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Secular Identities:

An Exploration of Secular Models in Islam

Samantha Cooke

Secular society has become a fashionable concept in the Western world, with the separation of religion and politics, or religion and the state, often being associated with progress, democracy, and freedom. Whilst states such as France have become staunchly secular in their separation of religion from public life, others such as the US¹ and India, who openly critique religious states in other parts of the world, have retained the intertwined relationship between religion, politics and the state. Secularism is however, frequently recognised as being a Western concept, and it is partly because of this that perceptions of its suitability or compatibility in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region throughout the twentieth century fluctuate;² usually coinciding with colonial or imperial engagements. This Western identity emerges from key works, such as Taylor's (2009), which root secularity in societal processes which are heavily influenced by 'Western Latin...Christianity' (Künkler and Shankar 2018: 1). When examining state engagements with secularism however, it becomes apparent that there is no uniform model, and more importantly, there is no universal definition of secularism or its accompanying suffixes. Instead, diverging interpretations emerge, with scholars such as Kosmin (2007: 1-16) developing a spectrum, in which states are positioned based on how strictly they adhere to secularism and the philosophical 'identities' which can be attributed to the nature of this engagement.

Whilst such spectrums are useful for indicating the extent to which a state engages with secularism and how it aligns with (Western) political thought, it does not provide the parameters for exploring how secularism was introduced to a state, how states engaged with it, and how it interacted with (majority) religions. Consequently, this chapter argues that such knowledge is pivotal to further understanding the secular or religious trajectories adopted by states and starts the discussion about varieties of secular models, what they indicate and the stability of state's religious or secular identities. By focussing on the MENA region, which has been shaped dramatically by colonial interactions, it shows how different models were formed, and how the introduction of such models impacted religious engagements at different levels in society. By engaging with secularism in the MENA region this way, the article proposes understandings of the interactions between secularism and Islam across a historically, culturally, and religiously diverse region (see for example Kuru 2007); thereby speaking to deviating compositions of secularism and varying fractures which emerge within different contexts. To reflect these factors and begin understanding the intricacies of such relations in more depth, this chapter explores models of secularism for Egypt and Iran during the early twentieth century, drawing on Turkey due to the

¹ Despite retaining this identity, the US is often perceived as a polity where religion and politics are generally separate. This blurring of identities and understandings of the relationship between religion and politics within a state echoes the need to further understand typologies and variations in state identities.

² The term 'fluctuations' is used to refer to changing levels in religious or secular engagements in each state. Changes in such engagements relates to leadership objectives as well as how secularism was introduced to each state. In Iran a more authoritarian implementation is observed, with the longevity of ruling families presenting more continuous engagements, whereas Egypt's more regular leadership changes and more external interests directing secular introductions, and policies saw state identity change more.

influence Atatürk's secularisation of the state had on state trajectories, as was seen in Iran. Although encounters with foreign powers and secularism predate the twentieth century in both states, it is at this point in history that we see a marked shift in how citizens, as well as some governmental institutions, engage with the state. It is within this period that both states develop and implement their first constitutions in 1906 (Iran) and 1919 (Egypt) following revolutions. Civilian resistance to authorities emerged in response to authoritarian rule by the ruling elites and British empire, as well as dissatisfaction with gendered inequalities based on interpretations of Islam, rather than Islam itself.

This period is also marked by the First World War, which emerges as a significant point, not only in state relations, but for understanding relationships between imperial powers and those who were colonised. 1914-1918 signifies the opposition and passage between the secular, especially in Egypt; with the effects of war on government policies and engagements with Islam and secularism, based on British priorities, being pivotal in understanding variations in levels of engagement and state identity.

The models of secularism explored throughout this chapter emerge in relation to colonial interactions with occupied states, where secularism was introduced to Egypt by colonising powers, and by the state leader in Iran, in an attempt to alter the state's religious identity. To understand the trajectory of each state during this era, an analysis of socio-political implications of secularism in predominantly religious states is required. By exploring secular and religious identities in this manner, this chapter addresses three key areas of inquiry. Firstly, it moves beyond discussions of degrees of secularity, instead exploring how secularism was introduced to specific states. This will be achieved through the development of 'secular models', which speak to implementation methods and state engagements with secularism. Secondly, it explores fluctuations in a state's secular or religious identity; this will be achieved through a comparative approach. Third, an historical approach is adopted so that the roots of secular introductions are recognised. This allows for more robust foundations to emerge and more nuanced discussions to occur regarding (fluctuations in) religious and secular identities as a way of better comprehending contemporary state identities and engagements.

Religion, secularism and the state

Religion is a key factor in determining a state's identity. The religion/secularism binary emerges prominently when examining state behaviour and levels of engagement, especially when social and political life in the MENA region becomes the focal point. It also emerges prominently when considering the [religious] culture of a state. It is posited, however, that secularism is not exclusively referring to the distinction between public and private spheres, or toleration, with sovereignty of the modern state also being key (Bangstad 2009: 191). Moreover, the notion that secularism circumvents conflict stands in stark contrast with the twentieth century European authoritarian regimes which 'yields nothing to the ferocity of the religious' (Asad 1993: 236 in Bangstad 2009: 197).

Such observations are key to our understandings of the secular and religious spheres, reinforcing that what each sphere facilitates is not necessarily in direct contrast with the other, and the importance of context for engagements with each sphere. Observations of these interactions have however, predominantly occurred through a western-centric lens; consequently, their application to non-Western states will not fit as well as might have initially been anticipated.

When seeking to determine degrees of religiosity within a state, especially outside of the West, a similar model to that which is employed for determining the (non) democratic nature of a state is often used.

This model, simply put, has limited scaffolding in place, thus making it a rather flimsy and ineffective way of understanding different state identities with such concepts.

Secularism

Secularism falls into the grey area of linguistic ambiguity, with the distinctions between varieties remaining unclear. Definitions are therefore an important component in understanding how concepts are being engaged with and play a prominent role in determining (self) ascribed identities. Moreover, the emergence of definitions at specific times and places results in the lens through which they are viewed being context dependent. For Calhoun (2011: 6), secularism and religion are intertwined, with definitions and comprehensions always being developed in comparison with the other (Calhoun 2011: 6). This introduces the concept of power structures to the discussion, with this religious-secular binary favouring religiosity over secularism and presenting the latter in a more negative light. There is however, at least one religion which clearly challenges such assertions, and that is Islam, with religious influence and engagement increasing (Esposito 2011: 1), rather than declining; as has been seen with Christianity.

Often understood as a Western construct, secularism in the MENA region is frequently considered to have been imposed by colonising powers. Consequently, the effects of secularism are often in line with the rhetoric of *gharbzadegi* (Westoxification) which in turn results in the process of modernisation being understood as Western whilst simultaneously overlooking how secularism was introduced into a country and the effect this had on the stability or its secular or religious identity. The malleability of concepts such as secularism, whereby there is no fixed definition, has resulted in multifarious meanings emerging. When recognising this issue and the effects it has on different levels of engagement, it is important to acknowledge that this is not only occurring on the Western end of the telescope. Badran (2005: 10) speaks of how definitions of secularism altered throughout the twentieth century, predominantly since the 1970s. These changes are seen to correlate with changing, increasingly negative, perceptions of non-Islamic ideas; becoming synonymous with 'Westoxification'. This recognition of secularism as Western has resulted in it being considered foreign and being 'inserted into the narrative of confrontation with the Other' (Ismail 1998: 210).

Further complicating the matter is the existence of a variety of suffixes which are frequently considered to be synonymous (Fokas 2010: 163) and thus reiterate the absence of definitional clarity. In reference to Taylor's three conceptions of secularity, Künkler and Shankar (2018: 3) speak of the need to separate them from secularism and secularisation, claiming that the former usually speaks to an ideological legitimisation of separating political and religious authorities, with religious laws not being present in the legal system and, in some instances, religion being relegated to the private sphere. The latter, however, refers to an historical process of the liberation of the state and its structures from religious authority. For others, the process of secularisation speaks exclusively to the decline of religion within institutions or was reflected in reduced engagement with religious communities and/or beliefs (Künkler and Shankar 2018: 3; Casanova 2011: 54).

In seeking a more nuanced understanding of secularism and its accompanying suffixes, Cesari (2014: 118) claims secularisation occurs at the individual, state and institutional levels and such comprehensions assist in better identifying and understanding the 'different regimes of secularity' within different states, thus asserting the impossibility of a 'one size fits all' model. Along these lines, Demerath (2007: 57) recognises the need for contextualising secularism's emergence and how this

relates to religious engagement. Adopting a similar approach to Demerath and drawing on my earlier work (Cooke 2019: 5), this chapter defines secular as ‘the acquisition of power through modernisation resulting from the separation of religion from politics and /or the state.’ This results in ‘secularisation’ being a process, ‘secularism’ is the separation, ‘secularity’ is the type of separation, and ‘secular’ is the outcome and how it is indicated (Cooke 2019: 5). This approach, whilst reverting to the original ‘separations’, which Cesari argues need to be developed, provides the opportunity to develop a framework for understanding how secularism was introduced and engaged with, before delving further below the surface to understand the greater complexities of social, institutional and individual engagements.

Secularism & Islam

Being rooted in 19th-century European history contributes heavily to perceptions of secularism as western and/or European and incompatibility outside of the (European) West; as such, reconceptualisations of secularism, rather than alternatives to it (Bhargava 2011: 94), are pivotal to further contextualising secular developments and experiences. Its western foundations are furthered through its intertwining with foreign occupation and the western concept of modernisation. Most Muslim countries, including the more secular Tunisia and Iran (Esposito 2011: 2), employed Western models and advisors to find a ‘middle ground in nation building’, with religious states, such as Pakistan, also adopting this approach. One of the most influential, and arguably most successful, examples of state secularisation in the MENA region is Turkey. In seeking to comprehend the secularisation process in the MENA region and its potential for stability and success, Turkey serves as a good model against which comparisons can be made due to its inspiring effects on other states, and Iran presents as a strong case for evidencing models and engagements with secularism.

During the early 1920s, Atatürk sought to reform the Turkish state through a secularising project which saw Turkish identity change from a religious empire to a modern state (Göl 2013: 1). Absolute sovereignty was reinforced through the secularisation process incorporating religion through institutions as opposed to laws; hence Turkish secular identity being identified as *accommodationist*. Whilst Turkey is observed as having been successful in its secularisation process, with the state identity not having altered since – despite more recent attempts; Başkan contends that the focus on a single religion during this process resulted in its occurrence at the expense of minority religious groups within the state (Başkan 2014: 159).

Through examining differing models of state secularisation, Başkan identifies Iran as *separationist* due to the transformation of religion being excluded from the project, with Turkish accommodationism reforming religion within the state (Başkan 2014:147-148; 159). Shifting from the Turkish approach, a consolidation of power occurred prior to Iranian reforms; the successive form can therefore be understood to have influenced the secular nature of the state (Başkan 2014: 99; 101). Another distinguishing feature was the apparent absence of competition between rulers as was observed in Turkey (Başkan 2014: 102; 147). McCarthy (2014: 734) however, highlights how secularism is understood as a means by which the state is able to define and control aspects of religious life. In this context, state secularisation appears as the blatant protections of state sovereignty through the adoption of a variety of different methodologies to ensure the retreat of religion from the public sphere. Engagements with secularism do, however, vary across the region, with resistance movements expanding beyond Muslim societies (Bhargava 2011: 93).

Such movements not only spoke to secular transformations within society, but the authoritarian manner by which they occurred, with the concept of the secular state still remaining unclear, crucially contributed to the 'dispute in the debate about Islam and secularism' (Esposito 2011: 3), reinforcing the fractured relationship between them. Moreover, it is vital that Muslims are not positioned as 'secularism's 'other'' (Bangstad 2009: 202). Resistance has taken many forms, with the 'discrediting of secular paradigms' being apparent throughout the region (Esposito 2011: 3), with the 1979 Iranian Revolution challenging the secular authoritarianism of the Pahlavi's, positioning it as the 'other', and replacing it with the Islamic Republic, which is now recognised as a theocratic state. This does, however, follow the continuation of Pahlavi secular authoritarianism by Mohammad Reza Shah following his father's forced abdication in 1941.

Secular Typologies

Seeking explanation over secularism, Kosmin (2007: 3) created a secular spectrum which included classifications of hard and soft secularism. Here, 'soft secularism' refers to mainly liberal religionists (Locke) who view religion as a 'private lifestyle option' (UK, Denmark and Israel) and it is just before here on the spectrum that I would place pre-Sadat Egypt. This does not however, mean that religion is absent, with each of these states having official religions, which, as is the case with Israel, has implications on civil law; highlighting the difference between having a state religion and being a religious state. On the other hand, 'hard secularism' speaks to more atheist states (China and the former USSR), and in states such as Iran, which are considered to be theocratic, there is no secularism (Kosmin 2007: 3). The positioning of these states on this spectrum clearly reflects understandings at the time of writing; thus, the absence of secularism in Iran would not be a correct depiction of the Iranian state of the 1920s to 1979, being this aligned more with hard secularism, yet with no atheist characteristics.

Present day Iran is commonly recognised as a theocratic regime. The state has experiences with being both religious and secular, and its current identity is that of an Islamic state following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in 1979 as the result of the Islamic Revolution. Along with the new religious identity and the recognition of an authoritarian regime, it is important to remember however, that the two do not automatically accompany each other; secular states can adopt the same dictatorial characteristics, while some religious states have democratic institutions in place (Feldman 2008: 147). Thus, Egypt has had experiences with both of these identities and, after an ephemeral experience with democracy in 2011-2012, is currently widely recognised as both a religious and authoritarian state. This religious identity does, however, stand in contrast to that of Iran, with Egypt adopting Islam as its state religion rather than establishing itself as a religious republic. Moreover, as will become evident in the following sections, Egypt's religious and secular identities lacked the 'stability' which was so apparent in Iran. This speaks to 'contextual secularism' which engages with specific varieties, incorporating a particular 'model of contextual moral reasoning' (Bhargava 2011: 93).

Secular contextualisation is also key because of its role in Western-led civilising missions through foreign occupation, and subsequently its position in directing both Western and non-Western historical processes; thereby reinforcing the need to engage with global and colonial history to complete the secularity puzzle (Göle 2010: 244). In order to do this however, a greater understanding of how secularism was introduced to each state is needed, which will in turn provide insights into secular stabilities and religious identities.

Secular Models

Although comparative secularism is an emerging field (see for example Ahmad 2009; Cady and Hurd 2010; Çitak 2004), there remain questions about the importance of implementing powers and how their differences can impact the development of secular identities. This speaks to Künkler and Shankar's (2018: 8) comparative attempt which places 'what?' as the point of departure for emphasising the cultural and societal complexities and contexts of religion and thus, secularism. By exploring diverging secular identities within the MENA region, it will become possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of state identities and this will feedforward into the creation of secular models. Focussing on early twentieth century Egypt and Iran, this chapter argues that variations in the MENA region can be explained by utilising the concepts of *internal* and *external* secularism, both of which are shaped by interactions with imperial politics; although similar, these models are distinct from, and are not to be confused with, Demerath's (2007: 57-80) which adopt the same initial labels.

Demerath (2007: 74-77) explores the differences in secular models by developing two key typologies, internal and external, which are then sub-divided into four different 'secularization scenarios' (2007: 74) based on whether or not it is directed, following a top-down approach by controlling authorities. The internal typologies are 'emergent' and 'coercive'. The former, which Demerath considers reflective of a more 'classic model', refers to unintended consequences of various reforms in the fields of education, modernisation and industry, for example. The latter refers to a process directed by an 'effective authority', with the label 'coercive' being used to imply a form of top-down power and implementation (2007: 76). For external secularisation, 'diffuse' refers to a less directed process, with cultural interactions often contributing to this model due to the displacement and relegation of more traditional practices (Demerath 2007: 76). Finally, there is 'imperialist' secularisation, with the main influencer being external to the society in question (Demerath 2007: 77). Whilst using the same initial labels for our typologies and recognising the presence of internal and external influences on the secularisation process, this is where the similarities in our models end.

In my earlier work (Cooke 2019), these secular typologies emerged in relation to colonial engagements in these states. *Internal* secularism emerged in Iran following the successful 1921 coup d'état lead by Reza Khan against the *Majlis* during the first constitutional period, with the Cossack Brigade remaining closely aligned with the monarchy as a military source. It was at this time that Reza Khan began his climb to power, eventually securing the position of Shah of Iran in 1925. The main focus for Reza Shah was modernising Iran and it is through this project that *internal* secularism was introduced into Iran through various encounters with Western imperialism. This model of secularism refers to changes in a state's religious trajectory based on the decisions of the state leader, with the apparent absence of external engagements in this process contributing to the development of this label.

When considering this model, the state leader is positioned at the top and it is this individual who determines how religion engages with the state and/or politics. The decision is then filtered into areas of government and politics such as government structures/actors, laws and policies which consequently feed into branches of local government or local authorities before entering into sectors such as business, agriculture, and education. In the case of the latter, continuous dialogues occur to ensure national agendas are reflected at the local level. Such sectors are what the public sphere is comprised of, and it is through this that such decisions on state's religious identities trickle down to the citizen level and eventually into the private sphere of the family.

In addition to this, there are other dialogues between the private sphere and public sphere, as well as with areas such as policy and law formation. The difference in relationship between them, however, is

due to such engagements occurring through a third party, with leadership decisions and their impact on the private sphere occurring via policy development or reform.

Contrastingly, *external* secularism refers to the impact of imperial powers – whether direct or indirect – on the presence of religion in politics and how this filters through political structures and into society. In this instance, it is the authority external to the state that is directing the religious identity of the state, subsequently resulting in this label being applied. This model follows a similar structure to *internal* secularism, with the key difference being that the decision maker is that of the colonial or imperial power, and the nature of this relationship will determine whether or not the introduction of secularism was done directly by the colonial power or indirectly through imperial policies.

There are two possible routes these decisions make. The first is that the colonial power engages directly with the state leader, whether this be a monarch or elected Head of State; the second is that this individual is bypassed, and these policies or decisions are filtered directly into the government without that initial engagement with the leader. It then follows the same route as *internal* secularism, filtering into areas of politics such as policy and law development and government structure before deviating slightly and filtering to local authorities via localised, colonial authorities. The presence of this additional structure, however, will be dependent on the region within the state and value perceptions by the colonising power. After this, both models once again share the same structure with policies and laws being disseminated into specific sectors such as business, agriculture and education which result in these decisions being implemented in the public sphere and affecting citizens who also enter into the sphere via the family. Both of these models speak to the same local actors, with the key difference being the presence of more localised, colonial authorities where secularism is being introduced by a foreign power. What both of these models illustrate however, are broad frameworks which engage with two alternative, top-down approaches to introducing secularism. What these models do not directly indicate, but are by no means exclusionary of, are bottom-up approaches such as social movements which may result in authorities changing the religious or secular trajectory of a state. What they do provide however, is a broad framework which can accommodate different forms of engagements, thereby enabling the creation of more specific models of *internal* and *external* secularism. Consequently, these typologies build on those advocated by Demerath, taking an alternative path to explore the role of specific actors, in these instances, those in positions of authority, in the introduction, implementation and resulting stabilities of secularism in each state.

Colonising powers and secular introductions

Representing the largest empire, British colonial rule has left a prominent mark throughout history, the effects of which are still visible in the present day. Colonial rule emerges as a multifaceted concept which is not only established on military, political and economic wealth, but also on ‘cultural technologies’ (Dirks 1992: 3). Emerging from this is the establishment of binaries which served to present European powers in a more positive, developed manner to their non-European counterparts. These binaries are what Said (1978) critiques throughout his seminal work *Orientalism*, highlighting how representations and engagements go beyond the states in question and colonial occupation; thus, speaking to postcolonial scholarship through the challenges it presents to Western-centrism and how this hinders our understanding of the historic and contemporary world.

In seeking to further this understanding, recognition of the obstacles facing imperial powers and their eventual demise presents an equally important factor when considering their cultural legacies. By 1945,

the size of the British Empire stood at approximately one fifth of the globe, encompassing approximately twenty-five percent of the population (Chamberlain 1985: 3). By this stage in the twentieth century, devolution and partial autonomy was occurring within parts of the British Empire (Chamberlain 1985: 3).

Observations of colonial encounters at both the political and societal levels also assist in understanding how secularising encounters are shaped and the impact they leave once decolonisation begins. For Fanon (1963: 74, 129, 190) there were two key things to take away. The first related to hierarchies such as interactions between colonisers and colonised peoples, and those which existed amongst colonised societies and were based on identity factors such as race, class, or sex. The second was the oversimplification of culture and the detrimental impact this had on subjugated persons.

The effects of hierarchical power structures, how secularism was implemented by colonial authorities and the legacies following decolonisation, can in part be reflected in the imperial models each state adopted. For Chamberlain (1985: 4), there is a clear distinction between models of imperial rule, with an empire such as the French following *centralised assimilation*, therefore enabling culture and civilisation to be spread throughout the empire; with the British adopting *devolution*, which occasionally permitted a greater degree of autonomy. Consequently, these methods of rule impacted on eventual decolonisation experiences, as well as engagements with concepts such as secularism which are frequently recognised as Western.

The impact of these powers on state engagements with *Shari'a* also becomes visible through demands that it is incorporated as civil law, resulting in areas of family law being codified in it (Cesari 2014: 161). This has resulted in current family law not reflecting traditional jurisprudence, with judges having the benefits of interpretation and amalgamation to assist in reform justifications (Cesari 2014: 161). Moreover, some societies have experienced the use of religion as a tool by the elite to create a common identity, with others experiencing the marginalisation of religion to the private sphere as it was considered to hinder modernisation (Künkler and Shankar 2018: 11). The current secular crisis, which arose from criticisms of the secular state, the strains it was placed under and a focus on two Western doctrines of secularism is considered to have emerged prominently following the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw the creation of the 'first modern theocracy in Iran', before becoming visible in states such as Egypt (Bhargava 2011: 92).

Egypt

The commencement of World War One served as a trigger for exacerbating British concerns regarding control over colonial territories. Egyptian involvement in the First World War was not optional, and Britain was paranoid regarding the potential for colony revolts against them. Moreover, their protectorate status (1914) reinforces external influences within the state and the perceived need for British intervention to protect their interests in Egypt. This speaks to how religion and secularism were engaged with throughout this tumultuous period by both colonial and Egyptian authorities. It is from this that two introducers of secularism can be identified: the British Empire and nationalist movements which became visible in the immediate post-war era, culminating in the 1919 revolution.

During the war, the khedive was also urged to utilise this unstable period and declare an Egyptian constitution (Farid/Goldschmidt 1992: 173-175). The use of religious language throughout these

communications, with references to 'God', the 'Islamic ummah', and the use of 'amen' (Farid/Goldschmidt 1992: 173-175), implies an attempt to remove secular influences from issues relating to Egyptian independence. The incorporation of religious language into the letter suggests an attempt to reassert a religious and cultural identity of matters political; challenging external, colonial secular influences.

Egyptian nationalists ardently challenged the negative impact of British colonialism through socio-political means, with the primary actors seeking the 'loyalties of intellectuals' being moderates who compromised with British power and they were liberal nationalists and reformist Islam (Baker cited in Gershoni and Jankowski 1987). Ideological background was also integral, especially in considering the 'exclusively territorial nationalist orientation that marked the Egyptian Revolution of 1919', as the Wafd leadership has links with the Umma Party and its understanding of 'secular, separatist nationalism' before the war (Baker cited in Gershoni and Jankowski 1987).

Prior to the start of World War One and Egypt becoming a British Protectorate, the foremost type of nationalist ideology was modelled on Ottomanism. This, alongside Ottoman suzerainty, proved more popular than an elongated period of British rule (Baron 1991: 283). Following the war however, Ottoman support had reduced to levels lower than expected, especially given the religious bond developed by the power given to the Ottoman Empire by Egyptian Muslims (Gershoni and Jankowski 1987). It is because of this that there were expectations of an Ottoman/German triumph which would result in ending British rule (Gershoni and Jankowski 1987: 24). The absence of direct engagement with the Ottomans during the Revolution also contributed to changing sentiment within the state, including the notion which was presented at the 1919 Peace Conference that their claim to sovereignty over Egypt and Sudan was void due to the events of World War One and as such, they should be considered independent (Gershoni and Jankowski 1987: 24). Furthermore, the ramifications of World War One are understood to have contributed greatly to increased national sentiment. This was further emphasised by President Wilson's theory of self-determination; with Egyptian nationalists determining Egypt's new position as not only a sovereign state, but also as the leading Muslim state. The nationalist sentiment among Egyptians was thus successfully and energetically championed by Sa'd Zaghlul (R.I.I.A 1952: 5), and thus it was during this period that the effects of Egyptian secular nationalism could be felt.

The conversation between secular and religious sentiments was firmly established by anti-Ottoman resistance and later responses to British rule, resulting in Muslim-Christian, and nationalism-religious relations remaining ambiguous during the interwar period (Krämer 2018: 299). This reinforces the role of external actors in introducing and embedding the secular conversation within Egypt, with both the Ottoman and British empires playing key roles in this. Whilst it is argued that Demerath's emergent and coercive models of internal secularisation can be found in Egypt (Künkler and Madeley 2018: 373), I argue that when exploring the introduction of secularism, external models are more evident, with Demerath's imperialist secularization being the closest pre-existing model. Where this model differs from mine, is that external secularism refers to foreign powers present within the state rather than those external to it, as is the case with imperialist.

Within this context, secularism was introduced to Egypt in two ways; colonial authorities and nationalist movements. In this instance however, the form of secularism which was most readily engaged with was that which was implemented through colonial policies from a top down approach. Engagement of the colonial power with either the leader or the government appeared to fluctuate depending on their

relationship. So, whilst an internal form of secularism can be seen, colonial engagements indicate that this was initially subservient to the colonial concept which was predominantly implemented through policy and law.

Iran

The 1920s and 1930s saw the separation of religious institutions from the state in Iran. A disconnection between the state and the religious community is also believed to have occurred; this allowed neutrality towards those engaged with the project of secularisation (Başkan 2013: 73). Religious separation was not however, new in Iran, with the ulama having established independence in the sixteenth century alongside Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion (Halliday 1979: 18). Moreover, their growth in power as a 'major social force' is traced to the degeneration of the Safavid dynasty, specifically the late eighteenth century, which was greatly impacted by the Sunni-Shi'i rifts (Bayandour 2010: 18; Keddie 2006: 19). The ulama's influence continued to grow, playing an integral role in opposing, and defeating, Prime Minister Reza Khan's unpopular bill (1925) proposing the eradication of the monarchy and the development of a secular republic using Turkey as a blueprint (Bayandour 2010: 19); standing in contrast to their less confrontational political and ideological natures of earlier centuries (Keddie 2006: 15). This separation occurred as a result of social unrest and the ensuing 1906 constitutional revolution which heard calls for an increasingly secular approach to be introduced.

Calls for an increasingly secular state were not, however, a new introduction accompanying the rise of Reza Khan. Lasting almost thirteen decades, the Qajar epoch (1789-1925) is documented as an era of 'cultural and artistic contributions and of important popular movements', representing an important aspect of the transitional process between pre-modern Iran and the later societal and cultural modernisation (Keddie 1999: 1).

Departing from social and religious components, the importance of Islamic leaders and how they engage with the existing system becomes key, with the role of the 'ulamā' in the constitutional revolution further emphasising the intertwining of religion and politics, with most of them supporting those challenging the Qajar's (Akhavi 1980: 25). Adjustments in strength notwithstanding, both *daulat* (state) and *din* (religion) were considered by the Shah and 'ulamā' to be distinct but entangled entities which relied on each other (Bayat 1991: 21). On August 9th, 1906 a win for the secular constitutionalists and their supporters became apparent following impactful strikes that resulted in a National Consultative Majlis being agreed to (Afary 1996: 58). The internal political makeup of the state was therefore key in the eventual, public shift from religious to secular state, resulting in this change in trajectory falling into the broad model of *internal* secularism.

In this instance, bottom-up secularisation is the model identified in Iran (Künkler and Madeley 2018: 373) and whilst this chapter agrees and this does fit within the broader model I apply, what is not reflected is how the Iranian model shifts later in the twentieth century to a top-down approach. By retreating to these broader models, I argue that trajectories and stabilities can be better understood, thereby laying the groundwork for more nuanced understandings to emerge and reduces the risk of experiences being placed in predetermined, less flexible frameworks.

Due to the prominence of Western influenced persons in the establishment of the 1906 constitution, it was considered to be 'an odd amalgamation of contradictory concepts, including Muslim religious law, secularism, and Western constitutional precepts' (Sanasarian 1982: 19), and was therefore not

considered to be completely Iranian. When considering the impact of such concepts on state formation, Halliday (1979: 22-25) highlights the emergence of five crises throughout the twentieth century, all of which shaped Iranian development. These crises incorporate the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the subsequent weakness of the Qajar's and the absence of an adequate central government by 1919, and the *déjà vu* of military termination of the Shah's power as was previously seen with the Qajar's. It is at this point that, when reflecting on the model of *internal* secularism, that the military needs to be introduced as a prominent actor, initially above, and then alongside the government.

At the same time, the Iranian anti-Russian movement sought assistance from Britain, and although Britain responded, their engagement was limited due to a reluctance to engage with the more radical or secular participants; instead focussing on the more conservative, and possibly religious, members (Keddie 1969: 4). The nature of Britain's response to these calls for her speaks to a disinclination to help in the secularisation process of Iranian politics. This could be due to concerns surrounding a less vulnerable Iran, thereby reducing the potential for British control within the state. Consequently, this speaks to 'secular' as the result of state modernisation enabling greater power to be gathered (Cooke 2019). Moreover, it illustrates why *external* secularism was not present in Iran, particularly as a result of British involvement.

Iran was categorised as a semi-colonial zone because of the riskiness of state sovereignty and their circumvention of colonisation in the twentieth century (Marashi 2008: 17). It is through this understanding of the Iranian relationship with colonialism that the development of *internal* secularism can be better comprehended. The emergence of this form of secularism not only speaks to colonial engagements, but also to arguments that the constitutional movement failed to result in a stronger parliament, leader, and a more coherent system, such as the one which had developed in India (Ghani 1998: 21-22). There were however, some key successes of the movement, such as the establishing of a constitution. According to a piece in the St Petersburg *Birzheviya Viedomosti* (September 13th, 1906 cited in Browne 1910: 123), this was partly to do with British involvement, and was therefore not to be considered as a solely Iranian achievement. So, despite British reservations about a secular Iran due to fears of a more capable and powerful state, British involvement in constitutional development allowed them to maintain pretences of development and assistance within Iran.

In this instance, two types of internal secularism emerge in twentieth century Iran; the first is bottom-up, emerging through citizen dissatisfaction with the Qajar dynasty and religious institutions, and the second is top-down secular authoritarianism under the Pahlavi dynasty starting in 1925. This latter model of secularism reflects the aggressive state-building and modernisation approaches adopted by many Muslim-majority states in the early twentieth century, with the Iranian project challenging traditional religious establishment (Künkler and Madeley 2018: 356).

Stable identities

Empires rarely re-emerge from a collapse with the end of communism and the declining support for monarchies being amongst the possible examples (Feldman 2008: 1). This does not mean that their revival is impossible, with the Islamic state and democracy challenging this assertion, and the former being achieved via the introduction of *Shari'a* influenced government foundations replacing secular measures (Feldman 2008: 1-2). Challenging this assertion, however, is the fact that the reintroduction of either in (former imperial) states, such as Turkey, does not however, guarantee their return to being an imperial power. Furthermore, religious decline within the Muslim world, according to Feldman

(2008: 85), cannot be solely accredited to the effects of (European) colonialism due to the preceding impact of the Ottoman Empire across the region. This is however, challenged by the notion that secularism within the MENA region has never escaped its colonial past and the postcolonial struggle (Nasr cited in Yom 2002: 96).

Egypt

Egyptian secularism was by no means as 'stable' as its Iranian counterpart and this is partially a result of colonial interactions. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, the impact of Egyptian secular nationalism was still evident. Despite this, the 1950s and 1960s especially, have come to represent an era of independence for states such as Algeria, with Western observers' secular exhilaration at the spread of nationalism accompanying it (Juergensmeyer 1993: 11). This era was also shaped by social and state level developments within Egypt, whereby modernity reflected secular transitions. In this instance however, the synonymisation of modernity and secularism did not equate to the retreat of religion to the private sphere. Instead, what is observed is the implementation of secularism formed the basis of citizenship, consequently confiscating certain religious rights (Hibbard 2010: 7). The secular transformation of the Egyptian state was not a quick process, with Nasser continuing it with the belief that the '*ulamā*' should be limited rather than removed so that a 'state-controlled monopoly on religion' could be achieved alongside his protectionist project (Hibbard 2010: 63). This approach speaks to traits found in the Turkish model, with religion remaining influential, but much less prominent, in some aspects of society. Furthermore, leaders of minority groups within Egypt eagerly supported this shift as they understood it to mean that they would be better represented in public life (Juergensmeyer 1993: 190). This subsequently resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood advocating a return to Islam in the 1960s (Hibbard 2010: 64).

Despite the gradual secularisation process which occurred under Nasser, occurring in tandem with the advocacy of an Arab influenced national identity, his successor is understood to have undermined these efforts. Anwar Sadat is thus recognised for reemphasising religious divisions; consequently, the question of 'what?' becomes prominent in establishing Egyptian public identity – is it religious or secular? (Hibbard 2010: 75) The result of this is that the Sadat era is identifiable as deflating a partly risen secular state by reinfusing the Egyptian public sphere with religion; resulting in a stark contrast to Nasser who, alongside India's Nehru, is considered to have typified this shift towards a more secular identity, claiming that there was no return to a religiously infused Egypt (Juergensmeyer 1993: 190).

Although they appeared to oppose an Islamist society, the policies and approaches of Anwar Sadat, and later Hosni Mubarak, chose to adopt conservative Islamic rhetoric, thus reinforcing perspectives which were supported by Islamists (Hibbard 2010: 94). Since the start of the twenty-first century, the indeterminacy of Mubarak over the role of religion and secularism in the public sphere resulted in 'a Saudi influenced version of Islam' flourishing alongside government advocacy of Islamic orthodoxy (Hibbard 2010: 110-111). Despite more liberal principles being adopted following the elongated period of British colonisation, Egyptian policies continued to be influenced by religion which had not be relegated to the private sphere (Hafez 2011: 56). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring which saw the removal of Mubarak from power (2011) and the subsequent failure of Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood), El Sisi's regime has resulted in a potential confrontation between religion and politics because his secular government is seeking Islamic reforms, thus indicating a potential shift towards a more internal model

of secularism, but this would require a greater understanding of the changing nature of secularism within the Egyptian state, and that is what the current typologies hope to enable.

Iran

Diverging from the (inadvertent) cessation of Egyptian secularisation, the 1960s bore witness to the continued authoritarian secularisation of Iran which had begun under Reza Khan. One key difference was the apparent improvement of gender equality following female enfranchisement and the development of literacy training programmes under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Strong 1997: 133). The roots of 'Pahlavism' and the policies seen during this period are understood to be entangled with romantic ideas of what the Iranian identity was and how the modernisation project was undertaken (Adib-Moghaddam 2013: 238). The depiction of Iran as sitting 'at the crossroads of East and West' speaks to Islamic absences in the formation of its identity until the late 1970s and early 1980s (Adib-Moghaddam 2013: 238). This geo-political representation of Iran echoes the Turkish positioning and indicates attempts to completely remove religion from the public sphere as a more modern, secular and ultimately Westernised 'identity' was sought for the international arena.

The continued secular, authoritarian leadership of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was challenged in the late 1970s, concluding in the 1979 Iranian revolution which saw the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty and the replacement of secular authoritarianism with religious authoritarianism following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This shift in state identity occurred as a result of the population's rejection of the Pahlavi dynasty's authoritarian rule, bringing into question the relationship between secularism and democracy, with the secular policies of the Pahlavi's working in opposition to the rational notions which were usually partnered with it (Shakman Hurd 2011: 175). The radical transformation in Iranian national identity and the policy reforms which occurred reinforces public discontent with the West inspired, Pahlavi autocracy. The existence of '*secular* opposition forces' also contributed to the fall of Mohammad Reza (Halliday 1996: 57). The 1979 revolution is also seen as a key point of departure in the Iranian secular crisis which was unfolding, with the crisis of the 'modern secular state' (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani 1994: 51-52) resulting in calls for a return to Islam whilst simultaneously indicating potential fatigue of the state.

As a consequence of the 1979 Revolution, the 1980s saw a dramatic increase in religious sentiment, with the Afghan-Soviet war also contributing to this environmental change and the re-grounding of Islam as the main challenger to the existing state system (Hibbard 2010: 82). Having positioned itself as the primary contender to Western cultural pre-eminence and secular politics, the immediate post-Cold War era in Iran is recognised because of this and the restoration of ethno-religious loyalties (Juergensmeyer 1993: 1).

Conclusion

Religious or secular consistency is something both states have struggled with as a result of various internal and external power struggles, however, Keddie posits that 'Under most Iranian governments, whether monarchical or clerical, there has, however, been a gap between the authoritarian means employed by governments and what most people see as in their best interests' (Keddie 2006: 317). Moreover, imperial domination is considered to have been a hegemonic system seeking global domination via guises of secularism, liberalism, and capitalism, with imperial history being seen as 'a

200-year' campaign to dominate the Middle East (Tripp 2013: 178). Consequently, regional stability has not been uniform due to the differing effects of colonialism on each state, and it is through initial engagements with these models that such formulations and engagements can be more comprehensively understood.

As the twentieth century progressed, transitions between the religious and secular identities in these states appear to have adopted a cyclical nature. The Egyptian experience was prolonged partially due to its colonial history. Moreover, the indecision of governments as well as between them resulted in a potentially inadvertent directionality becoming possible. In the Iranian case, the cyclical nature of the religious and secular state can be seen to have occurred as a response by a discontent public. The overwhelming presence and absence of religious authorities in the state potentially affected its directionality, with both types of authorities emerging as equally restrictive.

Whilst Iran experienced longer durations as a secular or religious state, Egypt's history appears more haphazard, with fluctuations occurring during leadership transitions as well as during their term(s) in office. Subsequently, initial conclusions about the relationship between each state and secularism can be drawn; with secularism in Iran appearing more resilient than in Egypt, potentially due to the manner in which it was implemented at the state level. This reinforces the importance of recognising different modes of introduction, as well as how state infrastructures and citizens engaged with it, thereby paving the way for more intense scrutiny of secularism, and how it was implemented within each state, following a model similar to that advocated by Cesari (2014).

Modernisation was also a prominent factor, not only because of its synonymisation with secularism, but because in Egypt, there was an awareness of the need to develop an independent, competitive economy, a more rigid position in the international arena, and a stronger society through social and political reforms. However, due to their continuing history of foreign occupation and colonisation, Egypt was finding itself in an increasingly precarious position, which resulted in an enforced reliance on foreign powers. Western economic and political standpoints which were enforced throughout Egypt further contributed to the increasing Westernisation of the state as social practices became common amongst Egyptian citizens.

The primary objective of Reza Khan however, was the establishment of a modern state. This was to be achieved through the introduction of Western science and technology, and the adoption of European models of economics, education and administration. Of these reforms however, secular changes in the legal system and the development of a railway took priority (Ghani 2000: 397). Education was also reformed, with the implementation of compulsory education for children between the ages of six and thirteen, as well as the adoption of the French curriculum for secondary education, with enrolment increasing six fold (Ghani 2000: 399). It is here that the objectives of this *internal* secularism were to influence external perceptions by other actors in the international system of development and modernity within the state.

It was during this time that secularism became increasingly present in the Egyptian and Iranian states and external influences such as foreign occupation and behaviours contributed to the formation of a secular consciousness. Its application in each state varied however, with stronger internal (governmental) voices advocating its implementation in Iran than in Egypt; subsequently giving rise to conceptualisations of internal and external secularism.

Whilst both states saw political resistance to foreign occupation, it was not necessarily directed against secularism, with both nationalist movements frequently opting for more secularised approaches to resistance as well as politics. Resulting from this were criticisms of groups and individuals for being Westernised. The apparently synonymous nature of secularism and Westernisation thus proved problematic in some areas due to perceptions that the result of secularism was the replacement of Islamic or national traditions with Western concepts. This perception becomes visible with specific reference to Iran and Reza Khan's modernisation project which saw enforced Western customs and clothing within the public sphere. This is not to refute its visibility within Egypt, rather it serves to highlight the vast disparities between the implementation styles within the two states. These potentially arise from divergences regarding foreign occupation, with the formally occupied state presenting a less authoritarian methodology for its implementation. In this context, Egyptian secularism emerges as the separation of religion and politics, whilst Iranian secularism presents itself as the separation of religion and the (public) state. In both instances however, secularism emerged as incompatible with these two states due to the model which was being utilised. This is not indicative of an incompatibility between Islam, MENA states and secularism; rather it indicates the incompatibility with the homogenised 'Western' model which is considered to be inclusive of democracy and modernisation. Consequently, the failure of secularism in these two states reflects the omission of cultural, historic and political differences and the superficial manner in which secularism was implemented.

The Egyptian experience, however, was more prolonged and this can be partially attributed to its colonial history. Moreover, the indecision of governments as well as between them resulted in a potentially inadvertent directionality becoming possible. In the Iranian case, the cyclical nature of the religious and secular state can be seen to have occurred as a response by a dissatisfied public. The overwhelming presence and absence of religious authorities in the state potentially affected its directionality, with both types of authorities emerging as equally restrictive.

In relation to Egypt and Iran, this chapter concludes by arguing that in these instances the overtly Western nature of this model of secularism is thus the reason for its failure, and secularism needs to be redefined and re-comprehended if it is to be successfully utilised in non-Western states. Moreover, initial engagements with these models reinforces the need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the secular model and identity of each state, developing more specific and comprehensive models for this era before tracing this identity forward and beginning to engage with the aforementioned fluctuations in religious identities. It also emphasises the complex nature of the relationship between Islam and secularism, how hierarchies of preference have impacted prominence in the public sphere, but also how they should not be considered antonymous, rather contextual religion and secularism need to be engaged with to ensure appropriate models are developed and utilised.

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