Change and Continuity of Citizenship Norms – A Study of Parental Socialisation of Poles

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Abstract

How people see their role as a citizen has been changing as a result of changing values across generations. The post-materialistic turn has been deemed responsible for a more engaged, cause-oriented, expressive citizenship norms and political participation style, found predominantly among younger citizens, with a duty-based, institutionalised norms and participation preferred by older cohorts.

Scholars researching political participation have been exploring the explanatory potential of such citizenship norms for the last few decades. However, large, crossnational datasets, have so far failed to provide evidence of a universal preference for either engaged or duty-based styles. This theoretical typology has brought even less conclusive results for post-communist populations, pointing to a lack of a generational shift in the way citizens participate in politics. The prospect of a universal change in the relationship between the citizen and the political system requires questioning the future of representative democracy. Such an inquiry is even more salient for countries that only recently transformed to democracy.

The aim of this thesis, therefore, was to understand how citizenship and political participation is defined among the citizens of a post-communist country, Poland, if and how these norms translate into behaviours, and lastly, taking advantage of the coexistence of cohorts socialised under different political regimes, this research aimed to understand how citizenship norm is passed on from parent to child.

This study applied qualitative content analysis to 32 in-depth interviews conducted with young Poles and their parents.

Allowing for participants' self-definitions of norms and political participation resulted in identifying two, new for the social norms literature, elements of the citizenship norm — a personality, trait-like, moral aspect and a patriotic component.

A divorce was identified between the norms and behaviours interviewees engaged in, that is that the citizenship norms definitions did not contain activities people were actually participating in. This finding points to the resilient nature of social norms.

The study also found that the parenting style played a bigger role in socialising young Poles into activity than the abstract, behaviour-deficient citizenship norms of the parents.

This study's main contribution lays in providing new knowledge to the field of political participation research, specifically in the area of citizenship norms, by deepening our understanding of young people's political participation in a postcommunist country. This single-nation research allowed for a careful consideration of its findings' relevance in other cross-national contexts. I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other education institution in the United Kingdom or overseas. Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University.

Signed Weronika Najda Date 29.08.2021

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1.Introduction

The field of political participation research has for many decades concentrated on what makes people act and, simultaneously, why some individuals shy away from politics. The latter question has been growing in significance concurrently with mounting evidence of citizens' decreasing enthusiasm for electorally-oriented activities and traditional channels representing their interests, such as political parties or trade unions. With some activities becoming less popular and to mark the changing relationship between the citizenry and political systems, political participation research started to expand the repertoires of behaviours under study.

The turn of the millennium brought the inclusion of activity in voluntary organisations into the participation mix. This expansion of participation modes offered new evidence for political participation amongst scholars who favoured, like their colleagues beforehand, an explanation based on cultural theory (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart 1990, 1997). Intergenerational changes in values started to be deemed responsible for the different ways that younger and older citizens participate in politics. In particular, social norms, relating to how people see their role as citizens, brought theory-expanding findings.

How such norms are learned and re-defined in a newly developed democracy is an intriguing and salient line of enquiry.

This study applied the social norms perspective to explore the context for political participation in Poland, a former communist country grappling with a citizenry more passive than its Solidarity union-activist past would ever predict. The main objective for this research was to understand how young Poles and their parents, 30 years after the democratic transformation, define citizenship norms and political participation and how their approaches compare.

This introductory chapter outlines the background to the study, indicates the main arguments found in the literature and the study's proposed research objectives, methodology undertaken, as well as the limitations and implications of the study's findings. Lastly, the thesis structure will be presented.

1.1. The Case for Researching Citizenship Norms in Poland

Political participation, both as a concept and a field of research, had gone through an intensive development in the last several decades. The early definitions portraying participation as the activities of private citizens aiming to influence the selection of governments (Verba & Nie, 1972), or as a way to hold governments accountable, so essential for democracy (Dahl, 1971), exemplify where the focus of the early research laid — elections and political campaigns.

To track the evolution of this concept, Van Deth mapped out the journey this field of research had gone through, with the first three post-war decades dedicated to electoral and political party activities, the 1970-80s witnessing a growth of, unconventional for the times, protest activities and social movements, and the 1990s expanding the boundaries of what is political to include "civil" or "social" participation, such as activities in voluntary organisations (van Deth, 2001).

More recently, the methods afforded by digital, online technologies became the next evolutionary step for political participation in the new millennium. Even though at the start they were not treated seriously (earning names such as "slacktivism" — Fisher, 2020), some evidence now exists that activities of citizens utilizing their online presence for political organising, information sharing and campaigning, can be

empowering and democratising, having positive influence on people's willingness to participate (Castells, 2012; Shehata, Ekstrom & Olsson, 2016).

1.1.1. Why is This of Interest?

Explaining political participation, the reasons for lack of it, has important policy implications. Withdrawing from voting in elections in particular, which is the main channel for both aggregation of interests and the legitimisation of those in power (Dahl, 1971; Schmitter & Karl, 1991), can be seen as a threat to the stability of the political system. Low activity in voluntary associations and local communities, "weak civil society" can been seen as detrimental for social capital and social trust, qualities which, when in abundance, are believed to enhance cooperation and efficiency of democratic governments (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995, 2000).

Policy-makers and supporters of the view that "the institutions of a democratic political process should be structured to respond to the citizenry" (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 1), would also be interested in exploring the different modes and patterns in political participation, the attitudes and behaviours of citizens the "wellspring of politics flows from" (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 1).

Building a better understanding of the recent expansion of participation methods is particularly important for sustaining democratic systems. For instance, the inclusion of activities reliant on the skills and resources, that only members of high socio-economic status groups possess, means that there is an increased risk of inequality, a widening "participation gap" (Dalton, 2017), with large parts of populations being excluded from political influence. As such, citizens' changing preferences for how they interact with democratic institutions have been interpreted as a critique of the representative democracy system and a push for more participatory, deliberative arrangements. Some analysts interpret these developments with more caution (such as Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). However, the fact that there are existing diverse understandings within populations (and across nations) of what democracy should look like is undisputed (for example Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014).

1.1.2. How do we Explain These Changes?

The various hypotheses tested over the years by scholars in the political participation field can be divided into three types of explanations — structural, attitudinal and relating to social norms. Firstly, factors such as age, educational attainment, income, have been found to be positively associated with increased political activity, for example (Bartels, 2016; Brady, Schlozman & Verba, 2015; Norris, 2003). In other words, being educated to a higher level, wealthier and middle-aged entails a greater probability of participation. Secondly, political knowledge, political interest and political efficacy, factors linked with each other, have been found to explain political participation levels (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2008; Galston 2001). Lastly, social norms relating to the citizenship concept have been used in a growing number of studies looking into the differences in participation styles of young and older generations (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013; Dalton, 2007; Norris, 2003).

Differing levels of political activity are attributed by some studies to a life-cycle effect, that is the motivating impact of taking on responsibilities of adult life and being politicised by the exposure to topics such as state childcare, healthcare, tax systems, employment law and so on, see (Stoker & Jennings, 1995). What is more, historical events, social, economic and political transitions can have a universal effect on the way populations understand and relate to politics, with a specific period in time leaving a lasting behavioural and attitudinal imprint on all age groups, see (Beck & Jennings, 1979). Finally, in line with political socialisation theory placing an emphasis on experiences in adolescence — the "impressionable years" — there will be specific ways in which some cohorts, considered distinct generations, participate in politics (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). Unravelling these above-mentioned impacts of age, period and cohort is an important pursuit of studies concerned with finding causal relationship between the mentioned above factors and political activities in which people engage (Bartels & Jackman, 2014).

1.1.3. The Importance of Citizenship Norms

Citizenship norms, the focus of the current study, are a key concept used by scholars exploring factors differently impacting whole generations, in particular young people. There is no consensus over the strength and direction of impact of social norms on individuals' behaviour, including for concepts such as citizenship norms. Several studies provide evidence for social norms impacting political behaviour (Blais et al., 2000; Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013; Dalton, 2007), and there are numerous publications presenting opposite findings, or at least signalling mutual influence of norms and behaviours people engage in (Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Quintelier & van Deth, 2014).

What has been evident for both "camps" is that the last two decades has seen the emergence of new styles of citizenship. Ronald Inglehart's scholarship in particular has laid the foundations for this strand of research. Inglehart's work on intergenerational values changes, that accompany modernisation processes, highlighted how overarching values changes can translate into the apparent transformation of the citizenship concept, by introducing self-expressive, emancipative, post-materialistic orientations (Inglehart, 1971, 1997). The evident growing distaste for political parties and formal politics, and concurrent introduction of new methods such as online campaigning, "buycotts" and boycotts of consumer products, have started to be interpreted as a dawn of new citizenship norms, championed by younger, post-materialistic citizens.

The work of two other prominent scholars in the field, Russel Dalton and Pippa Norris, reflect this shift in thinking. Dalton developed the concept of the "duty-based" and "engaged" citizenship styles, the former standing for preference for state-centred, formal, electoral-focused orientations, and the latter for activities such as participation in voluntary initiatives, independent thinking and concern for others (Dalton, 2007). Norris found evidence for the emergence of "critical" citizens, dissatisfied with the main representative democracy institutions and performance of governments, yet actively engaged in other types of behaviours, such as protests or political consumerism (Norris, 2003).

Several publications have since corroborated the above with evidence from various national and cross-national contexts. Hooghe and Oser's (2015) 21-countries study results showed how the engaged citizenship norms became more prevalent over a 10-year period, at the same time as the duty-based norms lose popularity. The above mentioned conceptualisations so far have had limited explanatory power — with majority of studied populations choosing a mixture of the two styles or none at all, for example (Oser, 2017; Hooghe and Oser, 2015). The new, participative type of citizen has been found mainly among the younger cohorts, see (Forbrig, 2005; Checkoway, 2003). However, there is lack of clear evidence to determine whether the new activity preferences, and concurrent distaste for formal politics, results from a life-cycle effect

(Norris, 2003) or, are a distinct feature of a generation of young, who will never be active in the same way as their parents (Delli Carpini, 2000).

1.1.4. Where this Study Fits In

What motivates the current study is the political socialisation element of the described framework. This learning process of political socialisation, to put it succinctly, is "the process by which individuals acquire attitudes, beliefs and values towards the political system and their role as citizens within it" (Greenberg, 1970, p. 65). Learning about the role of a citizen and political behaviour from your closest ones – the impact of family as a socialisation agent, is a particularly interesting topic in countries undergoing system transformation. In those countries, with older cohorts socialised under the previous regime and younger educated in a reformed, democratic system, parental citizenship norms may not only mismatch with the new system, but have also a continuous impact on the younger cohorts. Therefore, one of the major questions asked by post-war social researchers — how do people become democratic citizens? (Almond & Verba, 1963) — is indeed highly pertinent for countries that have undergone a system transformation, for example, Poland.

How do people learn to practice democracy? How can young citizens of a newly transformed, democratic country learn about values and norms, as well as practise political behaviours, despite being socialised in a context of overlapping norms, by people whose lifetime experiences fall under a communist regime? Irrespective of the content of citizenship norms, the success of transmitting them depends on many factors. For school environments, the key tool for it has been "service learning" (Dudley & Gitelson, 2002; Print and Milner, 2009; QCA, 1998); whereas for families,

according to social learning theory, it is the frequent cue giving and consistency of views between parents and across time (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009).

Coming back to the focus of the study, there is absence of evidence for a universal generational shift in citizenship norms in Poland (Coffe & Van der Lippe, 2010), as the young do not display a clear preference for either the duty-based or engaged norms. With Polish citizens not only trailing behind their Western colleagues when it comes to political activity, but also less active when compared to some of their colleagues from other post-communist nations (EIU, 2021), there is an urgent need to establish how young Poles themselves understand their role in democracy. Evidence regarding young Poles' political efficacy, that is the feeling of competence and belief in the system's responsiveness to one's efforts, is commonly used when explaining levels of political participation (Easton & Dennis, 1967). It is however also inconclusive — the young feel more efficacious than the older cohorts, but participate less (Grabowska, 2013).

For a society in transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, it is vital that the learning of new citizenship norms happens smoothly, as Mishler and Rose put it: "Individuals must either learn fresh norms and behaviour appropriate to a democratic system or a new democracy cannot become consolidated (...)" (Mishler & Rose, 2002, p.7). Has it happened in Poland? The unusual case of this Central European country is at odds with what might be predicted from its socioeconomic situation and proximity to Western democracies (Barnes, 2006). Poland does not generally fulfil the empirical and theoretical expectations with regards to its citizen participation levels. It is thus a matter requiring a timely, in depth examination, both to establish what the contents of the citizenship norms of both the young and the parents are, and whether they are passivity or activity-promoting.

The current study's focus therefore is on the socialising impact of the parents on young Poles born after the start of the political system transformation of 1989. Employing the social norms framework, while researching levels of political participation in Poland, can evaluate how fitting are the citizenship norms' conceptualisations for studying citizens who lived under communism. Allowing for selfdefinitions, an in-depth exploration of how the young and their parents see the role of the citizen, and how they define political participation, can enrich current citizenshipnorms theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, this focus can also shed more light on the slow process of generational replacement and the communist legacy, hanging on in the form of norms, attitudes and values (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014).

To conclude, this study follows the approach found in the social norms literature (such as that in Legros & Cislaghi, 2020), applies it to citizenship norms in Poland and identifies (a) the generally practiced behaviour (empirical expectations); (b) the perceptions about what behaviour or attitude is desirable (normative expectations) and (c) if there are any positive or negative consequences of adhering to the norm(s). This approach is complemented with an exploration of Poles' political participation repertoires, in order to understand if the young and their parents act using different methods. The issue of political efficacy, examined through participants' definitions of their role within the democratic system and the system itself, also features in the research. Crucially, this study examines how young Poles and their parents perceive the process of learning norms at home and the impact of parental socialisation on political activity.

This study fills an important gap in the existing research on parental socialisation in Poland, establishing and comparing what norms and behaviours parents and their offspring endorse, using their own words. The research objectives

of the study are fourfold. Firstly, the study sets out to understand the perceptions of citizenship norms among Poles, in particular those concerning normative and empirical expectations, and what the perceived consequences of citizenship norms adherence, or lack of it, are. Secondly, it explores how the citizenship norms are fulfilled through Poles' political practice. Thirdly, the study aims to understand how citizenship norms are passed on from parent to child. Fourthly, it explores young Poles and their parents' perceptions of the feeling of competence and the political system's responsiveness. It is hoped that the findings formulated by fulfilling the study's four research objectives should allow to propose recommendations for policy-makers and for further research, aimed at improving political participation of young Poles.

1.2. The Methodology of Researching Citizenship Norms in Poland

This research used a qualitative approach. The reasons for choosing this approach were twofold — firstly, quantitative studies included in the literature review have not provided conclusive results with respect to the prevalence of the theoreticallydriven typologies of duty-based/engaged citizenship styles in Poland. Secondly, existing evidence shows that young people may appear passive due to a narrow understanding of politics (Quintelier, 2007). Allowing study participants to define citizenship norms and political participation in their own words meant enriching the existing conceptualisations, as well as offering a unique opportunity to compare the pre- and post-transformation cohorts.

Qualitative content analysis was used to examine 32 in-depth interviews. The purposive sample consisted of 19 participants born after 1989 and 13 of their parents. To provide high variability of data active young people were recruited through two non-governmental initiatives, one with a conservative, and the other with a liberal/left-leaning profile. The rest of the young came from a convenience sample supported by

a snowballing technique. The makeup of the young people's sample reflected the wider demographic, with 9 female and 10 male interviewees, with higher degree attainment for around half of the sample and even distribution of residence in smaller, medium and higher populated locations.

Interviews were conducted in two rounds: from September 2019 to February 2020, and from September 2020 to January 2021. Due to safety restrictions, implemented as a result of the COVID-19 epidemic, the second round of interviews was conducted using online conferencing platforms or by telephone.

Potential threats to validity criteria of credibility, criticality and integrity (Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 2001) were minimised by implementing scrupulous data collection and analysis, which included recording interviews, using dedicated software for analysis of transcribed interviews, implementing measures to achieve intra-coder reliability, conducting interviews in a comfortable and informal atmosphere to counteract the risks arising from the public and private opinions phenomenon (Rose, 2007), as well as considering any data ambiguities and diversions from the conceptual framework. The resulting analysis preserved participants' confidentiality by not disclosing any personal or contextual information.

1.3. Findings, Study Limitations and Contribution

The main findings in relation to the first research objective included identifying two unique (absent in standard survey responses) elements of the citizenship norm. Firstly, Poles' conceptualisations centred around the notion of personal character and personal moral norms, and as such understood a good citizen as a good person. Secondly, study participants, when defining a good citizen, emphasised the relationship with the state and the nation, valuing mainly symbolic deeds and emotional states. Whereas the trait-like, good citizen definitions and patriotic elements were found in mostly all of parents responses, the above elements were not as strongly reflected in young Poles' descriptions.

This study also found two approaches in how young participants understood citizenship norms. The first group of responses included, already mentioned, personal character and patriotic elements, as well as state-centred behaviours. The second type of definitions portrayed, already found in literature (Hooghe & Oser, 2015; Oser, 2017), of an all-around citizen, who not only endorses state-centred and patriotic behaviours and attitudes, but also values activity in formal politics, local communities and voluntary organisations.

With regard to how interviewees understood political participation, the main finding was that nearly all of the active young Poles included community and voluntary activity in their definitions, whereas (mostly inactive) parents did not. At the same time, the study found, already known from literature (Quintelier, 2007), narrow, partypolitical definition of politics and political activity among the inactive young Poles.

The above findings can be interpreted, in light of existing research (Budzyńska, 2014; Jasińska-Kania, 2012; Letki, 2006), as evidence of a general weakening of moral foundation of social norms. Furthermore, the current research rationale prevents the decisive interpretation of the patriotic statements, embedded in majority of definitions of active as well as inactive study participants, as clearly conducive or prohibitive of civic activity. The patriotic element of definitions can be nonetheless understood as evident of a continued salience of a national dimension of citizenship (as opposed to say global, post-national identities).

Last of all, the absence of community and voluntary engagement in the inactive young and inactive parents' definitions, and presence of such elements in active Poles' conceptualisations of citizenship, as well as the reported early experience in extracurricular, participatory initiatives for most of the active young, can be interpreted as evident of a socialising effect of the school environment (Beaumont, 2010; Niemi & Junn, 1998). This effect was however not universal and dependent on other factors (Jondy & Koseła, 2005).

In relation to the second research objective, the analysis did not bring up any activities not already known from the literature. Responses consisted of a wide repertoire of electoral, party-political and state-centred methods, as well as communal, voluntary and local initiatives. As expected by the purposive sample rationale, young Poles recruited through the non-governmental initiatives self-identified as politically active. All young participants from the convenience sample identified as inactive. Most of the parents self-identified as inactive, bar one individual. Some participants, parents and young Poles, self-identifying as inactive, engaged in behaviours which may have been deemed as political (protests, voluntary and community initiatives). However, there was no dissonance between norms and behaviours in these cases, since the above mentioned activities were not included in participants' political participation definitions. The finding of some of the young Poles engaging in protests can be attributed, in line with earlier research, for example (DiGrazia, 2014), to the "biographical availability" of participants. Limited and cautious engagement in online activism can be reflective of a wider aversion toward sharing political opinions online to avoid conflict, in line with existing research (Cybulska, 2017).

Analysis in regard to the fourth research objective delivered a finding of congruence between role self-assessment and activity self-identification: active Poles presented themselves using dynamic, affirmative role descriptions (such as "activist", "educator", "trainer", "participant in democracy"), and inactive Poles chose more

passive, negative, lacking in self-belief terms to assess their role in the political system.

Taken together, the above findings present cohesive normative and behavioural profiles. The content of citizenship norms, in particular how interviewees defined political participation (normative expectations) — how wide ranging and behaviour-specific they were, paired with a favourable evaluation of the levels of political activity of their fellow Poles (empirical expectations), all of these aligned with respondents' self-identification as politically active and with an affirmative assessment of their role in the system, forming an activity-encouraging context. Likewise, the abstract, low-intensity, behaviour-deficient or narrow normative content, paired with negative evaluation of activity levels of others — low empirical expectations, aligned with self-identifications as politically inactive and with inefficacious assessments of one's role in the system, all were associated with the formation of a passivity-encouraging context. These findings are in line with earlier research pointing to injunctive (normative expectations) and descriptive norms (empirical expectations) being positively correlated, strengthening the desired behaviours, be it passivity or activity (Rimal & Real, 2005; Thogersen, 2014).

The main findings with regard to the third research objective, were twofold. Firstly, political discussions at home of active young Poles were frequent and considered important by both, the young and the parents, which can be interpreted as confirming earlier evidence on impact of politicised domestic environment (Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Quintelier, 2015). Conversely, the inactive young interviewees were of the opinion that there was a lack of conversations about politics at home as well as some disagreement of views. Secondly, in case of those active young, who perceived the impact of parents to be positive and encouraging activity, political opinions at home were reported as compatible. Both of these assessments were shared by the parents. In some cases of active young Poles, who did not consider their parents' impact to be positive, they also distanced themselves from their parents' point of view on politics. These young interviewees credited external events or an encouraging school environment for their political participation. The inactive young, who perceived the impact of parents to be negative, neutral, and not conducive for activity, also believed that their and their parents political opinions differed.

Even though the focus of the current research was not on parenting styles, research on the latter could bring more insight into the above-mentioned findings. Elements of authoritative parenting style found in the study's active participants' responses, encompassing encouragement of independence and expression of opinions, as well as support for extra-curricular activities, are deemed to have a positive influence on the success of passing on values and political views (Baumrind, 1971).

This study's attempt to explore the wider context of citizenship norms, contrary to most quantitative research examining only injunctive norms (or normative expectations), as well as allowing for self-definitions and activity self-identifications, yielded interesting findings. For both, the pre-1989 and post-1989 cohort as well as for active and inactive participants, the way interviewees described the role of the citizen and their understanding of the prevalent behaviour demonstrated congruence.

1.3.1. Study Limitations

This study has some limitations. Considering that a qualitative approach was employed, and the study had descriptive and exploratory research objectives, the findings presented in Chapter 4 and 5, were not meant to point to any definite causal relationships. Furthermore, even though data saturation was reached during the coding process, that is no new subcodes were emerging, the parental sample was limited in size, due to recruitment effectiveness, and consisted of mostly mothers. This may have caused the analysis to be skewed and to present female-specific perspectives, an issue not anticipated by the study design. Using gatekeepers for contacting active participants may have also introduced biases into the recruitment process.

The study findings presented a clear alignment between normative and empirical expectations, however the research design did not include explorations of other contextual factors. Future research could therefore include breaking down the empirical expectations for various reference groups the individual has been in contact with, in particular the closest such as family, spouses or partners (Ajzen, 1991). Future studies could also examine the impact of expectations on particular participation methods, taking into account the methods' individual characteristics, for instance expected outcomes, private vs. public behaviours, or individual verses collective acts. Future research should employ a multi-method approach, in particular experimental methods, as such designs have proved to provide valuable findings in norms' context analyses and recommendations for norm-based interventions , for example (Shulman et al., 2017).

1.3.2. Contributions

This study's findings contribute new knowledge to the field of political participation research. The finding of trait-like, moral conceptualisations and patriotic elements enrich the existing citizenship norm research, providing a stimulus for quantitative studies to widen their scope when researching norms in Poland.

The identified alignment of normative and empirical expectations, activity selfidentifications and efficacy self-assessments, building a passivity-inducing or activitypromoting context, adds new insight to the social norms field and has consequences for policy-design. Breaking the potential mutual influence of passivity-inducing normative and empirical expectations, in order to improve levels of political participation, requires well-designed interventions.

In addition, the findings generated by exploring parental impact on political activity of young Poles, shed new light on this largely forgotten political socialisation agent. Although the analysis did not identify any solid pattern or one-to-one match in parental and young Poles' norms' comparisons, and no general, direct norm transmission can be established, elements of authoritative parenting style were found in active young and inactive parents' households. This finding confirms that cohorts socialised under the communist regime have the potential to provide an activity-conducive environment for the post-transformation cohorts.

1.4. Thesis Structure

This introductory chapter contained background information for the study of citizenship norms in contemporary Poland, offering an executive summary of the scholarly discussion on the topic of political participation and social norms research. The chapter also described what research objectives guided this study and with what methodology they were addressed. The chapter closed with a presentation of the main findings, plus their limitations and significance for the current body of research and for future studies.

Chapter 2 outlines the literature and earlier evidence, building a theoretical framework for the study. It sets out the main definitions and concepts within political

participation, political socialisation and social norms research. The chapter offers an in-depth review of three types of explanations present in political participation literature, focusing on citizenship norms in particular. Lastly, through identifying a gap in the literature, the chapter presents the case for studying citizenship norms of pretransformation and post-transformation cohorts in Poland. The research objectives and research questions are presented at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology. It details the research approach, where the reasons for employing qualitative approach are explained. The chapter then presents the methods with which data was collected, describing the rationale for a purposive sample and the process of the participants' recruitment. Details on the qualitative content analysis employed for data analysis are followed by reflections on how validity considerations were embedded in the study's methodology. The chapter closes with information on confidentiality, safety and ethical considerations and the measure that this study undertook.

Chapter 4 presents the effects of the analysis of data collected through in-depth interviews, and lays out the findings identified for each of the four research objectives and corresponding eight research questions. The chapter is structured into four sections and each of them finishes with a short summary.

Chapter 5 gathers all the findings together and presents them in light of existing evidence, discussing possible interpretations.

Chapter 6 then closes the thesis with reflections on this study's limitations, its original contributions and future research suggestions. It also presents, fulfilling the fifth research objective, several recommendations for improving the levels of political participation of young Poles.

2. Review of the Literature

This chapter will lay out the literature pertaining to the theoretical framework of the study that aims to explore whether young and older Poles differ, from a normative and behavioural perspective, in the way they approach political participation. The review will present the main definitions and questions that are at the base of this research.

After setting the scene for political participation research with the types of explanations of this human activity, the chapter will further explore the political culture theory explanation with particular focus on social norms and political socialisation literature. The case for a study on Polish citizens will be then presented, offering some contextual information, and what is known so far about their political participation.

2.1. Political Participation and Non-Participation

In the process of political socialisation people develop knowledge and skills needed to be active in the public sphere. Researching why people are active, along with the reasons for their lack of political participation, have been the focus of a great number of studies for several decades. The literature reviewed for this study reveals that the research on people's political activity has for some time concentrated on the issue of political alienation and anti-party sentiment.

These issues have so far been foregrounded theoretically, but the literature provides mixed empirical explanations at best. The causes examined tend to belong to either the supply side, that is how complex and technical contemporary politics is, among many other things: the questionable moral and intellectual quality of members of the political class; political parties accused of being ill-suited to develop meaningful policies; or the electoral process perceived as inconsequential. On the other hand, on the demand side, we find reference to citizens' lack of interest in politics, or their lack of knowledge (both factors being linked with structural factors of age, ethnicity and sex).

That said, what is known for certain is that participation of citizens in politics, measured mostly using the traditional representative democracy channels, started dwindling in the second part of the 20th century. What followed this downturn was a raft of publications announcing a crisis of democracy, its decline and inevitable end. Eventually, researchers started to reflect on the measures and definitions of political participation, and begun to identify a change, an apparent preference for self-expressive, ad hoc, and issue-oriented activity, in particular among young people.

Alongside this trend, there has also been a growing enthusiasm and belief in the democratising power of the internet, and its ability to foster communication among people, between politicians and the wider public. However, strong evidence in support of such an effect is yet to be established (Chen and Stilinovic, 2020). Some recent evidence shows that even though social media are used for things such as planning political events, people remain reluctant to get involved in online political debates (Ekstrom & Shehata, 2016; Mathe, 2018).

There has also been an increased scholarly interest in political marketing, focusing not only on the efficacy of the technique, but also looking with criticism at potential effects of methods like negative campaigning, or attack advertising, on young voter turnout. The varying impact of political marketing on the electorate has been reported across countries. Some researchers believe that this technique has adverse effects on voter confidence and perceptions (Dermody and Scullion, 2001; Dermody et al. 2014). That said, some scholars have praised the impact of the adaptation of

commercial marketing methods to electoral campaigning — political advertising is seen as crucial at engaging the electorate in the times of social media (Enos and Fowler, 2016). There is no clear evidence, however, of any causal effects of this technique on electoral turnout — as Spenkuch and Toniatti suggest: "in the aggregate, the mobilising and demobilising effects tend to cancel out" (Spenkuch and Toniatti, 2018, p. 2031). Since the discipline is still in its formalisation stage, lacking mid-range theories (Perannagari and Chakrabarti, 2019, p. 10), and concentrating on one aspect of citizen activity, electoral behaviour, the literature review below will engage with three comprehensive types of explanations of political participation.

It can be said that there have always been individuals who did not venture out too much into the public domain and instead busied themselves with the contents of their private lives. The fact that the size of that non-participating group started to increase, according to statistics on voting, trade union and political party membership, was worrying for some to differing degrees. Dependent on the preferred definition of democracy, researchers can either see political participation as a prerequisite of a true and healthy political system, a necessary evil, or something in between.

According to Amna and Ekman's (2014) recap of the three commonly accepted models of democracy, those who support the Weber/Schumpeter-based minimalist model gladly welcome non-participation. In their eyes, political activity should be reserved for the selected, competent few. In contrast to this minimal model sits the participative approach to democracy, where passivity is far from welcomed and citizens should be active in politics on a daily basis concurrently to their private lives. Positioned somewhere in the middle is the representative model of democracy, in which citizens act rationally and according to their feeling of civic duty, embedding political participation into their social lives. Irrespective of the impact of political activity on democracy, the literature refers either to participation — who and why participates — or non-participation, focusing on finding explanations for such behaviour. Voting is generally considered as a separate activity, as it seems to be distinct, "an independent democratic 'good' and not part of a larger framework of citizenship duties" (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 59). The group of participating, active, interested and efficacious citizens is quite small. For this reason, conducting studies exploring any causal patterns relating to participation, is very difficult. Conversely, studying the lack of activity creates problems of its own relating to operationalisation and methods, and similarly to participants, as the "pure" non-participants can also constitute a small group within a population (Hensby, 2019, p. 2).

2.2. Explaining Political Participation and Non-Participation

Studies concerning political participation tend to test hypothesis and provide explanations relating to structural and attitudinal factors. There is also a growing body of evidence which incorporates a social norms perspective, inherently linked with the process of political socialisation. Three types of empirical explanations will be presented below, in the case of the first two to provide context, with the majority of focus given to the concept of social norms.

2.2.1. Structural Factors

Researchers focusing on the diminishing levels of conventional political participation such as electoral activity, political party or union membership, or activity within traditional civic or voluntary groups, tend to look for explanations in structural and mediating variables. These examinations, based on public opinion surveys, usually conclude that people with certain characteristics are demonstrably more likely

to participate in a traditional manner or have "improved citizenship" (Milligan, Moretti & Oreopoulos 2004), when compared to those without those qualities (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Park, 1998; Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley 2004; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). Those certain characteristics are: greater educational attainment, higher knowledge of the democratic processes and institutions, and higher socio-economical class (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 2015; Stoker, 2006; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995).

It needs remembering that even though some analysts perceive the issue of political activity as a "voluntary matter", as Moyser (2003, p. 174) explains: "fundamentally, the choice of the level of personal participation, the methods used and the agenda of concerns are matters that typically rest with the individual citizen"; others present the issue as part and parcel of contemporary economic inequality discourse, highlighting the structural factors conditioning individuals' skills, knowledge and behaviour. These researchers claim that traditional, as well as non-standard political activities of citizens, differ across various groups within the population.

According to these inequality explanations, political participation tends to flourish, for example, among the wealthy (Bartels, 2016; Gilens, 2012). What is more, differences in activity levels translate into differing levels of influence over government policies and decisions. Political inequality therefore can mean not only less airtime for some groups, but, due to the nature of the decisions made, may also reinforce the other, foundational form of inequality in wealth, income and consumption (Bartels, 2016; Dubrow, 2014). Further, the likelihood of being active politically can also be explained by age — being young and older means that it is less likely such person will partake in such political activities as voting, or political party membership. The political, or participation, inequality argument develops further when we look into differences in

how often certain age groups choose various methods to influence government policies and decisions.

Cross-national research into political participation channels reveals that there is a clear withdrawal among the younger cohorts from conventional political participation (such as voting and party membership). Even though there are no major differences in levels of unconventional participation across age groups, some studies do present evidence of an increased popularity of non-standard, or cause-oriented participation among the young (Hooghe and Oser, 2015; Norris, 2003; Quintelier, 2007). While it may not simply mean that younger citizens, by rejecting the preferencetransferring channels of representative democracy, cut themselves off from having any impact on governments' decisions, their growing interest in more direct, unconventional, policy-influencing initiatives does not automatically compensate for the aforementioned absence in conventional politics either. Efficacy and real impact of citizens' preferences and opinions, in whatever form they are externalised, be it voting, demonstrating or petitioning, is vague. The symbolic value of such activity is undisputed and represents the foundation of democracy, but the classic, empirical answer to the question on how elected representatives make their decisions is that public opinion rarely directly translates into public policy (Miller & Stokes, 1963).

To expand upon this point, in Miller and Stokes (1963) seminal work, the roll call behaviour of members of American Congress' was scrutinised through comparison of members' attitudes, members' perceptions of their constituents' attitudes, and the constituents' actual views. Fifty years later Broockman and Skovron confirmed that constituents' views are seen in a biased way (Broockman & Skovron, 2013, p. 32), if ever they are reflected upon. More importantly they were found to be

competing for politicians' attention with national party platforms or narrow interest groups (Broockman & Skovron, 2013, p. 34).

2.2.2. Attitudinal factors

Certain attitudes concerning politics are considered to be linked with structural factors, or even seen as having direct influence on participation (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013). A review of studies on political participation reveals that much emphasis has been given to political interest and knowledge, both of which can be observed as not only impacting each other (interest fuels the drive to learn more) but also individually influencing citizens' participation. Political efficacy, another concept commonly examined in this context, marries political knowledge, motivation and an individual's confidence in their own abilities to be politically active.

Self-reported levels of political interest (but also characteristics such as educational attainment, race, and sex) are all strongly correlated with all aspects of political knowledge — the latter, consequently, bolstering political participation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Galston 2001). Passing on political interest is more complicated — American studies reveal that when it comes to transmission of this characteristic (and political trust) through political socialisation at home, the success rate for it is much smaller than other characteristics, such as party identification or religiosity (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009).

Political Knowledge and "Civics". Political knowledge is important for participation. Delli, Carpini & Keeter (1996) in their seminal work on the American public's levels of political knowledge conclude that more knowledgeable citizens are more likely to vote and participate in politics in other ways. They however leave almost unanswered the question of how citizens gain their political knowledge. The formal

education environment provides programmes of citizenship education ("civics"), but the exact efficiency of such programmes is not very well known; though research by Niemi and Junn (1998) indicates that American "civics" make a small difference. However, Dudley and Gittelson note that no judgement has been reached on how education impacts political knowledge, apart from an agreement on a correlation (Dudley and Gitelson, 2002; Galston, 2001). What is certainly confirmed is that those with higher educational attainment are more likely to vote (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) and participate in other forms of political activity (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). Increasingly popular pupil engagement programmes in local community and voluntary organisations do produce results (Astin et al., 2000), but as educational activities account for only one of the socialisation agents, there is more research needed into the other influences, such as family, peers, and the media.

What is more certain is that knowledge about the governing system, political issues and actors, and a reflection on how this knowledge may be put into practice, is most comprehensively and consistently transferred within the formal education setting. The efficacy of this process of political learning is particularly important for states in transition to democracy from an authoritarian system (Mishler and Rose, 2002; Heyne, 2008). In the literature, the topic of acquiring political knowledge, but also skills and dispositions is based on the assumption that "good citizens are made not born" (Galston, 2001, p. 217).

With the above in mind, civic education aims to fulfil the fundamental requirement for a well-functioning democracy to educate citizens into becoming its active, informed and responsible members of society. Citizen education is conceptually founded on the theory of democracy and citizenship in contemporary states, therefore, it is loaded with normative assumptions and, as such, requires clarity

from policy-makers as to what values and practices ought to be promoted through it. This type of education, within a formal educational system setting, is only one of the spheres where political socialisation takes place, but a crucial one, as it is there that a government's vision of what a "good" citizen should be like, can be consistently implemented. Citizen education can therefore not only be scrutinised in terms of whether its objectives have been successfully delivered, such as whether the skills, knowledge and values made their way into young people's everyday practices, their "hearts and minds", but also in terms of exactly what constitutes this particular vision of democracy, and the citizen's place in it, that the government is attempting to impart.

Political Efficacy. Another concept highly relevant to the explanation of political participation is that of political efficacy, which encompasses the feeling of personal political competence and the view of the political system's responsiveness. Political knowledge is not all that is needed to participate meaningfully, there are skills and dispositions to be acquired as well. This acquisition (or transfer) process starts early on, as according to the influential study by Easton and Dennis (1967, p.31), children by the third grade have already developed an initial political efficacy disposition.

Political efficacy is studied among other civic dispositions, especially those character traits that stimulate the abilities to "execute the rights and responsibilities of citizenship" (Vontz, Metcalf & Patrick, 2000, p. 11). Political sophistication, or personal efficacy, can act as a mediating variable, explaining electoral participation (and non-participation) of highly cynical young people (Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2008). Political efficacy is also linked to political knowledge and interest (Westholm and Niemi, 1986, as cited in Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2008). Dermody's and Hanmer-Lloyd's study results confirmed that young people with high self-reported levels of

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political sophistication are also voting, and those scoring low on personal efficacy do not take part in elections (Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2008, p.14), even though both groups are as cynical.

Social norms. Conventional interpretations for lower levels of participation, pointing to structural factors such as age, income and educational attainment (items which also happen to be interlinked) can be treated as life-cycle explanations. A separate line of inquiry interprets the changes in political activity of populations in light of political culture theory, pointing to factors differently impacting whole generations, in particular young people (Blais et al. 2004; Henn, Weinstein & Wring, 2002).

Therefore, additionally to exploring the impact of socio-economic status and attitudinal aspects, this chapter will now review the literature and investigate how social norms, being learned and maintained in the process of political socialisation, influence political participation. Particular attention will be paid to the citizenship norm, and within it, to the concept of a "good citizen".

2.2.3. The Concept of Political Socialisation

Many fields of study, including sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science or philosophy, have been trying to explain how people become functioning members of society, what are people's visions of society and their own role in it. The concept of socialisation has been useful in these explorations. The term, which started to be widely used only around the mid-20th century, developed alongside sociology, another relatively newish discipline.

For the purposes of this study, socialisation is understood as a multifaceted learning process, through which an individual becomes social, that is, learns social norms, develops attitudes, behaviours and knowledge about social roles pertinent to his or her smooth functioning within society. Political socialisation as a distinct concept has grown to reflect the increasing importance of politics, considered a particular area of human social activity, and this growth has been possible due to the development of modern era public opinion polling. Ever since the American newspapers joined efforts in tallying straw polls of their readers' presidential election choices and the founding of Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion in 1935, social scientists have been able to examine patterns of individuals' political behaviour, as well as start to methodically explore how such behaviours develop.

The research on political socialisation, a concept defined in one of the field's founding works as "learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal position as mediated through various agencies of society" (Hyman, 1959, p 25), for some time concerned itself with early life experiences (Easton & Dennis, 1969) as well as the stability of attitudes and behaviours acquired (Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings and Niemi, 197).

Early research focused on primary socialisation agents and put forward claims that political views take on concrete shapes by the adolescence period, and hardly change after that (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Greenstein, 1965) — the so called persistence model (Fillieule, 2013). After an initial surge of academic interest in the topic in the early 1960's, political socialisation research had begun to lose its appeal two decades later, around the time when the field's core concept of party identification was losing its explanatory value as a result of voters increasingly volatile choices. The focus shifted from early life experiences to the very broadly defined impressionable years, the concept of lifelong learning, the life-cycle effect on political behaviour (Strate et al., 1989) as well as the cohort or generation effect (Conover, 1991).

The life-long openness model provided a critique founded on longitudinal studies and proposed that, at different stages of life, people, through taking on different roles and interacting with secondary socialisation agents, are open to change in their political inclinations (Blais et al., 2008; Shapiro, 1994, 2004). Proponents of a life-cycle model claimed that it is in the nature of the youth to have views of a radical hue, which mellow as people age and turn more conservative (Abramson 1979; Glenn, 1980; Nie, Verba & Kim 1974).

The impressionable years model emphasised the impact that important political, historical events have on individuals, who are in their formative, "impressionable" years (commonly understood as the period between teenage to the end of further education, or before the first professional experiences start) (Becker, 1990; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Mannheim, 1952).

After several decades of research the general consensus appears to be that political socialisation is a lifelong process, starting at an early age, and it is during the "impressionable years" that foundations of political identities are formed (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998; Neundorf, Smets & García-Albacete, 2014). However, as the socialisation process is of a dynamic nature, researchers' explanations regarding the further development of political identity vary. It is claimed that the impact of age on political behaviour transpires in the lower participation of younger and older age groups, due to people prioritising different aspects of their life. The generation or cohort effect is observed when members of specific cohorts display similar attitudes or behaviours which differ between cohorts. Lastly, a specific period or time, and any major historic events occurred within it, can have a lasting effect on all citizens' political identity. The conclusions are yet to emerge from studies using the

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APC (Age-Period-Cohort) approach, in which combined impacts of age, period and cohort differences are studied (Bartels & Jackman, 2014).

2.2.4. Defining the Concept of Social Norm

Social norm is an essential element of the conceptual framework employed by social scientists. The concept's use across many disciplines means that social norm has many definitions. At its core though, social norms are informal rules existing among members of a group or a society, passed on in the process of socialisation.

The underlying assumption is that norms inform behaviour, influence it in some way. Norms can do that, first of all, through presenting information such as advice regarding the effectiveness of a certain course of action (descriptive norms). Norms can also formulate a direct instruction to be followed with its resulting action being subject to social approval or disapproval (injunctive norms), see (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020). Another way of looking at how norms are taken into consideration is the one proposed by Bicchieri (2006, p. 11): descriptive norms are those rules which are conditional on empirical expectations, that is when a person assumes that people behave in a certain way; injunctive norms on the other hand are based on normative expectations, that is, when a person chooses to behave a certain way they assume people around them believe this is the way they ought to behave. When a social norm becomes a strong internal motivation, valued irrespectively of others' behaviour or approval, it is considered a moral or a personal norm, no longer a social norm (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 70).

2.2.5. Defining Citizenship Norms

Understanding citizenship, as with any other social norm, differs across nations and people, as well as over time. Over the years, citizenship, alongside its function as a legal status, became a social and cultural phenomenon, taking the central place in the administrative systems and political cultures of modern national states (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship has developed as a concept, starting from the 18th century as "civil citizenship", concerning the legal status of an individual. It developed further through the 19th century addition of a political element ("political citizenship"), guaranteeing voting rights and participation in the political life of the country, to the emerging "social citizenship" in the 20th century, with welfare and economic aspects added to the catalogue of citizen rights (Marshall, 1950).

Citizenship, as any other social and cultural phenomenon, has been undergoing transformation as a consequence of globalisation (Kamens, 2012). It has been in particular influenced by the changing makeup of the labour force due to migration, the growing strength of international corporations and the dissemination of knowledge, the latter having an impact on the educational system, and, within it, on the citizen education content, see for example (Bryan & Vavrus, 2005).

In the literature there are two main conceptions of citizenship located within broader political perspectives of liberalism and republicanism. These two political philosophies place accents differently, however, as Honohan (2017) observes. liberalism, being the dominant approach in the contemporary world, has managed to absorb some aspects of other intellectual doctrines (Honohan, 2017 p. 84) and so some definitional differences are very fluid. The general consensus, when it comes to aspects of citizenship, is that liberal conceptions emphasise legal rights, the obligations of citizen being fairly limited in scope, and the republican approach focuses on participation and citizen activity: Contemporary republicans call for a more active citizenry and more extensive popular involvement in political activity than the liberal consensus on limited government, electoral representation of interests, and consent of the governed. (Honohan, 2017, p. 93)

Therefore, exploring the importance assigned to political participation within the citizenship norm in this current study on "how people understand themselves as citizens" (Jones and Gaventa, 2002, p. 28), is perfectly valid.

A commonly quoted citizenship norm definition describes it as "a shared set of expectations about the citizen's role in politics" (Dalton, 2008, p. 78). The role can concern the relationship between the citizen and the state, as well as between citizens (Almond and Verba, 1963). Emerging from a theoretical consensus in the literature is the idea that the citizenship norm generally refers to motifs of political activity, civic duty and social responsibility:

...a political dimension combines beliefs in the importance of voting, being active in social and political associations and keeping a watch on government; a civil dimension includes the importance of paying taxes and obeying the law; and a social dimension has included the importance of understanding the opinions of others, shopping for political reasons and helping those worse off. (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 47)

The list of activities or behaviours mentioned by Bolzendahl and Coffe is not full, nor universal and applicable to all, mainly because what constitutes politics and political activity changes. What is political, what requires collective decisions, which matters acquire the "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1953, p. 129), and which do not, is a fluid narrative with issues coming onto and disappearing from the political agenda. What is more, the range of forms and methods of political participation changes, as citizens are free to choose any activity they view fitting to use in order to influence political decisions.

As mentioned above, the citizenship norm normally contains references to behaviours and attitudes, the ways people should or do behave when faced with "political" matters. To be able to make conclusion regarding any correlations between the citizenship norm and political participation, researchers draw data from surveys with pre-defined and limited in scope answers. It must be emphasized that such methodology may have a distorting effect on the phenomenon under examination, by not allowing research participants to formulate their own definitions of concepts undergoing dynamic changes.

To conclude, a citizenship norm, adopted for use in this study, is understood as an informal rule containing information on how people understand the concept of the "good citizen", as well as what constitutes political activity for them.

2.2.6. The Relationship Between Norms and Political Participation

Central to studying social norms is the question of how norms come into being, how they change or, consequently, how they disappear. From the work of Legros and Cislaghi (2020), who performed a review of multidisciplinary reviews of studies on social norms, it is known how scholars in the field view the general process of norm change:

...a process of mutual influence between the two levels: the more regular a behaviour becomes in a population, the more individuals will believe there is a norm, and the more individuals believe that a norm exists, the more they will

comply with it. As a result, the behaviour becomes more common in the population. (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 72)

The norm is intrinsically linked with the behaviour. The norm continues to exist, reliant on the perception that the course of action it promotes is present in the group it applies to. What is more, the norm also exist if there is still an expectation of a given normative instruction to be fulfilled. Social norms are passed on through primary and secondary socialisation and so can potentially last for many generations.

Linked with the existence of social norms is the group to which particular norm applies, the so called "reference" group. Members of that group are the source of empirical or normative expectations and its members can be the target, the enforcers, as well as the beneficiaries (or victims) of the norm — that is, those who observe the norm, those who promote its use and those who are impacted by the norm (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 75). Identifying the reference group is important when studying social norms. However, it becomes problematic when people identify with several reference groups, whose members could possibly hold dissimilar normative beliefs.

In addition to describing the reference group, studying social norms also encompasses identifying (a) what the generally practiced behaviour is (empirical expectation), (b) the perceptions about what behaviours or attitudes are desirable (normative expectation) and (c) whether there are any positive or negative consequences of adhering to the norm (Mackie et al., 2015; Pulerwitz et al., 2019).

Citizenship norms (either as comprehensive concepts or, as presented earlier in the chapter, as separate attitudinal elements, such as political interest, knowledge, trust or political efficacy), have been found to influence political participation (Blais et al., 2000; Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013; Dalton, 2007; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2020; Hooghe & Oser, 2015; Lane, 2020; Oser, 2017; Zorell & van Deth, 2020).

Researchers have provided evidence not only that citizenship norms are predictors of political behaviour, but have also been able to examine which types of norms impact on what types of behaviours and how they vary across, for example, demographic groups or whole nations. With regard to the basis of the expectation, the impact of norms also differs; for example Fieldhouse and Cutts (2020, p. 11) found evidence for an "interactive effect of injunctive and descriptive norms" on voting turnout.

Alongside the efforts of finding evidence that norms determine behaviour, several attempts have provided some indication of the opposite (Gastil and Xenos, 2010; Quintelier and van Deth, 2014; Zorell and van Deth, 2020). The latter research used cross-sectional data or panel sets limited to a single nation, therefore conclusive information is yet to be identified. However, there is some evidence of a mutual influence, specifically political norms and attitudes have an effect on behaviour, and behaviours in turn have an influence on norms. The size or strength of the effect, which one is stronger, is also to be conclusively established. Results from a Belgian panel study show that political participation have slightly stronger impact on some norm components, such as political trust and interest (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012), than the other way round. Additionally, contrary to concerns over the ability of individualistic political acts to be conducive to developing political attitudes, both methods of political participation, collective and individual, seem have a socialisation effect (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012).

Over the last two decades, researchers have used the argument of emerging new citizenship norms to explain the trend of decreasing "traditional" participation, such as levels of voting turnout, trade union and political party membership, and the increasing presence of "new" types of political behaviour, such as online activism, protest and political consumerism. The two main assumptions of such an argument are, firstly, that norms informing certain spheres can change, and secondly, that citizenship norms influence political participation.

A review of social norms literature shows that theories regarding changes in norms contain several explanations relevant to the alteration of citizenship norms. Firstly, norms can be modified with incoming, correct information regarding people's behaviour (empirical expectations). Additionally, normative expectations — learning that others do not actually follow the norm or approve of different behaviours — can potentially adjust the norm in a process called "correction of misperceptions", (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 73). Secondly, structural changes, for example economic or technological, can have an influence by "affecting the nature" of norms (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 73). Lastly, reviewers pointed to power relations, proposing that norms either change in a top-down, intentional process or bottom-up, organically through time. Additionally, at the individual level, reviews indicate that there are "norm leaders", who initiate the norm change and are in some ways influential in their reference group.

All of these explanations are not necessarily exclusive and it is possible that they all happen at the same time. For example, it could be imagined that with rising economic and political interdependencies, politics becomes more complex and exclusionary, so several local leaders set up youth councils, which they see as a useful tool for involving portions of the "need-to-reach" population, as a result of which youth councils become popular among politicians and young people, and finally there is an amendment of the law requiring all local governments to set up youth councils.

2.2.7. New Citizenship Norms and new Forms of Participation

Reviewing the literature identified a number of publications devoted to the notion of cultural change and its consequences for political participation. Work on how values change by Ronald Inglehart (1997) in particular has had an enormous influence on research regarding people's disaffection with representative democracy channels. Inglehart's concept of intergenerational values change — the product of advanced industrialism — has become very helpful in interpreting the processes Western societies had been going through, such as the growing dissatisfaction with formal politics and increased interest in new social movement issues (environmental, women's and ethnic minorities rights, among others). Because new issues find it difficult to enter the political agenda, the methods employed to position them on it have to be more direct and "citizen-led" (Hay and Stoker, 2009) - hence an increased preference for self-expressive methods of participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). The trend of rising expectations and increased criticism of party politics has been spreading among, in particular, the young and the postmaterialistic (Dalton, 2004). Younger, post-materialist citizens, while distancing themselves from bureaucratic, hierarchical, elite-directed organisations, have at the same time become more involved in unconventional, elite-challenging forms of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Inglehart, 1997).

Within this field, Dalton was one of the first scholars to interpret the decreasing trust in politicians and political institutions, declining political party attachment, dissatisfaction with the democratic regime's performance — but at the same time

consistent support for democratic values and political community — as a series of signs of a changing political participation pattern: not as a crisis of democracy, but an opportunity for improving the way it functions (Dalton, 1999). Rebutting the claim that American democracy is in peril, he made a case for a different narrative, investigating a change in citizenship norms and the resulting new participation styles of citizens (Dalton, 2007). The author embraced the modernisation hypothesis of Ronald Inglehart and pointed to the self-expressive values as being responsible for a generational difference in political taste.

To this end, Dalton turned the question of the decline of the democratic, good citizen on its head and instead pondered, what it means to be a good citizen for contemporary Americans. He presented two, seemingly distinct, concepts: first, that of the "duty-based" citizenship, with its high acceptance of state authority and lawabiding, tax-paying, voting citizens; and the other of an "engaged" citizenship, emphasising citizens' interest in politics, activity in voluntary groups and a general concern for others. The author of "The Good Citizen" argued that there may be an erosion of the duty-based norms, but engaged citizenship is thriving, in particular among the young. Dalton claimed that the nature of norms changed substantially in the latter half of the 20th century, and following in Almond's and Verba's (1963) footsteps, the scholar portrayed a link between social norms and patterns of citizens' behaviour. However, instead of identifying the cultural preconditions of democracy, Dalton (2000) emphasised that the increasing individualisation of politics, citizens' participation taking on unconventional forms and the development of an eclectic and egocentric citizenship model, are all putting pressure on representative democratic institutions, a pressure that simply requires an upgrade on democracy's interface.

Other researchers also found empirical evidence for a generational change, with cause-oriented engagement favoured by younger people. For example, work by Pippa Norris (2003) drew on the 15-nation 2002 European Social Survey's results to present a compelling argument for a generational shift in the political activities of citizens. In order to identify the nature of the change, Norris (2003, p. 22) distinguished between the repertoires of political participation relating to traditional voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, churches) and new social movements and advocacy networks. Norris observed therein that the established distinction between "conventional" and "protest" repertoires is no longer valid, as the acts themselves have changed their meaning. She therefore proposed a distinction between citizen-oriented and cause-oriented repertoires, the former being in relation to political parties and elections, and the latter regarding an issue, a single cause, with a repertoire usually performed outside representative democracy channels. The author supported the line of argument from Inglehart's work on post-materialistic values and attributed the emergence of cause-oriented, life-style politics to this cultural change. Norris also suggested that young voters are "on the run" and have changed avenues for political expression. To be more specific, Norris (2003) argues that youth's decreasing participation in standard representative democracy's political practices ("politics of loyalties") is being compensated by an increased usage of a new repertoire of activities, such as cause-oriented consumer boycotts (as well as "buycotts"), petitions or demonstrations ("politics of choice"). Another influential scholar in this field, Henrik Bang (2005), also locates such practices outside the state — such mobilised participation happens in relation to a single cause or an issue, where citizens, "everyday makers", mix life and politics.

Dalton and Norris laid the foundations for a new way of thinking about political participation and several studies since then provided a more detailed description of the prevalence of such new "engaged", "expressive" and "critical" behaviours, and the corresponding norms. What is important is that the above mentioned scholars did not claim that the new, non-institutionalised acts will completely take the place of traditional participation. On the contrary, empirical evidence points in the direction of expansion rather than replacement.

Jennifer Oser (2017) enriched the topic by investigating how different political acts are distributed among the American population. The author found several types of participators, with distinct repertoires of behaviours and norms. Most importantly, the analysis did not identify Dalton's duty-based citizen, what is more, the identified engaged type had also a penchant for voting. In addition, Oser discovered a big group of disengaged citizens among the population, as well as a small group of "all-around" activists. The last group, even though they scored high on engaged citizenship and low on duty-based norms, engaged in various political acts, including institutionalised and state-oriented ones. Dalton's presumption of possible replacement of duty-based citizens with the engaged type was not confirmed — instead, it appears that the already active are diversifying their participation methods.

Oser's finding above regarding the large group of "disengaged" citizens supports a similar conclusion coming from Amna and Ekman's research into Swedish adolescents (Amna & Ekman, 2014). In their study, in addition to a large "unengaged" and "disillusioned" group, an analysis of participation and various attitudinal factors like political interest, efficacy, knowledge and trust, resulted in identifying an even bigger group of "standbys". "Standby" citizens were as interested in politics as the

small group of "active" young Swedes, they however had lower or average participation (Amna & Ekman, 2014, p. 274).

Moving further in the exploration of the new norms, Marc Hooghe and Jennifer Oser (2015) provide empirical evidence not only for the existence of the engaged type of citizen but also show the change in prevalence over time, using data for 21 countries that were surveyed in 1999 and 2009. According to the authors, engaged norms are becoming more widespread around the globe and the duty-based norms are in retreat. At the same time, their analysis shows the theoretical framework does not apply to a large portion of the studied populations of adolescents, whose normative choices are generally all-embracing, with no definite preferences for either the engaged or dutybased side.

The question is how do these different types of norms influence political participation? Evidence shows that citizenship norms vary with regards to their impact on participation, that is some norms are stronger than others, and, furthermore, some are negatively related with behaviours (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013). Catherine Bolzendahl and Hilde Coffe unpacked the components of norms and tested separately their impact on various political behaviours in 25 countries. Contrary to common understanding, some duty-based norms components, such as obeying the law or paying taxes, were negatively related to overall participation. Some norm components, like voting, joining associations and keeping watch on government, were positive only for party political activity, whereas obligation to vote was linked positively with all methods of participation. The impact of engaged norm components was mixed; it was positive for "activism" such as political consumerism, demonstrations, petitioning or online activity, but negative for party political activity.

The above studies tested citizenship norms' and behaviours' new conceptualisations that arose as a result of late 1990s revival of de Tocqueville's ideas on the socialisation impact of voluntary, associational work. These ideas resulted in researchers broadening the studied political participation repertoires and adding in social, civil engagement activities (Quintelier & van Deth, 2014). Consequently, young people, so far labelled passive and cynical, started to be perceived as more interested in the civic engagement side of participation, such as volunteering for a cause — local and global alike (Dalton, 2007; Keeter et al. 2002; Norris, 2002; Putnam, 2000).

That said, the distinction between these two spheres — political participation and civic engagement — can be seen as artificial and confusing. Research conventionally distinguishes between political participation (which falls into the sphere of interest of voting behaviour, political parties or union movements, among others) and civic engagement, which the civil society studies tend to examine more closely. However, while quantitative, mainstream research in particular, may enforce a particular definition of politics and the types of political activity, it may also significantly misrepresent people's political participation and non-participation (O'Toole et al., 2003; Henn, Weinstein & Wring, 2002).

This potential for misrepresentation is vitally important for researchers in countries where, following a political system transformation, activity in the public sphere is being constantly redefined and re-learnt by citizens. Some writers argue that the top-down approach to researching "the political" may have inadvertently created a false dichotomy: by failing to include respondents' own definitions of political activity, researchers falsely dismiss them as either "apathetic" or "passive". However those same respondents may in fact be involved in practices that do not fall within the scope of survey research, but are, in the eyes of the participant, inherently political, such as

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rock-climbing in France (De Leseleuc, Gleyse & Marcellini, 2002), or, historically, pinning a radio resistor to one's jacket's lapel, which was a sign of "resisting the state" in communist Poland (Ferfecki, 2011).

As O'Toole et al. (2003, p. 54) rightly pointed out, there can be activities interpreted (by researchers) as non-political, but intended as such by those performing them. In later research, O'Toole (2004, p. 15) concluded that in young people's view politics is "something done unto them" thus signalling their lack of political efficacy, sense of distance from, and uneasiness with, traditionally defined politics. O'Toole et al. (2003, p. 47) also contributed a common distinction between political participation and civic, local community engagement in the "participation" literature to the social capital concept popularised by Robert Putnam (1995, 2000) as well as in Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1993). Civic engagement in this context means the inclusion of activities not directed at formal institutions, political actors or in a form of traditional, electoral, party-political behaviour but those focused on volunteering and community collaboration on issues at the local level. This distinction is in line with common criticisms directed at Putnam, namely that his conceptualisations lack a political dimension, see (Foley and Edwards 1996; Mouritsen 2003).

Such distinctions may be a myopic analytical strategy resulting in the omission of practices, which are not traditionally classified as "political participation", but that could be regarded as such by those involved, or would have been, after a closer inspection by the researcher. For example, a report on the quality and scale of engagement in American public life established that 1 in 5 young people, who are more active than others in the civic engagement domain, in particular in volunteering, see their activity as addressing a social or political issue (Keeter et al 2000). By removing the "political" from some types of practices by default, researchers risk providing the decision-makers, or the general public, with a misjudged picture of the phenomena studied. Presenting the "political" as an exclusive, "serious" and inaccessible activity may discourage the development of political efficiency among citizens, and provide false base-line data for any governmental citizen education initiatives.

To summarise, the studies presented above reveal limitations of the citizenship norm theoretical framework, as not only do citizens prefer a mix of norms, the "clean" types being in minority, but also the predictive strength of some norms' components is limited or negatively linked with political behaviours. The labelling as either "political" or "civil", or as active or non-active, can also be misleading. Some limited evidence depicts "in-between" citizens, those interested in political issues but not yet willing to act on their views or preferences. What is more, the repertoires of political activity change, as certain behaviours gain meaning and value as political acts.

2.2.8. Citizenship of Young People

A large portion of the studies concerning political participation is based on data collected from adolescents. Understandably, limited election turnout has been visible most clearly for the younger segment of a number of populations. Examining why young people are less likely to participate in formal or informal politics seems like a worthy pursuit, providing the opportunity to firstly, understand a matter important for any political system's existence and secondly, to develop policy approach aiming to alleviate the problem.

This focus on adolescents is also in line with the political socialisation approach, emphasising the so-called "impressionable" years, during which attitudes toward politics start to take shape. The exact age range varies between cultures and in time, but is thought to be between around 15–25 years old (Grasso, 2016). During these formative years, people's identities develop, making use of the feedback and relationships with one's family and peers. Adolescence is the most appropriate time to identify early socialisation effects, before any life-cycle events start to influence people, before they begin to take on adult social roles, before they become fully active in the labour force, or start families themselves (Neundorf, Smets & Garcia-Albacete, 2014).

Young people are believed to be the "citizens of tomorrow" and undoubtedly, the meaning of citizenship, how people view citizen's role in modern societies, is changing in that part of the population. Young people's preference for a more participative style of making politics has been documented (Checkoway, 2003; Forbrig 2005; Percy-Smith & Thomas, 2010), but some evidence shows that the withdrawal from more formal participation may be caused by the life-cycle effect (Norris, 2003), which may mean that self-disenfranchisement will disappear with the simple passage of time and having experience of adult social roles. Conversely, some scholars attribute particular participation styles to a specific character of a given generation, rejecting the possibility of any major style change over their life-cycle (Delli Carpini, 2000).

Within the cultural change hypothesis, researchers used to focus more on the reasons why young people withdraw from (formal) politics, and not on what motivates them to engage with it. From the social norm theory perspective, the fact that norms of electoral activity are not as present in the younger generation as they were decades earlier, is often attributed, after Putnam, to "a failure in passing a commitment to involvement from parent to child" (Keeter et al. 2002, p. 5). The literature has moved on from claims based only on formal political activity data, interpreted as a withdrawal

of the young from politics. With the expansion of the definition of political participation and the inclusion of new activities, the data has started to show a more nuanced picture. However, from a methodological point of view, it is likely that even with the broadened definition, young people themselves understand politics in a very narrow, formalistic way, which in turn may be making politics insignificant to them (Quintelier, 2007).

2.2.9. Citizenship and Transformation Into Democracy

Countries undergoing a transformation into a democracy offer a rare opportunity to witness how new citizenship norms and political behaviours emerge. The smooth implementation of any systemic reforms, building new institutions and the general stability of any new regime depends on having a cooperative citizenry. Similarly to legal or structural changes, normative shifts take time. Some co-existence of different citizenship concepts is to be expected, and, as a classic of generational research once suggested, this specific transitioning period can only be completed through generational replacement (Mannheim, 1952). Older citizens, who spent their adolescence under the previous regime, can find it harder to re-learn what they already know about a citizens' role in a new political system.

Citizenship norms in newly democratic states. This lack of a coherent normative framework, a lack of a developed civic culture, can prove to be a challenge to any fledgling democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963). Obviously, citizens' response to any particular regime can vary from affirmation to critique, but, as the APC study (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014) of 12 former communist European states shows, the impact of the previous regime can be described as indoctrination rather than resistance of the citizenry (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014).

Even though the authoritarian legacy lingers on, some other factors, such as perceived corruption levels and ineffectiveness of governance, are also considered to have a negative impact on political participation levels in former communist countries (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014).

Not only some dissimilarity of norms and behaviours is expected, but also that the relationships between citizenship norms and political participation vary crossnationally, as countries' paths to democracy differ considerably. It appears that in countries, which went through communism, the link between citizenship norms and political behaviours is weaker, in particular for the informal type of participation, and there is lower support in general for the engaged type norm (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013). Researchers propose that it may be that the limited opportunity to practice the behaviours contained in the newly democratic norms, or the "abstractness" of norms, is causing the limited impact of norms on political behaviour (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 60). That said, the democratic transformation time itself, offering plenty of extra-electoral participative opportunities, can be treated as a "democracy-school" for citizens. However, evidence from a recent APC study shows (Joly, 2018), that even such generation-defining events like the peaceful protest activities of 1989–90, did not have a lasting effect on the political participation of Eastern Germans.

Parental political socialisation in newly democratic states. Even though political socialisation researchers tend to agree that people continue with political learning into their adult lives, there is also a widespread acknowledgement of the family as the fundamental socialisation agent. Parents, from whom children learn early on before the schools', media and peers' socialisation contexts fully emerge, play a key role in the process of passing on the seeds of attitudes and behaviours (Hyman, 1959; Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009). According to several authors, parents are a

key agent in the political socialisation of children (Andolina et al., 2003; Beck and Jennings, 1982; Jennings and Niemi, 1974; McIntosh, Hart and Youniss, 2007). In an American study of political reproduction within a family, partisan identifications were the most likely political orientation passed on from parent to child (Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009). Jennings, Stoker and Bowers also concluded that young people, whose parents are less interested in cue-giving, discussing politics at home, etc., show much more instability in political dispositions (i.e. changing party preferences).

Ample evidence exists to confirm the impact of parents' views on children with regards to party membership and identification (Banks & Roker, 1994), and voting (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). There is also some positive correlation between parents' political participation and the level of participation of children (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998). With regards to the factors securing an effective transmission of activity-promoting values and behaviours between parents and children, families with a high socio-economic status (Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Plutzer, 2002), offering a stable, both-parents setup (Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007; Clarke, 1973) and discussing politics regularly (Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007), all have a positive effect on increasing the political participation of young people. In one Canadian study, which examined the motives behind choosing a traditional-style participation and preference for "new politics", socialisation at home, in particular with parents' political party involvement, was found to be statistically significant in explaining participation among young party members (Cross & Young, 2008).

The family as a socializing agent becomes particularly salient in countries that witnessed a major historical event, such as Central and Eastern European political systems' transformation into democracies in the late 1980s. With parents, socialised in a non-democratic era, navigating daily the new reality, children receiving key democracy know-how in schools, it is the household that acts as the center stage for reflections on the political aspect of the daily life. It can be assumed that in such countries some level of discontinuity or disruption of transmission of political socialisation content is expected, and that differences in levels and methods of political participation between age cohorts can occur. However, the results of a handful of cross-national studies available that looked at the effects of political socialisation of young people in post-communist countries, show an absence of evidence for a universal generational shift in citizenship norms (Coffe & Van der Lippe, 2010), as well as weak influence of parents on the political participation of their children (Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007). The former results add to the debate about how fitting for young democracies is the typology of duty-based and engaged citizenship norms, while the latter highlight the need to establish a "norm" baseline for individual young democracies that specifies what values and behaviours are being transmitted from parents to children.

Socialisation (secondary for adults and primary for adolescents) into a new set of citizenship norms plays out on many fronts, as the various agents of socialisation can interact with each other. In countries undergoing democratic transformation however, the family home could be the first source of communal reflection on the historic changes, before institutional reforms start changing school curricula and altered legal regulations affect associational activity, and so on (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998).

There are no studies to confirm in what way the family, peers, media, schools and civil society institutions impact the new democratic citizen norms development. Some evidence, from a three-wave panel study, depicts the strength of impact of these five socialisation agents on Belgian youth (Quintelier, 2015). It appears that the institution of the family increases the level of political participation, but the initial socialisation impact of peers and voluntary associations is more profound. With regards to the context of the family home, this study captured the occurrence of discussion about politics at home as significant — a result which confirms earlier empirical evidence. The impact of socialisation was also deduced from participants' opinion whether someone in their family was political active; these results then confirmed earlier evidence that children of political active parents are more likely to be active themselves (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). The author concludes, that due to the limitations of the study, political socialisation was not captured directly, and there is need to include parents perspectives (and other socialisation agents) in future research.

In a similar vein, Westholm (1999) also advises the use of both children and parents as sources of data, in order to avoid children's potentially skewed understanding of parents' behaviours. For the current study it would be therefore beneficial to explore not only if parents are active in their own opinion, but how both sides define political activity, and whether parents aim to influence their offspring political attitudes at all. As Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier (2007) observe, parents' objectives and methods of child upbringing have changed over the last few decades and it may no longer be their goal to affect children's political preferences.

2.2.10. The Case at Hand.

The early 1990s saw a tidal wave of Central and Eastern European states switching to democracy and liberal economy, as a result of the end of reign of communist governments and the Soviet Union breaking up. This renewed demand for a democratic "know-how" inspired scholars to revisit some of the fundamental questions about the elements essential for a functioning democratic system (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991).

After an initial focus on the process of implementing the institutional, procedural features of a new democratic regime, scholars in the field started to question the quality of these new systems at their core and how democratic the citizens themselves are (Carothers, 2002). The health of new democracies was measured by the willingness of people to participate in organised politics (Linz and Stepan, 1996), and the mass withdrawal of citizens of post-communist countries from political participation became soon evident. Explanations of this troubling phenomenon were rooted in the pre- and post-transformation realties. Firstly, the liberal economic reforms and resulting, initial negative impact on households, volatility of the political system, corruption and misgovernment, were believed to have prompted a widespread disenchantment with the political class (Howard, 2003; Tworzecki, 2008; Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014). Secondly, the cultural legacy of political participation under communism, often carried out in the context of coercion, may have led the newly democratic citizens to decide to withdraw from public life without risk of repression, and instead embrace the private life (Howard, 2003, Tworzecki, 2008). The role of legacies described above seems indisputable, it is the scale of their impact on all cohorts that is unclear.

The early optimists envisioned a swift generational replacement, which, with time, would erase the impact of communist cultural legacies (Sztompka, 1996) and cause participation to flourish. However, some scholars warned that this process will take time — norms, values and behaviours would continue to be passed on by those socialised under the communist regime (Howard, 2003). Therefore, the issue of decreasing political participation in democratic populations, in particular among

younger people, is of special significance to the newer democracies on the European continent. Whereas the basic institutional arrangements (structures) are largely in place by now, 30 years after the transformation, it is the various opportunities to have a say in between elections about the way things are governed (Barber, 1984) and the quality of everyday politics, which are still developing,

Given the above, measuring the quality of democracy goes hand in hand with the approach that sees "democracy" as a "democratisation process", which can accelerate or start reversing. This qualitative approach is obviously in opposition to understanding democracy as a binary concept — for which it either exists or not (Przeworski, 2003). Data collected for the Democracy Index (EIU, 2021) shows that in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Poland (ever since the index started to be published, for the first time in 2006), when compared to its neighbouring or other postcommunist countries (excluding Eastern Germany), is trailing behind. The overall ranking of quality of democracy since 2006 has situated Poland lower than other countries in the region such as Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia or Slovenia. Wide-spread political participation, formal as well as informal, is seen as a crucial component of a "good democracy" (Morlino, 2004). Therefore, understanding how Poles view politics, what are the contents of their citizenship norms, as well as their repertoires of political behaviours, is especially relevant for improving the perceived (and measured) quality of Polish democracy, going forward.

Considering that the quality of democracy and, within it, political participation levels, are lower in post-communist European countries when compared with majority of Western European democracies, and that young people in post-communist countries are perceived as even less politically active that the general population, a question arises: whether CEE youth political (in)activity can be explained as part of a trend affecting young people in older democracies. Perhaps, the explanation should also include, as signalled above, the communist legacy, as the social norms, the attitudes and experiences developed under the previous regime may still be having a negative effect on political participation of newly democratic citizens.

It is safe to assume that the norms "inherited" from the previous system affected different age groups differently. Those who were socialised under communism, or at least spent their adolescent years before the democratic transition, experienced one-party, authoritarian governing approach, where citizens were often pressured to participate in elections, marches, associations or other social initiatives, "voluntary" in name only. Even the experience of a grass-roots opposition and a participative, mostly peaceful, transformation process, was not enough of a "democratic" leveller to allow the whole population to start with a clean "normative" slate. Lack of trust for state and public administration was carried over to the next political regime. The "empowered space" that once existed, has not turned into a deliberative one, as most post-1989 reforms were "accepted rather than deliberated" (Dryzek, 2010, p. 16).

That said, it would have been hard for anyone to build trust into a new institutional system, even harder if one set up arrangements that discouraged citizen participation, such as "closed door 'salon' politics and Burkean elitism" (Cirtautas 1997, p. 240). These arrangements violated "what people expected from a democratic government" (Cirtautas 1997, p. 240) Some even claim that citizens themselves curbed their enthusiasm for civil society to allow the new governments to act without being obstructed (Kolarska-Bobińska, 1994). Such views were perhaps feeding on the blurred lines between the state and civil society due to many local activists and opposition leaders joining the ranks of central and local government.

2.3. Political Participation in Poland: What we Know so far

This study will focus on Poland, an "unusual" case of a Central European country, which, after transitioning from a communist to a democratic system, continually fails to fulfil the empirical and theoretical expectations with regards to its citizens' political participation levels. The literature specific to the situation in Poland will therefore now be reviewed.

2.3.1. The Historical Context

It is worth recapping some relevant Polish history for any readers who may not be fully aware of it, for the sake of context.

Before Polish Independence. The 20th century for Central and Eastern Europe was a period of an intense geo-political change caused by the two World Wars and by the dismantling of the Soviet Union. In those years, new countries and borders were established, some of the states were then annexed by the Soviets after the World War II, to regain their statehood and sovereignty following the dissolution of the Union. Poland, a Central European nation, with a rich history dating back to the 10th century (Nowak, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021), had over the centuries its fair share of political upheavals.

At the end of 18th century Poland vanished from the political map of Europe after being partitioned by its neighbours, Austria, Russia and Prussia. The Polish state, after several failed uprisings, regained independence after 123 years, its reappearance brought about by the end the Great War and the Triple Entente's endorsement of Poland's sovereignty (Davies, 2003).

The Second World War and its Aftermath. Unfortunately, the period of rebuilding state institutions, Polish culture and national identity, was cut short in 1939

with the onslaught of German and Russian invasion (Moorhouse, 2019). Even though Polish soldiers fought alongside the Western allied forces and helped to defeat the Axis powers, Poland's sovereignty was not fully re-established after World War II ended. The country's borders were changed, a satellite government was created, and Poland for the next 50 years fell under the control of Soviet Russia (Zamoyski, 2015).

Rebuilding the infrastructure, economy and social institutions in such a postwar reality was difficult and much slower than in the West. This was not only as a result of rejection, under the Moscow's pressure, of the Marshall Plan offer but also, because Poland was subjected to the Soviet's central planning system (Anderson, 1991). Dealing with the destruction of the war and the loss of more than six million of its citizens, becoming Soviet "satellite" state under a regime perceived as an "alien imposition" (Tworzecki, 2008, p. 50) and being politically and culturally isolated from the West characterised Poland's first three post-war decades.

The Return to Democracy. The early 1980s brought a shimmer of light at the end of the tunnel for the Polish People's Republic. Karol Wojtyła was chosen Pope (John Paul II) in 1978, an extraordinary event, which gave hope to many Poles and provided an impetus to the already strong anti-communist activity of the Catholic church in Poland (Weigel, 2012). What is more, the communist government in a surprisingly conciliatory move allowed for a legal existence of a new trade union *Solidarność* (Solidarity). The lights went out soon after the union's first national congress — in December 1981 the head of communist government, Wojciech Jaruzelski, proclaimed martial law in order to suppress the growing opposition movement. The trade union was dissolved and political repressions ensued (Polak, 2016).

Even without the military patrols, curfews, imprisonments and secret service activity, the quality of life in the 1980s was dire. The communist government accumulated huge international debts, which, due to deteriorating economic situation, the country was unable to repay (Galata, 1997). The reforms of the Soviet central planning system of the mid-80s did not improve the economic stagnation plaguing all of the Union's republics (Daniels, 1990). The overall weakness of the Soviet Union, the growing unrest and protests, the overwhelming popularity of the Solidarity movement (with up to 10 million Poles joining the trade union) and the willingness of the communist government to hold talks with the opposition, resulted in Poland becoming the first of the "satellite" states to peacefully transition to a democratic regime, helping to dismantle the Soviet Bloc in the following years (Garton Ash, 2002).

Post-Communist Poland. Poland's path following the 1989 transition was a rocky one. The country went from a centrally planned economy to a free market at one sweep. The economic reform was prepared by Jeffrey Sachs, consulted with IMF and local Polish experts and was given the name of the Polish Minister of Finance, the Balcerowicz Plan (Soros, 1991). However, for the first few years after the transition, Poland's economy was characterised by high prices, inflation, insolvency of state-owned companies, long-term unemployment and chaotic privatisation.

By the end of the 1990s, Poland went through several rounds of democratic elections, the economy stabilised, the country joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and begun to negotiate the accession to the European Union (EU). Poland joined the EU on 1 May 2004 after a national referendum in favour of the membership (Szczerbiak, 2004).

Poland Today. Overall, it can be said that the last 30 years have been the most peaceful and prosperous times for Poland since it regained statehood in 1918.

Poland's continued economic growth was amplified with the opening of new opportunities after the EU accession (Kundera, 2014). Poland has been undergoing a demographic change too, as on the one hand, the free flow of goods and people meant that large numbers of Polish citizens migrated to other EU countries, while at the same time, good economic prospects and flexible migration policies attracted large migration from Ukraine and Belarus (GUS, 2020).

The party political scene following the accession has been "monopolised" by a "duopoly" of Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska — PO) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość — PiS) (Szczerbiak, 2008). These two political groupings both started in the early 2000s as parties with a Christian democratic profile, however, over the years their ideological stance changed, welcoming respectively, economically and socially liberal programmes (PO), and for PiS, an economically interventionist approach, while retaining a socially conservative profile. Both parties had been successful at forming governments twice, PO between 2007–11 and 2011–15, and PiS between 2015–2019 and currently, since 2019.

As explained above, Polish citizens have been in the forefront of the anticommunist movement at the time of the democratic transformations at the end of 1980s, and the country was one of the first in the Soviet bloc to start roundtable talks between the communist apparatchiks and the civic resistance representatives. It can be said that a very limited amount of work has been undertaken on the political socialisation of the young in the post-1989 Poland. This is particularly surprising given the uniqueness of the transition between the regimes and the research opportunities this historical moment afforded.

The majority of the work conducted so far has been with regard to the "content" of young Poles' political socialisation, such as the opinions, knowledge and attitudes

toward democracy and liberal economy (Dolata et al., 2004; Jondy & Koseła, 2005; Koseła 1999; Wiłkomirska, 2013). Yet, understanding the process of young Poles' learning about their role in a political system, in particular the impact of the family as a political socialisation agent, could contribute to a better understanding of the prevalence of social norms governing citizenship after political systems change, and about the wider context of socialisation. Therefore, in case of a so-called "young" democracy, where the "content" of political socialisation — the behavioural patterns and social norms — is still developing, it is crucial to allow for self-definitions.

2.3.2. Political Interest, Knowledge and Efficacy

Little is known about the factors influencing young Poles' **political interest**, but some studies show that pupils with a positive view of their school, especially in the case of secondary schools, were more supportive of democratic values and had more interest in politics (Jondy & Koseła, 2005). The lack of interest in politics was listed as the main reason for electoral voting abstention by over 45% of final-year pupils, whereas the main motivation behind participation was due to personal political efficacy — the feeling of wanting to have an influence on the country's sociopolitical scene (32%) followed by civic duty, curiosity towards a first election, and political interest, placing the latter as the most popular reason for 14% of young people (Turska-Kawa, 2012).

A popular explanation for the disengagement of Americans from politics — the stealth democracy argument — contends that low interest and a willingness to participate only when the system is perceived to be in a crisis, play a deciding role (Webb, 2013). In Poland however, the relationship between the two factors, political interest and how politics is perceived, is not clear. There is some evidence to suggest

that interest in politics does not determine views on democratic functioning, as a breakdown of such views among those young who are interested in politics does not differ significantly from those who are uninterested (Grabowska, 2013). It can thus be deduced that young Poles do not seem to completely fit the profile of stealth democrats.

There are no comprehensive systematic studies available on how well versed on political issues, actors and institutions the adult Polish population may be, but such knowledge would have to be influenced by the media and any state administration social campaigns, as well as adult learning. Cross-national data provides evidence that, as far as student achievements and civics curricula go, young Poles were actually very **knowledgeable** when compared with pupils from across the world (Dolata et. al., 2004). Factors that have influenced Polish pupils' levels of political knowledge came from a variety of contexts. Those significant and relevant include the school's location — young Poles from urban schools were more knowledgeable in "civics" than pupils from rural schools. For pupils in urban schools, regular conversations about politics at home were a better predictor of good results in civic knowledge than teachers' input into the political discourse (Dolata et al., 2004). Other factors impacting pupils' knowledge levels included socio-occupational status and the educational attainment of parents (Jondy & Koseła, 2005; Schulz et al., 2010; Wiłkomirska, 2013), and pupils' grade achievements (Jondy & Koseła, 2005).

What still needs to be understood is why these high levels of formally tested, political knowledge among young Poles are not translating into high levels of political participation. The imbalance between measured levels of political knowledge (high) and civic and political engagement (low) of young people is obviously at odds with the conclusions of Niemi and Junn (1998), who claim civic courses make a difference, as they are positively correlated with political participation.

In Poland's case the relative inactivity of pupils has been attributed to the schools' un-democratic setting (Dolata et al., 2004). It needs to be remembered that in the first few years following the transformation there was a certain educational vacuum: the citizen education course ("knowledge about society" — *Wiedza o Społeczeństwie* [WoS]), was not formally supported within the Ministry of Education's curriculum until 1996 (Wereszczyński, 2006). Obviously, an equivalent of civic education existed in Poland under the rule of the communists, but its main objectives were to instil the socialist ideology and enforce obedience to the authority of the state and the Party.

Up until 1999 WoS was taught in the last grade of primary schools and as a one-year course in secondary schools. Following the education system reform of 1999, citizenship education has been spread over the three tiers of the educational system, where primary schools combined teaching about history and society, lower secondary schools (gymnasium) introduced "knowledge about society" as a separate subject, which then continues into upper secondary school (grammar, vocational and technical).

It must be added that some early legislative initiatives did attempt to provide tools for civic education that aligned with the new democratic system. The School Education Act of 1991 introduced channels for pupils' participation at primary and secondary education levels. These provisions consist of electing class representatives, a pupils' council (*Samorząd uczniowski*) and pupils' representatives participation in the school council (*Rada Szkoły*). Their main role seems to be consultative at best, as none of these forms of participation poses real decisionmaking powers in the activities they are involved in (EACEA, 2012, p. 44). As the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) results showed, Polish pupils were indeed doubtful of their own input and abilities to have any influence on decisions in their schools (third last among the countries in the study). A completely opposite view was held by their teachers, whose perception about pupils influence was highly optimistic — top fourth among the participating countries (Koseła, 2013, pp. 83–84). It seems that even though Polish schools have some participative structures in place, these may be either not utilised well (due to non-participating young people or a tokenistic and tick-box treatment on behalf of school staff) or the pupils' appetite for decision-making participation is much bigger than what the schools can offer.

Levels of **political efficacy** among young Poles were higher than among the general population (Grabowska, 2013, p. 50), and the need to express personal efficacy was the top reason to vote for young people (Turska-Kawa, 2012). Voting patterns, however, show the opposite — the younger part of the population was less willing to vote despite feeling more efficacious. Interest in politics in Poland was lower among the young than among the general population, and has been decreasing steadily (Grabowska, 2013). However, since 2019, research shows the level increasing; for instance Scovil (2021) showed an increase from 9% to 14% of respondents who were either "very interested" or "interested" in politics. Political knowledge on the other hand was high among Polish school leavers (Koseła, 2013). These two statements are contradictory, as it could be expected that high levels of knowledge and efficacy can result in higher levels of standard political participation. Political interest on the other hand is highly dependent on understanding of politics or

even definition of that concept. Could it be that young Poles' lack of interest in politics is linked to their distaste for the traditional politics, or their definition of politics?

2.3.3. Political Parties

During its relatively short history, Polish post-transformation democracy¹ has gone through a similar process that its Western European neighbours have gone through in the post-War years, albeit at accelerated speed. Poland has seen progressively decreasing levels of institutional trust, trade union and political party membership and electoral turn out. Analysis conducted by the Parliament Research and Expertise Office, suggested that Poland at the new, constitutional opening was already being plagued by the ills Western societies had been "working on" for decades. Little interest in politics, politicians alienated from the rest of society with motives seen as unethical, and an anti-partisan outlook — with only one Pole out of four choosing parties as organisations representing their interests. The report quotes Jerzy Szacki, a Polish sociologist, explaining the possible origins of such views:

One has to remember that political socialisation of the potential clientele of modern parties has happened when "a party" simply meant "the Party" — the Communist Party, and being a member of it was seen in many circles as morally questionable. (Osiecka 1992, p. 5)

Polish democracy did not start with a clean slate, but transitioned from a centrally controlled communist state, in which political participation was expected, quite often enforced — to exist in a communist society was "to live within the lie" (Havel, 1985, p. 35). Szacki's comment captured the seemingly obvious — citizens,

Some authors trace its starting point to 1989's "Contract" Sejm (Lower House) and "December amendment" of the Polish constitution in 1989, some others to the first free elections of October 1991.

who for years used to distance themselves from the Party apparatus and treated the state as a foreign body, an alien, political force implanted by the Soviet Russia, their Eastern neighbour, were not capable of an overnight change in their attitudes towards party politics. There was to be an ambiguity of norms for some time and the legacy of the communist past was to impact upon political, economic, religious and other behaviours differently (Davidson-Schmich et al., 2002).

What might have shaped this highly pessimistic way citizens viewed participation in party politics? It seems at odds with the fact that it is the citizens who, more than ten years before the 1992 report, had set up an independent trade union, Solidarity, the largest social movement in Europe at the time. The union provided a platform for discussions about the future of the country's governing system (Makowski, 2010). It was also the citizens (or rather, intellectuals representing them, as some wish to see it — see Lomax, 1997), who were willing to drive a particular agenda for change to finally secure the system's transition through round-table talks in 1989. The answer to this question may lie in the apparent behavioural pattern of abstaining from enforced political participation as a way of challenging the communist state, but also in self-organising as an anti-political strategy for bypassing the state (and the Party). Analysts of the transformation also point to the levels of social and institutional trust (Coffe & Van der Lippe 2010; Letki, 2004) thought to be important factors impacting citizen participation in post-transformation Poland.

The notion that people are dissatisfied with party-politics is old news for the Western world. However, contrary to the so-called "democratic crisis" laments that have been sprouting now and again in social sciences since the 1970s, the first empirically-backed confirmation of commonly shared anxieties appeared only in 1995, when Schmitt and Holmberg concluded that there was a "general cross-national

weakening in attachment to political parties" (Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995, as cited by Norris, 1999, p. 5).

A few years later, Dalton and Wattenberg further examined the decline of party identification and made it official that citizens in advanced industrial democracies are disengaging themselves from party politics (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000) — with few exceptions, parties not only have lost their mass movement foundation of the 19th century, but also the membership base has increasingly been drawn from a limited and distinctive pool of citizens (Cross & Young, 2008; Van Biezen, Main, & Poguntke, 2012). Therefore, if one of the functions of political parties is to socialise citizens into politics by creating opportunities for participation in articulating interests, and integrating these into political programs (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000), what are the consequences of the diminishing presence of parties in their communities? When considering this question one needs to be aware that there are obviously many other channels for voicing political points of view, as public opinion-building in modern societies is a multifarious process. Yet, it is only parties that can take these opinions forward and implement them through elected representatives in parliaments.

When democracies to the west of the Berlin Wall enjoyed a few rather peaceful post-War decades, rattled from time to time by civil rights protests, the Vietnam War and student demonstrations or trade unions strikes, Polish society struggled under communism and was just beginning to catch the democratic tidal wave of the 1980s. Instead of an enthusiastic welcoming of a pluralistic political offer, Poland joined the so-called "disenchanted voters" club straight from the start of its democratic days. As one commentator noted recently, political parties did not appeal to a large proportion of Poles when there were 29 of them gaining entry to Parliament in 1991, nor when, 20 years later, the political stage has only two major players, with *Platforma*

Obywatelska (PO) and *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS) together gaining 80% of the seats in the Lower House in 2011 elections (Ekiert, 2015). Attachment, identification or appeal aside, straightforward levels of membership in political parties are the most common form of evidence confirming the withdrawal of citizens from traditional politics. If parties were to be the "bridges between civil society and government" (Cross and Young, 2008, p. 345), these bridges may have been burnt in Poland a long time ago, with membership levels oscillating at maximum 2% of the electorate for most of the last two decades (GUS, 2019).

Party identification, or preference, is an indicator often used for explaining participation in elections. Also, age is a variable commonly appearing in analyses of engagement in politics, in particular voting behaviour or ideological preferences (Harrop & Miller, 1987). These two indicators provide a rather ambiguous picture of Poles' political participation. On the one hand, among other mediating variables such as an election's participative cost, interest in politics, and political efficacy, Poles' party identification is one of the strongest predictors ("voting as a duty" being the strongest) of the outcome variable of voting.

Additionally, among the structural variables, age and educational attainment explain the largest proportion of the outcome variable's variance (Cześnik, 2009). Consequently, the two indicators, age and party identification, seem to be both having influence on voting.

On the other hand however, the relationship between these two variables is more complex. For example, social structure (including age) is not a source of ideological or partisan divisions in Poland, as is the case in many Western societies, where it determines political identifications (Godlewski, 2008). Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik (2010) also checked several variables — place of residence (geographical), sex, age, education attainment, civil status, occupation, financial status, and none of these showed to be statistically relevant in explaining partisan preferences among the population.

With regards to age, research on young people in Poland shows that they are even less keen on involvement in the work of political parties than the already apathetic older part of the population. Only a small proportion of young people are able to recognise particular parties as organisations that represent their interests. The fact that young people disassociate themselves from parties, specifically they are less often turning up on election day and fewer of them are joining parties, may have an influence on, for example, the age profile of the Polish parliament's members where only 3% of all members of *Sejm* are under 30 and 17% are aged between 30–39, see (Sejm RP, 2021).

Are political parties on the path to becoming member-less shells, completely disengaged and unrepresentative of their communities? Paul Whiteley (2007, p. 4) warned that if the trend of declining party membership levels continues, "party activism will gradually die out in the long run". His findings, based on a cross-national study (which included Poland), highlight the generational replacement process, in which new cohorts are increasingly choosing participation in voluntary activities over those channeled through a political party. After analysing three models of political participation (the civic voluntarism, the cognitive engagement and the social capital models), Whiteley concluded that the voluntary activity variable is the most powerful predictor of party activism. However, the replacement process is likely to occur in contexts where voluntary organisations are relatively strong and alternatives to party activity are readily available. This particular finding of Whiteley's explanatory model

does seem to offer a good fit with the Polish context, where young Poles' activity in voluntary organisations is much higher than in political parties (but low in general terms). It needs to be added that such voluntary activities are encouraged by schools through reward points in official student assessments and during the secondary schools' recruitment process.

With electoral voting instability relatively high in Poland when compared with both, seasoned and young democracies, noting that an estimated 25–30% of the electorate has moved from absence to participation over the years (Cześnik, 2009), there is an important question to ask about young Poles' distaste for political parties, their electoral absenteeism, and what the other political practices they get involved in are.

2.3.4. Civil Society Organisations

Some analysts claim that the real legacy of the Central and Eastern Europe transformation of the late 1980s is the popularity of the civil society concept. "Civil society" became a mantra and a buzzword at the end of the Cold War (Carothers, 1999), equipping politicians, scholars and the wider public with an analytical and normative tool for reflection on the quality of their Western democratic systems. Post-1989 universal enthusiasm for liberal democracy did not marry well with "pervasive disdain for politics" (Mair, 2013, p. 26) that has been troubling Western countries for decades. The decline of cleavage politics, the hollowing out of mass political parties (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012), the rise of issue voting and vote volatility (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Franklin, 1992), the decline of trust towards institutions, the emergence of the critical citizen (Norris, 1999), have all shaken the foundations of citizenship norms in Western democracies.

The growing disenchantment with formal, party, politics means that citizens can either distance themselves from the political process, refusing to legitimise it (a symptom of which is the international trend of decreasing election turn out), or find new channels for political activity, mostly through networked technologies, but also in non-party campaigning groups. Political parties, with their falling membership levels² have withdrawn from "the realm of civil society towards the realm of government and the state" (Mair, 2013). If the party machine has ceased to be the mass form of political mobilisation, where and how can citizens voice their political concerns, aspirations and needs? The answer shouted from the rooftops at the end of 1980s was as one — civil society.

Before Poland's political system transition, members of the Solidarity trade union agreed at the Solidarity Congress in 1981 on the idea of the "self-governing republic" as their vision of the governing system and the society. The vision for democracy embodied in the Solidarity's October 1981 programme centred around citizens' active participation. The right (and responsibility) to express opinions and formulate interests and needs of citizens did not rest on any "groups placing themselves above the society" but on society itself. Society "must be able to speak with its full voice" (Cirtautas, 1997, p. 221), so that "democracy was to be, at last, not just an abstract power upon the people and for the people, but also by the people" (Grabowska, 1995, p. 196).

Has this vision for active citizenship been put into practice in posttransformation Poland? Solidarity's programmatic proposal for democratisation, "a

In Europe only Austria and Cyprus have membership levels above 10% of the electorate, Poland and Latvia being the bottom two, with levels below 1% (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2009, p. 23). The drop in youth party affiliation is even sharper than the general public's (Cross and Young, 2008; Seyd and Whiteley, 2004)

negotiated takeover of... the old hegemonic state by civil society" (Pełczyński, 1988, p. 376), has not been fully implemented (Gliński, 2006). While some specific, international pressures might have been at play, when deciding on the economic side of transformation, thus making Solidarity's co-operative, civil enterprise economy proposal unfeasible, the societal aspect of the self-governing republic concept remained to be implemented through internal institutional reforms, led by the opposition leaders.

The Polish democratic opposition of the 1970s can be characterised by an inherently anti-state attitude, which rejected the possibility of reform of the state, was anti-political, that is did not meddle with affairs that were in the remit of the state, and concentrated on "resistance" instead (Ost, 1990). Another strategy of the dissidents — socially organising through cultural and communal initiatives aimed at the democratisation of Polish society, had not prepared the opposition for the period following the legalisation of the Solidarity trade union in 1980, nor for the post-1989 reality. Suddenly, "the political as social" (Ost, 1990, p. 66) had to change — the post-transformation world required "political" to be "legislative", "constitutional", "governmental". The once radical ideals of authentic participatory democracy were abandoned in the transformation, not only by the way Poland's reforms were brought about during the transition, but also by the inability of dissidents to convert these ideals into feasible policies.

Transformation researchers have since argued that the same force that helped to bring a regime down, a strong "civil society against the state", will hinder the consolidation of a young democracy if not transformed into "interest-based politics" (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 272), channelled through political parties. A pattern of political activity formed in the past, like self-organising in a social movement, a strike,

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demonstration, or any contestation of political actors, is seen here as an act against the democracy itself — democracy understood in a narrow, procedural, party-political sense. A strong, "ethical" civil society (in Poland's case it is the social movement of Solidarity, the trade union at some point reaching 10 million members) is capable of overcoming an authoritarian state, yet, the same civil society is problematic when a democratic state already exists. Civil society is de Tocqueville's reservoir of democratic values, and, at the same time, a force making it difficult for democracy to consolidate.

Another strand of the argument comes with the concept of social capital (Putnam, 2000, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993) which states, in summary, that (the right kind of) civil society ("civic community") makes democratic governments more efficient by generating social capital, consisting of public virtues such as trust and reciprocity. Putnam's "Making Democracy Work" (1993) has been criticised widely, scholars questioning its methodology (correlations do not stand enquiry) and findings (ignoring the explanatory power of socio-economic factors), but, most importantly, that the concept of civil society itself has been presented in a rather partial, skewed way (Mouritsen, 2003; Foley and Edwards, 1996). Putnam's civil society is surprisingly apolitical, non-conflictual and existing in a functionalist relationship with the state. Putnam is "reluctant to count among his 'civil associations' any, that advance a cause, pursue policy change, as their central vocation, or provoke conflict" (Foley and Edwards, 1996, p. 46). Therefore, he is taking politics out of civil society, domesticating it by reducing it to the same level as bird-watching or choir singing. This de-politicisation of citizens' activity reduces civil society to a passive witness or, at most, a service provider to the government.

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Post-1989 Polish civil society has gone decidedly in the non-governmental organisations' professionalization direction, straying somewhat from the "ethical" path, meaning that the watchdog, state-challenging functions are rare (Gumkowska et.al, 2006, p. 65). Therefore, the "wrong kind" of civil society phase in Poland, an issue transformation analysts were lamenting about in the early 1990s, has been followed by a "weak civil society" phase, which is still the dominant narrative among sociologists and political scientists interested in democracy in Poland.

Civil society, defined as a system consisting of: a moral community, a democratic state, a territorial self-government, and a non-governmental organisations (NGO) sector (including social movements and less formal civic communities) has developed in Poland in an unbalanced way, with no real de-communisation. Early democratic political elites were not particularly forthcoming or supportive of the nongovernmental sector (Glinski, 2006). The lack of any serious financial or legal support for capacity-building of the NGO sector in the early years following the transformation and up to the pre-EU accession period resulted in an "enclave" character of this sphere of associational activity of citizens (Gliński, 2006; Gumkowska et al., 2006), specifically groups and organisations not only geographically concentrated mostly in larger, urban areas, but also its leaders are predominantly of the same profile, welleducated and with a history of involvement in the anti-communist movement (Gumkowska et al., 2006). At the same time, the so called "civic demobilisation" interpretation of low volunteering and associational membership levels in postcommunist countries continues to be reaffirmed in the results of national opinion surveys in Poland. The Polish National Statistics Office data on volunteering show that only 8.5% of the population (above the age of 15) volunteer with an NGO (GUS, 2017).

2.3.5. Values and Norms

An early insight into the post-materialistic vs. materialistic values dichotomy in Poland was revealed in 1988 with the publication of "Changing Values and Political Dissatisfaction in Poland and the West: A Comparative Analysis" (Inglehart & Siemieńska, 1988). The study established that Polish post-materialists tended to be younger than materialists, and it is among the young that the 1980's political discontent was concentrated. A few decades later, Poles still predominantly favoured traditional values, but since 2005 the strength of materialistic values has been decreasing, while self-expression, freedom of speech and political freedoms have been on the rise, mainly among the young and educated city-dwellers (Jasińska-Kania, 2012; Marody, 2019). The road to post-materialism may be longer and follow a different path for Central and Eastern Europe, mainly because the region's democracies are aiming to reach the Western stage of economic development first.

Is the younger generation of Poles also more willing to become involved in "new politics", channelling their political participation through non-standard methods such as informal, non-hierarchical groups of various ideological hues or all kinds of protest actions? National studies so far provide evidence that points to a limited impact of new participative styles on young people's activity choices in Poland. Even though electoral turn out as well as membership in political parties is lower among younger citizens (PKW, 2020; Marzęcki, 2013), young Poles' views on non-standard participation are not more enthusiastic.

Ten years following the transformation, Polish teenagers' idea of what a good citizen's activity should look like was almost entirely "conventional" (Dolata et al., 2004). The engagement in civil and civic matters of such citizens was limited to:

abiding by the law, being informed about the country's history, loyalty and willingness to take part in military service (at the time of the report's publication compulsory for men leaving school and not enrolled in higher education courses). Political and civic activity should not be too strenuous, therefore Polish teenagers did not think such virtues as support for fellow countrymen and their rights, involvement in local communities, or in political parties, were the most important behaviours for being considered a good citizen (Dolata et al. 2004).

Hilde Coffe's and Tanja van der Lippe's (2010) quantitative examination of citizenship norms found that 20 years after the transformation, Poles' perception of citizenship was already founded on both engaged and duty-based norms. Dalton's thesis of a new style of citizenship and an erosion of the duty-based norms among the young was not fully confirmed — young Poles scored lower on duty-based norms, but the only significant correlation between age and engaged citizenship was negative (older citizens scored lower in regards to these norms). Among the other postcommunist countries in the sample (Czechia, Hungary and Slovenia), Poland had the highest levels of education, and this indicator was shown to significantly and positively affect duty-based norms, but remained inactive for engaged citizenship norms. Religiosity was also a statistically significant factor, positively affecting both types of citizenship norms in Poland. The relationship between institutional trust and citizenship norms was also significant, but there was a troubling impact of social trust - with higher levels meaning lower scores for duty-based norms. The fact that this cross-national study was not able to find evidence for a generational shift in citizenship norms prompted the authors to hypothesise about the impact of communist experience which differed across countries.

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2.4. Conclusions and Research Objectives

This chapter presented the main concepts, definitions and questions which underpin the theoretical foundations for this study. I have argued that employing the social norms perspective can be beneficial for examining political participation in excommunist countries. The citizenry of "newer" democracies is seen as more passive and more "de-politicised" than their Western counterparts. Instead of enthusiasm and selfless engagement in the political system they so longed for, citizens of the Central and Eastern Europe are still, 30 years on, not showing up. Communist legacies, in the shape of informal rules informing daily decisions, continue to play a role with some help from parental socialisation in this normative transmission. Young people nowadays perceive politics differently and this interest in less conventional activities needs to be examined for citizens who lived under communism. Useful in this pursuit will be allowing for self-definitions in the sphere of changing norms of citizenship and the ever-developing nature of political acts.

The slow process of generational replacement means that the communist legacy lingers on (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014) and young people in CEE countries continue to be raised and educated by people — parents, members of family, teachers and tutors — who were socialised under the communist regime. There are no in-depth studies focusing on the impact of communist legacies being played out in the process of parental socialisation into citizenship. Studying young people born after the 1989 transformation, the first post-communist cohorts, together with their parents, can offer, through contrasting and comparing, an enriching reflection on Poles' understanding of political participation and the norms and expectations which govern it.

In order to address questions and gaps highlighted as a result of this literature review, I will employ a theoretical framework based on the social norms of citizenship and parental, political socialisation literature. As presented earlier in the chapter, the study will follow the approach found in the literature, and identify:

- (a) what the generally practiced behaviour (empirical expectation) is;
- (b) the perceptions about what behaviour or attitude is desirable (normative expectation) and;
- (c) if there are any positive or negative consequences of adhering to the norm.

This will be achieved through allowing participants to define for themselves the concept of a good citizen and what constitutes political participation (normative expectation). Furthermore, participants will be able to reflect on how people around them follow the norm, what are people's levels of political activity (empirical expectation). To capture the elusive social pressure process, participants will be asked to reflect on any barriers or reasons for political activity or inactivity (norm adherence consequences). In addition to citizenship norm definitions, participants will be able to expand on how they act politically, and what are their paths to political participation. Perceptions of parental impact, from both sides, will be explored.

What is known from research is that Poles', contrary to Western citizens, have less engaged norms, which do not seem to have a significant influence on behaviours. How do parents, having experienced living under both communism and democracy, define their obligations, preferences or rules for citizen's activity? Do norms of parents and the young differ? Can any "clean" types of citizenship norms be identified? Does any potential normative difference carry into the realm of political activity? Do parents consider, and youth recognise, how politicised is their home environment? Such questions will explored in this study on the role of a citizen in contemporary Poland.

The review presented in this chapter identified a number of issues relevant for research on political participation. Firstly, it is important to broaden the scope of participation research to include explorations of everyday meaning of citizenship. I highlighted gaps in the theoretical framework, relating to emergence of new, engaged type of citizenships norms. In particular, the popular, dichotomous typology of engaged and duty-based norms rarely exists in such clean types, as majorities of respondents in studied populations subscribe to a mixture of citizenship norms. Although there has been a handful of country-specific studies, which investigate how people themselves define politics and citizenship norms, for example (Borge & Mochmann, 2019; Lister et al., 2003; O'Toole, 2003), political participation research is dominated by quantitative, survey research methods. The understanding of citizenship, in particular as a legal status, is changing, with more people choosing to describe themselves as so-called "global citizens" rather than using national identities (GlobeScan, 2016). If good citizenship implies "some sort of loyalty to and identification with the nation" (Pages & Sant, 2015, as cited by Sant, Davies & Santisteban, 2016, p. 237), and those loyalties are changing, it seems most urgent to explore in-depth how people resolve belonging to local, national and global communities of their own choosing.

Secondly, the explanatory power of the above-mentioned citizenship norms and participation typology is further reduced in the case of former communist European countries, as the literature provides mixed results on the prevalence and impact of norms on political participation. Are citizenship conceptions, based on and defined for Western Europe or North America populations, appropriate for explaining how populations of CEE countries understand the role of citizens in politics? Research on political participation in ex-communist countries has left some questions unanswered — while some evidence points to levels of trust and social capital being responsible for low political participation, there are no studies exploring in-depth how older and younger cohorts define politics and citizenship norms for themselves, and what are their repertoires of political behaviours. This direction of research offers promising prospects of unpacking the impact of communist legacy on political participation of citizens in one, unusually politically indifferent country — Poland.

Thirdly, much political participation research has explored the socialisation impact of the school environment, civic education in particular, in equipping young people with the knowledge and skills beneficial to the smooth functioning of democratic systems. Little recent empirical work, using broad definitions of norms and behaviours relating to politics, has focused on parental socialisation impact. In the case of continuously existing democratic systems, activity-promoting citizenship norms (motivated by civic duty, or fulfilling individualistic, self-actualising purposes, or of other provenience) can be, more or less coherently, maintained through several socialisation agents. In the case of recently transformed systems, the probability is high of a mismatch between citizenship norms and the reality they refer to. The family as a socialisation agent can still be the source of social norms learned under the previous regime. In the light of no existing research in Poland on parental socialisation by communist-socialised cohorts of first, democratic cohorts, there is an urgent need to establish a "norm" baseline for this young democracy that is what norms and behaviours parents and their children endorse. Additionally, investigating parental approaches to passing on these informal rules will illuminate our understanding of impact of this somewhat forgotten socialisation agent.

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Lastly, the literature on one of the attitudinal components of citizenship norms, political efficacy, provides confusing evidence for the Polish population. Although the reported levels for young Poles are higher than the general population, and the levels of political knowledge are high (even when compared internationally), participation levels are not matching these assessments. The topic of alleged political indifference of Poles could be illuminated by exploring how Poles define their role in the system, whether in passive or active terms, and if the system itself, by definition, could be responsive to Poles' efforts of influencing it. Successful application of all research objectives of this study will allow me to formulate recommendations for further research as well as for policy-makers, in the aim of understanding how young Poles can be more participative in contemporary Polish democracy.

2.4.1. The Research Objectives

To summarise, the research objectives, and corresponding research questions, for this study are as follows:

Research objective 1: to understand the perceptions of citizenship norm among Poles, in particular, what are the normative and empirical expectations, and what are the perceived consequences of citizenship norm adhering or lack of it.

- Research question 1: how do young Poles and their parents define the good citizen?
- Research question 2: how do young Poles and their parents define political activity?
- Research question 3: what are young Poles and their parents assessments of political participation among Poles?

Research question 4: what are perceived consequences of norm adherence
 or lack of it?

Research objective 2: to explore how the citizenship norm is fulfilled through Poles' political practice.

- Research question 5: what are the repertoires of political behaviour of young Poles and their parents?
- Research question 6 what are the perceptions of barriers impacting participation of Poles?

Research objective 3: to understand how the citizenship norm is passed on from parent to child.

 Research question 7: what are the perceptions of parental impact on young Poles' political activity?

Research objective 4: to explore young Poles and their parents perceptions of the feeling of competence and political system's responsiveness.

• Research question 8: how do young Poles and their parents define the political system and their role in it?

Research objective 5: to understand how young Poles can be more politically participative in contemporary Polish society.

3. Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology used for the study of citizenship norms of Poles. I firstly present the research approach, in which I reflect on the reasons for choosing a qualitative approach to conduct research into citizenship and political participation in a post-communist country. The chapter elaborates on the chosen methods of data collection, on the data sources and the rationale for the chosen sample, it also provides an overview of the process of data analysis. I then give some considerations to validity in qualitative research and how I attempted to implement it in my study. Further, I also explain my approach to ethical and confidentiality matters in my research, and some contextual information regarding the safety precautions used while conducting my research during a pandemic. Lastly, this chapter closes by presenting the limitations to my research.

3.1. Research Approach

Much of the evidence contained in the literature on political participation reviewed for this thesis was based on quantitative research methods, predominantly cross-sectional, national surveys, with minority of studies employing qualitative or mixed-methods approach. The strand of political participation research, looking to benefit from the explanatory power of the concept of citizenship norms, has been testing various indicators supplied by large, cross-national datasets, for example the International Social Survey Program, European Social Survey or International Civic and Citizen Education Survey.

These theory-driven explorations of the prevalence of the duty-based and engaged citizenship norms, and political participation styles, have so far provided evidence of the majorities of studied populations choosing an all-embracing style of citizenship, for example see (Oser, 2017; Hooghe and Oser, 2015). As was presented in Chapter 2, the present study aims to explore how citizenship norms are understood in a post-communist country, given the inconclusive results of earlier research that applied the duty-based/engaged typology, in particular considering some evidence for lack of generational shift in norms (Coffe and van der Lippe, 2010). Such an enquiry requires a qualitative research approach, one which would allow individuals to formulate their own definitions, identifications and categorisations. The chosen qualitative methodology suited this exploratory, process-oriented study well, as it allowed to ask interviewees open-ended questions about their attitudes, behaviours and what they make of them. Such approach is indispensable in researching citizenship norms and behaviours in the context of participants' home environment, because it permits interviewees to describe with richness their lived experience of being a citizen.

The literature review highlighted that citizens of countries, which transformed into democracies at the end of 1980s, were still less engaged in the civic and political sphere than their Western neighbours, and that young people in particular were trailing behind with their willingness to participate. With the communist legacy effect still being evident (Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014) and the older, pre-transformation cohorts still able to pass on values and norms to younger cohorts, this study's research approach assumed that inclusion of both voices — in the form of parent-child dyads. There are no other studies, to my knowledge, that use this novel approach of researching Polish parents' and their offspring's citizenship norms at the same time, exploring and including both cohorts directly. It is important in studies aimed at comparing and contrasting the views of parents and their offspring to include parents' voices verbatim. Although some evidence points to the young people's perception of parental practices being more relevant for socialisation impact than

actual practices (McFarland and Thomas, 2006), relying only on young people's accounts of their parents' views or behaviours could result in only partial understanding of the phenomena (Brady, Schlozman and Verba, 2015; Quintelier, 2015; Westholm, 1999).

What is more, qualitative methods can be of particular value in case of researching political participation of young people, as it has been identified already that the young can interpret political participation, and politics in general, using concepts different to those of the researchers trying to study them (O'Toole 2003; Henn, Weinstein and Wring, 2002). Pre-defined categorisations, examples of behaviours and closed-questions, all known from surveys, may be liable to misrepresent how citizenship and political participation are understood by young people, in particular in a newer democracy, where behavioural patterns and social norms are still be developing.

Conclusions from a recent study (Blais, Galais and Mayer, 2021) point out that it is also the way survey questions on citizenship norms are worded that may induce social desirability bias and affect data on the prevalence of the engaged/ duty-based typology. It was therefore crucial for this study to allow for self-definitions. The qualitative methodology of this study therefore not only allowed an exploration of *processes* but also gave participants *a voice*. In particular, this study intentionally involved participants from a variety of geographical locations to explore and portray an array of voices with different socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore, young interviewees were recruited purposefully so that the study included participants with diverse ideological and partisan preferences. Such a design was aimed at reducing biases and offered a richness of data. Finally, Poland, as a place of an enquiry into citizenship norms, offered an interesting case — the country's post-transformation political participation levels failed to fulfill expectations, held by many observers of its strong anti-communist civil society, and there was an urgent need to establish a normative baseline, given that no in-depth analysis of Pole's citizenship norms yet existed.

3.2. Research Design

My research into citizenship norms of Poles had exploratory and descriptive aims (Babbie, 2007). Research questions 1, 2 and 5, had descriptive objectives of gathering definitions of good citizen and political participation, as well as examples of actual activities. The remaining research questions aimed to explore the nature of social pressure linked with citizenship norms, perceptions of prevalence of political participation, perceptions of the impact of parents on young people's political activity, as well as elements of political efficacy. The findings of my study are intended to form a basis for formulating recommendations on how to increase political participation of Poles. Exploratory research tends to give rise to new ideas (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), being key in generating insights into an issue that can be used in further research (Marlow, 2005), and qualitative methods are frequently used for exploratory purposes (Babbie, 2007).

Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) proposed that data acquired through the use of qualitative methods allows the discovery of the meanings individuals give to events, processes and structures, while linking those meanings with the social context. The ultimate aim of qualitative research is the development of a deep understanding of human experience, and the most effective way to get closer to this goal is to use an in-depth interview, with its open-ended questions (Silverman, 2009, pp. 40–41). I chose to use in-depth interviews for my study, over focus groups, as this method was best suited to support my research objectives. This is because, as a result of the literature review, I set out to explore individual norms and behaviours, as well as family contexts, with questions probing individual paths to activity, as well as private, intimate relationships with family members. Focus groups, therefore, would be less appropriate to offer comfortable environment for such conversations.

3.3. Sample, Data Sources, Access and Data Collected

The sample used in this study was purposive. To ensure high variability of data I decided to recruit study participants, who could be deemed active, as well as those inactive politically. Considering that some evidence pointed to ideological position having influence on propensity to participate (Quaranta, 2013, p. 514), I chose to contact two organisations that had access to potentially active young people, and also had a conservative and liberal/left-leaning profile respectively.

The main activity of the first organisation was a leadership training project, aiming to provide youth civic leaders from around Poland with the knowledge and skills needed to progress with their own local initiatives. Based on the curriculum of the training project, the networking possibilities offered and the list of speaking guests invited, this organisation was considered to have a conservative profile. The recruitment of study participants was aided by the training project coordinator, who distributed my invitation among the training project participants to take part in my study, with my contact details provided. Eight young participants were recruited from this source.

The second organisation I chose to contact was a youth regional assembly, specifically a youth engagement project funded by one of the regional assemblies.

Youth regional assemblies are not required by law, they serve as consultative bodies, encouraging young people's involvement in local government issues. Each youth assembly functions in accordance with an internal code of conduct. Candidates normally should already be representatives of pupils' school councils, youth councils, youth or student organisations, or non-governmental organisations working with young people. Youth assembly councillors are approved by the regional assembly executive body. The youth assembly chosen for this study was set up by a regional assembly controlled by opposition parties. Administrative support of the youth assembly was contracted out to a local non-governmental organisation. Recruitment of study participants from this source was also carried out through a gatekeeper — the youth assembly project coordinator. The coordinator distributed my invitation to take part in my study among youth councillors, who could be assigned to a liberal, or left-leaning wing of the assembly. Five participants were recruited from this source.

The last source of study participants secured recruitment of potentially inactive young people. I placed an invitation, to take part in a PhD study, on a social media platform on a number of online forums dedicated to advertisements in localities within one voivodeship that was chosen for convenience reasons for potential face-to-face interviews. The invitation stipulated an age requirement. Interviews were set up following initial contact where I explained the study's topic and secured consent to take part in the interview. After securing two interviews I then used the snowballing technique in order to contact more participants. Six participants in total were recruited through this method.

Young participants recruited for the study came from post-transformation cohorts and their date of birth was confirmed at the recruitment stage. I defined post-transformation cohorts as people born after 29 December 1989, the day when the

Polish parliament approved the change in the country's constitution, The Polish People's Republic was renamed as the Republic of Poland, and the leading role of the Communist Party was removed from the constitution's text. The choice of date had to be arbitrary, since there were many events leading up to and during the systemic transformation, such as the round-table talks of spring 1989, the partially-democratic parliamentary elections of June 1989, the first democratic presidential elections of 1990, the first democratic parliamentary elections of 1991 as well as the consequent decisions and reforms undertaken (Dudek, 2019). The chosen date was of symbolic value and important from a legal point of view, meaning that all Poles born after this day were citizens of the Republic.

I asked young participants to, on my behalf, invite one of their parents to take part in the study. After initial agreement and exchange of contact details, I was able to secure interviews with the parents of 13 out of 19 of my participants. In total, I conducted 32 interviews, with 19 young Poles and 13 parents. Tables 1 and 2 summarise information about the parents and young people recruited to this study.

Table 1

YOUNG POLES			PARENTS				
Interviewee number	Year of birth	Male /Female	Self- identifying as active (A) or inactive (I)	Interviewee number	Year of birth	Male /Female	Self- identifying as active (A) or inactive (I)
1	2000	М	А	7	1971	F	I
2	1991	F	А	x	Х	Х	Х
3	1994	М	А	4	1970	F	I
5	1996	М	А	6	1970	F	I
9	1995	М	А	10	1971	F	I
11	2004	F	I	12	1980	F	I
13	1998	F	А	30	1966	F	А
14	1994	М	I	X	Х	Х	Х
15	2001	М	I	28	1968	F	I
16	1996	F	I	20	1958	F	I
17	1990	М	I	21	1966	М	I
18	1993	F	I	X	Х	Х	Х
19	1992	М	I	29	1970	F	I
22	1998	F	А	8	1952	М	I
23	2003	F	А	31	1978	F	Ι
24	1999	М	А	32	1972	М	I
25	1999	F	А	X	Х	Х	Х

Information About Study Participants (X Denotes no Interview Available)

26	2002	F	А	Х	Х	Х	Х
27	1995	Μ	А	х	Х	Х	Х

Table 2

Collated Information About the Study Participants

Young Poles		Self-identifying as active
		(A) or inactive (I)
Educational level:		
Secondary	8	6 A / 2 I
Degree	11	6 A / 5 I
Female	9	6 A / 3 I
Male	10	6A / 4 I
Marital status:		
Unmarried	19	12 A / 7 I
Married	0	
Divorced	0	
Employment status:		
Studying/in school	6	4 A / 2 I
In employment	5	2 A / 3 I
Studying & working	8	6 A / 2 I
Not in employment	0	0 A / 0 I
Place of residence:		
<50,000 residents	7	4 A / 3 I
50,000–100,000 residents	2	2 A / 0 I
>100,000 residents	10	6 A / 4 I

Parents	Self-identifying as active		
		(A) or inactive (I)	
Educational level:			
Secondary	6	0 A / 6 I	
Degree	7	1 A / 6 I	
Female	10	1 A / 9 I	
Male	3	0 A / 3 I	
Marital status:			
Unmarried	2	0 A / 2 I	
Married	10	1 A / 9 I	
Divorced	1	0 A / 1 I	
Employment status:			
In employment	11	0 A / 11 I	
Not in employment	2	1 A / 1 I	
Place of residence:			
<50,000 residents	5	1 A / 4 I	
50,000–100,000 residents	1	0 A / 1 I	
>100,000 residents	7	0 A / 7 I	

Young participants were between 16 and 29 years old at the time of conducting interviews, with 9 female and 10 male interviewees. The age range of the youth sample is roughly in line with the age ranges considered to cover adolescence (Grasso, 2016). Considering that the study was of an exploratory nature, it was regarded valuable to include the voices of individuals across the adolescence age range. Among the young participants 5 were in full-time jobs, 6 were concentrating

solely on studying or school, and the remaining 8 were employed as well as studying. 10 young interviewees had a higher degree, the rest were either still in school or in the process of getting a degree. The above participants' characteristics were in line with the Polish population's attributes, according to which 93% of 15–19 year-olds are in educational system, and 44% of 25–34 year-olds achieve higher education degree (OECD, 2019). As for the pre-transformation cohort, since the sample was based on the initial recruitment of the young, and the age of becoming a parent differs from individual to individual, the parents ages were quite diverse, with interviewees born between 1952 and 1980. Young interviewees were not instructed to choose the father or the mother when inviting parents on my behalf to take part in the interview. The resulting sample consisted of 3 fathers and 10 mothers.

The young interviewees' sample, which consisted of 12 active and 7 inactive individuals, does not appear to differentiate majorly when it comes to activity identification. The main characteristics are reflected similarly among both groups, for example among the inactive there were three female and four male, and among the active there were six female and six male. Among the inactive two individuals were still in school, three were employed, and two were studying and working, compared to, among the active: four individuals were in school, two were employed and six were studying and working, etc. The parent sample consisted of one active and 12 inactive individuals, and activity identification was not used as a recruitment filter. The active individual's characteristics reflect the make-up of the majority of the sample, except for the employment status — the active interviewee at the time of the interview was between jobs.

3.4. Data Collection and the Process of its Analysis

The data was collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews. The interview scenario was piloted with 3 young people and 1 parent, to make sure that the questions were worded and the topics introduced clearly. The final scenario used in the study is presented in Appendix 1. The interviews were conducted in Polish, and lasted between 20 to 75 minutes. The interviews were recorded using an audio-recorder, generating a total of over 23 hours of recording, and transcribed for analysis. The data coding was done using the data analysis software NVivo 12. Excerpts from Polish transcriptions of interviews were translated into English, and used in the text of the thesis where appropriate. Two full interviews, one with a parent and one with a young person, have been translated in full and are presented in Appendices 4 and 5.

For the data analysis I used the qualitative content analysis method, as the flexibility of this approach best suited the data collected (Cavanagh, 1997). Most importantly, given the study's focus on self-definitions and conceptualisations, the value of a responsive and systematic method, particularly one that allows the researcher's immersion in the interviewees' language, cannot be underestimated. The content analysis of interviews allows for systematic, structured examination by the researcher, whose task is to arrange interview text of alike meanings under appropriate categories (codes). Categories must be "mutually exclusive and exhaustive" (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 10). The researcher can then perform manifest and latent analysis, the former concentrating on what is explicitly communicated — the content of communication, and the latter aims to interpret the hidden, contextual meaning (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 4).

In my analysis I focused on manifest meanings, guided by my research questions. Coding of interviews was a deductive-inductive process (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 4), that is, I began with developing a skeleton coding frame, based on topics found in the research questions informed by existing literature. Such approach is in line with common guidance on starting the process of coding with previously prepared codes referring to the conceptual framework the research uses (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 58). The codeframe was further expanded to include sub-codes arising organically from data (Schreier, 2012). Codes and sub-codes (or nodes and sub-nodes to use NVivo vocabulary) contained text which, in a succinct and clear way, signified the meaning of the portion of the text it was applied to.

To begin the process, I read and re-read all of the interview transcripts. Following an initial coding of four interviews for each group (parents and young people) a coding frame was then set up, with codes/categories derived from the research questions. Sub-codes were added along the way, when encountering passages to which none of the existing sub-codes applied, making sure they were mutually exclusive. A few weeks later, to achieve consistency in applying codes (Schreier, 2012, p. 146), the same four interviews were coded again, and some changes were made to the sub-codes.

Following this step, all interviews were coded using the revised framework, with some further additions or adjustments at the sub-codes level, in particular, grouping similar sub-codes and reorganising them. After one week, to achieve intra-coder reliability, I performed another check of the codeframe with another coding session, reviewing my coding decisions, this time with some minimal tweaks. I then looked for any patterns, contradictions and consistency in data aggregated through the coding process, in preparation for writing down the analysis findings.

The parents' and young Poles' interviews were coded separately within the software environment to allow for comfortable later analysis and comparisons, the

codeframes sharing the majority of the main nodes. The contents of both codeframes were concurrently checked, and re-checked throughout codeframe development, so that comparability was achieved. The final codeframes are presented in Appendices 2 and 3.

3.5. Validity

Accessing the quality and legitimacy of qualitative research is regarded as a challenging matter, having generated heated debates over the years; for example see the discussions by: Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, (2001, p. 525) and Maxwell, (1992, p. 279). As such, consensus over assessment criteria is still to be reached. The validity criteria I considered for this study included credibility, criticality and integrity, see (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001, p. 534).

With respect to credibility, that is the factual accuracy of researcher's account (Maxwell, 1992, p. 285), or the consideration if "the results of the research reflect the experience of participants or the context in a believable way" (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001, p. 534), this study was dependent on the individual reflections and experiences of participants, and their willingness to present themselves authentically. I therefore made sure to minimise the validity threat by employing rigorous data collection and analysis.

That said, when conducting social research in Poland one has be aware of the public verses private opinion phenomenon. Public opinion polling in Poland flourished following the Second World War, with surveys becoming increasingly politicized from the late 1950s. Conducting social research in a communist country meant that respondents tended to have both public and private opinions, and would share only politically correct views, in particular in surveys dealing with political and ideological preferences. The difficult relationship the Polish public has had with social research,

and opinion surveys in particular, meant that results of polls taken in communist times were "disparate, spotty, and often contradictory" (McGregor, 1984, p. 33) and surveys had high levels of non-response or "don't know" responses (Henn, 1998, p. 236). Therefore, the above mentioned phenomenon may be a remnant of a habituated behaviour aimed at avoiding the consequences of disclosing opinions against the Party's lines (Sułek, 1990). Some evidence confirms that the citizens of post-communist countries still exercise self-control and may experience fear when expressing views in public (Rose, 2007). This context needs to be taken into account, in particular when considering parental responses in my study.

I therefore made every effort to create a comfortable and informal atmosphere when conducting the interviews, taking inspiration from an advice to "appear slightly dim and agreeable" (McCracken, 1988, p. 38, as citied by Adams, 2015, p. 502). Sometimes my non-challenging, yet persistent pursuit of an answer resulted in an interviewee challenging my questions, like in the case of the conversation with interviewee P4-I below:

Researcher: How do you understand and what political activity means to you?

Interviewee 4: In my opinion engagement starts with not being indifferent...[continues to slowly present an answer] But the question is at a such general level....Sigmund Freud famously said that what we have in our minds comes out of our mouth...and it is true, you are yet again using this adjective "political" in another question....

Researcher: I understand. I am interested how would you define what is political activity? Do you consider yourself politically active?

Interviewee 4: But what it means to be politically active?

Researcher: I am trying to pose this question to all the people I talk to in my interviews.

Interviewee 4: well...To act politically...you don't have to be a professional politician to act politically. Politically means to fit into certain rules...[continues to present the definition].

As explained earlier for transparency reasons, I was supported by two gatekeepers to recruit young people to my study. I provided information about the study objectives when contacting gatekeepers within organisations, and throughout the recruitment process. Gatekeepers may affect who participates in research by consciously "filtering" individuals, however it is not possible to establish if and how using gatekeepers impacted the selection of my young interviewees, and consequently, the make-up of the sample and data collected.

The researchers' personal characteristics may also have an impact on the quality of data collected. The research participant may be tempted to provide certain answers to avoid the researcher's disapproval, or to deliberately hide some opinions because of the social norms prohibiting the certain attitudes, behaviours or beliefs (Nowak, 1985). Considering that my interviewees potentially may have wanted to discuss current political affairs and alter their opinions because of the researcher's views, firstly, I made sure throughout this process to follow commonly accepted guidelines for conducting interviews, offering both a neutral and non-judgmental environment for the conversation, see for example (Adams, 2015). I also made sure that none of my social media handles were public, thus excluding any possibility of the interviewees learning about the researcher's personal opinions.

With respect to criticality and integrity, that is the need for critical analysis of evidence and the research process, and interpretations grounded on data (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001, p. 531), I attended to potential validity threats by paying attention to data that did not fit the conceptual framework, taking into consideration alternative explanations when ambiguities arose and providing evidence to support interpretations in my analysis (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001, p. 533).

3.6. Ethical Issues and Confidentiality

The design of this study followed the examining university's guidelines on research ethics (University of Gloucestershire, 2021). I recognise that some of the conversations I was facilitating were touching on topics that could be considered contentious. What is more, interviewees were volunteering opinions they may have been reluctant to share in public, and also some of them were of young age. Considering the above, I conducted my research in a way that protected the rights of people involved, respecting their dignity, integrity and privacy. In particular, I communicated during the recruitment stage and throughout the interview that interviewees' confidentiality will be preserved. In particular, I conveyed that I would not disclose my interviewees' names during the fieldwork nor in the thesis, also making sure that I did not provide any contextual details (such as names of organisations, political parties, places, schools, and so on) in the thesis, which may have suggested involvement of particular individuals.

Interviewees were informed of their right to withdraw from the interview, their freedom to not to answer interview questions and decline participation at any moment of their involvement. I also informed participants that all data gathered as a result of interviews, the audio-recorder files, transcripts, e-mails, notes or other documents, would be kept in safe conditions. I required and received confirmation of understanding of the above arrangements from all participants.

3.7. Challenges Posed by the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic

Interviews were conducted over two periods: from September 2019 to February 2020 and from September 2020 to January 2021. The face-to-face interviews took place in a variety of settings that were comfortable for the interviewees and conducive for focused conversation. Toward the end of the first period it became apparent that conducting further interviews was impossible because of the safety restrictions put in place due to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. I was able to restart the interviews in the last quarter of 2020 and all of the remaining meetings were conducted using video-conferencing platforms or over the phone, and some involved further e-mail correspondence.

I believe no major negative impact was caused by not conducting some interviews in person. The researcher and the interviewees were able to build enough of a rapport to warrant honest and insightful responses, in particular because the majority of the population at this point already had experience in using online conferencing platforms or other technological means, e.g. at work, while studying or to keep contact with friends and family. Existing research on conducting in-depth interviews using online technologies does not find the general quality of interviews to differ from face-to-face meetings (Gray et al., 2020; Nehls, Smith and Schneider, 2015; Deakin and Wakefield, 2013).

That said, there are specific measures that should be undertaken by the researcher prior to and during such interviews. Providing clear technical information about the interview set up, and being in prior contact with interviewees builds rapport (Deaking and Wakefield, 2013); friendly communication, for example by e-mail, prior to the online interview, builds trust between the researcher and the interviewee (Nehls, Smith and Schneider, 2015).

My online interviewees were provided technical details about the interview a few days beforehand. Interviews were conducted using the University of Gloucestershire Microsoft Office researcher's account and utilised the MS Teams programme (which did not require the online meeting participant to download any software, as the meeting can be held within browser environment), or Skype (which is a free-of-charge programme). Concurrent to online (or telephone) interviews, after receiving consent, the interviews were recorded using an audio-recorder. The technical set up at the start of the interview was a convenient warm-up stage, where interviewee and the researcher were able to get to know each other, any technical issues providing a "bonding" experience (Archibald et al., 2019). Most of the interviews went according to plan, though in the case of three, due to the quality of Internet connection, during the interview either the video had to be turned off, keeping only the sound on, or the interview switched to telephone conversation. Most of the participants used computers or phones with Internet connection.

Online interviews generally lasted a little longer than the face to face meetings, accommodating any technical problems, the researcher making sure that participants heard and understood all of the questions. The flow of conversations, any repetitions or pausing, did not differ from other face-to-face meetings, which is in line with the findings of Deakin and Wakefield (2013). Video conferencing allowed both sides to read each other's facial expressions and body language. The researcher, in particular in such circumstances as above, made a point of keeping eye contact, and using active listening methods, in order to facilitate an engaged, natural and focused conversation (Nehls, Smith and Schneider, 2015).

All in all, I did not identify any major differences in terms of outputs between the face-to-face and online interviews. Video-conferencing was an alternative that eased

access to participants and allowed for certain flexibility of arrangements. Conducting interviews online did not impact negatively the process of data collection and analysis, which, needs to be emphasised, focused on manifest content.

3.8. Limitations of the Study

In the absence of a baseline, in-depth understanding of the contents of Poles' citizenship norms in the post-communist reality, and inconclusive evidence from quantitative studies using conceptualisations applicable for Western populations, my aim was to introduce the individual perspective of young Poles and their parents. As such, using qualitative methods did have its limitations — the purposive sample was of a size big enough to provide data saturation and manageable, given the constraints of a PhD dissertation. The young people's sample was generally consistent with the demographic make-up, however the parent sample was smaller in size due to difficulty in access to data (13 out of 19 young Poles' parents agreed to take part in the interview). Young interviewees, acting as gatekeepers, were asked to gain approval for an interview with one of their parents, without any communicated researcher's preference for maternal or paternal side. The resulting parents sample was made of 10 mothers and 3 fathers, which may have introduced sex-specific perspectives, which were not anticipated by this study design.

Furthermore, resource constraints meant that this study explored the parentchild dyad by recruiting one of the parents of each participant. The voice of the second parent may have been useful in understanding the dynamics of the household and the socialisation processes more comprehensively, allowing the exploration of the contribution of each parent. As presented earlier, some evidence explains that successful transmission of values, norms and attitudes has been found to be higher households, where parents have shared political views (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). Therefore, exploring citizenship norms and political socialisation through triads could have brought more data regarding the congruence between cohorts. There is, however, mixed evidence regarding compared levels of influence of mothers and fathers. Some research points to a greater influence of mothers on political attitudes, see for example (Shulman and DeAndrea, 2014). Beck and Jennings (1975) also argued that fathers will take on a leading role if mothers are not particularly politicised. More recently Boonen (2017) claimed that both parents influence offspring correspondingly.

Finally, two gatekeepers, who facilitated access to the young conservatives seminar and the regional youth council members, may have unintentionally introduced biases into the recruitment of participants.

4. Findings: The Contents Of The Citizenship Norm, How it is Fulfilled And Perceptions Of it Being Passed On.

This chapter presents findings from the 32 qualitative in-depth interviews conducted with young Poles and their parents for this study. The chapter is divided into four main sections, each addressing one of the Research Objectives stated earlier. There is a summary of findings at the end of each part. An example interview transcript with a parent and a young Pole can each be found in the Appendices section.

The first section addresses Research Objective 1, which was to understand the perceptions of citizenship norms among Poles. In particular, it examined both normative and empirical expectations, and the perceived consequences of citizenship norm adherence or lack of it, so addressing Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The second section then presents findings in relation to Research Objective 2, which set out to explore how citizenship norms are fulfilled through Poles' political practice and the perceptions of barriers that impact upon the participation of Poles, as well as to address Research Question 5 and 6.

The third section details the findings in relation to Research Objective 3, which was to understand the perceptions of parental influence on citizenship norms of the young Poles, as well as to address Research Question 7.

Finally, the fourth section focuses on Research Objective 4, which was to explore the feeling of political efficacy among Poles, and its corresponding Research Question 8.

This chapter is structured in such a way so as to aid comparison between the parents' and the young Poles' samples; to this end, each research question responses' are presented separately for the two cohorts, where possible.

Further, for reasons of clarity, when excerpts from interviews are used, the interviewee number is preceded by either a "P" (which stands for parent), or a "Y" (which stands for young Pole). Similarly, since analysis of some responses was structured around either inactive and active identification, the interviewee number is followed by either an "A" (active), or an "I" (inactive).

4.1. Research Objective 1: The Citizenship Norms of Young Poles and Their Parents

It should be noted from the outset, prior to analysing the contents of the citizenship norms, that the word "citizen" (*obywatel* in Polish) itself may not have completely neutral connotations in contemporary Poland. It can be perceived as a very official, formal word, with a slight political tinge. A large portion of the population, who lived during, and remembers well, the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa* or *PRL*) times that spanned 1947–89, can feel a certain discomfort when in contact with the term "citizen".

The above is because the PRL period has been judged negatively by the majority of Poles (Feliksiak, 2009), as a time of widespread repressions, loss of national independence and a dire economic situation. During the PRL, addressing Poles as *obywatel* was the preferred way of address by the official authorities of state in their public propaganda activity (Party members would use the term "comrade" among themselves). *Obywatel*, most importantly, was the way the state police —

"Civic Police" (*Milicja Obywatelska*) addressed Polish people, instead of the traditionally accepted titles of Mr/Ms (*pan/pani*).

In post-transformation times, the term may be associated with the formal status of a inhabitant of the Polish territory, and *obywatel* is also the name of the official administration portal through with majority of official matters (like paying taxes, registering a car, renewing passport, etc.) can be arranged. Perceiving the term *obywatel* in a political context may be related to the fact that one of the main parliamentary political formations is called the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*), and that this party ruled in Poland between 2007–2015.

For the post-transformation cohorts, the term formally arises during the civic education classes in primary and secondary schools, where they learn from the Constitution of Poland that "the Polish Republic is for the common good of all citizens" (Sejm RP, 1997).

To sum up, the above mentioned contemporary connotations of the word "citizen" can be perceived in contrast with the decidedly positive tinge the term had, at the time it was entering the common Polish vocabulary in the 18th century. The term *obywatel*, derived from the Czech language with the meaning "inhabitant", was initially used only in relation to the nobility and wealthy bourgeoisie (Adamkiewicz, 2019). After the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794, the term *obywatel* ceased to apply only to selected classes, but also began to be used in relation to members of the poorer classes and the insurgents, fighting against the Partition of Poland. Kościuszko addressed all soldiers, regardless of their origin as "citizens" (Adamkiewicz, 2019). The term *obywatel* in these contexts embodied the attitude of a Pole as a patriot and participant, also often the initiator, of positive changes in the country.

4.1.1. Research Question 1: How do Young Poles and Their Parents Define a Good Citizen?

As per the definition of a citizenship norm presented in Chapter 2 (pp. 28–30), interviewees were asked some questions in relation to it. First, they presented their understanding of the concept of a good citizen; secondly, in order to explore their understanding of the citizen's role in relation to political matters, interviewees discussed what constituted political activity for them. The responses to these questions were analysed and together formed their normative expectations, that is, which behaviours young Poles and their parents believed are perceived as desirable.

In order to understand what their empirical expectations were, the interviewees were also asked to describe what they believed was the generally practiced behaviour regarding the political activity of Poles.

Finally, to explore how the interviewees adhered to their citizenship norms, young Poles and their parents were asked about any feedback regarding their political activity received from others.

The Moral View of Citizenship. Parental good citizen definitions, in contrast to their offspring's, mainly used language relating to personal character. The straightforward "a good citizen is a good person" was mostly given as a first answer, often backed up by other descriptions of a tolerant, respectful, honest or well behaved person. Being a good person does not exclude being a citizen, however, the emphasis on the personal sphere and lack of reference to the state or political matters was very clear. It is also difficult to operationalise this rule — to be a good person is to rely on personal, individual understanding of what being good entails. One parent pondered whether using the term citizen is even needed:

A good citizen is a good person, what difference does it make whether we call him a citizen or a person? Well, there is only one more thing, that being a good person, to simplify, is being good to others and to yourself, and being a good citizen is being good to others, to yourself, but also to your homeland, coresponsible for good or bad citizens, whoever, for another human being. (Interviewee P4-I)

The interviewees gave examples of the qualities of a good citizen as an honest, conscientious, tolerant, well-behaved, family-caring, cultured person, who can be relied upon, for example:

He lets other people live, does not comment on it, does not criticize, accepts them... Being such a noble person, it is also important to have your own opinion, but with respect for other people. (Interviewee P10-I)

The personal, moral context appeared, as one parent elaborated that to be a good citizen one has to rely on their conscience:

Live in accordance with your conscience. Be good to your family, at work, so that... It seems to me that if you live this way, the state will also be in a good condition, a better condition. (Interviewee P20-I)

This "character" component is an example of an informal rule, which does not offer direct and clear instruction how to behave — for it to be effective, it has to exist in a wider context of shared moral values. It was possible to identify a minimal instructional message in the norm, contained in the rule of not behaving in a way which could be bothersome for others, or could have negative impact on them: "To be simply a good person, to do no harm to anyone, above all" (interviewee P20-I) or, as another interviewee explained: "A good citizen, that is a good person, who above all does not

hurt another person" (interviewee P10-I). Parents used in their definitions either only a "good person" rule and corresponding character traits, or mentioned this rule in their more comprehensive answers.

The above relational, character component also featured in the response of the young people, in all cases as part of a longer definition. One young interviewee had trouble himself to describe who the "good citizen as a good person" is: "I don't know how to...well, everybody knows who a good person is, what the traits are, which are understood as good, as accepted as good." (interviewee Y19-I), a finding that again points to the wider normative context that the rule exists in. Young interviewees pointed to good character traits like helping out those in need, not being egoistical: "not only thinking about yourself, about your loved ones, but also about the welfare of other people" (interviewee Y22-A) and being able to "sacrifice for others" (interviewee Y15-I), as well as through volunteering. Young people spoke about not only being reactive when someone is in a difficult situation, but also being vocal when someone is not following the rules, such as "throwing rubbish or destroying something" (interviewee Y25-A). Where parental definitions pointed to the more passive behaviour of not harming anyone and being respectful, young Poles emphasised a more active approach.

The Patriotic View of Citizenship. Another element of the definition contributed by parents consisted of a sphere of behaviours and attitudes related to Poland, as a nation. In those instances, the informal rules took on a patriotic tone — parents talked about respecting the homeland as such, as well as national symbols, and supporting the native economy: "hang the flag and buy 590"³ (interviewee P12-I), the importance of historical knowledge: "to be a good citizen is first and foremost ... for me, history is of great importance, so to remember your past." (interviewee P7-I), and about caring for the country, the immediate environment and not "badmouthing your homeland" (interviewee P21-I). Interviewees also drew attention to the sphere of work, emphasising working "for Poland" as goal, and in consequence, building the country's wealth:

Work for Poland and not for other nations. Poland is [the] only one [nation]. Beautiful and communal. And we all should strive for prosperity in Poland. We have the conditions for that. After all, Poland occupies the middle of Europe, and the first union was formed in Poland. And we really have very talented people. (Interviewee P8-I)

This patriotic strand was also visible in the statements of young Poles — the issue of respect for the state was accompanied by respect for the homeland, national symbols and the territorial defence of the country. As one of the interviewees pointed out, the nation and the state had not been synonymous concepts for Polish people until quite recently. More than 100 years of partitions ending after the First World War and later the de facto occupation of the country, through to the control of internal politics by a foreign state during the period of communism, that lasted from the end of the Second World War until 1989, meant that:

³ Polish code in the product barcode system

The nation has not always been identified with the state. Only recently have we been lucky enough to have us Poles as the country's hosts. So being a good citizen has not always meant being a good Pole... Being a good citizen, first of all, in Poland is only just being coined and we are only just getting used to the fact that we should respect the state, national symbols, laws, taxes, national history and have national pride... A deeper definition of a citizen is a person who identifies himself with a community, firstly, national, and secondly, relating to the state. (Interviewee Y2-A)

As successive interviewees stated, a good citizen "is above all someone who loves his country" (interviewee Y18-I), someone who "first and foremost wants to do good for his country, for his homeland" (interviewee Y24-A), and also "it would be good if, in case of last resort, he defended his country" (interviewee Y24-A). There was also a voice concerned about the image of Poland abroad: "we all know how to represent the country here in Poland, while abroad, unfortunately, they have a bad opinion about Polish people." (interviewee Y14-I). Contributing to Poland's progress was also seen as an overarching aim that can be achieved through different means:

I think that very often ordinary people who do not have any extensive knowledge, but simply work, do not disturb anyone and if they... if they act in such a way that they do not harm anyone, then I think this is also very important. Because building a country is not just... it's not just culture, it's not just an approach to the economy, it's not just civic activity, it's just, as I say, everyone doing their own thing. (Interviewee Y9-A)

Citizenship as Being Active. The next element of the definition of a good citizen that appeared in parental statements was the sphere of behaviour and attitudes

directly related to citizen activity. The interviewees primarily indicated here that a good citizen participates not only in elections, but also in referendums, and is simply active in political life. Informal parental rules indicating certain behaviours were limited to formal methods of political participation, but one of the parents signalled the need for good citizen to "be interested in political life" (interviewee P30-A), which is considered in the literature as that engaged style of citizenship.

References to citizen activity presented in young interviewees definitions on the other hand were more varied and included engaged as well as duty-based elements. In relation to the former, young Poles indicated an interest in political matters or current affairs as an activity a good citizen should engage in, in particular to keep an eye on "old men" creating laws:

I think it is worth being interested and aware of what is going on in politics nowadays...because politics is not only about older men quarrelling all the day but also it is things...well it is easy to ignore politics, because it does not apply to us. But in truth, they are creating law, something we have to abide by, so it is worth knowing what is going on and understanding it. (Interviewee Y26-A)

Furthermore, such interest should be extended, according to some respondents, to all matters in the public sphere, not only politics, but also "events which can have impact on other people... if there is some catastrophe, natural disaster, a good citizen should be interested in and know about this, and provide help" (interviewee Y24-A). Interest in gaining basic knowledge about the state administration was also thought to be important for good citizens, who should be monitoring what is happening and possibly intervening in relation to the actions taken by the state:

Such a name [good citizen] is reserved for the people who really know what is going on in the state, know the governing bodies of the state, who is who, who is a minister of what and so on. It is worth knowing this, because it is the basis of the functioning of the state. (Interviewee Y11-I)

In addition, the young thought that a good citizen should be "involved". The spheres where citizens can display this type of behaviour varied. The local community was mentioned a number of times:

A good citizen is someone who cares about his community in various dimensions, in various aspects, shows this care for the community... Good citizen is someone who is involved socially on different levels, but it does not have to be the highest, national level, it can be involvement in those small local communities, because this is also a great mission. (Interviewee Y3-A)

The young also spoke favourably about involvement in non-governmental initiatives as well as general involvement and participation in democracy; for example praising the fact that one can be effective and influential in politics, while retaining an expert role:

If there is a possibility, then one should get involved in the third sector, because you really do not have to participate in political decision-making by being a politician yourself, a member of a political party. People reach many decisionmaking positions and need help in substantive issues. Really, you can realize yourself very well in this expert role. (Interviewee Y1-A)

It is worth noting that neither involvement in the local community nor NGOs as a sphere for citizen activity were not present in parental responses. Another engaged citizenship aspect, that appeared in their offsprings' definitions, was "expressive" activity. The young emphasised the need to have their "own opinion and values" (interviewee Y23-A), in order to "objectively assess what is happening in Poland, and somehow, if something really bad is happening, know how to react" (interviewee Y11-I), sometimes "being critical about certain decisions" (interviewee Y9-A).

Lastly, young interviewees pointed to elections, mentioning how important it is to vote, how it is "a citizen's duty", and that this participation has to be very conscious: "generally, everyone has to vote and consider politicians' programmes. I know this a very idealistic approach, but this is how it should be" (interviewee Y1-A).

The State-Citizen Relationship within Citizenship. A further element of parental definitions included the sphere of behaviour concerning the state, i.e., obeying the law:

Whatever the case, obey all kinds of laws, even if they are not good and do not fulfil what they were supposed to fulfil, but they exist, someone invented them, and we have to comply with them. (Interviewee P21-I)

Paying taxes was also seen as an important activity:

Above all, to make your payments, because it must be a continuity and you have to pay taxes honestly, because for me it is also a responsibility and tax patriotism. (Interviewee P7-I)

Not being a burden on the state was also mentioned in parents' responses:

Working, not abusing state welfare aid. This applies to people who are healthy and resourceful in life, but the state has an obligation to help those who cannot manage on their own. (Interviewee P28-I)

Rules regarding relations between the citizen and the state were also present in young interviewees' definitions, and again, they were more comprehensive than those provided by parents. Paying taxes "politely", even though it is unlikely the young paid taxes⁴ themselves (apart from VAT) was included as a norm in some of their responses:

Well, to fulfil those civic duties and privileges, those privileges of participation and so on, but also to bear the burden, to pay taxes, not to run away from it. Not to try to steal from the state, as was the case with the VAT issue scandal. (Interviewee Y19-I)

Similarly to the parents' definitions, being law abiding, not committing crimes, was thought to be a "basic thing for a good citizen" (interviewee 26). The young expanded on the relation with the state, adding, that the individual should not "act in a way that harms the state" (interviewee Y16-I) and should respect it. As one interviewee explained, it is crucial to take responsibility for "what kind of state he lives in... cares about the general good of the state." (interviewee Y5-A).

Detailed Response Analysis. It is worth seeing how the elements identified above map onto interviewee responses. The below two tables present, side by side,

⁴ Income for people below the age of 26 is tax-exempt in Poland.

the contents of parental and young people's definitions of a good citizen. The elements were colour-coded for analytical clarity.⁵

The first table (Table 3) groups together young people's definitions of a good citizen as someone who, among other elements, is involved in the community, that is who acts in various organisations or takes part in informal initiatives.

Table 3

Contents of Parental and Young Poles' Definitions of a Good Citizen (Community Focused)

Interviewee Number	Parents' Definition of a Good Citizen	Interviewee Number	Young Poles' Definition of a Good Citizen
P4-I	A GOOD PERSON TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS	Y3-A	IS NOT INDIFFERENT RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR THE STATE
			INVOLVED IN LOCAL
P6-I	A GOOD PERSON TOLERANT NOT HARMING ANYONE	Y5-A	VOTER PAYS TAXES TAKES PART IN
			INITIATIVES

⁵ Colours used: purple — character elements; blue — duty-based elements (state and Poland-focused); red — duty-based elements (voting and formal political methods); green — engaged elements.

P7-I	SENSIBLE VOTER KNOW POLISH HISTORY PROMOTING POLAND PAYING TAXES RESPONSIBLE FOR FAMILY	Y1-A	VOTER INVOLVED IN NGO INTERESTED IN POLITICS
P8-I	BUILDING POLAND'S PROSPERITY THROUGH WORK	Y22-A	VOTER EXPRESSES OPINIONS CARING ABOUT OTHERS INVOLVED IN LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN NGO
P10-I	A GOOD PERSON NOT HARMING OTHERS TOLERANT HELPFUL WELL BEHAVED	Y9-A	PROUD TO BE POLISH WORKING FOR THE PROSPERITY OF POLAND INDEPENDENT THINKING LOCAL ACTIVITY
P12-I	DISPLAYING NATIONAL FLAG BUYING POLISH PRODUCE PROTECTING POLISH TERRITORY IN CASE OF WAR	Y11-I	KNOWLEDGABLE ABOUT THE STATE ADMINISTRATION INDEPENDENT THINKING INTERESTED IN POLITICS

P30-A	Voter	Y13-A	VOTER
	TAKES PART IN REFERENDUMS WORKING AND PAYING TAXES ACCORDINGLY INTERESTED IN POLITICS		PAYS TAXES KNOWS POLISH HISTORY ABIDES BY THE LAW INVOLVED IN LOCAL COMMUNITY
P31-I	Voter Politically active	Y23-A	VOTER PATRIOTIC CARES ABOUT POLAND HAVE OWN OPINIONS HELPING OTHER PEOPLE
P32-I	Politically active Honest	Y24-A	VOTER CARES ABOUT POLAND PATRIOTIC PROTECTS POLAND'S BORDERS IN CASE OF WAR INTERESTED IN POLITICS

Among young Poles' responses, engaged and duty-based appeared concurrently – norms about helping those in need occurred along-side norms about activities relating to the state and feelings for the country, or, an emphasis on voting

appeared alongside involvement in local communities. Therefore, none of the above young interviewees' definitions can be interpreted as examples of pure duty-based and engaged types of citizenship found in the literature, details of which were presented in Chapter 2 (see pages 33-36). Rather, it was possible to identify, in all but one, some all-around definitions (Oser, 2017), that is definitions of a good citizen defined using both, engaged citizenship and duty-based norms.

There were minimal similarities within all of the parent-child pairs, which is to be expected, given the particularity of most parental definitions and how wide-ranging were those of the young. Single elements, like voting, character or patriotic traits, were visible in the parent's as well as the child's conceptions. Similarity between two elements were visible in the definitions of only one pair. This pair of interviewees provided similar sentiments: in both definitions we find the duty-based elements, like voting and paying taxes, as well as engaged elements, like the young person's involvement in the local community and the parental interest in politics. Their full definitions are presented below:

- To be considered a good citizen you have to take part in elections, referenda....You have to work and pay taxes honestly. Also, you have to be interested in what's going on in political life. (Interviewee P30-A Parent)
- To be a good citizen is to pay taxes, yes, that's how it is in the system, paying taxes politely. Also, it is to know the past, have this view, that something like that can repeat in the future, and be aware that in the past Poland was faced with dangerous situations, yes, simply learn history and don't allow past mistakes to happen. Also, be involved in the local community, vote, simply be

a good, law abiding citizen, that's what I think. (Interviewee Y13-A — young person)

Table 4 depicts the second group of definitions, containing all remaining pairs, in which the young did not define a good citizen through his or her involvement in the local community, nor the NGO sector, nor through an interest in politics.

The young people's as well as parental conceptions in this group were either a mixture of duty-based norms, some feelings for Poland, coupled with good person traits, or were limited to one definitional element answers. None of the young interviewees nor the parents in this group self-identified as active.

Table 4

Contents of Parental and Young Poles' Definitions of a Good Citizen (Other)

Interviewee Number	Parents' Definition of a Good Citizen	Interviewee Number	Young Poles' Definition of a Good Citizen
P28-I	HELPFUL	Y15-I	IS NOT INDIFFERENT
	HONEST		CARES ABOUT COUNTRY
	CARING ABOUT THE		
	COUNTRY		
	WORKING, NOT ABUSING		
	STATE BENEFIT SYSTEMS		

P20-I	GOOD PERSON	Y16-I	RESPONSIBLE FOR FAMILY
	TRUE TO YOUR		WORKING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COUNTRY
	GOOD FOR FAMILY WORKING FOR THE BENEFIT OF STATE OR THE EMPLOYER		ABIDES BY THE LAW PAYS TAXES NOT HARMING THE
	ABIDE BY THE LAW		STATE
P21-I	VOTER ABIDE BY THE LAW RESPECTING THE HOMELAND	Y17-I	PARTICIPATING IN DEMOCRACY
P29-I	A GOOD PERSON	Y19-I	A GOOD PERSON VOTER PAYS TAXES

There was also a stronger similarity of definitions in this group. The definitions below of a pair of interviewees is a good example, both expressing care for the country and good person traits:

- A good citizen is someone honest, and working, not burdening the state benefit system. Every person should help other people, if they need help, and a citizen should also take care about his country. (Interviewee P28-I – parent).
- A good citizen is someone who cares about the country, as well as the society.
 It is not a person who indifferent to what is happening, and is using his voice to help, to improve the situation. (Interviewee Y15-I young person)

In the case of 6 young people it was not possible to obtain an interview with the

parent — their definitions of a good citizen are presented below.

Table 5

Contents of Young Poles' Definitions of a Good Citizen (Without Parent Interview)

Interviewee Number	Young Poles' Definition of a Good Citizen
Y2-A	RESPECTING THE STATE
	RESPECTING NATIONAL SYMBOLS
	KNOWS POLISH HISTORY
	PROUD TO BE POLISH
	ABIDES BY THE LAW
	PAYS TAXES

Y14-I PROMOTING POLAND

Y18-I LOVES POLAND
ABIDES BY THE LAW
INTERESTED IN POLITICS

Y25-A VOTER

A GOOD PERSON

HELPS OTHERS

INVOLVED IN NGO

Y26-A ABIDES BY THE LAW VOTER TAKES PART IN REFERENDUM INTERESTED IN POLITICS Y27-A PAYING TAXES RESPECTING NATIONAL SYMBOLS KNOWING HISTORY BEING PROUD TO BE POLISH VOTING

In the case of this group, it was possible to distinguish two definitions which emphasised only the patriotic element (interviewee Y2-A and Y14-I). Elements such

EXPRESSING OPINIONS

as feelings for the country, being law-abiding and staying interested in political matters, formed the definition of interviewee Y18-I, and as such can be identified as a standby citizen conception. The remaining definitions marry duty-based norms with engaged elements and can be identified as an all-round citizen type.

Summary of the Analysis on Research Question 1. When comparing *en masse* the contents of the definitions of a good citizen, parents and young Poles differed in their approaches. Firstly, parental definitions were limited in scope and length, some given as short as one-sentence responses, whereas the young elaborated at length on various definitional elements. This signals a certain level of political sophistication, an ability to explain topics, which are not subject to everyday discussions.

As noted already, the parents' most common response was a character definition, stressing the personal and moral context of a citizen's behaviour, which did not present itself prominently in younger interviewees responses. The definitions of both groups incorporated rules referring to positive feelings for Poland as a nation, as well as, approaches known from literature, towards the state — affirming support for the legal and tax system. The young elaborated on many types of citizen behaviour, from self-expression, interest, involvement in non-governmental organisations and local communities, to electoral activity, whereas parents focused mainly on voting in elections.

All in all, as a result of analysis of content conforming to good citizen's definitions, it was possible to find examples of all-around citizen definitions, mostly among the young. Parents and some young offered conceptions, which were clearly limited to duty-based norms, with an emphasis on patriotic feelings. Some of the

parents understood the requirements for a good citizen only through personal, familial or moral lens, a finding that enriches our understanding of social norms informing citizen behaviour in Poland.

To summarise, the normative expectation among all of the self-identifying as inactive parents can be seen as abstract and not formulating ambitious, behavioural obligations, so it can be interpreted as passive. Among the young, two approaches were visible. Firstly, mirroring parents, norms regarding citizen activity concentrated on the state, elections and the nation. Along with this approach, another conception appeared — specifically one that described a good citizen as someone well-rounded, not only respecting the state and the nation, but also aware of others and the issues present in local communities, interested in politics, and ready to express their own views.

4.1.2. Research Question 2: How do Young Poles and Their Parents Define Political Activity?

Most of the norms of citizen activity analysed in the previous section did not contain an explicit, strong need for a citizen to be engaged in political activities. Rather, the interpersonal, state-oriented and nation-loving, communal aspects were thought to be key in describing the ideal, good citizen. Voting, as the only behaviour directly linked to the world of politics, appeared here and there in definitions. It is worth interpreting responses about political activity in the context of wider attitudes toward politics and politicians. As one of the parents commented, when asked about her understanding of the term political activity, Poles can be "allergic to the word 'political"" (interviewee P4-I). **Politics as a "Cesspit".** Among the young as well as their parents, one of the most cited reason influencing levels of political activity among Poles was the negative image of the world of politics, the mechanisms that govern it, and the people involved in it. My interviewees believed that Poles not only think that politics is a "swamp, a cesspit", but this bad opinion also translates into an opinion about the structures of the state, which is ruled by a clique:

They see the state, and the structures of the state in general, as completely hostile to them. That there are "we" and "they". We just have to give some of our income to "them" and that's the way it is, our relationship ends because we don't get anything good from it anyway, right? And influence it at all? There is no option. They are a clique, as it is often called, right? And we simply cannot belong to it. (Interviewee Y1-A)

Attitudes toward the world of politics can be deduced from research on occupational prestige. Being an active member of a political party, a member of parliament, or a local councillor, not only holds the least respect and admiration in Polish society, being ranked in the bottom four of all occupations (with 20-30% of the population respecting these professions), but this assessment has also changed very little since the data started to be collected in 1995 (Omyła-Rudzka, 2019). Poles also do not trust political parties nor the parliament (24% and 33% of Poles respectively trust these institutions) (Omyła-Rudzka, 2020).

To give further context to the point above, politics in general, and political views in particular, are highly divisive for Poles. Around 47% of the population has someone among their family or friends whose political views they cannot accept. What is more, 15% of Poles has recently had an argument about political matters (Cybulska, 2017, p. 12). Therefore, perceptions informing understanding of the word "political" can be negative for some people.

Political Activity as Personal Action for Society. When it comes to characterisations of political activity, parents gave one or two examples of an activity they identified as such, or described it using a personal character trait. Mirroring their good citizen definitions, parents understood political activity as the actions or attitudes one displays in relation to their surroundings. In their responses they expanded on "personal character" definitional elements, such as caring about others, acting for the good of society, not being selfish, such as: "political activity in my opinion should involve acting for the good of society rather than satisfying own needs and whims" (interviewee P28-I), and: "To be involved in political activity is to be a leader, having an impact on reality, 'not being indifferent'" (interviewee P4-I).

Politically active people were also seen as able to adapt and manipulate interpersonal relationships:

To act politically...you don't have to be a professional politician to act politically. Politically means to fit into certain rules, standards, or to be able to juggle between different options, or to be a bit of a devil, and light a candle to God and another to the devil — this means to act politically. (Interviewee P4-I)

Young Poles also used personal character traits in their definitions, however, they put more emphasis than parents on the concept of personal impact. Interviewees believed the personal character trait of being able to exert influence was important it did not matter in which context, work or place of residence, but rather the effect itself, that is, to affect an change in reality: Fighting for better wage guarantees in your workplace or some kind of caregiver benefit, for example when female employees, working in a corporation, lobby that they are guaranteed that they finish work at 4:00 p.m., I think... that this is already some form of political activity, but in a broader sense, because it's not just that political activity means that we are members of a political party or some association, but the very fact that we act through..., how to put it, even in a group, I don't know, in own professional group or housing estate, if we want to initiate some kind of change in the existing situation, it can already be said in a certain way that we influence a given policy, the policy of the housing cooperative or the policy of a given corporation. (Interviewee Y5-A)

The "personal power" element is also what distinguishes social from political activities. The young emphasised motivations behind certain behaviours. For example, you can clean the forest without publicity, for a cause, and then it is a "concern for the common good, because everyone will benefit from it. But it is not strictly political in the modern sense." because in this modern kind of politics "people get involved in order to get something... something in politics, be it... publicity, fame, money, possibility of influencing others, contacts, realization of their dreams or visionary work" (interviewee Y9-A).

Political Activity as Partisanship. The topic of elections and political parties also appeared in parental statements, i.e., to act politically is to exercise the passive or active right to vote, for example: "As an ordinary citizen, I think that when I take part in elections, it is already my political activity, so to speak. I then express my opinions in that election" (interviewee P21-I).

Connected to this, interviewees also pointed out the importance of searching

for information about candidates, avoiding the mindless following of opinions imposed from outside, and getting familiar with political parties' programs. Being a member of a party, supporting campaigns and organizing events of political parties, or taking part in meetings with politicians, was also considered a political activity by parents. This partisan element of political activity was also included in young interviewees responses. They understood political activity in the context of political parties' activities and professional influence on the creation of law. Clue of political activity in this category was to be an initiator of actions, as one of the interviewees described it: "creating or trying to create politics, not just accepting it, blindly supporting it. Becoming a member of political parties, trying to somehow manage the currents within the party, organizing within the structures" (interviewee Y1-A).

As put more strongly by one NGO-activist, political activities are: "political games, by signing up to parties, by acting in local government, by trying to get into different political structures" (interviewee Y9-A).

Interviewees believed that people who acted politically had to have their own political views, for example "when one represents certain views all the time, and one belongs to a youth group, or sympathizes with a particular group" (interviewee Y11-I). Young people start their political activity by being "simply enrolled in the youth wing of a political party" (interviewee Y22-A). This first step means more direct involvement of the individual — he or she attends "various such conventions, events... He is already strictly involved, let us say, on a particular political side, he works for a particular fraction" (interviewee Y22-A). Once such a person has managed to "join a party and identify with that party" (interviewee Y14-I), then he or she can focus on activity, which should be treated as a profession, fulfilling "activities aimed at changing the law in the state, or activities already within the scope of creating the law" (interviewee Y15-I),

because, as another interviewee emphasized, "everything is about changing the law, and this is the domain of political activity" (interviewee Y17-I).

Political Activity as Electoral Engagement. Moving our focus to formal electoral activity, the most important thing for the young interviewees in this respect was participation in elections and general orientation in current politics. Young interviewees' reflections indicated they realize that they fulfil a certain minimum: "when there is an election, I take part and make a decision, because it is my duty, so that later I do not complain that things should be different, although I did not make a decision" (interviewee Y18-I) and that other citizens are more active:

First of all, the exercise of voting rights. This is basic participation, because an ordinary person, not everyone is able, let's say, to participate so actively, in the sense that getting involved in something too much. Political activity, it manifests above all, in participating in elections, taking more interest in what is going on in the country. And in general, I suspect that 90% of Poles see it that way, as I do. (Interviewee Y19-I)

When it comes to elections, it is not only general, parliamentary, presidential elections, but it is necessary to remember also "about local referendums and consultations" (interviewee Y24-A).

Political Activity as Being Engaged. Moving on to the next aspect of political activity, some parents decided to use, more than in the case of good citizen definition, examples of an engaged style of activity — pointing out in their definitions the issue of interest in current events, acquiring information regarding politics from the media, as well as taking part in demonstrations and protests. For one of the interviewees, expressing their views and political opinions was based on certain values — the parent

stressed that they act politically also when educating family or friends about the importance of involvement: "making your own children aware of the need to be involved in the affairs of homeland" (interviewee P30-A).

Young people's responses, on the other hand, emphasised staying engaged between elections more powerfully — they believed in being active in the local community, in organisations and by volunteering, being interested in political matters, protesting in the name of various causes (such as climate change or abortion rights), and expressing views using every possible method. Young interviewees pointed out that apart from casting their vote, political activity in between elections includes "taking interest in what is going on in the country" so that when the next election comes round, "if something does not suit us, we are trying to find another option" (interviewee Y16l).

For some interviewees the word "politically" meant acting for the common good — such a person acts for others, from the bottom up, comes up with initiatives, and may even gain the support of politicians if needed. These can be small scale and more local activities: "one can care for the common good... grandparents and parents used to teach their children not to throw trash, to care about local heroes, to engage in various initiatives" (interviewee Y9-A). In the eyes of some of the interviewees, everything is politics, in particular "any engagement with the community is politics" (interviewee Y2-A). Young interviewees also recognised this complex nature of being politically active in an NGO, when not all third sector initiatives can be considered political. Social activism, volunteering, can become political activity as soon as it "affects at least local issues" (interviewee Y25-A). Being active in a non-governmental organisation or a student association sometimes is:

related to such actions as, for example, taking part in protests, not necessarily belonging to a party, because you can belong to or be in a non-governmental organization, be active there, and privately have different views and go to protests, you can also identify with a party, but not be in its structures. (Interviewee Y23-A)

When it comes to protest activity, as one interviewee observed, this activity does not even have to be conscious or deliberate, but because of the consequences, it qualifies as somehow "political":

In my opinion, even such phenomena as the Youth Climate Strike or Black Protest, where there are very often people from the generation of 20-year-olds, 30-year-olds, who sometimes even without wanting to explicitly act politically, de facto it comes down to that. So I think it is that young people do not want their activities to be seen as political activities, but paradoxically, more and more of these people are somehow doing it. (Interviewee Y5-A)

As one interviewee observed, their perception of politics begins to change and this change is brought about by an understanding of politics in a broader sense, less as a profession of politicians, most often MPs:

We are beginning to see politics as something good, as a commitment to the community, as the art of convincing each other of different agendas, different visions of the future, and this is something that I am very happy about, that policy and politics is no longer an invective. (Interviewee Y2-A)

The interviewee looks for the sources of this change in the increasing involvement of young people on a mass scale:

On the one hand, young people are directly involved in politics, in youth groups,

and therefore they help in election campaigns, but on the other hand, young people are involved in other initiatives.... In the last 8 or 10 years a number of youth organizations were established, I was associated with one of them. Even if the organizations are not affiliated with any party, they act for the benefit of politics, that is, to stimulate political debate. (Interviewee Y2-A)

For the young, to achieve political goals one does not have to belong to a political party, it can be done using other methods, as long as it is "a community activity that brings some people together for some common action to change the world around us, we assume for the better" (interviewee Y3-A). The methods can also include being active where one lives and on a daily basis, being "involved in the affairs of their local community, at this smallest level" (interviewee Y13-A), understood also as activities carried out within the institutions of local government: "becoming the member of the city council, talking to city residents about their needs, participating in civic projects, or submitting your civic projects" (interviewee Y13-A).

Young activists can also influence reality by influencing other people's views and attitudes, for example, as one member of a student organisation explained, by educating them "in a certain ethos and putting them on certain paths, seeing certain values, creating certain future cadres... it is precisely the shaping of young characters and young minds" (interviewee Y3-A).

Externalisation of Political Views. Furthermore, when defining political activity the young described how important it is for their view to "be externalized somewhere" (interviewee Y26-A). Once these views are externalized, "people begin to see that they have influence and want to have that influence and... They display Facebook profile photo frames; they want to indicate that they are not indifferent to

what is happening in the country" (interviewee Y26-A).

Further examples of this view, include the point that to be politically active, people do not have to take write comments on online fora, but can "continue to pass on the knowledge" about politics (interviewee Y23-A), discussing "certain ideas or values, which are important for our society" with family or friends (interviewee Y27-A). In the eyes of one young interviewee, the expression of views had a normative, patriotic aim — to act politically is to "know the history of my country. I do not let other people offend it. I express my opinion. I promote it in a very positive way among outsiders... I guess being proud of being a Pole" (interviewee Y27-A).

Social versus political activity. It needs to be mentioned that for some young interviewees, when defining political activity, it was important to do so in relation to social and political party activity. On the one hand, young people emphasized that social activity is about "making things better for people' (interviewee Y15-I), or, for example, that such actions are "aimed at people but not specifically representing political views" (interviewee Y11-I), and, in contrast, political activity is "maybe not so much regulated by law, but it is already more of a profession and such concrete action as changing the law of the state or acting to bring about the creation of law." (interviewee Y15-I). On the other hand, political activity is not the same as party activity, because in the latter, one does not act for the society as a whole, but "pursues a specific goal, which is set by a specific social group, and when doing that, he takes no prisoners" (interviewee Y24-A). At the same time, many of the definitions of political activity did include party activity, which leads to the conclusion that there was no consensus among the interviewees about the demarcation lines between these three types of activity.

Detailed Response Analysis. It is worth seeing how the activities identified above, map on interviewee responses. To this end, the two tables below present, side by side, the contents of parental and young people's definitions of political activity. The elements were colour-coded for analytical clarity.⁶ The first table contains young interviewees' definitions, which included engaged citizenship elements.

Table 6

Contents of Parental and Young Poles' Definitions of Political Activity (Engaged Citizenship Elements)

Interviewee	Parent's Definitions of	Interviewee	Young People's
Number	Political Activity	Number	Definitions of Political
			Activity
P4-I	NOT BEING	Y3-A	BEING ABLE TO
	INDIFFERENT		CHANGE REALITY
			TYPE OF SOCIAL
			ACTIVITY, NOT PARTY-
			POLITICAL
			BEING INVOLVED IN
			COMMUNITIES
			HAVE COMMON GOAL

⁶ Colour used: purple — character elements; red — voting and party political elements; green — engaged citizenship elements.

P6-I	TO EXERT INFLUENCE	Y5-A	TO EXERT INFLUENCE PROTESTS LIKE CLIMATE STRIKE ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY
P8-1	BE INVOLVED TO HELP OTHERS	Y22-A	INVOLVED FOR THE COMMON GOOD ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR YOUTH WINGS
P10-I	VOTING AND KNOWING CANDIDATES PROGRAMMES	Y9-A	ABILITY TO INFUENCE OTHERS CARE ABOUT COMMON GOOD LOCAL COMMUNITY ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY
P20-I	ATTENTING MEETINGS WITH POLITICIANS	Y16-I	INTERESTED IN POLITICS BETWEEN ELECTIONS DISSCUSING CURRENT POLITICAL AFFAIRS
P29-I	VOTING	Y19-I	INTERESTED IN POLITICS VOTING

POLITICIANS

Ą	BEING INVOLVED IN
	LOCAL COMMUNITY
	TAKING PART IN LOCAL INITATIVES
	DISCUSSING POLITICS
	WITH OTHERS, FELLOW LOCAL RESIDENTS
	VOTING
	STANDING AS A
	CANDIDATE IN
	ELECTIONS
	ATTENDING LOCAL
	GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

P31-I VOTING

P30-A

BE A PARTY MEMBER

HELP ORGANISE

CAMPAIGNS FOR

POLITICAL PARTY

Y23-A **PROTEST TO FIGHT** FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

BEING ACTIVE IN NGO


DISCUSSING POLITICS

INTERNET ACTIVITY

PETITIONS

VOTING

ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY



To summarise, most of the parental definitions were one-dimensional. Some of them described political activity using only personal character traits, some focused only on formal political methods, such as voting and activity in political parties (dutybased elements). There has been increased media coverage of various protests happening around the time of conducting interviews, which may have made this method of political activity salient for some parents — two interviewees added this engaged method of protests to the formal political methods already contained in their definitions. One interviewee described political activity using duty-based and engaged elements, adding the personal expression of views.

Among the young, similarly to their good citizen definitions, it was possible to find several all-around conceptions. A definition of one of the young interviewees in this group had an engaged style, emphasising the communal goal of political activity and distancing it from political parties:

Political activity, but not party political activity, is a type of social activity, communal activity, which brings people together to act jointly, with the aim of changing the world around, presumably for the better. It is about changing certain mechanisms or at least understanding them. I act politically when I am able to change reality around through transforming people around me. (Interviewee Y3-A)

How parents and their offspring understood political activity had some similarities, but these were limited to one or two types of definitional element in most cases. The strongest likeness can be seen, similarly to their good citizen definition, in the case of interviewee Y13-A and their parent. Examples of political activities given by the pair included voting, standing as a candidate and discussing politics.

- Political activity to me means taking part in all elections, referendum, also standing as a candidate, if one has such aspirations and resources. It means being interested in politics on a daily basis. For example political activity is when you are taking part in meetings with local government politicians. I think also as a politically active person you have to educate your family to be active in homeland matters. (Interviewee P30-A — parent)
- Political activity in my view definitely includes voting every few years, but also being involved on a daily basis in the matters of your local community, but also wider, in matters on a national level. But this political activity starts at the lowest level of local community, for example standing in local government elections, or taking part or organising local initiatives, even just discussing things with

your local fellow residents. (Interviewee Y13-A — young person)

The second group of definitions contains all remaining pairs, in which the young described political activity using only duty-based elements.

Parental conceptions in this group were again, one-dimensional, and contained either personal character or electoral elements. Young people understood political activity in a decidedly formal way, that is, to them to be "political" is to act within a political party or its youth wing, alternatively being a professional creator of change, influencing creation of law. There is an evident similarity of definitions in the case of one of the pairs (interviewee Y17-I and P21-I), where both the parent and their offspring define political activity through voting and political party membership. I will return to this case later in the chapter.

Table 7

Contents of parental and young Poles' definitions of political activity (Duty Based Elements)

Interviewee	Parent's Definitions	Interviewee	Young People's Definitions
Number	of Political Activity	Number	of Political Activity

P7-I	TO VOTE AND SUPPORT CHOSEN PARTY	Y1-A	CREATION OF POLITICS, NOT PASSIVE ACCEPTANCE ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY INFLUENCING DECISIONS OF GOVERNMENT OR
P12-I	TO BE A LEADER	Y11-I	STATE ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR YOUTH WINGS
P21-I	VOTING BE A PARTY MEMBER	Y17-I	ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO CHANGE LAW VOTING
P28-I	BE ACTIVE TO HELP THE SOCIETY AND NOT YOURSELF	Y15-I	INFLUENCING LAW IT IS A PROFESSION DIFFERENT TO SOCIAL ACTIVITY

In the case of the six young people for whom it was not possible to obtain an interview with the parent — their definitions of a good citizen are presented below.

Table 8

Contents of Young Poles' Definitions of Political Activity (Without Parental Interview)

Interviewee Number	Young Poles' Definitions of Political Activity
Y2-A	BEING INVOLVED IN COMMUNITIES DISSCUSSIONS ABOUT POLITICS
	ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR YOUTH
Y14-I	PROTESTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT
Y18-I	ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY, IDENTIFYING WITH IT INTERESTED IN POLITICS
	VOTING
Y25-A	BEING INTERESTED IN POLITICS INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL COMMUNITY
	VOLUNTEERING ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY
Y26-A	INTERESTED IN POLITICS
	TAKING PART IN PROTESTS
	ACTIVITY IN POLITICAL PARTY, AS A PROFESSION

Y27-A INTERESTED IN PUBLIC MATTERS

Among this group of young Poles we again find examples of all-around definitions as well as some stand-by citizen types, who between elections continue to stay interested in politics.

Summary of Analysis on Research Question 2. The definitions given by the young indicate a greater awareness of, or experience with, different methods used in political activism, than their parents'. Most of the young interviewees gave several examples of political activity each. An element that was not mentioned by parents — activity in local communities, in non-governmental initiatives — can be found in nearly all definitions given by the young. Parents, similarly to their conceptions of a good citizen, understood political activity in an abstract way, and relied in their definitions on personal, individual character traits.

While using such broad definitions allows to consider many activities as political, it can also be interpreted as parents distancing themselves from institutionalised methods of activity. For some of the parents voting was the only political activity they mentioned. Some made a foray into less passive methods, in particular those of parents who recognised as political activities such as protesting, being a member of a political party and standing as a candidate.

Young Poles' perceptions on the other hand, in line with their good citizen definitions, showed a more sophisticated approach than their parents. Interestingly,

the young believed that being involved in local communities, or NGO projects, can be perceived as political, because of the aim — the common good. At the same time, it was important for some of the young to talk about lines of demarcation for their various activities — placing being political as a more of an overarching attribute, rather than equivalent activities within political parties, or, on the contrary, equating the terms "political" with "party political". All in all, most of the young presented definitions containing a varied repertoire of methods: formal, institutionalised and state-oriented, as well as individual, expressive and cause-oriented. As mentioned above, a handful of the young, in line with explanations found in the literature, for example (Quintelier, 2007), perceived politics and political activity in a narrow, party-political way.

4.1.3. Research Question 3: What are Young Poles and Their Parents Assessments of Political Participation Among Poles?

In order to understand what the empirical expectations of the citizenship norm are, I needed to check the interviewees' assessments of the levels of generally practiced behaviour — political activity — with regard to their immediate surroundings and Poles in general.

Low Expectations. The general assessment of levels of Poles' activity was not positive. Parents in particular expressed the view that Poles were not active enough. Only one of the parents had a decidedly good opinion about fellow Poles — her chosen timeline for this assessment allowed for an optimistic view with regard to increased voting levels, as well as new avenues for activity:

I think that in the 1990's Poles were active very little, but for the last few years the situation has been changing. More people are taking part in elections. There are plenty of various organisations and initiatives going on, like...for example the citizen budgets. Even if you look online, there are more people talking about politics on various forums and on social media. (Interviewee P30-A)

Additionally, some parents noticed that even though Poles in general cannot be called politically active, there are some groups slightly more active than others. Young Poles, in the eyes of parents, have been visibly more active by attending various demonstrations since 2016: "in recent years they are politically active, they are taking to the streets to protests against government decisions" (interviewee P32-I). According to interviewees, this activity is motivated by a discord, a lack of acceptance of the current reality: "there are people who take part in protests, marches, even travel far, because they dislike something, they are trying to manifest, to achieve something with their protests" (interviewee P20-I), and those who are inactive are so, because they are "passive, they accept the reality, they are content." (interviewee P20-I).

It is worth restating that apart from some activity once in a while — like voting — parents thought that in daily life, Poles do not get involved in politics. As such, there is little in-depth interest in political matters apart from news consumption: "only a small group of Poles are really monitoring what is going on in politics beyond the daily Newsnight information" (interviewee P29-I). Parents were also critical of the activity that does take place, because, according to them, it is too concentrated on political parties: "there is a general muster when the election is called, but very rarely one can see actual involvement beside partisanship" (interviewee P31-I). According to some supporting comments, motivations for any additional political activity, beyond voting in elections, are antagonistic in nature, as this activity is "directed against people with different views, only to oppose them" (interviewee P28-I). Therefore, to sum up, the

empirical expectation of political participation is low — parents did not see Poles nor their surroundings as active.

Activity for Some. In contrast to their parents, young interviewees had a more diverse opinion about Poles' activity levels, and young Poles, like themselves, in particular. There were positive comments on election turnout, that the levels are quite satisfactory, even when compared with nations where voting is obligatory: "actually, turnout is not so low, in Italy is always high, around 80%, and in our last elections it hit around 70%, and it was higher than usual. So in Poland it is nothing special, but it is not a disaster either" (interviewee Y11-I).

In line with their parents, however, the majority of Poles in the eyes of the young limit their activity to only voting in elections. For one interviewee, Poles' electoral activity should be based on "the feeling of duty, being grateful for having this choice, identifying with it, believing it is important" and not because of the pressure that "grandparents and parents already voted" (interviewee Y23-A). There were also voices criticising low levels of turnout in referenda, or the fact that there is little interest in standing as a candidate in local elections. The young reflected that people treat politics like sport, vote because they want their team to win, without any serious assessment of political programmes: "there is team A, and team B, a person was born in this region, so she supports this team, and cries when the team loses. But there is no factual discussion" (interviewee Y1-A).

In addition, when reflecting on the groups that are active, a divide was highlighted between urban and rural areas. In the countryside people are less politically active, believing that "whatever decision the authorities take, it is good" (interviewee Y24-A), whereas in urban areas people are more aware how the state

functions. The young commented on the older generations participation, saying it has withered after the transformation: "When Poland in reality regained sovereignty after the transition in 1989, people stopped being interested, they started thinking — well, we have people, politicians, to do these things, we don't need to meddle in this" (interviewee Y26-A).

In a similar vein, another interviewee commented that in order to solve local problems more people need to be involved, even to inspire initiatives to "clean up the local park, or renovate local sports club, but they all think that it is politicians' jobs to organise it" (interviewee Y9-A). Commenting on the fact that more people are active in addition to voting, one young interviewee noticed the changed motivation for demonstrations: "democracy in Poland is strong, people are increasingly more involved in civic matters, take to the streets not because they don't earn enough money to put bread on the table, but because of an idea, even a completely irrational one, in my opinion, like the abortion legislation protests" (interviewee Y2-A).

Summary of Analysis on Research Question 3. Most of the parental definitions of a good citizen and their understanding of political activity (normative expectations) did not place an emphasis on political activity — parents used vague conceptions, context-dependent personal traits, non-operationalised emotional attitudes toward the state and the nation. Political activity was defined in terms of low-intensity activities of voting or an interest in politics.

In line with the above, information coming from the parental reference group regarding political activity and parents' understanding of the generally practised behaviour was, likewise, not in favour of political activity. In fact, most Poles were seen by parents as passive, experiencing a brief awakening only around election times, sometimes pointing to people younger than them being active.

It can be therefore deduced from the above analysis that neither the normative nor the empirical expectations of parents accentuated that Poles engage in political behaviour. The only exception to the above was one parent whose citizenship norm was the most comprehensive, containing engaged as well as duty-based elements, and within it, taking advantage of the passive voting rights (interviewee P30-A), and whose perception of the levels of political activity Poles engaged in was positive.

The young had a more optimistic and nuanced view of the scale of Poles' participation in political activities. Fellow young Poles were seen as the most active, in particular because of their presence at street demonstrations, which was applauded by some young interviewees even when they did not support the cause. Some young interviewees believed there was an increased involvement of Poles in politics, more people taking part in elections and choosing extra-electoral activities, like protests, to voice their disagreement with the current government. There was another group of young who saw Poles as generally active, but were critical of the quality of their engagement, that it was limited mostly to elections, membership in parties is low, and so on. The above views were mostly shared by the young who identified as active. The young who identified as inactive had mostly negative opinions of the scale of Poles' political activity.

Similarly, the normative expectations as we saw earlier in the chapter, can be allocated to two groups. The first type of young Poles' good citizen definitions showed a preference, much more clearly than in the case of parents, for increased engagement of the young in political activity, understood by them as multi-method approach. The second type of definitions placed little emphasis on political activity and instead highlighted citizens' connection with the state, the nation and individual and personal traits. It can be therefore inferred that there was a nearly universal alignment of empirical expectations and the normative content.

4.1.4. Research Question 4: What are the Perceived Consequences of Norm Adherence or Lack of it?

Norm Adherence according to Parents. The consequences of adhering, or not adhering, to a norm will depend on the norm's contents. Parental good citizen definitions referred to highly abstract concepts like love, respect or care for the state, for Poland, or being a good person, as well as voting as a citizen activity. Political activity was defined by parents by using personal character traits or simply meant electoral activity.

The research question can be reframed along the following two points worth making. Firstly, it is easier to provide feedback on certain behaviours than on ephemeral, personal feelings. Secondly, providing feedback on individual acts, such as turning up to vote, is dependent on admission of absence, which may or may not happen, as we see, for example, from research on accuracy of past vote recall (van Elsas, Miltenburg and van der Meer, 2016).

More concretely, when the issue of feedback about political activity did come up during the interview, it referred to activity in relation to political parties. According to parents, politics and consequently any activity within this sphere, is perceived negatively: "Maybe they are trying to be active....but all political activity in the eyes of the people, everybody will tell you, that politicians, that politics is disgusting, dirty" (interviewee P7-I). Furthermore, discussing politics or any activity related to one's political views, can be self-limited by taking into account others' dislike of it, for instance: "People are afraid to say what their party preferences and views are, especially if they have conservative views" (interviewee P30-A).

Norm Adherence According to Young Poles. Several of the young Poles had experience with receiving feedback from others with regard to their activity and political activity in general. Feedback coming from family or parents is presented later in this chapter, so here I analyse the information relating to other sources of feedback. The contents of young Poles' citizenship norm pertained, similarly to parents, to personal character traits, patriotic feelings and activity in relation to the state. Young interviewees' definitions included not one-off but intensive, visible activity in local communities, being involved in political parties and youth wings, voicing opinions on the Internet, and it is in relation to these behaviours responses about feedback referred to.

On the whole, young interviewees included in their responses only the negative feedback they received while adhering to their citizenship norms. Those who identified as active, signalled that their activity received unfavourable feedback in the past. There was a general consensus in young interviewees' narrative, similarly to parents, that Poles do not see politics and its actors in a positive light. One interviewee observed that being a member of a political party is perceived as having a "very special or weird penchant. It is not perceived as something natural" (interviewee Y17-I), and there was an recurring comment about not getting too involved, as one is risking falling into the cesspit of politics: "Any increased political activity is badly perceived...because political class and this whole party system has bad opinion" (interviewee Y22-A). Another interviewee observed that people are being fed stereotypes about "dirty"

politics" and told "that you have go and vote in elections, but nothing more, no more involvement" (interviewee Y23-A). Some young people recounted personal circumstances, when their norm-adhering, that is being active in extra-electoral activity, was not welcomed:

I've met some people, and it happened to my friends too, who, because of how I am active, treated me badly, pushed me away. So, if we are already in a group of people who are, let's say, average, and suddenly there is a person among them who wants to talk about politics and inspire someone, they are like, ok, go away and come back when you're done with talking. They are ignoring you. And don't let me start on hate I get online. (Interviewee Y27-A)

Another activist, involved in a dialogue body and representing her region, reflected on what she thought was the general approach to people like her:

Maybe for some people, when it comes to political activity, they are still afraid of how their mates will react, because... I think not only in Poland, but in other countries too, there is this ostracism, hate, for people who are active politically. You can't please everybody. Me too, my friends criticised me for my activity, for being in those organisations. Even though I don't treat it as political, I treat it as a social activity. (Interviewee Y22-A)

The young in general believed that expressing their political views has been met with a negative reception in the past. One local activist reflected on the mechanisms of social media, their ability to turn young local politicians into celebrities, who are being constantly scrutinised: "I can feel the fear of being judged, not necessarily by professionals, but by everyone, because everybody feels they are experts on social media" (interviewee Y23-A). Incompatibility of views was thought to be important factor, limiting interviewees' self-expression. Specifically, the young interviewees recalled that their opinions were sometimes met with contempt: "there is this barrier, for having unpopular views, you are instantly treated as coming from the dark ages" (interviewee Y13-A) or with ridicule: "It only takes that you find yourself in a group of people different to those you are hanging out with, and you are immediately ridiculed for the fact that you think differently than the group" (interviewee Y27-A).

Additionally to criticism of the activity or the political views, the fact of their young age has also been brought up by one local activist: "I am being judged because of my age. I often hear, but you are only 16, 17 years old, you don't know the world, what can you know about politics?" (interviewee Y23-A).

Summary of Analysis on Research Question 4. From analysing the above comments on the issue of received feedback, it becomes evident that it is difficult to disentangle feedback on the activity itself from feedback regarding the political views, held by the individual engaged in the activity. Engaging in a political activity essentially requires holding and expressing views that may not be in line with views of others. In addition, the already mentioned negative approach toward politics as a profession, existing different normative expectations, and perceptions on what political activities people should engage in, may have all had an impact on the feedback interviewees experienced.

4.1.5. Taking Stock: Summary of Analysis on Research Questions 1–4

The definitions of good citizen differed between young Poles' and their parents'. The normative expectation among most of the parents was formulated using abstract concepts, state and nation-oriented elements. These norms lacked ambitious behavioural obligations and can be interpreted as passive. In line with their conceptions of a good citizen, parents understood political activity in an abstract way, relying in their definitions on individual character traits and low-intensity behaviours such as voting. The feedback received by parents, about which norms and behaviours are approved and desirable, pointed to minimal political activity, with politics and political parties seen in negative light. Parents' perceptions about what was the generally practised behaviour were that most Poles are passive, at most taking part in elections, but the young were more active, and took part in protests. Therefore, neither the normative nor the empirical expectations of parents stressed that they engaged in political behaviour. I identified some exceptions to this approach and will expand on that later in the chapter.

Among the young, the normative expectations varied. For the first type of expectations identified, a good citizen was defined as someone respecting the state and loving the nation, as well as engaged in local communities, interested and vocal about politics. Their political activity repertoire was diverse, with state-oriented, party-political, as well as expressive, community-based, cause-oriented elements. In the case of the second type of expectations, mimicking parental definitions, young Poles' good citizen definitions concentrated exclusively on their connection with the state and nation, with political activity limited to electoral and party-political methods.

When it came to young Poles' empirical expectations, again, two approaches were found. Young interviewees, who self-identified as active, had positive and ambitious perceptions — fellow young Poles were seen as engaged in various political activities, recently in street demonstrations, a method universally applauded by interviewees. Some criticism was directed, firstly, towards people older than them and seen as passive, and secondly, at the quality of political activities of young Poles,

which were seen as not being engaged in-depth enough. The young self-identifying as inactive, on the other hand, were of a more negative opinion, believing that the majority of Poles are passive and do not get engaged in politics. An exception was the young interviewee Y11-I, who, even though participating in a variety of projects and initiatives, did not consider this activity to be political, but social, and saw her compatriots as active enough.

4.2. Research Objective 2: Exploring how Citizenship Norms are Fulfilled

Research Objective 2 sets out to explore how citizenship norms are fulfilled through Poles' political practice and what are the perceptions of barriers that impact upon the participation of Poles. To this end, the findings of Research Questions 5 and 6 will be presented in turn.

4.2.1. Research Question 5: What are the Repertoires of Political Behaviour of Young Poles and Their Parents?

Young Poles and their parents were asked if they considered themselves politically active. They were also asked if, using their own definition of political activity, in the last year or so they were involved in any activities they would consider political; then if so, to describe them. When evaluating their levels of activity, interviewees were also asked about possible barriers to the political activities of Poles.

Parents' Responses to Research Question 5. Interviewees were asked to evaluate their political activity levels, using their own definitions. Among all parents only one person described themselves as politically active. All the others stated that they were not politically active, but added information, presented below, during the interview that augmented this zero-sum evaluation.

Parents indicated that they were taking some action. Some were involved in

school boards and considered themselves socially active: "I am rather a person that is socially involved, but not politically. When the kids went to school, I was always on the parents board" (interviewee P10-I). Some parents supported local projects financially: "My husband and I also take on sponsorships for local initiatives, like city events and sports clubs like the [REDACTED] Basketball Club" (interviewee P31-I). One of the parents advocated for increased scrutiny of local health providers and "cooperated with the Patient Ombudsman" (interviewee P32-I).

Parents also reminisced about their volunteering experience: "I also told them about my different activities before I got married, what I did as a volunteer, and they also saw that it was like before they were born. But later when they went to school, they also saw my involvement and that of my husband" (interviewee P4-I). Another parent reflected on a one-off initiative, which saw her help out a local group protesting against a garbage dump being set up in the area:

It was a local issue that had a direct influence on the neighbourhood where I live...because it's a very industrial area, there were going to be a lot of garbage dumps set up here and garbage was going to be brought in from as far away as El Salvador. It was quite a loud issue. I took part in it in any way I could. (Interviewee P6-I)

The person who identified themselves as politically active was also the only person, who exercised their electoral right and stood as a candidate in local elections. This parent's normative and empirical expectations stood out from the rest of the group. The interviewee's understanding of a good citizen, as the only one among parents, contained engaged as well as duty-based elements. Political activity for this parent included extra-electoral methods, staying interested in between elections, attending meetings with local government and discussing these topics with family members. This particular interviewee's view of the generally practised behaviour was also, contrary to the rest of parents, optimistic and saw an improvement in the levels of the political participation of Poles. In this case it is possible to identify an alignment of activity-affirming norms with assessments of each respondent's own levels of activity. Understandably, any causal relationships between such citizenship norms and political activity needs to be examined with longitudinal data.

The table below shows the information regarding the self-evaluation as well as spontaneously mentioned activities and election turnout for each parent. Taking part in protests was noticeable by its absence.

Table 9

Interviewee	Self-evaluates	Takes part in	Supporting	Takes part in
number	as active?	elections?	organisations	protests?
			or initiatives?	
P4-I	NO		YES	
P6-I	NO		YES	
P7-I	NO	YES		
P8-I	NO			
P10-I	NO	YES	YES	
P12-I	NO			
P20-I	NO	YES		
P21-I	NO	YES		

Parental-Mentioned Self-Evaluations and Activities

P28-I	NO		
P29-I	NO	YES	
P30-A	YES	YES	
P31-I	NO	YES	YES
P32-I	NO	YES	YES

Young People's Response to Research Question 5. Self-assessments of young people's own political activity were practically in line with the assumptions, on which recruitment for the interviews was based on. Young people involved in the leadership programme, as well as members of the regional youth council, considered themselves politically active. One young local activist, a high-school pupil, was apprehensive about such a description and instead emphasised instead social involvement. Remaining interviewees, who were not recruited through an organisation, considered themselves politically inactive.

Young people were asked to list all activities that were in line with their own definition of political activity and that had happened in the last year or so. It should be noted that the interviews were conducted in the period before, or just after the Polish presidential election (June 2020) or the general election (November 2019), and so casting a ballot could have been considered a salient issue. It was possible to find similarities in interviewees' answers, therefore, for analytical clarity, activities will be discussed in tern by type.

Activities Relating to Political Parties or Elected Posts. There were a few political parties' youth wing members among the young interviewees. One young

person had been a member of the youth wing of a party (not given here for confidentiality reasons), but had resigned his membership. Two individuals decided to join an organisation, which also acted as a youth wing — the NGO in question had a partnership agreement with a political party. One of those young people was also a member of that party along the way, but decided to resign their membership. Membership in the youth wing not only involved helping the mother-party in all kinds of election-related initiatives, but the members also felt they had a large amount of autonomy. The tasks these young were involved in were "more than just helping in election campaigns for people who are in the party. We can take our own actions and I think that is very important" (interviewee Y23-A). The organization offered not only opportunities for self-development, members also took part, for example, in various types of projects, for example:

We got a grant from the European Young [REDACTED], to carry out this project. We all met in [REDACTED] and started thinking about how to heal Polish education. It was great, because I realised then that I won't be treated as an object forever, I can also develop myself, I can gain new experiences, I can act and create various projects, and initiatives myself, more or less related to politics. (Interviewee Y23-A)

The interviewee could also network with members of European youth wings in the development of own their projects, learn about policy development and meet politicians:

...the legal abortion campaign, where we talk to young [REDACTED] from Europe. We ask them to prepare, together with their parliamentarians, such a project so that we could allow people from abroad to have abortion in their country, if it is for free. So it is actually more political, diplomatic I would say, we enter into dialogue with people from other countries and also often with politicians who are in those parliaments. (interviewee Y23-A)

Another interviewee reflected on the fact that the even though the mother party is included among the opposition parties in Polish parliament, it does not have the opportunity to promote its own original programme proposals well and gain popularity, signalling interviewee's strategic thinking: "With such a small number of representatives, it is hard to build some recognition and this is probably a major blockade" (interviewee Y26-A).

Two interviewees did not rule out membership in a political party in the future, but these decisions were contingent on what programmes were on offer:

I am considering the possibility of becoming permanently involved in politics in the future. Perhaps I would have done it long ago if there had been a party on the political scene with a programme I could identify myself with in its entirety. At the moment there is no such party and it does not look like there will be one. (Interviewee Y2-A)

The next young person, who was aiming high and thinking seriously about professional politics, reflected on the education needed for a career in politics:

I would like to be involved in politics in general. I don't want to have a political education; I would rather have a technical one. However, I would like to be a public person, like an MP, a minister, I like it a lot when I observe what it all looks like behind the scenes. I would rather not see myself as an average voter, but somewhere higher, for whom you vote. But specifically, what field, which ministry, I don't know. (Interviewee Y11-I)

One interviewee won a seat as a borough councillor in his city as a result of local elections. In his activities he tried to focus on substantive issues, such as "forming the city budget, which means making sure that my borough has as much funding as possible for a lot of different issues" (interviewee Y1-A). He also stated that he has never tried to pursue a political strategy and is not sure if a career as a professional politician is a good choice:

But whether in the long run or in general I would feel comfortable in it, and whether in the long run it would be more useful or harmful, I don't know. I have never been involved in such activities in the political circles. I only focused on substantive, minor problems. I mean, we have a borough, we need to win elections, we need to win internal elections. If we have a project to implement in the local government, we implement it, if we have a social project, we implement it too. (interviewee Y1-A)

The young interviewees had ambitions for progressing their activity and were aware that, on the basis of their involvement as local activists, they could build a future professional life:

Very often people who are activists become political activists because people tell them: hey, you're doing well, you're recognized in the local community, you should continue with this. It first starts with city councils or such offices, then even the parliament, senate or other places. (Interviewee Y26-A)

All in all, those young interviewees, who had some experience in political parties and their youth wings, approached this method of political activity enthusiastically, treating it as a tool for self-development and a potential career option. Activities Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations or Informal Initiatives. Young people included as political activities their involvement in various organisations and initiatives. Several of the interviewees were members of student organisations, which sometimes had long history, even a pre-war tradition:

At the same time, I was president of the [REDACTED] student union at my university, and I would say that's political in the sense that it has some kind of action aimed at changing the reality around us. And now I'm the president of an academic corporation — these are sort of student fraternities. Mine is 96 years old almost, founded before the war. (Interviewee Y3-A)

Another interviewee pointed to activities in organizations with a conservative profile, aimed at young people, and praised self-development opportunities provided by them:

I was also in [REDACTED] and there we also organized various initiatives, for example meetings with decision-makers, some historical projects, what else from such recent ones... I was also in [REDACTED] foundation, we had our meetings every month, then we learned geography, history, political science and we also often participated as an organization in various public events. (Interviewee Y13-A)

Based on the young interviewees' statements it is possible to notice that often they did not limit their activity to one organisation or project, and instead invested their time and developed their interests in several places at once:

That's why I try to get active, as long as I protect what I find valuable, and cultivate what I find valuable, or change what I don't like...So that is one of the

reasons why I signed up and joined several associations, foundations. (Interviewee Y9-A)

For one interviewee, a local association became the beginning of their involvement in other organizations, and it gave them good experience before trying their own hand at starting an organization:

Well, I personally started my adventure from a very low level, from my borough, where with a group of residents we fought and initiated the process of building a park... In the meantime, I was also active on a more provincial level in the [REDACTED] branch. It was also an educational activity, a project of the academy of modern patriotism, implemented in schools, and also a bit of quasi-expert activity... We are at the stage, with a group of several people, of establishing an NGO, a local one, in the [REDACTED] voivodeship. Generally, we want to act a little bit at the expert level...promoting green transport, green mobility, and so on. (Interviewee Y5-A)

In the opinion of one of the young people, the activity in youth organizations is necessary, mainly in order to practice some ideas and topics, to release the energy of youth, as well as it is also a good place to learn skills:

This is a place to learn how to make compromises. Sometimes these NGOs simply destroy each other, they cannot get along. But I think these experiences will pay off, because these young people, even if they joined NGOs in their thirties, would make the same mistakes at the beginning. And if they are richer in experience at a young age, as teenagers or twenty-somethings, they can go straight to be active in these adult, proper NGOs. So, this is a kind of kindergarten for public service and work in NGOs. (Interviewee Y1-A)

It should be noted that young people did not include volunteering, which they specified as a social activity, among their political activity. Such activity appeared on a young person's path of becoming involved in various projects, usually at school, and was continued and built upon by some interviewees:

I started volunteering when I was in the first grade of junior high school and I've been doing it ever since. But there are two types of volunteering: first one is social volunteering, for example I volunteer in the [REDACTED] and there I help disabled children and so on. (Interviewee Y3-A)

These volunteering experiences allowed the young to practice the skills they had developed in the formal educational setting:

Because I am mainly active either in terms of volunteering, or as a computer graphic designer — and they need me in every volunteering project. So, I'm always helping in some way. (interviewee Y25-A)

Activities relating to consultations and dialogue bodies. The youth, already having some experience in non-governmental organizations and school initiatives, participated in consultation and advisory activities organized by local or central government. Interviewees were mainly involved in city or county youth councils, or were trying to get such a council established in their area: "I fought for a youth council in my city, a bit in agreement with one MP, and along the way, I got to know the network of these youth councils, mainly at this congress at the national level" (interviewee Y5-A).

For context, youth councils have existed in Poland since 1990, they are optional, advisory bodies, its members are elected in democratic elections held at

schools, and they can exist on different levels of local government (borough, city, municipality, county or province).

Two interviewees were involved in government advisory bodies — the Council for Dialogue with the Young Generation and The Children and Youth Council at the Minister of Education. Representatives of local youth communities and organizations join these bodies as a result of nationwide recruitment. Additionally, several of those participating in the study were members of a Youth Regional Assembly in [REDACTED], which has an advisory function for a Regional Assembly. Youth Assemblies, according to their regulations, are non-partisan and do not follow the agenda of any political party.

Activities relating to elections. The topic of elections did not come up often in interviews with young Poles, although the conversations took place not long after decisions were made at the ballot box. Several of the young people referred to taking part in elections, one stating: "but not as a rule, it just depends on the specific offer which is presented" (interviewee Y17-I). One of the interviewees took part in a NGO project promoting voter turnout, another helped in presidential campaign, someone else pointed to his own activities of "collecting signatures, canvassing during the election campaign" (interviewee Y5-A). Another person mentioned acting as a scrutineer in local election committees, which was a challenge, given their disability, but a deeply valuable experience:

I took part in committees at elections. And I simply took part in collecting the votes... I mean collecting votes, counting and all that. It was also an experience for me, especially that it took us 24 hours, and I have my back problems...I saw how important it is to participate in elections. As in the past I didn't pay much

attention to it. But when I came there and saw what it looked like behind the scenes, suddenly such an enlightenment came over me. (Interviewee Y25-A)

Protests and demonstrations. Some of the young people confirmed their participation in recent demonstrations. These demonstrations concerned homosexual rights (the so-called "Equality Parades") and issues concerning the abortion compromise (the so-called "Women's Strike" or "Black Marches"). One interviewee reflected how invested she was in this activity, wanting to organise a march in her own location, and commuting to a far-way city to take part in a demonstration there (interviewee Y23-A). Another young person took part in a Women's Strike protest in a bigger city, because she "felt offended by what this politician said in the television interview" (interview Y25-A).

Discussions with Parents. These will be addressed later (see pages 180-192), but a few points are worth making here.

First of all, discussion on political topics was seen by the young as a separate activity. One interviewee saw deliberations as key political activity, and a reflection of the state and how things should be:

This is probably the most difficult, but it is happening, in the area of some discussion clubs, analytical centres that are opening up to citizens. This is happening. Participation in this in-depth debate is an important manifestation of political engagement. (Interviewee Y2-A)

The interviewee further argued, that this type of activity is close to hand: "Just go to Plac Zbawiciela⁷ in the evening and listen to what people are talking about, join

⁷ A square in Warsaw with a large number of cafes, bars and restaurants.

them". The interviewee praised the broad offer of the capital: "Warsaw is full of possibilities, there are plenty of discussion clubs, on the left, on the right, you can go to the Klub Jagielloński⁸, you can go to Krytyka Polityczna⁹, everywhere you can meet people with whom you will agree or argue", and emphasised that discussion inspires to future action: "So, this is the first involvement, interest, this first step to involvement" (Interviewee Y2-A).

Sometimes parents or friends are no longer enough to talk to, so one interviewee reflected on how they educate siblings about politics:

And I immediately have such a need to discuss it with someone and in person, but not with peers who share this topic, and I can already see my parents' reaction — oh dear, you're talking about politics again — they'll say, and then that they don't want to talk about it anymore. I even came to this conclusion at one point, OK fine, since this is such a touchy subject, well maybe I'll start talking about it with my sister, and my sister is 7 years younger than me. (Interviewee Y23-A)

Activities on the Internet. There were only a few examples of online activity, mostly to do with signalling certain topics and opinions in a form of social media profile picture frames. There were also negative comments about this method, one interviewee expressing anxiety due to being under scrutiny online, "because everybody feels they are experts on social media" (interviewee Y23-A). Some

⁸ Think-tank with a conservative profile.

⁹ Think-tank with a socialist profile.

interviewees simply stated they had a preference for exchanging views face-to-face, with close circle friends, anticipating conflicts and arguments:

Facebook is such a place where I have a lot of friends, those related to work, to the industry, let's call it that. I also have friends that I have from other spheres of life and not necessarily everyone is interested in that, I respect it, so I don't spam Facebook with such things. I keep it for my narrow circle. Because I also think that politics is the last topic I would want to talk about. If someone asks me, or it gets heated about the election or other things, then yes, I can talk. But I don't push it so much on the Internet. I keep it more to myself. (Interviewee Y27-A)

Another interviewee considered the use of social media profile frames as not constructive: "I consider all Facebook manifestations and also manifestations in the form of clothing to be unnecessary. This is something completely unknown to me, this purely symbolic engagement. I believe that it does not contribute anything" (interviewee Y2-A).

Considering how popular social media usage is internationally, the comments above signal that the young were very cautious about what and with whom they share online.

Activities of the "Inactive". Among those who identified as politically inactive, some young interviewees expanded not only on certain activities they engaged in, but also offered rationalisations on why they are not active using certain methods. With regard to the latter point, those interviewees who had substantial comments about online political activity, had strongly negative attitudes toward publishing their views, such as: "I'm not the kind of person to make my opinion public in a way that publicizes it. I will talk to someone about it but I will not publish it in the social media" (interviewee Y16-I). Interviewees explained that their lack of online political expression was caused by the wide diversity of their friends' views and potential disagreements:

By the way, I always try not to express my political views so publicly, because I know what it ends up with. And the environment, in which I work, is so diverse that these topics are not in the foreground, so I do not express my position, my view on political life in public. (interviewee Y19-I)

One young person, a first year student with no previous experience in expressing their opinions publicly or participating in group activities, indicated their participation in a demonstration related to abortion regulations, commenting that "I don't consider myself politically active. It is how recent events have made me aspire to show my opinion. For the time being, I do not feel the need to become involved in political life" (interviewee Y15-I). This assessment was consistent with their own definition of political activity, which stated that it is "maybe not so much regulated by law, but it is already more of a profession and such concrete activities as changing the law in the state or acting within the creation of law" (interviewee Y15-I).

The next young person classified themselves as not politically active, but socially active, listing activities such as: membership in a youth organization, cooperation with an MP in order to set up a youth city council, membership in the Children and Youth Council of the Minister of National Education and participation in a pupils' school council. According to this interviewee, political activities are those in which "one represents some specific views all the time, and one belongs to a youth wing or sympathizes with some specific political group" (interviewee Y11-I), while the social activities she undertook were aimed at "strengthening civic awareness among

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young people, or of a thematic kind, for example economic. I would say these are kind of actions aimed at young people, but not specifically representing political views" (interviewee Y11-I).

The last interviewee did not consider himself to be currently politically active, but in the interview, he mentioned his involvement in the activities of one of the parties as a teenager:

When I was younger, I belonged to a political party...I was actually a registered member until probably my second year of studies, then I stopped getting involved, but also due to the fact that back then, when there was an election campaign, there was a lot of work involved, while the results were of the order of 1 or 2%, so there was this discouragement. (Interviewee Y17-I)

Irrespective of the poor election results of the supported party, "deactivation" of political activity occurred, according to the interviewee, under the influence of their studies:

When I was at university, and I studied philosophy, I got involved in the philosophy of politics. When you study it from a more theoretical point of view, the distance is in a way forced, in the sense that you do not believe in these various ideological constructs, because you know that this is one of many stories and you do not accept it as you did before, that this is the truth and this is how it should be. (Interviewee Y17-I)

Normative expectations of this interviewee were in line with the self-assessment — he understood political activity only as influencing the law through involvement with a political party. The above examples show how citizen norms, in particular in regard to what constitutes political activity, is aligned with the person's identification as politically active.

The table below summarises the self-evaluation as well as spontaneously mentioned activities and election turn out for each interviewee.

Table 10

Young Poles' Mentioned Self-Evaluations and Activities

Interviewee number	Self-identifies as active?	Takes part in elections?	Supporting or- ganisations of initiatives?	- Takes part in r protests?
Y1-A	YES		YES	
Y2-A	YES		YES	
Y3-A	YES		YES	
Y5-A	YES	YES	YES	
Y9-A	YES		YES	
Y11-I	NO		YES	
Y13-A	YES		YES	
Y14-I	NO			
Y15-I	NO			YES
Y16-I	NO	YES		
Y17-I	NO	YES		
Y18-I	NO	YES		
Y19-I	NO	YES		
Y22-A	YES		YES	

Y23-A	YES		YES	YES
Y24-A	YES		YES	
Y25-A	YES	YES	YES	YES
Y26-A	YES	YES	YES	YES
Y27-A	YES	YES	YES	

In addition to current political activity, interviewees reflected on what was their path to their activity, as well as which events and experiences helped them to become active. As per the table below, it is clear that extra-curricular activity, like science circles, scouting, school governance bodies and other voluntary initiatives, were perceived by the young as important.

Table 11

Young Poles' Activity in Youth Organisations and Other Extracurricular Activities

Interviewee number	Self-identifies as active?	Extra-curricular activities
Y1-A	YES	Academic clubs
Y2-A	YES	Х
Y3-A	YES	Scouting, volunteering
Y5-A	YES	Church group, academic clubs
Y9-A	YES	x

Y11-I	NO	Pupils' council
Y13-A	YES	Youth district council
Y14-I	NO	Х
Y15-I	NO	Х
Y16-I	NO	Х
Y17-I	NO	Х
Y18-I	NO	Х
Y19-I	NO	Х
Y22-A	YES	Pupils' council
Y23-A	YES	Pupils' council
Y24-A	YES	Pupils' council, City's youth council
Y25-A	YES	City's youth council, volunteering
Y26-A	YES	Pupils' council
Y27-A	YES	Pupils' council, City's youth council

4.2.2. Research Question 6: What are the Barriers to Political Activity in the Eyes of Young Poles and Their Parents?

The focus now moves onto how ordinary people see the reasons underlying the lack of political activity, as well as how they indirectly formulate possible fixes to low levels of participation. This was an interesting line of enquiry, complementing the self-definitions of norms and methods for being politically active. The discussion below summarises interviewees' reflections on the topic.

Parents' Responses to Research Question 6. The first subquestion was: how did the parents explain the lack of political activity of Poles? Their answers to the question about barriers can be divided between external and internal reasons. Among the external reasons, some interviewees referred directly to the situation of young people, and e.g. noted the lack of a body representing the younger generation, "something opposite to the Senate" (interviewee P32-I), and the lack of opportunities to promote youth activism.

For the reasons that have their source in attitudes, perceptions or life decisions, which were grouped under the common category of internal, the most frequently mentioned barrier was the negative image of the world of politics and political parties, in particular the "dislike of the PiS-PO duopoly"¹⁰ (interviewee P31-I).

Another internal reason given for inactivity was the attitude or individual preferences presented by the individuals, in particular, interviewees attributed these characteristics to young Poles. Among the answers mentioned were, for example, the

¹⁰ PiS — Law and Justice Party; PO — Civic Platform Party

lack of a sense of having influence, even for those respondents involved in local initiatives:

People don't believe they have influence, a lot of people don't get involved. I think it's mainly because of that. Or initiatives stop, wither. There's no real benefit from such initiatives, no impact. Maybe because they don't believe they have influence. (interviewee P6-I)

Parents also mentioned reasons such as the lack of time, different interests, or other preferences for spending free time, especially when "young people are working professionally" (interviewee P30-A), "other priorities and interests" (interviewee P31-I) but also, the fear of revealing views, as well as the acceptance of the status quo and the lack of reasons to participate in protests.

Interviewees also pointed to certain standards and values that have changed and are now influencing people, citing materialistic focus, as "it is unfortunately more important to have than to be" (interviewee P4-I), or not enough emphasis placed on patriotism and lack of "political traditions in the family" (interviewee P30-A).

Young people, according to parents, are comfortable and do not need to fight for citizen rights like their older compatriots, they "have a lot of things handed to them on a platter and also, they seem to live differently" (interviewee P10-I). Similarly, one parent looked back on their own adolescence and concluded that the young nowadays are characterised by the "lack of creativity, a lack of involvement, a lack of opposition for the sake of it, which in my youth was the norm, you had to be in opposition, no matter to what" (interviewee P4-I). Interestingly, parents were more ready to provide comments on young people, why they may be passive, and not on fellow adult Poles, often drawing historical comparisons of how political activity looked like during the times of communism.

Young People's Responses to Research Question 6. Barriers to political activity indicated by young interviewees can also be divided into external and internal categories.

The external reasons mainly concerned the large geographical variation in the availability of all kinds of initiatives, organisations and other opportunities to act in the political sphere. On the one hand, interviewees pointed to the lack of an inspiring school or academic environment, pointing to "lack of support from good teachers...if we start alone, well, it's not easy" (interviewee Y5-A), lack of opportunities to practise within youth councils and youth wings to prepare for future activities in the adult world. One interviewee commented that in particular in "small towns there are not, let's say, the youth organisations of different parties. I have a comparison of what it looks like in Cracow, in Warsaw and in other places, for example, here where I grew up in [REDACTED]. There is a big difference, people don't know about many activities" (interviewee Y22-A).

On the other hand, there were opinions voiced about the approach of schools to civic education courses being too theoretical, as this is causing lack of practical information for young people in other spheres: "knowing what the legislative process looks like is important, but not when young people are going to partake in their first election, because they are relying on what grandma or grandpa says" (interviewee Y23-A). There were related comments about uninspiring teachers: "the model of education, teachers...passionate teachers you can count on the fingers of one hand

throughout the course of education. They do not inspire the necessary emotions in us... There are few teachers with passion, who instil certain values and ideas in us" (interviewee Y27-A).

As part of the internal reasons, there was also a theme of existing stereotypes. On the one hand, interviewees blamed mass culture, which does not spark interest in serious activity in the political sphere. Young people pointed to pop culture, which "does not spread it in the way that it is something attractive. What is attractive now consists of completely different things, different values. Things much easier to achieve" (interviewee Y27-A). On the other hand, there were negative opinions held by the society about the maturity of youth. Sometimes, even the availability of institutions of dialogue is not satisfactory for young people, because in their eyes they are not taken seriously:

I, for example, am a member of the District Youth Council and in fact they treat us like mascots, we cannot do anything, because they think we are young and, in this respect, it is very difficult for us. (Interviewee Y13-A)

In common with the internal reasons given in the parent interviews, the most frequently cited was the poor image of politics, which gets reflected in the way majority of Poles talk about politics. Young interviewees criticised this stereotype as "an exchange of opinions, some kind of repetition of what they hear in the media, what is being discussed" (interviewee Y17-I). According to the young, this negative opinion prevailing in the society — expressed for instance in the words: "mudslinging", "cunning", "corruption" — causes that Poles feel "distrust towards politicians, so they do not want to get acquainted with what they offer" (interviewee Y23-A). Furthermore they do not perceive politicians' decisions as rational, but as having an ulterior motive,

fulfilling the interests of the political caste. Politics was also perceived as a sphere closed to the majority of people, and activity in political parties in particular was considered exclusionary, because it was reserved for older men:

If you look at the parliament, there is a certain percentage of young people there, but mainly the group involved in making laws in our country are older men. And in my opinion, it is hard to break through into that group being a young person. (Interviewee Y15-I)

According to the interviewees, the age of most professional politicians is also related to their experience of living and working under the communist system, which can also act as a deterrent for young people who want to get involved: "At this moment still, in politics, in all these top positions, the functions are held by people from the previous system. So, I suspect that for young people, it is not attractive to be in a political party." (interviewee Y19-I).

Further to this, political activity, understood as party activity, may also be unattractive to these young people, who would find it difficult to compromise on their own views, being discouraged by the necessity of total subordination. This concerns the young who want to make the transition from an NGO or private sector, but "the necessity to temper their views discourages them completely from acting. Additionally, their views are often not represented by particular political parties" (interviewee Y1-A).

Another barrier that was often mentioned was the lack of political knowledge among Polish people: the knowledge needed to make choices at the ballot box; information needed to access, for example, the records of parliamentary committee; knowledge useful in crisis situations when there is a need to: look for help, because when something happens, most often no one thinks about the fact that one can call an MP, a senator, anyone who can intervene...This lack of sufficient civic awareness, that we can report an issue somewhere, often makes us not react. (Interviewee Y23-A).

In addition to the above, there was a lack of knowledge of available methods of action, such as membership in youth groups, and how it makes a difference to be in a group where someone has this experience:

there is no such awareness that you can do something like that. If someone is already active as a youth activist, not necessarily political, but just starting being active, then sooner or later they will be pulled in and join something, and if they have a group of friends where there is no one like that, they are unlikely to get involved at all. (Interviewee Y26-A)

Another group of internal barriers were related to psychological sphere. There were responses, in which interviewees indicated mental attitudes, self-confidence, and perception of other people's opinions. Most often, the interviewees pointed to the "lack of feeling that an individual initiative can change something" (interviewee Y2-A); according to them, people often ask themselves "whether my action has any impact on reality" (interviewee Y5-A).

Quite often young people also emphasized that fear of being judged, either by peers or an undefined audience, can have an inhibiting effect on involvement. According to the interviewees, Poles also lack faith in the power of their vote, which together with other like-minded people can influence the outcome, the results of elections: "this is what some people lack, such a general view that this is an important

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day because we have an influence on decisions, that even this one vote can always prevail" (interviewee Y23-A).

In the eyes of the young, other young people also fear that a lack of experience in a field or a college degree will make them irrelevant:

Most often among people I know, who want to get involved politically, they tell me that they go to college because later they are afraid that they won't be considered experts in their field in politics, that their right to speak publicly will be taken away. (Interviewee Y23-A)

A black-box answer was the indicated lack of interest in the sphere of politics. Of course this attitude must also have its reasons, but the interviewees indicated that "they just do not want to, there is a possibility that they are not interested in it at all, that they prefer to just be quiet, to do nothing" (interviewee Y13-A), following the principle "if they don't force me, I won't do anything" (interviewee Y19-I).

One interviewee in his response combined political activity with a sense of national belonging, and pointed out the lack of interest on the part of those who "simply do not feel Polish, I must say unfortunately, because they simply feel European and simply do not want to get involved" (interviewee Y13-A).

A clearer answer, albeit related to the earlier "lack of interest" reason, was the one concerning the other priorities of Poles, who concentrate "on some kind of professional path, that my priority is my career, or maybe starting a family. Nobody has time to get involved" (interviewee Y5-A), pointing out their need to spend most of their time on paid work, and thus a lack of time to engage in initiatives.

There were responses referring to the influence of the evaluation of the political system on participation. On the one hand, interviewees reflected on the activity of

those unsupportive of government: "people who have suffered are the ones who will just stand up, achieve change with their voice" (interviewee Y16-I) and on the other hand, the passivity of people whose political option did not win the election, "because they would like to do something, but because of who is in power, they do not want to" (interviewee Y26-A).

For one interviewee, disability was given as a reason for some people not being more involved in politics (interviewee Y24-A).

4.2.3. Summary of Analysis on Research Questions 5–6

An alignment of citizen norms and how the interviewees assessed their own political activity can be observed in the analysis contained in this section. Firstly, among parents who did not consider themselves politically active, several mentioned supporting non-governmental or local initiatives, and volunteering in the course of their interviews. Normative expectations of these interviewees, in particular how they viewed political activity, were aligned with their negative self-assessment. In other words, there was a divorce between norms and behaviours, their citizen norms did not promote community involvement nor were such activities defined by them as being political, yet, they engaged in them. Further, the citizen norms of the active parent were "activity-affirming", behaviour-specific and in line with their self-assessment.

Interviews with young Poles paint a different picture to their parents. The majority of them identified as politically active, which is to be expected, given the sample composition.

The activities of those who classified themselves as politically active, could be placed into the following categories: relating to political parties and elected posts; relating to non-governmental organisations and informal initiatives; relating to consultations and dialogue bodies; relating to elections; protests and demonstrations; discussions; activities on the Internet. All in all, the repertoire was quite diverse, but low on expressive and online activities, which much of the literature identifies as methods favoured by the young. Interviewees' inclusion of involvement in NGOs, in particular in youth and student organisations, as political activities, is in line with much of the literature identifying these avenues as young people's participation methods.

When it comes to the alignment of citizen norms and self-assessment of activity levels, among those young people who chose to identify as inactive politically, some still mentioned taking part in protests and civic awareness initiatives. In these cases, similarly to their parents mentioned above, the interviewees' normative expectations, how they understood political activity (in a narrow party-political way), was in line with their self-assessment.

With regard to barriers to more participation, parents attributed the lack of political activity of Poles largely to internal factors — mostly to an unfavourable view of the world of politics, as well as to personal attitudes and preferences.

Young Poles also identified barriers, which could be categorised as external, such as the lack of opportunities or incentives to get involved in various activities, as well as internal. Among the external factors, the young signalled the importance of an "activity-inducive" school environment, inspiring teachers and institutionalised opportunities, such as youth councils, and the need to practice skills and grow selfconfidence.

The internal factors for majority of the young, similarly to their parents, consisted of the poor image of politics, lack of knowledge regarding political activities, personal preferences and priorities, as well as issues of self-confidence and other people's perceptions of them. Reflections on this topic again show that the approach to political activity of the young and their parents differed. Where parents mainly concentrated on beliefs and stereotypes regarding politics, the young also saw other, external factors, for example lack of institutional opportunities for increased participation.

4.3. Research Objective 3: Perceptions of Parental Influence on Passing on the Citizenship Norm

In order to find out more about the parental approach toward political activity of the children, parents were asked if they had any opinion on how active their son or daughter was, to see if the sphere of political activity had ever been a subject of reflection in the family. Interviewees were asked how they assess their own influence on the activity of a young person. Parents also provided information on whether discussions about politics were held at home, as well as information presented earlier, with respect to the activity of parents themselves. Young people also had the opportunity to express their opinion on whether their level of political activity was influenced by the situation in the family household.

4.3.1. Research question 7: What is the Perception of Parental Impact on Young Poles' Political Activity?

The third research objective is addressed by Research Question 7. Perceptions of parental influence were mixed and included positive assessments, that encouraged activity, as well as negative ones that were conductive to inactivity. For some parents and young Poles the issue had not been settled and they chose to withhold their judgement. Active Young People. It should be noted first, that all interviews were conducted separately, and the young person was asked not to share the details of interview, in order to guarantee the spontaneity of the parents' responses.

In the case of all affirmative responses given by young Poles, that acknowledged parental influence, such positive influence was also confirmed by the parents themselves. A common element in these parental statements was an emphasis on the importance of regular conversations about politics at home. There was a general view, that political opinions of parents and their active offspring were aligned. The young believed, that even if they differed about particular topics, they were "in agreement about fundamental issues" (interviewee Y1-A).

Interestingly, the young sometimes took on a leading role in explaining political issues to parents, "sneaking in a young, modern perspective on things" (interviewee Y13-A), or due to their parents "relying on what they see on TV or read in newspapers" (interviewee Y22-A), the young were bringing in other perspectives. Parents believed discussions at home, but also in the wider family circle, for example contact with grandparents, were key in inspiring the young to be active:

We always talked a lot... However, I think it is a bit to do with my husband's family, because my father-in-law is so... he has a great memory and he likes to converse a lot, my husband also likes to have discussions. (Interviewee P10-I)

The young person in this pair during his interview also reflected on the relationship with their grandparents, considering them to have "an enormous influence on patriotic upbringing" (interviewee Y9-A). One parent emphasised that contact with their grandparents gave young people the opportunity to understand older generations better:

... my dad talked to him a lot. You know, the influence of the older generation is still very important, because my dad also devoted a lot of time to his grandson and they understood each other perfectly. (Interviewee P7-I)

The young person in the pair also highlighted conversations as frequent, focused on facts and because of agreements in their conservative outlooks, there were never "two opposite camps" (interviewee Y1-A) at home when it came to political topics.

Talking about history came up in interviews, parents stressed that for their children's political activity it is importance to live in a "family where some traditions are cultivated and some views are more important" (interviewee P6-I), where patriotic values are passed onto children, and are understood in the context of sustaining Polish statehood and liberation struggles:

I tried to pass on to her some values from a very young age. The values of not only my parents but also my grandparents, who took part in the Silesian uprisings for the incorporation of Silesia to Poland. So that she knows that Poland is to be Poland and not a part of someone else's territory. (Interviewee P8-I)

Interestingly, parents, irrespective of their self-assessment as inactive, talked about the importance of being an example to their children, because it is through copying behaviours this influence happens:

Young children learn from their parents not through what they say to them, because many of these things they are not able to understand and process mentally, but through imitation, and that is where we start. (Interviewee P4-I) The offspring of this parent was well aware of this influence, citing parents' activity in various projects, for example reflecting on the mother's "long-term help in hospices" and school boards (interviewee Y3-A).

In connection with the above, parents found their own involvement in volunteering to be of significance, as well as encouraging reading books and newspapers at home, and some believed that supporting children in voicing their own opinions was key:

...the fact that I always consciously wanted him to have the right to have his own opinion. I was brought up in such a different way... And as I was raising my son, I thought to myself that, you have to respect that, and he always had the right to have his opinion and say it. That also, I think, has some influence. He was able to develop himself somehow and give his opinion. (Interviewee P6-I)

The young person in this pair recognised the general emphasis placed by parents on "being responsible", which meant at least that "when no one in our circle went to vote in elections, my parent went to vote" (interviewee Y5-A), and it also encouraged staying informed about current affairs.

The only interviewee pair, in which both the parent and the child identified as active politically, was also in agreement with regard to parental impact. The parent felt that the upbringing provided in the family home "was fundamental" in forming the young person's views, which were "the same political views as her parents and grandparents, which proves that upbringing, both in her case and mine, was the most important" (interviewee P30-A). The parent also, similarly to others, stressed the significance of "discussions on political issues at home", but also the fact that "family

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members always participate in elections, sometimes even running for office themselves" (interviewee P30-A). All in all, the parent was certain that the above had an influence on the young person's attitude toward political activity. The young interviewee in this pair was well aware of their parent's activity, praising the mother for standing in local elections, grateful for being able to learn about their parents' involvement in anti-communist demonstrations or illegal organisations before the transformation of 1989, learning about history at home, but also being "encouraged not be a wallflower" (interviewee Y13-A).

In case of two young interviewees, who identified themselves as active, both their parents and the young persons agreed in their assessment of parental influence, describing it as negative or were unable to define it. Whether being divided over individual topics, where the young perceived themselves as radical, but the parents as neutral (interviewee Y23-A), or quarrelling about the "matters of the communist past" (interviewee Y24-A), general disagreement in political matters transpired from these interviews.

In the first pair, the parent believed they had influence "in part", but emphasized the fact of their divergent political views:

Perhaps in part, but certainly not entirely in terms of views. Of course, in our house we talked a lot about tolerance and acceptance, but on issues of economic views we differ a lot. My daughter is a socialist, I tend to have liberal views. (Interviewee P31-I)

As for the young interviewee, they summarised the influence of their parents as negative, and pointed out the bad image of the political sphere present in the conversations at home that may have delayed the young person becoming politically active:

Unfortunately, at home [my] parents perpetuated this stereotype that politics is a swamp, that you have to go to the elections... but if you would like to get involved, then no... I think that it was a big mistake, because I could have started acting earlier than I got into it myself... the more I tried to get to know these parties and groups, the more wonderful people I met and it didn't agree with what I heard at the family table. (Interviewee Y23-A)

The above young person, when asked about any activity of parents that may have inspired her interests in being active, did not mention the involvement in supporting local organisations the parent discussed in her interview. In terms of reasons for becoming active, the young interviewee tended to see it more in the school setting, having been given the opportunity to participate in school's pupil council:

...I had very anarchistic views, I believed that the government cannot be changed in any way, that the system is terrible, and I cannot fight it either... my colleague whom I supported during the school elections campaign said that he was so grateful to me that he couldn't imagine it being such a one-time collaboration and invited me to be the vice president of school government. I have never really taken this kind of social activity and had been very quiet. (Interviewee Y23-A)

The young person continued to developed and expand their knowledge of available methods (for example about political parties youth wings) by participating in a pro-turnout civic education NGO project: The project of the [REDACTED], to which I was invited to, "Young people vote", was based on the fact that it is a politically neutral project, but it is pro-turnout, aims to engage young people to build such local communities, collectives and work to encourage people to participate in elections, to raise this civic awareness. (Interviewee Y23-A)

In the second pair, the parent stated that he had not contributed to his child being politically active, distancing himself from any influence: "everyone has their own mind and knows how to act according to their beliefs" (interviewee P32-I). As for the interview with the young person, any influence was difficult to establish. In the eyes of the interviewee, similarly to the previous pair, the conflicting views on political matters and the family's general attitude towards political activity, belonged to the old, communist system:

In my case there was no such thing, because as far as I know, my family was more in favour of the old system. I argue with my father and with my grandfather about these issues. (Interviewee Y24-A)

This young person in particular stressed the passivity characterising people who lived under the old system, because they thought that:

...they are entitled to everything. And we, young people, don't necessarily look at it that way that we deserve everything, on the contrary, only within the limits of what we grew up in, in which country. (Interviewee Y24-A)

The young interviewee did not bring up any activity of the parents, which he found inspired his own activity, even though the parent in the interview gave examples of initiatives he got involved in. As for his own political activity, the young interviewee believed he owed it to his character, the fact that he likes to help: "that it's my nature

to do something and to do it for others, not only for myself. It started from my character" (interviewee Y24-A). He also felt that changing schools and a new, supportive school environment influenced his activity, in particular having friendly peers in junior high school: "that's when the new people made an acquaintance with me and it enabled me to be active, as if with a new charter" (interviewee Y24-A).

Inactive Young People. For those young people, who identified themselves as politically inactive during the interviews, in some cases the parent or young interviewee spoke of a negative influence within the family environment on political activity, and in some cases it was possible to speak of no influence or an unclear relationship.

In all of these pairs, contrary to information about not discussing politics, interviewees believed there was a mismatch of political views. Some of the parents were willing to talk politics, but in their eyes divergent views meant "the conversation stops" (interviewee P20-I), or even if the young person "rarely voices his opinion", parents knew their ideological views were different (interviewee P29-I). Another young interviewee felt that their and their parents' "views are different, because we hold different values" (interviewee Y15-I).

In the negative cases, that is when the influence of parents was perceived as not conducive for political activity, one young interviewee pointed out the lack of conversations about politics, "even at the Christmas table". This was seen as deliberate avoidance of this topic, as their parents believed it was an issue of conflict:

My mother tries to be very non-confrontational, so even if the subject comes up, she might say something, her opinion, but in general — well, let's stop talking about politics. My father is like a typical father, he is just angry. (Interviewee Y16-I) The parent in this pair confirmed that the topic is not often present, even the issue of elections and decisions made, is not an occasion for discussion either:

If there was a vote, I don't impose anything, each has their own conscience. But I would be more satisfied to have her behind my back. But she has her opinion. We don't talk too much; I mean that honestly. (Interviewee P20-I)

Another parent went a step further, and believed that their impact on the child's activity was negative: "I have no opinion on my child's activities. I believe the lack of political involvement on my part has affected my child" (interviewee P28-I). In contrast, the young person, describing the impact, emphasized that the topic of politics had only recently come up at home, but stressed that their political views were fundamentally different in this relationship (interviewee Y15-I).

For another inactive person, the parent could not definitively state the impact, and emphasized differences in political views and the young person's inactivity:

My son is not very politically involved. He rarely expresses his opinion on these topics. Although I know that we differ in political views...Throughout my life I have tried to pass on good role models, so perhaps in a way I have influenced his political views. (Interviewee P29-I)

The young interviewee, on the other hand, emphasized that the parents are not active; the topic rarely comes up at home, usually "when there's an election we talk about the subject. But fortunately, there's an election every 4 or 5 years, depends which one, and so this topic of politics is not discussed at home" (interviewee Y19-I). The young interviewee, when it comes to political views, rather saw himself being "influenced by the immediate environment in which I hang around...my older friends, older acquaintances that I see and we talk about these topics" (interviewee Y19-I).

Some young interviewees had a problem with classifying their activities as political activity, and ultimately identified themselves as inactive, as presented earlier in the chapter. The first of them emphasized their social involvement and the early stage of her activity, lacking precise preferences in terms of any political party she could support. As for parental influence on their activity, their parent did not take responsibility for the actions of the young person, rather, indicated that it was the young person's decision, resulting from her character:

[She] is like that. For example, she knows that she doesn't want to be a doctor because she can't stand the sight of blood or there's something there that makes her nauseous or faint, so she doesn't do that. Could we have influenced her to be like that — well maybe, but she is like that anyway. (Interviewee P12-I)

This young person, on the other hand, saw the sources of her social involvement in the school setting, when in her junior high school one of the teachers was supportive of her participation on the pupils' board. Since this initial involvement, she believed it was her own responsibility to learn and to get to "know different people". Being "involved in different communities" made her develop and move "away a bit from those views that have been imposed on me, and I can build my views on my own. By observing my surroundings, what is happening in Poland, in the world, by observing others" (interviewee Y11-I).

The second young man did not consider himself to be currently politically active, but in the interview, he mentioned his involvement in the activities of one of the parties as a teenager. The interviewee believed that the decision to stop being active was influenced by his studies, which made him develop a distant approach to politics. When determining the influence of the family environment, the young interviewee firmly excluded any influence on his activity: "None. If I was to think of something completely apolitical, I would think of my parents." He also criticised the way parents approached politics, stating that they "are rather guided by their reflexes, sympathies, they don't think about it in terms of any programme, I think so. Although I haven't talked to them much about it" (interviewee Y17-I). His parent interview confirmed that the topic of politics is not often discussed in the family home:

No, we rather not bring up politics. Perhaps some of the current news. I mean, sure, when there are some events or things, then yes. But there are no disputes, discussions...it's best not to talk about politics over dinner, because dinner [then] tastes bad. (Interviewee Y17-I)

In terms of their influence on their child's activity, the parent confirmed the lack of influence on the decision to engage in any political activity. He reflected on the time when the young person was involved in a political party, which the parent "didn't like at all. But well, you know, it was his choice, I never told him not to go there, not to act. He wanted to do it" (interviewee P21-I). The parent emphasised that the pair had "completely different views", the young interviewee's political party of choice was conservative, and the parent felt "more left-wing," which made him question if he had any influence: "Well, I don't think he did it out of spite" (interviewee P21-I).

Unilateral Assessment of Parental Influence on Political Activity. In the case of 6 of the young people, it was not possible to obtain an interview with their parents, so any information on influence can only be sourced from interviews with the young people themselves.

In the eyes of those young interviewees who identified as politically active, in common with their fellow active Poles presented already, their parents had a positive influence. This influence was primarily through frequent discussions about politics at home. One interviewee was grateful that her "family has always just talked about the situation in the country", in particular citing their father's "travels all over the world", which meant that "he is very familiar with different political systems" (interviewee Y25-A). The mother's education was also thought to be conducive to informed discussion: "My mum is the same way, she has a law degree, she is a legal adviser — and we also just very... very... we talk very often about different topics related to politics, for which I'm very grateful" (interviewee Y25-A).

Another interviewee pointed out that even though the political activity of the family was "more emotional than intellectual", the parents placed emphasis on national identity and respecting the state, which built the young person's reasons for their political activity:

...they were of those who cried when the anthem was played, they liked to watch national celebrations on TV, visit national necropolises, some national mementos, Wawel¹¹, for them it was very important and they were able to delight in it. (Interviewee Y2-A)

The next interviewee considered as a positive influence the fact that his parents, despite their inexperience with certain types of activities, never forbade the interviewee to get involved: "I never really experienced them holding me back. They didn't lift me up either, because they didn't know what it was" (interviewee Y27-A). In

¹¹ Polish royal castle in Cracow

the eyes of the young person, the family had never been active in a way he wanted to be active, but they:

...didn't want to spoil it for me either. Maybe they got to know it along with me, maybe they got convinced by it...But I never heard a "no". I think that was the most important thing about it. They didn't want to make it difficult or repellent for me in any way. (Interviewee Y27-A)

For another interviewee, the influence was unclear, despite noting the activity of parents, believing them to be "quite aware and to some extent active", displaying interest in political matters, current affairs. However, the parents' not being "in favour of any particular party" was making it "difficult to talk about any party activity and open support for any of the options" (interviewee Y26-A). When asked about an event that had an impact on the level of political activity, the interviewee believed it was an external event that triggered her involvement, around the time when there were:

...the parliamentary wars over the morning-after pill. And I was only 15 or 16 at the time, although as a young girl I was aware that it was... that it would be prescribed, I knew what the consequences could be, as that it was nothing good, and that was the moment when I practically started to get interested in politics. (Interviewee Y26-A)

Among the inactive young, one interviewee spoke of "inheriting" this lack of interest in the political sphere from the mother: "she could have had that sort of influence on me, especially because we have such a good relationship, I consider my mum to be my friend in general" (interviewee Y18-I). Another young person, on the other hand, lost his parents at a young age, but emphasized that "no one put pressure on me, no pressure on me whatsoever when it comes to party, power or political activity, here absolutely none of my parents had any influence on me" (interviewee Y14-I).

The tables below provide summary information¹² on the perceived impact on activity levels provided by both parents and young Poles, or by the young people only, in the cases where an interview with their parents was not available.

¹² Positive — resulting in activity; negative — resulting in inactivity; no influence — hard to say.

Table 12

Summary of Ferceived Farental impact and Young Foles Activity Self-evaluations	ived Parental Impact and Young Poles' Activity Self-evaluations
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Parent	Self-assessment of	Young Poles'	Young	Young Pole's
interviewee	parent's influence	assessment of	person's	self-assess-
number	on the activity of	parental influence	interviewee	ment of activ-
	young Poles		number	ity
P4-I	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y3-A	ACTIVE
P6-I	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y5-A	ACTIVE
P7-I	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y1-A	ACTIVE
P8-I	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y22-A	ACTIVE
P10-I	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y9-A	ACTIVE
P12-I	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	Y11-I	INACTIVE
P20-I	HARD TO SAY	NEGATIVE	Y16-I	INACTIVE
P21-I	HARD TO SAY	NO INFLUENCE	Y17-I	INACTIVE
P28-I	NEGATIVE	HARD TO SAY	Y15-I	INACTIVE
P29-I	HARD TO SAY	NO INFLUENCE	Y19-I	INACTIVE
P30-A	POSITIVE	POSITIVE	Y13-A	ACTIVE
P31-I	HARD TO SAY	NEGATIVE	Y23-A	ACTIVE

Table 13

Summary of Perceived Parental Impact and Young Poles' Activity Self-Evaluations (Without Parent Interviews)

Young person	Assessment	of	parental	Self-assessment of activity
interviewee number	influence on poli	tical ac	ctivity	
Y2-A	POSITIVE			ACTIVE
Y14-I	NO INFLUENCE	E		INACTIVE
Y18-I	NEGATIVE			INACTIVE
Y25-A	POSITIVE			ACTIVE
Y26-A	HARD TO SAY			ACTIVE
Y27-A	POSITIVE			ACTIVE

Summary of Analysis on Research Question 7. Nearly all of the young Poles, who described themselves as politically active, also believed that their parents and wider family environment had a positive impact on their activity. Young interviewees and their parents considered frequent conversations relating to politics, current affairs or history, as being essential for passing on views, attitudes and values. These

discussions frequently included older members of the family — the involvement of grandparents was perceived as crucial in passing on patriotic values.

A few of the interviewees mentioned the importance of their parents' own political activity and its impact on them. In these pairs there was a general agreement in political outlook, reported both by parents as well as the young.

The politically active young Poles, who believed parental impact to be negative, or difficult to establish, pointed to external factors influencing their activity, such as a conducive school environment and inspiring teachers, a political event or decision they were opposed to, or internal determinants, such as personal character. In these cases, a disagreement over political topics transpired from the interviews with both sides.

The narrative regarding parental impact in cases where only the interview with the active young person was available, confirmed the main topics already presented; that is frequent discussions and general supportive, friendly relationship was thought to be responsible for the young person's keenness on political activity.

Of the inactive young, the perceived parental impact for all of them was either negative, hard to establish or none. Similarly to the active group, political discussion at home was brought up by majority of interviewees, but in this case, what was crucial was the lack of discussion. Negative impacts were believed to be through passing on a dislike for politics by parents, or instilling unfavourable stereotypes about the world of politics. There was a general belief in a mismatch of political views of parents and the young, established even though discussions were lacking, or even perhaps lacking because of the differences.

4.4. Research Objective 4: Political Efficacy of Young Poles and their Parents

Political efficacy was a concept, which brought up several questions as a result of the literature review. Young Poles political knowledge is typically higher, but political interest lower than the general population. It is one of those important dispositions that encourages political participation, but the evidence of its impact on young Poles has been fuzzy.

It was thus worth exploring in-depth how Poles saw their role in the political system, and through this, their individual confidence in own abilities to be politically active. Therefore, to expand the understanding of Poles' feeling of political efficacy, I explored two topics with interviewees. Firstly, I wanted to check what their definitions of the current political system in Poland are, and if, with this fundamental question, interviewees would be able to use their political knowledge. Interviewees were also afforded the opportunity to assess the system's overall performance and the system's responsiveness. Secondly, I wanted to check their individual confidence in their abilities, if interviewees could define themselves as people able to implement their rights and responsibilities, and how they defined their role in the political system.

4.4.1. Research Question 8: How Young Poles and Their Parents Define the Political System and Their Role in it?

Parental statements about the political system prevailing in Poland can be divided into two types. Firstly, neutral, factual answers, in most cases defining the system as a democracy, a multi-party bicameral system, and then secondly, answers referring to the current distribution of political power resulting from the 2019 parliamentary elections. In the latter case, interviewees did not separate their reflection on the political system — democracy — from their assessment of how democratic governance is exercised. Some interviewees chose to affirm the ruling coalition, stating that "Poland is ruled by a party that cares about citizens. It provides social benefits, people live more prosperously, they have more money. Most people around me are happy with the current situation" (interviewee P29-I), and some criticized it: "We have a unilateral political system based on a single right-wing party" (interviewee P32-I), questioning how democratic is the decision-making process in the government: "officially we have a democracy....and unofficially well, unofficially, well, one man rules" (interviewee P21-I). As one parent observed, influencing politics is difficult due to "nepotism...promoting certain people, friends" (interviewee P7-I). The chances of having any impact were believed to be limited due to politicians' behaviour, who exclude and discourage any attempts of involvement with their "irresponsible treatment of their mission" (interviewee P7-I).

Young interviewees showed more nuance in their responses. When asked to describe the political system in Poland, most of the interviewees indicated a democratic system. Similarly to parents, a variety of adjectives and additional descriptions of democracy appeared in these responses, ranging from affirmative or with additional descriptor (such as "stable", "turned to values", "conservative", "parliamentary-cabinet", "liberal", "with tripartition of power"), to those suggesting a negative evaluation (such as "officially", "legally" or "theoretically" democratic), supplemented with information on their perception of governance of the coalition of parties elected in 2019:

Officially there is democracy, but in recent years it is going in a more authoritarian direction. One party is right and the rest should follow. Or one person is right and dictates his views to the whole society. (Interviewee Y15-I) Some pointed to demonstrations as an evidence that there was something wrong with Polish democracy:

I would say that theoretically it is a democracy, because practically everything looks a bit different....I would also cite the events of recent weeks, months, women's protests, or protests by non-heteronormative people. (Interviewee Y23-A)

Another young interviewee emphasised the early stage of Poland's implementation of democracy:

In legal terms we have democracy... we still have to reckon with the fact that there is an older generation which lived under a different system. We are at a transitional stage from the People's Republic of Poland to the democracy as it should function. (Interviewee Y24-A)

The remaining answers showed that young people perceived the system in relation to the existing political groupings, giving responses that included the phrases: conservative government, two main groupings, two main parties with one currently in power, as well as two main forces — right and centre. Conservatism also appeared in an answer that emphasized that the country is divided, because "a lot of young people are now moving away from all that, and are often rebelling against that older majority", even though "young people also elected the ruling party", but times changed, there is a need for modernity, and so "the country is a bit divided" (interviewee Y16-I). There were also comments that the system was post-socialist, and that the way it is now is a result of the way "our political system was formed in the 1990s, it was just a clash of these several different visions, taken from different countries" (interviewee Y1-A).

When it comes to the confidence of an individual in his or her abilities to act politically, parents struggled to respond to this topic. Several interviewees had difficulty answering such a question and did not provide an answer. Those who were able to self-define their roles in the political system, mostly described themselves using terms relating to the political sphere — presenting themselves as voters , e.g. "A voter, a person who has an influence on who will take a seat in the bodies to which elections are held" (interviewee P31-I), or in one case, as an opposition activist. In addition, parents chose to identify as a citizen or taxpayer, while also describing themselves using a family role, as a mother, or as an elder. The lack of feeling competent to act was also reflected in the responses to the question of whether interviewees considered themselves to be politically active, with only one positive response. Some interviewees expanded on their negative self-assessment and stressed that they "don't have any influence" (interviewee P10-I), are a "passive member of the system" (interviewee 29), do not have any influence but they "do not feel the need" (interviewee P31-I).

In contrast, among the young a greater variety could be seen in the perception of their own role in the described political system. The statements on their role can be divided into two types — affirmative and passive. Interestingly, these selfassessments were aligned with the young's identifications as active or inactive. In the case of affirmative responses, the feeling of competence to play a role was reflected in the way the young described their role in the context of political activities undertaken: as an expert, an assistant to decision-makers, a non-governmental activist working with the government, an educator of the young, a trainer, a citizenactivist, a social activist, a person planning a career as a politician, a voter who educates those around him, and also as someone who perceives themselves in many roles: I am certainly a citizen, I am a taxpayer who contributes to the state budget, I can also be a critic who can express his opinion on any topic and also influence the decisions made in the state, due to the system we have, that is democracy, I think... who else I am...probably a citizen, a participant in democracy, that is a voter. (Interviewee Y13-A)

There were also responses emphasizing personal initiative and freedom of action. One interviewee believed that citizen activity "depends on each citizen individually", stressing that "everyone will play such a role as he is able to work out for himself, as he wishes to achieve" (interviewee Y2-A). This young person's view was optimistic, so in their view, if someone wished to take the initiative, there were "very many opportunities in our country to realize themselves, in politics, in civic organizations, social organizations, depending on their own interests and predispositions" (interviewee Y2-A).

In a similar fashion, another interviewee supported the view that nowadays "in Poland every citizen has so many opportunities". This young person also commented that it has not always been like that, and that "for many years, unfortunately, the role of citizens was reduced to an object-like function, perhaps in many places it still is" (interviewee Y5-A).

Encouragingly, the youth interviewed believed that apart from taking part in elections, citizens had "many different tools of influence today" which enable people "to create this reality" (interviewee Y5-A). This freedom-affirming and self-made theme continued in reflections of another interviewee, who thought that "everyone should do their own thing, and that above all we should change the world beginning from ourselves" (interviewee Y9-A). Borrowing language from diplomacy, this young

interviewee stressed that citizens "should try to learn how to take care of such soft power, of our own little homeland, to unite, to make different kinds of structures", and instead of relying on politicians, "try to solve these problems and enjoy what we can achieve in life" (interviewee Y9-A).

In the case of the more passive responses, young interviewees emphasized their mediocrity, normality. One person stressed they were "a decent citizen", because they took part in elections and worked. She also highlighted their future plans to raise a family and in this way supporting the country she lived in. This young interviewee was adamant, that when it came to political activity, she "certainly wouldn't participate, I wouldn't go into a political career, I would just be the little ordinary person who is governed" (interviewee Y16-I). The next interviewee, in similar manner, believed he was "an ordinary man", who tries to "stay as far away as possible" from politics. He believed he is "not going to change the world", and hoped that "this world of politics never affects me too much" (interviewee Y19-I).

Reflecting this theme, there were also voices doubting their own contribution, who did not "feel as an individual entity in this system" (interviewee Y17-I). The next interviewee did not know what is her role in the system, because it was:

hard for me to define it, because in fact, I keep going, living and somehow I don't contribute, it's like I don't exist. The fact that I voted doesn't change anything and a lot of people might think the same. (Interview Y18-I)

It is for this fact that the young woman above was not interested in politics, and even if she was interested and wanted to contribute, she was not sure of "anyone would even want to listen, I don't know if it would do anything, it's hard to say. I don't see an important role that I would play" (interviewee Y18-I). Another interviewee also emphasised, when describing their role, that they did not want to get politically involved, e.g. by coming to the conclusion that as an artist they did not feel their actions can impact politics, therefore they stayed "far away from it. As an artist I think that we should not get involved in politics" (interviewee Y14-I).

Summary of Analysis on Research Question 8. Although limited in number, parents' responses regarding the political system provided a clear picture — the system was defined either simply as democratic, or as the government, which they evaluated favourably or criticised. Similarly, the majority of the young people's responses classified the system as democratic, some additionally questioning its "realness" due to their assessment of the performance of current government. A minority of answers stayed on the governing level and described the political and parliamentary partisan divisions. There were no major differences in the way interviewees and their parents saw the political system. Most of parents and young people either confirmed the system as a representative democracy, or questioned whether the system was democratic when they did not agree with policies implemented by the government.

Interviewees' attempts to describe their role in the political system were diverse. Parents saw their role in the political system mainly as being a voter, some limiting themselves to familial roles. Definitions given by the young were more complex. The majority of young interviewees described themselves in an affirmative way, emphasising personal sense of agency and using activist labels. Many of the young used freedom-affirming statements, believing in their own abilities, as well as the opportunities there were on offer. A minority chose to use passive language, articulating their "averageness", doubting personal efficacy or questioning playing a role. These interviewees were also the ones who self-identified as inactive.

5. Discussion Of Findings

This chapter presents the study's findings in the context of existing research by reviewing and discussing the main conclusions from the previously described data analysis under the four research objectives. It will then close with a discussion of the potential applicability of these findings to other national contexts.

5.1. Findings for Research Objective 1

It is worth restating the first research objective here.

Research objective 1: to understand the perceptions of citizenship norms among Poles, in particular what are their normative and empirical expectations, and what are the perceived consequences of citizenship norm adherence or lack of it.

This study sought to bring further understanding of the concept of a citizenship norm, one of the explanatory tools used in political participation research. After introducing the perspectives of young people and their parents, I found that the standard conceptualisations of a citizenship norm used in survey research would have not accounted for two important elements of Poles' understanding of the concept.

5.1.1. The Role of Personal Character

The first of the definitional elements noted above was personal character, which appeared in various guises of a tolerant, helpful, well behaved, responsible for one's family, honest and conscientious individual — that is, a good citizen as a good person. Even though such personality-based definitions are not used in major quantitative studies focusing on the influence of citizenship norms on political participation, personality traits have been present in political participation research for a while. There is a growing empirical evidence on how personality, measured with the Big Five personality model (Costa & McCrae, 1988), impacts political behaviour, for example certain personality traits affect political consumerism, voting or protest behaviour (Blais & Pruysers, 2017; Quintelier, 2015; Gerber et al., 2011; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Only a handful of studies, which directly link personality traits with citizenship norms, were found, for example (Pruysers, Blais & Chen, 2019; Dinesen, Nørgaard & Klemmenson, 2014). The example of Pruysers, Blais and Chen (2019) used Canadian national survey panel data to establish that the traits of honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are all positively related to good citizenship, measured using standard items of voting, paying taxes, and obeying the law. Dinesen, Nørgaard and Klemmenson (2014, p.12), using Danish population web survey data, found that various citizenship norms were significantly affected by personality traits, but the strength of associations depended on the nature of the norms.

The above mentioned studies present character traits as separate factors playing a role in the development of informal rules, which in turn inform civic behaviours. How does one interpret the inclusion of, and, in some cases, a complete reliance on, personal character traits when defining a good citizen for oneself?

On the one hand, personal, so-called "good" character traits can be considered desirable by practitioners, educators and policy-makers in civic education. For example, the Polish Ministry of Education's curriculum for civic education in primary schools lists the development of pro-civic and community-centred attitudes as an overarching aim, achieved through gaining knowledge about and experience in practising, among other topics, virtues such as responsibility, tolerance, conscientiousness, solidarity, care for the common good (MEN, 2018).

In addition, in the US, practice-oriented character education, with its focus on forming personalities and habits, and moral education promoting moral cognitive development, both get embedded within the school systems' knowledge-oriented state civic education (Whitehouse, Baumann & Brennan, 2017; Althof & Berkowitz, 2006).

Furthermore, in the UK, the Crick Report defined citizenship education as encompassing three, interlinked elements: "social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy" (QCA, 1998, p. 13), emphasising that "moral values and personal development are essential preconditions of citizenship" (QCA, 1998, p. 11).

The good character norms of citizenship described by parents, and partially by some of the young Poles, can be interpreted as personality traits, as well as pro-social virtues that are moral rules focusing on behaving in certain way and treating other people or wider communities well (Mariański, 2017, p. 13).

On the other hand, despite how commendable these traits are, such definitions, consisting only of character traits or moral norms, can be interpreted as incomplete within the contexts of liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship (Honohan, 2017), lacking the portrayal of how the citizens see themselves in relation to institutions of the state or political matters.

In addition to the absence of a political, institutional dimension, good person definitions of a good citizen are based on assumptions of a wider context of shared moral values. This finding is supported by analyses of the value system present in contemporary Polish society, which largely confirm the conclusion regarding a moral character of social relations provided by Stefan Nowak's research that was conducted throughout the three post-war decades (Nowak, 2009, p. 114).

It needs to be emphasised, that moral rules are still salient for Poles, who — when compared to other European societies taking part in the European Values Study (EVS) — are characterized by greater moral rigourism than permissiveness. This rigourism results in disapproval of violations of moral norms, especially in the sphere of public life (Jasińska-Kania, 2008, p. 15). Interestingly, the growth of moral relativism affects different types of morality differently — the most strict are expectations regarding compliance with the norms of social morality (understood as rules of social conduct in public places, such as polluting, drink-driving, deceit and so on). That said, the assessments of violations of norms of behaviour towards state institutions are slightly less severe (so-called civic morality, for example tax avoidance, corruption, benefit fraud), and the greatest permissiveness is directed towards norms related to the private life of others and their relationships with family and friends, such as sexuality, divorce or drugs (Jasińska-Kania, 2012, p. 127).

The moral rules present in parental, and to a lesser extent, young Poles' good citizen definitions can also be found among the contents of the normative system of some Polish students. A study by Ewa Budzyńska (2014) sheds some light on the transmission of moral values of Polish parents to their offspring. Young Poles were asked to assess their own and the parental hierarchy of life values, understood to be the ultimate goals the person wishes to achieve in life. The findings pointed to a traditional parental value system that, in the eyes of the young, reflected their parents' desire for their offspring to achieve a higher social status through educational achievement and increased economic independence. Slightly less important, but still high on the list, was a social norm of honesty, followed by building a family and being respected by others. Further, students thought that their parents wanted to pass on the norms of being religious, social norms of helping other people, and being tolerant.

The study by Budzyńska (2014) explored the process of intergenerational transmission in the family. The young people were asked to assess the degree of similarity of views on various issues between them and their parents. Young people noticed the largest intergenerational similarity in the sphere of views on the family, social moral norms, religious matters, and in career plans. They also saw partial similarity in the spheres of views on national and European politics. Students saw the greatest difference between their own views and parental views in their lifestyles, their ways of spending free time. All in all, according to Budzyńska (2014, pp.77–78), the biggest normative difference affected norms regarding activity in external sphere, and not the traditional values (e.g. family, religion, social norms).

Even though there are some methodological issues with the above study (most importantly a lack of inclusion of parental self-perceptions), it does make a number of interesting points for the current research. Firstly, that the family, as a value in of itself, and parenting, as a source of moral values, could be considered an important factor in shaping young people's normative systems. This finding reflects Stefan Nowak's conclusions that Poles' two main group identifications were with the primary group, that is the family, and the Polish nation (Nowak, 2011, p. 265), with a "social vacuum" in between them (Nowak, 2011, p. 266). Jasińska-Kania (2008) supports this with the observation that Poles persistently attach high value to familial and other communities based on emotional ties.

The second point made by Budzyńska's study is that norms relating to social morality were considered important for both, the young and the parents, in the eyes of the young. This is supported by the EVS results presented earlier, pointing to continued salience of social moral norms among Poles (Jasińska-Kania, 2012, p. 127).

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Budzyńska's findings are also partially supported by a study by Natalia Letki (2006), using 1999–2002 World Values Survey data from 38 countries, which was aimed at identifying the foundations of civic morality. Letki established that support for civic morality was influenced by personal values and norms learned through primary socialisation (due to identified effects of age and religiosity), and by people's institutional trust. Letki also found that factors such as interpersonal trust and associational membership were not significant for civic morality (Letki, 2006, pp. 320–321). Letki also identified that older people had much stricter civic moral norms than young people, pointing out that increased participation in religious services lead to stronger disapproval of violations of the civic moral norms (Letki, 2006, p. 320).

To conclude the discussion on the finding of a good person element of Poles' citizenship norms, even though Poles can be characterized as morally strict (or at least stricter than other Europeans) rather than morally relativistic and permissive (Jasińska-Kania, 2007, p. 423), when we look at how these attitudes are represented throughout the Polish population the picture is less one-dimensional. Most importantly for this present study, adult Poles present themselves as stricter than young people, in particular in the sphere of morality relating to private lives, being impacted by their closeness to teachings of the Catholic Church. In addition, more rigourism in the sphere of social and civic morality is positively associated with Poles' belief that the systemic transformation in Poland did not go as planned (Jasińska-Kania, 2007, p. 436). In the last twenty or so years of transformation there has been an ongoing process of an increase in permissiveness of moral judgments due to what appears to be a generational replacement. That said, the levels of strictness in the private sphere are still higher than in Western societies.

Looking forward, considering that no causal relationship can be established through the current study research design, the finding that parental understanding of citizenship was based on personal moral norms of pro-social behaviours and character traits, and that those norms were not as strongly reflected in young Poles definitions — taken together with the results of studies presented above — could be explored in future research as hypotheses of decreasing moral foundation of citizens' norms. More importantly, an original addition to the field of political participation research is the finding of personal, trait-like, moral elements being used when conceptualising the idea of a good citizen.

5.1.2. The Role of Feelings for the Nation

The second element of good citizen definitions, which would have been missed by standard survey studies into citizenship norms, were the variously described feelings and deeds of love and respect for the nation, country and state. Young Poles and their parents, when defining a good citizen, spoke about knowing Polish history, respecting the national symbols, building the country's prosperity through hard work, and linked with it, not evading taxes. They declared the requirement of feeling various emotional states, like respect, pride, love and care of "the homeland", as well as the duty to protect the country in case of war.

Even though such elements, like feelings and acts of patriotism, did not feature in surveys used in most studies reviewed for this study, it needs to be mentioned that the CIVED 1999, and later ICCS (the biggest international study on citizenship and civic education) have been collecting data on one citizenship norm component regarding knowing or learning country's history (Schulz, Ainley & Fraillon, 2011).

Such an analytical separation between citizenship norms and emotional identification with one's country or nation is understandable, as both concepts are

continuously redefined and operationalised. Patriotism, nationalism, national identity, and citizenship can be treated as somewhat separate phenomena, but conceptually they have many tangent points.

The meaning of patriotism, as Huddy and Khatib (2007) proposed, can be distilled to, firstly, positive identification, and secondly, affective attachment to one's country (Huddy & Khatib, 2007, p. 63). There is however more disagreement among scholars on how the measure it. Patriotism is commonly presented in opposition to nationalism that is understood as a national attachment, which is "blind, militaristic, ignorant and obedient" versus a "genuine, constructive, critical, civic, and reasonable" patriotic attachment (Davidov, 2010, p.88). Paul Gilbert usefully proposed that the target of the emotional identification of patriotism is the country, whereas nationalism prioritises the nation over the state (Gilbert, 1998). Some scholars distinguish between "blind" patriotism and "constructive" patriotism (Staub, 1997), the difference being based on an attitude toward "us" and beliefs about "others". In other words, so-called blind patriotism is characterised by an uncritical view of one's own group and negative feelings toward other groups. Furthermore, national identity, while occupying a small corner of the social identity theory, can be defined as a perceived membership in groups of people, such as nations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Lastly, citizenship has been seen mostly as national citizenship, the legal status it provides linked to a specific country's legal system, and defined by birth (jus soli), or in some cases by blood or ethnic descent (jus sanguinis).

Movement of people across the globe creates circumstances, in which decision-makers and the wider public are continuously faced with questions regarding not only migrants' legal status, that is who and under what conditions can gain the rights and take on responsibilities on a given territory, but also, what are the cultural aspects of "joining the club" by acquiring citizenship. Furthermore, what are the contents of the national identity, what makes a person Polish, and so on? A certain conflation of both concepts — citizenship and national identity — can be expected (Lister et al., 2003).

Citizenship, in addition to rights and responsibilities granted within a certain national context, can be understood as feeling of belonging to a specific national community, elements of which, for example knowing the language, culture and customs, can also be part of the formal requirements when applying for this legal status.

Theories on national identity traditionally regarded citizenship policies based on the principle of descent as a core element of an ethnic national identity, and policies based on the principle of birth as a foundation of a civic national identity (Brubaker, 1992). There has been a growing trend of liberalisation of citizenship policies toward a mixed regime of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* elements (Bertocchi & Strozzi, 2010). There have also been attempts to operationalise citizenship as "post-national" — in other words, as an identification linked with institutions of a supra-national level. This is in response to "ongoing processes of globalisation [and] nation states...slowly losing their monopoly on the concept of citizenship and especially citizenship rights." (Hafner-Fink, Malnar & Uhan, 2013, p. 867). In one study, using information regarding macrosocietal conditions as well as European Social Survey data, authors established that elements of post-national citizenship were present in some Nordic and Western EU countries, though were not found in Poland (Hafner-Fink, Malnar & Uhan, 2013, p. 889).

Legal system aside, research on how people define their national identity asks questions such as what are the elements, which make a person Polish, German, British, and so on, as a result, placing their identification on a civic vs. ethnic national identity spectrum. These include concepts of feelings for one's country, among other elements, such as having citizenship understood as a legal status (Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019).

Therefore, in light of the literature presented above, the interviewees in this study, by including within their definitions the various acts and feelings of patriotism, located their citizenship firmly within the national context (as opposed to, say, global or post-national).

What is more, parental and young Poles' inclusion of patriotic feelings in their good citizen definitions reflect the salience of nation and country-affirmative opinions. National polling provides evidence for this sentiment. For example, according to a 2018 study (Głowacki, 2018) the feeling of being proud to be Polish is shared by 71% of Poles, with 88% of Poles thinking of themselves as patriots. When asked how they understood the term (multiple choice question), responses, on which over 50% of respondents strongly agreed on, referred to cultural and state-centred activities (such as respecting national symbols, holding onto Polish traditions, knowing Polish history, teaching children about the importance of loving and respecting the homeland, as well as abiding the law, taking part in elections and protecting the country in case of war).

Another related study (Boguszewski & Głowacki, 2016) also checked the prevalence of nationalistic attitudes. It found that three quarters of Poles were in strong support of only four statements (as multiple choice questions). Two of these statements referred to the economic dimension: a view that Poles should buy mainly Polish products and opposition to selling land to foreigners. Two further statements were linked to historical events: the belief that the Polish nation has been harmed in history more often than others, and that Poles have acted in the past more nobly than

other nations. None of the remaining statements were supported by the majority of Poles. It is particularly interesting that the issue of selling land to foreigners was not mirrored by a general aversion to foreigners — only one third of the respondents were against the settlement of foreigners in Poland, and less than half believed that they should not be hired, because they take jobs from Poles. A minority — one in ten — of the respondents believed that Poles should not get married with people of other nationalities. In another study, between 60 to 70% of respondents agreed that nationalism is, by definition, an attitude which pertains to lack of tolerance for other nations, the feeling of superiority and contempt for other nations, which leads to aggression toward them, and is based on the assumption that some nations have better traits than other nations (Ruszkowski, 2017).

To conclude the discussion on the identified patriotic element of Poles' citizenship norms, the type of responses provided in the current study cannot be identified as fitting the blind patriotism definition, rather, they are a mixture of constructive, activity-oriented (e.g. working for the country's prosperity, also through payment of taxes), as well as symbolic and affective norms (including feelings of responsibility — for protecting the country's borders, or for contributing to the positive image of Poland abroad). These patriotic elements were seen in the majority of parental and young people's responses, among those self-identified as active and inactive.

To put the last finding above in context, Radosław Marzęcki set out to explore whether the way Polish students understand patriotism had any influence over their activity in voluntary organisations (Marzęcki, 2020). His findings point to a predominantly passive patriotism, that is students' definitions were mostly more of a symbolic and affective kind. Marzęcki found that there was a weak influence of the identified model of patriotism on civic engagement, thus he recommended that civic education should aim to help young Poles turn their love for Poland into civic activity, so that "constructive forms of patriotism (understood as civic activity and local community activities) are more rooted in student consciousness." (Marzęcki, 2020, p. 42).

This lack of connection between feelings of patriotism and civic deeds can be interpreted in light of Stefan Nowak's research, which showed that for Poles the nation did not equal the state — the former being perceived as a kind of moral community of all Poles, with an autotelic value, and the state seen as some top-level organization system that exists in the nation in a strictly instrumental way (Nowak, 2011, p. 266). This "double-vision" of Poles not automatically linking their national identification with the state, has been shaped by historical events (i.e. the partitions of Poland, two wars in the 20th century and the Soviet invasion and subsequent imposition of a communist regime) and has thus resulted in a "specific model of political culture. It involves a constant sense of threat to the state's sovereignty..." (Marzęcki, 2020, p. 39). He then goes onto argue that nations lack the tools to solve social problems — states with their governments, administrations and members of political communities on the other hand, can represent interests and citizens' concerns, whereas identification with a certain nationality "is closely interwoven with notions of a moral and cultural community" (Mannitz, 2011, p. 316). As McCrone and Kiely proposed, "these concepts belong to different realms, nationality to the cultural realm and citizenship to the political" (McCrone & Kiely, 2000, p. 39).

From the analysis presented in the current study we see, that various patriotic attitudes permeate citizenship norms, patriotic statements have been included by both

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the active and inactive individuals. The research rationale however prevents the deduction of any clues as to whether they promote or prohibit civic or political activity.

5.1.3. What Does This Mean for Polish Youth?

Moving to young Poles' conceptualisation of a good citizen, this study found two approaches. Contents of the first approach, with their patriotic statements, character traits as well as state-centred norms, have been discussed already. The second type of definition, portrays a good citizen as someone proficient in conventional participation, a law-abiding, tax-paying voter, respecting the state and loving the nation, as well as interested in matters close to home, in local communities and through non-governmental organisations. This is largely in line with previous studies pointing to a prevalence of either all-around activists, employing various methods in their activity, or an all-embracing citizen, who interprets their citizenship style using engaged as well as duty-based norms, see (Oser, 2017; Hooghe & Oser, 2015). An addition to these conceptualisations is the already-discussed emphasis on patriotic norms relating to the state and the nation, and the corresponding character traits.

Opening up the discussion about what is political for Poles did not reveal any unexpected methods — the examples of activities, as well as definitions, point to a repertoire of formal, state-oriented, as well as engaged political activities known from the literature. A few of the inactive young people understood political activity in a narrow way, a finding in line with explanations found in the literature (e.g. Quintelier, 2007), perceiving political acts as belonging only to the sphere of professional behaviour and political parties.

This study also found that self-expression, by some scholars proposed to be an important element of the new citizenship and participation styles (Theocharis & van

Deth, 2016; Shehata, Ekstrom & Olsson, 2016; Bennett, 2008), in particular communicated through digital media, was not a predominantly valued political or civic behaviour. This is a finding mirroring the results of other research, e.g. Lane (2020). What is more, young people shared their uneasiness about expressing views — not only conservative, in line with the findings of Lane, Das and Hiaeshutter-Rice (2018), but also left-leaning.

Similarly to the good citizen definition, young Poles conceptualisations of political activity included involvement in non-governmental organisations and in the local community. Even though some of the parents mentioned their links with local community initiatives (see Chapter 4, pp.131–133), none of these experiences ended up in the content of their citizenship norms. The lack of community engagement in parental definitions and their prevalence in active young people's conceptualisations, as well as their discussed early participatory experiences at school, can point a socialising effect of schooling on the young Poles interviewed for this study. Obviously, this effect cannot be universal in the socialisation of all of the young, as this was evident from the current study. Opportunities for civic engagement, the quality of education as well as socioeconomic circumstances differ, and even pupils' satisfaction with school can have a distinct effect on young people's school socialisation experience and activity (Jondy & Koseła, 2005).

Some further context is important here. Polish Education Law stipulates, that for social activity, in particular in a form of volunteering, pupils can be awarded additional points by secondary schools during their pupil recruitment process (Sejm RP, 2016). Volunteering experience can therefore become very valuable in districts where there is large demand for limited places in well-performing schools. It can be thus assumed that the early volunteering experiences exist in a context of educational competition, not only rewarding the more ambitious, strategic-thinking individuals, but also creating a disadvantage for young people without the resources and access to volunteering experiences. It is unclear what long-term impact this legal provision will have on pupils' choices and motivations when it comes to community engagement; however, what is known is that there is an ongoing trend of decreasing levels of volunteering in organisations, in particular among the younger cohorts.

According to research conducted by National Statistical Office in 2011, and in 2016, the levels of volunteering of 15–17 year-olds fell from 18.9% in 2011 (GUS, 2012, p. 28) to 9.5% in 2016 (GUS, 2017, p. 24), a trend visible also for other cohorts. These gloomy statistics provide a valid context for Bolzendahl and Coffe's (2013, p. 60) findings — the scholars found lower support for the engaged norm among the former communist democracies (including Poland), attributing this result to the lack of opportunities to practice such behaviours through involvement in voluntary associations, which in turn could provide skills and motivation for political activity (McFarland & Thomas, 2006).

It is true that the Polish voluntary sector did not have the chance to develop during the communist regime time of 1948–89, with charitable organisations often denied registration by authorities, other political and legal limitations making it hard to function, curbing Poles' civic spirit (Leś, Nałęcz & Wygnański, 2000, p. 12). Informal organising, discussion clubs, self-help initiatives, on the other hand, flourished in the 1980s, forming "an inchoate civil society" (Gliński, 2011, p. 272). That said, after an initial surge of associating following the political transformation — in the first decade numbers of registered associations quadrupled, see (Leś, Nałęcz & Wygnański, 2000, p. 13) — this enthusiasm started to stall. According to public opinion, increasing number of Poles did not feel represented by any civic organisation (Leś, Nałęcz &

Wygnański, 2000, p. 21), signalling the sector's potential detachment from the wider society. At the same time there was an upward trend in the number of registered NGOs — from around 50,000 non-profits in 1997 (Leś, Nałęcz & Wygnański, 2000, p. 12) to approximately 145,000 in 2018 (Charycka & Gumkowska, 2020, p. 3). Despite this, the number of Poles who associate, or volunteer in NGOs has stayed around the same level since 2012, with one in five Poles engaging in volunteering through organisations (Adamiak, Charycka & Gumkowska, 2016, p. 44).

The group of young people active in non-governmental organisations, or other formal and informal initiatives at a local or national level, is relatively small. It is therefore not surprising to find community or NGO engagement in good citizen norms and in political activity definitions of most of the young Poles who identified as active, and have been recruited on the basis of their NGO-engagement, but not among the remaining (inactive) young nor their parents.

The active young interlocutors all had experience in pupils', youth or student organisations, which typically focus on self-development, community volunteering, leadership training, students' rights advocacy, entrepreneurial training (ECORYS, 2001, p. 29), and, importantly, on providing opportunities for taking part in governance of schools and higher education institutions. The young interviewees were also volunteers (as they stressed, social), a distinction understood by them as "helping other people".

There are two concurrent issues here. Firstly, activity in NGOs can be seen as political, but, I will propose, that it depends on the nature of activity, specifically whether people involved in it aim to influence law, policy or decision-makers, and if the two spheres, political and voluntary, "cross-fertilise one another" (Amna & Ekman, 2014, p. 267).

Secondly, any activity in NGOs can lead to people becoming politically active, for example through building their skills and confidence, for example (Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995). The majority (10 out of the 12 active young — see Chapter 4, pp. 169–170) of young Poles interviewed for this study talked about their experience in extra-curricular activities in primary or secondary school, from their school's pupils council, city or region youth council, through church groups, scouts, academic clubs to volunteering. None of the inactive (apart from Interviewee 11, who perceived herself as socially active) talked about being engaged in such activities at school.

Such findings are in line with earlier research, for example Quintelier (2015), as well as McFarland and Thomas (2006). The latter, in their longitudinal study of American youth, found that engagement in such above-mentioned extra-curricular initiatives and youth organisations had a positive effect on people's political participation, even 6 to 12 years later (McFarland & Thomas, 2006, p. 418). Confidence-boosting experiences in voluntary organisations, such as pupils' councils or local initiatives, by strengthening internal political efficacy, had a positive effect on peopleter on political participation (Beaumont, 2010).

For some young Poles in this study, the pupils' councils, introduced in 1991, and the youth councils, both being practice-based forms of democratic civic education, as well as other opportunities to practice communication skills, and experience working toward achieving common goal, seemed to have a socialising effect (Niemi & Junn, 1998).

5.1.4. Final Remarks on Research Objective 1

To close the section dedicated to discussion of findings in relation to Research Objective 1, the feedback that active interviewees had received in the past and referred to during interviews, was critical of their political activity. However, due to the nature of political activity, it would be difficult to ascertain, whether the negative feedback regarded activity itself, or was linked with criticism of any political views expressed during the activity. Irrespective of the target, such negative feedback is a manifestation of the conflict inherent in politics, and naturally can have an influence on individuals' willingness to engage in political activity; for example, see the classic study by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) and their finding that conflict-aversion drives Americans away from participation. From the perspective of social cognitive theory, the ability to persevere in implementing an individual's norms when faced with setback (specifically negative feedback from peers) and to exert personal control (Bandura, 1986), in other words having high levels of self-efficacy, has been documented to be a moderating factor between norms and behaviours, for more see the review by Chung and Rimal (2016).

5.2. Findings for Research Objectives 2 and 4

As the discussion of the Research Objectives 2 and 4 are very much linked, they will be discussed together. We will start with Research Objective 2, which is worth restating here:

Research objective 2: to explore how the citizenship norm is fulfilled through Poles' political practice

Young Poles' repertoire of political activity included a comprehensive selection of conventional, state-oriented activities, such as voting, activity in political parties and consultative bodies, as well methods considered part of a critical, expressive or engaged citizenship style, such as demonstrations or activity in local community and non-governmental organisations. It appears that, in line with earlier studies, claiming that a small group of active citizens, all-around participators include a range of methods in their participatory toolboxes (Oser, 2017, p. 246), young active Poles are also proficient in engaging in many political activities.

However, as observed earlier in this chapter when discussing contents of citizenship norms, young Poles were not keen on expressive, online activity, and it was reflected in their comments regarding limiting their online presence, and sharing views only in a small group. This finding is supported by the results of public opinion polling, according to which only six percent of the Polish population engaged in online discussions about politics, and of those who shared their opinions, only two percent did it with strangers (Cybulska, 2017, p. 5–6). Only one per cent of respondents when asked about whose opinion they hold in high regard, pointed to people they met online (Cybulska, p. 8). According to the survey, 15 per cent of respondents had an argument about politics with someone recently. With a reported rise in incivility in political communication and evidence pointing to its detrimental effect on political activity (Otto, Lecheler & Schuck, 2020), it may be that young Poles interviewed for this study are purposefully avoiding conflict online.

Protest activity was mentioned by some active and inactive young, who during their interviews identified as being opposed to the government formed after the October 2019 general elections. Protest activity, considered "a direct form of political action that takes places in the absence of mediating, institutional actors and aims at influencing... governmental institutions" (Quaranta, 2015, p. 24), have been for some time now considered an important element of the engaged citizenship model, see for example (Norris, 2002). Young people's keenness on this participatory method is often attributed to "biographical availability", as well as a distaste for institutional methods (such as activity in political parties). It is also considered popular, because protest, as a tool for political expression, became a fashionable method that is implemented for a growing number of issues (Earl, Maher & Elliott, 2017).

Demonstrations that young Poles took part in have included the Equality Parade¹³ that was advocating for transsexual people rights, homosexual people rights for adoption, change to sexual education curriculum and the Women's Strike¹⁴ that was proposing publicly funded in vitro procedures, removal of religion classes from schools, state pension contribution for unpaid work of women. These have been organised by non-profits, fulfilling their role of formulating and representing interests of groups of society.

Protest activity has a long tradition in Poland, with the Solidarity trade union movement during the communist period, as well as after the transformation. For example, only in 1989–93 there were approximately 1400 protest events, caused by state-owned companies' privatisation processes and consequent rise in unemployment, see (Ekiert & Kubik, 1999).

Activity in protests, as mentioned by young interviewees, is in line with earlier studies highlighting stronger inclination of younger cohorts for this type of activity (Kurowska & Theiss, 2018, p. 113). Whereas the inactive young considered taking part in demonstrations as the first ever political activity they engaged in, feeling mobilised by the issues, the active young already had experience in participating, and the protests were another tool for expressing political views in their repertoire.

Analyses in the present study point to an alignment of normative expectations, in particular between political activity definitions, Poles' assessment of their activity

¹³ Equality Parade demands: <u>https://www.paradarownosci.eu/en/equality-parade-demands/</u> (accessed: 22.07.2021)

¹⁴ Women's Strike postulates: <u>http://strajkkobiet.eu/postulaty/</u> (accessed: 22.07.2021)

and the political activities they engaged in. Van Deth proposed that the way individuals participate in public and political life is consistent with their norms of citizenship (van Deth, 2007, p. 403), referring to the apparent link between behaviours and informal rules informing them. Conversely, the alignment identified by this study is not consistent with research results in Bolzendahl and Coffe (2013), which highlighted weak ties between good citizen norms and participation in former communist European countries (Bolzedahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 61). As presented earlier (Chapter 2, p. 46), the direction of any causal relationship between citizenship norms and behaviours is still to be established, and the research rationale of the current study was not designed to fulfil this purpose. What is visible though is that parents' and the young's views on what is perceived as valuable, which behaviours and attitudes are considered good for a citizen, their understanding of the term "political", together with information on which behaviours are actually prevalent, formed either a passivity-inducing or activity-encouraging context.

5.2.1. Relevance to Research Objective 4

Much of the discussion above is also relevant to Research Objective 4, which is restated below:

Research Objective 4: to explore young Poles and their parents perceptions of the feeling of competence and political system's responsiveness

Analysis of the interviews with regard to Research Objective 4 showed that elements of political efficacy of young Poles also align with the wider normative and behavioural profile, with the inactive young choosing passive descriptors and being doubtful of own competences, whereas active Poles described their role in affirmative terms, mainly using labels linked to their engagement in civil society organisations. The qualitative nature of the present study limits generalisability, however, what was presented earlier with regard to how the contents of citizenship norms of Poles differed from standard survey conceptualisations, and the fact that study participants were able to use their own activity definitions and assessments, may have had an impact on how cohesive the norms and behaviours appear.

5.3. Findings for Research Objective 3

It is worth restating the third research objective here.

Research Objective 3: to understand how the citizenship norm is passed on from parent to child.

The analysis of responses regarding the issue of family impact on young people's activity shows that, in line with earlier studies such as (Quintelier, 2015; Badescu, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2007), discussions at home about politics, but not limited to it, were frequent and deemed important by parents and their active offspring. Parents' and grandparents' activities, voluntary as well as political, in particular with regard to their engagement in communist opposition, were also highlighted as crucial in passing on patriotic values — a finding reflecting claims that politicised homes transfer political content more successfully (Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009; Beck & Jennings, 1991). Those active young who believed the impact of their parents to be positive, that is activity-encouraging, were also of the opinion that their political views and party identification generally aligned with those of their parents.

Interestingly, however, parents who identified as inactive politically, at the same time believed their parenting efforts positively contributed to their offspring's political activity. Inactive young Poles, who all described parental impact on their own activity as negative or non-existent, in other words not activity-encouraging, were also critical of the lack of political discussions at home, believing the topic brought conflict and should be thus avoided. Linked with the latter statement was the inactive young's general opinion that their and their parents' political views were dissimilar. In a few cases of active young people who did not consider their parents' impact to be positive, they also distanced themselves from their parents' point of view on politics.

To conclude, the focus of this study was on citizenship norms and behaviours, and thus exploring the context of parental socialisation was limited to increasing our understanding in this regard. Parenting styles themselves, however, are complex concepts, and it may be valid to explore in-depth whether differences in parenting styles influence the political participation of the young. Frameworks employing parenting styles, presenting the transmission of values, norms and attitudes in a context of an overall interaction between parents and their offspring, could bring a more nuanced approach than those limited to applying a political socialisation approach.

From the analysis of the current study it can be deduced that visible elements of authoritative parenting style (Baumrind, 1971), such as allowing young people to express and discuss opinions, as well as encouraging independence through providing support for extra-curricular activities, could have had a positive effect on transmission of political views and values. Murray and Mulvaney (2012), in a study of American adolescents and their parents, demonstrated that authoritative parenting was more efficient in the transmission of parental political values than other parenting styles (Murray & Mulvaney, 2012, p. 1121).

The current study finding that the young, who reported negative or no parental impact, also held political views different from those of their parents, is in line with the findings of Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009) that young people, whose parents are

less interested in cue-giving, discussing politics at home, etc., show a greater instability in political outlooks, such as party preferences.

5.3.1. The Expectations of Polish Citizenship

This study used a wider approach, exploring not only the normative, but also the empirical expectations of Poles with regard to citizenship. So far, research on political participation's normative determinants has predominantly used a narrow conceptualisation of the citizenship norm, limiting its content and omitting any usage context, by focusing on injunctive norms. My attempt to explore the usage context, that is, what people's concurrent views on desired citizen behaviour (normative expectations) and assessments of actual prevalence of such behaviours (empirical expectations) are, and how people define political activity and how they judge their own activity levels, yielded stimulating findings.

Interviewees born before 1989 presented evaluations congruent with each other, that is their normative and empirical expectations aligned — those who selfidentified as not active, held abstract, low-intensity injunctive norms and believed the prevalent behaviour is not to engage in political activity. Following the same logic, the only self-identifying active parent's normative expectations portrayed a comprehensive repertoire of behaviours and their empirical expectations encouraged activity.

For interviewees born after 1989 there was also a nearly complete congruence of empirical and normative expectations. For the active young, whose conceptualisations of good citizen and political activity included a variety of behaviours and attitudes, and who believed that the prevalent behaviour, particularly among their own age group, was to be to a lesser or greater extent politically active, their expectations were aligned.

In the case of the young interviewees who self-identified as inactive, the description of desired citizen behaviours was limited to low-intensity, state or nationcentred norms, and Poles were seen as non-participating, thus also making the normative and empirical expectations congruent. Only in the case of an interviewee who identified as inactive politically, but engaged in a variety of activities self-defined as "social engagement", was the empirical expectation activity-encouraging, which naturally resulted in incongruence.

Overall, the above findings can be interpreted as consistent with earlier evidence, showing that injunctive and descriptive norms are not only positively correlated (due to one of them being derived from the other), but also influence each other, boosting the desired outcomes (Thogersen, 2014; Rimal & Real, 2005), of passivity or activity.

5.4. Relevance to Other National Contexts

At this stage it is worth exploring the question of whether any of the findings could be applicable to other national contexts? Even though the present study did not employ a *comparative* research strategy, rather, it did present a comprehensive, empirically-rich context for citizenship norms among Poles, some suggestions can be made with respect to the relevance of the findings for other countries.

To this end, the discussion will first take a look at the contextual issues relevant to this analysis before turning its attention to extended citizenship norms and parenting styles.

5.4.1. Contextual Issues

Poland has conventionally been studied together with other Central Eastern European/ex-Soviet Union satellite countries, that fared relatively well following the Union's collapse. Poland's communist regime has been categorised, together with regimes of other countries in the region, including Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009, p. 473), as a "national accommodative" type (Kitschelt et al. 1999). According to analysts, this type of communist regime made concessions to the anti-communist opposition and initiated some market-oriented reforms, in order to "cultivate national consensus" (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009, p. 462).

That said, the nature of a communist regime is not the only factor taken into account by comparative researchers when examining the prospects of democratic consolidation. Scholars, agreeing with a view that "the collapse of communism did not create a tabula rasa" (Howard, 2003, p. 105), point to various factors influencing the citizens of post-communist countries. Studies of political system transitions and the process of the democratic consolidation of the formerly communist countries focus on various "structural, cultural and institutional starting points" (Pop-Eleches, 2007, p. 910), that is, institutional and individual-level legacies. Such research provides some clues as to which of the legacies could be responsible for the diverse political and economic outcomes in the region.

From the above research, it appears that democracy is more stable in countries "with longer histories of statehood, democracy and bureaucratic competence", as well as in countries being relatively developed and ethnically homogenous (Pop-Eleches, 2007, p. 909). Countries that transitioned into democracy as part of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and as its satellite-states do not only differ with respect to factors from their pre-communist histories (e.g. if the nation experienced statehood and democracy), the communist era legacy (e.g. the type of communist regime, the degree of state control over society and economy, the levels of social development, see Kitschelt et al. 1999) but also the post-communist era factors (including the mode of transition into democracy and the shape of institutional and legal arrangements that followed it (Szczerbiak, 2016); also see (Pop-Eleches, 2007, pp. 910–911). Most importantly for the present research, prior experience of communism has been deemed crucial when explaining civic participation deficits, by virtue of it having "generally demobilizing effects" (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013, p. 63).

The present study compared and contrasted two cohorts, socialised under a different political and economic regime, in order to explore if the parents and their offspring shared any of the norms, values and behaviours related to citizenship. The communist experience is often used as part of an explanatory framework in studies on low political participation. However, the limited number of studies on citizenship norms in Central and Eastern Europe that do exist, show that the region, irrespectively of the joint experience of communism, is not a homogenous entity, for example (Coffe & Van der Lippe, 2010).

5.4.2. Moral and Patriotic Citizenship Norms

The discovery in this research of two new citizenship norm elements has a potential to be applicable to other contexts. Firstly, the prevalence of citizenship norms, which refer to interpersonal behaviours and attitudes, and are embedded in a common morality code, can be seen as related to the still significant role religion plays in the Polish society, as religiosity is associated with moral values (Storm, 2015; Voas & Storm, 2012). Levels of religiosity across Europe are declining, although there are still several nations in which more than seven in ten respondents identify with their

religion, for example in Cyprus (79%), Italy and Slovakia (both 74%), Bulgaria and Poland (both 72%), Romania (71%) (EC, 2021, p. 66).

What is more, prioritising such personal character traits, as indicative of one's civic disposition, can also be interpreted as a sign of valuing and idealizing the private sphere. One of the individual-level communist legacies has been a reliance on private, informal networks and friends, which originally helped to alleviate goods and services shortages under communism, but in the long term made citizens less eager to join civic organisations and initiatives (Howard, 2003). Scholars identify this withdrawal from public life and focusing on the private one as an influence of the communist past, responsible for participation deficits (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013, p. 46).

It would be therefore reasonable to assume that the personal trait element of the citizenship norm could be found among the pre-transformation cohorts of other post-communist countries, in particular in those, which report high levels of religiosity.

To address the second identified component of the citizenship norm, the study participants, parents and, to lesser extent, their offspring, by channelling their patriotic feelings through citizenship norms, signalled the salience of nation and countryaffirmative opinions. It would be reasonable to assume that such patriotic elements of the citizenship norm could also be present in countries that experienced similar struggles for independence as Poland.

Countries that transitioned as part of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, either its ex-republics or ex-satellite states, had to reconstruct or redefine their statehood and nationhood. Some of these post-communist countries experienced statehood in the pre-communist era, and even if they did not, the aspiration for freedom from a Soviet oppressor and a pro-democratic sentiment meant that anti-communist movements also aimed for a fully-sovereign state (Gaber, 2006, p. 41). Given the above, it would be also reasonable to assume that countries, in which feelings of patriotism are prevalent, such opinions also permeate into the citizenship norms held.

It would be more difficult to speculate how prevalent the two new elements among citizens of all post-communist countries are. Standard citizenship norms survey results showed that the communist experience has not been a great leveller — there are considerable differences in distribution of the engaged/duty-based citizenship norms among the studied nations (Coffe & Van der Lippe, 2010). The results of Coffe and Van der Lippe study confirmed previous research on civic and political participation in the Western and Eastern Europe, and showed low levels of explained variance for post-communist countries using the models designed for Western populations. It would be therefore reasonable to assume that there may be other normative elements in the citizenship concepts of citizens who lived under communism that are not being measured by standard surveys.

5.4.3. Divorce between Norms and Behaviours

Another of the main findings concerned the relationship between participants' definitions of the citizenship norm, and the behaviours they engaged in. The divorce between norms and behaviours was evident when interviewees reported participating in certain activities (defined by other participants in their interviews as political) but did not identify themselves as politically active, nor used such behaviours in their citizenship norm definitions.

As presented earlier (see page 35), Bolzendahl and Coffe's research results highlighted weak ties between citizenship norms and political participation in former communist European countries (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 61). Bolzendahl and Coffe's assumption for their study was that citizenship norms precede and inform behaviours. According to the authors, what contributed to this apparent lack of influence of norms on behaviours was a common legacy of living in "a regime where ideology was often disconnected from practice" (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2013, p. 49). In other words, people said one thing, but did another, thus making it harder for the democratic norms of citizenship to become internalised and translated into practice.

The present study's findings of the divorce between norms and behaviours point in the opposite direction — my pre-transformation cohort participants have been exposed to democratic politics in their daily life and participated in it, but such experiences have not been translated, yet, into the citizenship norms they held.

Following from this, a strand of research presented earlier provides some evidence that it is "much more likely that political behaviour precedes political attitudes than the other way round" (Quintelier & van Deth, 2014, p. 168). One possible explanation of these political behaviour-deficient citizenship norms is that the negative view of politics, as reported by interviewees, along with the need to keep positive view of oneself (Bracken, 2009), may be making defining one's behaviours as political less desirable. Amplifying this uneasiness, to call one's action political and include them in their citizenship norm repertoire, could be the empirical expectation one holds (that is, "none of those around engages in politics").

A wider explanation, afforded by the impressionable years political socialisation model (see page 32), could be that the way pre-transformation cohort understands citizenship was shaped and petrified during their impressionable years, which mostly fell under the communist regime, and this normative stance has not changed since the democratic transition 30 years ago. Since the matter discussed essentially pertains to norms change (or adjustment), it needs to be emphasised that there is a lack of agreement in the literature on how exactly norms change, for example how much exposure to new information "corrects" people's empirical expectations, or how long people need to engage in a behaviour before it enters their normative repertoire (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 70).

Generally, there are three theoretical proposals on how norms change and new norms emerge — either that behaviour is first to change and the adjustment of norms follows, or, the opposite, norms are first to change, and behaviours follow, and thirdly, where a norm becomes popular among a specific group, leading to change in behaviour, which then is adopted by a wider population, thus leading to a normative change (Legros & Cislaghi, 2020, p. 72). How the norms change or adjust, to reflect the democratic political activity people engage in, could be a matter for future research.

That said, the example of the only self-identifying active parent in the study, whose citizenship norm contains behaviours and attitudes that promote democratic political participation, is an optimistic indication.

It would be reasonable to assume that the above finding of the divorce between norms and behaviours can be relevant for other post-communist countries. Pretransformation cohorts of these countries experienced, to a varying degree, forceful indoctrination by a repressive communist regime, a process that had a socialising impact resulting in negative attitudes toward democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014).

Additionally, post-communist countries have a comparable history of struggles in rebuilding the associational life, which involved "the transformation of this old associational sector *combined* with the emergence of a diverse NGO sector and other social organizations prohibited by the old regime" (Ekiert & Kubik, 2017), making it difficult for the first two decades to facilitate widespread civic activity (Gliński, 2011, pp. 277–278) and offer opportunities to partake in political participation, which could potentially transfer into citizenship norms.

5.4.4. Parenting Styles

The final main finding regarded an alignment of political views of parents and their offspring, who also jointly believed in a positive parental impact on young persons' political participation. As was pointed out earlier, parents in those pairs exhibited elements of the authoritative parenting style. This style encompasses high levels of parental warmth and positive communication, as well as higher level of behaviour monitoring. Such close and positive relationships can make it more likely for parents and children to hold shared political opinions, for example (Rico & Jennings, 2016). What is more, interviewed parents in the above-mentioned pairs expressed views and described behaviours that support the independence of children (e.g. facilitating discussions, valuing young people's opinions, supporting offsprings' academic and professional decisions). Autonomy support can also be connected to higher levels of civic participation (Smetana & Metzger, 2005).

There are major differences in the prevalence of various parenting styles across countries. Some evidence points to differing levels of collectivism or individualism being responsible for the way people parent their children in given cultures, for instance cultures high in individualism favour authoritative parenting style (Smetana 2017). Other research claims that economic factors play an important role, for example, a low income inequality level is linked to independence-promoting parenting (Doepke & Zilibotti, 2017). The research mentioned above shows that parental influence on offsprings' views and values, and the resulting intergenerational congruence, differs significantly between countries and cultures.

With regard to parenting behaviour, discussions about politics at home is one of the tools parents can use to, consciously or not, pass on views and values. Research shows decidedly that young people from highly politicised homes, where discussions are frequent, are more likely to have similar political views to parents (Hooghe & Boonen, 2015; Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009) and are more likely to volunteer or be active in the community (Andolina et al. 2003; McIntosh, Hart & Youniss, 2007).

As already mentioned, good relationships, warm and positive communication improves transmission of views and values to children. Poland, being "a highly individualistic" country (Hofstede, 2022) and with income inequality among the lowest in the EU (OECD, 2022), could be expected to have a higher share of independencesupporting parenting styles (Doepke & Zilibotti, 2017), resulting in higher intergenerational congruence of views and values.

The two types of parent-offspring relationships portrayed in the thesis are partially in line with the above mentioned studies. In the pairs in which positive and open communication was reported, there were shared political views and perception of positive impact of parents. In all those pairs young people self-identified as active. Such findings follow the logic of the research presented earlier. On the other hand, pairs, in which there was a lack of political discussions and feelings of anxiety around the outcome of such conversations were reported, there were dissimilar political views and perceived negative or non-existent parental impact on offsprings' activity; however, some of the young participants identified as active and some as inactive.

This study provided evidence that even though the citizenship norms of parents were not activity-promoting (with an exception of the only parent self-identifying as active), some of the active offspring claimed to benefit from parental influence on their political participation, and, at the same time, some of the active young people regarded parents' impact as a predicament. The latter interviewees believed it was their personal decision to take up the opportunities that were presented to them and become active. In both types of pairs, the norms held by parents were similar, that is, not activity-promoting.

How should we understand this apparently contradictory finding? The way the pre-transformation cohort defined their role as a citizen did not directly address the relationship between the citizen and the state, and in several cases did not reflect the behaviours interviewees engaged in. Even though the character and patriotic elements of parental citizenship norms cannot be discounted as a potential behavioural signpost, a possible interpretation of the finding is that in the two types of pairs described, the parenting style (of varying levels of support for children vocalising their views, taking action, feeling competent and confident to participate in political or civic activities) played a bigger role than the citizenship norms held by parents, and that the young Poles became politically active in spite of the citizenship norms of their parents.

With regard to the relevance of this finding for other national contexts, it would reasonable to expect, on the basis of the research presented earlier, that, firstly, in countries where the authoritative parenting style is prevalent, levels of political participation are higher, and concurrently, countries, in which opportunities to participate in civic and political initiatives are readily available (possibly as measured by the strength of the civil society organisations sector), citizens are more likely to be both "asked to" and "enabled to" participate (Lowndes et al., 2006).

6. Conclusions

This final chapter identifies the study's strengths and limitations, its contribution to knowledge and presents suggestions for future research directions. The thesis closes with a set of recommendations, based on the study's findings, for improving the levels of political participation of young Poles.

6.1. Strengths and Limitations

This study offered a unique opportunity to explore citizenship and political participation through the eyes of those whose political socialisation differed dramatically — a cohort of parents born and educated under a communist regime, and a cohort of their children, born in a free, democratic Poland. The main strength of the study lay in its richness achieved by a thoughtful and intentional design — the voices presented here came from across rural, urban and provincial Poland, from a variety of socioeconomic, ideological and partisan backgrounds, and most importantly, from young people and their parents directly. Their voices portrayed a complex network of ideas, attitudes and behaviours that formed the meanings of citizenship.

This study found many definitions of citizenship and the most fundamental differences transpired not within the cohorts themselves, but between them, especially with the inactive parents' nearly universal, moral and patriotic understanding of the concept.

Another strong point of this research was that it concentrated on a nation that experienced a series of formative cultural, social and political events, which also affected a larger region of Central and Eastern Europe, and such focus allowed tentative suggestions to be drawn for other national contexts. Finally, the study's strength lays in its contribution to knowledge in the field of political participation research, summarised later in the chapter.

The findings of this research need to be understood in the context of the study's limitations. Firstly, some limitations stem from the methodology employed and could have influenced the quality of the sample, for example the unavailability of some parents, an uneven mother-father ratio, the use of gatekeepers (as explained in detail in chapter 3, p. 88).

Secondly, the study's objective, relating to political socialisation, by its precisely defined focus on that sphere, limited systemic gathering of data about a wider parenting context that could have brought more understanding of the impact of parents on their offspring's activity levels.

Lastly, even though the findings allowed a careful consideration of crossnational relevance, this study did not use a comparative research strategy, and so any wider applicability needs to be treated with some caution.

6.2. Contribution

This study's central contribution is providing new knowledge to the field of political participation research, in the area of citizenship norms, thus furthering our understanding of young people's political participation in a post-communist country. The research offers an in-depth analysis of how Poles define both a good citizen and political activity, supplying new knowledge to the field of citizenship studies. What is more, Poland shares several pre-communist and post-communist era characteristics with other nations in the region, and this study draws careful analogies highlighting its single-nation research findings' relevance to other contexts (as explained in detail in chapter 5, section 4).

First of all, using insights from social norms and social cognitive theory, this study made a distinction between the normative and empirical expectations (injunctive and descriptive norms) with regard to Poles' citizenship norm. This provided useful empirical insight into the relationship between the two types of norms by highlighting their alignment and family socialisation context. Most importantly, this study's finding of a trait-like, moral conceptualisation and patriotic elements enrich the state of existing citizenship norm research, providing a stimulus for quantitative studies to widen their scope when researching norms in Poland and other post-communist countries.

Secondly, this study identified a divorce between the norms and behaviours interviewees engaged in. This expanded our current understanding of political participation, pointing to the resilient nature of the citizenship norms of pretransformation cohorts.

What is more, the identified alignment of normative and empirical expectations, activity self-identifications and efficacy self-assessments, which build a passivity-inducing or activity-promoting context, adds new insight to social norms research and can be applied to policy-making. Well-designed norm interventions that are aimed at improving political participation have the potential to break this joint effect of passivity-inducing normative and empirical expectations.

Lastly, the findings regarding the perceived impact of parents on political activity of their offspring, reveal an existing explanatory potential of this under-explored political socialisation agent. Although no general, direct transmission of norm content can be established through comparing the two cohorts, the social fact of perceived positive impact, shared by inactive parents and active young alike, as well as their analogous political views, cannot be ignored.

Essential features of authoritative parenting style, identified in the above mentioned households, can be interpreted as relevant to a successful activity socialising effort by pre-transformation cohorts. What needs to be emphasised is that even though some of the parents participated in extra-electoral activities, these behaviours were not included in their citizenship norms (a finding described earlier as a "divorce" between norms and behaviours), nor had they any influence on parents' negative activity self-identification. The parents' normative profile was "passive", that is the norms did not address the political sphere and citizen-state relationship.

In other words, the study found that parental political socialisation of Poles happened *despite* the passive citizenship norms and point to the overall style of parenting as a potential influence on activity.

An unexpected, negative finding of this research was with regard to the topic of political participation on the Internet. Activity on social media has been conventionally linked with the new, expressive citizenship norm (as described in chapter 2, page 35), and so it would have been reasonable to expect an embracing and positive attitude toward this medium, in particular among the younger interviewees. This study found that not only being politically active on the Internet was not particularly *in vogue*, the young interviewees were anxious and selective about using social media for such purposes. Also the majority of the interviewees believed that what prevents Poles from being more expressive online was the fear of conflict it could bring. This non-finding can have practical consequences for policies aimed improving political participation, as explained later in the chapter.

6.3. Future Research

This study offers a starting point for exploring if, and how, the way postcommunist citizens define their roles, impacts their decisions to act. My findings, even though pointing to a relationship of alignment between the perceived norms and behaviours, open up further research opportunities for exploring how contextual factors can impact this link.

6.3.1. Influence of All Types of Social Norms

Further research is needed on how the vicious circle of descriptive and injunctive norms' mutual influence on passivity-encouraging norms can be broken. This is because active citizenry is commonly deemed crucial for a well-functioning and stable democratic system. More research into citizenship and political participation needs to recognise not only the distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms, but also the claim that how individuals take these norms into consideration is dependent on the context (Cialdini, Reno and Kallegren, 1990). For example, election turnout studies seldom make this distinction, and in cases when they do, descriptive norms are considered to be more influential, see the review by Fieldhouse and Cutts (2020).

Future research exploring impact of social norms should differentiate among specific political activities, for example what is the impact of norms on taking part in demonstration (low-intensity activity performed with other people, a potential source of social control) vs. contacting an official with a policy proposal (high-intensity, individual activity performed at people's discretion).

6.3.2. Contextual Moderators Beyond Family

This study aimed to explore contextual information in the form of young individual's most immediate environment of their important others, their family members — their norms, activity self-assessments and potential socialisation impact. The importance of studying not only perceived popularity of given behaviour in a wider society, but also perceptions about what important others expect individuals to do, in a form of subjective norms, was introduced by the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).

Unexplored in this dissertation, due to the research design, were other contextual moderators, which have been used successfully in a growing number of social cognitive theory studies. One of them are outcome expectations, that is beliefs about how impactful the individual action is on the outcome (Rimal and Real 2005). Another important contextual factor that may influence how social norms inform behaviours is behavioural privacy; that is whether given behaviour is acted out in private or in public, with disappearing impact of norms for behaviours enacted in private (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990).

A further contextual aspect pertains to individuals' self-efficacy and their ability to not rely on information about how prevalent certain behaviours are in cases of incongruence between descriptive and injunctive norms (Bandura, 1986). Finally, favourable or unfavourable appraisal of behaviour can also have an influence on activity — see also a review of other moderators in (Chung and Rimal, 2016).

Studies looking into various contextual factors, which influence the way citizenship norms are taken into account by individuals, should adopt a multi-method approach, in particular using experimental design methods. This in turn can provide valuable recommendations for norm-based interventions (Shulman et al. 2017). For example, future studies exploring the impact of norms on the propensity to participate could use experiments involving the correspondence between specific messages and behaviours, varying among treatment and control groups; the content of messages containing various descriptive and injunctive messaging, as well as mentioned above, other contextual factors.

6.3.3. Researching Family Full Dynamics

Furthermore, future qualitative studies exploring households as a political socialisation agent should aim to capture the dynamics of parenting comprehensively, by researching triads (mother-father-child), and investigating parenting style as an overarching concept by performing, for example, a Parenting Style and Dimensions Questionnaire (Robinson et al., 1995).

6.3.4. Adapting Surveys on Citizenship

A final suggestion is a national longitudinal study of citizenship norms, using a survey tool informed by the injunctive citizenship norm contents identified in the current study. This could potentially provide a better opportunity for testing any causal relationship between social norms and citizens' behaviours in Poland. Even though the impact of limited sovereignty, communism and a resulting shorter democratic system experience differs across countries, see for example (Coffe and van der Lippe, 2010), future research on post-communist countries may want to explore whether opening up citizenship conceptualisations to the above mentioned elements improves the studies' explanatory potential.

6.4. Recommendations: how can Young Poles be More Politically Active?

Research objective 5, through achieving all of this study's other research objectives, was to understand how young Poles can be more politically participative in contemporary Polish society, and consequently, to formulate recommendations based on the study's findings.

The success of any policy recommendations is contingent on the willingness of decision-makers to consider expert advice. At the moment there is no state of permanent emergency around the topic of low political participation in Poland among the political classes, neither on the government nor the opposition side. Nor are there any immediate and pressing circumstances that could bring about an in-depth inquiry into its causes and solutions, such as the British Advisory Group on the Teaching of Citizenship and Democracy in schools (QCA, 1998) and reforms resulting from the Groups' report.

Analysis of the latest election manifestos confirms the above assessment. The election manifesto of Law and Justice party (PiS, 2019) emphasised citizen education, which will aim to inspire "responsibility for communities", understanding the "differences between manipulations and reality", and helping to bring up "good people". The Civic Coalition programme (KO, 2019), did not mention civic education at all, however, the document contained proposals for online electoral voting, as well as an automatic referendum for initiatives with one million signatures.

It also remains to be seen if there will be any long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on political participation levels, and if these would require any strategic policy response around citizen participation. There is already some initial evidence of depressed election turnout rates (Noury et al., 2021).

6.4.1. Political Corruption

Moving on to the study's findings, in addition to the conceptual richness provided in relation to the contents of citizenship norms, the interviewees' understanding of barriers to being more politically active offered a comprehensive framework (see Chapter 4, pp. 171–178).

The most often cited reason for not getting involved — a negative opinion of politics and politicians who were perceived as a corrupt, self-centred class — can be interpreted as in line with earlier evidence of the effect of exposure to communist systems on high expectations for performance-based aspects of democracy (Heyne, 2018). Similarly, perceptions of governments as inefficient and corrupt were found to have a negative impact on civic engagement in Central and Eastern European countries (Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014).

National opinion polls on perceived corruption, collected since 1991, have been showing a steady improvement of opinion about the problem of corruption in Poland. In 2000 14% of the population at least once gave an illegal gratuity and 29% knew someone, who accepted such payoffs, 17 years later the number of people fell to 6% and 10% of the population respectively (Boguszewski, 2017). Only through efficient law enforcement and permanent change of attitudes toward giving bribes, can these positive developments continue, affecting perceptions of corruption and indirectly, the willingness of Poles to be more active.

6.4.2. Political Conflict and Incivility

Furthermore, political conflict and incivility had been shown to negatively affect political participation (Otto, Lecheler and Schuck, 2019), therefore a change of style of communication by politicians could be beneficial to increased political activity. The most immediate way of achieving this by, for example majority of voters keeping in parliament only those representatives who avoid such tactics, may seem like an implausible strategy, however, the idea of political parties changing their processes to recruit and reward such noble politicians seems even more futile.

6.4.3. The School Environment

The interviewees' opinion on external barriers to political activity, as well as their past experience in extra-curricular activities, point to the importance of an encouraging school environment, with inspiring teachers, and a knowledge-rich, service-learning-based civic education embedded in the education process.

Specifically, early engagement in school governance or youth organisations not only can positively affect political participation in adult years, for example (McFarland and Thomas, 2006), but, as evident from interviews with some of the young activists in this study, also act as a launchpad for a professional career. The few cases of young Poles, with a family environment discouraging political activity, showed that participation can be triggered by existing school governance and civic engagement opportunities.

Increased efforts to provide comparable school environments and civic engagement opportunities should be undertaken, for example firstly, by amending laws on community, district and voivodship government, making youth councils mandatory for all levels of local government, secondly, by amending the law on education system, operationalising the voluntary involvement for which pupils gain additional points during the secondary school recruitment, to reward regular and longterm activities.

6.4.4. Lack of Visibility of Diverse Methods of Political Participation

Both parents' and young Poles' comments on the lack of visibility of young people in so-called "professional" politics, irrespectively of the causes (such as limited numbers of younger people in the upper echelons of parliamentary politics, their limited access to media, etc.) highlight the need for Polish political parties to rethink their recruitment and promotion strategies. Any effective publicly-funded campaign, aimed at changing citizens' political activity preferences should consider involving role-models for young people to take example from, preferably with a large social media following. Such a strategy would be in line with other participants' comments about the mass culture not valuing political participation and not providing good examples of civic behaviours.

Expanding party-political networks to include youth and student organisations, growing regional branches of youth wings, encouraging word-of-mouth marketing strategies using young members and affiliates, should all be adopted to spot and nurture the young talent, and provide future, competent cadres for parties.

At the same time, media portrayal of political participation has for some years now concentrated on protest activities, helping to create an impression that politics happens on the streets, and that demonstrations change the course of elections. Such was the case with the coverage of the mobilisation of citizens following the 2010 Smoleńsk plane crash (in which died the then Polish presidential couple, as well as around 100 other prominent politicians and officials). As a result of this, thousands of mourners and groups of citizens continuing to gather regularly in the months and years following the event. In addition, after the successful (for the Law and Justice party) campaigns in presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015, the now opposition parties managed to present as salient many ideological issues, which helped to spark well-attended demonstrations in the recent years.

The above, coupled with the inherent ability of democracies to produce inequalities of outcomes as a result of regular elections, in the form of winning majorities and losing minorities, impacts the "political protest potential" of individuals, in particular "in countries whose democratic institutions are relatively new and potentially more unstable" (Anderson and Mendes, 2006, p. 91). However, it is a matter for separate inquiry not only, if media portrayal of political participation have influence on greater citizen activity, but also what the socialising effect of methods such as street demonstrations on young people is.

What is more, in addition to a more age-diverse representation of professional politicians in the media, it would valuable for the media to also consider postulates formulated by non-governmental organisations' sector members and provide more air-time for various initiatives, helping to inspire more young people to gain volunteering experience (Adamiak, 2015).

6.4.5. Anxiety Around Public Discussion

Another barrier to increased political activity, which parents as well as the young interviewees included in their responses, was the anxiety around taking part in political discussions, in particular when it came to being expressive on the Internet.

There are no easily applicable policy proposals when it comes to encouraging civil, constructive discussions on any topic. The culture of conversation, using arguments, focusing on the problem and not the opponent, is a skill which needs to be learned and practised from young age, therefore embedding it within the schools' curricula seems like a good idea. At the moment, the Ministry of Education Safe School¹⁵ campaign does include components on mental health and dealing with conflicts, and there are various social media campaigns by local Police forces that are aimed at educating about hatespeech online¹⁶. There are also many examples from the non-governmental sector, which not only identify the issue but also propose how to increase "digital civility"¹⁷.

6.4.6. Influencing Norms

The interviewees also reflected on the wider attitudinal aspect of political activity, placing the blame for passivity in the public sphere on people's individualistic inclinations and their focus on the private sphere of careers, hobbies and consumption. While there is some evidence of people not being subject to strong injunctive pressure with regard to political activity — for a review see Fieldhouse and Cutts, (2020, p. 3) — an interplay between descriptive and injunctive norms is believed to be influencing how people participate in politics (Fieldhouse and Cutts, p. 11–12).

Any norm-based interventions, aiming to encourage increased political participation, need to carefully consider tailoring of messages and methods, taking advantage of the interplay between beliefs about what citizens should do, and assumptions about what the majority of citizens are doing. Good practice from other countries, such as in the in spheres of health or environmental issues — increasing organ donor registrations, decreasing energy use (Schultz et al. [2007]; BIT [2013]) —

¹⁵ Available at: <u>https://bezpiecznaszkola.men.gov.pl/</u>

¹⁶ For example this campaign by the Silesian Police: <u>https://slaska.policja.gov.pl/kat/informacje/wiadomosci/299748,quotChron-dziecko-przed-hejtemquot-spot-profilaktyczny.html</u>

¹⁷ See, for example, this Digital civility project: <u>https://www.digitalpoland.org/blog/2021/02/jak-</u> zapanowac-nad-hejtem-w-internecie

also provides some warnings. For example, negative descriptive norms promoted alongside injunctive norms (that is messages informing that many people are doing something they should not be doing), actually decreases the popularity of the desired behaviour by inadvertently advertising the socially undesirable behaviour (Hassell and Wyler, 2019, p. 234).

6.4.7. Voluntary Activity

There is no doubt that the "good person" moral character of Poles' citizenship norms, identified by this research, can have a stimulating effect on individuals' participation in public matters in general. It can be seen in the philanthropic trends reports that stipulate, that the two top reasons for giving money to non-profit organisations by Poles are "helping others" and "supporting important values" (SIACEE, 2021).

The imperative to be a good person and help others can also be seen in the decisions of taxpayers, who, according to a law operating since 2004, are able to give 1% of their income tax to a chosen NGO. In 2019 nearly 15 million taxpayers took advantage of this regulation, with overwhelming majority of them supporting ill, disabled children and adults, on whose behalf organisations collect donations (NIW, 2020). Similarly, the top reasons for engaging in voluntary activity are linked with this do-good approach, with majority of people claiming that they volunteer because they enjoy helping others and believe they just have to help — a statement pointing to a normative foundation (Kosewska, 2015, p. 360).

Contrary to the bitter words of Margrave Wielopolski, who claimed that "For Poles one can do much, but not with them"¹⁸, a large part of the Polish population is able to support common goals and work together on not-for-profit basis, outside of their professional lives. Even though, as presented in Chapter 4 (pp. 123–124), Poles can feel a strong distaste for participating in politics, the "pre-political", latent political participation (Ekman and Amna, 2012, p. 287), in the form of civic engagement, exists in Poland, and requires careful encouragement as a gateway into wider public engagement.

Specifically, long-term, strategic support for civil society organisations delivered by the state, in the form of available grants for core costs, easy financial reporting methods, tax exemptions, national campaigns promoting volunteering and charitable giving, can all have an impact on increasing Poles' "potential willingness to take action" (Ekman and Amna, 2012, p. 297).

6.5. Reflections on the Research Journey

Some reflexivity on the research process is due. As Nadin and Cassell pointed out, it makes the readers "more aware of the role and impact of the researcher; it increases the trustworthiness of the data and integrity of the research process" (Nadin and Cassell, 2006, p. 208–209).

I have been working as a practitioner in the field of citizen participation for 15 years, trying to make it easier for people to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, at a local and central government levels. I have worked at the intersection of state administration, politics and civil society, and learned a few things about who

¹⁸ <u>https://pl.wikiquote.org/wiki/Aleksander Wielopolski</u>

participates and why. I did not enter this research completely without ideas and intuitions. What this research process has taught me, however, is that people are not merely passive or active. Even though the normative toolkit and the knowledge is there, people can and will still choose not to follow it through with behaviours. What is more, even if the norms appear not to guide toward activity, people somehow choose to participate, out of "personal decision" (Blais, Galais and Mayer, 2021) or because of circumstances.

Given the above, the topic chosen for this dissertation was not chosen at random, it was founded on a strong belief in benefits of people taking an active part in the lives of their country and communities, anchored in the social identity of national citizenship. This research has been a way for me to engage with the world and to understand it better. I also realise that by asking my questions, for a short period of time I have brought the concepts of citizenship, political participation and parental political socialisation to the centre of my interviewees' attention. This study therefore was a small-scale intervention in itself.

Findings with regard to the last research objective, the recommendations presented above, were of particular importance to me, as I deeply care about the quality of public debate and political participation in Poland.

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Appendix 1: Interview Scenario

Interview scenario (Translated into English – all interviews were conducted in Polish)

Interview Thank you for agreeing to the audio-recording of this interview and introduction for agreeing to take part in my research. I will first be telling you a bit more about the research and then move on to questions. If you have any questions yourself during this interview, please do not hesitate to ask.

> I am studying for my PhD at the University of Gloucestershire, UK, however, my research aims to explore how people in Poland understand citizenship and political activity. I am conducting interviews with young people and their parents. As a result of this research, I will have to produce a thesis, where some excerpts from my interviews may be used. I will not however be disclosing any of your personal information, please rest assured that your privacy will be respected. I am following an ethical code, which means that your personal information will remain private, and any notes, files relating to this interview will be confidential and kept in a safe place. You don't have to answer my questions if you don't feel like it, and, for that matter, you can leave this interview any time and ask not to be part of this research, if you change your mind. Also, there are no "good" or "wrong" answers, all of what you say is valuable to my research, and I appreciate you spending your free time doing this interview with me. Like I mentioned before, the interview usually lasts up to an honour, but it may be less, or longer, it depends on how much time is needed.

Interview main			
questions	 How would you describe the political system in 		
(for all)	Poland?		
(usually follow- up questions were asked to further explore the topic or to clarify a response)	 What role do you see yourself playing in this system? How would you assess political activity of Poles? What are the barriers, what do you think prevents people from taking up political activities? What political activity means to you? Do you consider yourself political active? Why? Could you describe all of your political activities in the last year or so? 		
	• How would you describe who is a good citizen?		
Questions regarding family (for young Poles)	 How would you describe your parents political activity? In what way do you think your parents influenced the way you approach political activity? Do your parents have any opinion about your activity? Do you talk about it? Do you talk about politics at home? 		
Questions regarding parenting (for parents)	 Do you have any opinion about your son/daughter approach to political activity? In what way do you think you have influenced that way your son/daughter approaches political activity? Do you talk about politics at home? 		
Demographic questions (for all)	 age, sex, place of residence, marital status, employment status, educational attainment 		

Appendix 2: Young Persons' Codeframe

Nodes and subnodes		
barriers to	Poles being active politically	
t	pad opinion about politics/politicians	
i	naccurate civic education	
I	ack of knowledge	
I	ack of self-belief	
barriers to young Poles being active politically		
I	ack of opportunities	
ł	pad opinion about of politics/politicians	
é	avoiding hate/conflict on social media and from others	
I	ack of knowledge	
I	ack of self-belief	
i	naccurate civic education	
C	disability preventing from being active	
r	no barriers	
I	ack of interest	
ţ	participation is not valued	
I	ack of time	
definition	definition of political activity	
ł	peing a member of a political party, local or national politician, a career	
ł	peing active socially, helping local community	

expressing own political views e.g. protesting, FB profile labels

being interested in politics

being patriotic

different to being active in parties

different from social activity

educating others about politics

creating/impacting law and decision-makers

having knowledge about politics

Voting

definition of a good citizen

abide by the law

being a good person with certain qualities

caring about the local community

caring and respecting the country and the state

creating a family and having children

critically assess politicians

engaged in NGOs

Patriotic

interested in politics

knowledgeable about Polish history

knowledgeable about politics

pays taxes

protecting the country in an armed conflict

promoting the country abroad

expressing political views

taking part in elections and referendums

taking part in local initiatives, volunteering

impact of parents on political activity

agreement in political outlooks with parents

own political outlook different from parents'

discussions with grandparents

discussing history with parents

discussions about politics with parents

no discussions about politics at home

grandparents' political activity

parents' political activity

parents' activity in local community

parents had positive impact on activity

parents had negative impact on activity

parents' impact difficult to describe

parents not knowledgeable about politics

parents knowledgeable about politics

parents interested in politics

parents not interested in politics

parents not politically active

parents passed away

opinions on current government

did not vote for current government but supports individual policies

does not agree with the current government

does not agree with the welfare policies

supports current government

in favour of welfare policies

assessment of Poles' political activity

not participating in politics to avoid conflict

not knowledgeable about politics

certain groups active and certain non-active

more people are active than before

people in urban areas more active

people in rural areas not active

older generations not active

younger people are active

activity limited to voting in elections

not active enough in referendums, nor local elections as candidates

people are not active

low activity in political parties

political activities

politically active

not politically active

interested in politics

being a councillor in the city's borough

being a member of a political party

being involved in an NGO

being a member of a student organisation

being a representative in a dialogue body (central government)

being on a pupil's board at school

active in elections campaign and pro-turn out

cooperating with a local MP

discussing politics with siblings

discussions with friends about politics

does not identify with any political party

does not make opinions public on social media

member of a church group

member of a city youth council

member of a party's youth wing

member of a Regional Youth Council

member of a science circle at school

volunteering in social projects (e.g. hospices, disabled children)

promoting Poland abroad at a cultural event

taking part in debates

taking part in demonstrations - women's strike, pride

taking part in elections

political system's definitions

conservative democracy

conservative government

country's divided

positive assessment of current government

negative assessment of current government

democracy, but is still developing, between communist one and a properly functioning democracy

liberal democracy

mixture of borrowed ideas

democracy but lately with authoritarian tendencies, one party holds the government, minority groups protesting (quasi-democracy, officially, theoretically)

parliamentary democracy, limited power of president

post-Communist

stable democracy, based on values and ideas

social-democracy

two major political groups

reasons for starting to be active or being inactive

being on pupils' board

Individual causes (e.g. climate policy, abortion, student rights)

no opportunities available at local level

does not understand politics enough to be politically active

studying and new people influence

inspirational teacher at school

natural progression from social activity in youth organisations

need for contact with people due to personal disability

never had a direct event or situation that would trigger political activity

to do something good

saw other people being active and liked what they do

personal character

role in the system

Citizen

Voter

active in NGOs, associating

creator, with own initiative, changing reality

Taxpayer

advisor, expert to decision-makers, technical expert

activist, critic in democracy, fighter

creating a family

doesn't get involved, observer, absent, no important role, governed by others

educating others

employee

social activities/volunteering

member of pupil's council at school

member of youth organisation

member of youth shooting sports branch at school

member of youth parliament

volunteering at a charity

volunteering at youth portal

assessment of young Poles' political activity

are active

are not active

some are active, some aren't

are more active than older generations

are not knowledgeable

older and younger generations' political outlooks differ

not enough young in political parties

young take part in demonstrations

signing petitions, posting social media picture frames

young who are active online are being criticised

a lot of the young are NGO activists

a lot of young are active in consultative bodies, youth councils

young are increasingly active in youth wings of political parties

Appendix 3: Parent's Codeframe

Nodes and subnodes		
barriers to Poles being active politically		
bad opinion about politics/politicians		
lack of self-belief		
barriers to young Poles being active politically		
bad opinion about of politics/politicians		
lack of opportunities		
avoiding hate/conflict on social media and from others		
lack of time		
no barriers		
lack of interest		
participation is not valued		
definition of political activity		
being a member of a political party, local or national politician, a career		
being interested in politics		
being active socially, helping local community		
different from social activity		
does not define one's action in this way		
educating others		
creating/impacting law and decision-makers		

helping out with electoral campaigns

being a leader

Voting

not being indifferent

acting in a sly way

taking part in demonstrations

standing in elections as a candidate

taking part in meetings with politicians

definition of a good citizen

being a good person with certain qualities

abide by the law

being active in political life

being responsible for one's family

caring about the local community

caring and respecting the country and the state

interested in politics

knowledgeable about Polish history

pays taxes

promoting the country abroad

protecting the country in an armed conflict

taking part in debates, events

taking part in elections and referendums

working, not relying on state help

definition of politics

full of conflict

impact of parents on political activity

agreement in political outlooks

own political outlook different than YP

discussions about politics at home

no discussions about politics at home

grandparents' political activity

grandparents discussions with YP

members of close family active in local government politics

parents' political activity

parents' believe had negative impact on YP activity

parents' believe had positive impact on YP activity

parents do not believe they had an impact

parents' discussing history with YP

parents' activity in local community

parents' support for YP activity - allowing impact on school attendance, dropping off to meetings

opinions on current government

does not agree with the current government

assessment of Poles' political activity

activity limited to voting in elections

certain groups active and certain non-active

not participating in politics to avoid conflict

more people are active than before

people are not active

younger people are active

political activities

politically active

not politically active

interested in politics

taking part in elections

standing as a candidate in local elections

political system's definitions

conservative democracy

constitutional democracy

Democracy

positive assessment of current government

multi-party system

democracy but lately with authoritarian tendencies, one party holds the government, minority groups protesting (quasi-democracy, officially, theoretically)

two major political groups

reasons for starting to be active or being inactive

does not understand politics enough to be politically active

role in the system

Mother

Voter

Oppositionist

Taxpayer

Citizen

no response

passive role

social activities/volunteering

parent representative on a school board

supporting local initiatives

volunteering at a charity

protesting against local issue

contacting public officials

army training

assessment of young Poles' political activity

are active

are not active

young take part in demonstrations

a lot of the young are NGO activists

Appendix 4: Translated Transcript of the Interview with Interviewee

Y1-A

Here's a question to warm up. If you were to either recall conversations you've had, or imagine that you meet someone from abroad, who does not know anything about Poland. How would you describe the political system in Poland to this person?

— If I were to be completely honest, I would say that our system was a patchwork of many ideas, from many different countries, mainly European. In fact, when our political system was formed in the 1990s, it was just a clash of these several different visions, taken from different countries. It was clearly possible to see the German, French influences. They tried to put together this system out of these opposing ideas. And some compromise was found. A compromise somewhere between these political systems. I mean presidentialism, but at the same time a chancellor system, you know? Many things were also taken from the Italian system, such as the judiciary. They were not able to work out our own, unique vision of some issues, although we did work out a unique solution in some minor elements, details. But as a rule, the main pillar was worked out rather by a combination of these different ideas from several countries.

And now leaving aside this example with a foreigner, if you were to describe what role you play in this political system to me, what would you say?

— I think that the key role, yeah, of the third sector, which is where I'm coming from, is to be such a think tank, someone helpful for the people who are the decision makers. A person who is in a certain position, whether official or political, is completely overwhelmed by everyday life. I mean, these issues that come up every day prevent them from looking somehow at a bigger picture, and especially in seeing some things

that are just obvious to us. So the role will be to signal these issues and propose solutions in some different aspects. And it's not just that there is this need for public consultation, that decision makers should pay attention to public opinion or NGOs. Of course, it's important, and even from such a pragmatic point of view, but, in my opinion, you can lose yourself simply in the management of public affairs and you need someone from the outside to say here's a problem and this is the way to solve it.

Putting aside your profession, your work in a think tank, your experience or education, what role do you, as [REDACTED], play in this system?

- Oh, what specifically I work on now? Should I say?

No, abstracting from this.

- Abstracting

As a person, as [REDACTED].

— It seems to me that I mainly help a few people who are in a sense decision-makers in our... lower level, obviously. I try to find some better solution for them and also help them in their everyday struggles with this administrative and political reality.

Speaking of politics, how would assess political activity of Polish people nowadays?

— Well, the number of people who are members of political parties is small. From my experience a lot of people are interested in political struggles, but more on the level of sports. There is team A, and team B, a person was born in this region, so she supports this team, and cries when the team loses. But there is no factual discussion. It's just as if someone was born, they picked a team because they were born in that region of the country, and that is the team they support. And this person cries when

his team loses or when his team wins. Very limited interest in the content of politics or policies. Usually they accepts the content that has already been presented to them by his team and that is it... they kind of internalize it.

So generally, as I understand your point, there is widespread interest but lack of critical reflection?

— Exactly, political activity would consist of creating or trying to create politics, not just accepting it, blindly supporting it. Becoming a member of political parties, trying to somehow manage the currents within the party, organizing within the structures. This does not occur. And looking at the political activists who are... who join parties, there is no such will to organize from below. This means that we have a party leader and we can see that generally, if we organised ourselves, with 50 other people, we would be able to dismiss the leader in a normal, fair election, which takes place once every two years. So, at that level, that would be the end. What I mean is, that in other Western countries it would be quite simple and obvious, but in ours it is somehow beyond imagining. Here we have this mentality that there is a patron-client relationship. Here I have to be in a patron-client relationship to please the person who is higher up and it is at this stage that we cooperate, not on a horizontal level, but on a vertical one.

I understand. So, for you, what is this political activity, how would you define it in general?

Trying to influence the decisions of state bodies.

And do you consider yourself politically active, using the above definition?

-Yes, I try to be. I mean I've never been a member of any political party or youth group because I didn't see it working for me, it wouldn't work for my mentality. It would be

difficult for me to find myself in it. Actually, I became a local councillor in my home town, a district councillor. I even managed to be the chairman of the board for a month. But it was hard, it was this lack of political legitimacy that made it difficult for me to pursue some issues, because it was easy to find a method to limit my aspirations a bit, yeah? Well, it was possible to block a couple of issues for me. And certainly, legitimacy would have helped me out temporarily, right? For sure, I am aware of that. But whether in the long run or in general I would feel comfortable in it, and whether in the long run at would be more useful or harmful, I don't know. I have never been involved in such activities in the political circles. I have only focused on substantive, minor problems. I mean, we have a borough, we need to win elections, we need to win internal elections. If we have a project to implement in the local government, we implement it, if we have a social project, we implement it too. Somehow, I have never had... a broader political strategy of this kind for myself and I have never pursued it.

And has it always been like it? Why do think you chose not to be active in a political party?

— I think it is related to the idea of organizing on a lower level and cooperating with each other, giving up the patron-client relationships. Especially, that there are many young people who came out of the youth councils of cities, communes, who worked in these youth NGOs. Because this is where learning to cooperate with each other and trusting each other is the key. If we once worked together on a project and got along well, none of us will cheat each other, we can also trust each other. In my opinion the main problem here is the lack of trust. We are not able to organize ourselves, not because of our mentality, that we are different, but because we cannot trust each other within our community. That we prefer to follow this patron-client relationship, as it seems more obvious to us, more clear. Somehow it seems that way. We don't trust

our own people who are on our level. Civil society in our country is getting stronger, many more young people are involved, however, it is still the case that when they go into strictly political activity, they often change their attitude. Entering politics, running for local government, party structures also change people. Often those people who are oriented towards horizontal cooperation are very quickly eliminated from the structures. There are such internal mechanisms, that get them eliminated, pushed aside, discouraged at some point, isn't it? And those people, who rely on the patron-client relationship, are able to go higher, and are also a model for others, right? For those people who are in front of them, they get their heads up. Somebody tried to do some kind of alliance here, to act vertically, then — oh, he's out. This person who just went into this patron-client relationship — oh, he's already up there.

Going back to how you assessed your own political activity. Could describe all of such activities, behaviours you'd consider political, that you participated in in the last year or so?

— Well, I try to influence the local government in my city. There I am a councillor and also, now I happen to be the secretary of the district board, before that, I was the chairman. So, forming the city budget, which means making sure that my district has as much funding as possible for a lot of different issues. Lobbying for these issues. This is participation in politics, as we have this 3 billion złotych city budget and we try to ensure that as much as possible is spent on investments in the southern part of xxx. And this is politics already... pure politics. Well, that's what it's all about — making compromises, right? Making agreements, lobbying for certain issues. So, this is certainly one part. But should I list it more specifically or more like this again?

It can be specific if you like.

- Specific, OK. The second area is the NGO matters, namely cooperation with the Council for dialogue with the young generation, which I am just now implementing. Well, this is certainly more important now. So this is the second part of my activity ensuring that the youth organizations I worked with are properly represented. So that this dialogue council meets their expectations. After all, a lot of people don't yet have the proper understanding of this environment. And I, thanks to the fact that I cooperated with them for 4, 5 years, I went to these congresses, I organised these congresses for them, I could get to know their opinions, what they need and how this activity can be directed in a good way, right? I mean, because they're mostly young people. Those youth NGOs, their main task is simply to form them. To form, to teach them how to cooperate, to teach them certain processes. It is often noticeable that... I make such a digression, but it is important to understand the issue. That youth NGOs often do not have such spectacular successes, which could be achieved with the energy of youth. But it is necessary to understand that this is the place for learning. This is a place to learn how to make compromises. Sometimes these NGOs simply destroy each other, they cannot get along. But I think these experiences will pay off, because these young people, even if they joined NGOs in their thirties, would make the same mistakes at the beginning. And if they are richer in experience at a young age, as teenagers or twenty-somethings, they can go straight to be active in these adult, proper NGOs. So, this is a kind of kindergarten for public service and work in NGOs. It is important to support them, because their later activities in adult NGOs will be more valuable.

So, activity in local government, activity in NGOs. Something you would like to add to these political activities?

- ... well, I'm not directly involved in political parties, so that will be it.

I wanted to come back to something you talked about earlier - you talked about this unreflective interest in politics, you also described the lack of trust. Can you talk a little more about possible barriers causing Poles not to undertake political activity?

- well, I have been thinking a lot about it and also talked with people who were great local activists and implemented projects well. Generally, I think this experience would translate nicely for these activist to go into administration and politics. But they were mainly deterred by the necessity of total subordination. Because they never had to temper their convictions, ideas, and what they wanted to do in their groups, I mean in NGOs, or in the private sector. Here in politics, the necessity to temper their views discourages them completely from acting. Additionally, their views are often not represented by particular political parties. They have very expressive views, very often, young people, in spite of everything. They cannot imagine cooperation with political institutions. I have also noticed that the more politically to the centre a given person is or the less ideologically... I will use such a term — ideologically hardened, the less ideologically hardened he is, the easier it is to find his place in a party. They can just shelf their ideas for some time and start to realize themselves. And just to be clear, you don't necessarily have to be a member of a political party... you don't have to cooperate with a political party to implement politics, right? You can get on the candidates list without being a member of a political party, but you have to realize the vision of your organization, right? Or the vision of the people, who are in the party and who gave you the place on list, right? Or generally to whom you owe something, right? These young people can see it, because it is common knowledge, people who are not politically involved know this and it discourages them from the very beginning. Or they tried to get involved, once they reached that barrier, they just gave up on it.

And if you thought about your colleagues, or someone who is completely uninvolved, politically passive? Those who have nothing to do with politics. In your opinion, why are they this way?

- And they have never been active in NGOs either?

Yes, not active at all.

- I've thought about this a lot, too, but I haven't been able to find a clear answer. I mean it is very obvious, that they believe they have no influence on the reality around them. I don't know where this belief comes from, because you can... I also talked with them many times, because I often lobbied people to join organizations... I said to them, you will be able to go to a conference, sign up! It was very difficult to convince such people. But I noticed that the antidote to this is to... excuse me for the expression, to forcefully persuade to join an organization. To show them that if you are a member of an NGO or a council, you can realize your vision, your idea, put it into practice, and not just whine that it's impossible. You can really get along with people who hold various public functions. It really is possible, you just have to make compromises, cooperate, understand the other side, right? And the second issue is also that lack of knowledge. People often consider the decisions of politicians at every level — local government, government — as completely irrational. The reaction — it's totally sick, sick, it shouldn't be like that. And when they acquire this knowledge, it turns out that, all in all, it's a rational decision. They would make the same decision if they were in the position of the decision-maker. If people had more knowledge and saw that these decisions are in fact rational, and generally there is no other way, I think they would be more willing to get involved, right? And knowing they can solve specific, small problems. Really, for a large part of the population, the political decisions in our country, regardless of which option we talk about, are illogical. They see the state, and the structures of the state in general, as completely hostile to them. That there are "we" and "they". We just have to give some of our income to "them" and that's the way it is, our relationship ends because we don't get anything good from it anyway, right? And influence it at all? There is no option. They are a clique, as it is often called, right? And we simply cannot belong to it. I don't think I need to explain more.

No, thank you, I understand your points. My last question in this part is how would you define who is a good citizen?

— The most difficult question at the very end. I would like to say that it is a committed person, but we cannot expect commitment from every person. So, if he has the opportunity and also the disposition, he should get involved in public affairs — this is the first thing, it is very important. Above all, I think that every person can be expected to take an elementary interest in politics. Generally, everyone has to vote and consider politicians programmes. I know this a very idealistic approach, but this is how it should be. If there is a possibility, then one should get involved in the third sector, because you really do not have to participate in political decision-making by yourself being a politician, a member of a political party...People reach many decision-making positions and need help in substantive issues. Really, you can realize yourself very well in this expert role. In fact, many solutions can be suggested. I think that this is what our civil society should be taught. That they can be partners, they can suggest certain proposals, right? They do not necessarily have to get involved in direct politics, which is related to various mechanisms that often scare people off, as I mentioned before. Yes, that's I would define it.

Thank you, now I will proceed to some questions related to your family, your parents, maybe some more extended family. I'll start with a general question — How would you describe your parents' political activity?

— They have basically never been politically involved at all throughout their lives. They've always run businesses, and somehow this third sector route or NGOs, in the 90s, 80s, never came their way.

Do you think that your parents or your family somehow influenced your opinions, for example on the political system, or impacted your current activity?

— Definitely, positively. It was definitely such an internalization of views. Both my mother and my father are conservative people, with conservative views. So that was the beginning of my path. From that, it was the beginning, and then my views evolved. In my house there were always political discussions and...it wasn't of such a kind that we had two opposite camps and we argued here. Of course, sometimes at the big Christmas table there were such typical Polish conversation about politics. Obviously, we are in agreement about fundamental issues. But, for example, within my smaller family, that's what I always thought and what I always appreciated, it was such a substantive discussion. Really very substantive. I always liked it and I think it had a positive influence on me. In working out my opinions as well. But yeah — I certainly haven't drastically changed my views, because my family was conservative, I'm conservative too.

And do you think they have any opinion at all about your activities?

— Well, they certainly respect it very much, I must say that straight. They also supported me, for the reason that — especially in secondary school — it was difficult to reconcile any social engagement. Because there were frequent trips to conferences, frequent sessions of various council bodies, which happened during my school duties. These were some historical celebrations, state ceremonies and so on. And to get involved, you had to be there. So basically, my attendance in secondary school was about 55%. There was really a lot of that going on. I mean... and that was interesting to me too. I didn't see these activities as work, I just found it interesting, I wanted to be there. I thought it was more developmental for me — to be in some kind of history conference, tax law conference, than to be in a classroom, right? I never had a problem with grades, I never had a problem with writing well on a high school exam, a test — from the first year of secondary school. I also didn't think it was necessary for me to be in class. Of course, the school thought otherwise, so... but I was supported all the time. My parents understood me, and I spoke frankly about what was going on, why I was going to these conferences.

Thank you, that was the last question.

Appendix 5 Translated transcript of interview with interviewee P7-I

My first question to warm up: if you could imagine such a situation, that you meet someone who doesn't know anything about Poland, someone from abroad, how would you describe to this person the political system here?

— Well, that we are a very open country, we keep... we respect civil rights. We are a country where we respect difference and have respect for political views. We are a free and open country — this is how I associate Poland, the country which does not limit me at all. I mean, this feeling of freedom, a man creates for himself, right? Sometimes a person can be mentally limited and it's hard for him to live, because the reality is somehow unbearable, and...I don't like the ideological disputes that are going on in Poland. I think that the times are so dynamic and very difficult, and my heart breaks. For all the arguing and the rascality that the opposition carries out in our country. This is the worst thing, that they try to create such a reality and make us believe that we are a country which limits its citizens, which discriminates, which somehow restricts their freedoms, while the reality is completely different...I feel very comfortable and free in our country. I have the awareness that I can talk about anything. I am not, you know, politically involved, I'm just such a free person and I feel freely, I feel good in this country and I can't imagine I could leave Poland. Unless it was for tourism.

Is there anything you would like to add to how you described the political system?

- No, that's it.

I asked you on purpose about the political system and how you would describe it, because my next question is how do you perceive your role in this political system that we have in Poland?

— Well, I don't know, my role... My role is such as... I am a payer of some taxes, so somehow, I contribute to the state budget. Above all, I am a mother, I brought up my child as well as I could, I never limited my child's time. I don't know, I mean, this question is just so difficult for me.

We can always come back to it, that's the way these questions in the study are...

— I will say that this question, yes... is a bit problematic for me.

So, this is my next question, because you mentioned earlier that you're not involved...

- Yes, I'm not involved politically.

Yes, and I wanted to ask in general, what does political activity mean to you?

— Political activity would be to exercise my civil rights, so I have an impact on this reality at election time, right? Where I decide, which political option I identify with and which one is closer to me, because none is perfect, but which one is closer to me, right? And I always choose the patriotic option because it is closer for me.

And how would you assess political activity of Polish people in general?

— Are they politically active? I don't think so...Maybe they are trying to be active....but all political activity in the eyes of the people, everybody will tell you, that politicians, that politics is disgusting, dirty...But in fact, people, some of them, are not aware that these people, at the lowest levels of local governments, decide even about the type of bus that people use to get to work, right? So actually, this awareness is not so... it seems to me that this awareness is not that deep and it can be seen even during the elections to the district councils, as far as the turnout is concerned — it's actually not that interesting for people, and this is very important, because these politicians are responsible, they try to do something in our district and somehow listen to the residents' problems. I don't know, I just don't know, I don't really... I don't know if I can help you somehow...

Oh actually, everything you say is important to me, it's not that there are good or bad answers. Every opinion is very important to me and I take it all in. I have a few more questions...

— I didn't...because I didn't know that this conversation would take such a course. I am probably the wrong addressee, because...once again I will say that I am an aware voter, I don't like populism, I don't like lies and somehow, I choose this option which is closer to my perception, but I am not — and by the way I have never been in any association, any organisation or party — and I haven't conducted any political activity. I am just a voter.

I understand. Do you think, looking at other people, for example, who are more or less politically active, do you think there is any...

— Out of my circle, unfortunately, I don't have such friends who are politically involved.

That's all the better, because I wanted to ask you about what you think are the barriers which prevent people from political activities?

— I think that one of the barriers is of psychological kind. It's that politics is just, as I told you, it's a cesspit, there is... And besides, let me say that politicians themselves are a bit exclusionary. I think that if an informed observer looks at and analyses our political scene and the behaviour of responsible MPs, I would say that they themselves

are withdrawn. When they look at the whole circus, the whole rascality, and not only this last period and all the fuss that are happening with the presidential election. I think that the December events and also politicians themselves, irresponsible treatment of their mission and their behaviour discourages such common-sense people from any activity, doesn't it?

I understand.

— I think it's in general, I'll say that it's difficult. We are not free from certain things related to this mechanism, nepotism, promoting certain people, friends. Sometimes entering politics involves some backstabbing, so not everybody can... This environment is so hermetic and so closed that, unfortunately, it eliminates certain individuals. Especially, unfortunately, because it seems to me, that the wiser ones sometimes have a purpose and an idea. So, I think that this is a separate class, of influence and connections, and it makes it difficult for people to enter politics.

We were talking about political activity and now I would like to ask you what it means to you to be a good citizen?

- What does "being a good citizen" mean?

Yes.

— Well, it's... to be a good citizen is first and foremost... for me, history is of great importance, so to remember about your past. Above all, to make your payments, because it must be continuity and you have to pay your taxes honestly, because for me it's also a responsibility and tax patriotism. What else? I think, to be a good citizen is to promote your country in a positive way. I don't know... to be responsible for your family, that is also very important to me, very important, actually. I really don't know... to be an informed voter — that's so important too?

Great. I have two more questions, related to..

— I feel like I'm in a Citizenship Education class. I wish I had known; I would have prepared myself somehow!

It's all about whatever comes to your mind. I have two more questions, just related to your son. Do you have any opinion on him and how he approaches political activity?

— What opinion he has on politics, I'd like you to talk to him.

We've already talked. But I'd like to know your thoughts...

— I wouldn't want to speak on behalf of my son. I don't want to, because everyone has the right to express their own opinion and it should be a direct question to him...He has been such an activist since he was a kid. He's such an... an open-minded person. Already in primary school he educated his classmates! By the way, it was a very nice school and a great teacher. Also, in the second grade, he did various events related to the Porpoise Day, which is a protected species in the Baltic Sea. And this is so shocking, because I remember... He went to the second grade, it was so many years ago, and when it came to the Baltic Sea, there was very little awareness, not only among his peers, but also among the teachers, they didn't realize that there's a harbour porpoise Swimming in our Baltic Sea, a type of dolphin, so he organized such Porpoise Days, actually throughout the whole primary school, every year, and he tried, he was able to motivate his classmates to join this action and everyone was simply convinced, everyone was convinced. So, I think that from the very beginning he was somehow able to do it... From the beginning he liked that kind of different social challenges.

I wanted to ask whether you have any opinion at all, where did him being active came from? Have you thought at all about where that came from?

— I think that, you know, I think it's just... actually I've thought about it. I'll say it's probably divine intervention... such genes! But I'll tell you that I have never spared any time for my child and I've been able to withdraw from my professional life and everything... because I'm the kind of person who can't concentrate on two different missions, and I just have to concentrate on something, to concentrate on bringing up my son and let me say that I took my child everywhere, I even took him even to the exam in constitutional law when I was at university, when he was two years old, and I won't say that he didn't help me! I think that, above all, we can't ration the child's time, we just have to devote to the child's upbringing, that's the most important thing. Create a sense of security, and then it's a well-thought-out kindergarten, where the child feels comfortable. And it was really the right choice, then a good primary school and simply education, education that runs in two directions, because at school and at home, as you can't demand from a school that... parents can't wash their hands, right? Not to help their child, it's just impossible!

I understand.

— Particularly now, but it's always been that way, because sometimes parents are too demanding of the school, not paying attention at home to their children, right? It's just that there needs to be this constant... constant supervision, so to speak, educational supervision

Anything else you'd like to add?

— No, no, no...It's somehow in the genes, our ancestors were involved, so I think he just sucked something from mother's milk.

Did you son learned about family history at home?

— Yes, yes, my dad talked to him a lot. You know, the influence of the older generation is still very important, because my dad also devoted a lot of time to his grandson and they understood each other perfectly...They understood each other so well that my dad's been dead for three years, and to this day my son hasn't digested it yet, he still can't talk about it.

I understand.

- Grandpa was very, very... the whole summer vacations here were actually... My son had a huge bond with grandpa, and my grandpa was just such a... my dad was a very open person and I think that had a huge impact on his openness towards people, because my dad's very positive feature was that he liked people and he liked talking to people so much. Actually, in the modern world, people stop talking to each other verbally, even that... Recently I took a bus. Very rarely I have the pleasure of going by bus. I was shocked, I wanted to get off at the next stop. Everyone is sitting, with their phones, no one pays attention to anyone, no one says good morning on the bus. I even have this impression that when you used to travel, people always read newspapers, but most of all they talked to each other and you could find out who is a good doctor in the city, or a hairdresser, right? And who is not worth going to. For example, ladies used to exchange information. Now, there is no conversation, there is only a phone, headphones and the world is closed.

Thank you, that was my last question.