French (2012) argued that Hofstede's model and wealth of data is the most prominent research with the greatest impact on the field of study, despite the criticism. Other researchers developed models based on Hofstede's work, including Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE), a large-scale, 11-year research programme involving 170 researchers in 62 nations. The cultural

dimensions developed by GLOBE include 18 units of measurement, nine "as is" and nine "should be" values (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004):

- Performance orientation: the degree to which performance is encouraged and rewarded.
- Institutional collectivism: the degree to which organisational and societal institutions encourage individuals to integrate into groups and organisations.
- Gender egalitarianism: the degree to which gender roles are defined or are overlapping in a society.
- Uncertainty avoidance: the degree of anxiety in case of ambiguity.
- In-group collectivism: the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organisations or families.
- Future orientation: the degree to which perseverance and planning for the future is valued over short-term gains.
- Human orientation: the degree to which of being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others is encouraged and rewarded.
- Assertiveness: the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.
- Power distance: the degree of inequality in a society.

French (2012, p.51) identified several dimensions of GLOBE which originate from Hofstede's work (e.g., power distance and uncertainty avoidance) and noted that gender egalitarianism and assertiveness are adaptions of the masculinity-versus-femininity dimension. Institutional and in-group collectivism are adapted from the individualism-versus-collectivism dimension. The GLOBE research program compares societal clusters; for example, 'Switzerland (German)' refers to the Germanic European cluster and 'Switzerland (French/Italian)' to the Latin European cluster.

Furthermore, GLOBE's main goal was to identify universal leadership practices and values. The research found that certain leadership styles and attributes were globally supported, while others were viewed as universal barriers to effectiveness. Twenty-one dimensions were identified and classified into six global leadership dimensions: charismatic or value based (i.e., visionary, inspirational, self-sacrificing, integrity, decisive, and performance-oriented); participative (i.e., autocratic and non-participative); team-oriented (i.e., team collaborative, team integrative, diplomatic,

malevolent, and administratively competent); self-protective (i.e., self-centred, status conscious, conflict inducer, face saver, and procedural); human-oriented (modest and human-oriented); and autonomous. The globally endorsed leadership attributes are trust, integrity, and vision (Grove, 2004). Due to the long-running mission, the team setup, and the flat hierarchy of an observer group, some of these dimensions may also be appropriate in the UNMO context, whereas others are less relevant. The interpretation of this model suggests that UNMOs should be participative, team- and human-oriented, and not self-protective. Additionally, they should be value based; however, the values for UNMO may differ from the leadership ones. The OGL are an older mission where changes take time, and thus suggesting that UNMOs being visionary and inspirational may not have the same significance as in the business context.

An additional behavioural model widely referenced in the literature is the 7-D model by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997). The data are from quantitative questionnaires with over 50,000 participants from 50 countries over 15 years. The model contains three areas (i.e., relationship with other people, attitudes regarding time, and attitudes towards the environment) with the following seven dimensions.

Relationships with other people:

- Universal versus particular: the degree of attention given to the obligations of a particular situation (i.e., relationships and friendships).
- Neutral versus affective: the degree to which the interaction is objective and detached or expresses emotion.
- Individualism versus communitarianism: the degree to which the interest of the individual or the group prevails in a society.
- Specific versus diffuse: the degree to which personal and work life are separated.
- Achievement versus ascription: the degree to which status is earned through knowledge or skill.

Attitudes regarding time:

- Sequential versus synchronic: the degree to which things are done in sequence.

Attitudes towards the environment:

- Inner- versus outer-directed: the degree to which people believe they can control their environment.

With its applied focus, Trompenaars's model is the basis of over 1,000 cross-cultural trainings in general business and management. It advocates that recognising differences between cultures without ignoring one's own culture may lead to successful outcomes in cross-cultural situations. In contrast, compromising one's beliefs and actions would be ineffective. This finding suggests that in the context of this research, officers with multiple cultural backgrounds need to be aware of their own background without neglecting it to be effective. This may help the officers to better recognise and understand the difference between themselves, which may lead to better outcomes while working together.

Finally, Schwartz (1994) gathered data between 1988 and 1993 from over 25,000 survey respondents in 44 countries. The model provides insight into the nature of values and associated goals and motivations, in the sense that goals and motivations are an expression of values. He defines values as desired goals or motivations (e.g., power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security). Schwartz identified relationships between the values and created two core bipolar dimensions:

- Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement: the degree of the pursuit of one's own relative success and dominance over others.
- Conservative versus open to change: the degree to which own independent thought and action favour change.

It could be argued that 'self-transcendence versus self-enhancement' is close to Hofstede's individualism-versus-collectivism dimension. However, French (2012) identified the challenge of separating beliefs (cognitive), emotions (affective), and individual actions (behavioural) in Schwarz's model.

These types of models may serve different purposes, such as helping businesses operating in several countries to adapt their strategies (e.g., marketing and negotiation) to a specific country. Other areas of research sought to understand cultural differences in learning (Yamazaki, 2005) or in psychological functioning (Matsumoto, 2001). The aforementioned models contained similarities such as bipolar measures to understand cultural differences with sometimes similar dimensions (e.g., individualism versus

collectivism). Furthermore, the models were mainly developed by Western researchers, and it could be argued that they only cover an occidental point of view and are thus incomplete, especially in the context of this case study where there are not only Western officers. For example, Magala (2005, p.3) referred to ideological bias, where the risk is that important aspects of national culture may be missed. Hence, it could be argued that these models lack certain key attributes which cover all officers' cultural backgrounds.

Although these models mainly assume that culture is static, there is a convergence of culture with globalisation (French, 2012). Culture is not static but is influenced by migration flows, changes in political and economic situations, and other factors impacting the norms and behaviours of individuals and societies. In consequence, it could be argued that the validity of the findings based on 30-year-old data is no longer certain. In Hofstede's model, for example, results may depend on job-behaviour-related norms, values, and patterns and could suggest that organisational culture may be more dominant in the current globalised world than it was when the model was developed. This could also signify that UNMOs have more commonalities than differences because they all have a military background and are part of a military culture. However, according to Luthans, Luthans, and Luthans (2021, p.58), it is a misconception to understand that an organisation has a unique culture. Ruffa (2018, p.32) also identified that in the military context the culture is not unique and is influenced by nationality and thus culturally based differences between the officers, in the context of this case study, are expected. Additionally, individuals may have conflicting cultural influences (Ingold, 1994), and thus, it could be argued that it is irrelevant to map national differences and that the key is to understand differences at the individual level. However, the cultural model dimensions provide an overview of potential differences that UNMOs can expect during their deployments, such as different understanding of the hierarchy or the attention given to obligations versus to relationships.

In summary, culture is dynamic and multi-layered. In his review, French (2012) referred to various conceptualisations of culture such as the five-layer model (global, national, regional, community, and personal) and the three-layer model with an outer layer (artefacts), norms and behaviours, and values and core assumptions. Furthermore, an iceberg or onion model represents the multi-layered context of

culture. While culture is a differentiating factor, an individual's personality cannot be defined solely by their country or region of origin. However, research has shown that culture and personality are not fully independent, suggesting that personality is influenced by one's national culture. The culture scoring in Hofstede's dimensions relates to national societies, not individuals (Hofstede et al., 2010, p.40), suggesting that in the context of this study behaviours may depend on officers' nationalities, this for example in the decision-making process. Additionally, the different concepts suggest that officers may have several potentially conflicting cultural influences that would need to be negotiated (Ingold, 1994), different motivations (Schwartz, 1994) and that some officers may focused on achieving short-term improvements while others long-term goals (Hofstede et al., 2010).

This complexity reinforces the assumption that, while working in a cross-cultural environment, the need is not only to learn about different cultures, but also to manage oneself within a diverse team. In reference to GLOBE, UNMOs should be participative, team- and human-oriented, and not self-protective. A review of CCC models including cross-cultural communication, teamwork, and D&I models is thus pertinent for this study.

2.2 Cross-Cultural Competence and Associated KSAs

This section builds on the understanding of culture as dynamic and multi-layered and the idea that individual personality is partially influenced by cultural background. Due to the multi-cultural context of this case study, the most important KSAs needed to operate in such an environment are derived from CCC models, and they are thus a core part of this literature review.

Research on cross-cultural aspects such as CCCs are an integrant part of multiple academic disciplines, and as such, their definitions and concepts differ. Selmeski (2007, p.5) non-exhaustive list of terms related to CCC (i.e., cultural savvy, cultural astuteness, cultural appreciation, cultural literacy or fluency, cultural adaptability, cultural or human terrain, cultural competency, cultural intelligence, and cultural understanding) reflected these differences. In an attempt to cover multiple disciplines, different terminologies are reviewed in the literature review.

Interest in cross-cultural KSAs in the military context has grown due to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other military theatres. This interest has been recognised by

domain research, mainly by the US Army leadership who realised that to become more effective, cultural knowledge and skills are necessary to complement regional knowledge of the AO and local language skills (Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007). However, compared to other professions, the body of cultural knowledge is not as extensive in the military context. Additionally, the civilian context has similarities and differences to the military; thus, CCCs in both contexts are reviewed as depicted in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Civilian versus military context

Similarities	***Differences***
Often operate in unfamiliar context	Military takes the bulk of their workforce with them
Use local workforce	Military often faces greater cultural differences
Members are often unaware of their own biases	Military often sent to difficult environments without the possibility to leave
Can improve through training and education	Consequences: life/death (military) versus profit/loss (international business)
Prefer standards such as standard operating procedures (SOP) or checklists	Military operations entail greater power difference to the local population
Must work collectively despite cultural differences to accomplish the objectives	Military professionals understand and accept the principle of unlimited liability

Note: Adapted from Selmeski (2007, p.11) and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014, p.151).

Cross-cultural competence is first reviewed in the non-military context and then extended to the military context. Secondly, cross-cultural communication is reviewed. Finally, a review of assessment tools is performed to better understand the measures and their respective reliabilities.

2.2.1 Cross-cultural competence for civilian and associated KSAs

The objective of this section is to review CCC models in a non-military context, to understand the approaches and definitions, and to draft an initial set of KSAs relevant to this case study. Different orientations of CCC are found in distinct disciplines (e.g., higher education or international business). Opposing views on culture exist in the healthcare sector, and particularly in the nursing sector. There is a mainstream essentialist view, in which Blanchet Garneau and Pepin (2015) reference, for example, the work of Gray and Thomas (2006), suggested that the differences between individuals refer to a set of values, beliefs, and shared practices by a group of the same ethnicity, religion, and nationality. This view assumes that culture is stable over time and that the development of cultural competence is based on learning cultural aspects.

Opposed to this view is a constructivist definition of culture. Blanchet Garneau and Pepin (2015) referred, for example, to the work of Carpenter-Song, Nordquest Schwallie, and Longhofer (2007). Here, culture was viewed as a dynamic process in which a person is not only influenced by tradition, but also by the social, economic, and political context, as identified in the culture and model section. Likewise, Rajić and Rajić (2015), in their intercultural competence assessment in education, argued that knowledge, skills, and values expire rapidly, and that lifelong learning is thus needed. Their argument assumes that culture develops due to rapid socioeconomic changes in current societies (e.g., increased access to technology and transportation). The next paragraph reviews the differences between the CCC models in Higher Education (HE) and International Business (IB).

In HE research, a variety of intercultural competence models have been developed. Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) divided these models into five types: compositional, co-oriental, developmental, adaptational, and causal path. Compositional models are a listing of components or dimensions such as attitudes, knowledge, and skills (Howard-Hamilton, Richardson, & Shuford, 1998). Co-oriental models focus on communication and interaction between people from different cultures. Development models include successive competence which can be achieved via a learning process. Adaptability models also highlight communication and interaction between people but focus on a specific outcome. Finally, causal path models focus on the interrelationship between components or dimensions. Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) claimed that these types of models were not mutually exclusive; this research should thus not concentrate on a single model but rather understand and leverage the singularity of each model. In addition, they identified more than 300 terms and constructs related to intercultural competences, which is an indication that the topic is complex, context-specific, and lacks consensus on any single scholarly approach. In reviewing the components of the models, commonalities in skills, knowledge, and elements such as attitude or motivation are recognisable. For example, self-awareness, openness, and flexibility are commonly referenced. The models are differentiated by the variety of the model sub-components (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009), the components' interactions, and whether communication is within the model or interacts with it from outside. Consequently, an identification of the components and sub-components and their

interactions is relevant for this study, as well as a specific review of the cross-cultural communication.

Furthermore, KSAs are context sensitive since similar skills or behaviours may be perceived as positive in one context but not in another; thus, KSAs are not universal (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009, p.6). However, Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman (2003) suggested that, while some aspects of cognition, behaviour, or affect may be relevant only in a specific context, others are common, regardless of the environment. This implied that certain KSAs (e.g., ethnorelativism) may also be important for UNMOs to be effective.

Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) referred to intercultural competence, whereas Johnson, Lenartowicz, and Apud (2006, p.6) refer to CCC. However, the terminology of intercultural and CCC can be used interchangeably depending on the field of study (e.g., HE and IB). For example, Andresen and Bergdolt (2016, p.171) used the terms ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘intercultural’ interchangeably from one sentence to the next. In the context of this study, CCC is used. Johnson et al. (2006, p.530) defined CCC in IB as ‘an individual’s effectiveness in drawing upon a repertoire of knowledge, skills, and personal attributes to work successfully with people from different national cultural backgrounds at home or abroad’. In line with their definition, they developed a CCC model in IB based on knowledge, skills, and personal attributes, as shown in Figure 3 below.



Figure 3: Cross-cultural competence in IB

In the IB CCC model, the knowledge dimension is composed of cultural-general knowledge (i.e., awareness of cultural differences) and cultural-specific knowledge

(i.e., geography, economics, politics, law, history, customs, hygiene, and language). The skills dimension is composed of abilities such as foreign language competence; adaptability to behavioural norms; effective stress management and conflict resolution; and aptitude, which is the capacity to get or enhance further abilities. The personal attributes dimension included personality traits and values, as well as cultural beliefs and norms. The desirable personality traits referenced by Johnson et al. (2006, p.532) were 'ambition, courage, curiosity, decisiveness, enthusiasm, fortitude, integrity, judgment, loyalty, perseverance, self-efficacy, and tolerance for ambiguity'. Furthermore, Johnson et al. (2006) claimed that the personality traits are stable and antecedents to the CCC, as they may help or hinder its development. However, their visual model (Figure 3) does not reflect personality traits as antecedents, but if considered as antecedents, they may influence the acquisition of personal skills or cultural knowledge. Moreover, in the IB model factors other than the KSA may influence the CCC which may also have to be considered in the context of this case study (i.e., institutional ethnocentrism and cultural distance). Institutional ethnocentrism is seen in this multinational context as the imposition of the way of working from the headquarters to the overseas subsidiaries. Cultural distance is seen as 'cultural difference' in Hofstede's terms of the expatriate manager towards its overseas posting. Furthermore, in their attempt to integrate the existing literature into their model, Johnson et al. (2006) argued that personal skills and cultural knowledge may be gained via learning and training. The capacity to learn may influence the skills and knowledge of an individual and thus could also be considered an antecedent.

This IB model focuses on the competences which managers need to operate effectively with local employees when posted overseas. Rubinstein et al. (2008) defined two dimensions of interoperability in the context of peacekeeping: vertical and horizontal. Vertical interoperability is interaction with the local population, and horizontal interoperability is interaction with actors participating in the peacekeeping operation. In the context of IB, assuming that the overseas managers are only dealing with local employees, it could be argued that these two dimensions are not as distinct as in the peacekeeping context. A context that may be closer to one of the dimensions defined in peacekeeping is HE, where competences are needed to operate effectively within a multicultural group, which is similar to horizontal interoperability. Accordingly, the

HE intercultural competence model by Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) was reviewed; it consists of an inventory of competences grouped by KSA.

Knowledge: Awareness (values…): self as it relates to cultural identity, similarities, and differences across cultures. Understanding (devalues…): oppression, intersecting oppression (race, gender, class, and religion). Appreciation (values…): elements involved in social change and effects of cultural differences on communication.

Skills: Awareness (ability to…): Engage in self-reflection, identify, and articulate cultural similarities and differences. Understand (ability to…): take multiple perspectives and understand differences in multiple contexts. Appreciation (ability to…): challenge discriminatory acts and communicate cross-culturally.

Attitudes: Awareness (values…): own group and group equality. Understanding (devalues…): discrimination and ethnocentric assumptions. Appreciation (values…): risk taking and life-enhancing role of cross-cultural interactions.

In an attempt to compare the KSAs of these models, categories are defined with the aim to build an initial KSA skeleton for UNMOs that can be further developed to integrate findings from additional models. The initial categories defined based on the HE and IB models are the following:

Communication: Both models cover aspects of communication, such as communicating cross-culturally (HE) or foreign language competency (IB). As mentioned previously, it is appropriate to consider communication as a dedicated category.

Diversity and inclusion (D&I): D&I covers aspect of intersecting oppression (race, gender, class, and religion) defined in Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998)‘s model. D&I models are reviewed in a specific chapter of the literature review.

Cultural awareness and knowledge: As expected, both models include cultural aspects such as awareness of similarities and differences across cultures (HE) or cultural knowledge (IB), and it makes sense to include these aspects in a dedicated category.

Learning: This category is to integrate the aspect of aptitudes (IB) which covers the ability to gain more knowledge and skills.

Behaviours, attitude, and personality traits: This category is proposed to integrate aspects such as adapting to behavioural norms (IB), appreciation of elements in social changes (HE), and personality traits (IB).

External variables: This category is proposed to include external factors that may have an impact on the efficiency of the UNMO. This covers, for example, aspects of cultural distance or institutional ethnocentrism as defined in the IB model.

The analysis of the HE and IB models using the above categories helps to identify their similarities and differences. Table 2 displays the HE and IB KSAs categorised into the KSA skeleton for UNMO.

Table 2: Categorised cross-cultural competence

Category	***Higher Education (HE)***	***International Business (IB)***
Communication	Influence of cultural differences on communication and be able to communicate cross-culturally	Foreign language competence, conflict resolution
D&I	Understanding oppression (e.g., intersecting oppression such as race, gender, class, religion); different perspectives (e.g., take several perspectives, variance in multiple contexts); discrimination (e.g., devalues discrimination and ethnocentricity); challenging discriminatory acts	
Cultural awareness and knowledge	Awareness (e.g., self and own identity, similarities and differences across culture, identify and manage cultural similarities and differences, values own group and group equality)	Values, norms and beliefs (internalised from home); culture general knowledge (i.e., generic to any cultural, awareness of cultural differences); culture specific (i.e., factual [geographic, economic or historic knowledge]; conceptual [group values and how values are reflected by people]; attributional [tacit knowledge of awareness of appropriate behaviours])
Learning	Engage in self-reflection	Capacity to acquire new abilities (aptitude)
Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits	Appreciation of elements in social changes, values risk taking, life-enhancing role of cross-cultural interactions	Adapting to behavioural norms, effective stress management or conflict resolution Personality traits such as flexibility, ambition, courage, integrity, judgement, loyalty, perseverance, self-efficiency, tolerance for ambiguity
External variables		Cultural distance and institutional ethnocentrism

Note: HE and IB KSAs were grouped into specific categories for further analysis. HE KSAs are adapted from Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998); IB KSAs are adapted from Johnson et al. (2006).

The two models are context-sensitive (e.g., class and race issues in HE or cultural knowledge in IB). Similarities are also identified, such as being aware of one's own values, which indicates that some KSAs may be common while others may not. The

context of this case study may have contextual similarity to IB, such as expatriates versus officers serving abroad. Moreover, certain contextual elements from HE may also be relevant (e.g., the D&I aspect) due to the diversity within an observer group. It could thus be assumed that, for this case study, IB KSAs enhanced with the diversity aspect from HE could be leveraged for the UNMO context. Accordingly, the KSAs retained for the preliminary conceptual competency model for UNMOs are as follows.

Knowledge: General and cultural specific knowledge (IB) may be relevant for UNMOs as they operate overseas and thus need to have a strong understanding of potential cultural differences and of the local culture. Self-awareness (IB, HE) is suggested, as it may allow UNMOs to improve their views on cultural differences, and diversity due to the expected differences in gender, race, religion, and age within a UNMO team (HE).

Skills: The UNMOs must be able to deal with their colleagues from different cultural backgrounds (i.e., horizontal interoperability); hence, communication skills and skills similar to those identified in HE, especially D&I, may be an advantage. On the other hand, UNMOs must adapt to the context of the mission (i.e., vertical interoperability) and KSAs similar to those in the IB context may be favourable.

Attitude: The UNMOs interact with the location population (i.e., vertical interoperability) and team has a high level of diversity (i.e., horizontal interoperability); thus, the IB personality traits such as flexibility, including the HE attitude of appreciating cross-cultural interactions and perceiving it as life enhancing, may be beneficial for the UNMO context.

Clearly, KSAs are context-sensitive, and there is a need to develop a UNMO model as described above. Models from other contexts may be leveraged as described above, but they cannot be copied. For example, the IB model includes individual ambition, and it is questionable if this attribute has the same importance for an expatriate manager as for a UNMO. Nevertheless, the findings from this comparison assist in the development of an initial model.

As illustrated previously, the IB model includes institutional ethnocentrism and cultural distance as contextual and external factors that may influence the performance of expatriate managers (Johnson et al., 2006). As mentioned above, the institutional ethnocentrism in multinational business is the imposition of structural processes and

management mentalities from the parent organisation or HQ to the overseas affiliates. The UN also has their own institutional ethnocentrism and wants to standardise their processes, which may thus impact UNMOs who are not familiar with the UN system. Cultural distance in the context of this study has several dimensions (e.g., towards the local culture in which the mission is operating, towards the other peacekeepers, towards other military branch, or towards the UN culture and processes, which have their own specificities and may have an influence on the UNMOs). Furthermore, UNMOs aptitude or capacity to acquire new ability may influence the acquisition of required skills, knowledge, or a different type of intelligence, suggesting that the defined 'learning' category may be viewed as an antecedent.

Johnson et al. (2006) included elements of Earley (2002) concept of cultural intelligence (CQ), a construct that aims to increase understanding of intercultural interactions. Earley (2002) defined CQ as 'a social adaptation tied to intercultural interactions' which 'reflects a person's capability to adapt while interacting with individuals from different cultural origins' and is currently a predominant self-report (Li, Mobley, & Kelly, 2016). Van Dyne et al. (2012) argued that CQ is another intelligence construct, in addition to general intelligence (IQ), emotional intelligence (EQ), and social intelligence (SQ). Moreover, CQ does not correlate with IQ but does with EQ. Initially, the CQ model contained three facets: cognitive (i.e., metacognitive and cognitive knowledge), motivational, and behavioural. Subsequently, the metacognitive facet became a separate part of the model; thus, it is now referred to as the four-factor model of cultural intelligence (Earley & Peterson, 2004). According to Johnson et al. (2006), the cognitive components are included as antecedents in the IB CCC model. Furthermore, they argue that the motivation component is important, and that motivation is impacted by internal factors (e.g., personality traits) and external factors (e.g., institution, ethnocentrism). The next paragraphs explore these four facets in greater detail.

The metacognitive facet pertains to the individual's process of acquiring knowledge in different settings, the individual level of cultural awareness, and the steps that process includes when the interaction is in a cross-cultural context. An example given by Van Dyne et al. (2012) of high metacognitive CQ is an individual developing an action plan before a cross-cultural interaction, as that individual has an awareness of how their background influences them and the ability to adjust while interacting. Ang,

Van Dyne, and Koh (2006) claimed that individuals with high conscientiousness may have a higher metacognitive CQ. This suggests that UNMOs need self-awareness (HE) and the ability to adapt to different contexts (IB).

The cognitive facet includes both general cultural knowledge and context-specific knowledge (e.g., cultural institutions, norms, practices, and conventions; (Van Dyne et al., 2012). It could be argued that this facet covers the same aspects as the cultural knowledge dimension of Johnson et al. (2006) and strengthens the assumption that UNMOs need to have both general and cultural specific knowledge. Ang et al. (2006) claimed that people with personality traits (e.g., extraversion and openness to experience) may have a higher cognitive CQ, which would imply that it may be useful for UNMOs to have a certain degree of extraversion and to be open.

The motivation facet pertains to an individual's drive to learn and how they function in a cross-cultural context, as well as their interest in cross-cultural interaction, the efficiency with which they are able to adjust, and their confidence level (Van Dyne et al., 2012). According to Kolb (1984), the learning process is enhanced by experience, which suggests that experience would be beneficial for UNMOs to better adjust to a new context and increase their confidence level.

The behavioural facet refers to the usage of verbal and nonverbal communication in a cross-cultural context. Earley (2002) argues that difficulties related to learning a new language to a reasonable level of proficiency may be related to a low CQ. This aptitude enables people to adapt their communication to the setting and their behaviour to the context. This is relevant for UNMOs, as they may have several issues in respect to languages. The majority of them are not native-English speakers, but the mission language is English (horizontal interoperability) and the local language is also probably different from their mother tongue, which is Arabic in this case study (vertical interoperability). In consequence, they need to have the willingness and persistence to identify and acquire the necessary language skills (i.e., English and Arabic). Ang et al. (2006) claimed that individuals with personality traits such as high agreeableness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness to experience may have a higher behavioural CQ.

In the literature, personality traits usually refer to a model such as the Big Five model (B5M), the five-factor model of personality traits (FFM), or OCEAN. In the B5M, the

broad personality dimensions are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect or imagination. The B5M is nearly identical to the FFM, and the two terms are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, there are slightly different conceptions of the factors. For example, the last factor (i.e., intellect or imagination) is labelled ‘openness to experience’ in the FFM. Additionally, FFM uses the opposite of bipolar scale of emotional stability, which is neuroticism (Johnson, 2020). The term OCEAN used in the literature is a reordering of the initial letters of the FFM factors (i.e., O: openness to experience versus rigidity; C: conscientiousness versus undependability; E: extraversion version introversion; A: agreeableness versus temperedness; and N: neuroticism versus emotional stability). Consequently, the personality traits identified in this case study should also align with the FFM and B5M models.

Li et al. (2016) argued that the different factors of personality traits cannot be examined independently of each other. They claim that people with high openness have a higher CQ when they also possess high agreeableness than when they do not. This can also be explained by the argument that open individuals who lack agreeableness are less likely to learn from different cultures compared to those who are agreeable, due to their potentially lower level of interpersonal competence. The personality traits identified in this research should therefore not be seen as isolated but viewed within a broader context.

According to Caligiuri (2006), CCCs are usually defined by a set of KSAs or KSAOs. However, CCCs are often evaluated exclusively using personality traits. Shaffer, Harrison, Gregersen, Black, and Ferzandi (2006) investigated the effects of B5M personality traits (i.e., considered stable over time) and dynamic competence (e.g., cultural flexibility, task and people orientations, and ethnocentrism) on expatriates’ effectiveness (e.g., adjustment, withdrawal cognition, contextual performance, and task performance). In contrast to personality traits, dynamic competence refers to skills and knowledge which are malleable and can be learned. However, dynamic competence may not be quickly learned; for example, to overcome ethnocentrism, people may need exposure to other norms multiple times to understand and appreciate them, which will eventually improve interpersonal relationships (Triandis, 2006). This also suggests that previous cross-cultural exposure and experience may be beneficial for UNMOs. Furthermore, candidates with insufficient dynamic competence could

potentially be sent at a later stage, once they have gained the required competence, whereas people with core personality traits missing may be excluded from a deployment.

Personality traits are a significant predicator for at least one element of expatriate effectiveness. Emotional stability has an influence on people leaving their assignment prematurely (Schaffer, Harrison, Gregerson, Black, & Ferzandi, 2006). Although leaving an assignment prematurely is not possible in the case of a military deployment, UNMO candidates with low emotional stability may be subject to psychological issues during their deployment. Agreeableness and extraversion are associated with all forms of performance and adjustment. Interpersonal skills may be more relevant for management than technical assignments. This may pertain to UNMO deployment, as the role has both technical and managerial aspects. Intellect, subsequently renamed 'mentality' in the B5M model (Johnson, 2020), is a predictor for work performance, as well as a unique predictor of both contextual and task performance. The findings in relation to the dynamic competence were that cultural flexibility influences all criteria except withdrawal cognition. Task orientations influenced work adjustment and contextual performance, while people orientations had an impact on all criteria except interaction adjustment. Ethnocentrism is seen as relevant for interaction adjustment, withdrawal cognition (e.g., intentions to quit), and contextual performance (Schaffer et al., 2006). The relevance of these findings is that dynamic competence could have a positive impact on UNMOs' effectivity and performance, reinforcing that UNMO candidates with the required core personality traits, assuming that they can be measured, can improve their competency over time.

More recently, Bartel-Radic and Giannelloni (2017) attempted to link personality traits to CCK. They define CCK as a cognitive abilities with criteria in line with the culture-general knowledge defined by Johnson et al. (2006); that is, knowledge of one's own culture, knowledge of other cultures and culture-specific knowledge. They argue that the personality traits considered to be components of CCC are not from the B5M or FFM. The nine measures reviewed were (1) complex versus simple explanation, (2) metacognition, (3) motivation to understand human behaviour, (4) emotional stability, (5) open-mindedness, (6) self-confidence, (7) communication skills as part of sociability, (8) tolerance for ambiguity, and (9) empathy. They also identified ethno-relativism as an attitude influencing CCK. In their model, CCK results in behavioural

skills such as adaptation to specific interactions. Their findings contradict other research in arguing that CCK and adjustment cannot be determined solely by personality. This suggests that, after more than two decades of research, the understanding of CCC is not yet at maturity and reiterates the importance of CCC being context sensitive, thus the significance of this research. Five out of the nine personality traits and attitudes reviewed seem to have a relationship to CCK. As in CQ, motivation plays an important role. The study hypothesised that people with higher motivation to understand human behaviour profit more from cross-cultural experiences and can develop a better understanding of the other culture. It also identified motivation as essential for learning. Earley (2002) claimed that motivation is not only a learning driver but also impacts the use of knowledge to find appropriate responses to cross-cultural problems. People who feel at ease with complex explanations regarding behaviours tend to have better CCC. Compared to the finding that people with an open mind may have a higher CCK, however, the correlation was moderate. A further finding is that people with the ability to understand quickly and easily tend to question cultural differences in communication style less frequently. Finally, self-confidence may have an indirect impact on CCK, meaning that people with high confidence in their own communication skills may have difficulty interpreting foreign cultures, which suggests that highly confident UNMOs may have more difficulty understanding their counterparts and may consequently be less efficient.

In addition to CCC and CQ, other intercultural models attempt to link to personality traits, such as the U-curve, which deals with cross-cultural adjustment (CCA). For example, Konanahalli and Oyedele (2016) connect EQ to expatriates' CCA. Their findings are that EQ accounts for cultural adjustment among the expatriates taking part in the research. Social awareness emerged as the most significant component, followed by self-management, self-awareness, and relationship management. Consequently, in addition to the known attributes of self-awareness and contextual understanding, UNMOs must be able to build relationships to adjust better to their team and AO.

Other models and definitions are widely used, such as cultural agility and global mindset (GM). Cultural agility is seen as part of CCC, along with ethnocentrism and tolerance to ambiguity in relation to international assignments (Caligiuri & Tarique, 2016). Alternatively, Schaffer et al. (2006, p.12) defined cultural agility as 'the

capacity to substitute activities enjoyed in one's home country with existing, and unusually distinct, activities in the host country'. A global mindset is 'the ability to succeed in a complex cross-cultural environment through knowledge, or cognition, motivation, and behaviours' (Yari, Lankut, Alon, & Richter, 2020, p.3). Andresen and Bergdolt (2016) view CQ and Global Mindset (GM) as specific measures of CCC which are differentiated by their usage by different target groups. Cultural intelligence is a useful cross-competency measure for people engaged in operative management and an enabler for effectively coping with specific contexts. They define CQ as 'the capacity to function effectively within environments that are characterised by high cultural complexity' (Andresen & Bergdolt, 2016, p.185). A GM is specifically needed by people working at a normative and strategic level and is defined by Andresen and Bergdolt (2016, p.183) as:

> the capacity to function effectively within environments that are characterised by high cultural and business complexity. In order to function effectively within cross-cultural environments that are also characterised by high strategic business complexity, it is vital to possess – in addition to cognitive and motivational prerequisites – a specific attribute (mindset) characterised particularly by openness and cosmopolitanism.

These definitions also demonstrate that CCC depends on an individuals' tasks or future tasks and suggests that the KSAs are context-sensitive. Cultural intelligence fits the purpose of this case study, as UNMOs are engaged on a tactical level (e.g., patrolling the BL) rather than performing at a normative or strategic level.

Additionally, Yari et al. (2020) compared the CCC, CQ, and GM and found an overlap between the research areas, although the constructs emerged separately. They reviewed management and business publications with CCC, CQ, and CM as keywords and identified intellectual streams which they linked to themes (see Appendix D). Contrary to expectation, CCC intellectual streams do not include aspects such as personality, experience, or cultural knowledge. However, experience is a stream in CQ (i.e., cultural exposure). Furthermore, teams were often referenced, which suggests that teamwork is an area to be explored. Situational judgment is a newly identified theme to include in the cultural awareness and knowledge category of the conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

In the attempt to develop a definition in regard to the competency needed by UNMOs, definitions in areas with high cultural diversity are reviewed. Cross- or inter-cultural

competence in the fields of healthcare, hospitality, and psychology are defined as follows:

Healthcare: 'A complex act grounded in critical reflection and action, which the healthcare professional draws upon to provide culturally safe, congruent, and effective care in partnerships with individuals, families, and communities living health experiences and which takes into account the social and political dimensions of care' (Blanchet Garneau & Pepin, 2015, p.12).

Hospitality: 'Valuing the difference between people and the ways in which those differences can contribute to a richer, more effective, and more productive environment' (Devine, Baum, & Hearns, 2009, p.1).

Psychology: 'In order to be culturally competent, an individual would have to (a) possess a strong personal identity, (b) have knowledge of and facility with the beliefs and values of the culture, (c) display sensitivity to the affective processes of the culture, (d) communicate clearly in the language of the given cultural group, (e) perform socially sanctioned behaviour, (f) maintain active social relations within the cultural group, and (g) negotiate the institutional structures of that culture' (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993, p.396).

Considering these definitions, it could be concluded that efficient UNMOs need to be culturally competent with the ability to reflect (i.e., both on oneself and a situation) to take an adequate course of action. Building partnerships with the actors in the field, being open to others, and communicating clearly contribute to one's higher effectiveness in a cross-cultural environment. Personality traits and attitude may influence the ability to become cross-culturally competent. As a synthesis, the proposed KSAs definition KSAs for UNMOs is 'knowledge, skills, and attitudes that officers need to operate in partnership with all the actors in the mission and to contribute to the success of the mission'. Moreover, 'all the actors in the mission' include the team members, other military components, UN civilians and agencies, NGOs, and, last but not least, the local population and institutions.

In summary, multiple models have been developed in different contexts to achieve specific outcomes. The models have not only commonalties but also a great deal of variety. These models are commonly comprised of different components, causal relationships, and antecedents and differ in their components and sub-components'

definitions and granularity. It is concluded that CCC are a set of KSAs. The positive attitudes in a cross-cultural environment – self-awareness, building relationships, and flexibility – could be drivers of positive CCC. Static personality traits often referenced to be constant and to contribute to CCC are openness to experience and tolerance for ambiguity (Griffith, Wolfeld, Armon, Rios, & Liu, 2016). Consequently, it is relevant to identify the personality traits that contribute to the UNMO's effectiveness. The identified personality traits should be aligned to a model such as the FFM by McGrae and John (1992): extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Furthermore, language skills and communication play an important role in a cross-cultural context and should thus also be reviewed in this research. Additionally, the preliminary conceptual KSA model for UNMOs should include motivation and experience. These may be important attributes for individuals to be able to adapt to a new context, and they may also impact learning efficiency. Moreover, self-reflection, awareness of one's own value system and situational awareness (SA) may be beneficial for UNMOs to be effective and thus should be included in the preliminary model. These KSAs are identified in civilian contexts. However, CCC is context-sensitive, and the next section thus focuses on a CCC review in a military context.

2.2.2 Cross-cultural Competence for Military and Associated KSAs

The objective of this section is to build and enhance the findings from the CCC in civilian context with the CCC in military context. In comparison to civilian research, little has been done to address the characteristics that contribute to a soldier's success in a multi-cultural setting. Nevertheless, some armies have studied CCC; the US Army, based on their negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, have spent a great deal of resources trying to conceptualise CCC to measure it and provide suitable training for the armed forces (Abbe, 2008; Abbe et al., 2007; Caligiuri et al., 2011; Gallus et al., 2014; Greene Sands & Greene-Sands, 2014; Kraushaar, 2013; O'Conor et al., 2010). Research has been conducted accordingly by the US Army Research Institute and the Defence Language and National Security Education office, including critical reviews of cross-cultural models. Abbe et al. (2007, p.2) from the US Army Research Institute defined CCC as 'as an individual capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular intersection of cultures'. Greene Sands and Greene-Sands (2014, p.35) defined CCC as 'the abilities that enable one to operate effectively in different cultures. The commonality of these definitions relates to the

effectivity of an individual in a multi-cultural context, and the term's general meaning does not differ from the definition identified in non-military contexts.

Knowledge is defined as a basic body of information about the cultural aspect of the AO to be able to navigate through it. This aligns with broader cultural knowledge as defined by Johnson et al. (2006). Skills are defined as the proficiency or competency to perform certain tasks which can be physical, behavioural, or cognitive in nature and can be taught. Abilities are more general and difficult to train, such as managing emotions in difficult situations or perceiving and interpreting a non-verbal situation. Other characteristics refer to prior experiences, attitudes, and values that may affect performance in a cross-cultural context (Gallus et al., 2014).

Abbe (2008, p.11) cross-cultural framework was initially intended for army leaders but became a general CCC framework in the US military. The core model is based on a set of skills, knowledge, and motivation to enable individuals to adapt and perform effectively in a cross-cultural context. Language capability and culture- or region-specific knowledge may contribute to cross-cultural effectiveness but are not part of the CCC. This is suggesting that besides CCC other knowledge and skills are important for military personal to be interculturally effective. Local language skills and regional competence is defined by Johnson et al. (2006) as cultural-specific knowledge, and thus also named accordingly in Figure 4. Variables such as conscientiousness, extraversion, emotional stability, and self-monitoring, which are expected to contribute to CCC development, are defined as antecedents. Furthermore, situational and organisational variables partially align to institutional ethnocentrism and cultural distance as defined by Johnson et al. (2006). These variables also include military-specific competence in relation to the stress and threats condition. Figure 4 presents Abbe (2008, p.11) model (adapted).



Figure 4: Adapted cross-cultural competence model for army leaders

The description of the model dimensions are the following (Abbe, 2008):

Antecedent variable: Disposition (e.g., big five traits, tolerance for ambiguity and self-monitoring); biographical (e.g., prior experience, gender, age); and self and identity (e.g., self-efficacy and cultural identity).

Cross-cultural competence: Knowledge (e.g., cultural awareness, cross-cultural schema, cognitive complexity); skills (e.g., interpersonal skills, self-regulation and flexibility); and affect or motivation (e.g., attitudes and initiative, empathy and need for closure).

Culture specific: Foreign language (i.e., local language) and regional and culture-specific knowledge.

Situational and organisational variables: Cultural distance; conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat; family adjustment; and organisational variables.

Intercultural effectiveness: Job performance and work adjustment, personal adjustment, and interpersonal relationships.

Communication is not mentioned in this model, but it does refer to local language skills. This is likely due to the context of a US military engagement that is based on contingent (e.g., full unit) and not on individuals deployed in a cross-cultural context as is the case for UNMOs. Due the cultural diversity in an observer group, there is an assumption that the communication skills of UNMOs go beyond local language skills.

An alternative model was developed by Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) with the objective to synthesise the models used in the military. This model differs predominantly to Abbe (2008) model, going beyond local language skills, with communication being part of the core competency and assumed to be critical for effective intercultural interaction,. Figure 5 represents Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) conceptual model.



Figure 5: Cross-cultural competence military conceptual model

This model is based on four dimensions: antecedents, competencies, adjustment, and performance. The antecedents influence all other dimensions, competencies influence adjustment and performance, and adjustment also influences performance. Abbe (2008) and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) were both causal path models, meaning that they emphasise the interrelationship between components. Furthermore, both models defined personality traits with reference to B5M or FFM as antecedents and include elements of adjustment or adaptability. These models differed in several ways. Firstly, the outcome of CCC is related to individual efficiency versus individual and unit (e.g., team) performance. The Abbe model (Abbe, 2008) defined cultural-specific knowledge as influencing the CCC but not being part of it. More specifically, it was influenced by the local language knowledge compared to communication being a core competency within the Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) model. Research suggests that language proficiency (LP) contributes to CCC; however, it also reveals that personality traits may be a stronger predicator for job performance than LP (Abbe et al., 2007). Additionally, Abbe (2008) included experience as an antecedent and argues that prior experience may facilitate UNMOs to adapt to and cope with cross-cultural situations.

Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) included learning capability (i.e., metacognitive skills) as an antecedent. Finally, the Abbe (2008) model included situational and organisational variables, which was conceptually close to Johnson et al. (2006) institutional ethnocentrism and cultural distance. However, Abbe (2008) organisational variables is a term which is probably more pertinent than institutional ethnocentrism for UNMOs, as officers must apply other processes (e.g., UN) during their deployments rather than their respective national armies' processes. Furthermore, the conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat defined by Abbe et al. (2007) may also be seen as being influenced by external variables and thus a rationale to be included in a new conceptual model for UNMOs.

Military contexts differ greatly during an engagement and may have an impact on the competences needed by the deployed personnel. For example, in the UN context, military deployed as a contingent or unit (i.e., Blue Helmets) may need different competencies than UNMOs (i.e., Blue Berets). Table 3 presents the main similarities and differences between the military personnel deployed as contingents versus UNMOs.

Table 3: Military contingent versus military observers

Similarities	***Differences***
Often operates in unfamiliar context	Military contingents are prepared and sent as a unit, whereas UNMOs are sent individually
Use local workforce	UNMOs often face more cultural differences due to the multinational team structure. Units have more heterogeneity.
Members are often unaware of their own biases	Military contingents take most of their logistics with them, whereas UNMOs are principally supported by UN logistics.
Can improve through training and education	Military contingents tend to have a greater power distance to the local population than UNMOs (unarmed/low profile).
Prefer standards such as SOP or checklist	Military contingents operate mainly in their native language, whereas UNMOs operate in the mission language (which is often not their native language).

Note: This table is developed for this research and aligns to the structure of Selmeski (2007, p.11).

The military CCC models are generally based on vertical interoperability (towards the host population), whereas the model for UNMOs need to additionally integrate a horizontal interoperability capability (within the mission or team). In a UN context, no specific model on CCC could be found, but research has been conducted on the impact of cultural diversity and CCC. For example, a study of the UN integrated

peacebuilding mission in Guinea-Bissau Nzitunga and Nyanway-Gimeh (2016) expressed the importance of CCC and that peacebuilders needed to ensure their development in CQ, EQ, and SQ, as well as their LP. Additionally, within the context of peacekeeping operations, research on cultural differences has been done on the variances of performing daily activities by contingents from different countries (Ruffa, 2014). Other peacekeeping research on horizontal interoperability was done to understand the challenges in coordinating civilian and military components of missions (Rubinstein et al., 2008). For UNMOs, besides communication and local language skills, English proficiency plays an important role. Another dimension addressed in other research was the coordination with civilian personnel, suggesting another dimension of diversity within the context of this study.

In summary: Military deployments can take different forms of engagement, and the competences are thus context sensitive and role dependent. In general terms, the CCC model in the military context is similar to the civilian context, and it relates to an individual being able to operate efficiently in a multi-cultural context. The CCCs are a set of KSAs. Similar to a non-military context, personality traits were identified and referenced in the FFM model. As reviewed in the civilian context, these traits may also be looked at in connection with CQ, EQ, and SQ. Further and similar findings to the IB CCC model are that language and cultural knowledge contribute to the effectivity in a multi-cultural working environment. However, the importance of language skills may decline with international experience (Abbe et al., 2007). In the military context, ‘language’ is usually based on foreign language proficiency in reference to the local language, which differs depending on the UNMO context. The difference between civilian and military competences relate to stress and uncertainty management, especially due to threats situation within this specific context. This difference is reflected with the situational and organisational variables (e.g., stress condition, threat, or uncertainty) in the Abbe et al. (2007, p.23) model. This could suggest that in the military context, the SA of individuals needs to go beyond the cross-cultural aspects to be able to quickly adapt to safety and security aspects.

Furthermore, in addition to the personality traits identified as being an antecedent in the Johnson et al. (2006) model, the UNMO competence model should include experience as an antecedent, as identified in the Abbe et al. (2007) model, and the learning capability aspect identified in the Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) model.

In consequence, the KSA skeleton for UNMOs is enhanced with a new category experience which is defined as follows:

Experience is an antecedent proposed by (Abbe et al., 2007) to cover aspects of experience that may influence the ability of an individual to adjust and handle various situations. Table 4 represents the enhancement to the KSA skeleton for UNMOs developed thus far. This includes the new defined category (i.e., 'experience'), as well as additions to already defined categories such as communication, learning, and external variables.

Table 4: Additional KSAs based on CCC models for military

Category	***Description***
Communication	Mission language skills may not be the UNMO's primary language and thus a level of proficiency (LP) is required (e.g., English in the context of this study)
Experience (antecedent)	Prior experience may help an individual's, in this context the UNMO's, ability to adjust to and cope in different situations (Abbe et al., 2007)
Learning (antecedent)	Learning capability may help an individual's ability to adjust to and cope in different situations (Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014)
External variables	Organisational variables, conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat in the operation (Abbe et al., 2007)

Moreover, within the military there are several contexts, and the competences needed differ accordingly. For example, in the UNMO context, the primary language of the officers may not be the mission language (e.g., English), and they thus may have to manage multiple languages (e.g., the mission language and the local language), which is an additional justification for this research to review the CCC aspect.

2.2.3 Cross-cultural Communication and Associated KSAs

Communication is core to human interaction (Spitzberg, 2012), and a general review of the main concepts is thus important in the context of this study. In this case study, 80% of the UNMOs were not native English speakers. Communication and linguistics are critical for UNMOs in their day-to-day activities, such as in meetings with local authorities, interaction with the local population, and communication and interaction within the UNMO team and other partners, whether verbally or in writing.

The ability to build relationships was identified as a KSA in the CCC review. Establishing a connection with someone from another culture is the first step in building a relationship, and this cannot happen without effective communication (French, 2012). French elaborated on the attributes that impact positive communication: an open and non-judgemental attitude, self-awareness,

resourcefulness, and empathy. He referred to Lewis (2005) on how to communicate effectively across cultures and identified the following tools and approaches: tact, politeness, calm, patience, and warmth. Nonverbal communication differs culturally and is thus also important to consider, including symbols, kinesics or body movements, chromatics or significance of colours, and proxemics (Hall, 1982) how space is used). In addition to the aspect of space, Hall (1984) conceptualised culture in regard to time, such as monochromic cultures or individuals who are likely to handle events sequentially. In contrast, polychromic individuals or cultures view time more flexibly and engage in multi-tasking, similar to the 'sequential-versus-synchronic' dimension of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997). French (2012) referred to cultures which are task-driven versus those which are event accommodating. In Hall's concept of low- and high-context societies, the main differences between these two types of societies are direct communication and the importance of performance and expertise (low-context) versus indirect communication, the importance of non-verbal communication, the level of coded communication, and the importance of relationships (high-context). It is important for UNMOs to be aware of these main differences and to be able to adapt to them.

Communication in a cross-cultural context starts with defining the language of communication (French, 2012). In military multi-national engagements, English is the first global language (followed by French on certain African missions). The term referring to communication in English between speakers with different first languages is known as English as *a lingua franca* (ELF). Having the ability to communicate in English seems to be an inseparable part of professional military practice (Gratton, 2009; Orna-Montesinos, 2013; Sintler, 2011).

An additional point raised in relation to non-native English speakers is that 'the lack of linguistic confidence or the discomfort with language use might lead to evaluation and judgment, to apparent misconceptions of intellectual competency' (Orna-Montesinos, 2013, p.99). This implies that, for example, a UNMO with low English proficiency could be excluded from the decision-making process or feel excluded from the team, which could harm the group dynamic.

Orna-Montesinos (2013) concluded that for successful communication with the local population and other international military, pre-deployment training should stress gaining flexible skills and becoming familiar with native and non-native accents, as

opposed to lexico-grammatical accuracy and appropriateness. Furthermore, the US Army Research Institute concluded that interpersonal skills may be more important than language proficiency or culture. Additional skills identified as impacting the outcome in a cross-cultural setting are flexible thinking and EQ (Abbe, 2008, p.6), which also need to be considered for UNMOs.

Likewise, native English speakers have their own challenges. For example, the Poteet et al. (2008) refer to miscommunications between US and UK military personnel which were mainly due to cultural differences in language forms and usage. This suggests that there is a greater potential for miscommunication in a mixed group of native and non-native English-speaking military. Poteet's suggestion is to avoid the usage of acronyms, jargon, and idioms and to be flexible with trying to describe things in different terms, for example. Additionally, there are guidelines available for the usage of English with non-native speakers such as the usage of simple words (Abramson & Moran, 2018, p.60).

In summary, individuals' language skills are important to be able to communicate with the different UNMOs on the team. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that all team members in international teams on UN missions will have these skills. Of particular relevance for this case study is that interpersonal skills may be more important than language proficiency or cultural knowledge. To be able to achieve high performance in a cross-cultural environment, a set of competences such as having a non-judgemental attitude, being self-aware, being resourceful, taking responsibility, and having empathy are necessary. Certain personality traits may thus be more favourable than having the knowledge of a particular culture. Furthermore, an individual's lack of linguistic confidence should not be associated with their intellect or other competencies, and all UNMOs should have this awareness. The question is how this set of competences can be measured, and a review of CCC assessment is thus pertinent.

2.2.4 Cross-cultural Competence Assessment

This section is a review of CCC assessments which aim to understand how previously identified KSAs can be measured and to identify additional KSAs relevant to this case study. Based on research conducted by Abbe et al. (2007); Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014); and Griffith et al. (2016), a consolidated list of 49 assessment tools or

instruments was identified (see full list in Appendix E). Additionally, Gabrenya, Moukarzel, Pomerance, Griffith, and Deaton (2012) analysed and evaluated 33 instruments based on their suitability and ability to predict adjustment and performance variables. In their research, they identified two styles of measurement: compound instruments and single-construct measures. Compound instruments include more than one subscale and measure several dimensions. Single-construct instruments measure an overall score which is used as a predictor of adjustment or performance. The trend seems to be to move from a single construct to compound instruments and suggests that this should also be the case for pre-deployment TCs. Additionally, instruments were classified as primary or secondary instruments based on the usefulness of measuring the antecedent or competencies, the popularity of the instruments and the usage or availability in previous research, and the scoring being in relation to behavioural and performance outcomes. Table 5 lists the nine primary instruments enhanced with information on the delivery and intended population.

Table 5: Cross-cultural competence primary assessments

Instrument	***Acronym***	***Subscale***	***Source***	***Delivery***	***Recipient***
Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory	CCAI	Flexibility, openness, emotional resilience, perceptual acuity, personal autonomy	Kelley and Meyers (1995)	Self-report/ online survey	Any
Cultural Intelligence Scale	CQS	Cognitive, meta-cognitive (strategic), behaviour, motivation	Van Dyne, Ang, and Koh (2008)	Online survey	Any
Global Competency Inventory	GCI	Perception management, relationship management, self-management	Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, and Oddou (2014)	Online survey	Corporate managers and leaders
Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale	ICAPS	Emotion regulation, openness, flexibility, creativity	Matsumoto et al. (2001)	Online survey	Any
Intercultural Development Inventory	IDI	Denial/defence, reversal, minimisation, acceptance/adaptation, encapsulated/marginality	Hammer et al. (2003) and Hammer (2011)	Self-report/ Online survey	Any
Intercultural Effectiveness Scale	IES	Continues learning, interpersonal engagement, hardiness	Kozai-Group (2020)	Online survey	Executives, managers, staff, and students
Intercultural Sensitivity Scale	ISS	Interaction, engagement, intercultural awareness, respect of cultural differences, interaction confidence, interaction enjoyment, interaction attentiveness	Chen and Starosta (1996)	Self-report/ online survey	Any

Table 5 (continued)

Sociocultural Adaptation Scale	SCAS	Cultural empathy and relatedness, impersonal endeavours, and perils	Ward and Kennedy (1999)	Survey	Sojourners
Multicultural Personality Questionnaire	MPQ	Cultural empathy, emotional stability, social initiative, flexibility, open-mindedness	Van der Zee and Van Oudenhoven (2000)	Online survey	Any

Note: This table is adapted from Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014, pp.154-169).

With an initial analysis of each assessment tool, it is possible to distinguish distinct categories across subscales, such as the following:

Flexibility: Used as a subscale in CCAI, ICAPS, and MPQ, flexibility is also commonly referenced in the terms identified by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) and referenced as personality traits in Johnson et al. (2006) model. However, Schaffer et al. (2006) referred to dynamic competence, meaning flexibility can be learned. Flexibility has been identified in previous sections to have a potentially positive impact on the UNMO effectiveness and is thus part of the initial KSA skeleton for UNMOs.

Openness: Subscale in CCAI, ICAPS, and MPQ is defined as a personality trait in FFM (Johnson, 2020) and considered stable (Schaffer et al., 2006). Several researchers (Bartel-Radic & Giannelloni, 2017; Li et al., 2016; Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009; Van Dyne, Ang, & Koh, 2009) identified that openness is positively correlated to CQ and thus also part of the initial KSA skeleton for UNMOs.

Emotional aspects: Largely used as a measure (i.e., in CCAI, ICAPS, ISS, and MPQ). Emotional stability was seen as a personality trait (Johnson, 2020) and as stable (Schaffer et al., 2006). Ang et al. (2006) argued that EQ is positively correlated to CQ, and it is thus also included in the initial KSA skeleton for UNMOs.

Self: Assumed to be referred to as a subscale in CCAI, GCI, and IES with subscales such as personal autonomy, self-management, hardiness, perceptual acuity, and perception management. Of these subscales, only self-management was referred to in previous sections by Konanahalli and Oyedele (2016) as being influenced by EQ. However, self-awareness, in reference to Konanahalli and Oyedele (2016) and Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998), was not addressed by any of the assessments' sub-categories. This suggests that the assessments do not cover all the aspects of CCC models and are thus incomplete.

Metacognitive: The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) and Intercultural Effectiveness Scale (IES) contain subscales such as metacognitive (i.e., capacity to learn) and continues learning. Metacognitive is a facet of the Earley (2002) concept of CQ and was defined as an antecedent in the Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) model. Self-monitoring as a part of metacognition was referenced by Abbe (2008) as a predictor that contributes positively to CCC. However, this positive aspect of self-monitoring is relativised by Kudret, Erdogan, and Bauer (2019), who argue that this personality trait may lead individuals at work to be inauthentic or use situational ethics. In previous sections, learning capability (Abbe et al., 2007) has been identified as important for UNMOs to be effective, and it is thus included as part of the initial KSA skeleton for UNMOs.

Motivation: Considering that motivation is referred to in the Johnson et al. (2006) IB model and the Abbe (2008) model of army leaders, in the Earley (2002) CQ model, and the Bartel-Radic and Giannelloni (2017) CCK model, it is surprising that the motivation subscale is only part of the CQS assessment. This implies that CCC assessments do not focus on full conceptual models but rather only on part of them. A potential consequence is that a specific assessment would need to be developed for the competency model for UNMOs.

Behavioural aspects: Behavioural aspects are part of several assessments' subscales (i.e., CQS, IDI, and SCAS). Behavioural aspects are referenced in the Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) model (i.e., HE); the Johnson et al. (2006) model (i.e., IB); in facets of Earley (2002) CQ, and part of Yari et al. (2020) definition of a global mindset. Accordingly, a specific 'behaviours, attitude, and personality traits' category is defined for the competency model for UNMOs.

Relationships: GQS, GCI, IES, ISS, SCAS, and MPQ have subscales addressing relationships or interpersonal interactions. The aspects of theses subcategories are also visible in one of GLOBE's (House et al., 2004) dimensions (i.e., assertiveness); one of the areas of the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) 7D model (i.e., relationship); and in the Abbe (2008) CCC model for army leaders. Furthermore, relationship management influences CCA (Konanahalli & Oyedele, 2016) and relationship building is critical for communication (French, 2012). The focus of this subscale in the assessments is strengthening the findings of prior sections that the

ability to build relationships is important in a cross-cultural setting and thus important for UNMOs to be able to be effective.

Cultural aspects: Cultural aspects are not subscales of all CCC assessments and are only part of CQS, ISS, SCAS, and MPQ. However, models such as Johnson et al. (2006), Abbe (2008), and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) clearly identify cultural aspects as components influencing individuals' effectiveness or performance in a cross-cultural setting. Accordingly, and as identified previously, this is a key aspect of the initial competency model for UNMOs.

In summary, a multitude of instruments are available to measure CCCs. These instruments are typically not based on a single score but tend to have several subscales. The measures are based on underpinning cross-cultural framework but often based on personality traits such as flexibility, openness, and emotional aspects. Accordingly, the instruments only partially cover the conceptual CCC models and thus suggest that a specific instrument to cover the competency model for UNMOs may have to be developed.

Furthermore, the instruments are based on self-reports either with pen and paper or online. Self-reports are useful, as they are easily done and provide relatively quick results. Nevertheless, self-reports have limitations. The results may depend on and be impacted by the experience of the individual taking the test, as well as their bias (Griffith et al., 2016). Additionally, in an assessment, the person could answer the question based on the intended outcome rather than their personal belief. Self-report is thus inappropriate as an assessment on its own but can give an initial indicator and should be combined with other methods for assessment.

As mentioned previously, while working in a cross-cultural environment, UNMOs not only need to learn about different cultures, but also to have the competence to manage themselves in a diverse team. In consequence, the following section reviews the D&I and teamwork KSAs.

2.3 Diversity and Inclusion, Teamwork, and Associated KSAs

Due to the international working environment of a UN mission, the CCC models, CCC, and CCAs were reviewed in the preceding chapters. This section reviews D&I theories and associated KSAs due to the high diversity of UNMOs in age, gender, military

branch, and background. Furthermore, the teamwork theories and associated KSAs are reviewed due to the organisational setup of an observer group. The aim is to nuance the KSAs identified in the CCC section by identifying overlapping, contradictory, and enhancing KSAs to strengthen the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

2.3.1 Diversity and Inclusion

Diversity and inclusion is a vast field of academic studies across disciplines including management, sociology, and psychology (Farndale, Biron, Briscoed, & Raghurama, 2015). Increased diversity studies in organisations and human resources (HR) are found in the relationship of workforce diversity and performance (Guillory & Daniel, 2004), as it seems that an organisation with a diverse workforce produces better business results than does a homogeneous one (Herring, 2009). Human resources plays a significant role in establishing the context that influences diversity and resulting performance (Lee & Kim, 2020). Additionally, practices to promote, develop, and implement strategies that support diversity in an institution have increased in priority (Allen & Garg, 2016). Studies on HR often focus on frameworks to achieve diversity in an organisation. There has been a shift from diversity research to inclusion since having a diverse workforce without the ability to be inclusive does not have a positive impact (Guillory & Daniel, 2004).

The concept of diversity is commonly used to reflect workforce heterogeneity in organisations, especially in recruitment, whereas inclusion is used to describe the ability of an organisation to leverage its diversity (Roberson, 2004, p.4). In other words, diversity is about obtaining the right mix and inclusion is about making the mix work (GDP, 2020).

In the UN context, diversity is a fact (Bove et al., 2020; Elron, Shamir, & Ben-Ari, 1999), and it pertains to the ability to leverage the knowledge available within the team and to respect differences. Moreover, research has been conducted to understand the impact of diversity on the mission. Bove et al. (2020) defined and explored dimensions of diversity in peacekeeping operations. They defined field diversity (i.e., among the Blue Helmets); top leadership diversity (i.e., Force Commander and Special Representative of the Secretary-General); vertical leadership distance (i.e., Force Commander and Blue Helmets); and horizontal distance (i.e., Blue Helmets and the local population). Mission diversity is defined according to nationality, including the

variation of military, language, religious, and cultural diversity. They concluded that greater diversity in the mission could increase peacekeeping effectiveness through communication (e.g., informative trust, informative communicability and persuasion) and resolving deterrence (i.e., wrongdoing of local actors) due to the commitment of the international community.

Diversity research often focuses on specific attributes of diversity (e.g., gender and race). In the realm of healthcare, diversity is associated with transcultural competence (Trentham, Cockburn, Cameron, & Iwama, 2007), which reinforces the need to review D&I theories in the context of this case study. However, research on diversity is not only conducted in the context of gender or cultural diversity but also on age heterogeneity or education diversity at work are also of interest (Lee & Kim, 2020), as such, alternative definitions of diversity include all types of individual differences (Herring, 2009, p.209). In this broader context, Gardenswartz and Rowe (2003) developed a four-layer model that aimed to include all types of differences, which were also referenced in UN pre-deployment training lectures on 'respect of diversity' (UN, 2017-L3.2) as represented in Figure 6 below.



Figure 6: Four-layer model of diversity

The first layer is the personality, followed by a layer of internal dimensions (i.e., age, gender, race, ethnicity, physical ability, and sexual orientation) and a layer of external dimensions (i.e., geographical location, income, personal and recreational habits, religion, educational background, work experience, appearance, parental status, and marital status). Finally, the outer layer is defined as an organisational dimension that includes functional level, work content field, team allocation, seniority, work location,

union affiliation, and management and status. This model was enhanced with the aspect of EQ to identify and develop competences with a highly diverse workforce. The elements which are viewed as important factors to develop are affirmation introspective, intercultural literacy, social architecting, and self-governance (Gardenswartz, Cherbosque, & Rowe, 2010) and thus these are attributes likely needed by UNMOs, as they operate in highly diverse (e.g., in regard to gender, age, experience, and branch) settings.

Hays-Thomas, Bowen, and Boudreaux (2012) developed a framework for understanding the specific KSAs necessary for effective behaviour in a highly diverse work situation. They identified three areas (i.e., value, knowledge, and skills) which are important for success in a diverse team or organisation. Furthermore, they found that the KSAs needed depend on the level at which an individual is operating (i.e., staff, middle management, or executive). In Table 6 below, the KSAs identified in their model are regrouped into the categories defined and established in previous sections (i.e., communication, D&I, learning, and behaviours, attitude, and personality traits). Additionally, certain KSAs could not be attributed to any of the categories identified for the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs. The commonality of the KSAs is that they are nontechnical and role specific. Accordingly, a new category is defined, named ‘professionalism’, and described as follows:

Professionalism: This category includes nontechnical and role specific KSAs.

Table 6: Categorised diversity & inclusion competence

Category	***Staff***	***Middle manager***	***Executive***
Professionalism	Constructive use of policy and law, understanding power dynamics, use proper line of authority	Macro viewpoint, organisational structure, organisational policies, relevant laws, ability to investigate, implement corrective action, ability to relate	Macro viewpoint, organisational structure, organisational policies, relevant laws, role model, ability to anticipate problems
Communication	Active listening, communicate appropriately	Active listening, communicate appropriately, ability to persuade, ability to resolve conflict	Active listening, being tactful
D&I	Self-awareness, value diversity	Self-awareness, value diversity, managing diversity	Self-awareness, understand the benefit of diversity, have a diversity plan
Learning		Create learning outcome	

Table 6 (continued)

Category	*Staff*	*Middle manager*	*Executive*
Learning behaviours, attitude, and personality traits	Positive outlook, open to new ideas, build healthy coalitions, empathy, self-monitor	Create learning outcome Humility, flexibility, empathy	Humility, openness to try new things, empathy

Note: D&I KSAs are categorised into specific themes previously identified for further analysis. KSAs are adapted from Hays-Thomas et al. (2012, p.138).

The definition of KSAs aligned with the organisation level reinforces that KSAs are context sensitive. Additionally, it suggests that the KSAs for UNMOs should be enhanced with the aspect of active listening and the ability to adapt one's own communication, if necessary. Other key attributes include having empathy and humility, being able to build relationships, and possessing a deep understanding of policy and law.

Turnbull et al. (2010) developed the Inclusion Skills Measurement (ISM) profile, which does not align with the above model. It contains seven constructs along the three levels of an organisation: individual (intrapersonal and interpersonal), group, and organisation (see Appendix F). The ISM profile is an online assessment; it was not possible to assess its usage for this case study. Nevertheless, this review suggests that the KSAs for UNMOs should be enhanced with the ability to conscientiously put effort into learning about others, being self-critical, adapting behaviour, identifying issues, and managing conflict.

In summary, with the review of D&I, several additional KSAs were identified as enhancing the KSAs identified in the CCC model review. The preliminary model for UNMOs should include EQ, as it is an important attribute of a highly diverse workforce. Additionally, communication is key, especially the skills of active listening and adapting communication. From a behavioural perspective, showing empathy and humility may be beneficial and thus necessary for UNMOs. Moreover, having the ability to build relationships is reinforced. Being self-critical and open to learning may also play an important role for future UNMOs and thus be part of the preliminary model. The capacity to identify issues and manage conflict adequately may also be an advantage. Finally, knowledge of policy and law also seems beneficial, which could eventually translate to following standard operating procedures in the UNMO context.

The UNMOs are diverse in age, gender, and military branch, and they work in teams. Teamwork theories and associated KSAs are consequently reviewed in the next section.

2.3.2 Teamwork

This section's objective is to review teamwork theories and associated KSAs to enhance the KSAs previously identified in the literature review. In the literature, the teamwork model and the teamwork-KSA tested by Stevens and Campion (1994) were widely referenced. Nevertheless, there were divergent opinions on teamwork processes and discussions on the validity of this test (O'Neill et al., 2012). Although the focus of Stevens and Campion (1994) work excluded technical KSAs, it did not suggest that they were less important. The analysis of Stevens and Campion (1994) model of teamwork suggested that part of their model could be categorised into the pre-identified 'communication' category of the initial competency model for UNMOs. The KSAs by Stevens and Campion (1994) that cannot be allocated to an already defined category are integrated into a new 'teamwork' category which is defined below and Table 7 provides the results of the analysis and restructured teamwork model by Stevens and Campion (1994):

Teamwork: This category is proposed to integrate teamwork KSAs, such as the ability to recognise and implement strategy in case of conflict in the team, to coordinate and synchronise activities, to ensure a balanced workload across team members, and to provide feedback.

Table 7: Categorised teamwork competence

Category	***Intrapersonal***	***Self-management***
Communication	Ability to understand communication networks and utilise a decentralised network to enhance communication where possible; ability to communicate openly and supportively (i.e., to send messages which are behaviour- or event-oriented, congruent, validating, conjunctive, and owned); ability to listen to judgment less and appropriately use the active listening technique; ability to maximise consonance between nonverbal and verbal messages and recognise and interpret the nonverbal messages of others; and ability to engage in ritual greetings and small talk and recognise their importance	

Table 7 (continued)

Category	*Intrapersonal*	*Self-management*
Teamwork	Ability to recognise and encourage desirable team conflict and discourage undesirable conflict, ability to recognise the type and source of conflict, confront the team and implement an appropriate conflict resolution strategy, ability to employ an integrative negotiation strategy, ability to identify situations requiring participative group problem solving and implement appropriate corrective actions	Ability to coordinate and synchronise activities, information, and task interdependencies between team members; ability to establish task and role expectations of individual team members and ensure proper balancing of workload within the team; ability to help establish specific, challenging, and acceptable team goals; ability to monitor, evaluate, and provide feedback on both team and individual performance

Note: Adapted from Stevens and Campion (1994, p.505).

This model reiterates that communication is important and that communicating openly, being non-judgemental, understanding non-verbal aspects, and being able to engage in small talk should be part of the UNMO KSAs. The feedback orientation seems to be beneficial for teamwork and thus may also be needed by UNMOs to be effective as a team. Feedback orientation is the ability of individuals to seek, evaluate, and process feedback mindfully and be sensitive to other views. It also refers to the ability to give quality feedback to others (Londona & Smither, 2002). Additionally, certain negotiation skills may also be required, as well as being participative in setting team goals and accepting team decisions.

The Stevens and Campion (1994) model excluded personality traits but referenced desirable attributes such as initiative, trust, openness, helpfulness, flexibility, and supportiveness. Nevertheless, other studies focusing on valuable personality characteristics in teamwork have been conducted. For example, Curseu, Ilies, Virga, Maricutoiu, and Sava (2019) went beyond the listing of attributes and attempted to measure the intensity of the attributes' positive impact on teamwork. They found conscientiousness, extraversion, and agreeableness to be personality traits that have an impact on teamwork. This strengthens earlier findings that personality traits in the context of the UNMOs are important (e.g., higher extraversion and openness to experience may have a higher motivational CQ; (Ang et al., 2006); moreover, agreeableness and extraversion are associated with all forms of performance and adjustment in a cross-cultural context (Schaffer et al., 2006). However, Curseu et al. (2019) findings also illustrate that the relationship between personality traits (e.g., conscientiousness) and teamwork have positive outcomes to a certain extent and then

decline again (i.e., inverted U-shape). Conscientiousness and agreeableness drop the most on the scale whereas extraversion only drops slightly (see Appendix G).

Individuals scoring high on conscientiousness are responsible, controlled, orderly, cautious, meticulous, and have a strong desire to achieve goals that could lead them to be seen as reliable and trustful. However, if an individual only focuses on their personal goals and tasks and neglects collective goals, this could lead to relationship tensions. They will be seen as stubborn and not contributing effectively to the teamwork.

Individuals who score high on agreeableness are seen as cooperative, considerate, trusting, easy-going, empathic, friendly, and receptive to different perspectives. However, individuals with high scores may put the needs of others over their own needs or those of the team. These individuals may also have limited independent or critical thinking, which could result in overlooking others' errors to avoid conflict. Individuals scoring high on agreeableness may take on the tasks of underperformers, overload themselves, and consequently fail to contribute effectively to the team.

Finally, individuals who score high on extraversion are perceived to have strong interpersonal skills because they tend to be warm, talkative, enthusiastic, trustful, and fun-loving. The downside is that an extreme extravert may be seen as showy, superficial, and disruptive to interpersonal relations. These findings could suggest that the personality identified in CCC and D&I models are beneficial to a certain extent but that an extreme score in any one area is counterproductive.

In summary, the review of teamwork models identified several additional potential KSAs for UNMOs. Communication is increasingly important; UNMOs should engage in open communication, be non-judgemental, understand non-verbal communication, and be willing to engage in small talk with team members. Being able to give and receive feedback and employ negotiation skills should not be neglected. The UNMOs should participate in team activities and accept team decisions. According to the findings, personality traits impact teamwork similar to CCC and D&I.

2.4 Conclusion to Chapter 2

The literature review identified multiple CCC models that have been developed, mainly in non-military contexts. The behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits

individuals need to perform well are similar across the CCC, D&I, teamwork, and communication models. Concepts in the reviewed models are overlapping or antecedents to each other and thus enhance each other. For example, a group with high CQ may perform better and share team knowledge at a higher level (Yari et al., 2020).

The CCC models have commonalities and are also contextual. Within a military context, the research conducted was mainly on vertical interoperability (i.e., towards the host population; (Abbe, 2008; Abbe et al., 2007; Gallus et al., 2014; Selmeski, 2007; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014). In the peacekeeping environment and setting, research focuses on horizontal interoperability (i.e., within the mission) and on the cooperation between military and civilian personnel (Bove et al., 2020; Odoi, 2005; Rubinstein et al., 2008; Ruffa, 2014; Sintler, 2011).

Based on the literature review, specific KSAs UNMOs need have not been researched. This indicates a knowledge gap. The UNMO context is unique in the sense that the teams are composed of personnel from several countries, and personnel from the same nation do not operate together. Building partnerships (Abbe, 2008; French, 2012; House et al., 2004; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997) with the different actors in the field; being open to others and experience (Bartel-Radic & Giannelloni, 2017; Li et al., 2016; Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009; Van Dyne et al., 2009); and communicating (French, 2012; Hays-Thomas et al., 2012; Howard-Hamilton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2006; Lewis, 2005; Stevens & Campion, 1994; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014) clearly contribute to being more effective in a cross-cultural environment. The synthesis of the literature review concludes with a proposed definition of KSAs for UNMOs:

Knowledge, skills, and attitudes that officers need to operate in partnership with all the actors in the mission and to contribute to the success of the mission.

This definition is the basis for creating a KSA inventory and initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs which is presented in the following sections.

2.4.1 Creating a Preliminary KSA Inventory for UNMOs

The literature review indicates that the CCC KSAs enhanced by D&I and teamwork KSAs can be leveraged for the UNMO environment. Specific categories are defined along the literature review to be able to analyse and compare the different models. The

resulting categories developed in the literature review are synthesised in this section. These are enhanced with a set of identified potential KSAs. The result of this synthesise is a proposed preliminary KSA inventory presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Preliminary knowledge, skills, and attitudes' inventory for UNMOs

Category	***Knowledge, skills, and attitudes***	***Source***
Experience (antecedent)	Cross-cultural contact and experience	Kolb (1984);Gallus et al. (2014); Abbe et al. (2007); Yari et al. (2020)
Learning (antecedent)	Continuous learning (e.g., persistence to identify new required skills/knowledge and acquire them), conscious effort to learn about those who are different, ability to share knowledge	Earley (2002); Johnson et al. (2006); Turnbull et al. (2010); Van Dyne et al. (2012); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012); Kozai-Group (2020); Yari et al. (2020)
Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits (antecedent)	Trustworthy, having integrity, open and flexible, not ethnocentric, non-judgmental, motivated, loyal, perseverant, self-efficient, tolerance for ambiguity, ability to self-reflect, having an open mind, showing empathy, having humility, EQ, self-awareness, ability to build relationships, polite, calm, patient	Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998); Earley (2002); Johnson et al. (2006); Gardenswartz et al. (2010); Caligiuri et al. (2011); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012); Van Dyne et al. (2012); French (2012); Griffith et al. (2016); Bartel-Radic and Giannelloni (2017)
Professionalism	Constructive use of policy and law, understanding power dynamics, use proper line of authority, organisational structure, organisational policies, role model, ability to anticipate problems	Hays-Thomas et al. (2012)
Communication	Understand verbal and non-verbal communication, local language skill, adequate English competency, ability to adapt own language and communication style, active listening, open communication, ability to engage in small talk, persuasive	Stevens and Campion (1994); Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998); Earley (2002); Johnson et al. (2006); Abbe et al. (2007); Spitzberg and Changnon (2009); Turnbull et al. (2010); French (2012); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012); Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014); Bartel-Radic and Giannelloni (2017); Bove et al. (2020)
Teamwork	Negotiation skills, conflict resolution skills, readiness to change, adapt to different style of working, proactive and participative, early identification of team issues, ability to integrate others, accept team goals, feedback culture, ability to capitalise on the strength of the team members	Stevens and Campion (1994); Grove (2004); Johnson et al. (2006); Turnbull et al. (2010); French (2012); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012); Curseu et al. (2019)
Diversity and inclusion	Awareness of self and own identity, ability to embrace diversity as a benefit, having diversity sensitivity, ability to take multiple perspectives	Stevens and Campion (1994); Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998); Abbe et al. (2007); Spitzberg and Changnon (2009); Gardenswartz et al. (2010); Turnbull et al. (2010); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012)
Cultural awareness and knowledge	Awareness of self and own identity, general cultural knowledge (e.g., generic to any culture, awareness of cultural differences); culture-specific knowledge (e.g., geographical, economic, historical, group value, awareness of appropriate behaviours); ability to adapt to a cultural setting; intercultural literacy; and broad SA and judgment	Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998); Johnson et al. (2006); Abbe et al. (2007); Spitzberg and Changnon (2009); French (2012); Hays-Thomas et al. (2012); Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014); Yari et al. (2020)

Table 8 (continued)

Category	*Knowledge, skills, and attitudes*	*Source*
External variable	Cultural and language distance, difference in economy, political and legal systems in the host country; cultural institutions, norms, practices and conventions; conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat	Johnson et al. (2006); Van Dyne et al. (2012); Abbe et al. (2007): Bove et al. (2020)

Note: This conceptualisation is based on KSAs identified in the literature review.

The next section highlights each category of the proposed inventory and proposes an initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

2.4.2 Creating a Conceptual Competency Model for UNMOs

The aim of this section is to further synthesise the findings of the literature review and to create a conceptual competency model for UNMOs. The proposed conceptual model includes antecedents, core competencies, and external variables that may influence the UNMOs effectiveness.

Several theoretical frameworks suggest that antecedents are factors contributing to the UNMO effectiveness such as experience, capability to learn, and behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits. Experience seems to have a positive impact on the ability to adapt and to learn in a cross-cultural setting (Abbe, 2008). Capability to learn has been identified across the models to be an important competence to be successful in a cross-cultural context (Johnson et al., 2006; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014). Personality traits and attitude play a key role in several models (Abbe, 2008; Johnson et al., 2006; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014). Consequently, these three categories are defined as antecedent in the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs. The analysis of different models and theories also indicates that certain personality traits such as greater openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and lower neuroticism may have a positive impact (Abbe et al., 2007; Ang et al., 2006; Curseu et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2006; Van Dyne et al., 2012) on the UNMO's effectiveness (see Appendix H).

Beside the antecedents the literature review reveals that a set of core competencies may have a positive impact on the UNMO effectiveness, these can be categorized into professionalism, communication, teamwork, diversity and inclusion, and cultural awareness and knowledge. These categories are reviewed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) D&I model indicated that certain nontechnical skills may contribute to effectiveness in diverse and cross-cultural contexts. Accordingly, a 'professionalism' category that covers nontechnical role specific KSAs are included in the conceptual competency model for UNMOs, as illustrated in Table 8 above.

Across the reviewed CCC, D&I, and teamwork models and theories, communication and languages skills (Abbe, 2008; French, 2012; Hays-Thomas et al., 2012; Howard-Hamilton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2006; Lewis, 2005; Stevens & Campion, 1994; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014) were identified as important KSAs. Consequently, a 'communication' category is integrated into the conceptual competency model for UNMOs, as it may contribute to the officers' effectiveness in a cross-cultural, diverse, and team context. This category includes aspects of communication such as communicating cross-culturally, as well as foreign language competency.

The analysis of teamwork models, especially the Stevens and Campion (1994) KSA model of teamwork, shows that to operate effectively in a team, communication is key (i.e., 'communication' category). Additionally, KSAs such as the ability to recognise and implement strategies in cases of conflict, to coordinate and synchronise activities, to ensure a balanced workload across team members, and to provide feedback are not addressed by the defined 'communication' category. It is anticipated that conflict needs to be addressed in a UNMO team, that work, and activities must be synchronised and coordinated, and that a feedback culture is advantageous for the team to be effective. A 'teamwork' category is thus integrated in the conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

Diversity is a broad construct, and according to Gardenswartz and Rowe (2003) model, it comprises various dimensions (i.e., personality, internal, external, and organisational). UNMOs differ mainly by age, gender, cultural background, and military branch. In a broader context, diversity is enhanced by different actors in the fields (e.g., police officers and civilians who are integrated in the mission or not). The analysis of Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) D&I model shows that the KSAs needed in a diverse context are nontechnical and role-specific skills (i.e., 'professionalism' category); communication skills (i.e., 'communication' category); learning capabilities (i.e., antecedent 'learning capability' category); and dedicated personality traits and behaviours (i.e., antecedent 'behaviours, attitudes and personality traits' category). Furthermore, aspects such as self-awareness and valuing diversity may also

be important for individuals (e.g., UNMOs) to be effective in a highly diverse context; accordingly, a ‘diversity and inclusion’ category is integrated into the conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

‘Cultural awareness and knowledge’ is a key category in the CCC models and is also critical for UNMOs. Models by Johnson et al. (2006), Abbe (2008) and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) have clearly identified cultural aspects as components influencing individuals’ effectiveness or performance in a cross-cultural setting. Accordingly, and as identified previously, this is an important aspect of the initial competency model for UNMOs. This ‘cultural awareness and knowledge’ category includes the aspects of both *culture general knowledge* (i.e., generic to any culture, awareness of cultural differences) and *culture specific knowledge* (i.e., geographic, economic, or historical knowledge and awareness of appropriate behaviours) as described by Johnson et al. (2006).

Finally, certain external variables may influence the effectiveness of UNMOs. This may be the cultural distance (Bove et al., 2020, p.2) such as the language, economic economy, and political and legal systems in the host country (Johnson et al., 2006); the UN cultural institutions, norms, practices, and conventions (Van Dyne et al., 2012); and the conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat that the UNMOs may face (Abbe, 2008). Accordingly, a specific ‘external variables’ category is included in the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

In line with reviewed models such as Abbe (2008) or Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs illustrates that antecedents (i.e., experience, learning, behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits) have an impact on the core competencies.

The core competencies of the proposed model (i.e., professionalism, communication, teamwork, D&I, and cultural awareness and knowledge) go beyond the discussed CCC, D&I, and teamwork models. Thus it is that the suggested model for UNMOs addresses a more holistic set of KSAs that may impact the UNMO effectiveness.

Furthermore, the model suggests that besides antecedents and core competencies, external variables may influence the UNMOs effectiveness. The idea of having external factors impacting the effectiveness is mainly influenced by the Johnson et al. (2006) and Abbe (2008) models.

Figure 7 depicts the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs. As illustrated above this model proposes antecedents, core competencies and external variables that are impacting the UNMO effectiveness.



Figure 7: Initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs

Based on the literature review, the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs with its associated KSA inventory is the basis for the further development of this case study, which consists of verifying and enhancing the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2019) claimed that there are several choices that underlie data collection and techniques such as philosophy, approach to theory development, strategy, and the time horizon. Also, they claim that a researcher is not an objective entity and thus there is a need to understand their positionality as it will impact the decisions made. Accordingly, this chapter illustrates the different decisions made after identifying the researcher's philosophical position and presents the philosophical foundations for the research. It further establishes the research methodology and strategy, clarifies the main data generation techniques, and describes the systematic data analysis procedure.

3.1 Researcher's Positionality

The term positionality is described as the researcher's ontological assumptions, epistemology assumptions, and the assumptions about the way that the researcher interacts with the environment (Holmes, 2020). The narrative used by qualitative researchers is influenced by their positionality and experience in relation to the studied context and thus the importance of clarifying the researcher's positionality (Greene, 2014). Accordingly, in the following subsections I position myself and develop the terminology accordingly. Also, I use the pronoun 'I' to signal that I am involved in the research, with its potential effect on the data collection and analysis (Fusch, Fusch, & Ness, 2017).

3.1.1 Researcher's Stance

This section aims to understand the researcher's stance and identify their impact on the research. It is important that a social researcher clarifies their role to make the research credible, especially when applying a qualitative methodology. The role taken can be from a group member under study (i.e., and 'insider'), in contrast to a stranger or an outsider (Unluer, 2012).

According to Chavez (2008, p.475), being an insider means that the researcher shares 'multiple identities (e.g., race, ethnicity, class) or profound experiences (e.g., wars, family membership)' with the context under study. Collins and McNulty (2020) emphasised that there is various level of 'insiderness' which are dependent not only on the researcher's perception, but also on the participants' perception of the

researcher's positionality. They developed a framework including four positions based on researcher interaction or belonging to the organisation under study: the fellow (IN/IN)[1], the guest (OUT/IN), the intruder (IN/OUT), and the stranger (OUT/OUT).

My perception is that I am an insider researcher because I was part of the group under study and shared common experience with the participants. My impression is that the participants also saw me as an insider. During multiple interviews, responses implying internal knowledge such as 'as you know' were used, as in the quotation of NOR-Capt (2015, p.3): 'Also, you feel really competent and good being around this guy. That's one really positive thing, but as you know we always have like small conflicts and everything'. This quotation suggests the that the captain saw me as an insider and a 'fellow' (Collins & McNulty, 2020, p.209) or as an 'indigenous-insider' (Greene, 2014, p.3). However, there are arguments that insiderness shifts during the study; for example, an insider may become less of an insider depending on the participants' shared experience or social identities such as age (Chavez, 2008). In contrast, an outsider may become more of an insider over time along its integration to the studied group (Collins & McNulty, 2020). As described by Merriam et al. (2010) I also felt that my position shifted mainly due to cultural differences between the participants and myself. Also, before the interviews, I socially positioned myself using a 'positional map' (Jacobson & Mustafa, 2019, p.3) reviewing several attributes (i.e., middle class, Swiss, white, primary language French, Christian, mid-forties, military, rank of major, and male) to help me to identify potential differences between the interviewees and myself. Accordingly, before an interview I thought about the potential differences and 'power struggles' (Greene, 2014, p.6) between the interviewee and myself. I tried to understand if I had adapted my behaviour (e.g., eye contact or use of language) or if the location might embarrass or disturb the participant.

Over time I felt more detached from the OGL and thus from the research, especially when I was no longer on the research site. I think that this also led to certain positive effects. Many people give low credibility to qualitative studies due to their potential subjectivities (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012); by being more detached, I was likely more objective and could engage more critically with the data. There is still

[1] The first word in parenthesis stands for the researcher's perception and the second for the participants' perceptions; IN means insider and OUT outsider.

a personal interpretation of the theoretical material in chapter 2 that led to the creation of the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs and the way in which I have interpreted and analysed my research findings; however, by gaining more distance over time and including the focus group as a quality gate, the findings should be more reliable and valid. Insider research has advantages, but it is also challenging. In the literature, several arguments are put forward on advantages and disadvantages of insider research in the areas of access, knowledge, and objectivity:

Access: In general, it is assumed that an insider will have easier access to participants than an outsider (Greene, 2014) because the researcher is seen as being 'one of us' by the participants (Holmes, 2020); trusted (Chavez, 2008); and credible (Berkovic, Ayton, Briggs, & Ackerman, 2020). In this research, I also consider that the access to the participants was easy, the COGL gave its approval for this study, and no one declined the requests to participate. Furthermore, I feel that there was a 'sense of connection, trust, and mutual respect' (Chavez, 2008, p.215) between the participants and myself. A complication of access for insiders could be due to internal politics (Chavez, 2008). In the case of this research, this could have happened between the civilian and the military components of the observer group. However, it did not occur most probably because of the good relationship that I had with all individuals. The literature mainly focuses on access to a social group with little reference to the access to site itself. It could be argued that the access to the OGL has its own complexity, as they run a military operation, and it is thus difficult for an outsider to perform research. I had the opportunity to perform this research while being deployed as a military observer, which was also unique and valuable.

Knowledge: It is assumed that an insider researcher is familiar with the group and the context under study and thus can orient themselves easily; have meaningful questions, have a genuine understanding of the culture under study (Greene, 2014); elicit more honest answers; and better understand the language, including its non-verbal aspects (Holmes, 2020). Another potential issue is that participants may assume that the researcher already has insider knowledge and thus the perceived obvious may not be mentioned in an answer. Additionally, the researcher may not ask clear questions (Holmes, 2020). As mentioned above, some answers assumed tacit knowledge, such as 'as you know', 'we talked about it', or 'the conversation we had'. However, these

were limited and the context was still built around such answers as the quotation from NZL-LtCol (2015, p.4):

> …the conversation we had the other day where we were saying that for people to have to translate in their mind, I'd never thought of it that way and the fact particularly people that are new to another language takes time to think and process before they can actually speak.

In my opinion, I did not encounter many issues regarding my insider knowledge. Additionally, there are arguments that a case study by an insider produces 'exemplary knowledge' which is interpretable in the context of experience rather than on theory and is thus legitimate and robust (Trowler, 2011, p.3). As per Greene (2014), to reduce the interpretation based on my experience, I used my reflection and interview notes to try to replicate the participants' meaning.

Objectivity: Insider research is often seen as too subjective, and that the researcher makes assumptions based on their prior knowledge or experience. There is a need to keep oneself somewhat distanced (Greene, 2014). Another risk is that an insider researcher may obscure the findings due to the political climate in the field (Chavez, 2008). To address subjectivity and bias, I critically reflected and on what the participants meant by their answers instead of assuming it from my perspective. As mentioned previously, the timeframe of the research helped me to be more detached and to critically analyse the data. Furthermore, the use of multiple data sources (i.e., triangulation) is an important technique to reduce bias and subjectivity (Greene, 2014), and I believe that the focus group, as a different data source with off-site participants, also helped me to be more objective on the definition of the categories and their relationships.

Besides the researcher's positionality, the researcher philosophical assumptions are central to making the decisions of the underlying data collection and techniques (Saunders et al., 2019). Accordingly, the next section describes the researcher's philosophical position.

3.1.2 Research Philosophy

Moses and Knutsen (2012) argued that a researcher's understanding of the world, the truth, and how it should be studied is the initial and compulsory step in defining the appropriate research design. Grix (2002) clarified the general tools and terminology of social sciences and illustrates the interrelationship between the steps or building blocks

of research. He insisted that the steps must be taken in the defined sequence illustrated below, and that a researcher thus cannot, for example, choose a preferred research method and then work their way back to its methodology, epistemology, and ontology. This means that the researcher needs to understand their beliefs before defining the research methods. The sequence illustrated by Grix (2002) is as follows:

Ontology: What is there to know? (i.e., the nature of reality)
Epistemology: How can one know about it? (i.e., the nature of knowledge)
Methodology: How can one go about acquiring that knowledge? (i.e., a toolbox)
Methods: Which precise procedure(s) can one use to acquire it? (i.e., a tool)
Source: Which data can one collect? (i.e., whereabouts of the data)

Moses and Knutsen (2012) refer to the methods as the tools or research techniques which are applied in the research, while methodology is the toolbox or investigation approach. In general, authors have different ways of describing the terminology, but they share a common core meaning and importance of the sequences. The opposing research paradigms are positivism and interpretivism. The difference between these two paradigms relates to their beliefs about the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p.9).

Positivism: Positivists assume that a real world exists independent of the human senses, that facts exist and can be discovered, and that there is a single and unique truth. Nature is repetitive and regular, and this regularity is measured using objective methods such as systematic observations of studied phenomena. Science aims to reveal these regularities, demonstrate causalities, and restate them in natural laws (Blaikie, 2010).

Interpretivism: Interpretivists assume that there is an uncertainty about the nature of the world and that it is not independent of the human senses. Its appearance thus depends on the context of the researcher (e.g., temporal, geographical, gender, ideological, and cultural). The view of the world is as a human construction; there is no unique truth, as truth depends on context. Knowledge is subjective and socially constructed; it is necessarily knowledge in context. The aim is to increase general understanding of a given situation by gathering rich data. The term ‘interpretivism’ is often used interchangeably with ‘constructivism’ (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p.9).

Table 9 below depicts the differences between a positivist approach and an interpretivist one.

Table 9: Philosophical approach

Theme	***Positivist***	***Interpretivist***
Ontology	- Single truth - Facts exist and can be revealed	- There is no single truth - Facts are human creation
Epistemology	- The researcher must be independent - The process is deductive	- The researcher is not independent - The process is inductive
Methodology	- Hypotheses and propositions - Verification, falsification, correlation, and regression - Theory generation, testing, and confirmation - Deductive (top-down) approach	- Starting points are questions or critiques - Triangulation and comparison, sense-making and understanding - Theory generation, new insight, and actions - Deductive, inductive (bottom-up) approach
Methods	- Predominantly quantitative methods	- Predominantly qualitative methods
Source	- Experimentation - Surveys, questionnaires - Structured interviews	- Focus groups, in-depth interviews - Observations, notes - Document, physical artefacts, and records

Note: Adapted from Creswell (2006); Easterby-Smith et al. (2012); and Blaikie (2010).

Each position has its strengths and weaknesses, and there is no best philosophical approach (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). These approaches are complementary; however, they need to align with the researcher's assumptions. A positivist researcher applies quantitative methods in multiple situations. If statistics are based on large data samples, then the findings may be relevant for decision makers. The weakness of positivism is that the methods used tend not to be adequate to understand processes or the importance people attach to actions. Furthermore, the generation of theory is difficult with a deductive methodology. In contrast, an interpretivist researcher applies mainly qualitative methods. With this method, the researcher observes changes over time (e.g., processes) and understands people's meaning. The approach taken by an interpretivist may also be more flexible and ideal for theory generation. The weaknesses are that the data collection takes time and resources, the tacit knowledge of the research influences the quality of the analysis, and data interpretation may be difficult. Furthermore, decision makers may give low credibility to studies based on 'subjective' opinions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The understanding of these strengths and weaknesses is important, as it may impact the present research.

Once the research philosophy is defined, the researcher needs to choose their stance towards the research process and their relationship to the research participants (Blaikie, 2010), in the sense of clarifying their role such as being detached or involved in the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The following subsections develop my philosophical perspectives and the stance that I take in this research.

3.1.3 Ontology

As mentioned above, ontology refers to the nature of reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). A positivist researcher includes objectivism assumptions of natural science and arguing that there is a single truth and that, as in natural science, social science has patterns that are observable and measurable. In contrast, the interpretivist includes subjectivist assumptions, arguing that the reality is made from perceptions (Saunders et al., 2009).

Based on these extreme positions, I embrace the interpretivist ontological position. This research is about understanding which KSAs and behaviours are perceived by UNMOs as important. These perceptions are most likely based on individual emotion and experience. I believe that these perceptions cannot be observed and measured and that a positivist approach is consequently not adequate. However, there is another objective that this research aims to achieve, namely, to improve the selection of UNMOs. A clear objective aims to contribute with a practical solution to a problem (Saunders et al., 2009). By including this additional objective, I still espouse an interpretivist paradigm.

3.1.4 Epistemology

Epistemology refers to what knowledge is acceptable, valid, and legitimate. It also deals with the aspect of knowledge transfer or how knowledge can be communicated (Saunders et al., 2009). As for the ontology, there are different distinct epistemological assumptions. For example, empiricism assumes that knowledge is produced and verified by the use of human sense and that it can be observed by a neutral trained observer. In contrast, constructivism assumes that knowledge is the outcome of people making sense of their environment. Additionally, it assumes that the environment is so complex that it cannot be observed. In consequence, all observations are based on the researcher’s standpoint, which may be based on experience and other factors

(Blaikie, 2010). This also means that research data (e.g., numerical, visual, and textual) depends on the researcher's epistemological assumptions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).

In learning theory, Kolb's learning cycle emphasises the notion of the experience where knowledge is created via the transformation of experiences (Illeris et al., 2009, p.23). In contrast, according to Illeris et al. (2009, p.83), Dewey defines experience with a future orientation and not as a past one. Dewey sees experience as both subjective and objective and views knowledge as a subset of experience. However, thinking and reflection are seen as part of knowledge creation. I also believe that knowledge is based on experience and that the researcher standpoint impacts the research results.

Furthermore, based on the 'Heightening your Awareness of your Research Philosophy' tool and statements (Saunders et al., 2009, pp.153-156), I believe that theories and concepts in social science do not offer complete and certain knowledge. I believe that there is not an accurate explanation of how organisations or teams are working. However, I accept that knowledge can be an enabler to improve an organisation or a team. Based on these epistemological assumptions, I reaffirm that I adopt an interpretivist paradigm.

I have included relevant information about myself as the insider researcher and about my philological positioning to allow readers to judge whether my bias and presumptions may have affected my data collection and analysis.

The next section details the research approach.

3.2 Research Approach

This section aims to demonstrate which research approach best fits the research question and my philosophical position. This research is as an attempt to contribute to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, with the aims to revise and adapt CCC, communication, D&I, and teamwork models to generate a framework that is appropriate for UNMOs in Lebanon. After a careful review of my positionality and my adopted philosophical paradigm, I concluded that the context of this research is interpretive and thus follows a qualitative methodological approach. Several

approaches may be taken to perform a qualitative study based on the research objective, as outlined in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Five qualitative studies

Study	***Objective and constraint***	***Suitable***
Biography	Telling the story of a single individual	No
Phenomenology	Study of people's experience of a single phenomenon; no injection of personal experience in the study	Partially
Grounded theory	To generate or develop a theory or a model; used when little literature is available on the phenomenon studied	Partially
Ethnography	Study of the behaviours of a culture-sharing group	Yes
Case study	Study of a case with clear boundaries in time and place	Yes

Note: Adapted from (Creswell, 1998, p.65).

It took me some time to identify the right approach for this research. To do so, I went through the definitions and objectives of the different types of studies to identify the right approach. This research does not tell the story of an individual, and thus biography does not fit the purpose. It could be argued that phenomenology could fit the purpose of this study, but the context of the research is broader than a single phenomenon and the understanding of the essence of an experience. In addition, no injection of personal experience is allowed and thus this approach is not followed.

Grounded theory (GT) involves generating a theory and building a model, which could be argued is also the case for this study. However, GT is typically used when little literature is available; it is thus probably not an appropriate choice for this study. Nevertheless, GT has valid methods and procedures to generate and analyse data which I also used in this research.

This research surpasses describing and interpreting the shared patterns of culture of a group; however, I am studying a community in which I have a shared culture and spent extended time in the field, and this research thus applies an ethnography approach (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998). Furthermore, as a case study, this research has clear boundaries. A case study is a flexible research methodology capable of providing comprehensive in-depth understanding of various issues across disciplines (Harrison, Birks, Franklin, & Mills, 2017). A qualitative case study methodology is clearly useful when studying a complex phenomenon within its context (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987) and is the preferred strategy to answer how, what, and why questions (Fusch et al., 2017), which is mainly the case for this research. A case study methodology supports exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory studies and

enables researchers to build, test, or validate a theory or model (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies may be single, holistic, or multiple-case studies (Yin, 2014).

Accordingly, this research can be seen as an ethnographic case study based on a single case study of the UN OGL. The reason for choosing OGL as a case study was the unique opportunity to perform a study as an insider in a restricted context while I was serving in Lebanon as a UNMO.

Several research strategies may be applied (e.g., deductive, inductive, and abductive). The choice of strategy depends on the research objectives (Saunders et al., 2009). A deductive strategy, for example, is used to test a theory and answer 'why' questions. An inductive strategy is used to establish a description of pattern of a social phenomenon and to answer 'what' questions. An abductive strategy is chosen to describe and understand a social life and is used to answer both 'why' and 'what' questions (Blaikie, 2010). This research applies an abductive strategy to identify patterns and locate them in a theoretical framework (Saunders et al., 2009). While there was constant and systematic interaction between data analysis and the literature review, the research is mainly inductive, as depicted in Figure 8 below.



Figure 8: Research approach

The data collection is a process based on several interrelated activities that need to be considered to gather good information (Grix, 2002). The design of the data collection is mainly influenced by Creswell (1998, p.110) data collection circle which cover

activities such as locating site/individual, gaining access, sampling, collecting data, recording information resolving field issues and storing the data; the sections thus cover the different decisions made chronologically along these aspects and describe which principal methods are available to obtain data, the methods applied in the given study, and how it was designed.

The next section gives an overview of the different phases of this research and describes the methods and the procedures to collect the data to answer the research questions.

3.2.1 Research Definition and Design

The initial phase (2014) pertained to the research design such as the definition of the research philosophy as described above. It further included selecting the case, defining the research questions and purpose, and designing the data collection methods (Blaikie, 2010). The research questions initially focused on cross-cultural competence and were further developed to cover broader KSAs needed in a cross-cultural environment. The goal of the data analysis is to answer the research question (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Accordingly the initial core category (Strauss & Corbin, 2008) defined was that of knowledge, skills, and attributes. However, to be able to create a competency model for UNMOs I then applied the techniques defined by Stake (1995) such as categorical aggregation to define the core categories and establish patterns to find relationships between the categories.

Creswell (1998) defined a case study as a single bounded entity that is studied in detail. In this case study the bounded entity is the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), part of UNTSO. During the research, the OGL had 55 UNMOs from 25 contributing countries, five international civilian staff from five countries, nine local civilian staff, and another 13 local civilian staff acting as LAs. The mission language was English, and the military personnel taking part in this mission were typically between 30 and 55 years old and have a mission rank of captain or major, with the exception the Chief OGL who has a rank of lieutenant colonel. The site was chosen because I served in this mission from August 2014 to July 2015, and it was thus a unique opportunity to conduct research in this context.

According to Stake (1995) a case study involves an in-depth data collection process involving various sources of information such as observations, interviews, and

documents review. Creswell (2006) referred to similar data sources for case study and includes audio-visual material; additionally, he claims that interviews can be conducted on one-to-one or one-to-many (focus group). In this case study there were no audio-visual material to be reviewed and the observations were not applied due to potential ethical issues (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p.262). The initial data collection design was thus based on interviews and focus groups, as outlined in Table 11 below, and where accessible, document reviews (e.g., training material, SOP).

Table 11*:* Data generation plan

Participant / Method	***Interview***	***Focus group***
UNMOs	15–20	1–2
LAs	2–3	
Mission Support and Security	1–2	

According to Levy (2006), the one-to-one interview is the most effective method to allow participants to speak openly. Furthermore, this setting enables the researcher to perceive non-verbal communication and pay attention to tone and emotion and thus gain a better understanding of the messages (Guion, Diehl, & McDonald, 2011). Interviews can be performed face-to-face, on the telephone, or via the internet (Saunders et al., 2012). However Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) claimed that telephone interviews are not advisable if a good relationship was not established previously and it also limits the researcher to perceive non-verbal communication.

Based on Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) interviews may be categorised as structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, or unstructured interviews. Structured interviews are based on a questionnaire and usually used in quantitative research. The advantage of structured interviews is that the analysing of data and coding is easier and thus ideal for inexperienced researchers. The drawback of structured interviews is that relevant information can be omitted. Semi-structured interviews have a list of questions, although they may not all be used during the interview Unforeseen questions can be included depending on the flow of the discussion. Unstructured interviews are informal discussions to explore a phenomenon in depth.

The advantage of semi-structured interviews is that the researcher can go deeper into a topic and better understand the phenomenon. The difficulty is that an inexperienced researcher may not be able to ask prompt questions and thus not be able to go into the required depth. Additionally, analysing and coding is more difficult than with a

structured interview. However, unstructured interviews are a flexible and non-directed method. The advantage with this type of interview is that there are no restricted questions. The researcher needs to be experienced, as data analysis and coding may be difficult, especially if the discussion was about irrelevant issues (Kajornboon, 2005).

Based on the advantages illustrated by Kajornboon (2005) I planned to perform semi-structured interviews to be able to go deeper into a topic and better understand the phenomenon. Semi-structured interviews have a list of questions, although they may not all be used during the interview. Also, unforeseen questions may be included depending on the flow of the discussion (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) making the final coding easier that with unstructured interviews (Kajornboon, 2005).

As an alternate data source and as suggested by Creswell (1998), I planned to review documents and reports but did not define which documents at this stage, as it was not clear to which documents I would have access for the purpose of the research. Moreover, focus groups were initially planned to ensure the research quality by reducing the subjectivity of the initial findings. A focus group is usually a setting with four to 12 participants but can also be performed with three (Morgan, 1997). The researcher typically moderates or facilitates the focus group to enable and encourage participants to discuss and interact on dedicated topics. According to Saunders et al. (2012) the advantage of this method is that it generates rich information. Additionally, I planned and wrote personal notes during the research on methodological aspects, theoretical aspects, and reflections.

3.2.2 Data Generation and Initial Data Analysis

The initial step before data gathering is to seek access and permission (Stake, 1995). Accordingly, the data generation phase (2014–2015) involved the approval of the Chief OGL to conduct the case study as designed. Also, informed consent, as described in more detail in Chapter 3.3 Ethics and Field Issues, is an important ethical concept to ensure that participants keep their autonomy and can decide whether or not to participate in the research (Miller & Boulton, 2007). Accordingly, participants must have a good understanding of the research to allow them to make an informed decision to participate in a study (Smith, 2009). The UNMOs were thus informed about this case study during team meetings, the participant selection initiated, and then semi-structured interviews started. The research participants were all part of OGL as

UNMOs, UN international employees, or local hired personnel. My assumption was that there were no power issues affecting this research.

The next section details the participant selection, data collection method, and initial data analysis.

3.2.2.1 Participant Selection

During this case study I used a non-probability sampling strategy (Blaikie, 2010) based on a 'maximum variation' sampling type to try to attain a more holistic view of OGL combined with an 'opportunistic' sampling type to be able to follow leads from previous interviews (Creswell, 1998, p.119). This combination or mixed sampling method also aimed to reduce my potential bias in selecting the participants (Chavez, 2008). The data saturation of a GT is usually reached after 20 to 30 interviews, and for single case studies like this one, it is generally achieved after 15 to 30 interviews (Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, & Fontenot, 2013). As I only had access to the case study site for a limited period of time, I made the decision to perform 30 interviews which, according to Marshall et al. (2013) findings, should be appropriate. As mentioned above to obtain a holistic view and include team diversity, the plan was to have participants cover the following aspects:

- UNMO and roles (e.g., chief of OGL, team leader, and line UNMO)
- Teams (e.g., ZULU, VICTOR, XRAY, and SIERRA) or HQ
- UN civilian component (local and international)
- Rank
- Age
- Country of origin
- Gender (At the time of the research, only three female UNMOs were in the mission.)

The 'opportunistic' sample and questions were defined or adapted based on previous interview outcomes. If elements related to specific behaviours, skills, or experience were mentioned during an interview, I sought to hold interviews with a person who was able to elaborate on the mentioned elements. For example, referring to the military experience needed to be a UNMO in OGL, IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.1) stated: 'I think that's probably the reason that most observers, I think nearly all observer missions would be professional officers, because they would have the experience in the majority of things.

In my case, you cannot be a Military Observer from Ireland unless you've already done a mission with the troops'. Based on this, the second interview was with a conscript officer on his first mission. In this interview, experience was mentioned in another context; CHE-Capt (2015, p.8) stated: 'We spend 90% of the time with those people coming from other countries, different backgrounds, different cultures. If you have never experienced that before, it could be a shock, but I guess we are all prepared for this'. During the third interview, RUS-LtCol (2015, p.2) noted: 'Most of us have more or less similar traditions, customs, et cetera, because we don't have like, like soldiers from African countries which traditionally some have specialties maybe totally different from others'. This comment led me to include a UN international civilian employee from Sierra Leon.

As mentioned, the data collection was based on 30 interviews and a focus group. Twenty-five interviews were with UNMOs (including two female officers), two interviews with UN local civilian staff (including one female), and three interviews with UN international civilian staff, as shown in Table 12 below. As suggested by Merriam and Tisdell (2016) the identification of the participants was mainly based on an initial informal discussion, face to face or via phone. None of the people contacted declined to participate.

Table 12: Data generation - interview participant overview

	Male	***Female***
UNMOs	23	2
UN Civilian (local) / LA	1	1
UN Civilian (international)	3	

Table 13 captures the participants' diversity in rank, nationality, gender, age, and mission experience. The interviewees had military home rank from lieutenant to colonel, covering 19 countries and four continents. Three females took part in the interviews. The youngest participant was 28 years old and oldest 56, and the mission experience was from first mission up to nine missions (see Appendix I).

Table 13: Participants

Nr	*Rank (in mission)*	*Nationality*	*Gender*	*Age*	*No. of missions*	*Time in OGL*
1	Maj	Irish	M	54	8	6 months
2	Capt	Swiss	M	34	1	2 months
3	Ltc (Maj)	Russian	M	37	1	12 months
4	Capt	Irish	M	32	3	6 months
5	Ltc	Dutch	M	49	2	12 months
6	Capt	Norwegian	M	44	4	7 months
7	Col (Maj)	Austrian	M	54	4	10 months
8	Civ	Lebanese	M	40	n/a	15 years
9	Maj	Chinese	M	36	1	10 months
10	Capt	Italian	M	33	5	11 months
11	Maj	Sweden	M	42	9	9 months
12	Capt	New Zealander	M	29	2	12 months
13	Maj	Danish	M	55	1	12 months
14	Capt	Australian	F	31	4	5 months
15	Maj	Russian	M	32	1	8 months
16	Maj	Fiji	M	44	6	7 months
17	Capt (Maj)	Danish	M	40	4	10 months
18	Capt	Finnish	M	50	3	9 months
19	Capt	Dutch	M	47	5	11 months
20	Capt	Russian	M	32	2	18 months
21	Capt	Canadian	M	40	4	10 months
22	Maj	Estonian	M	36	2	7 months
23	Col (Maj)	Austrian	M	53	6	11 months
24	Civ (ex NCO)	Australian	M	n/a	n/a	4 years
25	Col (Maj)	Chinese	M	40	1	6 months
26	Plt (Cap)	Swiss	M	28	3	6 months
27	Civ	Lebanese	F	42	n/a	15 years
28	Civ	Morocco	M	45	6	4 years
29	Ltc	New Zealander	F	42	3	5 months
30	Civ	Sierra Leon	M	56	5	15 years

3.2.2.2 Interview

In accordance with Creswell (2006), the aim of the interviews is to generate data to explain the perception of each participants. In this case study it was in relation to the KSAs needed in a cross-cultural environment such as OGL and the actions UNMOs can take to improve their competence in such a context. As mentioned, the core data collection was based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with UNMOs, international civilian, and local hired LAs (see participant selection section) because it was the most effective method to allow participants to speak openly while still following an interview guide (Merriam et al., 2010).

As recommended by Stake (1995) I initially designed a list of questions that was enhanced with issue-oriented points raised during interviews. The literature suggests that several types of questions can be used during an interview such as experience and behaviours, opinions, feeling, knowledge, sensory, and background or demographic questions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p.118). Also, as suggested by Merriam and Tisdell (2016) the design was based on fewer, open, and broader questions to allow discussion. The intent of this study was to make the interviews conversational. The main objective was to understand which KSAs UNMOs need to be successful on a mission and, to achieve this, the design focused on experience, knowledge, and opinion questions. As a design tool Patton (2003) suggests the use of a matrix of questions. Table 14 below illustrates the matrix used in this study.

Table 14: Question Matrix

Objective	***Question focus***	***Question***
Understand the context	Experience / Past	- What are the differences between this mission and the others you have been on?
Understand if UNMOs have cultural training	Knowledge/ Past	- Did you have any training on cultural differences before joining the mission?
Understand the needed UNMO KSAs	Opinion/ Present	- What qualities and abilities do you believe are necessary for UN Military Observers to successfully operate in a cross-cultural context on an international mission? - To what extent do you think that these qualities or abilities are important to the successful implementation of the mission? - Do you think that someone could accomplish the mission equally as well without these qualities or abilities?
Understand how to improve KSAs	Opinion / Future	- What actions can the team do to help someone develop the required qualities or abilities?
	Experience / Past	- What actions have you taken to improve your ability to operate in this cross-cultural context?
Understand the issues in the case study context	Opinion / Present	- Do you see the following topics as issues or problems for the team? (Reported from previous interview; e.g., English, driving, alcohol, age, military versus civilian, rank structure, gender, risk perspective, reporting differences, and observation difference) - What do you think is the biggest issue in the mission?

The process of conducting the interviews was designed as suggested by Creswell (1998). For example, the location was either the participant's flat in Tyre or OGL HQ in Naqoura to be free of distraction. Each interview started with a short description of the research and the interview process and included time for questions. Furthermore, I asked permission to audio record the interview, and participants reviewed and signed

a consent form. No participants refused to take part in the research nor declined audio recording. As suggested by Patton (2003) I made the decision to do audio recording to help me to fully concentrate on the dialogue, actively listen, and better observe the nonverbal communication during the interview. Also, as suggested by Merriam and Tisdell (2016) I used an interview guide (see Appendix J) and first asked about the participants' backgrounds, which included mission experience and branch as well as demographic data (Guion et al., 2011). Demographic information included age, rank, function, nationality, number of international missions, number of UNMO missions, and native or non-native English speaker.

The audio recording started after the description of the participants' background to ensure that participants could not be identified. In addition to the audio recordings, I documented theoretical and observational memorandums (Wahyuni, 2012). I began to ask questions from a designed list of questions (see Table 14) but the interviews were intended to be conversational and thus developed questions flowing from previous responses. During the discussion and as suggested in the literature I avoided 'why' questions as these may lead to speculative responses (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Furthermore, the participants were encouraged to give examples but were asked not to use names while doing so.

Finally, I asked questions about the major issues observed by UNMOs to ensure that the case study focused on a real issue and understood whether the issues perceived were culturally influenced. At the end of the interviews, as proposed by Wahyuni (2012), there was a short offline debriefing with the interviewees to understand if additional topics should have been addressed.

The interviews were conducted individually and lasted 30 to 60 minutes. All 30 interviews were conducted in English and face-to-face. Notes and/or recordings were transcribed into Microsoft Word as soon as possible following the interviews. The transcripts were rich and between eight and 21 pages with an average length of 14 pages. Each transcript contained between 2,806 words and 9,431 words, with an average of 5,882 words. The transcripts were not translated into my mother tongue (i.e., French) and were kept in English.

As suggested by Creswell (1998) attention was given to the data storage. The several information sources were saved on different media and all data were digitised. The

interviews were transcribed into Word and coded with coloured pens. To reduce the risk of data loss, the handwritten protocols were scanned, and backups of the voice recordings and data files were created. A file-naming convention was developed to ensure anonymity of the participants while allowing an easy way to locate and identify the files (see Appendix K).

During the data generation potential field issues had to be considered. These field issues are detailed in the next section.

3.2.2.3 Resolving Field Issues

Field issues often occur (Creswell, 2006), such as issues with data access, time commitment of the participants, and technical problems. The field issues related to this research included the following:

Participants: The research participants knew each other well. The risk was that discussions between them happened prior to the interviews, which could have resulted in a consented view rather than the individual's perception. To reduce this risk, the sampling strategy was to involve different groups of people (e.g., UNMOs, LAs, and staff members) and data sources (i.e., interviews, focus group). The focus group is detailed in a later section.

Language: The interviews were performed in English. Most of the participants (80%), as well as I, were not native English speakers. The risk was that the participants would not be able to express themselves in the necessary depth. Additionally, I may not have fully understood the meaning of what was being expressed by the participants. To reduce this risk, the aim was to record the interviews and, if needed, have participants to review the transcripts. Furthermore, I maintained contact with the participants to be able to verify the data even after the mission. Neither potential action was implemented.

3.2.2.4 Initial Data Analysis

Data analysis is a complex process to make sense of the data. The technique to do so involved consolidation, reduction, and interpretation of the data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The technique used coding based on concepts and aggregation of concepts, and on building relationship between the aggregated concepts or core categories (Creswell, 1998). As mentioned, I collected rich qualitative data mainly based on semi-structured interviews and performed a focus group to review the initial results of the data analysis. The data analysis followed an inductive-deductive cycle; however, it was primarily inductive (Blaikie, 2010). The next section describes the data analysis process performed during this case study.

As suggested by Strauss and Corbin (2008) after each interview and transcription, I started with a systematic process to read the interview transcripts and to make notes on the transcripts. It was an intuitive process with no predefined categories. This technique is usually applied in grounded theory but can also be applied to a case study in the sense that according to Stake (1995) there is no specific time to start with the data analysis. During this process I examined the data gathered from the interviews to find relevant categories in the transcript text and labelled them. Based on the initial literature review, I was looking for a set of skills, knowledge, and other attributes. After each interview, the set of new information (i.e., KSAs) was compared to the already available data. The initial analysis led to subsequent interviews, as described in the participant selection section, and as suggested by Stake (1995) the interview guide was enhanced based on previous interviews. Table 15 illustrates the initial 'low-level' concepts based on the interviews, document review, and personal notes. These concepts were a set of abilities or prerequisites.

Table 15: Low-level concept

to cope with differences,	to be open to criticism,	to be a fast learner,	to listen,
to manage uncertainty,	to adjust,	to manage stress,	to set standards,
to be and stay focused,	to not hide,	to stay friendly,	to make small talk,
to fit the team,	to give an opinion,	to not show off,	to be flexible,
to have capacity to learn,	to have patience,	to accept differences,	to not create conflict,
to say no,	to be open to new ideas,	to manage conflict,	to create consensus,
to have had exposure to other cultures,	to understand that everyone is different,	to be interested in others (proactively),	to keep it simple and not complicate things,
to be respectful,	to be humble,	to listen,	to ask questions,
to be responsible,	to be non-judgemental,	to be collaborative,	to discuss any topic,
to not impose one's own view,	to challenge each other,	to consult and cooperate,	to interact with the local population,
to navigate in a civilian environment,	to understand different communication styles,	to do the best to fit in the group,	to be neutral and impartial,
to trust oneself and one's knowledge,	to not talk behind others' backs,	to be willing to contribute,	to show excellence and make a difference,
to observe and try to understand,	to have knowledge of local (host) culture,	to build relationships and trust,	To have English proficiency,
to be curious or want to discover,	to speak up about issues early,	not to be individualist or egotistical,	to be able to argue (in a positive way),
to show excellence and make a difference,	to be friendly and to be seen as friendly,	to be willing to do it right,	to have technical and military skills,
to learn about and enjoy differences,	to know oneself and one's own culture,	to not accept the status quo and try to improve,	to accept and not fight the situation,
to have mission experience,	to be loyal to the mission, team, and task,	to integrate people on the team,	to deal with misunderstandings,
to take a step back and review one's own behaviour,	to read and manage gestures and eye contact,	to adhere to law and rules,	to not take misunderstandings personally,
to take a step back and review one's own behaviour,	to interact with people from different backgrounds,	to take task seriously and not fall into a routine,	to know and appreciate the quality of the other individuals,
to have the courage to talk about one's own feelings or point of view,	to ensure that what one expresses is perceived the right way,	to share knowledge, experience, and concerns,	

All the initial conceptual ideas that emerged from the interviews were captured in an Excel spreadsheet or an interview log (see screenshot in Appendix L), as were the potential impacts on the sampling or interview questions. For example, as mentioned, during the first interview, life and mission experience were mentioned and, in consequence, the second interview was with a person on their first deployment to explore this aspect.

3.2.3 Advanced Data Analysis

The systematic approach used during the advanced data analysis (2018–2019). The main steps done during this phase was as proposed by Stake (1995), performing a categorical aggregation, establishing patterns and visualization of the relationships

between the core categories. The last points led to the Preliminary conceptual competency model for UNMOs that was review in a focus group for robustness. The next section details these steps.

3.2.3.1 Categorical Aggregation

As proposed by Stake (1995) this step consisted of grouping the initial or 'low-level' codes into 'higher-level' codes to then define the core category. As proposed by Strauss and Corbin (2008) the naming of the core category was intuitive, and no predefined categories were used. To aggregate the lower-level concepts, I used post-it notes, as shown in Figure 9 below. The initial core categories were experience and knowledge, willing to learn, tolerance and respect, open-minded and openness, competitive and excellence, social skills and social intelligence, teamwork, and communication.

Figure 9: Coding

As suggested by Merriam and Tisdell (2016), after the definition of the core categories, I aligned them with concepts found in the literature. This inductive-deductive analysis cycle resulted in the following core categories: professionalism, military and operational skills, regional and local knowledge, teamwork, cultural awareness, emotional stability, attitude towards learning communication skills, social competence, experience and knowledge, and behavioural markers, and attitude. I then re-coded all the transcripts based on the new defined codes to identify all the supporting quotations.

3.2.3.2 Preliminary Conceptual Competency Model

The preliminary conceptual KSA model for UNMOs was developed as suggested by Stake (1995). I established patterns and visualized the relationships between the core categories which then led to the initial conceptual. This step was inductive.



Figure 10: Preliminary conceptual competency model for UNMOs

The preliminary conceptual KSA model for UNMOs was then reviewed in a focus group as described in the next section.

3.2.3.3 Focus Group

A focus group is a group of experienced individuals selected and gathered to discuss and comment on a topic under study. It can be done either prior to, alongside or after a study (Powell & Single, 1996). The advantage of a focus group is that the participants hear and can react to each other's responses or comments (Patton, 2003). There are several sampling techniques that can be applied to a focus group, such as homogeneous or maximum variation sampling (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech, & Zoran, 2009). The number of participants is proposed to be between four and 12 participants but can also be performed with three (Morgan, 1997).

I used the case study after the main data collection with the objective to review the preliminary findings. I decided to apply a homogenous sampling with subject matter experts, as suggested by Creswell (1998), and with fewer participants to allow the experts to share perspectives and to generate meaningful discussions, as suggested by Morgan (1997). The focus group was held at the Swiss UNMO course on 13 June 2019 at Stans, Switzerland with a duration of about 90 minutes. A focus group usually lasts for one to two hours (Morgan, 1997). The focus group participants included three

experienced core-deployment training officers (including one female), with UNMO and Middle East experience. I moderated and facilitated the meeting.

The goal of the focus group was to review the conceptual KSA model for UNMOs, as well as the KSA inventory developed based on the literature review and the findings from the data analysis. The workshop included a formal presentation on the methodology, analysis, and findings. The presentation was followed by a review and a group discussion on the specific KSAs (inventory) and on the initial conceptual KSA model for UNMOs. During the focus group, we went through the core categories and their respective components, as well as the proposed potential relationships. The codes were reviewed, and the descriptions enhanced. The relationships were enhanced during the focus group. I used pre-structured protocols. The protocol template includes descriptive as well as reflective notes. Additionally, I took photographs to record the product developed during the focus group, as shown in Figure 11 below. This example outlines the review of the relationships between the core categories.



Figure 11: Focus group product

The next and final phase of the research was to refine and to conclude the analysis and write the thesis.

3.2.4 Refinement of the Analysis and Report

During the last phase of the research (2019–2020), in addition to writing the thesis and as suggested by Merriam and Tisdell (2016), I performed further refinement and

alignment to the literature, mainly related to wording and data representation. This phase followed an inductive-deductive cycle. Finally, the labels and relationships were further reviewed and compared to the literature and UN training material, which led to the proposed conceptual KSA model for UNMOs with the associated KSA inventory. According to Creswell (1998) several methods can be used to represent the data, including a visual model, hypothesis or stories. In this study, the data are presented along with the analysis process, to represent core categories and a short description is presented. A section is presented to consolidate the main set of quotes leading to this sub-category. Figure 12 visualises the relationships based on the inductive process undertaken after the focus group.



Figure 12: Core category relationships

3.3 Ethical Considerations

In the military context, access and written reports are important points to be considered in relation to research ethics to ensure that the participants and researcher are not put at risk during and post research. This research aligns with the ‘Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures’, which was approved by the University Research Degrees Committee in September 2008 and November 2018 (UoG, 2008, 2018). I am committed to acting ethically and understand that it is my responsibility to ensure the well-being of participants in relation to this research. Furthermore, no known risks are associated with this study. This research does not aim to identify or analyse operational activities or review operating procedures from any armed forces. The following section elaborates on specific ethics concerns: informed consent and confidentiality and anonymity.

3.3.1 Informed Consent

As mentioned earlier, this is insider research as opposed to covert research. There was thus no need to seek approval from the Faculty Research Ethics Panel (FREP). The Chief OGL approved this research (see Appendix M). After approximately six months, the chief of OGL changed and the research was reapproved.

To keep the research transparent, respect needs to be given to the principle of informed consent. Informed consent is a concept that aims to describe and express the researcher-participant relationship to ensure that the participant keeps their autonomy. The participant thus has the right to decide to participate and to withdraw the research if they choose (Miller & Boulton, 2007).

All participants must know why, how, and by whom research is conducted to allow them to make an informed decision to participate in a study (Smith, 2009, p.147). To be transparent, I planned and informed OGL about the research at a weekly team meeting. The objective was to allow the potential research participants to reflect on whether they would participate in the research if asked. The first information was given using a PowerPoint presentation on 11 January 2015. The presentation included the research title; objectives; methodology (e.g., qualitative, inductive, and sampling method); and an overview of the ethical measures (e.g., participant consent, anonymity, and confidentiality). The team was also able to ask questions in relation to the research. I re-informed the team about the research verbally at two subsequent weekly team meetings. Observations were not used for data collection, as they may have raised specific ethical issues in regard to privacy (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p.262).

A consent form to participate was signed by all the interviewees with explicit information about the recording and deletion of data. This is re-presented in Appendix N. Participants could withdraw from the research at any point. The consent form explained anonymity and confidentiality. Although the participants had the option to verify the interview transcript and to reject the use of the data, no one chose to do so.

After five months in the mission, I took on a more senior role; nevertheless, the role did not have an influence on the participants. All the military members of OGL are UNMOs, independent of their role, such as mine, which was the Deputy Chief OGL. The only exception was the Chief OGL, who had a specific status. Furthermore, the

military component of the mission does not have influence on the civilian component. Accordingly, there was no power struggle (Greene, 2014) at any time and thus no advantage or disadvantage for participants to take part in the research.

3.3.2 Confidentiality and Anonymity

The subject of this study should not put participants at risk; nonetheless, it is important to preserve the anonymity of participants. Consequently, no names are used in the report. I also specifically asked the participants to not mention names when giving examples in their interviews.

To differentiate and compare the statements between participants, their rank, country of origin, gender, age, and function were used. Nationality and rank are visible in the interview code; however, the high attrition in OGL should prevent identification of the participants' quotations.

Additionally, there are risks with insider research that researchers may obtain confidential information about colleagues that could negatively impact their relationship (Greene, 2014). However, the information that I obtained from the interviews was not subject to this risk. Additionally, all information that I received was used exclusively for the purposes of this research.

3.4 Conclusion to Chapter 3

This chapter presented the philosophical foundations for the research, the research design and methodology, the methods of obtaining the data, and how the data were analysed and represented, as well as the ethical consideration. It also elaborated on my philosophical position, which I defined as interpretivist. The justification is presented as to why an ethnographic case study methodology is best suited for this research.

The data collection is based on 31 samples (30 interviews and one focus group) and documents reviewed. The data analysis was done in several phases. The first phase was in 2014-2015 while I was immersed in the case study site. During this phase, the 'low-level' coding as per Strauss and Corbin (2008, pp.50-53) was performed. The second phase was in 2018-2019, during this phase an advanced analysis of the data was conducted by applying Stake (1995, pp.71-79) recommendations of categorical aggregation and of establishing patterns to identify relationships between the categories. During this phase the core categories were also defined as per Strauss and

Corbin (2008, p.104) recommendation. Based on the core categories and the identified relationships, a preliminary model was developed. The core categories and the preliminary model were then reviewed during a focus group. The last step, in 2019-2020, was to refine the analysis and write the thesis.

Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Discussion

This chapter presents the results of the coding by describing and discussing the individual category that comprise the proposed conceptual KSA model for UNMOs. It also outlines potential relationships between the categories. Beside the discussion with references to the literature review, this chapter focus on the contextualisation of the findings. Accordingly, numerous quotes are presented as an attempt to fully reflect the perceptions of the interviewees.

The core categories identified in the data analysis are ‘Learning and experience’, ‘Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits’, ‘Military skills and knowledge’, ‘Professionalism’, ‘Communication’, ‘Teamwork’, ‘Diversity and cultural awareness’, ‘Cultural specific knowledge’ and ‘Cultural and situational variables’. The next paragraphs give a short description of these core categories.

Learning and experience are critical for UNMOs to succeed and add value to the mission. All UNMOs need to be able and willing to learn. They should be self-reflective and ensure continuous improvement. Having mission and cross-cultural experience may be an advantage for UNMOs. Furthermore, UNMOs should know what knowledge is available around them to be able to leverage it.

Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits are defined by having the social competence to build relationships; being open and interested in others; and being motivated, friendly, and respectful. It also has to do with emotional stability and the ability to manage uncertainty.

Military skills and knowledge are expected. Not having the required skills and knowledge may lead to operational issues. The aim of this research was not to review these KSAs, and thus the list in the sub-category is not exhaustive. However, this category is important to be included in the KSA model for UNMOs due to the potential relationships to the other categories.

Professionalism is described in this context with integrity, which is mainly about representing the UN, being proactive and willing to make a difference, being responsible, and behaving appropriately on and off duty. Dedication pertains to putting the mission needs before personal needs, and persistence refers to sustaining momentum.

Communication skills are critical to be able to socialise within the team and with the local authorities and population. Communication is more than English proficiency or having basic knowledge of the local language. It also includes non-verbal communication and the ability to listen. Furthermore, it is about the ability to communicate openly with everyone, to adapt one's own communication, and to ensure that there are no misunderstandings.

Teamwork in this context is defined as an individual's ability to adapt and to integrate a team and help others. It is also about not being an individualist but rather working in favour of the team, being open, and embracing a feedback culture. Finally, participative leadership is part of the category.

Diversity and cultural awareness refer to the ability to respect and include diversity to achieve the objectives. The aspects include cultural differences (i.e., in background, organisation, or country); gender; and age. The prerequisites are to know oneself, to be aware of bias, and to stay impartial.

Cultural specific knowledge is needed to be able to operate effectively. The UNMOs need to fully understand where they are operating (e.g., local culture and knowledge of the AO) and what is influencing the mission. To be able to fully leverage this knowledge, it is important to respect the country in which the UNMOs are operating.

Cultural and situational variables are external factors which may influence UNMOs (e.g., cultural distance, UN culture, military branch culture, and SA within the UNMO team).

Quotations in relation to 'communications skills' and 'learning and experience' were given in all interviews. 'Teamwork' and 'diversity and cultural awareness' were mentioned by 29 interviewees. The KSAs in the 'professionalism' and 'behaviours, attitude, and personality traits' categories were mentioned by 28 interviewees, 'specific cultural knowledge' by 20 interviewees and 'military skills and knowledge' and 'cultural and situational variables' by 18 interviewees (see Table 16). These figures do not signify that one category is more or less important than another, but they provide an indication of how OGL members perceived each of them. In this presentation, the interviewees are categorised into military observer, international

civilian, and local hired civilian. Furthermore, each category is divided into male and female.

Table 16: Category overview

	Military Observer	***Civilian (International)***	***Civilian (Local)***	***Grand Total***
	25	***3***	***2***	***30***
Learning and experience	25	3	2	30
Behaviours, attitude, and personality traits	23	3	2	28
Military skills and knowledge	14	2	2	18
Professionalism	23	3	2	28
Communication	25	3	2	30
Teamwork	24	3	2	29
Diversity and cultural awareness	24	3	2	29
Cultural specific knowledge	15	3	2	20
Cultural and situational variables	13	3	2	18

The following sections provide detailed descriptions of each category and their potential relationships, supported by relevant interviewees' statements and conclude with a conceptual competence model for UNMO to answer the research question: 'What knowledge, skills, and attitude requirements are important and effective for UN Military Observers?'. Furthermore, the interviewees' perceived attributes are consolidated and presented in the discussion to answer the research question: 'What behaviours would likely enable or prevent the effectiveness of UN Military Observers?'.

4.1 Learning and Experience

As per Rajić and Rajić (2015) lifelong learning in a cross-cultural context is important and it is for UNMOs to be effective and to add value to the mission. They must be able and willing to learn, independent of age and rank. They should be self-reflective and ensure continuous improvement. Having mission and cross-cultural experience may be an advantage for UNMOs; they should know what knowledge is available around them to be able to leverage it.

The following sections provide more detail and examples to describe the attributes in this category.

4.1.1 Ability and Willingness to Learn

Metacognitive aspects (i.e., capacity to learn) are identified in several cross-cultural assessment (i.e., CQS, IES); in Earley (2002)'s concept of CQ; as antecedent in Van

Driel and Gabrenya (2014) model; learning capability in Abbe (2008) models; as a predictor that contributes positively to CCC. Being on a mission such as UNTSO is also a unique opportunity to learn about the local culture of the country. To appreciate this opportunity, the officers should have an interest in experiencing the local culture and people and learning about the regional and local history. This knowledge not only broadens the mind, but it is also critical to be able to fulfil the mission. Additionally, daily work gives UNMOs access to the local population, and they should leverage this situation to gain more cultural specific knowledge, not only to increase their own knowledge but also to gain trust and to be accepted on the team. The following paragraphs give examples on how the UNMOs could learn and improve.

As referenced in Abbe (2008, p.11) model, IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.14) stated that more one experiences of other people's culture, the less this person will find them different. The interest should not stop at the local population but also include the other troop-contributing countries in the region. Learning capability may help individuals ability to adjust to different situations (Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014), accordingly ITA-Capt (2015, p.3) said, 'You need to be flexible and then to improve your knowledge very quickly'. This was supported by DNK-Maj (2015, p.14), who stated: 'You also need to be fast learner'. SWE-Maj (2015, p.8) noted that gaining knowledge may help to get accepted by the team:

> I think in the beginning, we try to get as much information as possible into our heads and show the other guys that we can cope with the situations down here, we can cope with the other people and so on. Then when we feel that we are accepted in this organisation.

Learning can also refer to knowing the other team members. Doing so may develop trust. CAN-Capt (2015, p.3) stated:

> You have to basically be open and listen to everything everybody says, but you also have to be able to be open to other people's cultures and learn from those cultures. Learning their culture is very important because it helps build trust and mutual understanding.

It is also about learning from the other team members, regardless of age and rank. This could be also consider as part of the desirable personality training 'curiosity' referenced by Johnson et al. (2006, p.532). AUT-Col1 (2015, p.10) was 54 at the time and stated:

> I am listing on young guys if they have good ideas. It does not matter the nation, the rank or the authority level. I am listening because I want to learn. I think that it is good for me, if it is good for the team.

Additionally, FIN-Capt (2015, p.10) noted in relation to younger and older UNMOs, 'I feel also that that is also good for both sides, because both learn each other how we are handling this situation'. Moreover, LEB-LA1 (2015, p.12) stated:

> To develop you have to listen and take from the other and you have to develop yourself. Even if I am 45, for example, here I have to listen to an officer, who is 27 years old.

As in the IB model (Johnson et al., 2006), being open to learn is important for UNMOs. In the UNMO context, learning relates to operational aspects, communication, and other specific topics. Learning also helps one to be accepted on the team. ITA-Capt (2015, p.2) stated:

> You have to know that your level of knowledge is very, not low but it's not enough compared to other people. You have to accept that what comes from outside is good for you to know and to add to your knowledge, opinions and even ideas.

CHN-Col (2015, p.5) stated:

> If you have responsibility, you can use your spare time to make up what you're short and you will get respect from others and necessarily is the professional. The professional I think is the aim. It should with the base of language and the attitude of the responsibility, and you can get the aim of professionals so.

This could suggest that one's attitude towards learning may lead to better team integration and more professionalism. CHN-Maj (2015, p.7) stated:

> I tried to learn more things. So actually, I did not care about how many tasks I need to fill there. I just try to do my best. So actually, if you focus on the learning and focus on the operations, you have not too much things to worry about. So actually, from a perspective I think my team leader also was very happy with my appointment.

FJI-Maj (2015, p.4) noted: 'It's mandatory for all officers who need to improve on the communication level. We have a lot of spare time. At least sit back and try and learn communication'. This may also reduce the risk that the lack of linguistic confidence might be viewed as a lack intellectual competency (Orna-Montesinos, 2013). He added:

> I started off the first two months but gave it a lot of effort to work and know the people that I was working. At the end you need to prove yourself and by

> proving yourself it doesn't mean after patrols you come back and have a rest. You push to be more competitive, more competent.

As per Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998), FIN-Capt (2015, p.16) suggested that it is important to be open to other cultures and to be willing to learn from them: 'Every nation from here gives something to you. You learn something every nation; I feel that. The Russians, Switzerland, Chinese, and other nations, you learn how to work with them'. When asked what she had done to develop herself, NZL-LtCol (2015, p.16) stated:

> I have loved talking to other people understanding about their own cultures and I've learned lots so much… I think my number one take away from this mission would have been the people that I've met and the things that I've learned about those people so that's been really good.

Learning is not optional; it is necessary. If someone cannot or is not willing to learn, it becomes an issue. EST-Maj (2015, p.12) stated:

> UN already choose you to come here, and suddenly here you are supposed to do additional learning, courses, tests and people can be a little bit upset about it. At the same time, all the knowledge is what we really need here if we don't have this kind of background information and every person has to be capable to learn... Certainly they have to be ready to improve or to learn all the time.

Having the ability to communicate in English is part of professional military practice (Gratton, 2009; Orna-Montesinos, 2013; Sintler, 2011) and it seems that higher English proficiency helps to acquire mission-specific knowledge. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.8) stated:

> Someone who has English as his mother tongue for him it's easier to describe a situation, to describe whatever he is seeing than for a non-native speaker. Although he might have the respective skills for that, so far it is definitely linked with also the linguistic ability skills but actually you need to learn.

As in the Johnson et al. (2006) model, the ability to learn about local customs and beyond is important. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.5) stated:

> I think that's a personal thing that people have to learn how to do it. I don't know. I think it's something you have to learn it, it's something you have to adapt to it and if I want to say something different between us as Lebanese and European. I don't know if you've noticed that many of Lebanese people or especially women or even men, they don't look at you in the eyes when you talk to them. It's not about fear, it's not about the yeah. We talk sometimes when a woman it's more kind of like respect. But for me personally I used to be like that, but I learnt that from dealing with the Europeans, dealing with

> UNMOs I learned that that's how I should communicate with people. So, also, it's a learning process.

She also stated:

> Instead of complaining all the time about the drivers on the road, about cursing about this thing or what the hell is that what the hell is going on here. No learn, okay we have differences, we are different but learn… The people in the car, in the patrol are happy and then no tension anymore.

4.1.2 Continuous Improvement

Continuous improvement refers to attempting to excel in the job. As in Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998)'s model, it involves self-reflection and constantly trying to improve and learn. Part of learning is to continuously improve as an individual and to ensure that the organisational standards improve. NZL-Capt (2015, p.9) stated:

> You need to be putting your best foot forward. You need to be struggling to make change and strive to excel. You need to ensure that the mindset on the individual who's coming over is very much instilled.

When asked about the ways of working within the team and if any team members had an issue accepting the UN-defined SOP, AUS-Capt (2015, p.3) referred to after -action review as continuous improvement and stated:

> I can see how that might occur and certainly I mean even from a personal experience, we might do things differently in our country. If there's an issue with something, we'll often do an after-action review from an activity that we have conducted, so that next time we can improve on those things that we didn't do so well, during the training activity or even doing a real-time activity… so that we can continually update our SOPs.

In line with the CQ motivational facet (Earley, 2002), she further stated: 'I think having motivation and just I don't know the specific word, but just trying to improve, constantly trying to improve, not just accepting status quo or a low performance rate'. DNK-Capt (2015, p.11) stated:

> I have seen especially one guy when I arrived who was very stiff, yeah but we have always done it like this. It's always been like this so I don't think we should change it. There's no need to change it. Everything that has to get better I think comes out of disagreeing, then you discuss and then you enrol something new. Yes sometimes you try something new, it doesn't work out, fair enough, and sometimes you will try something new and it works out.

FJI-Maj (2015, p.7) referred to self-reflection to improve:

> When they get agitated and after that they realise that they've messed up. They cannot pick up. They think that oh, so everybody hates me because of this, everybody hates me, so they start to self-sympathise. When they self-sympathise, it blows up. However, when you are mature about it, okay I did mess up, apologise and you move on and try to improve. However, some still cannot improve on it. That's what I really learned the truth with.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.7) stated observation as a tool to learn:

> By watching the other members around you in the team, you learn the social skills. The team environment learns a lot towards teaching the social skills, whether you are actually realising it, because you tend to copy and you mimic your team leader or a senior person in the team.

4.1.3 Having Mission and International Experience

As in Abbe (2008, p.11)'s model, several interviews revealed that the certain maturity and life experience is required to be able to act as a UNMO. The main reason mentioned is that UNMOs interact with local people on a daily basis and thus need to be able to recognise the importance of cultural aspects as well as sensitive situations covering the horizontal interoperability aspects as of Rubinstein et al. (2008). IRL-Cmdt (2015, pp.2,10) stated that an officer needs confidence, for example, to not be intimated at a checkpoint. It was mentioned several times during the interviews that age plays a critical role and that junior officers are too young for this type of mission. He further stated that the Irish Defence Force have the prerequisite that only officers deployed previously with a contingent are eligible to join a UNMO mission to ensure that the officers have experience dealing with different cultures. This is not only important because of the daily interactions with the local population but also because of the team setup itself. At the time of the interview, 25 nations had officers engaged as UNMO in OGL. This was also noted by CHE-Capt (2015, p.8), who mentioned that a lack of awareness and not being used to working with people from different backgrounds may result in culture shock. The following aspects are covering challenges of horizontal interoperability (Rubinstein et al., 2008).

FIN-Capt (2015, p.3) gave an example of being able to understand civilian structure:

> It's good that you are a little bit older, because if you have family in your home country and so on, then you understand much better also in this the order of living in this area… you understand your counterpart much better when you are older... you are much awareness what has happened and what is ongoing.

This was reinforced by AUT-Col2 (2015, p.10) who stated that having civilian experience may be of advantage:

> Skills to be brought by the UNMOs to, I think even the officers with a coming from their countries, from a reserve army like the Swiss do cope with that situation easier than regular officers being at home stuck into a complete military hierarchy system rarely dealing with civilians or not so often at least dealing with civilians.

NOR-Capt (2015, p.6) stated that in his point of view, it is more important to have life experience and to deal with other people than to have combat experience such as a mission in Afghanistan. In contrast, LEB-LA1 (2015, p.5) noted that officers with combat experience seem to be more professional than others: 'They can react quicker and think quicker that the guys who have been in a mission here'. Nevertheless, he stated that it was not the most important for the mission, as there were no major clashes currently. RUS-Capt (2015, p.11) stated that too much experience can also be negative:

> So many people here with so different experience. Like five, six missions and it's not like a UN mission they are real combat missions with the combat experience and then they bring it here. Sometimes some people they have too much experience and you think okay yeah, the way I think is the best way well it's not like that here but still.

NOR-Capt (2015, p.2) was one of the four deputy team leaders and stated that officers coming to the mission should have experienced other countries than their own, for example by travelling, and have experience speaking English. He gave the example of Chinese officers and stated: 'It looks like everything is new for them… you have to explain everything deeper that you would with others'. He also mentioned age and stated that for him an ideal age to be a UNMO is approximately 35 but not in the twenties or the fifties, where the high level of experience could be negative. ITA-Capt (2015, pp.3-4) noted that life experience is important and that officers who are 25 or 26 could be a problem. SWE-Maj (2015, p.5) stated that experience also comes with age:

> The work we are doing requires a certain level of age because you want the individuals to have some sort of background from the normal life, you have to have experienced a few situations like backlashes or what you are saying in life, to cope with them, you have hopefully a little bit better judgment when you get older.

When asked what his life experience was in the interview, he stated:

> It's also important to have like life experience with people passing away back home, also being disappointed of friends back home and so on. You know how to handle when everything is not as smooth as possible.

DNK-Maj (2015, p.2), age 55, stated that age should be considered:

> I was actually surprised that there are so many young officers in OGL, or in UNTSO. I have a little impression that it would be age 40 and over something... not because they don't do a good job, but I think in looking in a whole perspective.

In contrast, NZL-Capt (2015, p.9), age 29, noted: 'The age groups and the minimum ranks, to come on this mission is captain. In order to get to captain, you need to conduct a significant period of time, to be deemed competent to achieve that rank'. However, looking older can be positive in the region, as UNMOs have a great deal of interaction with senior local people like mayors (i.e., *mukhtars*). AUT-Col1 (2015, p.2) gave an example of one of his missions in Syria: 'They spoke to me and not to the young company commander in the region. It was for me a very good experience to see how people are thinking here'. The colonel suggested that the officers should go on at least one or two missions before joining UNTSO.

Positive experience may also be due to the environment the officers come from. For example, FIN-Capt (2015) stated:

> We have a lot of experience those kinds of events that the driving skills are different. Of course, I feel that the Finnish guys in Finland they are quite good travellers [drivers], because we have a wintertime in there, we have a summertime in there, so we have a lot of experience with those kinds of conditions. Maybe other countries they have only in the summertime experience to drive the car. That might be dangerous, for example, in wintertime and those kinds of cars driving in the winter where it's just snow and where it's slippery and so on, because he has no experience how to handle the car, and what has to be take advice how to handle the car when you're driving speed limits and so on.

Experience can be seen as negative, as well. LEB-LA1 (2015, p.13) stated: 'the Australians and the New Zealand and Austrian, they think they are more professional. Because they are more experienced'. IRL-Capt (2015, p.3) noted that experience could have a negative result. Where a younger officer may be more interested, eager, and looking for ways to approach things, older officers may be less eager to try things (e.g., 'There is no point, it's a waste of time. I have seen this before, and you are not going to change anything'). Another example was given by CAN-Capt (2015, p.8) on risk awareness:

> It seems like the people who would probably be more comfortable have a lot of experience with mines one way or another, but that's not necessarily a good thing. Because they have like a lazy fear attitude towards that.

4.1.4 Ability to Leverage Available Experience and Knowledge

An aspect that was not referenced in the models reviewed was knowing where the knowledge is. However, it could be argued that this aspect is covered in the 'Ability to encourage and capitalise on the diverse contributions' of the Inclusion Skills Measurement Profile (Turnbull et al., 2010). Knowing where the knowledge is, is an important aspect of an organisation with a high attrition such as OGL. DNK-Capt (2015, p.11) stated that the experience is not fully leveraged:

> I think the young ones they need to learn, because I had a very young team here when I started here, and they did an excellent job. But they sometimes forgot to use the experience they had within the team… sometimes remember to know use the whole team... It could be because you had some experience that had already worked in the Middle East or experience just because they have been used to going to meetings. They might have been working in the ministry of defence in their home country, so they're used to working at a political level.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.5) stated that specialists need to be identified:

> Everyone here has a strength. So, somebody is specialist in this part, and somebody is specialist in that part. So, when we have, for example, a week of training, so we can plan those our training program using our team members' skills that they give those own special skills to the teams.

RUS-Capt (2015, p.13) noted that experience need to be shared but not imposed: 'Well, since they have so many experience I expect them to share this experience but not push it'. AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.4) stated: 'It's really important the spread of the experience across the teams is done wisely, so the new ones can easily fit in and learn quickly off the older ones and the ones that have been before'.

4.1.5 Discussion

Key findings in relation to learning from the literature review (see Table 8) include: continuous learning (e.g., persistence to identify new required skills and knowledge and to acquire them); conscious effort to learn about these who are different; and ability to share knowledge. The aspect of experience was mainly about cross-cultural contact and previous experience in cross-cultural settings. These categories were also identified and applicable in the context of this research. However, the finding is that the aspects reflected in this category go beyond those identified in the literature review.

Learning is a critical element. As mentioned, the willingness and ability to learn may impact all the other categories identified. Learning about others and displaying interest in them may help to build trust. Learning is independent of age and rank; older officers should be able to learn from the younger, as well as the younger from the older, independent of rank. The ability to observe and improve communication is important in building relationships. Having cultural specific knowledge (Johnson et al., 2006) may increase the acceptance of the officer on the team and increase officers' professionalism. Additionally, a continuous improvement mindset is important. Although drastic change may not occur, the officers are expected to try to excel in their activities and continuously improve. A prerequisite for continuous improvement is the ability to self-reflect and listen to feedback. Commitment to continuous learning is also a UN core competency (UN, 2017-L3.1).

Experience is part of the Johnson et al. (2006) and Abbe (2008) CCC models and is important part of the learning process (Kolb, 1984). Having experience and specific knowledge beyond military skills may be an important prerequisite for UNMOs. Experience can be seen as related to the age, maturity, or international or mission experience of officers. For example, age can be positive in a society where age is respected and part of the hierarchy and thus impacts task execution. Several interviewees mentioned lived experience as a prerequisite. Lived experience is seen as having faced issues from different perspectives (e.g., having children or having faced death). Moreover, UNMOs are exposed to civilians and thus experience in a civilian context is an advantage. Having international experience or language experience has its own importance. Additionally, the officers need to accept that change takes time and not try to change everything and everyone. The ability to share experience without imposing it is also important. This last point is linked to teamwork.

Nevertheless, experience may not necessarily be positive in the sense that negative experiences may influence the openness of the officers. Multiple deployments in the same mission may lead officers not to invest themselves as much because they have the impression that nothing will change. Another example is the experience with mines, where the risk can be relativised, and attention reduced. Combat experience may lead some officers to feel more knowledgeable than others and negatively influence their SA. In consequence, the awareness of one's own experience and bias needs to be managed. The sub-categories that cover 'learning and experience' in the

context of the UNMOs in Lebanon are: ability and willingness to learn; continuous improvement; having mission and international experience; and ability to leverage available experience.

Abbe et al. (2007) suggest experience and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) capability to learn as antecedent in their respective cross-cultural models. The findings show that this is also legitimate for the KSA model for UNMOs.

The sub-categories that compose the categories are as follows:

Ability and willingness to learn: Johnson et al. (2006, p.530) included the ability and the aptitude to learn in their model and argue that personal skills and cultural knowledge may be gained via learning and training. Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) identified the ability to create learning outcomes as important in their D&I model. Similar aspects identified in this research cover attributes such as willingness to learn from others, willingness to listen to others even if not agreeing with them, openness and ability to learn about difference and willingness to learn from younger or older officers.

Continuous improvement: Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) include 'engage in self-reflection' in the intercultural competence model. The attribute of self-reflection is also identified in this study; however, it goes beyond with aspects such as willingness to change and to excel.

Having mission and international experience: Abbe (2008) CCC model covered aspects of experience that may influence an individual's ability of to adjust and handle various situations. The attributes perceived as important are having life experience, having been exposed to different countries, environment, languages, and cultures, understanding the civilian mindset, and not being biased by one's own experience.

Ability to leverage available experience and knowledge: The aspect of leveraging available knowledge was not identified as such in the literature review; however, in a context of a high attrition such as a UNMO group, it seems to be important. The attributes perceived as important are knowing one's own strengths, knowing where the knowledge is in the organisation, and having the ability to share experience.

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between the learning and experience to other categories such as:

Military skills and knowledge: Mission experience can impact sub-category (e.g., driving skills).

Professionalism: If learning willingness is not available, then the learning of the mission context and the understanding of the actors in the fields may be limited.

Communication skills: If learning willingness is not available, then the improvement of English skills is limited.

Teamwork: The ability to learn may help to be accepted by the team.

Diversity and cultural awareness: Learning about the others and thus understanding the difference which may or may not happen.

Cultural specific knowledge: If learning willingness is not available, then learning about local and regional aspects may be limited.

Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits: Self-reflection will help to identify positive or negative self-behaviours and allow the UNMOs to take the measures to correct them.

The next section reviews the 'behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits' category.

4.2 Behaviours, Attitudes, and Personality Traits

The preliminary model developed in the literature review identified the following behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits as beneficial for UNMOs: being trustworthy; having integrity; being open and flexible; not being ethnocentric; being non-judgmental, motivated, loyal, perseverant, and self-efficient; having tolerance for ambiguity; able to self-reflect; having an open mind; showing empathy; being emotionally intelligent; having self-awareness; able to build relationships; and being polite, calm, and patient (see Table 8).

These qualities were also recognised during the interviews. Additional desirable traits identified for the UN military context are to be generous, be patient, accept the situation, manage misunderstandings, have a sense of humour, and manage time appropriately. The sub-categories that cover 'behaviours, attitude, and personality traits' in the context of the UNMOs in Lebanon are defined as social competence, behavioural markers and attitude, and emotional stability.

The expectation is that officers deployed as UNMOs are high in agreeableness, conscientious and openness, enough extraversion to be able to socialise, and low in neuroticism. For example, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.5) stated:

> The fact that they are quiet, and they are reserved and they are not outspoken, introvert not extrovert, I found really doesn't matter because when you talk with them one-on-one or when they are doing the job, they know what they are doing.

Nevertheless, the officers need to be talkative enough to be able to build relationships within the team, as well as with the civilian part of the organisation and the local population, while keeping a low profile. Several examples given suggest that personality traits may be more important attributes than other skills such as military skills and knowledge or English proficiency. These KSAs are described in more detail in the following subsections.

4.2.1 Social Competence

Social competence is defined in the context of this case study as being oriented to the other, such as the ability to build relationships, as well as being open and interested in others. Officers should be interested in others and able to build relationships. This may positively impact the requirement to respect diversity and to be inclusive. In addition, the officers with a higher level of openness may have higher performance.

4.2.1.1 Ability to Build Relationships

Several cross-cultural assessments have relationship or interpersonal interactions aspects as a subscale (e.g., GQS, GCI, IES, ISS, SCAS, and MPQ). The aspects of relationship are also visible in several models such as 'assertiveness' in House et al. (2004) model; 'relationship' in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997); or in Abbe (2008) CCC model for army leaders. Furthermore, according to French (2012) relationship building is critical for communication. When asked about the teamwork between civilian and military components of the mission, FIN-Capt (2015, p.12) stated that it helps to be open to build a relationship:

> Basically, also those friendship that you build up with them, because you have to know that we working here maybe six months, maybe one year, but they have worked in here several years... You have to figure out the basic things, and then discuss what's going to be solution and build up very good atmosphere... When you are open-minded, of course they are also open-minded towards you.

CHN-Col (2015, p.5) stated that building a relation with everybody is important:

> You should have social competence to get a good relation with each other from different culture, different country. If you most times if you gave the others a good response and you can get a good response too.

Relationship building is important for the team. For example, RUS-Capt (2015, p.5) stated:

> Our mission is to observe and report violations, yes you can do it with pretty much any person. You go to the car you sit, you drive, you observe, you see something, "Do you agree with it?", "Yes, I agree," you write it down done, our job is done. We spend most of us will spend one year here away from families, away from our environment that we are used to. That's where the psychological part and welfare part comes to play. We need to think about time when we are not in patrol and we still need to interact with people because we live together for a week, 10 days then we go back to team and then again, we will live together with other people. It has no direct implementation on our mission here, we are still able to observe and report but if we are talking about healthy environment, we really need to have those qualities.

SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.3) stated that relationship is significant to be able to operate as a team:

> We are working as a team and either military or civilians we are here for one aim… We're here to support each other. You need my support; I need your support. You cannot operate alone; I cannot operate alone. So, if we don't have that peaceful relationship, I don't think we can achieve our goal.

It is also important to build good relations with the local actors. AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.7) stated:

> To become friendlier and approachable and indirect on a level that the local can interact with them, not at a higher level that, in the middle east if you are coming from a higher level down end you are seen as a snob, or the perceptions is you see you are higher than an Arab person. For example, in Lebanon, the people will shut off to you. If you want to interact and get information you require from them or become friends with them for future sharing of information you must, come down to the level where they understand. Whether it's having coffee with them, or tea with them, shaking their hands, learning a few words of the local language, understanding what the customs are. You must be able to interact in those. People with no social skills find that very hard. You cannot be an introvert to the extent where you don't want to interact with people, to be a good observer.

This suggests that having strong social skills could lead to better operational and military skills and knowledge such as information gathering.

4.2.1.2 Being Open to Others

As identified in the literature review openness is an important aspect in a cross-cultural setting (Bartel-Radic & Giannelloni, 2017; Li et al., 2016; Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009; Van Dyne et al., 2009). For CHE-Capt (2015, p.8), a prerequisite to building relationships is to be open and able to talk to other team members and ask questions. If one is not open and willing to share, then a wall will be built, and it will become too difficult to operate with this person. 'Able to talk with other team members' could be seen as an indication of extraversion and 'interested in others' as openness. Even with the multiple facets of the comments, the core idea is relationship building, which could also be seen as part of the FFM attribute of agreeableness. DNK-Capt (2015, p.17) stated that you need to be close to the others:

> At the end of the day, if you and me are patrolling together if something happens, you are my best friend right there. We need to figure this out together. We need to have each other's back. I think we need to really have some discussions.

This was supported by LEB-LA1 (2015, p.7) stated:

> Here we should really be like a family. Like, you have to behave, like he is your colleague, because you live together. You drive in the same car. If something happened to you, and this guy, he is not happy for me, or he is not really happy to work with you, but he has to work with you, this is your life saver. So, you have to, with all nationalities, even if you think he is not as professional as you, but he is your colleague.

Furthermore, CAN-Capt (2015, p.3) reinforced that officers need to get well along, he stated:

> If you have a team that isn't working well together then they might overlook things, they might not say things to each other, they might not communicate essential details. I have seen this on the plane for example where you have two pilots that are arguing, and they are arguing almost to the extent that they are going to die that's just because they refuse to talk to each other. The same thing could happen here usually, two people who are just not getting along they sit in the car all day they don't speak to each other it could be very bad.

Social skills are occasionally an issue. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.4) stated: '…they are all coming with their respective military skills and abilities. These I have not experienced as being an issue. It's more the social part which is an issue'. Additionally, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.6) stated:

> They (UNMOs) should have good social skills, should understand that as a UNMO that you are going to be interacting with the civilian staff within and outside of the UN, whether its local taxi drivers, local people that you meet near the accommodation where they live or civilian staff asking for supplies or transport. They have to have an understanding of the civilians' mindset as well.

4.2.1.3 Being Interested in Others

As in HE's model of Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) the interest in cross-cultural interaction is seen as an enhancing factor. The quotations in this sub-category further explain the requirement of being interested in others. For example, NZL-Capt (2015, p.8) stated that a sense of comradeships need to be developed:

> You do develop a sense of comradeship with some of the countries that you've never worked for, for instance the Russians, the Chinese, Italians. You do build a very good bond with those guys.

And that officers need to be interested in the others (Ibid., p.12):

> As soon as you're able to understand a specific culture and how people work and operate, then automatically that improves your own perspective… if you take interest in individual's background and their culture, you automatically get a bit of understanding of the individual.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.11) suggested that being interested in the other team members helps to create trust and build relationships:

> When working inside the team, so you learn very quickly the person who's working with you, and you build up relationships to him. When you get friendships in those guys, so then you trust also in those guys. But most important you have to build up the relationships, every member who are working inside the team.

Moreover, ITA-Capt (2015, p.2) stated that relationships are important and that 'you need to have a good personality and appreciate the other culture, appreciate other nations'. CHE-1stLt (2015, p.5) stated that it is important to understand each other:

> I think people should have to understand each other when they are on patrol. As more as they harmonise together, as more as they can, as easier it is to stay on the line and maybe joke with each other and have a good time.

4.2.2 Behavioural Markers and Attitude

Behavioural aspects are part of several assessments' subscales (i.e., CQS, IDI, and SCAS). Behavioural aspects are also referenced in Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) model (i.e., HE); Johnson et al. (2006) model (i.e., IB); facets of Earley (2002) CQ, and part of Yari et al. (2020) definition of a global mindset. Also, behavioural markers

and attitude is linked to the FFM's agreeableness. Accordingly, having higher agreeableness is important for UNMOs. The sub-categories identified during this case study are having empathy and being respectful, friendly, cordial, generous, patient, and motivated. The character traits identified are descripted in the later sections, they enable UNMOs to navigate well within the team, and they also impact the success of the mission.

4.2.2.1 Having Empathy and Being Respectful

According to NZL-LtCol (2015, p. 2) being respectful is essential:

> Being respectful is common sense. Being concerned of others, taking the time to learn about their own culture and then respecting their culture not just dismissing someone because of something they say or do trying to understand actually why they say that or why they do that. If they have particular traits associated with that culture whether it would be, say prayers or perhaps the way they eat… it's understanding what those little traits are and then taking the time to consider that.

CHN-Maj (2015, p.4) noted that the officers should 'show respect to different people and not care about background, not care about age, not care about his professionalism or something else. You need to show respect'. Respect can be linked to agreeableness in the FFM.

Empathy emerged during the focus group while reviewing the categories. All participants agreed that the adjective empathy was missing in the list of categories, and thus included (Core-Instructors, 2019).

4.2.2.2 Being Friendly, Cordial, and Generous

NOR-Capt (2015, p.10) stated that the UN is on Lebanese territory and thus they have to be careful as to how they perform their job. He gave an example of UNIFIL personnel who are being stoned by the local population on a weekly basis because they use armoured personnel carriers (APC) with heavy guns in narrow streets. However, UNMOs do not face this issue, as 'we are very friendly, we are stopping in the village and talking to the people in the street. We never had that problem'. A similar example was given by AUT-Col1 (2015, p.4) and he elaborated on the issue: children were on the street and with the APC driving through the village, and the roads were not safe for them. He also mentioned that the reason why UNMOs do not cause an issue is

probably because they are a small international team, low profile, and unarmed. Thus, they are not seen as a threat by the local population.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.3) stated: 'You should be kind, you should be friendly every time, you should smile not be angry'. AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.7) stated the importance of being friendly:

> You cannot come in as a hard fast, all fresh and military person because they will work against you. So you got to have good social skills, you got to be able to interact. You got to be friendly, be seen to be friendly.

DNK-Capt (2015, p.19) expressed the importance of being generous:

> I'm really surprised actually how alike or how generous most people are very quickly to each other. I do think we have some, I don't know if it's the same countries, but as I stated we have some people who need to understand this to work'.

This suggests that being friendly and generous may be more important that being a high performer. During the interviews, it was noted that some Chinese UNMOs did not have the required English proficiency. When asked if this was an issue, NOR-Capt (2015, p.11) stated: 'No, for sure, you have to take more care of them, because you need somebody to tell them what to do and when to do it. But it is totally not a problem, because they are very polite'.

4.2.2.3 Being Patient and Motivated

As in the concept of CQ (Earley, 2002) the social adaption in a cross-cultural context and motivation aspects are also identified in this case study. CHE-Capt (2015, p.11) noted that some UNMOs lack patience. Additionally, NOR-Capt (2015, p.9) stated that it important to be flexible and patient and to let the other person do the work in their own way. This same idea was repeated by SWE-Maj (2015, p.11) when asked about the behaviours and attitudes UNMOs should have:

> You shouldn't run over, like if you are European Union or NATO mission for example, you can just run over a nation, no that's wrong when you do going into this direction for example. But here we rarely need to get everybody along towards the same objective.

This point is also supported by NZL-Capt (2015, p.3): 'You definitely need to be able to have flexibility and patience as well just to get used to how people do business and how they work'. He added that 'the mission here isn't a kinetic mission, so the output that we are likely to achieve here aren't as visible as what you'd see during a kinetic

mission'. Furthermore, CHN-Maj (2015, p. 8) noted: 'Most guys are eligible for the job. The only difference is the motivation'.

4.2.3 Emotional Stability

Emotional stability is used as a measure in several cross-cultural assessments (i.e., in CCAI, ICAPS, ISS, and MPQ). Emotional stability is seen as a personality trait (Johnson, 2020), which is stable over time (Schaffer et al., 2006), and correlates positively to CQ (Ang et al., 2006). The emotional stability category identified in this case study, contains attributes such as the ability to manage uncertainty, accept the situation, manage misunderstandings, be positive, have a sense of humour, be humble, and manage time. A lower level of neuroticism seems to be required to be able to stay positive and relaxed even when there is uncertainty and to be able to accept the situation (Abbe et al., 2007; Ang et al., 2006; Curseu et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2006; Van Dyne et al., 2012). With the different cultures and the high potential for misunderstandings, people are expected to stay calm and positive. Officers need to be able to manage their free time and not get anxious about it either in the evening when on duty or while off duty.

4.2.3.1 Ability to Manage Uncertainty and Accept the Situation

DNK-Capt (2015, p.17) stated that officers need to accept uncertainty:

> You need to accept that you don't know exactly where you're coming, how it's going to be who are the people you are going to work with, and work with the people, not necessarily agreeing but work with them, because they will be your buddies for next year.

EST-Maj (2015, p.9) gave an example of certain officers constantly discussing everything instead of just accepting the situation:

> We have certain tasks that we have to complete, and we try to do as best we can and try not to make comments that this is not good, or this is stupid. They try to find the purposes why not to do it.

AUT-Col2 (2015, p.3) stated that accepting the situation is necessary: 'Many are coming over and instead of adopting a situation are fighting a situation until they find out that they cannot win this war like this'.

4.2.3.2 Ability to Manage Misunderstanding

The ability to manage misunderstanding could be considered to have similarities to the teamwork competence of the ability to recognise conflict (Stevens & Campion, 1994). AUS-Capt (2015, p.2) notes, 'It's about understanding or knowing that someone not necessarily saying something negative or being rude, it's just the way that they speak and they like to enjoy. That's how they behave in their culture'. FJI-Maj (2015, p.9) stated that officers need to be able to accept issues:

> Sometimes people can get really bold and then when you flip. Thick skin is you are able to absorb it and say okay here it comes. You take it on both and then you adapt to it and then you act accordingly and ensure everything is going according to plan. If you really know that there's something wrong with it, then you can make the decision.

CAN-Capt (2015, p.2) noted: 'I've seen a few times people get offended easily but usually the offence is not meant'. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.5) stated that officers should be able to forgive and let go:

> I've seen many silent patrols. Probably something had happened at the patrol base and then the whole day the patrol… They should let go… Forget, forgive and let go… At the end of the day, we are learning together so forgive, forget, and let go.

4.2.3.3 Being Positive and Having a Sense of Humour

IRL-Capt (2015, p.5) noted that officers' threshold of complaining differs and that those who complain a great deal create a barrier. This is supported by NOR-Capt (2015, p.5): 'Some complaining could be healthy until a certain point, after that it is just going to be distracting. If you have the same guys nagging all the time, it will be negative'. He added: 'Try to be flexible and positive and then I think it will turn good for everyone'. AUS-Capt (2015, p.8) stated that it is important not to get frustrated:

> Some people might be slow at learning and just you might get frustrated, but just take a breath and don't show it and just be okay this person just needs a bit more time to learn. Just the frustrations in the communal environment, just talking to that person straight up rather than having to complain about, so like don't complain about something unless you're willing to do something about it.

IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.19) stated that humour is often overlooked but that it is an important attribute for UNMOs to have. Having the ability to inject humour into a tense situation can deflate it within the team and in the field. Similarly, during the

focus group, all participants were unanimous that having a sense of humour is beneficial (Core-Instructors, 2019).

Based on McGrae and John (1992, p.178) table, this category could be linked to FFM extraversion due to the humour. However, with the argument that to be positive a person should not be anxious or self-pitying, it could also be argued that this category is linked to neuroticism. Accordingly, in Table 17 this category is linked to extraversion and neuroticism.

4.2.3.4 Being Humble

It could be argued that this sub-category should be linked to agreeableness, which, based on the factors of Cattell's 16PF presented by Eysenck (2004, p.460), humble is paired with assertive. According to McGrae and John (1992, p.172), being assertive is part of extraversion. In this context, humility was used to reflect that the officers may not be too extraverted and thus proposed to be linked to the FFM extraversion. NOR-Capt (2015, p.3) gave an example of an officer who was competent, able to socialise with everyone, and kept a low profile. With these behaviours, the officer was contributing to the positive atmosphere in the team. The captain stated: 'You feel really good and competent beside this guy… he is really polite, and he helps with everything, he has a good knowledge, good background but he did not brag about it'.

In this example, the behaviour is keeping a low profile, which can be described as humble, in combination with high agreeableness and knowledge. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.3) stated:

> Some people come with let's do this, we are here to change the world. We are here to change the people. Look at those are Lebanese they don't know nothing. We should teach them how to drive, how to do things, how to have a better life, how to you know. They come from up, looking down to the people and yeah… That sometimes annoyed me I can say that.

She further stated that the officers should be humbler (Ibid., p.4):

> It's the way Europeans look down at those nationalities. They don't think they are competent like at the same level you can say that… (the UNMOs should be) more humble down to earth more respectful to other cultures.

4.2.3.5 Ability to Manage Time

This category emerged during the focus group, on the identified premise that the officers may have a great deal of free time and thus need to be able to manage it accordingly (Core-Instructors, 2019).

4.2.4 Discussion

In several models, personality traits and attitude play an important role (Abbe, 2008; Johnson et al., 2006; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014). Abramson and Moran (2018, p.28) reference House's list of traits which are desirable or undesirable for leaders in the context of managing cultural differences. The desirable traits are **integrity**, inspirational, visionary, **performance-oriented**, **team integrator**, decisive, administratively competent, **diplomatic**, **collaborative team orientation**, **self-sacrificial,** and **modesty.** The undesirable traits are **status-conscious**, **conflict-inducer**, procedural, **autonomous**, face-saver, **non-participative**, autocratic, **self-centred,** and **malevolent.** The desirable personality trait referenced by Johnson et al. (2006, p.532) are 'ambition, **courage**, **curiosity**, decisiveness, **enthusiasm**, **fortitude**, **integrity**, judgment, loyalty, **perseverance**, **self-efficacy,** and **tolerance for ambiguity**'. The bold-face traits were also identified during this study. The necessary personality traits are context-sensitive, for example, being visionary is specific to business leadership but in the context of a UNMO may not be relevant.

The literature review also showed that the five factor model (FFM) is often used in the different models reviewed; thus, a proposed link between the different attributes identified in this case study and the FMM model is made. As per Johnson (2020, p.2) the FFM is 'a representation of the universe of personality traits in terms of five broad personality dimensions'. These dimensions are extraversion (E), agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C), neuroticism (N), and openness (O).

Table 17 represents the proposed link of the different attributes identified in this case study to the FMM's dimensions.

Table 17: Categories link to FFM

Sub-category	*Attributes*	*FFM dimension (proposed)*
Social competence	Ability to build relationship	A
	Being open to others	A / O
	Being interested in others	O / A
Behavioural markers and attitude	Having empathy and being respectful	A
	Being friendly, cordial, and generous	A
	Being patient and motivated	A / C
Emotional stability	Ability to manage uncertainty and accept the situation	N
	Ability to manage misunderstandings	N
	Being positive and having a sense of humour	E / N
	Being humble	E
	Ability to manage time	N

Note: Extraversion (E), agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C), neuroticism (N), and openness (O).

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between the learning and experience and other categories such as:

Military skills and knowledge: If UNMOs are not able to manage misunderstandings in the team and get frustrated on a patrol, then observation and information gathering may be impacted because there is no exchange between them.

Professionalism: An UNMO who is unable to cope with uncertainty may develop an alcohol issue.

Communication skills: Being open and positive may compensate for the lack of English skills.

Teamwork: Relationship building is important for teamwork.

Diversity and cultural awareness: If a person is not able to cope with misunderstandings, then the frustration may exceed their ability to learn from others and to appreciate diversity.

Cultural specific knowledge: If a person is open to others and friendly, then the person will be able to integrate with the local population and learn about them.

Learning and experience: If a person is open to others, then the person can learn from them.

4.3 Military Skills and Knowledge

This section reviews the core category of ‘military skills and knowledge’. This category can be considered as technical skills. This aspect is specifically excluded in the widely referenced teamwork KSA by Stevens and Campion (1994) and not referenced in other reviewed models. This case study does intent to review specific

training material and thus focus solely on issues raised during the interviews. The reason to include these issues in the case study is because of their potential impact on other categories, and thus relevant. Officers are expected to have military skills and knowledge to be able to fulfil their duty, gained over their years of service or during pre-deployment training or mission induction training. However, it seems that some officers did not attend pre-deployment training. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.2) stated:

> I have experienced that some of the nations do not have a UNMO course or do not send over officers with a UNMO course and that is not good. I think this is an essential requirement… This is one thing concerning the operation issue.

The identified 'military skills and knowledge' are driving skills, technology awareness, information-gathering skills, and observation skills. These KSAs are described in greater detail in the following subsections.

4.3.1 Driving Skills

The UNMOs in Lebanon spend most of their time patrolling along the approximately 120 km BL between Lebanon and Israel and, in consequence, driving skills are critical. The interviews showed that this skill is critical and not all the officers have the required level. For instance, DNK-Maj (2015, p.7) stated that some officers were poor drivers:

> I actually experienced that some officers were very poor drivers… I think it's one of the most important skills. The car is our most important tool. If the cars are not in good shape, if we don't drive safe, it might cost our lives.

Some interviewees suggested that these skills depend on the officers' origin, but this view is not consistent throughout the interviews. Different nations were specifically mentioned, but it seems that skill level depends on the individual's experience. For example, LEB-LA1 (2015, p.3) noted: 'Before sending their UNMOs to the mission, they should train them better. Not only language, also driving… is one of the important parts of the mission'. He also mentioned that driving issues are in general with few countries and gave an example of Chinese and Nepalese officers who did not have driving experience when coming into the mission, stating that 'the officers don't drive back home; they have drivers'. When CHN-Col (2015, p.6) was challenged about this argument, he stated, that this may have been the case 10 to 20 years ago:

> I think maybe 10 years or 20 years ago, the driving skills for Chinese' UNMOs is a little problem because there are times we don't have so many cars… now more and more people driving cars can go up one to the work and so like this. So, this is not the problem.

NOR-Capt (2015, p.6) gave an example of a Russian officer: 'I was very afraid when I was travelling with a Russian officer. He had no driving skills. That could be not only a problem, but that could be a safety issue'. When RUS-Maj (2015, p.7) was asked about this situation, he stated: 'I think it's not a problem over here. Of course, driving is not very like relaxed in this country. It's challenging but I'm from Moscow region and I faced in Moscow more challenging situations'. When asked if he was comfortable with all UNMOs as drivers, he stated: 'Well, comfortable, yeah, but some guys they are not very comfortable when I'm driving'.

The UN is aware of the criticality of driving skills and thus has a specific module in their pre-deployment training about road safety. They claim that on a UN peacekeeping mission, road travel can be the most dangerous activity. More peacekeepers die in vehicle accidents than in any other situations. In addition to injuries and loss of life, car accidents also result in financial losses, reduced operational capability, and a negative public image. The concept of defensive driving is introduced, which is based on anticipation and control (UN, 2017-L3.11). In the context of OGL and based on the interviews, driving skills relate to the ability to operate a geared armoured land cruiser or equivalent and drive in a defensive and safe way. The last point may be linked to the individual SA. For instance, CHN-Maj (2015, p.13) stated that the perception of good driving skills may differ:

> If you can say, okay, I can drive, I have very good skills, I can drive 160, 150 kilometres per hour in a very rough road is not very good skills. I think we need to have very good sense of safety and security. You need to drive very defensive.

Furthermore, the lack of driving skills may impact teamwork. For instance, NOR-Capt (2015, p.6) stated that several team members were not allowed to drive the armoured vehicles, which was a problem for the team:

> We had some tension between the Canadian and the some of the team that were nagging and saying that he should not be in the mission because he does not have the licence for the heavy car.

AUT-Col1 (2015, p.12) did not directly mention the tension within the team but identified the consequence of having team members without driving skills, stating that 'you can be very professional, but if you don't have a driver licence it is absolutely a no go'. The colonel was referring to a heavy car licence which is needed to drive

armoured vehicles. This view was also supported by DNK-Maj (2015, p.8), who stated:

> If something happened to the driver, you should be able to just swap around. I think we should all be equal concerning the task or what we call the positions we have inside the team when you're doing patrol.

The training officer NZL-Capt (2015, p.11) also acknowledge this and stated: 'Some countries arrive without the required licenses. That I guess comes down to again just values from the host nations or what the minimum requirement is'.

4.3.2 Technology Awareness

Different armies use different equipment, and thus familiarity with the mission-specific equipment is important. For instance, MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.3), the outpost signal responsible, stated:

> They should have some basic knowledge of some new technology, as well, because they are going to be dealing with a lot of equipment related to what I believe most of the militaries observers that they are all officers. I believe they should already be with a capacity to deal with computers, with GPS, with radio, with all kinds of radios devices.

4.3.3 Information-gathering Skills

To be able to add value to the mission and gain SA, strong information-gathering skills, and pass on the information further is required. For instance, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.8) stated that the interaction with the local community is important for information-gathering:

> You got to understand that coming in as a UNMO is not merely just being able to observe and report military observations. It's also being able to interact with the locals and gather information and pass it on. To do that, you've got to have these social skills. You cannot come in with a mindset, "I'm here purely to observe the Blue Line and to report IDF movements only. That's it". You have to understand that to report information or pass the information in any area operations, you need to be able to interact with the villagers. You need to go interact with the local people around you, and the only way you can do that is by having the social skills. It's important.

This quotation also suggests that having strong social and communication skills may increase the information-gathering skills of UNMOs.

4.3.4 Observation Skills

Observation skills are key for UNMOs. No specific research on observation skills fitting the context of this study was found. Observation skills were researched mainly in the areas of education and medicine, which cannot be generalised to the context studied. Observation skills in context can be specific and technical, such as vehicle and weapon recognition. The interpretation of an observation is specific to a defined situation in a specific time frame and thus closely linked to the SA and described as individual factors of SA theory (Endsley, 1995, p.4). Observation skills may depend on the individual military branch with its specific knowledge and experience. This may also suggest that the team setup shall not only be based on national balance but also on diversity of military background. For instance FIN-Capt (2015, p.13) stated:

> It depends on your military background. That is the most important part in here because if you came from navy, if you came from infantry and if you came from [sic] Air force that is the difference. Of course, that is also your strength because air force guys they're recognised very easily those airplanes, with flying UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] and other things… Infantry guys is most interesting infantry issues, what is there in the other side.

CAN-Capt (2015, p.9) suggested that observation may have a cultural influence and further suggested that experience may have an influence on observation skills. He stated: 'I think the Chinese though have a different way and there is a slightly different perspective on things than I do. We really need to discuss it and come up with a theory'.

In addition, he stated:

> A situation like how can you know these guys are this by just looking at to make armed hunters or you notice a suspicious activity… so certain cultures will be like, "Well, that's *Hezbollah*, it's got to be". How do you know it's *Hezbollah*? Explain it to me because I don't know, so that kind of thing. You see some of us have jumped to conclusion and others as well… It could be experience as well.

When asked if cultural differences were preconceived during observation, EST-Maj (2015, p.7) stated that due to the SOPs they should not be any differences:

> I haven't noticed because we do have these SOPs and we do have training in here as well, so we should have the same understandings the observations on how to recognise difference and how to act in different situations.

This suggests that military skills and knowledge should be aligned across the officers regardless of their background and that the actions to be taken in the case of a pre-defined situation should be standardised.

4.3.5 Discussion

Military skills and knowledge can be learned; nevertheless, some need more time to acquire and thus may not be fully taught during a three-week pre-deployment training session. Additionally, in the widely referenced teamwork KSA by Stevens and Campion (1994), technical skills were specifically excluded and were not referenced in the CCC or D&I models. Thus, it could be argued that these skills and knowledge are basic military skills and do not have to be described in this research. However, there are relationships between this category and other categories, and it is thus necessary to include this category in a holistic KSA model. For example, this category may impact teamwork and vice versa. Professionalism and cultural specific knowledge may also impact this category, especially in the case of observation skills and information gathering. Moreover, communication skills impact information-gathering skills.

The sub-categories that compose the categories are as follows:

Driving skills: The main attribute that is expected from UNMOs is the ability to operate a geared armoured vehicle and to drive defensively.

Technology awareness: The main attribute for UNMOs relates to the ability to quickly familiarise with mission-specific equipment.

Information-gathering skills: The main attribute for UNMOs is the ability to gather and pass on information if required.

Observation skills: The main attribute for UNMOs is to have SA and not to be biased when interpreting observations.

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested a potential relationship between military skills and knowledge and teamwork such as:

Teamwork: A UNMO with strong military skills and knowledge may gain respect and trust from the other team members. Driving skills may cause issues and impact the teamwork, for example, if one does not have a licence or drive carefulness.

The next section reviews the core category of ‘professionalism’.

4.4 Professionalism

Professionalism is a category that emerged during the literature review out of Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) model. The findings show several additional aspects that can be include in the initial category. The professionalism category contains a set of nontechnical and role specific KSAs perceived as being important by UNMOs. These sub-categories are described in greater detail below.

4.4.1 Mission and Context Understanding

Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) referenced the understanding of the organisational structure. In the context of this case study it goes beyond and this category is defined as the understanding of the mission, its history and organisation, and the roles and tasks within the mission. Also, these aspects seem not to be fully understood by some UNMOs. LEB-LA1 (2015, p.16) stated that understanding the context is important: 'The biggest issue in the mission, were where you think you've come for really a war situation, whereas it is not really that situation. You are more like a liaison officer in operation'. Additionally, CHE-1stLt (2015, p.6) stated:

> You have to understand the mission and not just be an officer who gets a mission and fulfils it… you have to have a certain background knowledge of the country of the people of what is going on and why it is going on. Otherwise, we can jump back to the judgmental pretty fast.

Moreover, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.4) stated: 'They should have a good understanding of what is being an observer, what's the observer task all about'. Yet, the role and the tasks seem not to have been unanimously clarified for all UNMOs before joining the mission. This was also supported by the training officer NZL-Capt (2015, p.4), he stated:

> Some countries when they arrive don't actually understand, they come with the mentality that they're going to fix the issues within Lebanon… You're not going to fix the issues in Lebanon. Those are things that are outside our scope of influence. We're very much here just as a reporting tool to ensure that if there was a significant escalation in… that could affect the wider region.

Furthermore, how the UN functions and how the mission is organised seems not to be clear for all, which may cause tension. In this context, it is a military-led mission with mission support led by civilians (e.g., security, logistics, signals, and financials). Referring to the civilian and military components of the mission, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.11) stated:

> I don't see tension to break down the operation side of it. It is lack of understanding for both sides. Um, one of the problems, I won't say one of the issues, but a lot of the civilian staff have had limited interaction or are not, don't have a military background.

Another example was given by SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.5), who stated: 'Our observers they come from the military from their country. The way they receive their items is different from the way we do things here in the UN'. Additionally, UN missions are multidimensional and undertake a broad range of activities. This also involves coordination between the different actors including UN military and police, UN civilians, UN agencies, governmental organisations, and NGOs (UN, 2008). In this complex setup, the role and responsibility of different actors is sometimes not fully understood. For example, in August 2014, I was in a meeting with a *mukhtar* (i.e., leader of a village responsible for the population) in a South Lebanese village. The aim of the *mukhtar* was to solve the issues that the village had with water supply. In contrast, the aim of the UNMOs was to understand the security aspects in the village. In this context, the *mukhtar* perceived the UNMOs as UN representatives, independent of which agency or branch the individuals represented. In consequence, to contribute to the efficiency of mission, UNMOs need to understand and navigate the complex network of agencies of multidimensional missions and work closely and build relationships with the full spectrum of diverse actors on the ground.

4.4.2 Integrity

Integrity is defined by the UN as individual behaviours that are expected to be in the organisation's interest (UN, 2017-L3.1). It is one of the three UN core values along with professionalism and respect of diversity. Integrity is also an attribute referenced by Johnson et al. (2006) and Grove (2004). This sub-category was initially named 'able to face issues' which included elements such as 'internal team issues need to be kept internally and not shared or visible outside of the team or the UN'. This idea is included in the UN definition of integrity and thus the sub-category 'able to face issues' renamed 'integrity'. However, in this context it seems unnecessary to create an 'integrity' core category, and it is thus included in the core category of 'professionalism'.

Gaining trust from local actors is vital for the success of a mission, and integrity is important to be able to gain and build trust. In addition, Evetts (2012, p.7) defines trust

as a core part of professionalism. One key element is that UNMOs show consensus in front of mission beneficiaries. The ability to accept and handle issues that can arise between UNMOs internally is expected of the officers. For example, CAN-Capt (2015, p.4) stated:

> You have two people going not getting along well together and it shows outside to the locals or it shows in the shop, bad blood between them. It can affect socially how UNIFIL or UNTSO is reflected. It can also be reflected in meetings, if those two go to a meeting together and they are just being dicks to each other again it's portrayed poorly... What really matters is how you reflect.

4.4.3 Proactivity

The fifth UN core competence, client orientation, encompasses seeking the clients' point of view, establishing and maintaining productive partnerships, and keeping the clients informed. Proactivity is also included in the 'Inclusion Skills Measurement Profile' developed by Turnbull et al. (2010). Also, it could be argued that integrity and building trust are a critical part of establishing and maintaining productive partnerships. An observer mission like OGL has a hierarchical structure with teams and a staff that covers the standard UN staff functions (i.e., U1 to U7). Nevertheless, UNMOs are not deployed in a dedicated function (e.g., team lead or staff). All are at the same level, independent of rank. The functions are not allocated uniquely based on performance, but in combination with national balance and acceptance. The only exception is COGL, which is a 12-month posting allocated to a specific country.

Objectives and tasks have to be achieved, but there is not a tasking as would be expected in a traditional military organisation, and thus it is expected that officers are proactive and seek high-level performance. It can be argued that this category is similar to the sixth UN core competency - creativity - which is defined as seeking to actively improve programmes or services and thinking of options to solve problems outside of the traditional approaches (UN, 2017-L3.1). The training officer NZL-Capt (2015, p.13) stated that the officers need to be proactive:

> We want guys that are proactive. That want to make a difference, want to change the way the organisation is run for the positive. We want guys that are continually seeking to get the best out of the people that they work with, and also guys that are setting benchmarks in the way that we do business.

However, when asked about the attitude that UNMOs should have, DNK-Maj (2015, p.3) stated that not all officers may be proactive:

> It's one of where you actually see the cultural differences. I think you can see some persons from third nations that just do what they are expected to do, which is linked to their task. They're maybe not that proactive.

Proactivity was reinforced by AUT-Col2 (2015, p.3), he stated:

> Each of them needs to be proactive. This is a very important thing… No one is doing your work, you don't have troops ward officer or whatever. You have to clean the car, you have to wash the dishes, you have to be proactive in that way and not to wait until someone tells you.

This suggests that being proactive could positively impact teamwork. To be able to be proactive, the UNMO also needs to understand what is expected of them and thus have a solid mission and context understanding.

4.4.4 Responsibility

Responsibility is not explicitly expressed as a UN core competence. The closest is the fourth UN core competence, accountability. The UN defines this category as 'taking ownership to honour commitments; delivering in time, cost and quality; operating in compliance with organisational regulations and rules; supporting subordinates; providing oversight; taking responsibility for delegated assignments; and taking responsibility for personal shortcomings and those of the work unit, where applicable' (UN, 2017-L3.1). The perception of a responsible UNMO is an officer who follows laws and regulations, an aspect that is also identified in Hays-Thomas et al. (2012)'s model. Each officer sent as a UNMO represents the UN and their nation at all times. CHN-Col (2015, p.4) stated:

> Responsibility is first to yourself and to a country and to the mission area. We are adults, we are with the common-sense person, and you cannot do like smoking in public place and you should respect the law of the local and the rules of UN like this kind of responsibility. You also should follow the rules of your own country.

NLD-LtCol (2015, p.12) stated that in the host country everyone knows who is working for the UN whether they are wearing the uniform or not. As a consequence, the officers need to behave appropriately even when not on duty. He stated that 'it is not a problem to drink a glass of beer or a glass of wine, but it is problem if you drink too much and that the behaviour changes'. The on- and off-duty discussion is typically mentioned during pre-deployment training and induction training with the argument that UN personnel need to be role models. However, this aspect could not be found in the UN core pre-deployment training material. In contrast, the US Marine Corps

describes this aspect in their values: ‘As a Marine, it is your responsibility, on and off duty, to maintain the Marine Corps reputation for smart, professional, and correctly worn uniforms’ (USMC, 1998).

Initially, this category was named ‘fitting the system and following procedures’, but it was integrated into the responsible category to align with the fourth UN core competence - accountability - which is partially defined as ‘to operate in compliance with organisational regulations and rules’ (UN, 2017-L3.1). In this context, LEB-LA1 (2015, p.13) stated: ‘Here, you need to blend in the system. If you do not get it in the first months, this guy will keep facing problem until the end of the mission’.

Standard operating procedures are also within the spectrum of rules and regulations. These help to avoid conflicting points of view, include best practices, and ensure standards. When asked about professionalism, CHN-Col (2015, p.4) stated: ‘While you do the job, you should first follow the procedure of this job and to as much as the good quality of this job and do it like a professional’. Moreover, CHN-Maj (2015, p.10) stated:

> We have very specific SOP to guide all the activities not only for the operation, but also for some disciplinary activities. But the problem is if the one you don’t like to comply with SOP they did not follow the rules we have not very mandatory measures to refrain or restrict his behaviour. This is an issue.

He further mentioned that UNMOs should ‘have the willingness to follow the rules not only for the operations, but also for experts to follow the UN value to follow all the rules concerning about his behaviour, his operations’. Furthermore on SOP, ITA-Capt (2015, p.5) stated:

> We have a lot of SOP and a lot of instruction. So if people know it, it’s easy. The problem is when people have a different point of view. But you don’t need to have your point of view sometimes in the military also is a complex situation.

It could be suggested that this aligns with the constructive use of policy and law in D&I as defined by Hays-Thomas et al. (2012). However, it is proposed to be included in this category, as it is more operational.

The ninth rule of ‘*Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets’* is ‘Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking of drugs’ (UN, 2019c). Nevertheless, the alcohol consumption of individual officers was mentioned several times as a concern for the teams. Additionally, it seems that alcohol

consumption differs by nationality with Australian, Russian, and Irish who may drink more than others. For example, IRL-Capt (2015, p.8) stated: 'As an Irish guy, I was drinking more on average and Australian were drinking a bit more as well. You could see that the Russian and the English-speaking guys probably drank more'. NZL-LtCol (2015, p.7) also stated that 'there are some cultures that drink more… New Zealand would be one, I think Australia is another, you think of Russians you automatically think of vodka and drinking'. According to DNK-Capt (2015, p.14):

> Yes, you can have one beer for your dinner or a glass of wine and, yes, I knew we just had a Dane who was on the drinking scene. So, there are exceptions but I have been really surprised in seeing how much some nations drink down here. For me, it's completely unacceptable.

However, alcohol consumption seems to be an individual issue. Its root causes could be stress, opportunity, or maturity level. For example, DNK-Maj (2015, p.6) stated: 'I can see that there are some officers from some countries that are consuming more alcohol than from other countries. But in the end, I think it's mostly an individual issue'. Furthermore, FJI-Maj (2015, p.6) stated: 'I think it doesn't come with a country… It comes down to personality, maturity, or maybe stress'. Additionally, during my deployment two cases were reported on excessive alcohol consumption involving officers joining the mission shortly after being deployed on a combat mission in Afghanistan. The alcohol consumption was such that they would not have been operational if an incident had occurred during the night, but their alcohol consumption decreased over time. This suggests that the time between a combat mission and a peacekeeping mission needs to be sufficient to allow military personnel to adjust to the new context.

Alcohol consumption is also a leadership issue. Even though UNMOs are officers, the rules need to be clear and respected. According to RUS-Maj (2015), prohibition of alcohol is not a realistic solution in this context, as it helps with team building. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.6), a team leader at the time, stated that:

> alcohol was an issue… also in my team I had to go with them. It is I think very much about leadership and rules given and clear lines given to people and to keep it in the red lines I would say.

Another example being unprofessional was given by AUT-Col1 (2015, p.14) of an alleged relationship between a team leader and a female officer on the team:

> The problem could be, if you are in a team with a girl, that it would start a relationship between her and him. That could be a big issue. For example, in my country this is a no-go, especially if a commander or the deputy has a relationship with one of the team member.

The same example was given by DNK-Capt (2015, p.15):

> I think we have an issue; I don't mind people can become girls and boyfriends. They can even get married. We've seen this in a lot of missions; people get attracted to each other... But I think we have a problem when you have a team leader and the only gender being girlfriend and boyfriend and they're still in the same team.

This suggests that people have to be transparent about relationships and that leadership needs to have clear rules for such cases. Also, according to Curseu et al. (2019) there is a relationship between conscientiousness and responsibility and this should be identified early in the selection process.

4.4.5 Dedication

This category was initially defined as 'able to live away from family' and this was in relation to a comment from AUT-Col2 (2015, p.4), who stated: 'You can expect an officer in an observer mission that he is able to live without his family or background for a while'. This category was renamed 'dedication', as the UN (2017-L3.1) partially defines professionalism as 'motivated by professional rather than personal concerns'. A similar description was identified by the US Marine Corps, who state that to be a professional, a Marine 'must put themselves and their personal needs secondary to the needs of the Corps' (USMC, 1998, p.191).

In the models reviewed in the literature, the term 'dedication' was not mentioned. Interest and dedication in the job were mentioned by NLD-Capt (2015, p.6), who stated: 'They should be very interested in what they are doing, otherwise if they are just coming for fun like the looking and cooking idea… we don't need guys like that'. SWE-Maj (2015, p. 3) stated: 'the most important thing is the individual… that feels responsibility for the work, that he wants to work'. A further finding was that it is important to be able to be dedicated to the job regardless of the UNMO's rank back home and to eventually accept a lower status. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.9) stated: 'When you are here… it is not of any important which rank you have, absolutely not. It's much more important to do whatever you do in the most professional way you can do'. Finally, the COGL, NZL-LtCol (2015, p.8), stated:

> We've had a couple of people that have had rank either the same as the COGL or higher and I think it's almost 50–50. So there're some individuals who because of their desire to be here they're willing to accept a change in the status to be here and they're prepare for that, accept it.

4.4.6 Persistency

The UN definition of professionalism mentions showing pride in work and achievements and showing persistence when faced with difficult problems or challenges (UN, 2017-L3.1). In the IB CCC model by Johnson et al. (2006), one of the attitudes is perseverance, and it could be argued that this is similar to persistence as defined in this research. A challenge that some UNMOs face is staying alert throughout their deployments.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.13) stated:

> After some period, first in my mind like boring, it's one issue, but second you become a little bit blind to the situation. You can skip something, you can decide not to report something because you faced this situation previously and there was not any impact after. So, like negligence increases.

IRL-Capt (2015, p.4) stated that some older officers or people who were in the mission for a longer period of time may tend to be more relaxed and eventually become lazy. He gave the example of an officer stating, 'There is no point in asking village leaders questions or doing background reports because nobody cares or they are not going to tell you anything anyway'. In a similar context, DNK-Maj (2015, p.8) stated:

> Sometimes it can be a little too much routines, you know, just leaning back and say, but why should we do, or check the vehicle today, I did it yesterday and those kinds of things. Instead of being serious when you're observing, a lot of UNMOs spend a lot of time on their iPhone or phone sending SMS all the time or going on Facebook and these kinds of things.

NZL-Capt (2015, p.5) stated: 'The key position is making sure that there's a clear balance and being relaxed, but also being clearly focused that you're achieving what you need to do, and that everyone is going to be doing it in a safe and appropriate manner'.

Additionally, UNMOs should not be too ambitious but should still not give up. IRL-Capt (2015, p.14) stated: 'Try to understand the realities of the situations and realising that there is limitation and not try to use the limitations as excuses' and 'it is not the best thing to be too ambitious'. Later in the interview, he stated: 'If you are doing the

job the best you can within the limitations and following the guidelines, then you are less likely to have problems operationally or culturally'.

To be able to keep the motivation and a positive attitude while performing routine tasks thus seems to be important for UNMOs. According to CHN-Maj (2015, p.7), 'The most important thing is reliability. You have a strong motivation to do a job... The difference is only the willing, the motivation'. This is supported by NOR-Capt (2015, p.7): 'I really like that people are trying to do their best, to do it the best way they can and to be positive'.

DNK-Maj (2015, p.3) suggested that work ideology differs due to culture, but this could not be observed. He stated: 'There are some cultures maybe too much to say that they close their ears and close their eyes. But I think there are some that are just, of course they are doing their task'.

4.4.7 Discussion

Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) D&I model include includes nontechnical and role specific KSAs such as constructive use of policy and law, understanding power dynamics, use proper line of authority, organisational structure, organisational policies, role models, and ability to anticipate problems. The codes covering non-technical and role specific KSAs are regrouped in the 'professionalism' category. As the KSAs are role specific, it is not surprising that those identified during this research differ and enhance those from Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) model. Moreover, the core values of the UN are integrity, professionalism, and respect of diversity. The UN defines professionalism as 'showing pride in work and achievements, demonstrating professional competence, being conscientious and efficient in meeting commitments, being motivated by professional rather than personal concerns, showing persistence when faced with challenges and remaining calm in stressful situations' (UN, 2017-L3.1). Likewise, the US Marine Corps defines professionalism as being competent, meaning that Marines are experts in their field and continually improve their skills; responsible, meaning that the Marines must understand what is expected from them and fulfil these expectations; and dedicated, meaning that the Marines make their personal needs a second priority (USMC, 1998, p.191).

According to Evetts (2012, p.7), professionalism has two forms: organisational and occupational. The first form is a managerial approach with clear hierarchy, standard procedures, and performance measures. The second form is based on normative values, organised in collegial authority, and based on trust. In both forms, self-motivation and competence development or professional development are key elements. NZL-Capt (2015, p.7) stated that the different defence forces have their own ethos and values. He was acting based on his values of 'C3I, so courage, commitment, comradeship, and integrity. So, those are some of the key tenets that we use whenever conducting any type of task or whenever you're working; you always need to keep in background those key things'. This could be seen as the root of understanding of being professional within the New Zealand armed forces.

These definitions of professionalism are broad. Nevertheless, the findings are narrower, and the sub-categories retained for 'professionalisms' based on the literature that concur with the interviews are as follows:

Mission and context understanding: The main attributes are the ability to understand the mission with its history, organisation, role and tasks. The UNMOs need to understand the roles of the different actors in the field.

Integrity: Evetts (2012) identifies integrity as a core element and the expectations for UNMOs align with the UN definition which is to be work and behave in the interest of the organisation.

Proactivity: Proactivity is included in Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) D&I model on a strategic level, whereas in this context, it is situated at a middle manager level. Additionally, it is expected that UNMOs seek high performance.

Responsibility: Responsibility pertains to the constant following of laws, regulations, and procedures (UN, 2017-L3.1). It is about maintaining the UN's and the home country's reputation, both on and off duty. This also implies that UNMOs should not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol and should be transparent about their relationship within the team.

Dedication: Dedication refers to the ability to put one's personal needs after the needs of the mission (UN, 2017-L3.1). It is about the being motivated, interested, and

focused on the job, regardless of whether the UNMO has a lower status than they do at home.

Persistency: Persistency pertains to perseverance and reliability. It is about not getting into a routine and getting too relaxed and showing pride in the work (UN, 2017-L3.1).

The quotations presented in the above sections suggest several potential relationships between professionalism and the other categories, such as:

Military skills and knowledge: If UNMOs do not follow the rules and regulations or the SOPs, they may impact the operation.
Teamwork: If UNMOs are not responsible, for example, with their alcohol consumption, they may lose the trust of the team members.
Cultural specific knowledge: If a UNMO is not dedicated to the mission, then the motivation to gain cultural specific knowledge may be impacted.
Learning and experience: If a UNMO is not dedicated to the mission, then the motivation to learn may be impacted.

4.5 Communication

This section reviews the core category of ‘communication’. In line with the literature review, communication is identified as critical in this research. The identified aspects of communication identified in the literature review are: understand verbal and non-verbal communication, local language skill, adequate English competency, ability to adapt own language and communication style, active listening, open communication, ability to engage in small talk, and to be persuasive. The ‘communication skills’ perceived to be important in this case study are the ability to: listen; read and manage body language; have open communication; be interested and interact with everyone; adapt own communication; avoid misunderstanding, through English proficiency, basic local language knowledge; have basic radio operation skills; display report writing skills; and meeting handling skills.

The following subsections details each of these categories with quotations from the interviews.

4.5.1 Ability to Listen

As per Stevens and Campion (1994) in their teamwork model and Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) in their D&I model, the ability to listen without judgement is an important skill for officers. It is necessary not only within the team, but also during meetings and in other settings. Listening encompasses the ability to accept others' opinions. According to French (2012), it is the foundation for communication. When asked about the competences which UNMOs need, LEB-LA1 (2015, p.11) stated: 'To work together you have to listen to the, what we call the guy who has been before you here, who has experience'. The ability to listen was supported by DNK-Capt (2015, p.6), he stated:

> We go to meetings with local people. If you're not capable of being neutral, if you're not capable of listening to other opinions, not necessarily agreeing, but listening to other opinions, if you're not willing to cooperate with the other guys in your team because of culture or language or whatever, personally I think you should be sent straight home.

He further stated (Ibid., p.11), 'The older people… also sometimes have to remember to actually listen to the young guys, because they will sometimes bring new ideas'. Moreover, CAN-Capt (2015, p.17) stated:

> If people aren't communicating it's bad, if people feel like they can't communicate it's bad, if people can't be understood it's bad. The idea is to foster communication back and forth up and down and you have to have, be open to what people are saying. You have to listen to what they say and then accept what they are saying.

According to NZL-LtCol (2015, p.3), the chief of OGL at the time:

> The big one is listening so taking the time to listen to others and whether that is someone in your team or whether that someone in the local community... that probably the key thing for anyone to be able to do is to communicate well and listening is part of that.

The ability to listen may also help to avoid or reduce potential conflict. For example, SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.7) stated: 'If we have that mutual understanding whereby you listen to me I listen to you and we find that common ground where we can agree, then there will be no conflict'. MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.3) stated: 'They have to accept to be able to deal with all nations because… they should listen properly and answer in a good manner not to create a conflict within a team'.

4.5.2 Ability to Read and Manage Body Language

The ability to read and interpret body language is about getting additional information beyond what it is stated (Stevens & Campion, 1994). This could, for example, help the sender to understand if the receiver understood what was stated or help to see if a person is comfortable or not. Nonverbal communication differs culturally (Lewis, 2005) and is more pronounced in some cultures than others and thus important to understand in an international setting. Body language is also being aware of one's own body language and its potential signification for others, aspect defined as behavioural facets in CQ (Earley, 2002). NLD-Capt (2015, p.2) stated:

> I think you should be a really good listener and not only to what's been stated, but sometimes more to what's not been stated, especially looking at people and to see what kind of expressions they have. Do they really understand what I'm saying? Do they really know what I mean or are they just pretending?

According to CAN-Capt (2015, p.6), 'Body language is very important, you can see who is confident and who is not confident very quickly'.

4.5.3 Ability to Have Open Communication

As in Stevens and Campion (1994)'s teamwork model, open and non-judgemental communication is thus important in the context of this case study. The officers spend 10 days or more on duty. A team usually has two patrols with two or three officers; one officer stays at the team base. At the end of the day, after the debriefing and report writing, team members engage in activities like sport or reading and eating dinner together. Open communication is important within a small group of people who are together for several days such as OGL. The team members may come from countries with different political positions. For example, during this research, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian federation took place. The Observer Group Lebanon was composed of Russian officers, officers from Baltic and European countries, Canadian officers, and officers from several Asian countries. The political position of the individual countries was clear. Nevertheless, officers in a UN mission cannot impose their country's position. They should instead be open and able to hold discussions without judgment, aspect Officers from opposing political positions must work hand-in-hand. This makes the situation interesting if managed wisely, meaning that judging and criticising a country's position may not be the best approach, whereas curiosity

and trying to understand the other may increase the individual's knowledge and develop mutual understanding. This could also lead to better teamwork.

Additionally, in a cultural mix such as a UN mission, different ways of eating or levels of hygiene are a common source of friction. Being able to address these differences early may ensure that it does not develop into a conflict. The finding is that if something is irritating an individual, then they should make the other person aware of it without judging by explaining the reason for the irritation. As time passes, more tension may develop. A prompt discussion may thus help to avoid unnecessary friction.

If a conflict occurs, other officers are expected to identify it to proactively address the situation and diffuse the conflict. According to Holt and DeVorne (2005), the communication strategy to resolve conflict differs depending on culture or gender. For example, individuals from a collectivist culture are inclined to choose a withdrawing and compromising conflict strategy more than those from an individualistic culture. In contrast, individuals from an individualistic culture force their way through more than individuals from a collectivist culture. A further finding was that collectivist cultures are more concerned with achieving win-win situations than are individualistic cultures. This suggests that the right communication strategy needs to be found in conflict resolution and that the strategy to be applied to achieve a positive result may be different depending on the individual. The ability to find an effective communication style and resolve conflict is also an important part of the social architecting element of EQ and Gardenswartz et al. (2010)'s D&I model.

Furthermore, the ability to share one's own experience and contribute to decision making is expected from the officers. The ability to talk about a wide range of topics and develop strong communication skills may allow individuals to improve themselves. IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.8) stated that the diversity of personal and religious beliefs is positive. Discussions about Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, or politics can happen in a relaxed atmosphere at the patrol base. He also stated that after dinner time at the patrol base is an ideal time to become better acquainted, build relationships, and hold in-depth discussions without animosity. Thus, the officers should be willing to explore, engage, and have deep conversations and arguments. This was supported by LEB-LA1 (2015, p.16), who stated that 'when you sit in a dinner, when you talk, that's part of the mission where you take and give. Share all, talk and discuss'. Further IRL-

Cmdt (2015, p.8) gave examples of discussions that he held with Chileans and Argentineans about their wars, with Russian officers about Crimea, and with Chinese officers about Tibet. This type of discussion could probably not happen in another context. Nevertheless, people may be sensitive about an issue, and the team should be aware of this. On the other hand, if people cannot talk about a serious incident from the past, they may have a problem.

The officers interested in a topic should have some background on the subject to have a semi-in-depth conversation about it. Additionally, RUS-Maj (2015, p.15) stated that it is important to be able to converse without being judgmental and gave an example of the Ukraine crisis:

> It's a problem between Russia and Ukraine. It's my personal problem because I have a lot of relatives in the Ukraine. For example, my aunt's house was destroyed in the very beginning, and actually now I have no idea what is the solution. I don't enjoy that some guys try to express their like negative vision of this problem, negative attitude maybe towards Russia or towards our government… They're not very keen on that problem, but they just look at BBC channel and then try to disturb my brain.

CHE-Capt (2015, p.6) mentioned his need to exchange and talk about everything to operate well with another team member. For him, it is a major issue if people do not talk or share experiences, and his perception is that when this occurs, people are not willing to be on the team. Another finding is that if a behaviour is bothering one, then it should be stated. A similar view was expressed by RUS-Maj (2015, p.3):

> I think it's not a bad idea if you don't agree with some one approach to some issue, just talking about it, it's also communicative. Because sometimes we are not agree but we keep it inside and we are not comfortable with this, but still we don't tell anybody about it and the problem is not solved… a guy can explain his point of view in friendly manner and do it the best way for everybody.

Furthermore, CHN-Maj (2015, p.3) stated that talking together is important to resolve small issues: 'We work together, we live together we need to chat... Sometimes we might discuss about difference in food cultures'. He also stated that one should not look for confrontation or be offensive in case of cultural differences or other issues: 'If you confront the guy… it may cause a problem… you need to find some interpersonal skills to communicate with them'. MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.4) stated that 'if there is any issue within a team, it's good to sit down and one to one if there's one

between you and your teammate it's better to solve it in the table'. NZL-LtCol (2015, p.4) stated:

> Like any relationship, if there's an issue and you don't talk about it, it just sits there and simmers. Whereas at least if you can talk about it, you either come to an agreement or you agree to disagree but at least you've discussed it and you can move on.

Examples of potential conflict mentioned during the interview and where communication may help are hygiene, issues between civilian and military components, different communication styles, and different risk perception. For example, AUS-Capt (2015, p.5) stated:

> Hygiene is always a good one to use because it can be uncomfortable to talk about. If someone doesn't use deodorant because they don't use it much in their country, then that might upset some people but be completely normal to others. So, it's about whether you are a sort of person who's comfortable in telling that person, you know I have to sit in the car with you all day, I can't open the windows, I would appreciate it if you used deodorant.

With regard to the civilian versus military component, DNK-Capt (2015, p.12) stated: 'I don't always feel people are fair when they say yeah but these civilians don't understand the military point of view… some misunderstanding could be solved by go and speaking with the person, instead of just shouting'.

In relation to different communication styles, FJI-Maj (2015, p.3) stated:

> You need to be open to address issues more in a diplomatic way and also some people need to be advised that other people might have a different perception of what is being stated. Say, for example, somebody from Europe is very used to speaking straight in a more authoritative way, in which, in fact, he means well, but there's someone who might perceive it as, "oh, this guy is forcing and is trying to overrule me". But, in fact, it is different altogether if you look at overall picture.

In relation to risk perception, EST-Maj (2015, p.6) stated that officers need to agree on risks:

> You should speak about it and just slow down or we do have some landscape here and everything is different. Sometimes lands can be very hard, very rocky, very deep, so we just have to avoid these kinds of things. That becomes again the communication part about it, just speak about it… for example, most people think it's safe, and if one thinks it's not that much safe, so you just have to agree about it and do not do it.

CHE-Capt (2015, p.11) also stated that the team discussion is important, for example, if a UNMO does not feel safe on a patrol, then it is a team decision to continue or not; it should not be imposed by one individual or another.

Furthermore, communication may contribute to self-improvement and learning. For instance, SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.9) stated that 'in order for people to improve themselves is through discussion with others… if we constantly interact and we ask questions, I think that will help us to improve'.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.14) also suggested that having strong communication skills will help with individual knowledge development: 'They've told me things from their point of view and I've learned and the same thing from mine'.

4.5.4 Interested and Ability to Interact with Everyone

The mission is composed of civilian local and international employees, military and police officers, younger and older people, junior and senior people, males and females, and a mix of culture and languages. In the AO, other UN agencies and NGOs are active. All work together for the benefit of the local institutions and population. In addition to the team, it is also a necessity for officers to be able to communicate and negotiate with all parties. As per French (2012), building relationships cannot happen without communication, in this context, the ability to build relationships may also impact operation effectiveness.

RUS-LtCol (2015, p.2) stated that is important to be able to communicate with everyone and especial with the local population. While patrolling, in meetings, or off duty, interactions occur on a daily basis and are key to success for the mission. This aspect could be referred to as the ability to engage in small talk in Stevens and Campion (1994)'s teamwork model. In addition, CHE-Capt (2015, p.6) viewed interaction and relationship building on the team as a critical success factor. It does not mean that a UNMO needs to have an affinity for or become close friends with everyone, but it is expected that a UNMO can work, solve problems, and live for 10 days with anyone.

While on patrol base, there is not much room to be alone; thus, being able to interact with team members is crucial. This view is supported by NOR-Capt (2015, p.1), who stated that 'you have to have social contact… you really have to connect with the other

nationalities' and 'up there you need to be able to speak to other people, work with other people and be around other people for many hours and days'. RUS-Maj (2015, p.2) had a similar view:

> Communication skills should be at least at middle level in the beginning, because if you can communicate good with different people you will be okay. You'll be like fish in the water. Even without some theoretic knowledge, but I think if the guy is not very communicative, it will be a little bit difficult for him.

When asked what he tried to change during his time in the mission, NZL-Capt (2015, p.14) stated that improving his communication was essential:

> The way I interacted with senior officers as well. Because when you arrive in the mission, you do arrive with guys that are majors and the like, and they are quite significantly older than myself, so being able to effectively communicate with them and try and get your point across.

AUS-Capt (2015, p.1) also stated that effective communication is crucial:

> Interpersonal skills are key, having understanding obviously of the cultural backgrounds as we just stated. Being able to communicate effectively, not only verbally but also written communication and interacting with people of different backgrounds, not just military but civilians, the language assistants, the local.

This was also reflected by RUS-Maj (2015, p.3), who stated:

> I think this, let's say, this bundle of characteristics can help you to operate both in teams and to converse, cooperate with locals. If you have good characteristics, communicative skills and so on, it will help you in both situations.

Additionally, LEB-LA2 (2015, p.8) stated: 'In a part of the mission is to communicate with the locals. I mean, if you are not able to communicate with the locals and to respect the culture then this part is cancelled'. FIN-Capt (2015, p.15) suggested that to be able to have small talk is important in the international context and that this was something difficult for Finland's officers:

> Of course, the learning is one and also communication skills. For example, in Finnish, we speak always very softly, but in here it's very nice to in the morning say hello, how are you? And so on, and you have to be again more open-minded, and you can small talk is not important things in here.

Finally, CHE-1stLt (2015, p.4) stated:

> Some people just don't care, their ego is big enough just to talk bad English I would say. Not bad but just to go on with their English and don't have a problem with it… don't be shy to participate.

4.5.5 Ability to Adapt Own Communication

As in Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) D&I model the ability to communicate appropriately is a prerequisite in the context of this case study. This is the sense that UNMOs should be able to appropriately adapt their communication and interact with all parties in the mission. According to the UN training, people should 'tailor language, tone, style and format to match audience' (UN, 2017-L3.1). In the context of this research, the different levels of English proficiency were mentioned, as well as the ability to adapt one's communications to various proficiency levels. One of the findings is that it seems easier for non-native speakers to communicate with other non-native officers, which suggests that native English-speaking officers may have to adapt more that non-native speakers.

In this context, IRL-Capt (2015, p.13) stated: 'have the patience to take it easy with someone… sometimes the Australians have only one channel they can transmit'. He further stated that 'communication is also about choosing the right time to bring issue and thinking of better way to get a message across'. An officer needs to be able to adapt their communication style to the receiver. NOR-Capt (2015, p.1) stated that 'with some nationality, you have to treat or talk in a certain way. For example, with Chinese, I probably have to go a little deeper when I try to explain something than I will do with a native'. CHN-Maj (2015, p.9) stated 'It's quite easy to communicate with non-native speakers because everyone tries to speak clear to speak loud. Some native speakers may speak very fast and also not in very loud volume. So sometimes you find some problem'. RUS-Maj (2015, p.6) also suggested that it is more difficult to understand native than non-native English speakers but that there were exceptions: 'I understand very good Italian guys, all European guys, Austrian like Swiss guys, European guys but not native speaker'. EST-Maj (2015, p.4) stated that 'non-native speakers… will understand each other of course, absolutely, sometimes even better than you're speaking with the native speakers'. FJI-Maj (2015, p.3) stated that good English speakers need to adapt to weaker ones:

> You cannot tell a nonspeaking a balance means we meet halfway, someone who's a very good English speaking UNMO needs to at least come down to this level… Someone who speaks English very fast needs to speak slowly and likewise. I've got a lot of UNMOs who used to come to tell me, what is the word for this? They feel better asking me how do we spell this word, rather

> than asking somebody who's a very good English speaker, because of, in my perception, the fear of making things more complicated.

NZL-Capt (2015, p.13) suggested that this challenge is recognised by native speakers and that they try to adapt accordingly:

> I had a very big tendency to speak quite quickly and because this was one of the first missions where I was working specifically with countries that English wasn't their first language, so the ability to just slow down my speech and talk with individuals in a way that they could actually understand me and what I was trying to get across.

Moreover, NZL-LtCol (2015, p.3) stated: 'If it is someone who is not an native speaker then you take the time to slow down, avoid using slang to make sure that messages are actually passed correctly. If you have to body language it, assists with'.

4.5.6 Ability to Avoid Misunderstanding

On an English mission with a mixture of English proficiency levels, it is important that people understand what it is stated: especially when it is a mission briefing or tasking. People can become frustrated when they cannot express themselves and be understood. As per Poteet et al. (2008), this case study suggests the usage of simple wording in written reports and in verbal communication. It should be verified that the listeners have understood what was stated. This can be achieved by reading the body language of the listener or asking questions to verify that the message has been understood. FJI-Maj (2015, p.3) stated: 'I've seen some UNMOs get really frustrated when they try to express themselves. The very individual in expressing themselves and other UNMOs get the wrong message than what has been stated'. NLD-LtCol (2015, p.3) stated that it is important for the officers to say if they did not understand something. An example that he gave was an Italian officer joining a team meeting; she did not understand anything but did not dare to ask questions. Only later did he realise that she had not understood anything. He then stated: 'As a leader, it is important that you realise when you have to repeat things'. SWE-Maj (2015, p.4) gave an example: 'We have Chinese… You are not sure all the time if he's understood what you have stated. You have to really make sure for yourself that he understands what you have stated'. When asked how to ensure this, he stated:

> First of all, it's the perception if he is, did he get what you stated? If you are not sure, then you repeat it once again and then you make sure that he can tell it back what he is going to do… you need skills to read other people.

CHN-Maj (2015, p.9) stated: ‘the best way and also the effective way is to write a simple English to make sure everyone can understand it and to avoid ambiguity’. With regard to communication, RUS-Maj (2015, p.2) stated: ‘Keep it simple and stupid’.

4.5.7 English Proficiency

Communication in a cross-cultural context starts with defining the language of use for communication (French, 2012). English is the first global language in military multi-national engagements such as UNTSO. In this study, less than 20% of participants were native English speakers. The other 80% had English as their second or third language.

A point raised in relation to non-native English speakers by Orna-Montesinos (2013) and also found during this study is that ‘the lack of linguistic confidence or the discomfort with language use might lead to evaluation and judgment, to apparent misconceptions of intellectual competency’, which could suggest that, for example, a UNMO with low English proficiency could be excluded from the decision-making process. English proficiency is identified immediately, and the risk is that officers with lower English proficiency will be classified as having lower competencies when joining the mission.

Having acceptable English proficiency is a clear advantage. However, interpersonal skills may be as important as language proficiency or cultural knowledge and compensate for a lack of these. Further skills identified as impacting the outcome in a cross-cultural setting are flexible thinking and emotional intelligence (Abbe, 2008, p.6). However, mission-specific learning may take longer for officers with lower English proficiency.

Likewise, native speakers have their own challenges. In reference to Poteet et al. (2008), miscommunications between US and UK military personnel were mainly due to cultural differences in language forms and language use. This suggests an even greater potential of miscommunication in a mixed group of native and non-native English speakers. However, this potential issue among English native speakers was not identified during this case study.

Individual language skills are important to be able to communicate with the UNMOs on the team. However, there is no guarantee that all members of international UN

mission teams will have an acceptable English proficiency level. LEB-LA1 (2015, pp.2-3) stated that language is important, and that English is the mission language. Every nationality had their own language except for the Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and Irish. He also mentioned that language proficiency may impact the speed with which people absorb knowledge: 'Australians are easy to pick-up the things, while the Chinese or Nepalese are too slow because of the language… it gives more work to the team'. NZL-Capt (2015, p.3) stated: 'The language one is probably one of the most easily identifiable things that create some, I guess, issues, initially, and that people sometimes struggle to understand'. NLD-LtCol (2015, p.2) stated: 'In my experience overall issue has nothing to do with culture but mostly with language… the first challenge for new officers is to talk only in English'.

SWE-Maj (2015, p.2), a non-native English speaker, stated:

> I think there is so many different ways that we try to cope, okay some guys speak very good English, some are native speaking and some are not that good in English but you can always cope in some way to communicate. It could be an issue if the level is too low.

When asked about the biggest issue in the mission, NZL-Capt (2015, p.11), a native English speaker, stated:

> Conversing in English. Written English not so much, there will always be what are called native speakers on base to monitor that. But to be able to converse and speak effectively in English from the get-go is almost a must.

On the other hand, officer DNK-Capt (2015, p.7), a non-native English speaker, stated that English as a mission language was not an issue:

> I really don't think it's a problem in here. Yes, we have had some people who have very difficult with English, but if you just let them rehearse and say, hey, don't be afraid to use it. I think we've come along. Of course, you need to have a minimum.

Also, EST-Maj (2015, p.4), a non-native English speakers, noted that English proficiency was not an issue:

> I'm even surprised that it's not a problem at all. Yes, of course, we can understand that somebody has better knowledge about the English, and somebody is not. But I never noticed it's some kind of, how to say, that there's some kind of limitation to do your job.

Many other quotations could be included, but at this stage it can be stated that this discussion is ambivalent. Some (i.e., mainly native English speakers) perceive English

proficiency as a major issue, while others do not. Moreover, the level of tolerance seems to be influenced by individual English proficiency. IRL-Capt (2015, p.6) stated:

> My perception is that people who learned English as a second language are perhaps less tolerant of others maybe because they feel like I have studied the language so you should have done the same at this is the level needed for the mission.

IRL-Capt (2015, p.6) also gave an example of Chinese officers who are adept at their duties but do not take much initiative, likely due to their lack of English skills. The consequence is that officers with low English proficiency may not be perceived as competent and may be a target of bullying as also suggested by Orna-Montesinos (2013). He further stated:

> I see guys that are more assertive and more likely to boss them around. I have seen people raising their voice and shouting…I think sometimes there is an element of if people don't speak English very well then people have a tendency to treat them as if their charge is not good.

An example given was 'when it came to train juniors, the Chinese guys were often being diverted from this task'. Additionally, SWE-Maj (2015, p.4) stated: in reference to a UNMO with low English proficiency:

> I'd say they may be put aside a little bit, because it's easier, it's easier to do the job and you want to make sure that the job is done in a good way. It's not that the person doesn't do the job good but I think it's easier to handle because it's difficult to put a guy in charge of a specific task if he doesn't cope with the language because then he can't.

CHN-Col (2015, p.4) stated that a minimal level of English proficiency is required:

> You can communicate and express and understand each other no problem that's okay. If you cannot… this is difficult, is a limitation for the UNMO to join the OGL family and to get a good relation, get a good response to each other.

He further stated: 'The linguistic is part of the communication, but it's about 50%... the other 50% you should do with your personality, your responsibility, and the professional like this'. This suggests that a lack of English skills may be compensated by social skills. Further, IRL-Capt (2015, p.11) stated that the native speaker would get a specific task due to their English, even though the task may not have been language related: 'I was getting tasks because I was native but actually I do not think that for these tasks, the language was an issue'. This is again suggesting that the language proficiency may impact the perception of an individual's competence.

A low level of English proficiency also impacts the speed of learning. Training officer NZL-Capt (2015, p.10) stated:

> It was noticeable that the individual that struggled to speak English struggled during their assessments. It was more of understanding thing and trying to get their points across as opposed to their performance.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.6) perception is that English proficiency has an impact on individual performance: 'It can influence because if you don't understand somebody quite enough or somebody doesn't understand you quite enough, it can influence their operational activity and its effectiveness'. LEB-LA1 (2015, p.4) stated that people with low English proficiency need more time to learn mission-specific topics and thus they may be perceived as less professional than other officers: 'People who do not pick up the thing quicker look as if they are not professional'.

Another aspect is that a native speaker needs to be aware of how they are perceived by non-native speakers. For instance, CHE-1stLt (2015, p.3) stated:

> I observed that if there are many native speakers together that people automatically go out of the group and because they cannot keep up the speed of conversation, native speakers just have their flow of the conversation and it's hard to somewhere find your entry into the conversation.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.8) stated, stated:

> Sometimes… native speaker, they think that they are a little bit cleverer than other guys because, for example, starting process is much easier for them… But the different nations who don't speak in English in the mother language is they have to always thinking and to make maybe double or three times more work as the same goal.

According to NZL-LtCol (2015, p.4):

> At the end of the day, it is an English-speaking mission. We should still, however, be considerate of those that aren't native speakers and take the time to listen and talk carefully, I think, in their presence. The conversation we had the other day where we were saying that for people to have to translate in their mind, I'd never thought of it that way and the fact particularly people that are new to another language takes time to think and process before they can actually speak.

Improving individual English proficiency requires practice. DNK-Maj (2015) stated:

> I did my first mission in 2006. That was a little late. I was 47 years at that time or something. Actually, one of the reasons that I hold myself back, what actually because I was insecure concerning my English. So, when I did my first mission, I just stated, okay what the fuck, I will just have to do it, jump into it,

> and take it from there. I think it's also even that you're maybe not that skilled in English, then you should still, I should say, don't be afraid'.

AUT-Col1 (2015, p.6) stated that officers on an English-speaking mission should try to speak in English and not to use their native language especially if their proficiency is low, as this allows them to improve their language skills:

> The Chinese had a very poor level… and there were always looking for comrade to speak their language. I think that this is not very helpful… you should train yourself and try to speak in English as much as you can.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.8) stated that all officers have specific skills and that English proficiency is not the most important:

> The natives and non-native speakers, they all bring different skill sets to the table, it just means that someone is not a first English speaker you just have to take a little bit time to listen more. I've noticed that the ones who come as weak English speakers, after some months they are actually stronger. The English skills have improved but as far as, it's important that you understand English obviously for this mission because it's an English-speaking mission. However, I don't think personally that is important that you have to have strong English skills… They may be weak in the English-speaking skills but may be strong in their social interaction observation skills.

Again, this suggests that social skills may be more important than English skills.

4.5.8 Basic Local Language Knowledge

Having basic local language knowledge may ease access to the local population. This aspect is also reflected for example in Johnson et al. (2006) IB model or in Abbe (2008) model for army leaders. Nevertheless, UNMOs typically patrol with LAs, which gives them the access to the local population. However, speaking the local language is also a form of respect. MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.3) stated:

> Arabic… is going to assist more and then make… the life of the UNMO easier, especially dealing with the local population… I was in one of the coffee shops sitting back-to-back and then there was new UNMOs just came in. The lady she was talking Arabic, the guy was talking English, so they were completely on a different, talking in a different wave. I mean everybody has, he was asking for something she didn't understand she was talking to the UNMO or someone else. So, I had to interfere and translate. So, if he knew simple words like coffee, tea or maybe he will have much more it will make him… more comfortable.

It was also recognised that when a UNMO was able to say basic words or discuss the menu in Arabic, the people were friendly and discussion could easily be started even if the language switched then to English. NZL-LtCol (2015, p.16) stated:

> I'd love to learn more of the local language, but it's kind of like everybody is talking in English. So it's easy, it's just the easy option, I'm a bit lazy, I just take the easy option and say hello than *marhaba*, and I can easily change that. I look one of our Irish officers and he's doing an amazing job of being able to interact… when I look at all our UNMOs there's only a small percentage who probably actually try and learn the local language. Why? I'm not sure, it could just be because it's so easy not to. They've all got access to a liaison assistant.

4.5.9 Radio Operation Skills

Radio operation skills are important and very specific for this case study. The radio is the main communication means between the team base, patrols, and HQ. Radio operation skills are standardised in the mission. IRL-Capt (2015, p.6) stated: 'I am not saying that I have not been frustrated if you are working on the radio if I listen and sometimes and like bail, and I probably joke with someone about it, but in a friendly manner'. If the skills are not available when the officers are joining the mission, they will have to learn these skills. There are skills that can be improved easily with practice. For example, when asked which skills he improved during his time in the mission, RUS-Capt (2015, p.11) stated: 'Well, I think that I improved my social skills. Operational, yes, working with other countries, helping to improve my operational skills those radio skills and everything I improved them as well'. My perception is that some of the officers were frustrated due to the certain team members' lack of these skills.

4.5.10 Report Writing Skills

As with the radio operation skills, the report writing skills is very specific for this case study. Several reports need to be written, for example the daily situational report (DSR), weekly report, and monthly report. The DSR is done by each team, consolidated by OGL HQ, and sent to UNIFIL and UNTSO HQ. Mission-specific templates and examples are available for the reports, and these skills can thus easily be learned. These skills seem to be influenced by culture and English proficiency. CHE-Capt (2015, p.12) stated:

> Reporting was mostly quantitative and based on the observation it is supposed to be qualitative…but some individuals went much lower on the detail. But I am not convinced that this was a cultural thing because I have seen different guys from the same nations taking a totally different approach.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.13) stated: 'We have our different skills to write those reports. Somebody is going to write a little bit more, for example, native speakers'. Furthermore, RUS-Capt (2015, p.7) stated:

> Some countries make it, like to keep it very strict and added value based, some people want to make reports as detailed as possible even though those details do not add to anything. As soon as we have known the UN way of reporting, everybody should adjust their ways to the standards we have here.

4.5.11 Meeting Handling Skills

As mentioned, daily tasks other than patrolling often involve holding meetings with political or military representatives of the host nations. These meetings are scheduled or, alternatively, could be courtesy visits to strengthen the relationship. The UNMOs are in the mission for 12 months and interact with the same actors several times during their engagement. Thus, meetings should involve a process of building a strong relationship to be able to have an in-depth discussion. For instance, IRL-Capt (2015, p.4) stated that it is helpful to be less regimental in handling meetings. To start a meeting with a *mukhtar* or a mayor with 'I have five questions…' is rather negative, and it is better to be less strict to be able to achieve the specific meeting goal. Furthermore, regional knowledge is important, defined as cultural specific knowledge by Johnson et al. (2006), to be able to hold in-depth discussions with the different actors regarding knowledge about political, infrastructure, social, or security aspects, for example. Moreover, AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.6) emphasised the local and regional as critical when having meeting with local representative:

> You don't, not always will have a senior officer or a senior member to fall back on and you have to have a good understanding of the political situation of the country as well. You are not in a purely green machine, we have that protection of the green machine around you. You are on your own and you will be asked questions at meetings with *mukhtars* and people you meet every day and you should have a general knowledge of what's happening in the region, what's happening in the country. Whether it's military issues, political issues, governance issues, they expect you to have some understanding. You cannot come across as, "I'm new, I'm here purely just to observe and report on the blue line".

These quotations could suggest that regional and local knowledge, ability to learn, and communication skills have an impact on operational effectiveness.

4.5.12 Discussion

Communication was identified as critical in the literature review (see Table 8). These skills include understanding verbal and non-verbal communication, local language skills, adequate English competency, ability to adapt language and communication style, active listening, open communication, and ability to engage in small talk. These skills were identified to different extents across the CCC, teamwork, and D&I models. Communication is also the first of the eight UN core competencies, and it is defined as follows (UN, 2017-L3.1):

> Speaks and writes clearly and effectively, listens to others, correctly interprets messages from others and responds appropriately, asks questions to clarify, and exhibits interest in having two-way communication, tailors language, tone, style and format to match audience, demonstrates openness in sharing information and keeping people informed.

Language proficiency is not defined as a core competency by the UN. Nevertheless, this study reveals that a team member's low level of English proficiency can be a source of conflict within teams. Officers with weaker English skills could be excluded from the team and their performance underestimated or undervalued; this was also recognised by Orna-Montesinos (2013) in another context. Officers may be able to overcome their lack of language skills with strong social skills. Thus, it could be concluded that an individual's English proficiency should be looked at in conjunction with their social skills. The UN does not refer to body language and local language knowledge as core competencies; nevertheless, this research claims that they are.

Initially, the ability to speak up, negotiate, and manage conflict were identified as specific categories. Due to their similarities, they were consolidated into the category of 'able to have open communication'. In the preliminary model defined in the literature review, conflict management and negotiation skills were identified as skills in the 'teamwork' core category (Stevens & Campion, 1994). However, in the context of this case study, it fits better with the broader communication skills.

This research suggests that the concepts identified during the literature review are also applicable in this context and further elaborates on them. Additional technical communication skills not identified during the literature review were recognised to be important. These skills include radio operation, report writing, and meeting handling. It could also be argued that these are military skills and knowledge; however, it is not,

for example, about handling the radio but it is about communicating over the radio. These ‘communication skills’ are described as:

Ability to listen: Listening to others may foster knowledge exchange from officers who have been in the mission longer. It is also about the ability to accept others’ opinions and to reduce potential conflict.

Ability to read and manage body language: This is about being able to get additional information in a specific context. Additionally, one’s own body language may have to be managed carefully, especially in a cross-cultural setting where a gesture may have a different meaning.

Ability to have open communication: UNMOs should be able to hold open and non-judgmental discussions. Furthermore, if an officer is irritated by the behaviour of a team member, then they should be able to promptly discuss the matter to avoid potential issues. Moreover, if other officers identify issues between team members, it is expected that these will be addressed rapidly to avoid a potential conflict.

Interested and ability to interact with everyone: It is expected the UNMOs can communicate, integrate, and cooperate with people of different backgrounds, regardless of whether they are military civilian, from the UN, or local actors.

Ability to adapt one’s own communication: It is expected that UNMOs can adapt their communication to match the audience depending on the English proficiency level and the cultural background.

Ability to avoid misunderstandings: UNMOs are expected to ensure that they understand what has been stated. Additionally, they should be able to use simple wording to communicate.

English proficiency: English is the main language in multi-national military operations (Orna-Montesinos, 2013). However, English proficiency is not included in the reviewed military CCC models by Abbe (2008) or Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014). Their research was US Army centric and not conducted in a multinational context. Accordingly, an acceptable English proficiency level is expected from all UNMOs to be able to communicate with other team members and actors in the field.

Basic local language knowledge: As in Abbe (2008) model, having a grasp of the local language seems to be an advantage; it is also a form of respect.

Radio operation skills: UNMOs are expected to be able to communicate in a standard way via radio. This skill is context specific and thus likely not included in another model.

Report writing skills: UNMOs are expected to be able to write reports based on specific templates and rules. This skill is context specific and thus probably not included in another model.

Meeting handling skills: UNMOs are expected to be able to engage with different actors in the field in the form of meetings or courtesy visits. This skill is context specific and thus probably not included in another model.

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between communication and other categories, such as:

Military skills and knowledge: Strong communication skills allow UNMOs to have discussions with local actors and thereby gather information.
Professionalism: Low English proficiency may impact the professionalism perception of the other team members.
Teamwork: Conversing with other team members will help them ge to know each other, build trust, and build relationships.
Cultural specific knowledge: Conversing with the local population may enable the UNMO to learn more about the region.
Learning and experience: By communicating with others, in the team or local population, the UNMO gains knowledge of them.

4.6 Teamwork

This section reviews the ‘teamwork’ core category. The UNMOs are diverse in age, gender, and military branch, and they work in teams. The attributes identified in this study are being able to adapt to a team, to integrate, and to help others. It is also about not being an individualist but rather working in favour of the team, being open, and embracing a feedback culture. Finally, participative leadership is also part of the category.

The following subsections detail each of these categories with quotations from the interviews.

4.6.1 Participative Leadership

An outpost of an observer group has a flat hierarchy. In exception to the COGL, the OGL officers are all line UNMOs with the rank of captain or major. Some line UNMOs may have another rank in their home country. For example, a Lieutenant could be promoted to captain for the mission, or a Lt-Colonel or Colonel could have a mission rank of major.

Some line UNMOs take a team leader position or staff a position. The selection of the team leader and staff position is based on a combination of national balance, acceptance of the officer by the team, and officer performance. It is voluntary and officers need to apply for a specific position. In consequence, a team leader or a staff member may have less experience or less seniority than an officer in the team. The perception of some officers is that placing more senior or experienced officers in a leadership position would help the organisation better utilise the available knowledge.

In this context, participative leadership allowing discussion is a way to include different perspectives in the decision-making process. Some officers also suggested the opposite - i.e., that in a multi-national or multi-cultural context, non-participative leadership may be easier due to the difficulties in accommodating many different views and preferences. Nevertheless, most of the interviewees stated that participative leadership is preferable in the context of the OGL. The contribution of all individuals is needed to be able to understand the positive and negative impacts of a decision.

This aspect could be referred to as the aspect of participative problem solving indicated in Stevens and Campion (1994)'s teamwork model. A team leader who asks the opinion of the team members prior to making a decision is seen as strong. For example, NLD-LtCol (2015, p.4) stated that to make a good decision, the contribution of staff and injection of individual experience is needed. Later in the interview, NLD-LtCol (2015, p.11) stated: 'Team leaders who ask the opinion of the team members prior to taking a decision is a strength'. This is also the view of team leader AUT-Col2 (2015, p.8):

> When you have a very flat hierarchy as we have it over here, it's not, it would simply the mission would fail if you are working from top to bottom. You have to integrate a lot of people. It does not mean that at the end of a decision-making process, there is one person that leader who takes the decision but you have to integrate all of them or at least more people into a process to the benefit of everyone.

In contrast to the majority of the interviews, SWE-Maj (2015) stated:

> I think maybe the Russian way, that's quite a norm, maybe it's easier in this environment, because it's difficult to get all the nations together and everybody will not be satisfied every time. Maybe it's better to have more like a straight leadership in the organisation that is put together just for this mission, maybe that's better, I'm not sure.

An example of a potentially non-participative leader was given by IRL-Capt (2015, p.7):

> Somebody was trying hard to become a team leader… but he would be viewed as somebody who was not a very unifying force… none would have liked to work for him so it became a big discussion around the base.

Another potential issue was raised by LEB-LA1 (2015, p.7):

> When they are in a position like a team leader or staff member, they think "because I am better than you, that is why I am in this position". This changes the people behaviours and has a negative impact.

The LA also gave an example of a Canadian officer becoming team leader and slapping a junior Chinese officer. Furthermore, he stated: 'You don't need a rank really. You work together. Alone, you will not do the work. Alone, you will not succeed to do the work. You have to do all in a team'.

It was also suggested that leadership approach may depend on nationality. For example AUT-Col1 (2015, p.9) stated:

> We will give a task to the guys and then expect them to solve it. In other nations, for example, Russia, they will give you a clear order, that means you have not really a highway on how to end or how to solve the problem. That is a little different.

A difference in leadership approach was also recognised by SWE-Maj (2015, p.3):

> For example, Russia doesn't, or as open, we try to always in the West, if I give the example with Sweden, we try to involve as many people as possible before you take a decision for example, but maybe in the Russian way it's more like, not too much interaction with the team before.

This perception is supported by the comments of RUS-Maj (2015, pp.3,4):

> We have more or less the same rank, captain, major and actually there is no strong chain of command that we have back at home. You are not subordinate and you don't have like concrete tasks. … During operational activity, during activity in the team I think it should better to have like this strong chain of command, so not to raise every issue and try to dispute about it.

However, it seems to be more a personal view rather than a cultural difference or could also be due to international experience. RUS-Capt (2015, p.2), a team leader with four years' international experience, stated:

> We are all colleagues. There is no subordinate, superior, pure military relation like we get used to in the army. You are giving the orders and you are expecting the people to follow the orders without questioning them. It doesn't work here. We get our orders and instructions, but we are still able to discuss and then give our opinions and between UNMOs it should be cooperation not like military way of doing things.

According to CHN-Maj (2015, p.5), the team leader's role is to ensure that the team is functioning well and create a harmonious environment, rather than tasking. With participative leadership, it is important that once the decision is made, everyone adheres to it. CHE-1stLt (2015, p.11) stated that the decision-making process should be a consensus approach:

> There should be a consensus approach in the beginning but still, as we are soldiers, the person needs to be able to lead. So, maybe allow a discussion. If there is a consensus within the team and in the team is obvious, well, I come to or I don't need to lead or to make a decision then he needs to accept the team's decisions. Otherwise, if he sees the team is not finding a good solution or not finding any solution then he needs to lead stricter. He needs to be able to adapt to the situation.

4.6.2 Ability to Adapt

It is expected that officers can adapt to the context, their role, and the team. Even with high attrition, each team still develops a team culture. The LA also contributes to the continuity of the team culture. Adaptability is seen as not imposing oneself and one's way of doing things, but rather observing first to better understand the context and the way the team and the individuals operate. It does not mean, not actively participating and contributing, but rather not being too demanding. It further means to be open to doing things in another way, embracing the team culture, and understanding different individuals. Furthermore, officers need to adapt to their role as line UNMOs, independent of their role, position, and rank in their home army.

In line with several cross-cultural assessments' subscales (i.e., CCAI, ICAPS, and MPQ); referenced by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) and Johnson et al. (2006); and considered as dynamic competence by Schaffer et al. (2006); flexibility and adaptability were referenced several times during the interviews. For example, when asked about the qualities or abilities that are necessary for UNMOs to successfully operate within a multinational team, CAN-Capt (2015, p.2) stated:

> You have to be open-minded, you have to be flexible, and you have to be tolerant. These are three keys, I think, the ability to work in a team environment is very important… teamwork is key.

NLD-LtCol (2015, p.10) stated: 'It is also important that you are willing to change which in the back of your head that you are doing that for the purpose of the team… have to adjust to the others. So to try to operate in common goal'. IRL-Capt (2015, p.8) gave an example of a person who became an issue:

> A new person… had really problems not for his ability to absorb the information, and to discern things but to accept it. Questioning everything absolutely everything and that became a big discussion in the team around what to do with this officer.

In this example, the officer in question came to UNTSO shortly after a combat mission in Afghanistan. He had the view that everything should change to be like it was in his previous mission and had difficulty letting go of that experience and adapting to the new context. When asked if he changed over the last six months in the mission, IRL-Capt (2015, p.14) stated: 'I think I have learned a lot about tolerance… and able to fit in', which is again a testimony of the importance to be able to adapt in a multicultural context. FJI-Maj (2015, p.2) stated that adaptability is broader than only the cross-cultural context:

> All officers must try to adapt and how that is implemented or what ways the training come across for that officer to adapt... Adaptability is not only for cross-cultural, but it's also for, of course, learning this. You have to adapt to certain personalities, because that personality is affected by could be the culture or the individual upbringing.

Furthermore, CHN-Maj (2015, p.6) stated that it was important to adapt to the team culture:

> LAs are stable. They will not change, so make it possible to continue to have a kind of a team culture. Since you join the team also, you can change a little bit the team, but also the team will also change you. So, finally, everyone adapts to team culture.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.11) noted the flexibility in daily activities and stated:

> Like we drink beer and you put like on the table or somebody use glass or no and you say, oh I don't use glass so everybody will not use glasses… and there is one guy who does not agree says no, I drink only from the glass and he start to arise this issue and after some time, it's already not an issue. It's a problem and the evening is bad, the party is broken just because of small thing that is not important. This is flexibility.

NLD-Capt (2015, p.8) stated that adaptability is crucial:

> If you cannot adapt, you're not happy anymore because you have to do things that you don't like, or they're not going the way you wanted... that might be a problem or maybe they start drinking to forget about the problem they have. So that might be a case… you should have the abilities otherwise you will not survive.

This suggests that adaptably in the context of teamwork may have an impact on professionalism. Moreover, teamwork is about not imposing one's own view or way of doing things. NLD-LtCol (2015, p.7) stated:

> You need to be able to cooperate in such a way that you are able to achieve your goal without stepping of toes or putting fingers in somebody eyes… or telling somebody that what he is doing right now is not right.

He also stated: 'don't tell people that what you are doing at home is better than they do'. Similarly, NOR-Capt (2015, p.9) stated: 'You cannot come and say "hey, we have to do it the Norwegian way" The thing that we are doing down here can be done in 100 different ways'. According to RUS-Maj (2015, p.2), 'You should respect habits of other nations and don't try to convince guys to do it your way'. A way to better understand the context is to take time and observe. SWE-Maj (2015, p.7) stated:

> I think we all are different but it's a way for me not to jump in and trying to put on my way of doing things to other people because maybe I didn't understand the task correctly from beginning. So I try to observe a little bit in the beginning, and then continue.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.4) stated that also the civilian component should adapt better:

> I've noticed this only takes three or four months before some of the new UNMOs come across as old hands, the three or four months here they, because we have rotation UNMOs coming through all the time, by the time the next rotation comes through, the ones who are previously trained, few weeks before come across as have been here a while, because they tend to adapt, the military guys tend to adapt a lot with that, while we don't see that with the civilian staff.

This could suggest that the ability to learn quickly may also help one adapt to new situations.

4.6.3 Ability to Be a Team Player

As in Stevens and Campion (1994) teamwork model, UNMOs needs to be able to interact positively with their peers. A team player is viewed in the context of this case study as a person who can integrate and adapt to the team. Individualists may be an issue for the teams. Officers need to be team players, which means putting the team before one's own needs. The team player has to be open about their own skills and knowledge and know the strengths and weaknesses of the other team members. Being a team player signifies being proactive, helping others, and performing tasks without being tasked, although in some cultures, certain tasks may be gender dependent or may not be done by officers of a certain seniority. Finally, it is also about the ability to discuss a situation and agree on a course of action, this aspect could be referred to a collaborative problem solving Stevens and Campion (1994).

In general, OGL teams have cohesion despite the potential difficulties generated by the multi-cultural context. This may be due to the fact that all team members are officers and thus have a similar background or curriculum. This suggests that having a common denominator or mutual interest may be favourable for team cohesion; SOP and regular training together may forge even more team cohesion. It could be argued that this aspect is in reference to Hofstede et al. (2010), that individual scoring may be influenced by job related norms.

When asked about the kind of personality a UNMO should have, RUS-Capt (2015, p.4) stated: 'Teamwork is crucial there… The only people we don't need are those who think about themselves first and then the team'. According to AUT-Col1 (2015, p.9), 'You should always be a team player. If you have guys that are only more or less… then of course we have troubles'. He also stated: 'If you have one or two guys in the team that are always going their way then it could become a threat for the team'. DNK-Maj (2015, p.4) stated: 'I think that it's also about caring, to care for others… be loyal to the task, but you can also be loyal to the mission, loyalty for the team'. RUS-Capt (2015, p.9) suggested that social skills may have an impact on teamwork:

> There might be situations where people are not so open and I won't say mission oriented, but when I came here right after my divorce so I was very open and friendly and very energetic with doing my job, so what I did I always just went for patrol, struggled through the patrol but still did my part then went back, went to my room and that's it. I mean people understood that and even though they didn't try to find out what's going on, but as soon as I'm doing my job

> and I'm not causing problems or fighting with anybody you are good. That there is no added value from this person to the team, but still if we have the whole team of people like that we will fail for sure. If it's like one or two people, the team can handle it.

AUS-Capt (2015, p.6) stated: 'Things that we don't need is people who aren't team players, acting as individuals and just doing their own thing. Everyone needs to be involved, everyone needs to contribute to the team'. MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.4) further stated that everyone needs to be in favour of the team and 'to avoid clashes, actually you should always try to work for the team benefit more than for your own'. Teamwork is also about being low profile. EST-Maj (2015, p.14) stated:

> You have to like communicate with people, try to understand them, not be egoistic and all this stuff. This is not the place where you can show that well, how good the infantry combat personnel I am or these kinds of things. Teamwork is the keyword I think here.

Helping others and doing tasks proactively is part of being a team player. NLD-Capt (2015, p.3) stated: 'You have to help each other, so if you see something needs to be done, even if it's not asked to you, but you see it needs to be done'. Also CHN-Col (2015, p.5) referred to peer support:

> If you help the others and you can get good results and also it's for your own moods and for your, how do you say it, for your the goodness sorts and your feeling you can feel good after you had given help to others.

RUS-Capt (2015, p.4) suggested that a team is not about one type of personality but that a mix is important:

> They should be different personalities. There is no way we can have a team full of this type of personality the whole section no we need everybody. We need very funny and open guys, we need also you know like the serious quiet guys who are doing their job and that's what keeps the balance. The only people we don't need is those who think about themselves first and then the team… Teamwork is crucial there.

NLD-LtCol (2015) covered another aspect, which is that everyone on the team needs to be able to do every task:

> In some culture it is very normal that men are doing things like putting the garbage away, but in some other culture it is a women task and not a men task… But here when living together in a house this need to be look at.

Similarly, AUT-Col1 (2015, p.12) stated:

> Russian and Chinese did not take care too much about the cars. That means if it is washed or not, if it is refuelled after a couple of days or they are… not

> operational. This is sometimes also depending of nation and rank. I remember, Chinese major has his guys to do that…. Here, we are at the same level, and everybody has to do the same. Which means cleaning inside, for example the kitchen, the bathroom, and the ablution.

IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.6) stated that different religions also impact the team and may become an issue. For example, for a long patrol during the Ramadan month, one cannot expect that officers observing Ramadan will be able to do it. On the other hand, officers should not demonstrate their religion without regard for the other people by, for example, blaring music at four o'clock in the morning and thus impacting the sleep of the team.

Having common ground helps to create team cohesion. For example, AUS-Capt (2015, p.3) stated:

> We might do things differently in our country… SOPs are definitely essential and then the understating of the SOPs need to be enforced or reinforced by training. By doing training, it can increase our effectiveness when conducting tasks. So, you are focusing on maybe key situations that we may be faced with. Working together to go through the process that we need to, to make sure that we are following SOPs and doing that in a safe manner. So, training and teamwork are definitely key.

DNK-Capt (2015, p.17) gave an example of how training could create team cohesion by knowing each other's capabilities:

> I would show what I had in my bag, and how to use it if they didn't necessarily have it. Maybe I would say yeah, this is actually I'm only allowed to use it on my own, but I would actually expect you to use it if you were hurt.

According to FIN-Capt (2015, p.5) team leaders need to know each officers background:

> You need to know what his background is that you can, that is the most important in my opinion that a team leader, and deputy leader they have to know, what is the background is this guy that he can use those skills.

CHE-Capt (2015, p.3) stated that aside from cultural differences, there is general team cohesion due to the commonality that everyone has a military background, all are officers have a similar rank, and they are volunteering to work on a UN mission, again this aspect could be in reference to Hofstede et al. (2010) that individual scoring may be influenced by job related norms. This view is also supported by IRL-Capt (2015, p.19), who stated that besides the differences in military structure, everyone being in

the military is the backbone of well-functioning teams. RUS-Capt (2015, p.3) also stated:

> What's good here is that we are all military officers of more or less the same rank, I won't say experience but the same level of expertise, so that helps a lot. Even though like us Russians we have so many issues with other countries, but I have never faced like a real hostile behaviour against Russians. Because we understand it, we do the same job, we are on the same mission there is no need to confront.

4.6.4 Ability to Gain Trust

Trust is an attribute often mentioned in the literature (Bove et al., 2020; Curseu et al., 2019; Grove, 2004; Stevens & Campion, 1994) and also identified in this case study. The officers need to be able trust each other mainly for safety and security reasons. The perception is that trust may be gained by officers with integrity and a high level of professionalism. Being open, knowing others, and having cultural awareness may also help to build trust between the officers. For example, when asked about the abilities and qualities UNMOs needed to have on this mission, NZL-Capt (2015, p.7) stated:

> Each officer if they don't have integrity then they've automatically lost the trust of the majority of people that they work with. So, you need to be able to trust the individual both from a safety point of view, especially here so that they know that if something happens to you, that they're going to make the correct decisions, and also that you can rely on them.

RUS-Capt (2015, p.11) stated: 'Usually you don't chase the trust, you just do your best and then eventually you earn it'. EST-Maj (2015, p.3) suggested that communication skills could help build trust:

> One most important thing is communication. I mean that at first if we do not communicate, we don't understand what different person are thinking about. If you're open-minded, it's much easier to trust as well, and you can understand what kind of background he is.

AUT-Col2 (2015, p.11) suggested that being professional helps to build trust:

> Trust we can build by professional reason. By acting as I stated as professional as you can in fulfilling also minor tasks. I'll give you an example. It's not only to observe and report an incident which is going on. It's also those little tiny tasks like washing the cars, like preparing the food and do everything what you do everything. What you do as professional as you can that builds trust. The people when they see that you are acting professionally in many levels like dealing with alcohol as I stated many of those little tasks, minor tasks. I think that's trust building'.

4.6.5 Ability to Integrate People Within the Team

Stevens and Campion (1994) teamwork model includes the ability to recognise type and source of conflicts and to define and implement an appropriate conflict resolution. Issues identified during this case study are for example that for different reasons, some officers may have difficulties integrating the team. Officers should have the ability to recognise such cases and to help with the integration. Furthermore, gender should not be an issue, and the behaviours and tasking of males and females must be the same to ensure integration within the team. The integration can be achieved in several ways. For example, CAN-Capt (2015, p.16) stated:

> We can do something absolutely so basically it becomes a point of finding mutual interests. You find what you find interesting, and he finds interesting and then you basically try to bridge the gap. Try to bring him into conversation… dinner is key because everybody is socialising. …The idea is you don't want somebody to be excluded from the pack. You don't want to always be joking about the same guy and so on. Humour is very important. You have to be able to make jokes with people and you have to do it without hurting their feelings.

Additionally, leadership plays an important role in integration. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.12) stated:

> We had one officer who had troubles in English skills which led to problems in reporting and which leads to participate in team interview discussions. He could not properly so to say participate in these discussions and became more and more out of the group. It is up to the team leader to integrate him to solve this problem within the team and to make everyone aware of the situation.

EST-Maj (2015, p.8) referred to team dynamic and gender, as well:

> All the teams are pretty cooperative about it. They do not have any kind of issues about that somebody is male or female… Females have been pretty much team workers, and they do not feel that they are not... But, of course, it depends on how the team is working as well, how they welcome, how they train. If the team started to do some kind of differences, for example, the first months and then it can go the issue about it, but if the team members are just acting exactly as it is, then no differences then I think mentally there cannot be any problems as well.

The ability to identify conflict situations and diffuse them is important. NOR-Capt (2015, p.4) gave an example of an LA diffusing tension:

> When the language assistant realised that there was a tension between two members teams, he invited the entire team for dinner to his place. By doing that, he was able clear the situation'.

According to NLD-Capt (2015, p.10):

> First, I talked to the one, and I talked to the other one, and I made up my mind and I put them together, and then we had to chat with the three of us. Afterwards, at least they were able to work with each other.

4.6.6 Ability to Integrate Language Assistants

The role of the Language Assistant (LA) is a specific aspect of this case study. LAs are usually with the patrols and help UNMOs interact with the local population. They are locals who live in the mission AO and have been in the mission for many years. They understand the geopolitical influence and know the history of the country and mission. With the high attrition of the mission, this knowledge also helps to keep the mission running smoothly and is thus critical for the mission. To be able to leverage the LA is an advantage. There is also a specific lecture on how to work with LAs in the latest specialised training materials for UNMOs (UN, 2019b). LEB-LA1 (2015, p.11) stated: 'This is one of the important tools really (meaning the LA), who keeps the mission from years and years. Otherwise, we would really lose so many background cultures'. They are also a helpful source of information about the current situation. For instance, NLD-Capt (2015, p.7) stated:

> We all know especially now again it's very tense, so then you need to be really here and interested in seeing the things and other differences. One of the important tools that we have according to me is the LA. They have some kind of gut feeling in a way, at least that's what I experienced with our guys. They can see if a leaf on a branch has turned, they see it. That might be important'.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.15) stated: 'It's good to know when you're working with them [LAs]; they have a lot of information that they can give you that you can use and it works'. NOR-Capt (2015, p.5) also stated: 'I totally know that if something happens, they are the guys [the LAs] who will get us out of the situation'. Language assistants are a main tool to communicate with the local population, for example in meetings, checkpoints, or markets. For instance, AUT-Col1 (2015, p.1) stated:

> We more or less have always a language assistant with us. Not using them is probably not the best solution. You will have a big drop or a big problem with the communication with the local population.

Furthermore, LAs have excellent knowledge of the AO. They know the roads, villages, and unsafe areas. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.14) stated:

> When UNMOs keep saying that okay I know everything like he'd come here, he is in his first week and then he starts to ask questions, all sorts of questions, we answer, we try to help, we do anything. Then those nosey parts starts. Of course, as UNMO you are allowed, there areis no restrictions of movements. But there is also the cultural thing like of respect also some places where over the years we've been told please don't go to those roads, to those narrow roads, those areas where can make friction between you and the people. When it comes to those UNMOs who thinks like in their first week no I'm here, I want to go there and who the hell are you to tell me you are just an LA. So, stay there and we go this road.

Language Assistants can assist in the training of juniors or the further development of specific skills of senior UNMOs. For instance, MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.11) stated:

> UNMO when he comes to a mission, I guess he should give, for the culture he should learn more about it and then try to be close to the local population. Especially through the languages assistance and get to know what he should do what he should not do in a certain environment and then this is how he should carry on with this.

This is also supported by NOR-Capt (2015, p.5) who stated that the LAs have great competence in teaching their culture, providing cultural awareness on the Lebanese people, and sharing their knowledge of the Middle East.

4.6.7 Ability to Train Other Officers

A specific aspect of this case study is that every month, UNMOs join and leave the mission. This requires constant knowledge transfer from senior UNMOs to junior UNMOs and the need for officers to be able to train other officers. An exam needs to be taken to qualify as a senior. This exam is called Test OGL or TOGL and is typically taken by the juniors after being in the mission for six to eight weeks. When the chief of OGL was asked about her expectations for officers joining the mission, she also mentioned the ability to train officers. NZL-LtCol (2015, p.4) stated:

> Knowledge I think if you're to, I mean just the general officer training, professionalism, their leadership, their staff officer skills, their ability to learn and train others are all really important to what we do and I expect that of any officer.

FIN-Capt (2015, p.8) gave an example of the difficulty that can occur when training juniors:

> When I was in SIERRA, I would drive all the time, but I need to train an Australian and make observations, make reports and other things, but always I'm driving. So because he was the patrol leader, he makes those issues what belonged to patrol leader, but because I was driver I drive. I check the car, and

> of course support him. But there are difficulties in this kind, because only to training you use the radio and basic things, but has to do during the patrol has to watch the patrol. When you have those kinds of colleagues with you that is always the patrol leader, because he has no heavy driving license that is a problem.

The training needs to be adapted to each individual. LEB-LA1 (2015, p.14) gave an example of a potential conflict and how he handled it:

> Once when we had Chinese junior UNMO due to patrol with a Australian senior UNMO. Immediately I told the Australian, you will be driving. I will teach the Chinese in my way. So, when I started teaching the Chinese, the Australian guy was driving, at the end of the day he was like very nervous, because you really need to take it very step by step. Then he told me, I think you were right, because if I would be really teaching him, and he did not really pick up these things, I would have dropped him in the end. So, this is it. It is in the blood and it is in the culture.

This suggests that personal traits impact the ability to teach and that patience may be required.

4.6.8 Ability to Have a Feedback Culture

Feedback on performance is part of an efficient teamwork (Stevens & Campion, 1994). Having the ability and the courage to give quality feedback, which can be positive or negative, and to be open and accept feedback contributes positively to the team performance (Londona & Smither, 2002) and thus important for UNMOs is also recognised in this case study. IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.13) stated that if an officer is not acting as expected (e.g., showing respect to the local population), then this should be addressed. NOR-Capt (2015, p.8) stated that when issues or lack of skills are identified in a team member, they should be discussed. The example mentioned was a lack of driving skills of a team member, which could have become a safety issue. Furthermore, NZL-Capt (2015, p.7) stated that officers need to have the courage to address issues:

> If someone is abusing that right, having more courage, I should go up to him and say, “Hey I think you need to stop,” if they’re drinking a little bit at risk, because it’s affecting their work. Also having the courage to actually just tell people, “Hey, if we’re not working hard enough and stuff, we should be doing more I think we could be doing this,” and being able to do that.

This was also supported by AUS-Capt (2015, p.7): ‘It’s about keeping an eye on people, and having a word with them, because we are officers, and that’s what we should do when they are getting a bit out of control, or being irresponsible’. This was also reflected by DNK-Maj (2015, p.6):

> If you can say no, or stop, or you can say, no, you should not do so and so. You can say to one of your colleagues, no, I think it's too much. I think we should stop this and go out of here, jeopardise our security or it can jeopardise our way to do our task.

RUS-Capt (2015) gave an example suggesting that communication skills and the aptitude to learn also improve teamwork:

> I was a very aggressive driver when I just came here. Then a couple of times the guys stated: "Okay slow down we are on patrol we are not on the race". Two times even now I understood it, adjusted my way of driving so no problem with that.

When asked what she was expecting from UNMOs to develop themselves, the chief of OGL NZL-LtCol (2015, p.13) stated:

> I think it comes back to what I was saying before about communication, listening to what others have stated, being accepting of feedback. Feedback's really hard to accept. It doesn't matter who you are but we can all learn from that feedback. So, someone needs to have the courage to be able to accept that feedback, which is probably a pretty good quality to have, and then work on that… the feedback, whether it's positive or negative, needs to be given and but then the individual that's receiving it should then learn from that feedback. If there's something for development, then try and work on it.

According to SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.2) officers need to accept when they are wrong:

> Once a mistake is made, maybe you are unaware of it, but somebody can point it out to you and if you have that ability to accept that you're wrong then there will be changes and we will have that smooth flow, we'll work amicably. But if you're always on the defensive even though you know you're wrong you're trying to prove that you're right and that will, what will, that will be the reason why things will not be smooth.

4.6.9 Discussion

The KSAs for teamwork identified in the literature review were negotiation skills, conflict resolution skills, showing readiness to change, adapting to different styles of working, being proactive and participative, early identification of team issues, ability to integrate with others, accepting team goals, feedback culture, and ability to capitalise on the strength of the team members (see Table 8). The finding is that these are also applicable in the context of this research. An additional category that was included is participative leadership as it is specific as to how the officer taking a leadership role should act in a cross-cultural context such as in this case study. Capitalising on the strength of the team is about knowing where the knowledge is and being able to leverage it. This part was also identified during this research, but it relates

to the officers' need to train other officers. The ability to integrate with others is only one part; the officers also need to try to integrate themselves in the team and be ready to perform all tasks independent of rank, age, and gender.

The interviews showed that teamwork is crucial for the success of the mission. The UN also views teamwork as a core competency and defines it as follows (UN, 2017-L3.1):

> Works collaboratively with colleagues to achieve organisational goals, solicits input by genuinely valuing others' ideas and expertise, places team agenda before personal agenda, supports and acts in accordance with final group decisions, even when such may not reflect one's own opinion, and shares credit for team accomplishments and accepts joint responsibility for team shortcomings.

The subcategories identified during this study which form the 'teamwork' category are participative leadership, ability to adapt, ability to be a team player, ability to gain trust, ability to integrate people within the team, ability to integrate the LAs, ability to train other officers, and ability to have a feedback culture.

The aspects defined by the UN are covered in the categories identified but are not exhaustive. For example, 'works collaboratively with colleagues to achieve organisational goals', 'places team agenda before personal agenda', and 'solicits input by genuinely valuing others' ideas and expertise' are found in the 'able to adapt' and 'able to be a team member' categories. 'Supports and acts in accordance with final group decisions, even when such may not reflect one's own and shares credit for team accomplishments and accepts joint responsibility for team shortcomings' is in the 'participative leadership' and 'able to be a team player' categories (UN, 2017-L3.1). However, the UN core competencies neither reflect the leadership competences that may be required by UNMOs, nor the importance of gaining the trust of the other. The attributes identified during this study are described as follows:

Participative leadership: Stevens and Campion (1994) model of teamwork includes the ability to identify situations requiring participative group problem solving and to implement appropriate corrective actions. This aspect is also found in this case study, in the sense that the nominated team leader includes the team perspective prior to making a decision.

Ability to adapt: Stevens and Campion (1994) model of teamwork does not explicitly mention the adaptability aspect; however, it references desirable attributes such as flexibility. Johnson et al. (2006) CCC model includes the capacity to adapt to behavioural norms which could also be interpreted as integrating the team norms. The finding in this research is that UNMOs need to be able to adapt to their role, context, team culture, and the way that the team is operating. To do so, it is expected that the officers do not impose their own way of doing things, but rather learn how the team is doing it.

Ability to be a team member: In the context of this study, being a team member is understood as the ability of UNMOs to put the team before their own needs. It is about knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the team members and being able to perform all tasks in a proactive manner. It could be argued that this is in line with the desirable attributes of being initiative, helpful, and supportive (Stevens & Campion, 1994).

Ability to gain trust: Stevens and Campion (1994) reference trust as a desirable attribute, which is supported by this research. Gaining trust seems not to be independent but rather linked to other categories or attributes (e.g., the ability to communicate, be open, and be professional).

Ability to integrate people on the team: Stevens and Campion (1994) reference several attributes such as the ability to recognise team conflict, to recognise the type and source of conflict, and to confront the team and implement an appropriate conflict resolution strategy. These are also attributes which could be identified during this study, especially to help with the integration of a team member.

Ability to integrate the LA: The LAs and their integration to the team is specific to this study and not part of the reviewed models. However, there is a training module (UN, 2018) on how to work with ‘liaison assistant’, which is the same as the ‘language assistant’ in the context of this case study. Language Assistants are seen as important not only due to their local knowledge and local security awareness, but also for knowledge transfer and as backbone for maintaining the team culture.

Ability to train other officers: Ability to give training is not part of the reviewed model but is needed in a team with high attrition such as in the OGL. The knowledge transfer is a constant process in OGL, and each officer must be able to contribute.

Ability to have a feedback culture: To be able to provide feedback on performance is part of an efficient teamwork (Stevens & Campion, 1994). This study acknowledges this aspect and suggests that UNMOs need to be able to give positive and negative feedback and that they are able to accept feedback.

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between teamwork to other categories, such as:

Military skills and knowledge: If the officers in the team know who has which skills, then it can be leveraged to improve the military skills and knowledge.
Professionalism: Weak professionalism of individuals can be addressed with strong leadership and a constructive feedback culture in the team.
Cultural specific knowledge: With engaging and integrating the LAs, cultural specific knowledge can be gained.
Learning and experience: Feedback culture contributes to continuous improvement.

4.7 Diversity and Cultural Awareness

This section reviews the core category of 'diversity and cultural awareness'. The D&I category of the preliminary model identified in the literature review encompasses 'awareness of self and own identity, ability to embrace diversity as a benefit, having diversity sensitivity, and ability to take multiple perspectives' as illustrated in Table 8. Cultural aspects are also subscales of some cross-cultural assessments but not all (e.g., CQS, ISS, SCAS, and MPQ). Also models such as Johnson et al. (2006), Abbe (2008), and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014) clearly identify cultural aspects as components influencing individuals' effectiveness or performance in a cross-cultural setting. The aspects of potential conflict cited during this research were age differences, gender, and working with other organisations. Since an aspect of diversity is culture, these topics were initially set as independent categories but were then consolidated into the 'diversity and cultural awareness' category. This section covers the general aspect of culture (i.e., specific to any culture) as per Johnson et al. (2006) and the aspect of self-identity and appreciation of diversity as per Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998). Host-country-cultural specific knowledge (i.e., country, region) in Johnson et al. (2006)'s model is proposed to be in a dedicated category, to differentiate the generic from the specific aspect of culture. Moreover, diversity issues are mainly identified as being within the team rather than with the host country.

The first sub-categories cover the cross-cultural aspects. For example, CHN-Maj (2015, p.2) stated: 'We live together, we work together. So sometimes especially at the beginning and you come to a sort of cross-culture you cannot say conflict but some difficulties'. When asked if the challenge was more with the local population (i.e., UN external) or with the team (i.e., UN internal), RUS-Maj (2015, p.3) stated: 'I think with the team because when we cooperate with the population, they accept us like guests first and like UN employers of mission that want to help this region, this country'. FJI-Maj (2015, p.8) stated: 'It's a very big challenge to be among a group of UNMOs, one with a different nationality, different cultures and traditions'. These quotations suggest that the greater challenge is within the team as opposed to the local population.

The sub-categories of diversity and cultural awareness are described in greater detail below.

4.7.1 Understanding of Own Culture

As identified in several models (Howard-Hamilton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2006), understanding oneself is the initial step to navigating a cross-cultural environment and appreciating differences from people of other nationalities or backgrounds. For example, IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.17) stated that UNMOs should know and be open about who they are and where they come from. This helps to appreciate cultural differences and share aspects of their culture with the team members. This is supported by CHE-Capt (2015, p.2), who believes that to be able to understand the way that the others act or think, UNMOs first need to understand themselves and know where they come from. Gardenswartz et al. (2010, p.76) defined this step as 'affirmative introspection' and claim that the self-awareness helps to understand one's reactions towards others. It helps to be comfortable with one's own identity including values, passion, preference, and worldview and to be conscious of one's own biases.

4.7.2 Awareness and Acceptance of Cultural Differences

Military Observers are exposed to several facets of cross-cultural differences, both with the local population and within the team, where the officers may be the only one from their country or culture. The differences could be reflected in how officers with different cultural backgrounds approach the hierarchy, work, address issues, and communicate. Hygiene, cooking, and eating habits are probably the greatest source of

conflict in regard to cultural difference. The aim for UNMOs is to be open and to accept that there are differences and that there is not only one correct view. Later, one may try to learn about and understand the different cultural rules, norms, and values. Gardenswartz et al. (2010, p.79) defined this phase as 'intercultural literacy'. This awareness and knowledge help the individuals to act appropriately in a given situation. The next paragraphs highlight the participants' perceptions of potential differences.

NLD-LtCol (2015, p.4), COGL at the time, stated that 'it is very important and effective to realise that everybody is different… with this approach makes much easier to cooperate with different people… and by doing that you start to create some understanding of earth'. He also mentioned that the officers need to be open to the fact that the ideas they have are not the only truth. An example given in relation to the different perceptions of hierarchy was the case of when he asked a Chinese officer for his opinion and the Chinese officer did not know how to deal with this situation. His perception was that in China, a chief does not ask for opinions but rather give tasks. He stated: 'in Chinese culture, there is a big power distance… and here I need to make the difference as small as possible'. DNK-Capt (2015, p.3) gave an example of his learning experience about cultural difference:

> I have to admit, I have been abroad before, and I've travelled a lot in Europe... I've been surprised how difference there even is within Europe, because we have other European countries here. Just an example, I've been surprised to see that an Italian and Argentinean are more alike than Italian and a Dane even that we are close, but the mentality and the culture is similar with South Europe and South America. But I feel I'm more similar with a Canadian than with an Italian. I've learned down here on the cultural part.

The captain then gave an example of his perception that the Italian and Argentinian would have another attitude towards works, where some activities that are not critical would rather be postponed to the next day, whereas the Canadian and Dane would rather finish all the activities the same day. He added:

> If you think that the world can only be the way you have thinking is from your own country that everyone should think the same as you, everyone else who doesn't think the same as you are stupid or there's something wrong with them, then you're in the wrong place.

NOR-Capt (2015, p.5) stated: 'There are so many nationalities in the team. I think you can have more issues inside the team than with the Lebanese population'. This view is

also supported by LEB-LA1 (2015, p.2), an LA working with UNMOs for more than 15 years:

> To deal with the Lebanese culture will not take much time. It is easy to understand but the military life has different approach depending on the nationality. For example, Australia are hot blooded. They have a different way of dealing with military life than Chinese or Scandinavians.

Issues mentioned in the cultural context were, for example, different hygiene practices. AUT-Col1 (2015, p.13) stated:

> Some guys went into the ablutions, went out without hand washing and they went to the kitchen and maybe prepared the breakfast. I am not very happy with that but that is the kind of things of specific nations.

While reviewing the sub-categories during a focus group, it was mentioned that the teams need to be self-sufficient and that cooking may contribute to a good team atmosphere. Nevertheless, different cooking habits and hygiene levels may generate issues and thus need to be discussed and compromised on (Core-Instructors, 2019). CHN-Maj (2015, p.2) stated: 'We live together, we work together. So sometimes, especially at the beginning, you may come to a sort of cross-cultural you can't say conflict but some difficulties'. When asked for an example, he stated: 'We come from different countries, we have different food culture and you are not aware of such kind of background and you cook something that for some of us will not feel good about it' and added that when one encounters such an issue, 'you need to find compromise'. LEB-LA2 (2015) gave an example of conflict involving someone 'cutting the vegetables on the ground without anything underneath' which caused a major issue within the team. Despite this example, differences need to be seen as enrichment. A recommendation is that UNMO teams need to agree on minimal standards, especially regarding hygiene.

Furthermore, IRL-Capt (2015, p.5) stated that in his experience there are cultural differences which result in issues (e.g., how to organise the team, living together, or cooking). However, he found that issues arise more often due to age differences rather than cultural differences. He further addressed the income differences of the UNMOs. He stated 'I have not had an experience of them complaining about the money or avoiding things when it comes to activities in the field. They want to be part of it'. In this example, China and Russia were referenced. On the other hand, there are wealthier officers who complain; 'I have a number of experiences whether Danish or sometimes

Australian making issues about money and complaining that sometimes is too expensive… it may be that these guys are more individualist'. Moreover, NLD-LtCol (2015, p.7) stated the difference in earning for officers of different countries and gave an example where the wages were more than 10 times less or more depending on the officer's country. He added that people do discuss this, but in his perception, it was never an issue.

There is more than one way to do things and this needs to be accepted. SWE-Maj (2015, p.2) stated:

> I think also its important before you leave your home country to highlight that they, don't see things as black and white as you can do back home in your own army because in your home own army you can put up your own rules and policies, but down here there is a lot of different nationalities working together. What may be is wrong for me, may be is not wrong for another nation.

AUT-Col2 (2015, p.5) stated: 'You have to learn or you have to accept that different countries… due to their historical and also their cultural background have a different approach to fulfil tasks'. Finally, SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.10) stated that officers need to be able to accept all individuals:

> Well, so far what I have to say personally is we should always be in the position to accept one another, that's the main thing. Regardless of the way we talk, the way we do things, once we accept, it's not easy, I don't believe that someone can change another person.

4.7.3 Ability to Manage Gender Difference

Research on diversity are often conducted in the context of cultural diversity and gender but not uniquely (Herring, 2009). In this case study, the gender aspect is also pertinent, even though only a small percentage of female officers were in the OGL. NLD-LtCol (2015, p.6) noted the difference between men and women in society in different cultures and the surprise of some officers when it was announced that the next OGL chief would be a female officer. Some cultures may have more issues with gender difference than others, suggested was Russian and Chinese. In general, the view is that there should be more females in the mission. In a Muslim country, is it helpful to have more female officers to access the local female population. Another positive impact is the potential for better behaviour from the male officers. The only negative aspect mentioned was that the logistics were not ready (e.g., mixed room, shower, and ablution). However, this could be solved with a few simple rules.

AUS-Capt (2015, p.10), who was the only female officer for a period of time, stated:

> I think there should be more females on missions. When I got here, I was the only one. Now there are four, which is good. But I think in terms of their main jobs as UNMOs working with the local community, then seeing females in that position makes it seem like it is more of a normality to have females in the military and females that are still in those positions, like I have run meetings, and that sort of thing and I didn't have any dramas. But maybe if they are not used to having females in charge, there could be some issues with them wanting to talk to a female, and that sort of thing with the locals, and even within the UN just a lot of countries don't have females in their military or not many. So, if there are more females here, there's more support for us, but also it becomes more of a normality to see females here.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.9) stated that the infrastructure could be improved in relation to gender:

> For me it's an issue, but an issue not about like chain of command or some like gender problems, no. I mean about housing issue. For example, one base with one woman, we have like toilets, bathrooms that we should share with women. In Russia, there is no bathroom that can be used by both men or women or toilet. I was very surprised when I saw in headquarter universal toilet. For me, it's strange.

CAN-Capt (2015, p.10) stated: 'My team has no females but there have been issues with females and members of my team. Certain members on my team think less of females in general from different cultures that's for sure… Russian and Chinese'. When asked if he observed any gender issues, RUS-Capt (2015, p.7) stated:

> I think it's good (to have female officers on the team), but it definitely brings more issues in the teams or in the OGL in general but those issues are easily addressed… For example, we don't have separate showers, for example, that's one of the issues, but really what when we have the females in our team we just set the simple rules… When she is at patrol base she always have separate room if possible, if not we have like one place that gives more privacy than others. Then when she is on the patrol base we knock on the washroom when they are going in and we don't walk out with our underwear or towel when she is there. No issues at all.

This suggests that even if the logistics are not available, with a basic set of rules some perceived issues could be solved. In general, the mixed-gender teams seem to have a positive impact on the behaviours of certain officers. AUT-Col2 (2015, p.9) stated:

> I think, unfortunately, we have not enough females. We have one female in our team which is very important which gave the team a real massive we could feel the massive push to a good behaviour, to good manners. A push to good manners and that's very important. The way we act with each other, we talk with each other, the way we handle each other changed.

CHN-Col (2015, p.7) stated:

> I think the gender have some of the gender difference is good for the mission because in China we have an old saying. It goes like different female or male work together you cannot feel tired of the work. So, it's good that different gender have different nature.

When asked what he thought about the gender difference, NZL-LtCol (2015, p.8), the COGL, stated:

> It's really disappointing to have so few women and so we've got three at the moment. We had four and I'd be intrigued to actually even know how, what's the maximum UNTSO has ever had in anyone at the station. I think four would probably be getting out there. I think that it's good to have the woman in particular in the mission. I think we should have more of them. Do I think there's any concerns about having woman and are the men accepting the woman or vice versa? I don't think so… I do feel though that the woman stand out more. When they do do well, people pick up on it quickly. So, it's almost like they've proven that I've got what it takes.

4.7.4 Ability to Manage Age Difference

According to Lee and Kim (2020) interest in age heterogeneity at work gained interest, an aspect also identified in this case study. During the research, the youngest officer was in his late twenties and the oldest was in his mid-fifties; the average age was between 35 and 40 years. Age difference was mentioned several times and seemed to be a source of issues. The officers need to be able to value their older or younger colleagues, to listen to them, and to be able to share their experiences. Younger officers bring dynamism, and the older ones are more relaxed and thoughtful in dealing with situations. Age also implies experience, both positive and negative. People with experience on several missions without major incidents may tend to be too relaxed and no longer see the potential risks. Issues in relation to age were mentioned by participants from different countries and regions, and this aspect thus may not be related to Hofstede's power distance, assuming that this dimension still has legitimacy. A balanced mix of age is important on the team. NLD-Capt (2015, p.3) stated:

> I think a mixture of age should be a good one and of course then you can keep the team into balance. A good mixture of native speakers and non-native speakers might help us so you can help each other by being a team.

When asked about sources of conflict on the team, NOR-Capt (2015, p.5) stated:

> We have some big age differences; the youngest officer is 28 years old and the oldest is 54. For me it is easier to deal with the younger. The older have more experience but they are also more stubborn.

CHN-Maj (2015, p.3) stated that the age difference is sometimes an issue: ‘even though you are senior and the newcomer is a junior. He may be 10 or 15 years older that you. But we need to find suitable way to do the job’. The potential conflict is around the older officer being able to adapt to their function in the mission. He added: ‘Some UNMOs maybe are battalion commanders, they are used to giving orders to their subordinates. But actually in an Observer mission it is not like this’. NZL-Capt (2015, p.4) stated:

> Age is probably a big one here in that you’ve got a very significant difference from the youngest person in the mission to the oldest person in the mission. So, I think the youngest is about 27 currently, with the eldest being 54 or 55. That’s quite a significant age group and experience, military background and taking into account how many times an individual might have served on specific missions, as well. So guys that have been here two, three times may have a different approach to an individual that’s been here for their first time. Those are some of the challenges that some guys have.

DNK-Maj (2015, p.2), an older officer, stated that officers need to accept the age difference:

> One day you are the driver and the next day you’re a patrol leader. Especially for myself, for example, I am a 55 years officer and now suddenly you have a young team leader. It hasn’t been a problem for me, but I think it’s also something to do with your personal quality, and you actually are able to accept that this is the way it is. Not just coming down here and because you have been 34 years in the army then you will be in charge all the time.

He also highlighted that officers need to stay open and flexible. When asked if this was a problem, he stated: ‘No. It is not a problem. Actually it’s a good balance because you need it. You need it from the two ways’. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.12) stated: ‘You can feel that there is tension. Like what I stated before about this kind of silence in the cars, it’s mostly done when there is difference with the age. Mostly when there is this kind of differences’.

Extensive examples and quotations could be included; however, only a few are presented to illustrate the perceived issue. For example EST-Maj (2015, p.8), age 36, stated:

> If you look the average age is pretty high, I have to say. Most of them are more than 40. I think sometimes it seems that some younger guys are a little bit more willing to see more action, trying to do more as we should do to be active. The older ones have seen more and they do understand it’s no reason to be too aggressive.

LEB-LA1 (2015, p.8) stated:

> Everyone will talk about the guy who is 50 years old different from when we talk about the guy who is 27 or 28 years old. That is very, very sensitive… the older one. He is more relaxed. He is more thinking. But the other the young guys are more hot blooded, where they are acting quicker before they think.

DNK-Capt (2015, p.12) described the actions that can be taken in teams composed of individuals with a large age difference:

> Older people should be willing to listen to the ideas of the younger, and the younger have to remember the experience that they actually have within the team or the assets or whatever you want to call it. I think that is the most important things.

AUT-Col2 (2015, p.8) stated that older officers need to accept younger officers but also the opposite:

> Older should have to accept that they are led… by younger ones and trained by younger ones… On the other hand, I think, vice versa, also younger people should acknowledge and accept that older people, older officers to bring a big, a lot of experience into the mission and into the fulfilment of the tasks. If you are using their abilities, their knowledge, their experience it could be for the benefit of everyone.

4.7.5 Being Unbiased and Impartial

While working for the UN, officers should not forget where they come from and their beliefs; this was identified as a specific aspect for this case study. However, this should not influence decisions that need to be fact-based. In a UN mission, officers need to stay unbiased and impartial, without prejudice (UN, 2017-L1.3). The potential topics of prejudice mentioned during this case study were religion, skin colour, and political ideology. An observer team is trusted due to their ability to communicate with the population and their impartiality. However, observers lose their trust if internal conflicts are visible. Moreover, biased officers may prevent trust and relationship building, which can lead to safety and security issues. IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.4) stated:

> Where UN falls sometimes down is that because of the religion or national bias. The officers engaged as UNMOs should be able to pack their national, religion or whatever prejudice they have. Once in the mission they are UNMOs and not a UN Military Observer from nation A or B. They are wearing a blue hat. Which means when a UNMO do, see or act should always be in the relevance of the UN and not from a point of view of the feeling of the officer, for example, an Irish catholic or Bangladesh Muslim. There may be situation where you don't agree with a situation because of your background but you should be able to recognise this and act all the time as an impartial UN Military Observer. If

> officers are not able to do so, the people will not have a great confidence in how the UN operates.

He further stated (Ibid., p.5) that one should never forget where they come from and what their beliefs are and that they need to be sensitive, make fact-based decisions, and not take sides. CHE-Capt (2015, p.4) stated that every UNMO is a volunteer who knows that they will be in an international environment. It is thus expected that everyone will be able to work with each other, independent of nationality, culture, or background. Similarly, CAN-Capt (2015, p.13) stated:

> We need open-minded people, we need people with cultural flexibility. I think it's interesting because I think our culture specifically we have a lot of different culture with them so you have to deal with them and then you have that open-mindedness that comes from interacting with other cultures often. We have a uniform culture so we have a base which is all X. I think there is a massive tendency to perceive other cultures poorly, to discriminate against Y because they have a different skin colour or whatever. I like to think that I don't care and for the most part I think it's true, but you have to be able to play like the walking with a bias you are already one step behind.

Racism can occur within the team. NZL-LtCol (2015, p.5) stated:

> Ten members that would, I guess be less respectful of others within the organisation who may make racist comments, who have clear biases, individuals that will speak ill of others behind their back but won't say it to their face, I guess, are some examples.

Then she gave the following example:

> One individual was annoyed that our civilian staff were not working on a UN holiday. Well, so I was in the vehicle they took the opportunity to complain to me. Their complaint was race-based… Throughout the conversation, he continually referred to the fact that they were black. But he was also stated that he wasn't racist. So, myself and the other member in the vehicle both stated to him, "If you're not racist, don't even mention the colour of the person because as soon as you do that the perception is you're racist".

Issues can also arise about a specific political situation or divergence. For example, RUS-Capt (2015, p.3) stated:

> They shouldn't be very narrow-minded. Because on the political level you can have all the differences and arguments and other stuff, but here we are doing the one job and our basic safety depends on how we interact in the team. Most of the people understand it and even though some people might not agree with what we are doing as a country but in here, officers, that's it, there shouldn't be any political things to put on top of it.

RUS-Maj (2015, p.3) stated: in reference to leadership and his team leader, 'He was really impartial towards different nationalities. It was especially important for me, because of this crisis in Ukraine'.

Issues can also arise with local actors. FIN-Capt (2015, p.17) stated:

> I feel that the local people they respect us, because we come from different nations and we are the officers, and we have also maybe a little bit better communication skills with them, we have a little bit easy to go close with them because we are on high alert, and we are not biased.

LEB-LA2 (2015, p.2) stated that officers need to be unbiased:

> Well, especially in relation to meetings some of the questions that have been asked and some of the behaviour or the way they start a conversation like they sometimes it seems like they are in favour to a party than the other, to an area than the other, to a country than the other. If you talk about Israel also some UNMOs they come with an idea like yeah here everybody is *Hezbollah* and everybody they are all terrorists and some people they can't feel this or they can't relate to this.

LEB-LA2 (2015, p.11) added: 'Based on the person's ideas, the person's political view of the situation. Most of the time we discuss things like whether this is a violation or not'.

SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.11) stated:

> I let things go, I know that one thing we are not 100% good. But by accepting each other not having biases about one another we can create a good working atmosphere whereby not only us will be benefit from it but the mission.

Military Observers with bias could be the source of issues. According to DNK-Capt (2015, p.16):

> If you don't have the ability to be open-minded or work with different cultures, because you're working within teams and I've seen it in reality. The teams would just make sure that this guy doesn't go to meetings, for example, or this guy does not go to coffee shops in specific cities because they are afraid of what he will say.

4.7.6 Discussion

The D&I category of the preliminary model identified in the literature review encompasses 'awareness of self and own identity, ability to embrace diversity as a benefit, having diversity sensitivity, and ability to take multiple perspectives', see Table 8. The aspects of potential conflict mentioned during the research were age

differences, gender, and working with other organisations. These topics were initially set as independent categories and later consolidated into a category initially called ‘respect of diversity’ and subsequently renamed to ‘diversity and cultural difference’.

In the preliminary model, cultural awareness was included in a category with cultural knowledge in alignment with the IB CCC model (Johnson et al., 2006). It was then separated and included in D&I, as in respect to Gardenswartz and Rowe (2003) model its essence is the same. It is thus assumed that it does not depend on where a difference comes from; it is about being aware of and being able to deal with it. Another difference from the CCC model (Howard-Hamilton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2006) is that culture is mainly seen as where people come from. In the context of this research, several other types of cultures need to be taken into consideration (e.g., civilian versus military culture, different military sub-cultures, or the UN as a culture). This aspect was named ‘be aware of institutional culture’ and included in the ‘cultural and situational variable’ category. Hays-Thomas et al. (2012)’s D&I model includes ‘value diversity’. In the context of this study, the potential issues identified related to the differences in culture, age, and gender. Also, Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) aspect of managing diversity is not relevant in the context of this study, as this is given by the troupe of contributing countries.

The sub-categories that cover ‘diversity and cultural awareness’ in the context of the UNMOs in Lebanon are as follows:

Understanding one’s own culture: This aspect helps to foster appreciation of cultural differences and is part of Howard-Hamilton et al. (1998) and Johnson et al. (2006) respective intercultural competence CCC models. Additionally, Abbe (2008) includes the aspect of self-identity in her model and Hays-Thomas et al. (2012) include self-awareness in their D&I model as a prerequisite to appreciate differences. This aspect has also been identified in this study and included in the model.

Awareness and acceptance of cultural differences: Awareness and acceptance of cultural difference pertains to intercultural literacy (Gardenswartz et al., 2010). It is the ability to accept that there are different ways and approaches to performing a task, and thus seeing and respecting other ideas. It also the ability to understand and handle different cooking habits and hygiene levels.

Ability to manage gender difference: Mixed-gender teams seem to have a positive impact on the team. However, if the infrastructure is not available to accommodate such a team, then the UNMOs should be able to set rules to solve potential issues. This also pertains to accepting women as leaders.

Ability to manage age difference: Age difference may be an issue, and the UNMO needs to be able to work with old and younger officer. Moreover, older officers need to be able to be led by more junior officers in age or rank.

Being unbiased and impartial: The expectation is that UNMOs can work with everyone, independent of nationality, culture, or background and avoid political differences impacting the work. By being unbiased and impartial, UNMOs should be able to make fact-based decisions (UN, 2017-L1.3).

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between diversity and cultural awareness and other categories, such as:

Professionalism: If a UNMO has issues with understanding and accepting the cultural differences, then the ability to gain trust from the local actors is jeopardised.
Communication: If interest in and acceptance of the other culture is not available, then the communication may not be adapted to the context. If respect to the country the UNMO is operating in is not available, then the willingness to learn a few words of the local language may not be favoured.
Teamwork: If team members have problems with diversity (e.g., gender, age, culture, or military branch), teamwork and team integration may be impacted.
Cultural specific knowledge: If there are prejudices about the region that the UNMO operates in, then the willingness to learn about it may be impacted.
Learning and experience: If a person is not self-aware, then self-reflection and continuous improvement may be impacted.

4.8 Cultural Specific Knowledge

This section reviews the core category of ‘cultural specific knowledge’. The similar dimension of Johnson et al. (2006, p.531) model includes the aspects of: ‘information about geography, economics, politics, law, history, customs, hygiene, what to do, and what not to do’. The next sections develop more specifically the aspects perceived to be important in the context of this case study. To be able to operate effectively,

UNMOs need to understand where they are operating (e.g., local culture and knowledge of the AO) and which factors influence the mission. To be able to fully leverage this knowledge, it is also important to respect the country in which the UNMOs are operating.

The sub-categories that cover 'cultural specific knowledge' in the context of UNMOs in Lebanon are: ability to understand the big picture, ability to respect the country one is operating in, ability to understand the local culture, having knowledge of the area, and SA. The following subsections detail each of these categories with quotations from the interviews.

4.8.1 Ability to Understand the Big Picture

To be able to operate effectively, UNMOs need to fully understand where they are operating (e.g., local culture and knowledge of the AO), as well as what influences the mission. They also need to have a complete understanding of the geopolitical situation of the region. AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.14) stated:

> They should be understanding, Lebanon and the region around them, because if, you just concentrate purely on your AO, you are going to find it hard to understand what's going on your AO… If you don't understand what's happening around the AO, outside the AO, and the reasons why in the Middle East things occur due to racial or an action by an external body or an external country. Very seldom do actions occur within a country that's purely or internally for their country. It is always influenced by outside influence and that's what the Middle East is about including the political actors. For example Hezbollah, Nasrallah his influence obviously is being navigated by Syria and by Iran, but events that happen in Yemen and have happened in Cypress and other areas also have an influence.

4.8.2 Ability to Respect the Country in which One is Operating

Military Observers should be aware and respectful of the local population. They should be able to interact and seek positive perceptions. This can take the form of a smile, a wave, or an acknowledgement when passing a checkpoint. As mentioned in the communication category, the UNMOs should also make an effort to learn basic phrases such as hello, good morning, goodnight, what is your name, where is, how can I, please, and thank you. One cannot be dismissive of the local population (IRL-Cmdt, 2015, pp.12,15). AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.7) stated:

> To be able to break the ice, like, to come across, one of the perceptions that they have in the Middle East is that if you come from Europe, certain countries you are not pro Middle East, you are anti Middle East, because this Islamophobia that's got across the globe. The anti-Arabs symptom because of IS [Islamic State] and different things whether rightly or wrongly that that sometimes can, the perception is for certain countries. I think all the observers who have come from the countries where this perception is in, they should have, they have to make an extra effort to show that they don't have these perceptions.

NZL-LtCol (2015, p.2) stated: 'Put the local community first or the local country that you're living to pay respect to them and, if anything, I guess a lot of the cultural stuff is common sense and you actually learn from your team members. You can learn from your allies, too, in relation to the local community'.

4.8.3 Ability to Understand the Local Culture

In addition to being highly respectful to the local population, UNMOs should learn about the local culture and understand the different religions in the region and the associated behaviours. By trying to understand it, the UNMO will become more tolerant (RUS-LtCol, 2015, p.2). The implications of different behaviours needs to be understood; for example, the consequence or meaning of looking directly into someone's eyes (CHE-Capt, 2015, p.10). IRL-Cmdt (2015, p.3) refers, for example, to knowledge of the difference between Shia, Sunni, and Druze Muslims for a mission in Lebanon. In addition, NOR-Capt (2015, p.11) stated 'Body language tells a lot, when you are in a meeting there are certain things that you can't do and we are getting taught this by the language assistant'. He gave another example of a LA who, due to his religion, is not allowed to shake hands with a female UNMO, which is not an issue, but the UNMOs need to be aware of it. SWE-Maj (2015, p.2) stated:

> I think it's absolutely important to have some sort of brief education in, about the area that we are going to work inside, to get a better understanding of the culture, not seeing the people living, for example in the Middle East as strange compared to our culture. We have that, we get a broader understanding that their behaviour may be okay, because this is the way they do down here.

This is also suggested by DNK-Capt (2015, p.2):

> In this world where religion is a big thing…, I think it's more important that people know more about this, what are the issues with this religion in their countries. Not good or bad, not taking sides, just so you know that what is the difference between the Shia and Sunni, what are the main focuses. That could be Ramadan. It could be their holidays. It could be what they celebrate, just so

> you have an idea of what it is you're stepping into before you do a fool out of yourself, or you actually offend someone.

This also suggests that this category has a relationship with the 'learning and experience' and 'diversity and cultural awareness' categories. FIN-Capt (2015, p.3) suggested that cultural awareness may impact the effectiveness of running a meeting and thus impact military skills and knowledge:

> There are some Christians and there are some Jews and there are Muslims, Sunni and Shia. So, you have to know how you behave with them when you have, for example, meetings and so on that what you have to think in first of all when you go inside the meeting. For example, say hello to the ladies. You can't handle it with Muslim ladies. It is most important that you know some etiquette before you start working with the different counterparties.

Additionally, MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.3) stated: 'They should be familiar with the culture of the country, host country. Means the behaviour the way they should behave with the local population because they'll be interacting with a lot of locals'.

4.8.4 Having Knowledge of the Area

The UNMOs are in a country to bring peace and security, so they need to know the area that they operate in and be sensitive to it. They need to consider the importance of historical events of the country and what happened in the area and to understand the political system and political groups. They need to know the history of the contributing troops to be aware that some countries may have a different view of the events taking place in the area. LEB-LA2 (2015, p.1) stated:

> The people here, especially in the South, they prefer Russians and Chinese because they are close to them politically. In their political situation. So, every time you see, the locals they see a Russian, oh our brother especially among the, if we can say about the Shia in the area. If they see, for example, a Finnish guy in some areas because they have been developing a good relation in the past with the UNIFIL as Finnish and Irish that's also like they had a very good relation and respect. Especially, I remember stories from the Finnish and stories from the Irish about the things they did for the people against a bit of politics, against idea or in relation to the idea not against but in relation to the idea.

AUT-Col2 (2015, p.1) stated:

> The difference to the other observer missions here in Lebanon is that there is a much more necessity of political and historical knowledge about the area. While this was not an issue or not an issue of such a high issue as it is over here.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.3) stated UNMOs should have ‘general knowledge of the area, which includes cultural knowledge… it’s very easy to be seen as new to the area and it could sometimes backfire’.

4.8.5 Discussion

When engaged in a peace-building or peacekeeping process, it is important to understand the geopolitical situation, including the regional interests and influences. Furthermore, officers need to show respect to the local population - e.g., a small gesture such as a smile or acknowledgement at a checkpoint. Having knowledge of the local culture and AO are aspects of being able to show respect, and this is also connected to the language skills that UNMOs need. This can take many forms (e.g., historical or political). While these aspects are covered in the cultural specific knowledge of Johnson et al. (2006) CCC model in this context it takes on greater importance than in IB, as this knowledge is critical to be able to fulfil the mission. This aspect is also reflected in Abbe (2008) CCC model for army leaders under the aspects of region- and culture-specific knowledge. The attributes identified during this study are described as follows:

Ability to understand the big picture: UNMOs should be able to fully understand the context in which they are operating, which includes external influences on the mission such as geopolitical situation of the region.

Ability to respect the country the mission is operating in: UNMOs should be able to respect the host country and their population.

Ability to understand the local culture: UNMOs need to understand the local culture including the differences (e.g., religion) and behaviours of the population.

Knowledge of the area: UNMOs need to know the area in which they are operating well. They need an understanding of the importance of historical events of the country and region; the political system and political groups; and the history of the mission with its contributing troops, including the different perspectives that the countries may have.

The quotations presented in the above sections suggested several potential relationships between cultural specific knowledge and other categories, such as:

Military skills and knowledge: A solid understanding of the region may allow UNMOs to better interpret their observations and understanding the roles and responsibilities of local actors may allow for targeted information gathering.

Communication: Understanding the local population may influence the willingness to learn the local language.

Teamwork: UNMOs with strong cultural specific knowledge may gain respect and trust from other team members.

Learning and experience: Understanding the local population may influence UNMOs' willingness to learn even more.

Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits: Knowledge of local customs may help a UNMO adapt their behaviour appropriately.

4.9 Cultural and Situational Variables

This section reviews the core category of 'cultural and situational variables' which is similar to the idea of external factors in Johnson et al. (2006) CCC model but contextualised for this case study. External factors may influence the UNMO's effectiveness. Themes identified in this research are cultural distance; institutional culture (e.g., UN or military branch); institutional culture; and SA within the UNMO team. The following subsections detail each of these categories with quotations from the interviews.

4.9.1 Cultural Distance

When asked whether the cultural challenge was towards the local population or within the team, MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.2) stated:

> I think both of them, actually is a fact of a success of a mission is when your culture is closer to the Middle East, if you have UNMOs closer...Give it like a priority try to bring some military observers who are more familiar with the local culture.

This quotation reflects the cultural distance aspect identified in Johnson et al. (2006) and Abbe et al. (2007) CCC models and seems to be applicable in the UNMO context. However, in the context of this case study 'cultural distance' goes beyond the host nation. The cultural distance within the UNMO team may also have an impact on the UNMO effectiveness. LEB-LA1 (2015, p.7) gave an example of the senior Canadian

UNMO teaching a junior Chinese UNMO. The Chinese UNMO had low English proficiency, which may have impacted the Canadian's behaviour:

> He was asking (the Canadian) what kind of position was there. Then the Chinese who was looking at a different angle gave a wrong answer, the Canadian behaved badly. He grabbed the guy and slapped him in the head. As an officer, you should not behave in that way.

In addition to the potential impact of English proficiency, which could also be seen as language distance in this example, this illustrates behavioural markers and attitudes that the observers should *not* have.

4.9.2 Institutional Culture

Military Observers are exposed to several types of institutions and associated cultures (e.g., military sub-cultures, civilians, and UN). Furthermore, on the team, there are members from different military sub-cultures such as army, navy, and air force. This diversity may become a source of conflict if officers are not open enough to acknowledge and accept their differences.

Understanding the organisational culture is also key. The UN, with its structure and the way that the different countries contribute, are very specific (e.g., personnel, material, or financial). For example, the national balance in a team or HQ may be more important than individual performance. Changes within a mission take time, and each mission is different. The ability to understand and accept the way the UN operates is important. IRL-Capt (2015, p.10) stated that change take time:

> Do not try to change too much here, because it is so many countries involved. There is so many different languages and things like that. Though this might be the best system… I found it difficult at the beginning.

AUS-UNCiv (2015, p.2) stated that the officers need to understand UN culture:

> If it is their first deployment to the Middle East and they have to understand the Arab culture and Arabic way of doing business. It can be different specifically haven't here before and they also need to have an in-depth understanding of the UN culture as well, that is something that is quite forgotten, if they haven't worked with the UN before.

The UNMOs also need to be able to navigate civilian organisations within the mission and their civilian components, as well as other UN agencies and the local institutions and population. DNK-Maj (2015, p.2) stated: 'The task we are doing as observers, we're both actually doing what I call the military task, but also the more civilian sides when you have the interaction with the locals meetings and these kinds of things'. He

further noted: 'But I see sometimes some problems in having these two parallel systems. You have the military system chain of command and you also have the civilian chain of command'. RUS-Maj (2015, p.13) stated:

> Sometimes there is kind of misunderstanding between like military and civilian staff. We have problems with some devices or with cars or with whatever, and the answer is but you don't need it. After like six years nobody needed it and you also don't need it.

When asked if the issue was more with international or local staff, he stated: 'Actually, for me, there is no difference between international civilian staff and local staff. I will not separate this. I will say just civilian staff'. With regard to the civilian component of the mission, DNK-Capt (2015, p.12) stated:

> I think the UNMO should remember that they are here or some other premises. They are here 24/7 because they have a job. This is their job for many years or whenever they will decide to get another job. So, for them, for the civilians this is in theory an 8:00-4:00 job because they have their family… it's another contract.

MAR-UNCiv (2015, p.9) stated:

> In the mission like for UNMO mission with the working relationships between civilians and military should be actually, should not even be discussed because once you start talking about military and civilians this is, you make me start already making a barrier… we are just working for the United Nations all of us.

The UNMOs may operate on a team with various military sub-cultures with a unique organisational structure, a set of norms that governs the group, and a clear identity provided to the group (Atuel & Castro, 2018, p.75). IRL-Capt (2015, p.2) stated that the military sub-culture awareness needs to be taken into consideration, as preconditions may exist with officers and thus become a source of conflict. The military sub-cultures include the army, the air force, the navy, and the reserves. For example, army officers may think that an air force officer is not as professional, serious, or well trained as they are or that they lack the experience needed because the air force officer worked at a desk rather than in the field.

4.9.3 Situational Awareness

In the context of this case study, safety and security should be the highest priority for UNMOs. Situational awareness is about understanding the context for safety and security measures. It also relates to avoiding misunderstanding the host country

culture, which could lead to inappropriate behaviour and thus impact the mission. This is reflected in the UN pre-deployment training material (UN, 2017-L3.6) and was mentioned several times during the interviews. For instance, SWE-Maj (2015, p. 5) stated: 'Since we are working alone, two guys together, it's important that you have a good sense of judgment to know whether now it feels dangerous, I need to go away from here or to step, take a step forward, to do something'.

The safety and security aspects are part of the understanding and interpretation of the current situation and thus of SA. Nevertheless, SA is a broad concept. For instance, SLE-UNCiv (2015, p.4) stated:

> We coming from different culture, different background or maybe it can be the same or maybe almost the same. But here, we are dealing with the host country whereby whatever we do that is contrary to their own culture and whatever will create a big problem or there will be a vacuum.

An example given by EST-Maj (2015, p.4) suggests that understanding the broader context and its interpretation may influence SA:

> If you are driving around in the field, and there is some incident then the people has different views, experiences, how to solve these kinds of things, to come out as clean and good as possible. For example, if you can understand that the locals don't, some I don't know what kind of reason they can be. They don't want you to hear, so you cannot just start to push. It doesn't matter that we do have this freedom of movement, but to solve this as delicate as possible, this is the background information or experience before that. It doesn't matter what the papers are telling us that we have right to do one, two, or three different things that sometimes we just have to stop to think about it, which another way to do it to complete our mission or task that we have here.

This is also supported by LEB-LA2 (2015, p.16):

> Avoid wrong decisions. When it comes to cultures of the whole country always talking consideration what if. Like you always say safety and security first. Keep that in mind and when it comes to the UNMOs amongst themselves just to have a discussion have a heart discussion but don't forget why you are here, the reason you are here for.

According to Salmon (2013, p.3), SA in the military context is often mentioned as a key causal factor in relation to friendly fire which results in unintentional death or injury; the root cause is poor communication. According to Endsley (1995, p.36), SA is 'the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the project of their status in the near future'. Even though this definition was developed specifically for research in the pilot

community, it fits the purpose of this study. Stanton, Chambers, and Piggott (2001, p.193) also argued that this definition and model can be extended to other domains.

The SA model developed by Ensley has three levels: perception, comprehension, and projection (Endsley & Garland, 2000, p.3). In relation to perception, Ruffa (2014) found that there is a systematic variation in the way that the different contributing troupes of UNIFIL implemented their mandate. Her initial finding and suggestion was that different armies understand the operational environment differently based on their specific experiences (Ruffa, 2014).

Within this research, the aim was to explore whether individual cultural background and experience have an influence on perceived safety and security. The suggestion is that safety and security perception may differ from person to person. No consistent evidence could be found that different perceptions are attributed to cultural background. However, it seems that knowledge, skills, and experience may influence the safety and security perception and thus the SA. AUT-Col1 (2015, p.11) stated:

> I learned not to leave secure or safety road. Just go there for have a look in the terrain, especially in this area. But heard somebody saying "there is something suspicious there on the ground, let's have a look"… this kind of behaviours is very bad and doing this if not specifically tasked is a no go.

Another example was given by FIN-Capt (2015, p.12):

> We have here some issues with basic military skills. For example, if I felt that that is now dangerous, I really told him that okay we can't do that. Like a couple of months ago some guys pick up those UXO [unexploded ordinances which pose a detonation risk] from the field and put it inside the car and transferred those UXO to the patrol base. That was one of those most stupid.

When the training officer was asked if the risk perception differs between cultures, NZL-Capt (2015, p.10) stated: 'No, not really. I mean for instance, even in New Zealand, it's not cultural. I don't think the cultural background has a significant effect'. In contrast, CAN-Capt (2015, p.8) stated:

> I'm not sure if it's culture or personality but you definitely see there is a difference. For example, we have cut lanes and some people will go down the cut lanes [Cut lane towards the barrels at Blue Line which is usually a mine field] and some people won't. So like my team won't go down a cut lane… A lot won't like the Finn, Chilean, but people that where we are like the Russian they would go down the cut lane as well. There is definitely levels of danger that's more tolerant by others but I'm not sure if it's cultural or social.

Finally, RUS-Capt (2015, p.2) stated: 'People are different and you cannot train for every situation you may face in this environment, but having at least basic training

helps you to think about things that you wouldn't think if you didn't have this training'. This suggests that there are individual differences in perception, but it cannot be concluded that cultural background has an impact on SA.

4.9.4 Discussion

Johnson et al. (2006) model includes the external factors of institutional ethnocentrism and the cultural distance that may influence CCC of an individual. Likewise, Abbe (2008) CCC model for army leaders includes the external factors of situational and organisational variables (e.g., cultural distance; conditions of stress, uncertainty, or threat; family adjustment; and organisational variables). In the context of this study, external factors that may influence the UNMOs effectiveness have also been identified, namely cultural distance as in both aforementioned models, SA which could be seen as influenced by the condition of stress and the uncertainty of threat (Abbe, 2008), and the institutional culture in line with organisation-specific influences in Johnson et al. (2006) and Abbe (2008) models. The attributes identified in this study are described as:

Cultural distance: Cultural distance is seen as the cultural difference in Hofstede et al. (2010) terms. In the context of this study, it could be the distance between the UNMO and the host country, the other actors in the field, and the other team members.

Institutional culture: The UN with their structure, process, and the way that different countries contribute are specific and may impact the effectiveness of the UNMOs if they are not accustomed to or at ease with the UN's way of operating.

Situational awareness: In the context of this study, SA pertains to understanding the situation for safety and security reasons. It also relates to avoiding misunderstanding the host country culture, which could lead to inappropriate behaviour and thus impact the mission. It is further about UNMOs being able to agree on the interpretation of a situation and to take agreed-upon actions.

The potential relationships between cultural and SA are not presented, as they are considered external factors.

4.10 Conclusion to Chapter 4

The conceptual competence model for UNMOs proposed in the literature review includes the following categories: learning and behaviours, attitudes and personality traits as antecedents. The core KSAs proposed categories are 'professionalism', 'communication', 'teamwork', 'D&I', and 'cultural awareness and knowledge'. Furthermore, an 'external variable' such as cultural distance is proposed to complete the initial conceptual competency model for UNMOs.

Based on the data analysis, the categories identified in the literature remain legitimate, however the research data suggests that there is a need for further development. Accordingly, I split the 'cultural awareness and knowledge' category into 'cultural specific knowledge', which aligned with Johnson et al. (2006) definition and included a generic cultural aspect into a newly defined 'diversity and cultural awareness' category. The findings are that the knowledge of the culture in which UNMOs are operating are important and that mere awareness is insufficient. Additionally, cultural awareness is not to be neglected; on the contrary, especially within a diverse team such as OGL, the generic part of cultural aspects in Johnson et al. (2006) model is merged with the diversity category. I merged the two categories because regardless of the difference (e.g., culture, age, gender), the awareness of the difference is rooted in the awareness of self and one's own identity.

Moreover, the ability to accept differences is independent of the difference (Gardenswartz & Rowe, 2003). Furthermore, I enhanced the model with the category of military skills and knowledge. Several KSAs emerged during the interviews and are included in the model, particularly in the 'military skills and knowledge' and 'professionalism' categories. Military skills and knowledge were assumed to be part of the pre-deployment training, and their review was of secondary priority. The findings show that these skills are part of a broader system and that they may impact operational effectiveness and are thus included in the model.

The literature review also revealed relationships between categories such as experience and learning (Kolb, 1984); I consolidated these two categories because they enhance each other. The military competency model has antecedents such as personality traits and attitudes that influence competencies, adjustment, and performance (Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014, p.153). Moreover, in the Deardorff pyramid model of intercultural

competence, the attitudes of respect, openness, and curiosity to discover are foundational and influence the other categories (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009, p.13). These categories are thus left as antecedents in the proposed model.

In addition to 'military skills and knowledge', additional KSAs were identified that were not part of the reviewed CCC, D&I, or teamwork models. These KSAs were integrated in the 'professionalism' category; these attributes are mission and context understanding, integrity, proactivity, responsibility, dedication, and persistence.

The relationships identified during the inductive process are complex. The description of the potential relationships is in the specific category discussions (see summary in Appendix O). However, the potential relationships between cultural and situational variables are not presented, as this category is seen as external factors.

The 'learning and experience' and 'behaviours, attitude, and personality traits' categories have relationships with all the other categories, and they thus have the potential to have a positive or negative impact on the system. These are seen as antecedents within the conceptual KSA model for UNMOs, which also acknowledges the findings of the literature review (e.g., personality traits as antecedent (Johnson et al., 2006); experience as antecedent (Abbe et al., 2007) and learning capability as antecedent (Johnson et al., 2006; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014). The implication of this finding is that the focus should be set in the preliminary stage of UNMO candidate assessment. Additionally, professionalism, communication skills, teamwork, diversity and cultural awareness, and cultural specific knowledge are influenced and interact with other core categories. These KSAs can easily be identified during pre-deployment or induction training. Finally, military skills and knowledge may also impact teamwork, as shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Category relationship

	Learning and experience	Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits	Military skills and knowledge	Professionalism	Communication	Teamwork	Diversity and cultural awareness	Cultural specific knowledge
Learning and experience		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits	x		x	x	x	x	x	x
Military skills and knowledge						x		
Professionalism	x		x			x		x
Communication	x		x	x		x		x
Teamwork	x		x	x				x
Diversity and cultural awareness	x			x	x	x		x
Cultural specific knowledge	x	x	x		x	x		

Based on the aforementioned research findings, the proposed conceptual competence model for UNMO is based on the 'learning and experience' and 'behaviours, attitudes and personality traits' categories as antecedents. The core KSA proposed categories are 'military skills and knowledge', 'professionalism', 'communication', 'teamwork' 'diversity and cultural awareness', and 'cultural specific knowledge'. The proposed model also includes a category 'cultural and situational variables' that includes external factors that may impact the UNMOs effectiveness. Figure 13 illustrates the proposed conceptual competence model for UNMO. A consolidated description of each category can be found in Appendix P.



Figure 13: Knowledge, skills, and attitudes model for UNMOs

This revised and proposed conceptual model can be used by pre-deployment Training Centre to assist in their UNMO selections and to enhance their future training. This model also leads to answer the research question 3: 'How can training centres improve the selection of UN Military Observers?'.

This KSA model for UNMOs emphasizes on the antecedents 'learning and experience' and 'behaviours, attitudes and personality traits'. Accordingly, the recommendations for TCs roots are in these categories.

TC Recommendation 1: Early identification of behaviours, attitude, and personality traits.

The first recommendation is that TCs, if not yet available, should implement psychological testing covering personality traits in their initial assessment of potential candidates, rather than select people solely based on their military background and military skills and knowledge. Furthermore, the assessment should include elements that aim to identify potential candidates' attitudes towards learning.

TC Recommendation 2: Experience as a critical factor

Both positive and negative experiences should be reviewed in the assessment of potential candidates. For example, it should be identified if a recent mission could distort the SA of the candidate, and if this is the case, they should be given sufficient time to readapt to the new context.

TC Recommendation 3: Attitude equal to other competencies

Teams such as those within the OGL are composed of such diversity that it is important for observers to show empathy, to be open and to be motivated. During pre-deployment training, the assessment of the candidates should thus clearly be separated between military skills, knowledge, and behaviours, attitude, and personality traits. Attitude (i.e., behaviours, attitude, and personality traits) should be viewed as equally important as other competencies (i.e., military, professionalism, communication, teamwork, diversity and cultural awareness and culturally specific awareness) identified in the proposed model illustrated in Figure 13. For example, if one candidate has low English proficiency, the training officers should not concentrate on that person but rather assess how the other candidates would handle the situation. Furthermore, the model reflects that the UNMO effectiveness may be impacted by external factors

such as the cultural distance from the UNMO towards the host nation and toward the other team members. Thus, the team setup in training should include a broad aspect of diversity such as countries, age, rank, military branch, and gender.

Chapter 5: Research Conclusion

In this conclusion chapter, I return to the research questions to identify the extent to which they have been achieved and discuss the contributions of this research to theory, practice, and methodology. I acknowledge the potential bias, discuss the limitations of the research, and propose potential areas for future studies.

This case study focuses on conceptualising the KSAs necessary for UNMOs. The increasing diversity within peacekeeping missions presents numerous challenges that may impact the mission's effectiveness (Gordon, 2022, pp.140-143). Research has been conducted on the diversity among peacekeepers and its effect on operations (Alzaben, 2014; Bove et al., 2020; Nzitunga & Nyanway-Gimeh, 2016; Odoi, 2005), as well as on the variances of performing daily activities by units from different countries (Ruffa, 2014), yet no previous studies have focused specifically on UNMOs and the KSAs they need. The implication of the proposed model closes this gap and with that contributes to the overall knowledge in the peace and security studies. It further gives a better understanding of the KSAs needed by UNMOs and enables for example pre-deployment TCs to review their UNMOs' assessments, evaluations, and trainings. The objective is for UNMOs to become more effective and pursue the UN's endeavour to improve peacekeeping operations (Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017).

This concluding chapter highlights the main elements and findings of the research by briefly summarising the previous chapters. Chapter 1 outlined the research, defined the case study, which is based on OGL, and aimed to conceptualise a KSA model for UNMOs. The UNMO context is unique in the sense that the teams are composed of personnel from different countries; to ensure different perspectives and impartiality, officers from the same nation do not operate together. Moreover, all military branches (e.g., army, navy, and air force) are force providers for UNMOs.

Chapter 2 examined the literature with a brief overview of culture and relevant models. It further explored and compared the CCC models in non-military and military contexts, as well as cross-cultural communication and associated assessments. The chapter also reviewed teamwork and D&I models. The findings are that the model concepts (e.g., CCC, teamwork, and D&I) overlap and thus enhance each other. Moreover, the KSAs are contextual (e.g., related to role, environment, and profession). The findings suggest that the definition of KSAs for the UNMO environment should

not rely exclusively on a CCC model. Further, this study presents a conceptual competency model for UNMOs with an associated KSA inventory.

Chapter 3 presented the philosophical foundations for the research based on the researcher's positionality (insider) and established the research methodology as an ethnographic case study, based on an interpretivist philosophical position. The data generation in this qualitative study was based on 30 semi-structured interviews. The data generation was done in 2014–2015 while I was a UNMO in Lebanon. The data were analysed in two phases. The first phase occurred in parallel to the data generation. During this phase, I performed a lower-level coding. During the second phase in 2018–2019, I conducted a more advanced data analysis, completed the aggregation of the codes or concepts, and based on the relationships between the core categories I developed the conceptual competency model for UNMOs. The quality of the findings was reviewed during a focus group with pre-deployment training officers during the Swiss UN Military Observer Course in 2019. The final step, in 2019–2020, was to refine the analysis and write the thesis.

Chapter 4 presented the result of the data analysis and discussed the findings. The data analysis helped to review, contextualise, and enhance the conceptual competency model for UNMOs, resulting in the identification of nine categories and 48 sub-categories. The categories are 'learning and experience' and 'behaviours, attitudes and personality traits' as antecedents. The core KSA proposed categories are 'military skills and knowledge', 'professionalism', 'diversity and cultural awareness', 'communication', 'teamwork', and 'cultural specific knowledge'. Furthermore, external variables influencing the UNMOs effectiveness are included in the 'cultural and situational variables' category. The analysis identified the potential relationships between the categories. Although the main objective was not to define a set of military skills and knowledge, military specific KSAs that impact operational effectiveness emerged from the data analysis and were thus included in the proposed model. Additionally, a set of attributes or potential enablers and barriers for UNMOs are identified and listed.

In this last chapter, a return to the research questions is done to identify the extent to which they have been achieved. It subsequently discusses the contributions of this

research to theory, practice, and methodology. It acknowledges the potential bias, discusses the limitations of the research, and proposes potential areas for future study.

5.1 Responding to the Research Questions

In an attempt to contribute to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, this research objective is to revise and adapt CCC, communication, D&I, and teamwork models to generate a framework that is appropriate for UNMOs in Lebanon. Therefore, this case study has been designed to answer the following three research questions:

1) What knowledge, skills, and attitude requirements are important and effective for UN Military Observers?
2) What behaviours would likely enable or prevent the effectiveness of UN Military Observers?
3) How can training centres improve the selection of UN Military Observers?

Question 1 is answered with a conceptual KSAs Model for UNMOs, Question 2 is answered with a list of attributes (i.e., enablers and barriers), and Question 3 is answered with a set of recommendations for TCs. The research questions are answered in detail in the following subsections.

5.1.1 Addressing Research Question 1

To answer question 1 ‘What knowledge, skills and attitude requirements are important and effective for UN Military Observers?’, a definition and a conceptual competency model for UNMOs is proposed.

The definition of KSAs for UNMOs proposed from the literature review is ‘Knowledge, skills, and attitudes that officers need to operate in partnership with all the actors in the mission and contribute to the success of the mission’. This definition remains legitimate after the data analysis.

The proposed conceptual KSAs Model for UNMOs proposed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 13) includes ‘Learning and experience’ and ‘Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits’ categories as antecedents. The categories ‘Military skills and knowledge’, ‘Professionalism’, ‘Communication skills’, ‘Teamwork’, ‘Diversity and cultural awareness’ and ‘Cultural specific knowledge’ as core competencies and ‘Cultural and situational variables’ as a category covering external factors that may influence the

UNMOs effectiveness. These categories are descripted in detail, alongside the 48 sub-categories identified in the previous chapter. The KSA conceptual model for UNMOs is mainly influenced by cross-cultural competence models identified in the civilian (Howard-Hamilton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2006) and in the military context (Abbe, 2008; Van Driel & Gabrenya, 2014), enhanced by diversity and inclusion (Gardenswartz & Rowe, 2003; Hays-Thomas et al., 2012), and teamwork (Stevens & Campion, 1994) models and further contextualised based on the research findings.

5.1.2 Addressing Research Question 2

To answer question 2, 'What behaviours would likely enable or prevent the effectiveness of UN Military Observers?', a summary of potential attributes, enablers, or barriers were identified covering mainly the perceptions of the case study participants, they are presented, and discussed in each category of the previous chapter. The attributes are consolidated and presented along the main categories.

Learning and experience: Ability and willingness to learn (e.g., willingness to learn from others, willingness to listen to others even if not agreeing with them, openness, ability to learn about differences, willingness to learn from younger or older officers); engage in continuous improvement (e.g., ability to self-reflect, willingness to change, and willingness to excel); having mission and international experience (e.g., having life experience; having been exposed to different countries, environment, languages, and cultures; and understanding the civilian mindset); ability to leverage available experience (e.g., knowing one's own strength, knowing where the knowledge is in the organisation, and the ability to share experience, being biased with own experience).

Behaviours, attitude, and personality traits: Ability to build relationships; being open and interested in others; having empathy and being respectful; being friendly, cordial, and generous; being patient and motivated; ability to manage uncertainty and to accept the situation; ability to manage misunderstandings, being positive and having a sense of humour; being humble, and ability to manage time.

Military skills and knowledge: ability to drive (e.g., able to operate a geared armoured vehicle and drive defensively); technology awareness (e.g., ability to quickly familiarise with the unknown); ability to gather information and to pass on information if required; having SA; and not being biased when interpreting observations.

Professionalism: Having the mission and context understanding (e.g., understanding the mission history, organisation, role, and tasks and the roles of the actors in the field); having integrity (e.g., being able to work and behave in the interest of the organisation); being proactive; being responsible (e.g., able to follow laws, regulations, and procedures; able to maintain the UN and home country reputation on and off duty; not consuming alcohol excessively; and being transparent about their relationship within the team); being dedicated (e.g., ability to put personal needs after the needs of the mission; being motivated, interested, and focused on the job; being able to accept a lower status than back home) and having persistency (e.g., ability to not get into a routine and not become too relaxed).

Diversity and cultural awareness: Ability to understand one's own culture (i.e., self-awareness); being aware and accepting cultural differences (e.g., ability to accept that there are different way to perform a task, ability to understand and to deal with different cooking habits and hygiene levels, ability to see and to respect the other qualities); ability to manage gender difference (e.g., ability to accept women as leaders); ability to manage age difference (e.g., ability to be led by more juniors officers in rank or age); being unbiased and impartial (e.g., able to work with everyone regardless of nationality, culture, or background; ability to avoid political difference which impact the work, and ability to make fact-based decisions).

Communication: Ability to listen (e.g., ability to accept others' opinions); ability to read and manage body language (e.g., ability to get additional information in specific situation and use gestures appropriately); ability to have open communication (i.e., ability to hold open and non-judgmental discussion and to address issues promptly); interested and able to interact with everyone (i.e., ability to communicate, integrate, and cooperate with people of different backgrounds, whether they are military civilians, from the UN, or local actors); ability to adapt one's own communication to match the audience); ability to avoid misunderstandings (i.e., ability to understand what has been stated and to use simple wording); English proficiency (i.e., ability to converse and express themselves in an acceptable and adequate English); ability to speak basic local language; ability to communicate over the radio; ability to write reports based on specific templates and rules; and ability to handle meeting appropriately.

Teamwork: Ability to have participative leadership (e.g., ability to include the team perspective prior to making decisions); ability to adapt (e.g., ability to adapt to their role, context, team culture and the way that the team is operating; ability to not impose one's own way of doing things); ability to be a team member (e.g., ability to put the team before one's own needs, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the team members, and ability to perform all the tasks in a proactive manner); ability to gain trust and to integrate people on the team (e.g., ability to recognise team conflicts and address them); ability to integrate the language assistants to the team; ability to train other officers; ability to give positive and negative feedback; and ability to receive and accept feedback.

Cultural specific knowledge: Ability to understand the big picture (e.g., understand external influences on the mission such as the geopolitical situation of the region); ability to respect the country in which the mission is operating; ability to understand the local culture (e.g., understand differences within the population and ability to adapt behaviour depending on the location); having knowledge of the area (e.g., understanding the importance of historical events of the country and the specific areas; ability to understand the political system and political groups; having the knowledge of the history of the mission with its contributing troops, including the different perspectives which the countries may have).

Cultural and situational variables: It is suggested that the cultural distance from the UNMOs to the host country, the other actors in the field, and the other team members may influence UNMOs' effectiveness. All UNMOs should be able to navigate and be at ease with the UN's way of operating and have strong SA (e.g., understanding the situation for safety and security reasons, ability to avoid misunderstanding of the host country culture, and ability to agree on the interpretation of a situation and to take agreed-upon actions).

5.1.3 Addressing Research Question 3

Pre-deployment TCs recommendations were presented in the previous chapter to answer question 3, 'How can training centres improve the selection of UN Military Observers?'. These recommendations are for TCs which provide pre-deployment training for UNMOs. The proposed KSA model for UNMOs (see Figure 13) highlights

the antecedents ‘learning and experience’ and ‘behaviours, attitudes and personality traits’.

5.2 Contributions

This section reviews the contributions of this research. This thesis is presented to fulfil requirements of the degree of Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) in the School of Business and Technology at the University of Gloucestershire. A DBA needs to be original, and the originality of this research lies in the context in which this study was conducted, as well as in the methodology applied. The data were collected while I was deployed as a UNMO in the OGL, a unique opportunity to perform this research. Additionally, the use of a qualitative approach in a military context is atypical; the literature review shows that a quantitative approach is more common in this context. Furthermore, this research includes a rich diversity of participants from 19 countries, including armed force personnel, civilians, males, and females, whereas the typical context of armed force research is within a single country. Moreover, the objective of a DBA is to contribute to knowledge and to business practices. Therefore, this section discusses the study’s theoretical, practical, and methodological contributions.

5.2.1 Contributions to Theory

According to the research findings, this study provides important contributions to the existing theories. The theoretical contribution is to organisational research, using the military context as a specific case that could be developed into other contexts. The literature review identifies that the military research focuses mainly on vertical operability (towards the host population), and the peacekeeping research mainly focuses on horizontal operability (within the mission). However, the literature review revealed that the KSAs needed by UNMOs have not been researched and identified a knowledge gap. The UNMO context is unique in the sense that the teams are composed of personnel from several countries, and personnel from the same nation do not operate together.

I innovatively use the framework of CCC, D&I, and teamwork to elaborate and propose a definition: ‘Knowledge, skills, and attitudes that officers need to operate in partnership with all the actors in the mission and contribute to the success of the mission’, as well as a conceptual KSA model for UNMOs (see Figure 13) and a KSA

inventory for UNMOs illustrated as ‘enablers and barriers’. The literature review highlighted that multiple cross-cultural competence research studies have been conducted, mainly in non-military contexts. It further recognised that the CCC models have commonalities and are contextual. Table 1 compares the commonalties and differences of the CCC models in HE and IB. Based on this comparison, specific KSAs are proposed for the UNMOs environments (e.g., general and specific cultural knowledge, self-awareness, and diversity; skills similar to those identified in HE, especially diversity and integration, as well as those in the IB context; IB personality traits and the HE attitude of appreciating cross-cultural interactions and perceiving them as life enhancing). The literature review also identified that CCC models in the military context have similarities to those in the civilian context. In both contexts, they relate to an individual being able to operate efficiently in a multi-cultural context, and personality traits were identified and referenced from the Five-Factor Model of personality traits. The differences between civilian and military context relate to stress and uncertainty management, especially due to threat situations in the military context; Table 2 illustrates additional differences. In consequence, the SA of a military observer needs to go beyond the civilian cross-cultural competence identified aspects by being able to quickly adapt to changing safety and security aspects. Moreover, the military environment differs depending on the engagement and thus requires specific competences. Table 3 illustrates the differences and similarities of deployed contingents versus UNMOs.

The UNMOs context is unique in the sense that the teams are composed of personnel from several nations, and personnel from the same nation do not operate together. Moreover, an individual’s culture is dynamic and multi-layered, and one’s personality cannot be defined solely by their country of origin. In consequence, it is not sufficient for UNMOs to merely learn about other cultures; they must also be able to manage themselves within a complex and highly diverse team. This also signifies that UNMOs need to be able to recognise how they differ from their team members without ignoring their own background.

The primary language of a UNMO may not be the mission language (e.g., English); thus, UNMOs should be competent in English. However, there is no guarantee that all members of a UN mission will have the required English skills. Moreover, it has been recognised that, in the context of this study, interpersonal skills may be more important

than language proficiency or cultural knowledge. Furthermore, it seems easier for non-native English speakers to communicate with each other than with native English-speaking officers, which suggests that the latter may have to adapt more that non-native speakers.

The literature review revealed that CCC, CQ, and GM overlap, although the different constructs emerged separately. Furthermore, several other intercultural models (e.g., CCA, EQ, and SQ) attempt to link personality traits to an individual's effectiveness in a cross-cultural context; they differentiate from each other by their usage or target groups. Moreover, the attitudes needed by individuals to perform well are similar across the CCC, D&I, teamwork, and communication models. Concepts in these models are overlapping or antecedent to each other and thus enhance each other. These concepts are found under different labels with similar meanings such as engaging in self-reflection, trust building, openness to novelty, mindful listening or collaborative dialogue, respect, openness, curiosity to discovery, cultural self-awareness, diversity, openness and non-judgemental reactions, cultural knowledge, and communication. In consequence, the KSAs should not be viewed in isolation within a specific model but rather holistically.

5.2.2 Contributions to Practices

This section reviews the contribution to practices. This research provides, along with its conceptual KSA model for UNMOs, descriptions of the categories and a list of attributes (i.e., enablers and barriers), a deep understanding of the KSAs needed by UNMOs. The products developed in this case study serve as additional sources and reference materials (e.g., for the review of candidate assessment, evaluation, or behaviour standards).

Candidate assessment and evaluation mainly relate to the three recommendations for TCs (e.g., TC 1: early identification of behaviours; TC 2: attitude and personality traits and experience as a critical factor; and TC 3: attitude over military skills and knowledge) presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, the list of enablers and barriers gives an indication of how to assess behaviours. Finally, the literature review provides a list of 49 assessment tools and instruments. The measures are based on underpinning cross-cultural framework. This compilation helps TCs to identify the appropriate tools for their purpose or can be used as a foundation to create specific tools. However, the

tools identified are all based on self-reporting and should be supported by other instruments during UNMO selection and evaluation.

The list of enablers and barriers for each category provides an in-depth understanding of behaviour standards for UNMOs. Therefore, this list can be used as an important additional source and reference material for the review, adaptation, and development of behaviour standards.

5.2.3 Contributions to Methodology

This study adds to the current knowledge in the military context in several ways. Firstly, in contrast to this study, research on peace and security and on CCC is mainly based on the quantitative approach. Secondly, this study is unique in the sense that I am practitioner and a part-time researcher and that during this research I was deployed as a UNMO and thus an insider researcher. Thirdly, the sampling is also original in the sense that it is based on a mix of non-probability sampling strategy (Blaikie, 2010) based on a 'maximum variation' to capture the diversity within the case and enhanced with an 'opportunistic' sampling type to be able to deep dive into the information gained during interviews (Creswell, 1998). This sampling allowed me to have a rich diversity within the 30 interviews. The interviewees had military home rank from lieutenant to colonel, covering 19 countries and four continents. Three females took part in the interviews; the youngest participant was 28 years old and oldest 56; and the mission experience was from one to nine missions. This combination or mixed-sampling method also aimed to reduce my potential bias in selecting the participants (Chavez, 2008). Finally, for robustness I applied triangulation in relation to the data collection process, as well as to the people involved in the research (Hussein, 2009). In addition to the interviews, I reviewed specific documents (e.g., standing orders, SOP, training materials, and performance evaluation forms). It was original to use a focus group with subject matter experts to review the quality of the preliminary findings. The participants of the focus group were three experienced core-deployment training officers (including one female) with UNMO and Middle East experience.

5.3 Research Limitations

The present research is not without limitations, which fall into the three main categories of scope, research aim, and general security context during the research.

Scope: This research is based on a single case study on the OGL. As the study was limited to this specific context, the findings are not generalisable to other contexts. A further scope-related aspect to consider is that the literature review is primarily based on English research; hence, the definitions and models reviewed reflect a distinctly Western perspective.

Research aim: The research aims to contribute to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping mission, and to revise and adapt CCC, communication, D&I, and teamwork models to generate a framework that is appropriate for UNMOs in Lebanon. The model proposed was developed without an assessment centric view, and its level of implementation may thus be reduced.

Security context: During the research period, the general situation was assessed as tense but calm (i.e., low-intensity conflict), and the outcome of this research may have been different if the situation were different (e.g., in the case of an open conflict between the different actors on the ground).

5.4 Researcher Bias

As an insider researcher, I cannot be removed from the process. The interpretation of the data to determine the findings and conclusions may be biased. Insider research has advantages, but it is also challenging regarding the access to the participants, internal knowledge, and objectivity. It is assumed that an insider gains easier access to participants than would an outsider (Greene, 2014). In this study, access to the participants was without difficulty in the sense that the research was approved by the Chief OGL and no one refused to participate in this case study. Furthermore, it is assumed that an insider researcher is familiar with the group and the context under study and thus can easily orient themselves, have meaningful questions, and have a genuine understanding of the culture under study (Greene, 2014). However, the issue can also arise that participants may assume that the researcher already has insider knowledge and thus not mention obvious facts in the answers. In my opinion, I did not encounter many issues regarding my insider knowledge. Additionally, there are arguments that a case study as insider produces ‘exemplary knowledge’, which is interpretable in the context of experience rather than on theory and thus legitimate and robust (Trowler, 2011, p.3). However, to reduce the interpretation based on my experience I used my personal, reflection, and interview notes to replicate the

participants' meaning. Finally, insider research is often seen as too subjective, that the researcher makes assumption based on their prior knowledge or experience, and that there is a need to keep oneself distanced (Greene, 2014). The timeframe of the research helped me to be more detached and to critically analyse the data. Additionally, I believe that the focus group with participants from outside the case study site helped me to be more detached, to become more objective, and to reduce my bias.

Moreover, I had a hybrid role as a civilian, a researcher, and a UNMO, and I needed to switch roles based on the situation or activity. However, I have been engaged in civilian and military environments in parallel for the past 30 years, which should have minimised the context-switching issue. Furthermore, due to several regional differences and languages in my home country of Switzerland, I am accustomed to cultural differences, which should also have helped to reduce prejudice and bias.

5.5 Potential Areas for Future Research

Similar case studies should be conducted in other UNMO missions and with other roles (e.g., UN staff officers) to explore which elements of the model are context specific and which may be generalisable. Furthermore, this model was developed by using CCC, D&I, and teamwork frameworks from different contexts and consequently a study could be conducted to explore the transferability of specific antecedents, competencies or other variables of the proposed model to other organisational contexts where diversity has become important such as the global banking sector (Bai, Hou, & Scrimgeour, 2022) or in computer science and technology development (Schelenz, 2022). As the proposed model was developed without an assessment-centric approach, it would be useful to develop and define a set of assessments to measure the categories proposed in the conceptual competency model for UNMOs. A development model (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009, p.21) could be defined to create a curriculum for UNMOs with clear maturity progression across the proposed model dimensions.

5.6 Conclusion to Chapter 5

To conclude, this study answers Research Question 1, 'What knowledge, skills, and attitude requirements are important and effective for UN Military Observers?', with a conceptual KSAs Model for UNMOs; Question 2, 'What behaviours would likely enable or prevent the effectiveness of UN Military Observers?', with a list of attributes

(i.e., enablers and barriers) for UNMOs; and Question 3, ‘How can training centres improve the selection of UN Military Observers?’, with a set of recommendations for TCs.

Furthermore, this study contributes to theory, as no previous studies have focused specifically on UNMOs KSAs. By innovatively using CCC, D&I, and teamwork frameworks a definition, a conceptual KSA model for UNMOs, and an inventory of attributes for UNMOs is developed and proposed. The implication of the proposed model closes this gap and contributes to the overall knowledge in the field of peace and security. With the conceptual model and the inventory of attributes, this study also contributes to practice, as these serve as additional sources and reference materials (e.g., for the review of candidate assessment and evaluation and adaptation of behaviour standards). This study further contributes to methodology by applying a qualitative methodology in an area accustomed to quantitative methodology, by being an insider, by using a mixed sampling strategy, and by using a focus group to review the quality of the preliminary findings.

Lastly, this research is in line with ‘Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures’, which was approved by the University Research Degrees Committee in September 2008 and November 2018. No known risks or discomforts are associated with this study.

References

Abbe, A. (2008). Building Cultural Capability for Full Spectrum Operations. Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Abbe, A., Gulick, L., & Herman, J. (2007). Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation. Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Abramson, N. R., & Moran, R. T. (2018). *Managing cultural differences* (Tenth edition ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Allen, B. J., & Garg, K. (2016). Diversity Matters in Academic Radiology: Acknowledging and Addressing Unconscious Bias. *American College of Radiology, 13*(12 Pt A), 1426-1432. doi:10.1016/j.jacr.2016.08.016

Alzaben, F. (2014). *Cultural Diversity among Peacekeepers and its Impact on the Peace Operations.* (Master of Arts in International Peace and Conflict resolution), School of International Service of American University.

Andreeva, G., & Andreev, A. (2013). Survey and analysis of intercultural communication in Bulgaria and anbroad. *Journal Scientific and Applied Research, 3*, 89-97.

Andresen, M., & Bergdolt, F. (2016). A systematic literature review on the definitions of global mindset and cultural intelligence – merging two different research streams. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 28*, 170-195. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2016.1243568

Ang, S., Van Dyne, L., & Koh, C. (2006). Personality correlates of the four-factor model of culutral intelligence. *Group & Organization Management, 31*(1), 100-123. doi:10.1177/1059601105275267

Atkinson, P., & Hammersley, M. (1998). Ethnography and participant observation *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry* (pp. 248-261). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications.

Atuel, H. R., & Castro, C. A. (2018). Military Cultural Competence. *Clinical Social Work Journal (2018)*(46), 74-82. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10615-018-0651-z

AUS-Capt. (2015) *INT181100MAY15MFZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

AUS-UNCiv. (2015) *INT011500JUN15SMH/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

AUT-Col1. (2015) *INT021600MAR15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

AUT-Col2. (2015) *INT311700MAY15MMV/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Bai, M., Hou, G., & Scrimgeour, F. (2022). Workforce culture diversity and compliance costs in the global banking sector. *Journal of Corporate Accounting and Finance, 33*, 109–122. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/jcaf.22566

Bartel-Radic, A., & Giannelloni, J.-L. (2017). A renewed perspective on the measurement of cross-cultural competence: An approach through personality traits and cross-cultural knowledge. *European Management Journal, 35*, 632-644. doi:10.1016/j.emj.2017.02.003

Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report 13*(4), 544-559.

Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D. K., & Mead, M. (1987). The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems. *MIS Quartaly, 11*(3), 369-385.

Berkovic, D., Ayton, D., Briggs, A. M., & Ackerman, I. N. (2020). The View From the Inside: Positionality and Insider Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 19*, 1-4. doi:10.1177/1609406919900828

Blaikie, N. (2010). *Designing social research* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity press.

Blanchet Garneau, A., & Pepin, J. (2015). Cultural competence: a constructivist definition. *Journal Transcultural Nursrsing, 26*(1), 9-15. doi:10.1177/1043659614541294

Bove, V., Ruffa, C., & Ruggeri, A. (2020). *Composing Peace : Mission Composition in UN Peacekeeping*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Caligiuri, P. (2006). Developing global leaders. *Human Resource Management Review, 16*, 219-228. doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2006.03.009

Caligiuri, P., Noe, R., Nolan, R., Ryan, A. M., & Drasgow, F. (2011). Training, Developing, and Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Personnel. Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Caligiuri, P., & Tarique, I. (2016). Cultural agility and international assignees' effectiveness in cross-cultural interactions. *International Journal of Training and Development, 20*(4), 280-289. doi:10.1111/ijtd.12085

CAN-Capt. (2015) *INT301715MAY15MMX/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Carpenter-Song, E., Nordquest Schwallie, M., & Longhofer, J. (2007). Cultural Competence Reexamined: Critique and Directions for the Future *Psychiatric Services, 58*(10), 1362-1365. doi:10.1176/appi.ps.58.10.1362

Chavez, C. (2008). Conceptualizing from the Inside: Advantages, Complications, and Demands on Insider Positionality. *The Qualitative Report, 13*(3), 474-494.

CHE-1stLt. (2015) *INT151730JUN15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

CHE-Capt. (2015) *INT181500JAN15MMV/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Chen, G.-M., & Starosta, W. J. (1996). Intercultural Communication Competence: A Synthesis. *Annals of the International Communication Association 19*(1: Communication Yearbook 19), 353-383.

CHN-Col. (2015) *INT060900JUN15MMV/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

CHN-Maj. (2015) *INT171330MAR15MMS/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Collins, H., & McNulty, Y. (2020). Insider status: (Re)framing researcher positionality in international human resource management studies. *German Journal of Human Resource Management, 34*(2), 202 –227. doi:10.1177/2397002220908425

Core-Instructors, S. P. (2019) *01-FOG111900JUN19/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J. W. (2006). Five Qualitative Approaches to Inquiry *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches* (pp. 53-84). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Curseu, P. L., Ilies, R., Virga, D., Maricutoiu, L., & Sava, F. A. (2019). Personality characteristics that are valued in teams: Not always "more is better"? *International Journal of Psychology, 54*(5), 638-649. doi:10.1002/ijop.12511

Devine, F., Baum, T., & Hearns, N. (2009). Resource Guide: Cultural Awareness for Hospitality and Tourism. *Hospitality, Leisure, Sport and Tourism Network*.

Di Salvatore, J., & Ruggeri, A. (2017). Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations. Retrieved from https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-586#:~:text=Consequently%2C%20peacekeeping%20is%20deemed%20successful%20or%20effective%20according,conflict%20diffusion%20and%20recurrence%20in%20the%20postwar%20phase.

DNK-Capt. (2015) *INT251700MAY15MMV/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

DNK-Maj. (2015) *INT121730APR15MMS/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Earley, P. C. (2002). Redefining interaction across cultures and organizations: Moving forward with cultural intelligence. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 24*, 271-299.

Earley, P. C., & Peterson, R. S. (2004). The Elusive Cultural Chameleon: Cultural Intelligence as a New Approach to Intercultural Training for the Global Manager. *Academy of Management Learning and Education, 3*(1), 100-115.

Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Jackson, P. (2012). *Management Research* (Fourth ed.). London, UK SAGE Publications.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. *The Academy of Management Review, 14*(4), 532-550.

Elron, E., Shamir, B., & Ben-Ari, E. (1999). Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces. *Armed Forces and Society, 26*(1), 73-98.

Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awarness in dynamic systems. *Human Factors, 37*(1), 32-64.

Endsley, M. R., & Garland, D. J. (2000). Situation awarness analysis and measurement Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

EST-Maj. (2015) *INT311300MAY15MMV/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Evetts, J. (2012). Professionalism: Value and ideology. *Sociopedia.isa*. doi:10.1177/205684601231

Eysenck, M. W. (2004). *Psychology: An international perspective*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Farndale, E., Biron, M., Briscoed, D. R., & Raghurama, S. (2015). A global perspective on diversity and inclusion in work organisations. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 26*(6), 677-687. doi:10.1080/09585192.2014.991511

FIN-Capt. (2015) *INT261300MAY15MMS/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

FJI-Maj. (2015) *INT201700MAY15MMX/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

French, R. (2012). *Cross-Cultural Management in Work Organisations* (2nd Edition ed.). London, UK: Charter Institute of Personnel and Development

Fusch, P. I., Fusch, G. E., & Ness, L. R. (2017). How to Conduct a Mini-Ethnographic Case Study: A Guide for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report, 22*(3), 923-941.

Gabrenya, W. K. J., Moukarzel, R. G., Pomerance, M. H., Griffith, R. L., & Deaton, J. (2012). A Validation Study of the Defense Language Office Framework for Cultural

Competence and an Evaluation of Available Assessment Instruments. Patrick Air Force Base, FL: DEOMI Press.

Gallus, J., Gouge, M., Antolic, E., Fosher, K., Jasparro, V., Coleman, S., . . . Klafehn, J. (2014). Cross-cultural competence in the departement of defence. Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Gardenswartz, L., Cherbosque, J., & Rowe, A. (2010). Emotional intelligence and diversity: A model for difference in the workplace. *Journal of Psychological Issues in Organizational Cultur, Volume 1*(Number 1). doi:10.1002/jpoc.20002

Gardenswartz, L., & Rowe, A. (2003). The four layers of diversity model. Retrieved from https://www.gardenswartzrowe.com/why-g-r

GDP. (2020). What is Diversity & Inclusion? Retrieved from https://globaldiversitypractice.com/what-is-diversity-inclusion/

Gordon, R. (2022). An Introduction to the UN System and Its Role in International Peace and Security (Fifth ed.). Williamsburg, VA: Peace Operations Training Institute.

Gratton, F. (2009). *Military English versus General English: A case study of an English proficiency test in the Italian Military.* (M.A. in Language Testing), Lancaster University.

Gray, D. P., & Thomas, D. J. (2006). Critical reflections on culture in nursing *Journal of Cultural Diversity, 13*(2), 76-82.

Greene, M. J. (2014). On the Inside Looking In: Methodological Insights and Challenges in Conducting Qualitative Insider Research. *The Qualitative Report, 19*(29), 1-13.

Greene Sands, R., & Greene-Sands, A. (2014). *Cross-Cultural Compentence for a Twenty-First-Century Military* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Griffith, R. L., Wolfeld, L., Armon, B. K., Rios, J., & Liu, O. L. (2016). Assessing Intercultural Competence in Higher Education: Existing Research and Future Directions. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Online Library.

Grix, J. (2002). Introducing students to the generic teminology of social research. *Politics, 22*(3), 175-186.

Grobelna, A. (2015). Intercultural Challenges Facing the Hospitality Industry. Implications for Education and Hospitality Management. *Journal of Intercultural Management, Vol. 7*(No. 3), pp. 101-117. doi:DOI 10.1515/joim-2015-0023

Grove, C. N. (2004). Introduction to the GLOBE Research Project on Leadership Worldwide Retrieved from http://www.grovewell.com/wp-content/uploads/pub-GLOBE-intro.pdf

Guillory, W. A., & Daniel, G. (2004). The roadmap for diversity, inclusion and high performance. *Healthcare executive, 19*(4), 24.

Guion, L. A., Diehl, D. C., & McDonald, D. (2011). [Conducting an In-depth Interview]. FCS6012.

Hall, E. T. (1982). *The Hidden Dimension*. New York: Anchor Books.

Hall, E. T. (1984). *The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time*. New York: Anchor Books.

Hammer, M. R. (2011). Additional cross-cultural validity testing of the Intercultural Development Inventory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 35*, 474-487.

Hammer, M. R., Bennett, M. J., & Wiseman, R. (2003). Measuring intercultural sensitivity: The intercultural development inventory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 27*, 421-443.

Hardison, C., Sims, C., Ali, F., Villamizar, A., & Mundell, B. (2009). Cross-cultural skills for deployed Air Force personnel defining cross-cultural performance. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Harrison, H., Birks, M., Franklin, R., & Mills, J. (2017). Case Study Research: Foundations and Methodological Orientations. *Forum: Qualitative social research, 18*(1).

Hays-Thomas, R., Bowen, A., & Boudreaux, M. (2012). Skills for diversity and inclusion in organizations: A review and preliminary investigation. *The Psychologist-Manager Journal, 15*(2), 128-141. doi:10.1080/10887156.2012.676861

Herring, C. (2009). Does diversity pay?: Race, gender, and the business case for diversity. *American sociological review, 74*, 208-224.

Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Holmes, A. G. D. (2020). Researcher Positionality - A Consideration of Its Influence and Place in Qualitative Research - A New Researcher Guide. *Shanlax International Journal of Education, 8*(4), 1-10. doi:https://doi.org/10.34293/education.v8i4.3232

Holt, J. L., & DeVorne, C. J. (2005). Culture, gender, organizational role, and styles of conflict resolution: A meta-analysis *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29*, 165-196.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (2004). *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications.

Howard-Hamilton, M. F., Richardson, B. J., & Shuford, B. (1998). Promoting multicultural education: A holistic approach. *College Student Affairs Journal, 18*(1), 5-17.

Hussein, A. (2009). The use of Triangulation in Social Sciences Research: Can qualitative and quantitative methods be combined? *Journal of Comparative Social Work, 1*.

Illeris, K., Jarvis, P., Kegan, R., Engeström, Y., Elkjaer, B., Mezirow, J., . . . Stroobants, V. (2009). *Contempory theories of learning*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

Ingold, T. (1994). Introduction to culture. *Companion encyclopedia of anthropology*, 329-349.

IRL-Capt. (2015) *INT111500FEB15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

IRL-Cmdt. (2015) *INT112000JAN15MMX/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

ITA-Capt. (2015) *INT181500MAR15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Jacobson, D., & Mustafa, N. (2019). Social Identity Map: A Reflexivity Tool for Practicing Explicit Positionality in Critical Qualitative Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 18*, 1-12. doi:10.1177/1609406919870075

Johnson, J. A. (2020). Big-Five Model. In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences* (pp. 1-16). New York, NY: Springer.

Johnson, J. P., Lenartowicz, T., & Apud, S. (2006). Cross-cultural competence in international business: toward a definition and a model. *Journal of International Business Studies, 37*, 525–543. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400205

Kajornboon, A. B. (2005). Using interviews as research instruments. Chulalongkorn University: Language Institute.

Kelley, C., & Meyers, J. (1995). *CCAI Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory*. Minneapolis, MN: National Computer Systems.

Kolb, D. A. (1984). *Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Konanahalli, A., & Oyedele, L. (2016). Emotional Intelligence and British expatriates' cross-cultural adjustment in international construction projects. *Construction Management and Economics, 34*(11), 751-768. doi:10.1080/01446193.2016.1213399

Kozai-Group. (2020). Intercultural Effectiveness Scale (IES). Retrieved from https://www.kozaigroup.com/intercultural-effectiveness-scale-ies/

Kraushaar, M. K. (2013). *Everyone Else is They: A New Framework for Operational Culture.* (Master of Military Art and Science), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Kudret, S., Erdogan, B., & Bauer, T. N. (2019). Self-monitoring personality trait at work: An integrative narrative review and future research directions. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 40*(2), 193-208.

LaFromboise, T., Coleman, H. L. K., & Gerton, J. (1993). Psychological Impact of Biculturalism: Evidence and Theory. *Psychological Bulletin, 114*(3), 395-412.

LEB-LA1. (2015) *INT152000MAR15LMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

LEB-LA2. (2015) *INT172000JUN15LFX/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Lee, H. W., & Kim, E. (2020). Workforce diversity and firm performance: Relational coordination as a mediator and structural empowerment and multisource feedback as moderators. *Human Resource Management, 59*, 5-23. doi:10.1002/hrm.21970

Levy, D. (2006). Qualitative Methodology and Grounded Theory in Property Research. *Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, 12*(4).

Lewis, R. D. (2005). *When cultures collide: Leading accross cultures* (Third ed.). Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey International.

Li, M., Mobley, W. H., & Kelly, A. (2016). Linking personality to cultural intelligence: An interactive effect of openness and agreeableness. *Personality and Individual Differences, 89*, 105-110. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2015.09.050

Londona, M., & Smither, J. W. (2002). Feedback orientation, feedback culture, and the longitudinal performance management process. *Human Resource Management Review, 12*, 81-100.

Luthans, F., Luthans, B. C., & Luthans, K. W. (2021). *Organizational Behavior: An Evidence-Based Approach* (Fourteenth ed.). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, Inc.

Magala, S. (2005). *Cross-Cultural Competence*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

MAR-UNCiv. (2015) *INT081000JUL15SMH/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Marshall, B., Cardon, P., Poddar, A., & Fontenot, R. (2013). Does sampling size matter in qualitative research?: A review of qualitative interviewd in IS research. *Journal of Computer Information Systems*.

Matsumoto, D. (2001). *The handbook of culture and psychology*: Oxford University Press.

Matsumoto, D., LeRoux, J., Ratzlaff, C., Tatani, H., Uchida, H., Kim, C., & Arakib, S. (2001). Development and validation of a measure of intercultural adjustment potential in Japanese sojourners: the Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale (ICAPS). *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 25*(5), 483-510.

McGrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An Introduction to the Five-Factor Model and Its Applications. *Journal of personlity, 60*(2), 175-215. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00970.x

McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede's model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith - a failure of analysis. *Human Relations, 55*(1), 89-118.

Merriam, S. B., Johnson-Bailey, J., Lee, M.-Y., Kee, Y., Ntseane, G., & Muhamad, M. (2010). Power and positionality: negotiating insider/outsider status within and across cultures. *International Journal of Lifelong Education, 20*(5). doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370120490

Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. J. (2016). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation* (Fourth ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Miller, T., & Boulton, M. (2007). Changing constructions of informed consent: Qualitative research and complex social worlds. *Social Science and Medicine, 65*, 2199–2211.

Morgan, D. L. (1997). Planning and research design for focus groups *Focus groups as qualitative research* (Second ed., Vol. 16, pp. 32-46). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Moses, J. W., & Knutsen, T. L. (2012). *Way of Knowing* (Second ed.). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

NLD-Capt. (2015) *INT261500MAY15MMS/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

NLD-LtCol. (2015) *INT221300FEB15MMH/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

NOR-Capt. (2015) *INT011800MAR15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Nzitunga, J. B., & Nyanway-Gimeh, C. M. (2016). Effect of Cross-Cultural Competence on Adaptive Performance among United Nations Peacebuilding Practitioners. *Business, managment and economics research, 2*(3), 36-45.

NZL-Capt. (2015) *INT121330APR15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

NZL-LtCol. (2015) *INT081730JUL15MFH/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

O'Conor, A., Roan, L., Cushner, K., & Metcalf, K. A. (2010). Cross-Cultural Strategies for Improving the Teaching, Training, and Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors. Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute For the Behavioral and Social Science.

O'Neill, T. A., Goffin, R. D., & Gellatly, I. R. (2012). The knowledge, skill, and ability requirements for teamwork: revisiting the reamwork - KSATest's validity. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 20*(1), 36-52.

Odoi, N. (2005). Cultural Diversity in Peace Operations - Training Challenges. . Accra, GH: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Onwuegbuzie, A. J., Dickinson, W. B., Leech, N. L., & Zoran, A. G. (2009). A Qualitative Framework for Collecting and Analyzing Data in Focus Group Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8*(3).

Orna-Montesinos, C. (2013). English as an International Language in the Military: A Study of Attitudes. *LSP Journal, 4*(1).

Patton, M. Q. (2003) *Qualitative Evaluation Checklist*. Evaluation Checklists Project.

Poteet, S., Xue, P., Patel, J., Kao, A., Whiteley, I., & Giammanco, C. (2008). Linguistic Sources of Coalition Miscommunication. (Vol.). Seattle, WA: NATO.

Powell, R. A., & Single, H. M. (1996). Methodology matters: Focuis groups. *International journal of qualility in health care, 8*(5), 499-504.

Rajić, V., & Rajić, T. (2015). Assessment of interculturalcompetence of vocational teachers in Croatia. *Andragoška spoznanja, 21*(4), 37–51.

Roberson, Q. M. (2004) Disentangling the meanings of diversity and inclusion. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ILR School

Rubinstein, R. A., Keller, D. M., & Scherger, M. E. (2008). Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions. . *International Peacekeeping, 15*(4), 540-555. doi:10.1080/13533310802239857

Ruffa, C. (2014). What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. *Armed Forces and Society, 40(2)*, 199-225. doi:10.1177/0095327X12468856

Ruffa, C. (2018). *Military Culture in Peace and Stability Operations: Afganistan and Lebanon* (1st ed.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

RUS-Capt. (2015) *INT280930MAY15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

RUS-LtCol. (2015) *INT241315JAN15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

RUS-Maj. (2015) *INT192000MAY15MMX/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Salmon, P. M. (2013). Situation awareness and safety: Contribution or confusion? Situation awareness and safety editorial. *Safety science*(56).

Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2009). Understanding research philosophies and approaches. *Research Methods for Business Students, 4*, 106-135.

Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). *Research methods for business students* (6 ed.). Harlow, UK: Pearson.

Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2019). Understanding research philosophy and approaches to theory development *Research Methods for Business Students* (8 ed., pp. 128-171). Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited.

Schaffer, M. A., Harrison, D. A., Gregerson, H., Black, J. S., & Ferzandi, L. A. (2006). You can take it with you: Indivdual differences and expatriate effectivness. *Journal of Applied Psychology 91*(1), 109-125. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.1.109

Schelenz, L. (2022). Diversity Concepts in Computer Science and Technology Development: A Critique. *Science, Technology, & Human Values*. doi:10.1177/01622439221122549

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values? *Journal of Sociat Issues, 50*(4), 19-45.

Selmeski, B. R. (2007). Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual development. Kingston, CA: Royal Military College of Canada - Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society.

Shaffer, M. A., Harrison, D. A., Gregersen, H., Black, J. S., & Ferzandi, L. A. (2006). You Can Take It With You: Individual Differences and Expatriate Effectiveness. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91*(1), 109-125. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.1.109

Sintler, P. (2011). *English as Lingua Franca in Military Meetings within a Multinational Peacekeeping Mission.* (Magister der Philosophie), Vienna, University of Vienna.

SLE-UNCiv. (2015) *INT091000JUL15SMH/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Smith, N.-J. (2009). *Achieving your Professional Doctorate*: Open University Press.

Spitzberg, B. H. (2012). A model of intercultural communication competence. In L. A. Samovar, R. E. Porter, & E. R. McDaniel (Eds.), *Intercultural Communication: A Reader* (13 ed.): Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Spitzberg, B. H., & Changnon, G. (2009). Conceptualizing Intercultural Competence. In D. K. Deardorff (Ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Intercultural Competence* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Stake, R. E. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Stanton, N. A., Chambers, P. R. G., & Piggott, J. (2001). Situational awareness and safety. *Safety science, 39*, 189-204.

Stevens, M., Bird, A., Mendenhall, M. E., & Oddou, G. (2014). Measuring Global Leader Intercultural Competency: Development and Validation of the Global Competencies Inventory (GCI) *Advances in Global Leadership* (Vol. 8, pp. 115-154). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Stevens, M. J., & Campion, M. A. (1994). The knowledge, skill and ability requiement for teamwork: Implications for Human Resource Management. *Journal of Management, 20*(2), 503-530.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (2008). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory* (3 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

SWE-Maj. (2015) *INT231000MAR15MMZ/Interviewer: M. Wettstein*.

Trentham, B., Cockburn, L., Cameron, D., & Iwama, M. (2007). Diversity and inclusion within an occupational therapy curriculum. *Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 54*, S49-S57. doi:10.1111/j.1440-1630.2006.00605.x

Triandis, H. C. (2001). Individualism and Collectivism. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *The handbook of culture and Psychology* (pp. 35-50). NYC, NY: Oxford University Press.

Triandis, H. C. (2006). Cultural Intelligence in Organizations. *Group & Organization Management, 31*(1), 20-26. doi:10.1177&1059601 105275253

Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (1997). *Riding the waves of culture: understanding cultural diversity in business*. London, UK: Nicholas Brealey Publishing Limited.

Trowler, P. (2011). Researching your own institution: Higher Education. *British Educational Research Association*

Turnbull, H., Greenwood, R., Tworoger, L., & Golden, C. (2010). Skills deficiencies in diversity and inclusion in organizations: Developing an inclusion skills measurement. *Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 9*(1), 1-14.

UN. (2008). *Unites Nations Peacekeeping Operation : Principales and Guidelines*. New York, NY: United Nations.

UN. (2016a). United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/news.shtml

UN. (2016b). United Nations Truced Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/news.shtml

UN. (2017). Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM). Retrieved from http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017/Introduction

UN. (2018). United Nations Staff Officers Specialised Training Materials for Peacekeeping Operations (STM for UNSO). Retrieved from https://research.un.org/c.php?g=636989&p=5915944

UN. (2019a). Peacekeeping Operations; Global Peackeeping Data (as of 31 October 2019). Retrieved from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data

UN. (2019b). Specialized Training Materials on Military Observers (STM for UNMO). Retrieved from https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/training/STM/UNMO

UN. (2019c). Ten Rules - Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets.

UN. (2020a). Geospacial Sevices: UN Operational Map Retrieved from https://geoportal.dfs.un.org/arcgis/home/

UN. (2020b). United Nations Truced Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO). Retrieved from https://untso.unmissions.org/untso-operations

UNDP. (2004). Directory of NGOs working in Lebanon. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org.lb/partners/NGOs/AffiliationType.pdf

Unluer, S. (2012). Being an Insider Researcher While Conducting Case Study Research. *The Qualitative Report, 17*(29), 1-14. doi:10.46743/2160-3715/2012.1752

UNTSO. (2015). Performance Evaluation Form. Jerusalem, IL: United Nations.

UoG. (2008). Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures. In R. E. Sub-Committee (Ed.): University of Gloucestershire.

UoG. (2018). Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures. In R. E. Sub-Committee (Ed.), (2 ed.): University of Gloucestershire.

USMC. (1998). *Marine Corps Values: A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders*. (MCRP 6-11B). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University (MCU).

Van der Zee, K. I., & Van Oudenhoven, J. P. (2000). The Multicultural Personality Questionnaire: A multidimensional instrument of multicultural effectivenes. *European Journal of Personality, 14*(4), 291-309.

Van Driel, M., & Gabrenya, W. K. (2014). Instrumentation challenges in developing Cross-Cultural Model. In R. Greene Sands & A. Greene-Sands (Eds.), *Cross-Cultural Competence For A Twenty-First-Century Military* (pp. 147-174). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., & Koh, C. (2008). Development and Validation of the CQS: The Cultural Intelligence Scale *Handbook of Cultural Intelligence Theory, Measurement, and Applications* (pp. 16-38). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., & Koh, C. (2009). Cultural Intelligence: Measurment and scale development *Comtemporary leadership and intercultural competence: Exploring the cross-cultural dynamics within organization* (pp. 233-254): Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., Ng, K. Y., Rockstuhl, T., Tan, M. L., & Koh, C. (2012). Sub-Dimensions of the Four Factor Model of Cultural Intelligence: Expanding the Conceptualization and Measurement of Cultural Intelligence. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6*(4), 295–313. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00429.x

Wahyuni, D. (2012). The research design maze: understanding paradigms,cases,methods and methodologies. *Journal of applied management accounting research, 10*(2), 69-80.

Ward, C., & Kennedy, A. (1999). The measurement of sociocultural adaptation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 23*(4), 659-677.

Yamazaki, Y. (2005). Learning styles and typologies of cultural differences: Atheoretical and empirical comparison. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*(29), 521–548. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.07.006

Yari, N., Lankut, E., Alon, I., & Richter, N. F. (2020). Cultural intelligence, global mindset, and cross-cultural competencies: a systematic review using bibliometric methods. *European Journal of International Management, x*(y), xx-xx. doi:10.1504/EJIM.2020.10026116

Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case Study Research: Design an Methods* (5 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Appendix

Appendix A. UN pre-deployment training

The UN defines the CPTM as: 'Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) represent the essential knowledge required by all peacekeeping personnel – military, police and civilians – to function effectively in a UN peacekeeping operation. The materials should be used as the core resource for any UN pre-deployment training course. The CPTM is intended to provide a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines, and policies of UN peacekeeping. These standards guide peacekeeping personnel as they carry out critical tasks to assist countries in the transition from conflict to peace' (UN, 2017). Table 19 gives an overview of the CPTM lessons.

Table 19: UN pre-deployment training (Appendix)

Module	***Lesson***
Module 1: An Overview of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	Lesson 1.1: United Nations Peacekeeping
	Lesson 1.2: Peace and Security Activities
	Lesson 1.3: Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping
	Lesson 1.4: Legal Framework for United Nations Peacekeeping
	Lesson 1.5: Security Council Mandates in Practice
	Lesson 1.6: How Peacekeeping Operations Work
	Lesson 1.7: Working As One in the Mission
	Lesson 1.8: Mission Partners
Module 2: Mandated Tasks of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	Lesson 2.1: An Overview of Mandated Tasks
	Lesson 2.2: Peacebuilding Activities
	Lesson 2.3: Human Rights
	Lesson 2.4: Women, Peace and Security
	Lesson 2.5: Protection of Civilians
	Lesson 2.6: Conflict Related Sexual Violence
	Lesson 2.7: Child Protection
Module 3: Individual Peacekeeping Personnel	Lesson 3.1: UN Core Values and Competencies
	Lesson 3.2: Respect for Diversity
	Lesson 3.3: Conduct and Discipline
	Lesson 3.4: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
	Lesson 3.5: Environment and Natural Resources
	Lesson 3.6: Safety and Security for UN Personnel
	Lesson 3.7: Personal Security Awareness
	Lesson 3.8: Health
	Lesson 3.9: HIV/AIDS
	Lesson 3.10: Stress Management
	Lesson 3.11: Road Safety
	Lesson 3.12: Basic First Aid in the Field

Note: This list is retrieved from UN (2017).

Appendix B. Specialised training materials for UN Military Observers

The UN has developed standard training packages for peacekeepers. Amongst these packages are the Specialised Training Materials for specific military duties and military units. One of these packages is designed specifically for the UNMOs (UN, 2019b). Table 20 gives the overview of the UNMOs specific training materials.

Table 20: UNMO specialist training materials (Appendix)

Module	***Lesson***	
	Lesson 1.1:	Overview UNMO in UN peacekeeping
Module 1:	Lesson 1.2:	UNMO Command and Control and Structure
Conceptual Framework	Lesson 1.3:	UNMO Concept of Support
	Lesson 1.4:	United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence
	Lesson 1.5:	Safety and Security
Module 2:	Lesson 2.1:	International Legal Framework
Legal Framework	Lesson 2.2:	United Nations Peacekeeping Legal Framework
	Lesson 3.1:	Basic UN Investigation and Verification Techniques
	Lesson 3.2:	Liaison and Coordination
	Lesson 3.3:	Negotiation and Mediation
Module 3:	Lesson 3.4:	Interviewing Techniques
Operational Framework	Lesson 3.5:	Weapons, Vehicles, and Aircraft Recognition
	Lesson 3.6:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
	Lesson 3.7:	Mines, explosive ruminants of war, improvised explosive devices & crater analysis
	Lesson 3.8:	Language Assistants
	Lesson 3.9:	Media Relations
	Lesson 3.10:	Procedures for Reporting

Note: This list is retrieved from UN (2019b).

Appendix C. UNTSO performance evaluation form (Structure)

The structure of the UN Military Observer performance evaluation form of UNTSO is shown in Table 21. The rating of the different assessed category is from 1 to4 (1: Unsatisfactory; 2: Developing; 3: Fully competent; 4: Highly competent) per subcategory.

Table 21: UNMO Performance Evaluation Form (Appendix)

Category	***Subcategory***
Core values	Integrity
	Professionalism
	Respect for diversity/gender
Core competencies	Communication
	Teamwork
	Planning and organizing
	Accountability
	Creativity
	Client orientation
	Technological awareness
	Commitment to continuous learning
Managerial competencies	Managing performance
	Vision
	Leadership
	Building trust
	Judgement/decision-making
	Empowering others
Job related competencies	Military bearing
	Professional military skills and knowledge
	Reliability

Note: This list is adapted from UNTSO (2015).

Appendix D. Intellectual stream in CCC, IQ and GM

Table 22 presents the finding of Yari et al. (2020, p.25) in relation to the different intellectual streams along the CQ, CCC, and GM research.

Table 22: Intellectual stream in CQ, CCC, and GM (Appendix)

Theme	***CQ***	***CCC***	***GM***
Concept, stage and measurement	- Conceptualisation of CQ - Four facets - Model of team collaboration - Firm level CQ - CQ Scale - Motivational CQ	- Situational judgment - Dynamic and stable CC - Cultural sensitivity - Cultural adaption	- Measure of global management competency - Use of corporate GM in multinational corporation - GM of top manager
Antecedents	- Personality - Cultural exposure - Emotional intelligence - Cross-cultural contact - Cross-cultural study - Language - Education - Stay abroad - Cultural belief - Trigger event		- Personality - Experience - Complexity of leaders - Antecedent to developing GM
Learning	- CQ learning - Experiment learning approach - Effect on global virtual team - Cross-cultural management - Service learning	- Effect on cross-cultural management training - Learning environment	- Service learning - Experimental learning - GM process design to minimise stigmatisation
Individual-level-outcome	- Cross-cultural adjustment - Expats adjustment - Socio cultural adjustment - Effectiveness - Performance - Job satisfaction - Cultural learning - Individual intention - Job creativity		- Individual perception of top management team - GM to individual-level commitment
Organisation-level-outcome	- Innovation adoption - Marketing strategy and performance		- Conceptual corporate GM - Employees' commitment - Effective global network - Exploiting opportunities - Performance of offshore service provider - Internalisation of subject matter experts

Note: This table is a reprint of Yari et al. (2020, p.25) intellectual stream illustration.

Appendix E. List of cross-cultural competence instruments

During this study as much as 49 CCC assessment instruments were identified and listed in the Table 23. This list is probably not exhaustive.

Table 23: Assessment of cross-cultural competence (Appendix)

Instrument	*Acronym*	*Category*	*Author/Year*	*Source*
Acculturative Stress Scale for International Students	ASSIS	Competence and intelligence	Sandhu & Asrabadi (1994)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Adjustment Difficulties Subscale	ADS	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Stroebe et al. (2002)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Assessment of Intercultural Competence	AIC	Competence and intelligence	Fantini and Tirmizi (2006)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Behavioural Assessment Scale for Intercultural Effectiveness	BASIC	Competence and intelligence	Koester and Olebe (1989)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory	BEVI	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Shealy (2004)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cross Cultural Adaption Scale	n/a	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Schmitdtchen (1997)	Abbe et al. (2007)
Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory	CCAI	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Kelley and Meyers (1995)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cross-Cultural Sensitivity Scale	CCSS	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Pruegger and Rogers (1993)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cross-Cultural Social Intelligence	n/a	Competence and intelligence	Ascalon et al. (2008)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cross-Cultural World-Mindedness Scale	CCWM	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Der-Karabetian (1992)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cultural Intelligence Assessment	n/a	Competence and intelligence	Tomas et al. (2015)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cultural Intelligence Scale	CQS	Competence and intelligence	Ang et al. (2007)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Cultural Orientations Indicator	COI	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Schmitz, Tarter, and Sine (2012)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Culture in the Workplace Questionnaire	n/a	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Hofstede (2010)	Griffith et al. (2016)
European Multidimensional Models of Intercultural Competence	EMIC	Competence and intelligence	Sinicrope et al. (2008)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Global Awareness Profile	n/a	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Corbitt (1998)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Global Competence Aptitude Assessment	n/a	Competence and intelligence	W. D.Hunter et al. (2006)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Global Competencies Inventory	n/a	Competence and intelligence	Kozai Group; Bird et al. (2002); Stevens, Bird,Mendenhall, and Oddou (2014)	Griffith et al. (2016)

Table 23 (continued)

Instrument	*Acronym*	*Category*	*Author/Year*	*Source*
Global Competencies Inventory	GCI	Competence and intelligence	Bird et al. (2002)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Global Perspectives Inventory	GPI	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Global Perspective Institute	Griffith et al. (2016)
Global Team Process Questionnaire	GTPQ	Behaviours and attitude	Bing (2001)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Implicit Association Tests	n/a	Competence and intelligence	Bazgan and Norel (2013)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale	ICAPS	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Matsumoto et al. (2001)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Communication Competence	ICC	Competence and intelligence (communication)	Arasaratnamand Doerfel (2005) and Arasaratnam (2009)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Competence Assessment	INCA	Competence and intelligence	https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/the-inca-project-intercultural-competence-assessment (visited 30.12.19)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Intercultural Competency Scale	ICS	Competence and intelligence	Elmer (1987)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Development Inventory	IDI	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Hammer et al. (2003)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Effectiveness Scale	IES	Competence and intelligence (continuous learning)	Kozai Group	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Intercultural Readiness Checklist	IRC	Competence and intelligence	https://www.ibinet.nl (visited 30.12.19)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Intercultural Sensitivity Inventory	ICSI	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Bhawuk and Brislin (1992)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Intercultural Sensitivity Scale	ISS	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Chen and Starosta (2000)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index	IRI	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Davis (1980)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Inventory of Cross-Cultural Sensitivity	ICCS	Behaviours and attitude	Cushner (1986)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Miville-Guzman Universality–Diversity Scale (M–GUDS)	M-GUDS	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Fuertes (2000)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Multicultural Awareness–Knowledge Awareness	MAKSS	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	D'Andrea,Daniels, and Heck (1991)	Griffith et al. (2016)

Table 23 (continued)

Instrument	*Acronym*	*Category*	*Author/Year*	*Source*
Multicultural Competence inventory	MCI	Competence and intelligence	Sadowski et al. (1994)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Multicultural Personality Questionnaire	MPQ	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Van der Zee and Van Oudenhoven (2000)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale	n/a	Competence and intelligence	Munroe & Peasron (2006)	Abbe et al. (2007)
Nonverbal Communication Competence Scale	NVCCS	Competence and intelligence	Kupka and Everett (2008)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Peterson Cultural Awareness Test	PCAT	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Peterson (1997)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Peterson Cultural Style Indicator	PCSI	Behaviours and attitude	http://acrossculturesweb.com/unit1/prca.html (visited 30.12.19)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Prospector	n/a	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Spreitzer et al. (1997)	Abbe et al. (2007)
Scale of Ethno cultural Empathy	SEE	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Wang et al. (2003)	Griffith et al. (2016)
Social Connectedness Scale	SCS	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Lee & Robin (1995)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Sociocultural Adaption Scale	SCAS	Openness, adaptability and flexibility	Ward & Kennedy (1999)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Tests for Hidden Bias	n/a	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Project Implicit (2000)	Griffith et al. (2016)
The Global Perspective Survey	n/a	Self-awareness, relativism and tolerance	Hanvey (1982)	Griffith et al. (2016)
The Inventory of Student Adjustment Strain	ISAS	Competence and intelligence	Crano & Crano (1993)	Van Driel et al, (2014)
Workplace Diversity Survey	WDS	Behaviours and attitude	De Meuse & Hostager (2001)	Van Driel et al, (2014)

Note: This table is a consolidated view of CCC assessment referenced by Abbe et al. (2007), Griffith et al. (2016) and Van Driel and Gabrenya (2014).

Appendix F. KSA of inclusion (ISM)

Table 24 presents an adapted view of the KSA retrieved out of the Inclusion Skills Measurement Profile developed by Turnbull et al. (2010).

Table 24: KSA of inclusion (Appendix)

Category	*Sub-category*	*Knowledge, skills and attributes*
Intrapersonal	Diversity sensitivity	- Ability to monitor own diversity sensitivity and impact others - Ability to make a conscious effort to learn about those who are different - Ability to be proactive in exposing self to a range of experiences with those who are different - Ability to take a step back in order to improve own diversity awareness
	Integrating with difference	- Ability to be aware of personal attitudes and beliefs about members of own social identity group - Ability to be vigilant about the tendency to discount self and members of own social identity due to internalised oppression - Ability to encourage those from own social identity group(s) to acknowledge and own the merits of their difference while honouring diversity in others
Interpersonal	Integrating with difference	- Ability to listen actively for other frames of reference and not prejudge - Ability to seek to understand and adapt to different styles when working with those who are different - Ability to treat others as they wish to be treated - Ability to show a readiness to change the way to do things to meet the needs of those from another backgrounds
	Valuing difference	- Ability to encourage innovation and creativity in the workplace - Ability to embrace diversity as a resource to benefit the organisation and its members - Ability to treat diversity as an asset, not a liability - Ability to support systems, procedures and practices which promote diversity in the workforce - Ability to leverage the benefits differences can add
Group	Team inclusion	- Ability to ensure that project teams and work groups are diverse - Ability to encourage and capitalise on the diverse contributions and strengths of team members - Ability to practice inclusive behaviours in groups and intervene sensitively when exclusionary behaviours occur
	Managing conflict	- Ability to learn about different styles of conflict resolution - Ability to have insight into and monitor own preferred conflict management style and its impact on others - Ability to be proactive in managing conflict when it arises rather than avoiding it - Ability to actively create the space for people to use different forms of conflict resolution

Table 24 (continued)

Category	***Sub-category***	***Knowledge, skills and attributes***
Organisation	Embedding inclusion	- Ability to be actively involved with organisational issues that promote diversity awareness - Ability to lobby influential individuals and groups on issues of D&I - Ability to challenge prejudice and injustice when confronted with evidence of it in the workplace, directly or indirectly - Ability to be an active advocate of treating people fairly and accommodating differences in all spheres of life (i.e., personal, professional and the wider community)

Note: This overview is adapted from Turnbull et al. (2010).

Appendix G. Teamwork relevant maladaptive personality traits

The teamwork personality scale referred to in the literature review are presented in Table 25.

Table 25: Teamwork personality traits scale (Appendix)

Personality traits	***Contribution to***	***Low personality score***	***High personality score***
Conscientiousness	Task	- Disorderly - Careless - Wasteful	- Perfectionist - Inflexible - Obsessive
	Interaction	- Neglectful - Uncontrolled	- Leisure less - Defensive - Hypersensitive - Moody
Extraversion	Task	- Withdrawn - Reclusive - Detached (from the task)	- Superficial - Dominant - Exaggerative - Egoistic
	Interaction	- Unfriendly - Distant - Solitary	- Flaunty - Showy - Overly reactive
Agreeableness	Task	- Harsh - Competitive - Unwitting	- Lenient - Ingratiating - Submissive
	Interaction	- Deceitful - Heartless - Treacherous	- Deceivable - Dependent - Gullible

Note: This overview is adapted from Curseu et al. (2019, p.641)

Appendix H. Favourable personality traits for UNMOs

Table 26 presents the potential impact of the specific UNMO personality traits identified in the literature review, categorised according to the FFM.

Table 26: Potential impact of personality traits (Appendix)

FFM factor	***Potential impact***	***Source: adapted from***
Extraversion (High)	Higher cultural knowledge, higher motivation, learning drive, ability to adjust, better language learning, higher performance, better development of CCC, interpersonal skills, talkative, usually enthusiastic, trustful	Ang et al. (2006); Abbe et al. (2007); Van Dyne et al. (2012); Curseu et al. (2019)
Agreeableness (High)	Better language learning, ability to adjust, higher performance, truthful, friendly, empathic, receptive to different perspectives	Van Dyne et al. (2012); Curseu et al. (2019)
Conscientiousness (High)	Higher cultural awareness, ability to adjust, better development of CCC, higher performance	Abbe et al. (2007); Van Dyne et al. (2012); Curseu et al. (2019)
Neuroticism (Low)	Better language learning, ability to adjust, fewer issues during deployment, better development of CCC	Johnson et al. (2006); Abbe et al. (2007); Van Dyne et al. (2012)
Openness to experience (High)	Higher cultural knowledge, higher motivation, learning drive, ability to adjust, better language learning, higher performance	Ang et al. (2006); Abbe et al. (2007); Van Dyne et al. (2012)

Appendix I. Research sampling details

This appendix outlines the sampling by using different dimensions. Table 27 lists the focus group participants. Table 28 displays the nationalities. Table 29 presents the ranks. Table 30 lists the function that the participants had during the interviews. Table 31 outlines the initial teams that the UNMOs were initially allocated, and Table 32 covers the age of the participants.

Table 27: Focus group participants list (Appendix)

Nr	*Rank*	*Nationality*	*Gender*	*Age*	*#Mission*	*Research context*	*Training Officer since*
1	Ltc	Swiss	M	55	5	(OGL-06)	21 years
2	Maj	Swiss	M	46	3	(OGL-08)	12 years
3	Maj	Swiss	F	35	2	(UNTSO-14)	3 years

Note: TO refers to Training Officer.

Table 28: Data generation – participant country of origin (Appendix)

	Country of origin	*UNMO / TO*		*UN Civilian (Local)*		*UN Civilian (International)*	
		Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Interview	Australian		1			1	
Interview	Austrian	2					
Interview	Canadian	1					
Interview	Chinese	2					
Interview	Danish	2					
Interview	Dutch	2					
Interview	Estonian	1					
Interview	Fiji	1					
Interview	Finnish	1					
Interview	Irish	2					
Interview	Italian	1					
Interview	Lebanese			1	1		
Interview	Moroccan					1	
Interview	New Zealander		2				
Interview	Norwegian	1					
Interview	Russian	3					
Interview	Sierra Leon					1	
Interview	Sweden	1					
Interview	Swiss	2					
Focus group	Swiss	2	1				

Table 29: Data generation – participant rank (Appendix)

	1st Lieutenant	***Captain***	***Major***	***Lt Colonel***	***Colonel***
#UNMO	1	11	7	3	3

Table 30: Data generation – participant function (Appendix)

	UNMO	***Team leader***	***Staff officers***	***Chief OGL***
#UNMO	13	3	7	2

Table 31: Data generation – participant team (Appendix)

	HQ	***ZULU***	***VICTOR***	***X-RAY***	***SIERRA***
#UNMO	2	11	5	3	4

Table 32: Data generation – participant age (Appendix)

	n/a	***<30***	***30-34***	***35-39***	***40-44***	***45-49***	***>49***
#Interviewee	1	2	6	3	9	3	6
#in focus group				1		1	1

Appendix J. Research interview guide

The research interview guide is composed of two parts, the first one is used to capture some basic information (e.g., demographic data) and the second part is composed of a questionnaire. However the interviews were open to allow discussions. Furthermore, only the second part is recorded and transcribed. The interview guide is presented in Figure 14 below.



Interview ID:

UNIVERSITY OF GLOUCESTERSHIRE

Interview Guide

Basic information

Nationality	
Mother tongue	
English proficiency	
Age	
Rank	
Branch	
How long have you been in the army	
How many oversee missions	
How many missions as military observers	
How long have you been on this mission	

Interview ID:

Main questions

- What are the difference between this mission and the others you have been on?
- Did you have any training cultural or cultural differences before joining the mission?
- What qualities and abilities do you belief are necessary for UN military observers to successfully be able to operate in a cross cultural context on an international mission (subjective)?
- What extent to you think that these qualities/abilities are important to the successful implementation of the mission?
- Are there following issues (reported from previous interview):
  - English
  - Driving
  - Alcohol
  - Age
  - Mil vs Civ
  - Rank structure (Mission vs Home)
  - Gender
  - Risk perspective
  - Reporting difference
  - Observation difference
- Do you think that somebody could accomplish the mission equally as successfully without these qualities/abilities?
- What action can the team do to help somebody develop the required qualities/abilities?
- What actions have you taken to improve your qualities and ability to operation in this cross-cultural context?
- What do you think is the biggest issue in the mission?

Figure 14: Interview guide (Appendix)

Appendix K. File naming convention for data collection

To retrieve data more easily the transcripts word file name is structured a follow: **AAADDTTTTMMMYYPGT**.doc.

AAA: Type of activities

INT = Interview

FOG = Focus Group

DD: Day date (e.g. 12 for 12 January)

TTTT: Time of interview (e.g. 1300 for 1pm)

MMM: Month of interview date (e.g. JAN for January)

YY: Year of interview date (e.g. 15 for 2015)

P: Type of personnel *

M = Military

L = Liaison Assistant (civilian)

S = Mission Support and Security officers (civilian)

G: Gender *

F: Female

M: Male

T: Team (ex Team) *

Z: ZULU

V: VICTOR

X: XRAY

S: SIERRA

H: HQ

Example: INT192000MAY15MMX.DOC

Interview of male military personnel from XRAY team. Interview conducted on May 19th 2015 at 8pm.

* only for interviews

Appendix L. Interview Log

Figure 15 presents a screenshot of the interview log.



Nr	Id	Main conceptual idea	Potential cultural differences	Impact on sampling and questions	Nr Pa
1	INT112000JAN15MMH	- Life experience, - Tolerance,		Interview with people on first mission and Capt	13
2	INT181500JAN15MMV	- Know own culture, - Discuss cultural difference openly, - communication skills, - Tolerance,		Interview with more experienced people	12
7	INT021600MAR15MM	- Experience, age - International experience (e.g. Russian or China don't have it) - Local cultural awareness) - English skills - Leadership skill, participative - team player - Hygiene - Attitude to rank - open minded - understanding other culture		Interview with none europeans/Germanique UNMO	17
3	INT171330MAR15MMS	- Clear SOP and rules, - Tolerance, - Participative leadership - Understanding (also taste a difference)			14
10	INT181500MAR15MMZ	- Openness - Willingness and Capacity to learn - Local cultural, historical and political knowledge - Complying to the rules and not to the way that activities are performed home - Experience (life and mission) - Cultural background not only about region/country, but also military branch or even team in the mission			9
11	INT231000MAR15MM	- there is not one right, acceptance of other view - Similar backgrounds (e.g. Military) - Straight leadership still - Knowledge of local culture - individual , people that like to do the job, not been lazy - min English level (e.g. people without needed level will not put in charge if not expressing them self/understanding) - Experience with backlash that leads to better judgments - Be able to relax, having patience - to be able to listen to others - know your culture - not be stocked to habit, be able to adopt other way of doing things - openness - be able to observe first, not to straight forward, don't run over	-leadership still direct/authoritarian/intergrated		11
12	INT121330APR15MMZ	- Patience - Flexibility - Adapt your English to no native - Focus on the job, don0t get relaxed - Mind-set: be willing to work and contribute) - Age issue with experience seen as negative, too relax - Showing excellence / want to make a difference -Setting standard - Courage (to tell something) - Open to discuss topics / openness - Interest in others proactive			14
13	INT121730APR15MMS	- Be mature - Be mature/experience- Basic military skills - Adaptability/ accepting change of roles life experience (mil, civ - be able to build relationship - Issues with rank where a lower rank is commanding a higher rack - give opinion - Taking tasks seriously / no routine / stay focused - be loyal to the team, task, mission - issues are about personality than cultural - when insecure in English you tend to hold back, If you have better English skills the interaction is better. Tell if you don't understand, don't hide - technical skills like diving is needed			15

Figure 15: Interview log screenshot (Appendix)

Appendix M. Research consent form of chief OGL

Figure 16 presents the signed research consent form of the Chief OGL.



UNIVERSITY OF GLOUCESTERSHIRE

Consent Form

Title of research

Cross-Cultural Competence: A revised model for UN military observers

Research objectives

1) To explore what is cross-cultural competence in a UN military observer mission.
2) To explore what cross-cultural competences are important for UNMOs to be effective.
3) To explore what actions are taken by UN military observers to improve their cross-cultural competence.

Aim of the research

The aim of this research is an attempt to revise and adapt cross-cultural competence models to generate a framework appropriate for a UN military observer mission.

Ethics

This research will be in line with the "Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures" which was approved by the University Research Degrees Committee in September 2008.

The participants are part of UN Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and will be informed about this research. A consent form to participate will be signed by the interviewees or focus group participants with explicit information about the recording and that the data will be deleted after the research. Participants will always be able to withdraw from the research. Anonymity and confidentiality will be explained in the consent form. They will have the option to validate the transcription and then to reject the use of the data.

As the observation will happen in informal manner and during day-to-day activities no consent form will be signed but the team members are aware that I am conducting this research. Only aggregated data from observations will be used and anonymity will be guaranteed.

Further, there are no known risks or discomfort associated with this study. This research has no aim to identify or to analyse operational activities or to review operating procedures from different armed forces.

I confirm that Maj Marc Wettstein is authorised to conduct this research within OGL.

Naqoura, 30th December 2014

Lt Col Carel Gerritsen

[redacted]

Chief Observer Group Lebanon

Figure 16: Research consent form of chief OGL (Appendix)

Appendix N. Research consent form for interviews

Figure 17 presents the consent form that was signed by all interviewees.



UNIVERSITY OF GLOUCESTERSHIRE

Consent Form

Title of research
Cross-Cultural Competence: A revised model for UN military observers

Researcher name
Marc Wettstein

	Please initial box
1. I confirm that have read and understand the information sheet for above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.	
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw any time without giving a reason.	
3. I agree to take part of the study.	

	Please tick box	
	Yes	No
4. I agree to the interview being audio-recorded.		
5. I agree the use of anonymised quotes in publications.		

Name of participants	Date	Signature
_____	_____	_____
Researcher	Date	Signature
Marc Wettstein	_____	_____

Figure 17: Research consent form for interviews (Appendix)

Appendix O. KSA Model for UNMOs: Relationships

Several relationships are identified between the different categories of the UNMO KSA model. These relationships are illustrated in Table 33.

Table 33: Category relationship (Appendix)

From	***To***	***Example***
Military skills and knowledge	Teamwork	- A UNMO with good Military skills and knowledge may gain respect and trust from the other team members - Driving skills may cause issue and impact the teamwork for example if somebody does not have the licence or drive carefulness
Professionalism	Military skills and knowledge	- If UNMO do not follow the rule and regulation or the SOPs
	Teamwork	- If UNMO are not responsible for example with their alcohol consumption, then they may lose the trust of the team members
	Specific cultural knowledge	- If a UNMO is not dedicated to the mission, then the motivation to gain specific cultural knowledge can be impacted
	Learning and experience	- If a UNMO is not dedicated to the mission, then the motivation to learn may be impacted
Communication skills	Military skills and knowledge	- Good communication skills will allow UNMOs to have discussion with the local actors and population and with that gather information
	Professionalism	- Weak English proficiency may impact the professionalism perception of the other team members
	Teamwork	- Conversing with the other team members will help to know each other, to build trust and to build relationship
	Specific cultural knowledge	- Conversing with the local population may enable the UNMO to learn more about the region
	Learning and experience	- By communicating with others, in the team or population, knowledge of them can get gained
Teamwork	Military skills and knowledge	- If the officers in the team know who has which skills, then it can be leveraged to improve the Military skills and knowledge
	Professionalism	- Weak professionalism of individuals can be addressed with a good leadership and a good feedback culture in the team
	Specific cultural knowledge	- With engaging and integrating the LAs specific cultural knowledge can be gained
	Learning and experience	- Good feedback culture in the team will help the continuous improvement

Table 33 (continued)

From	*To*	*Example*
Diversity and inclusion	Professionalism	- If a UNMO has issues with understanding and accepting the cultural differences, then the ability to gain trust from the local actors is jeopardized
	Communication	- If the interest and the acceptance of the other culture is not available, then the communication may not be adapted to the context - If the respect to the country the UNMO is operating in is not available, then the willingness to learn a few words of the local language may not be favoured
	Teamwork	- If members have problem with diversity (e.g. gender, age, culture, military branch) the teamwork and team integration may be impacted
	Specific cultural knowledge	- If there are some prejudices about the region that the UNMO operates in then the willing to learn about it may be impacted
	Learning and experience	- If a person is not self-aware then also the self-reflection and the continuous improvement can be impacted
Specific cultural knowledge	Military skills and knowledge	- A solid understanding of the region may allow the UNMO to better interpret their observations - Understanding the roles and responsibilities of local actors may allow for targeted information gathering
	Communication skills	- Understanding the local population may influence the willingness to learn the local language
	Teamwork	- A UNMO with strong specific cultural knowledge may gain respect and trust from other team members
	Learning and experience	- Understanding the local population may influence the willingness to learn even more
	Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits	- Knowledge of local customs helps a UNMO adapt their behaviour appropriately
Learning and experience	Military skills and knowledge	- Mission experience can impact all elements of the Military skills and knowledge
	Professionalism	- If learning willingness is not available, then learning of the mission context and the understanding of the different actors in the fields may be limited
	Communication skills	- Improvement of the English skills may be limited - Adaption of its communication to the receiver may not be seen as necessary
	Teamwork	- Adaption to the team may be jeopardize
	Diversity and inclusion	- Learning about the others and thus understand the difference may not happen
	Specific cultural knowledge	- If learning willingness is not there, then learning of the local and regional aspect may be limited
	Behaviours, attitudes, and personality traits	- Self-reflection will help to identify good or bad self-behaviours and allow the UNMOs to take the measures to correct them

Table 33 (continued)

From	***To***	***Example***
Behaviours, attitude and personality traits	Military skills and knowledge	- If a UNMOs are not able to manage misunderstand in the team and get frustrated on a patrol, then observation and info gathering may be impacted because there is no exchange between them
	Professionalism	- A UNMO not able to cope with uncertainty may get alcohol issue
	Communication skills	- Being open and positive may compensate the lack of English skills
	Teamwork	- Relationship building is important for the teamwork
	Diversity and inclusion	- If a person is not able to cope with misunderstand then the frustration may exceed to ability to learn from the other and to appreciate the diversity
	Specific cultural knowledge	- If a person is open to others and friendly, then the person will be able to integrate with the local population and learn about them
	Learning and experience	- If a person is open to others, then the person can learn from them

Note: These relationships are just examples and not exhaustive.

Appendix P. UNMOs KSA with short description

Learning and experience: Learning is critical for UNMOs to succeed and add value to the mission. The UNMOs need to be able and willing to learn. They should be self-reflective and ensure continuous improvement. Having mission and cross-cultural experience may be an advantage for UNMOs. The UNMOs should know what knowledge is available around them to be able to leverage it. Table 34 describes the sub-category of leaning and experience.

Table 34: Learning and experience (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Ability and willing to learn	The ability and willingness to learn seems to be important, not only to increase one's own knowledge but also to gain trust and to be accepted on the team.
Continuous improvement	Continuous improvement is about trying to excel in the job. It involves self-reflection and constantly trying to improve and learn.
Having mission and international experience	This sub-category is about the requirement of UNMOs to have a certain maturity and life experience, as UNMOs interact with local people daily and thus need to be able to recognise the importance of cultural aspects, as well as sensitive situations.
Ability to leverage available experience and knowledge	This about knowing who has which knowledge and being able to leverage this knowledge in favour of the team and mission.

Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits: This category is defined by having the social competence to be able to build relationship, as well as being open and interested in others motivated, being friendly and respectful. It also has to do with emotional stability and the ability to manage uncertainty. Table 35 describes the sub-category of leaning and experience.

Table 35: Behaviours, attitudes and personality traits (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Social competence	Social competence is defined as oriented to the other, such as the ability to build relationships, as well as being open and interested in others.
Behavioural markers and attitude	The behavioural marker is defined by being motivated, respectful, agreeable to others, friendly and cordial, generous, patient, polite and empathetic.
Emotional stability	The emotional stability contained attributes such as the ability to manage uncertainty, accept the situation, manage misunderstandings, be positive, have a sense of humour, being humble and being able to manage time.

Military skills and knowledge: The UNMOs are expected to have military skills and knowledge. Not having the required skills and knowledge may lead to operational issues. The aim of this research was not to review these KSAs, thus the list in the sub-category is not exhaustive. Table 36 displays the sub-category of the military skills and knowledge.

Table 36: Military skills and knowledge (Appendix)

Attributes	***Short description***
Driving skills	The UNMOs in Lebanon spend most of their time patrolling along the approximately 120 km BL between Lebanon and Israel. In consequence, driving skills are critical.
Technology awareness	In the context of the mission, technological equipment is issued by the UN and thus familiarity with the specific equipment is important.
Information-gathering skills	To be able to add value to the mission and gain SA, strong Information-gathering skills and an ability to communicate the information is required.
Observation skills	Observation skills and its interpretations are core skills of UNMOs. Observation skills can be specific and technical, such as vehicle and weapon recognition. The interpretation of an observation is specific to a defined situation in a specific time frame.

Note: These military skills may have potential impact on the operational effectiveness however this list has no ambition to be exhaustive.

Professionalism: Professionalism is described in this context with integrity, which is mainly about representing the UN, being proactive and willing to make a difference, being responsible and behaving appropriately on and off duty. Dedication is about putting the mission needs before personal needs, and persistence is about sustaining momentum. Table 37 lists the sub-category of professionalism.

Table 37: Professionalism (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Mission and context understanding	The understanding of the mission, its history and organisation. The understanding of the role and tasks within the mission.
Integrity	Acting in the organisation's best interest. For example, a team's internal issues should not be shared outside of the team or the UN.
Proactivity	The UNMOs have objectives and general tasks to achieve, but there is not a specific tasking. Officers serving in this type of mission are expected to be proactive and seek high-level performance.
Responsibility	Each individual officer sent as a UNMO represents the UN and their country, whether on- or off-duty. Consequently, responsible behaviour is important.
Dedicating	The UNMOs must work in favour of the mission and put their personal needs aside.
Persistency	Remaining rigorous throughout deployments and not getting relaxed over time but constantly aiming for excellence.

Diversity and Cultural Awareness: This category is about the ability to respect and include diversity in order to achieve the objectives. The aspects include cultural differences (in background, organisation or country), gender and age. The prerequisites are to know oneself, to be aware of bias and stay impartial. Table 38 outlines the sub-category.

Table 38: Diversity and Cultural Awareness (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Understanding of own culture	This sub-category is about understanding oneself and where one comes from. This is the first step to identify and appreciate differences with other nations or backgrounds.
Awareness and accept cultural differences	Military Observers are exposed to several facets of cross-cultural differences, both with the local population and within the team, where the officers may be the only one from their country or culture. The differences could be reflected in how officers with different cultural backgrounds approach the hierarchy, work, address issues, and communicate.
Ability to manage gender difference	This sub-category is about the ability to work with colleagues or leadership of the opposite gender and to appreciate and leverage the differences.
Ability to manage age difference	The age difference between the officers can be up to 30 years. The officers need to be able to value their older or younger colleagues, listen to them and be able to share experience.
Being unbiased and impartial	While working for the UN, the officers should not forget where they come from and their beliefs, but this should not influence a decision that needs to be fact-based. In the mission, UNMOs need to act in favour of the UN and be impartial.

Communication skills: Communication skills are critical to be able to socialise within the team and with the local authorities and population. Communication requires more than English proficiency or having basic knowledge of the local language. Additionally it includes non-verbal communication and the ability to listen. Furthermore, it is about the ability to communicate openly and with everyone, adapt one's own communication and ensure that there are no misunderstandings. Table 39 describes the sub-category of communication skills.

Table 39: Communication skills (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Ability to listen	Listening is an important skill for officers. It is necessary within the team but also during meetings or in other settings. Listening includes the ability to accept others' opinions. It is the foundation of communication.
Ability to read and manage body language	Reading and managing body language is about getting additional information beyond what it is said. This could for example help the sender to understand if the receiver understood what was said or help to see if a person is comfortable or not. Body language is more pronounced in some cultures than others and thus important to understand in an international setting. Body language is also being aware of one's own body language and its potential signification for others.
Ability to have open communication	When on duty, UNMOs usually spend their evenings with the team; they do sport, eat and converse together. In a cross-cultural context such as this, it is important be able have open communication and discuss all topics independent of different backgrounds but also to be able talk about issues perceived by individuals.
Interested and ability to interact with everyone	The mission is comprised of local civilians and international employees, military personnel, and police officers. Younger and older, junior, and senior, male and female. A mix of culture and languages. All working together in favour of the local institutions and population. It is a necessity for officers to be able to communicate and negotiate with all of them.
Ability to adapt own communication	In a cross-cultural context, the level of English proficiency differs greatly. Thus, the ability to adapt one's communications skills is important. One of the findings is that it is easier for non-native English speakers to communicate with other non-native officers, which suggests that native officers may have to adapt more that non-native English speakers.
Ability to avoid misunderstanding	On an English mission with a mix of English proficiency level, it is important that people understand what it is said, especially mission briefings or tasking. People can become frustrated when they cannot express themselves and be understood. Simple wording should be used in writing reports and in verbal communication. It should be verified that the listeners have understood what was said. This can be achieved by reading the body language of the listener or asking questions to verify that the message has been understood.
English proficiency	The UNMOs with low English proficiency could be excluded from the decision-making process or from the team. English proficiency is identified immediately, and the risk is that officers with lower English proficiency will be classified as having lower competencies when joining the mission. Thus, having acceptable English proficiency is a clear advantage.
Basic local language knowledge	Having basic local language knowledge may ease the access to the local population; nevertheless, UNMOs are mainly with LAs and thus not the priority. However, speaking the local language is also a form of respect
Radio operation skills	Radio operation skills are important. The radio is the main communication method for UNMOs.
Report writing skills	Several reports need to be written, for example daily situational reports (DSR), weekly reports and monthly reports. The DSR is completed by each team and then consolidated by OGL HQ to send to the UNIFIL and UNTSO HQ.
Meeting handling skills	Daily tasks besides patrolling often involve holding meetings with political or military representatives of the host nations. The UNMOs are in the mission for 12 months and interact with the same actors several times during their engagement. Thus, meetings should involve a process of building a strong relationship to then be able to have an in-depth discussion.

Teamwork: Teamwork in this context is defined as an individual being able to adapt to a team but also being able to integrate and help others. Further, it is about not being an individualist but rather working in favour of the team, being open and embracing a feedback culture. Finally, participative leadership is also part of the category. Table 40 outlines the sub-category of teamwork.

Table 40: Teamwork (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Participative leadership	The contribution of all individuals is needed to be able to understand the positive and negative impacts of a decision. A team leader asking the opinion of the team members prior to deciding is seen as strong.
Ability to adapt	Adaptability is seen as not imposing one's way of doing things but rather observing first to better understand the context and the way the team or individual operates. It does not mean to actively participate and contribute but not to be too demanding, to be open to do the things in another way, to give oneself time to embrace the team culture and understand the different individuals.
Ability to be a team player	Individualists may be an issue for the teams. Officers need to be team players, which means putting the team before one's own needs. In some cultures, certain tasks may be gender dependent or may not be done by officers of a certain seniority. In the context of UNMOs, all officers need to ready and willing to do all types of activities and tasks.
Ability to gain trust	The officers need to be able trust each other for safety and security reasons. Trust may be gained by officers with integrity and a high level of professionalism. Being open, knowing the other and having cultural awareness may also help to build trust between the officers.
Ability to integrate people within the team	English proficiency may be an issue for certain officers and a consequence could be that they do not feel comfortable actively participating and contributing to the team. This situation may lead to them not being integrated on the team. It is expected that the officers and team leader recognise such a situation and be willing to forge the integration of all officers in the team. This could be done by actively asking question during a conversation or finding a mutual interest for discussion.
Ability to integrate the LAs	The LAs are usually with the patrols and help UNMOs interact with the local population. They are locals who live in the mission AO and are in the mission for many years. They understand the geo-political influence and know the history of the country and mission. With the high attrition of the mission, this knowledge also helps to keep the mission running smoothly. To be able to leverage the LA is thus an advantage.
Ability to train other officers	Every month, UNMOs join and leave the mission. This implicates a constant knowledge transfer from senior UNMOs to junior UNMOs and the need for the officers to be able to train other officers.
Ability to have a feedback culture	Having the ability and the courage to give positive or negative feedback and to be open and accept feedback contributes positively to the team performance.

Cultural specific knowledge: To be able to operate effectively, the UNMO needs to fully understand where they are operating (e.g., local culture, knowledge of the AO) and what is influencing the mission. To be able to fully leverage this knowledge, it is important to respect the country in which the UNMOs are operating. Table 41 lists the sub-category of specific cultural knowledge.

Table 41: Cultural specific knowledge (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Ability to understand the big picture	To be able to operate in effectively, UNMOs need to fully understand where they are operating (e.g., local culture and knowledge of the AO), as well as what is influencing the mission.
Ability to respect the country one is operating in	Military Observers should be aware of and respect the host population. They should be able to interact and seek positive perceptions.
Ability to understand the local culture	Military Observers need to be aware of and sensitive to the local people. UNMOs need to understand the different religions in the region and the customs associated with the culture.
Knowledge of the area	Military Observers need to understand the importance of historical events of the country and what happened in the area. They need to understand the political system and political groups. They need to know the history of the contributing troops to be aware that some nationalities might have a different view of the events taking place in the area.

Cultural and situational variables: External factors may influence the UNMOs effectiveness; theses identified during this research are the cultural distance, the institutional culture (e.g., UN, military branch) culture and the different situational awareness within the UNMO team. The UNMOs should be aware of these. Table 42 lists the sub-category of cultural and situational variable.

Table 42: Cultural and situational variables (Appendix)

Sub-category	***Short description***
Cultural distance	Cultural distance is seen as the cultural difference in Hofstede et al. (2010)'s term between home and the expatriate manager oversee posting as well as difference in environmental variable. In the context of this study, it can be the distance between the UNMO to the host country, the other actors in the fields and the other team members.
Awareness of institutional culture	Military Observers are exposed to several types of institutions and associated cultures, and it is thus important for them to be able to navigate through them. The UN itself is an organisation with its own culture, value system, norms, and processes. Beside the military components of a mission, there are civilian components within their own sub-culture. Finally on the team itself, there are members from different military sub-cultures such as army, navy, or air force.
Situational awareness	Military Observers need to understand the context for safety and security reasons. Situational awareness also relates to avoiding misunderstanding the host country culture, which could lead to inappropriate behaviour and thus impact the mission.