RE-POSITIONING THE FOLLOWER IN THE LEADER-FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIP:

A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

MARLENE MULLER

A thesis submitted to the University of Gloucestershire in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Business and Technology.

September 2019

Word count: 25 199

DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other education institution in the United Kingdom or overseas.

I declare that the text of the thesis is all my own work. The research, upon which this Ph.D. (by Publication) is based, was primarily conducted by the author, apart from three publications (publications no. 4, 5 and 7). Appendices 1-3 contain the written confirmation regarding the co-authors' contributions.

Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University.

Signed:

Date: September 2019

ABSTRACT

We are all shaped by our situations, culture and history that drive our thoughts, relationships and actions. This PhD serves as a reminder that *we* matter and that our *contexts* matter; and that both followers and leaders are inter-connected with their environments, and with each other.

This thesis follows a reflexive and constructivist approach when examining my corpus of published works. With the use of critical discourse analysis I position myself primarily as an outsider, studying the intertextualities of language and social interaction that frequently reveal the discourse of our social and political inequalities. My publications are situated within South Africa's public sphere, focusing on the situational-bound agential follower and the detached leader, as shaped by pseudoism and change. However, this thesis equally extrapolates the narrative to the workplace environment, creating relevance regarding our workplace experiences and leader-follower relationships.

This thesis' main aim is to re-position the followers within the leader-follower relationships, by re-connecting my publications with current theoretical trends, de-constructing (public) leadership theory and re-emphasising the importance of situations and followers. It provided a more balanced leader-follower relationship paradigm that necessitates effective participatory mechanisms, servant leaders and empowered followers when facing transitions and change. Leader-follower relationships were de-constructed to fit into the public sphere but also re-constructed for organisational purposes. This thesis also acknowledged that both the public and organisational spheres are at best imperfect and dysfunctional, resulting in negative outcomes especially when leaders are de-coupled from their own values and followers. Effective change management thus requires leaders to re-connect with values, laws and followers that will improve organisational citizenship and efficiencies. Nonetheless, change agents can position stakeholders in different contexts to strengthen accountability and good governance, thus moving away from pseudoism.

This thesis contributed to new knowledge by re-constructing the leader-member exchange theory in creating a *new* follower group, the '*in-betweeners'*. By developing a *follower relationship model* and *follower matrix* the importance of the followers is established. Serving as an interventionist instrument the *follower relationship model*

allows followers to assess their leaders and to re-position themselves towards them. By acknowledging the imperfectness of their leaders, followers can re-strategise, re-influence and re-gain access to resources and power. Leaders themselves can now re-focus on the *follower relationship model's* determinants (lawfulness, values, leadership and social self-defence agents) to ensure improved leader-follower relationships, collaboration, performance and inclusiveness.

This thesis finally reinforces the need to re-visit the neglected areas of followers, leader-follower relationships and contexts in order to avoid defiance, prejudice and patronage, as underscored by social self-defence.

Keywords: Leader-follower relationships, follower relationship model, follower matrix, social self-defence, 'in-betweeners', South Africa, pseudoism, change management.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This journey was a deeply personal reflection on my positionality, as juxtaposed against my love-hate relationship towards my homeland, South Africa. But I am grateful for this opportunity that was made possible by the following supporters:

1. To my best friend, Wayne: you made me to question my research purpose, challenging me to find a new significance in it all.
2. Our anonymous 2013 protester: your perception that 'our lives are not important, only our vote' motivated me to do something different, pushing me to this exact time and place.
3. Prof. Malcolm Prowle: you were willing to give me a chance when, so few were keen, and who never stopped supporting me. A supervisor anyone can hope for.
4. Prof. Philippa Ward: you volunteered to join the team when life threw us an unexpected dose of reality, guiding me into becoming skilled in 'pruning'.
5. My daughters, Lara and Rayna: you gave me the space to complete this thesis, honing your own housekeeping skills along the way… for better or worst.
6. Our two adopted cats, Yoda and Miso: thank you for not destroying my keyboard whilst purring against my computer screen.
7. My Dubai-based colleagues, specifically Helen and Esinath: you remain such ardent supporters of this thesis and me, always listening and guiding despite your own hectic schedules.
8. My bank manager: I think this financial arrangement was a win-win situation for both of us.
9. My co-authors, Nonhlanhla and Mandla: thank you for being such willing participants.

Some other 'supporters' that provided me with much valued assistance:

(1) My 2nd computer chair: you made being deskbound more bearable.
(2) My laptop and cloud accounts: thank you for not losing my data, making it accessible on any device.
(3) Mendeley: a godsend for any writer in so many ways. Full stop.

doi: 10.46289/LUNC5135

GLOSSARY OF CONCEPTS

Follower relationship model (FRM)	This model serves as an instrument which allows both leaders and followers to re-assess their relationships, as perceived through the lens of the agential follower.
Followers	They can be referred to as citizens, employees or subordinates that follow their leaders, or not.
In-betweeners	Those citizens or staff functioning on the periphery supporting the manager/ leader, but not having access to resources, privileges and consultations.
IN-group (I-G)	Also referred to as the insiders.
In-OUT-group (i-O-G)	They are referred to as the 'in-betweeners'. The -in- means that they support the leader but the capitalised OUT shows that they function on the periphery, neither benefiting nor contributing as much as the insiders. Eventually their frustrations push them to become SSD agents, or even to shift to the OUT-group.
Insiders	They are loyal and passive supporters, the inner circle of a leader/manager as linked to personal relationships and common values. They also have access to resources and power and overall benefiting more than other groups.
Organisation	Interchangeably referred to as either a company or a municipality, with the national government seen as the mega organisation.
OUT-group (O-G)	They are the outsiders (hence the capitalised OUT) followers or staff whom neither support nor identify with their leaders or managers.
Outsiders	These followers support other leaders than their immediate line managers or national leader. They can become SSD agents simply because their status quo remains the same and economic hardships increase.
Public Sphere	Loosely interpreted as the mega-organisation that serves as the primary environment in which leaders and citizens co-exist. Thus, our everyday living spaces are shaped by our leaders, environments, and socio-economic conditions, ultimately creating tension between the haves and have nots.
Social self-defence (SSD)	When a significant part of a desperate community (organisationally perceived as a sub-group) takes counter measures to secure their socio-economic well-being. SSD is survivalism at its worst and best to avoid at all costs.
Social self-defence (SSD) agents	They are the downtrodden and the marginalized desperate for change, especially since dialogue failed with the leadership. They can become agents of resistance, testing the legitimacy of leaders and structures. These social self-defence agents can belong in either the in-OUT-group or the OUT-group, ultimately evolving into violent protestors.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
ELMX	Economic exchange relationships
IDP	Integrated development programmes
I-G	IN-group
i-O-G	In-OUT-group
LFR	Leader-follower relationship
LFRs	Leader-follower relationships
FRM	Follower relationship model
LMX	Leader-member exchange
O-G	OUT-group
PhDP	PhD (by Publication)
Pres.	President
RLMX	Relative exchange relationships
SA	South Africa
SLMX	Social exchange relationships
SSD	Social self-defence
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDM	uThungulu district municipality

PROLOGUE

My thesis is about opposites where two seemingly disconnected pieces merge, managing to connect the disconnect. These two distinct sets of narratives are paradoxical in nature, representing both the public sphere and the private organisation: poles apart and yet similar. In the end, is it not what research should be about: creating meaning by pushing the disciplinary boundaries? A PhD (by Publication) certainly challenges the orthodox boundaries of doctorate research and this thesis was no exception. Challenging traditionalists and my own comfort zones became the new normal when reflecting on the past and re-connecting with the present. Admittedly, moving away from the public sphere to organisational studies was not planned at all, but it adds up. After all, our everyday situations cut across our private lives and workplaces, with our organisational situations influencing our behaviour both at work and at home. Our struggles or feelings of insignificance, as exacerbated by inequality and injustice, furthermore, connect the two distinct, yet interdependent, units of study: followers and leaders.

My own experiences with pseudo-engaged leaders placed me firmly within the outsider category of leader-follower relationships, occasionally feeling like an 'in-betweener', but hardly like a member of the inner circles. When pseudo-democracy furthermore entrenches deceptive leadership, robbing you and me from a better life, cynicism and defiance enter our everyday lives, shaping our actions towards those in power. Disillusioned by our leaders' empty promises and corrupt ethos we morph into social self-defence agents. How else do we push for change and relevance?

Hence, my desire to make the world a little bit less fraught and a bit more inclusive helped me to identify the key culprits that dominate our communities: deceptive leadership, dire situations and the marginalised followers. Reflecting on my research I realise that my positionalities connected me with the imperfect situations and relationships we all experience, whether we are outsiders or in-betweeners. The core stakeholders - leaders and followers - therefore formed the basis of my research, as embedded within the theoretical premises of agency and grievance theories. My research journey also mirrored paradoxical trajectories, originating within political science, gradually evolving into public administration and eventually coming to an end within organisational studies. And why not? Given that my own career path and lived-in situations as an outsider moulded my very own agential propensities, I finally found

significance with the creation of my follower relationship model that can be utilised within both the public and organisational domain.

This thesis therefore unashamedly reflects my voice, my position and my subjectivity: both as a researcher and follower. And with one aim only: to re-position us within our leader-follower relationships, especially when surrounded by dysfunctionalities, thus re-claiming our voice for a better future.

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF INSIGHT BOXES

CHAPTER 1 THE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF IT ALL

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is about me and you and our imperfect lives. About our existence that is shaped by leaders, politics and socio-economic contexts. When delving deeper you would also realise that this thesis primarily focuses on the forgotten and the marginalised, those caught up in everyday politics and transitions, expecting change but not necessarily experiencing it. Once pseudoism emerges we realise that both ineffective leadership and participatory mechanisms are the common threads, falsely strengthening the notion that we are important and of significance. And at this point the relevance of relationships, positionalities and situations become intertwined, bridging the divide between public and private, connecting us across spatiality and dogma.

On a personal level, my own positionality – past and current – felt like a disconnect of sorts. Until 2013. Realising that pseudo-engagement feeds our despair and cynicism towards our leaders, I tried to find a way to give voice to us and them. And so, my PhD journey inadvertently started: re-connecting with my research, as informed by my positionality, then and now.

This chapter provides the background into my journey as a researcher and a PhD student. By acknowledging the importance of context, it shows insight into my own positionality throughout the years, reflecting on both my research and those being researched. This chapter furthermore reflects on the rationale and objectives for this thesis by highlighting the significance of the followers, their different groupings and relationships to leaders. Subsequently, discussions on the methodological premises - reflexivity and critical discourse analysis - allow for greater understanding when connecting this thesis with my published works. Finally, this thesis' contributions to new knowledge are introduced in this chapter.

1.2 The start of my journey

'Our lives are not important, only our vote'
(South African protester, 2013).

My nineteen years of research and publishing caused limited impact within the broader South African communities I lived in. This feeling of insignificance was exacerbated by

a 2013 interviewee who claimed that 'our lives are not important, only our vote'. Why do South Africans feel this way? Why does our research and training fail to reach our leaders and communities, leaving citizens disillusioned? Unable to answer these questions I started to reflect on my own publications, trying to find meaning and relevance. It became clear that I have shifted from a position of general observation to one of empathy, narrowing my focus to the marginalised and disempowered. Thus, my personal search for relevance led to this moment, recognising that followers are neglected with their leaders dismissing them as naïve and needy. The followers' subsequent marginalisation lead to resistance, especially when the disillusioned, yet loyal followers, are ignored. And as much as leaders claim to represent their followers, pseudoism prevail. Pseudo-engagement, as entrenched in pseudo-democratic propensities, strengthen alienation, distrust and corruption. Hence, the primary rationale for this thesis is to ascertain whether followers' re-grouping and re-positioning can influence leader-follower relationships (LFR). Second, this thesis aims to create a more balanced leader-follower relationship paradigm, as based on inclusiveness and engagement.

My primary reason to embark on a doctoral journey was simple: to enable the followers[1] that can only occur through change that is both a bottom-up and top-down process. Had I not started my own doctoral journey I possibly would not have had the opportunity to expand on the concept of social self-defence (Insight 1.5; 2.2 and 2.18) that I created to rationalise the defiance followers shown towards their leaders (Insight 2.5), especially when marginalisation occurs. This resulted in the construction of a new follower group, the *'in-betweeners'*, also referred to as the in-OUT-group (Insight 1.4; 3.4; Figure 3.5 and Table 3.4). By designing a follower relationship model (Insight 1.1; 2.6; 3.1; 3.3; Figures 3.2; 3.3 and Tables 3.2 and 3.3), I did not only create a new way to assess *leader-follower relationships* but highlighted the importance of the followers (Figures 3.2; 3.3, Insight 2.13, 2.14 and Appendix 8). The model furthermore serves as an *interventionist instrument* by enhancing awareness within the leader-follower relationships. Moreover, the importance of socio-economic conditions and situations

[1] This thesis will use citizens, followers and employees interchangeably.

(Tables 2.2 and 3.2) are re-established, specifically the *followers' position* within the leader-follower dyad, as shown in the newly created follower matrix (Figure 3.5). This thesis therefore re-visits the neglected areas of followers, leader-follower relationships and contexts in order to move towards greater *inclusiveness, transparency* and *deliberative consultation* between leaders and followers. But, let us first explore the push factors that led me onto this journey.

First, I am sure we can all recall the first vote that we cast: the feeling of purpose, contributing to a future that befits our needs and desires. However, do we still vote, believing that it will make a difference? Or are we detached from it all, worsened by all the images of warmongering tweets, conflict, corruption and abuse of powers? Despite esteemed scholars (Hyslop, 2005; Booysen, 2007; Bond, 2012; Rotberg, 2014; Twala, 2014; Mkhize, 2015; Chipkin, 2016; Everatt, 2016) publishing on South African leadership, democracy and governance, significant change remained elusive. It became clear to me that neither academic research nor leadership rotation have succeeded in guaranteeing effective change and strengthening citizen participation. How do we respond to this? Do we, as researchers, simply keep on observing, or do we seek to change it (Crosby and Bryson, 2017)? When looking back over the years, I realised that my own research was overly focused on ticking-off the boxes, without truly acknowledging and empowering the researched. Questions on effective participation and leadership remained rhetorical, unable to tackle the agential propensities of the South African citizens, whether they are part of the IN-group or OUT-group. The identification and development of a new group, the in-OUT-group[2], was also absent.

The second push factor is the notion of a PhD, perceived as the 'pinnacle of academic study' (Peacock, 2017, p. 123) and boosting Universities' research profile, as necessitated by the changing needs in industry and governments (Francis *et al.*, 2009). Furthermore, a PhD is the ultimate accolade for anyone having a passion for knowledge creation, research and the resultant publications. Of course, careers can be accelerated, and reputations cemented in specific niche areas. But for me it is more

[2] Within the leader-follower category, the citizens/followers are divided into [IN] or [OUT] or [IN-out] groups

about accountability, fairness and equity; trying to empower the marginalised. I therefore needed to find a path that would suit me best, hence the development of my *follower relationship model* (Insight 1.1), de-constructing past publications whilst creating new knowledge.

Insight 1.1 The main aim of the follower relationship model

My *follower relationship model* (FRM) serves as an interventionist instrument, allowing followers to assess their leaders and re-position themselves within the leader-follower relationships. Leaders themselves can re-assess their own standing in order to accommodate more followers and ensuring greater success regarding collaboration, consultation, performance and inclusiveness. Subsequently, greater commitment and effective leadership can be achieved. More importantly, followers are re-educated on the imperfectness of their leaders, allowing them to strategise their goals and positions without losing track of their needs and goals. Additionally, by realising that they can change the narrative, followers can start to re-engage with and re-influence their leaders, ultimately re-gaining access to resources and power.

This re-direction will allow me to effectively contribute to both organisational studies and public leadership by adding more insight into the knowledgebase of leader-follower relations. Hence, the enrolment into a PhD (by Published Works) seemed a natural fit. I therefore started to re-focus on the citizens, examining the reasons for their despair, re-affirming that the immediate answers are found within South Africa's (SA) socio-political and economic context, as vocalised and observed within the leader-follower paradigm; and more specifically, follower engagement.

Insight 1.2 The public sphere's IN-group and OUT-group

The public sphere's IN-group and OUT-group**:** Political parties reflect the needs, priorities and demands of their respective constituents. Followers connect with the political parties' leaders since they share similar values, concerns and ideals. Thus, the leaders become the tangible face of their followers' expectations and demands. These followers are the IN-group, with those opposing regarded as the OUT-group.

For example: Party A has a solid base of support, the IN-group. Those not supporting Party A, are the OUT-group, following/supporting either another party (Party C), or not supporting any party at all. Effectively each political party thus has a leader and a follower-base, known as the 'loyalist' IN-group.

But what happens when a political party becomes the governing party? The ruling party (Party A) will retain its 'loyalist' IN-group but will also reluctantly gain the 'opposing' OUT-group (from Party C), that does not support the national party leader, but are obliged to follow his/her laws and decisions.

How does one apply the IN-group or OUT-group to organisations? Subordinates, or followers, identify with their managers in a similar manner: the IN-group is the managers' inner circle because they share similar values, educational background or simply like playing golf. Whereas the OUT-group does not identify with the manager's leadership style or values, thus excluded from the manager's IN-group (Insight 1.3).

My own career randomly shifted between these different groupings. As an early career academic, my own workplace positionality – as an outsider – allowed me to view

organisational processes and behaviour through an outsider lens, observing both the obvious *and* hidden dynamics and politics of my organisational space. Within a short period of time I became part of the IN-group, collectively steering my department towards greater significance, specifically within the local communities. It was simultaneously rewarding but superficial, as correlated with the larger national trends. Because, as much as policies pushed for change, successes remained elusive and politically tainted. Thus the public and organisational narrative and actions aligned with my professional disillusions' gradually nudged me away from the kitchen cabinet (Insight 1.3).

Insight 1.3 The organisation's IN-group and OUT-group

I refer to such an IN-group as the 'kitchen cabinet', a small group who has exclusive access to their boss' 'round table', gaining insiders' insight into their boss' plans and visions. They sometimes even dress like him/her, whom I call the 'munchkins', or in Austin Powers' words, *mini-me's*. They are seen by the outsiders as the privileged, even untouchable.

The OUT-group can be those who had an altercation with the boss, or newcomers, or simply perceived as siding with other leaders. A true technocrat would also pursue organisational goals rather than a relationship with one leader, staying neutral at all time. Such outsiders are treated with caution and/or contempt, dismissing the benefits such employees can add to a business unit. Will they go the extra mile for their leaders? No, that would be unheard of.

But is there only one group or the other? What about those who do support their leaders, and yet, are excluded from the inner circle, the IN-group? Are they of any significance? I therefore created a new 'in-betweeners' group, a sub-group of the IN-group who support their leaders although they do not share the same privileges and access as the insiders: the in-OUT-group. They are thus are part of the IN-group even though they remain 'out'-side of the inner circle (Figure 3.2). Within the public sphere, the in-OUT-group are the masses, voting for the ruling party although their loyalty decrease given that their living conditions remain the same with expectations mostly unmet.

Reminiscing, I realise that my own work experience has led to many periods where I was part of the in-OUT-group: acknowledged but not included. Such paradoxical trends created unmet expectations that finally changed my own [follower] behaviour and identity: moving from naïvely loyal to cynically distanced.

Insight 1.4 The in-OUT-group in the workplace

Organisationally, they are those who work as hard as possible, supporting their managers/leaders and yet receive hardly any recognition. True, not all want to be part of the 'kitchen cabinet' but motivational theories -such as Vroom's expectancy or Adam's equity theory - have shown us that disillusion steps in when fairness and rewards are absent. Thus, support for leaders dwindle, resulting in alienation and dissatisfaction.

Thus, at some stage our situational desperateness and discontent - publicly or organisationally - result in a shift in our behaviours and relationships. Hence, the creation of the social self-defence[3] (SSD) concept, defined as 'when a significant part of a desperate community takes counter measures as a last resort to secure their socio-economic well-being' (Publications 5-7). Subsequently SSD acknowledges that politics and leader-follower relationships, as combined with our socio-economic environments, are omnipresent that affect our lives and behaviours.

Insight 1.5 Social self-defence

Social self-defence (SSD) is everywhere on the *streets*, whether in Sudan, Hong Kong, France, or SA. Those belonging to both the OUT-group and in-OUT-group remain marginalised, with many facing a daily struggle to survive. Frustration and alienation towards leaders increase, as linked to their inabilities to curb corruption or ineffective governance. Subsequently, defiance and violence enter the political arena, as fuelled by survivalism and anger. Because at the end of the day - whether you are a parent, grandmother, or teenager- you will do anything to look after your own household. This is SSD.

How does SSD apply to *organisations*? Defiance towards leaders and their inner circle increase when hard work and commitment go unnoticed whilst the IN-group keeps on receiving benefits such as promotions, performance bonuses or training. The initial 'phase' of SSD among outsiders' is seen with the weakening of commitment, productivity and loyalty that result in absenteeism, laziness and/or presenteeism. Africans call this 'a go-slow movement', silently defying the status quo and unfair practices. Petty theft and fraud are the next steps in SSD. Why does it matter? Well, the leadership loses out on valuable input from the outsiders, ultimately weakening their support and success, allowing new leadership to enter. Make no mistake, some outsiders will also do anything to join the IN-group, substituting their own moral values for the sake of survivalism.

By ultimately utilising my FRM both leaders and followers, especially the in-OUT-group, can strengthen their voice, securing greater dialogue and connections with their leadership; as well as restoring their position within the leader-follower relationships. But, first a look into my own personal context that shows the link between my own positionality and research journey.

1.3 The researcher and the context

'We do not create meaning. We construct meaning'

[3] As discussed in publications 5-7.

(Crotty, 1998, p. 53).

Nelson Mandela (1994, p. 109) wrote in his book, *Long Walk to Freedom,* that South Africans are 'politicised from the moment of one's birth, whether one acknowledges it or not' (Publication 3, p. 29). Indeed, politics infiltrated our everyday lives, creating groups and positioning them against each other: Whites against Blacks, Christians against non-Christians, rich versus poor. In other words, positioning the us against the others. Personally, I never felt at ease with such labels, seeing myself as an outsider: living inside a community but not necessarily feeling part of the local rhetoric.

With the abolishment of apartheid, our lives were turned upside-down. The new SA was a nation trying to deal with its past, re-dressing the wrongs in a reconciliatory manner, feeding on both anxiety and optimism. This period of paradoxical turmoil questioned our very belief systems and positioned families and strangers against each other. Amidst it all, I started working at a highly disadvantaged rural University in the heart of Zululand. As a white female - stereotyped as privileged and prejudiced - I carved out a new life in a predominantly impoverished black community, where wealth was evasive, HIV/AIDS explicitly destructive and violence a daily occurrence. An outsider[4], belonging neither here nor there. The politics of academia and my external environment eventually infiltrated my own space, reducing my post-graduate studies to an 'awfulising' (Roberts, 2010, p. 3) experience, causing me to lose faith in further studies. Paradoxically, my place of work became both a place of success and ill-treatment, with my research providing me with a much-needed escape route.

Thus, my own socio-historical contexts shaped my research positionality, making me less neutral. After all, by perceiving research as a 'social activity' (Blaxter *et al.*, 2010, p. 14), neutrality becomes therefore less important, steering research to a place of truthfulness instead of neutrality. Espousing detachment (Wall, 2008) whilst experiencing the extremities of my environment - the intense levels of violence, as aggravated by poverty, HIV/AIDS, illiteracy and unemployment – was truly difficult. My whiteness added to this sense of outsider-ness, fully affecting my neutrality.

[4] Insiders and outsiders refer to IN-group and OUT-group respectively, typically used within LFR.

My research inevitably mirrored my disconnect especially when questioning the rigidness of the dominating doctrines. The fact that the South African research community favoured the epistemological framework of positivism - where the truth (Egbert and Sanden, 2014) was affirmed in a statistical manner, devoid of feelings, and unable to connect with the 'why' (Grix, 2010; Mertens, 2010; Silverman, 2013; Gilbert and Stoneman, 2016) - moulded me into believing that research is primarily quantitatively based. Moreover, the African Renaissance's notion of reclaiming our own African voice, independent from colonial influences, shaped the South African discourse. Living in a highly isolated and disadvantaged community I continued to follow the positivist dogma, unknowingly reinforcing my disconnect by failing to explore the 'why'. Subsequently, my own ontological premise - interpretivism - was only embraced when I left SA.

By re-locating to the UAE I started a new chapter, cementing my position as a true outsider. My research projects in Dubai made me feel like a beginner all over again: my lack of know-how was evident, specifically the absence of theoretical underpinnings and methodological discussions. From a distance I realised that the South African academia was neither overly concerned about 'other' philosophical approaches, nor did global journal rankings (such as the Chartered Association of Business Schools Ranking of Business Journals) make any difference to the validity of one's publications. Subsequently, double, blind peer-review practices were key to the recognition of our publications and research funding, firmly distancing us from the [Western] elitist platforms. And that was enough.

However, my foreign base notwithstanding, I remained reluctantly connected to SA, but now being moulded by the UAE's ability to secure development by harmonising western liberalism and Islam. Supervising South African Master's students allowed me to retain my African roots, indirectly nudging me towards the notion of obtaining a PhD. Having lived in the UAE for almost ten years strengthened my position within the OUT-group. My observing status, as both a researcher and citizen, has evolved and matured, allowing me to reflect on the recurring pathways and subsequent determinants of my publications.

My publication journey did not follow any specific research trajectory (Gennaro, 2015; Lavigne, 2017), with my publications (Appendices 10-16) seen as acts of randomness and limited focus, instead of a clear path towards the honing of my own research

identity (Lavigne, 2017). Yet, when looking back I realise that my own outsider position had a greater impact on my journey than I would have imagined. Feeling like an outsider shaped my narrative right from the start. By focussing on the broader public sphere's context and narrative I kept my distance, as detected in my initial publications. Nevertheless, despite connecting with the general national trends and situations, greater authenticity and personalised narratives were needed. It all came to fruition with the 2013 research that allowed me to pivot towards the real stories behind citizens' behaviour, as linked to SSD and LFR. I furthermore appreciated the impact the UAE had on me, realising that leadership does ultimately shape society and economic growth. And as much as my locality's restrictions limited my career options in political science, I found a new base in organisational studies and business management. The change in my own academic domain allowed me to create the *follower relationship model* (FRM), adamantly re-positioning myself within the field of business management.

Herein lies the challenge of my research and thesis: to connect the seemingly disconnect. How do I blend my research on citizen engagement and good governance with leadership and organisational studies? Is there any room for finding the connectivity? I believe there is. Situations, followers, leaders and politics are universal, irrespective of domain or academic stance. Connecting the not so obvious is indeed possible.

The PhD 'by Publication' (also known as PhD [by Published Works]) was introduced as early as 1960 (Peacock, 2017) with many other models (such as the Professional Doctorate and Practice-based Doctorate) challenging the traditional PhD suit (Robins and Kanowski, 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, a PhD by Publication (PhDP) allows universities to enhance their 'research profile and publication output', successfully disseminating research and increase funding, especially for Universities in the UK and Australia (Ibid). The choice of pursuing a PhDP did not come easily, after all, it is seen as 'an easy way out' (Niven and Grant, 2012) or 'a backdoor route for those who are incapable of earning a higher degree in the conventional way' (Willis, 2011, as cited in Peacock, 2017, p. 1). Additionally, mentors advise prospective students on following the traditional PhD pathway, since it is either the most familiar or the more acceptable (Francis *et al.*, 2009); with originality seen as the key criterion (Clarke and Lunt, 2014). Admittedly, the validity of these thoughts does resonate, but I believe that my 19 years

of research has finally found a platform that can showcase the connectivity and relevance of past research and set the scope for future research endeavours.

Nonetheless, I do regret for not planning my publishing track in a more meticulous and disciplined manner, although I also believe that the randomness of it gave me more confidence when embarking on my PhDP journey. I likewise needed to acknowledge that despite external events shaping (or derailing) my own paths (Gennaro, 2015), I did achieve an understanding of my own research voice, albeit in an ad hoc manner. A PhDP therefore provided me with an opportunity to highlight my own research journey as well as finding new ways through which followers and leaders can re-connect. Lastly, by embarking on this pathway my outsider-ness cemented my position, thus studying SA's leadership and their followers through a more distanced and nuanced lens.

1.4 Thesis methodology

This thesis follows a mid-range or second order theoretical premise because it neither explains the totality of events nor universal traits of LFRs. Since the thesis is grounded in relevant and specific literature, clearly defined constructs are identified with the FRM providing insight and explanations on the how and why these constructs are interrelated and interdependent; thus strengthening practical implications for both managers and followers. From a philosophical stance, I am thus positioning myself as a subjectivist researcher, primarily adhering to the epistemological principles of interpretivism, where I interpret the social world as 'culturally derived and historically situated' (Blaxter *et al.*, 2010, p. 61). As a proponent of qualitative research, I identified with my publications' research participants and co-authors, having an understanding into where they work and live (Creswell, 2007). Hence, when looking at Babbie and Mouton's (2001, p. 4) claim that 'research is about identifying a social problem, debate the challenges and propose possible answers' my research resonates with South Africa's socio-economic problems, as heavily influenced by our public leaders and value systems in order to provide an alternative approach to leader-follower dyads.

My reflexivist-outsider perspective therefore accommodates this thesis' multiple understandings and interpretations, carefully reflecting on how my 'own presence and positioning might influence research process and outcomes'(Finlay, 2006, p. 324).

1.4.1 The reflexivist

'The real is relational'

(Bourdieu, 1995, p. 6).

Planning a traditional PhD is different from a PhDP; instead of looking forward I now must reflect back whilst simultaneously re-constructing and re-assessing my publications. This process fits within the constructivist framework, described by Bryman and Bell (2003, p. 20) as an 'ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors … and in constant state of revision'. Crotty (1998, in Golafshani, 2003, p. 603) define constructivism as 'the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings … and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context'.

Egbert and Sanden (2014, p. 21) believe that constructivism - rejecting the objective truth - recognises that 'knowledge for each individual is viewed as a construction based on the individual's experiences' and 'with each person seeing the world differently and creates their own meanings from events' (Burr, 2003, p. 201). The construction of meaning, as underscored by our culture, is evident when Crotty (1998, p. 64) states that 'we are all born into a world of meaning. We enter a social milieu in which a system of intelligibility prevails. We inherit a system of significant symbols. For each of us, when we first see the world in [a] meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed upon us by our culture.'

Bourdieu's constructivist thoughts, as based within his conceptual triad of practice, habitus and social fields, shape this thesis' methodology. Warde (2004, as cited in Rawolle and Lingard, 2008, p. 730) recognises that Bourdieu's practices are comprised of three interconnected associations and perceived as (1) 'the carrying out of an activity; (2) the formal naming of an activity that gives it social organisation, points of harmonisation and boundaries; (3) is differentiated from theories about practice, and is circumscribed by shorter cycles of time that give it structure, limits and meaning'. Bourdieu saw these practices as 'public, subject to scrutiny by other agents and relational'. Bourdieu's habitus therefore provides a connection between 'agents and practices through 'systems of dispositions', which are bodily incorporations of social history and are transposable to different contexts' (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008, p. 731). Habitus therefore 'incorporates prejudices and expectations, based on past

experiences and adjusted in light of changing conditions' (O'Reilly, 2012, p. 522). Lastly, Bourdieu's social fields are located within the social environment where an assortment of social fields result in 'agents producing practices, [that] compete with one another and develop social capacities' (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008, p. 731).

These 'bundles of relations' (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008, p. 732) can furthermore be localised within social constructivism, seen as a 'very broad and multi-faceted perspective' (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2018, p. 29), since it 'acknowledges the impact of others around us and our social interactions with them, on our ways of discovering' (Egbert and Sanden, 2014, p. 22). According to Burr (2003, pp. 2-3) a social constructivist will strongly believe in taking a critical stance 'toward the taken-for-granted knowledge, acknowledging the historical and cultural specificity where knowledge is sustained by social processes and social action'. Thus, by applying reflexivity, I would be able to take a critical stance and acknowledge the interplay between knowledge, action and processes.

Reflexivity, seen by Pillow (2003) as a methodology, is understood as an 'attitude of attending systematically to the context of knowledge construction, especially to the effect of the researcher, at every step of the research process' (Malterud, 2001, p. 484). Researchers must therefore acknowledge that their power relations, biographies, and interpretations affect these processes of knowledge construction (O'Reilly, 2012).

Critical self-awareness and the acknowledgement of my own beliefs and knowledge (O'Gorman and MacIntosh, 2014) are essential criteria for this chosen journey. I am also cognisant that the researchers are 'inserted into a social field, with specific relationships of competition and power generating a habitus' between the researcher and the researched (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, as cited in Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2018, p. 10). Burr (2003) sees such positionality within the micro social constructionist discourse as subjects, shaped by discourse, and being manipulators of it. Bryman and Bell (2003, p. 529) furthermore ascribe 'cultural baggage, personal idiosyncrasies and implicit assumptions' of reality onto the reflexive researcher, aiming to delve deeper in order to see how these affect the research process. Ethically, by failing to admit my own 'bias and subjective distortion … reflection becomes an open-sesame to woolly-headedness, a never-never land where anything goes' (Schon, 1991 in Kressel, 1997, p. 147).

Reflexivity increases the attention to the researcher's subjectivity in the research process - a focus on how does who I am, who I have been, who I think I am, and how I feel affect data generation and analysis - that is, an acceptance and acknowledgment that 'how knowledge is acquired, organized, and interpreted is relevant to what the claims are' (Pillow, 2003, p. 176). Cunliffe (2003, p. 983-4) furthermore construes reflexivity as a 'crisis of truth', accepting the 'inherent instability of knowledge' as opposed to social sciences' implicit view of an absolute world. Pillow (2003) assigns four traits to reflexive researchers: (1) reflexivity as recognition of self; (2) reflexivity as recognition of other; (3) reflexivity as truth; and (4) reflexivity as transcendence. I therefore need to self-reflect the validity of my own position, admitting my own cultural intuition, especially since I can be viewed as a white ethnographer and/or experience folded subjectivity. Based on my own perceptions and experiences I believe that there is more than one truth, especially those of the 'unsung' ones, derived from the grassroots and related to the 'taken-for-granted assumptions' (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2018; Cunliffe, 2003). Theoretically, many systems, processes and policies claim to reflect a large section of a given society, but so many hidden truths are neglected, or the taken-for-granted knowledge is ignored. However, some (Pillow, 2003; Cunliffe, 2003) criticise reflexivity, questioning whether it produces better research, especially if self-reflexivity is seen, at best, as 'self-indulgent, narcissistic, and tiresome and at worst, undermining the conditions necessary for emancipatory research' (Pillow, 2003, p. 176).

Nonetheless, as a reflexive researcher, it is important to clarify where I will position myself - based on my own background and position - and in relation to those whose behaviour I wish to understand (Kressel, 1997; Malterud, 2001; Finlay, 2006). Recognising my own 'philosophical commitments and enacting their internal logic, simultaneously allowing criticisms to reveal their situated nature' (Cunliffe, 2003, p. 985) are equally imperative. I therefore need to consider Cunliffe's (2003, p. 991) building blocks 'that range from questioning my own intellectual suppositions to focusing on life and research as a process of becoming rather than already established truth'.

Post-apartheid South Africa is a nation full of paradoxes, as shaped by our history of oppression and liberation, continuously shaping our cultures, situations and behaviours. My own reflective lenses are equally paradoxical, struggling to balance the forces of neutrality and cynicism, as contextualised within my own outsider position. Bourdieu's systems of dispositions are therefore interpreted as the followers and their

roles as agents, aiming to transpose their wants across space and organisation. Thus our leader-follower relationships are part of Bourdieu's habitus, spanning across areas of prejudice and expectations, shaping the bundles of relations (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008) among the different groups. My interpretation of text and their inter-connectedness could be seen as manipulative, although the critical discourse analysis approach added balance and legitimacy to my own voice.

1.4.2 Critical discourse analysis

My reflexivity will be analysed through critical discourse analysis (CDA) by focusing on language as discourse (Jahedi *et al.*, 2014), and analysing social interaction to discern 'the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power' (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258). This will therefore convey how discourse can reveal social and political inequalities (O'Gorman and MacIntosh, 2014, p. 149).

As such, CDA is based on critical theory (Wodak and Meyer, 2014) and focuses on social practices that are 'tied to specific historical contexts and are the means by which existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served' (Janks, 1997, p. 329). The main purpose of CDA is thus to analyse 'structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control, as manifested in language' (Wodak, 1995 as cited in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448). Fairclough's (1989, 1995) model for CDA (Figure 1.1) therefore consists of three interrelated processes of analysis, as tied to three interrelated determinants of discourse (Janks, 1997; Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000).

Figure 1.1 Fairclough's dimension of discourse and discourse analysis



Source: Janks, 1997, p. 330.

The embedded boxes above emphasise the interrelatedness of these determinants as well as the intricacies of such interactions (Janks, 1997). It is evident that the complexities of social phenomena requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach (Wodak and Meyer, 2014), with CDA working in domains such as political discourse, ideologies, racism, economic and institutional discourse (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 450). Furthermore, CDA's basis of social theory situates discourse in society, as linked to Faucault's works on 'orders of discourse and power-knowledge' (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 451).

Fairclough's CDA aptly re-connects with South Africans' perceptions of their leaders, as well as the interplay between the numerous social factors within SA's macro environment. Critical theory (as applied in publications 6 and 7) suits the CDA premise given that it is 'directed at the totality of society and improves the understanding of society when integrating all the major social sciences in analyses' (Wodak and Meyer, 2014, p. 6).

Given that CDA focuses on analysing 'text and talk' by taking an 'explicit socio-political stance' (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 286) on 'interdisciplinary discourse' (Mogashoa, 2014, p. 102), the following techniques of Schneider (2013) were considered when applying Fairclough's three dimensions of describe, interpret and explain:

(1) Identify the context, as informed by social, historical and other major events.
(2) Clarify the positioning of the sources and language used during the 'production' processes.
(3) Determine whether the structure of texts was balanced.
(4) Identify discursive statements that connect with the intertextuality and interdisciplinary nature of the discourse.
(5) Interpret the data and its meaning, as based on my own positionality.

Insight 1.6 Steps taken to re-appraise

How did I execute the re-appraisal? By re-reading, I studied my publications countlessly, looking for commonalities among them, finding themes that will connect the *then* with the *now*. I simultaneously conducted extensive research, re-researching for updates and the latest trends in relevant journals and reports. Reading newspapers helped me to stay abreast with the latest events taking place in SA. I finally re-reflected on the new and the old, narrowing down my thoughts whilst determining the positionality of not only me, but the researched as well.

By re-categorising these steps within Fairclough's broader categories, I achieved reflexivity when retrospectively analysing my publications (Table 1.1. and Appendix 9). It is a challenge to re-appraise my publications, highlighting their commonalities whilst re-reflecting. Studying my own set of sources by re-reading, re-researching and re-reflecting are therefore essential. The example below (Table 1.1) shows the keywords

when focusing on Publication 3: *In church and government we trust*, as linked to the CDA's three dimensions of describe, interpret and explain.

Table 1.1 Applying CDA

DESCRIBE Identify context & statements	**INTERPRET** Balanced & meaning; Positionality	**EXPLAIN** intertextuality & interdisciplinary nature
Context 1. 1994-1996 2. Religious-political interconnection 3. Historically informed 4. Interrelationship between values and leadership	Texts: balanced & meaning 1. Primary data: Empirical study with quantitative survey strategy 2. Loubser: Apartheid bible 3. Theologian scholars like de Gruchy, Loubser, Villa-Vicencio, Jordaan, Boesak	Intertextuality 1. Theopolitics: continual interrelationship between government and church. 2. Trust, leadership and values are related to political parties, churches and gov. a. key issues dominate: death sentence, abortion, homosexuality, land redistribution
Statements (1) Villa-Vicencio: p.131 (2) Solomon (reconnect ubuntu > intrinsic): p. 131. (3) Mandela, p.129	Positionality 1. Personal level I re-connect with religiosity of society, subjectively trying to fault with white churches and their support for oppressive regimes. Was surprised at level of Christianity found among the 'others'. 2. Could retain outsider position given that it was a quantitative study; also *safe* since topic remains contentious at best	Interdisciplinary nature 1. Religious studies; political science, public administration

Through the utilisation of CDA (Table 1.1) I retrospectively and systematically analysed the publications whilst reflexively re-constructing the key themes and pathways (Insight 1.6). By means of Schneider's techniques I could report, reason and relate (Ryan and Ryan, 2012) to the different sources of text, as well as consistently connecting with Fairclough's processing dimensions. Processing my publications was based upon the availability of texts as found in secondary (newspaper articles, government reports, books) and primary sources (2004 and 2013 data sets) that subsequently allowed me to re-construct and synthesise my publications, as discussed in chapter 3.

1.4.3 Publications' methodology

...many arrows, loosed ways,
Fly to one mark...
(William Shakespeare, Henry V).

As a novice researcher my methodological research journey was emulated by the externalities that affected my positionality and research approaches. Having had no mentor I found it intimidating to publish, thinking that only the experienced can succeed. With my own limited knowledge on publication requirements I relied on conferencing to kickstart my aspirations.

But I felt disconnected with the (elitist) political science community. Whereas, the public administration community allowed me to find my own rhythm and style. My initial publications were desktop based, void of any in-depth analysis or theoretical premise. Methodological substance was not seen as a major must-have, resonating with the Africanist's growing disregard for science. This suited me well since I never could connect with the abstracts of research philosophies or statistical analyses. Provided publications were double peer reviewed one could publish and obtain funding. The remoteness of my surroundings – having had no access to internet and my environment too dangerous to immerse myself into fieldwork – I had no choice but to extract different information from the same data sets, manipulating the narrative to suit the audience. And it worked. Within a short space of 3 years I published 9 double peer reviewed articles, served on 2 editorial boards and delivered 16 conference papers.

Unfortunately, my working conditions deteriorated despite winning awards and successfully completing empowering projects. My professional life became a paradoxical struggle between the forces of empowerment and extreme bullying, ultimately nullifying my sense of achievements. Moreover, after years of prolific research one could not find my publications anywhere. Hence, the increasing sense of insignificance.

Having moved to the UAE, this created the much-needed distance from my country and its people. In order to reconnect with myself I distanced myself from colleagues, old and new. A sense of loss and detachment prevailed, and coupled with the unfamiliarity of a new country, survivalism kicked in. I now realise that expatriates are all outsiders, which eventually helped me to re-connect with research projects, although avoiding any African projects. Co-authoring and mentors helped me to re-energise my research activities, guiding me into applying more robust research. And although the Chartered Association of Business Schools Ranking of Business Journals was used as the holy grail in measuring the quality of publications, I failed to connect with their platforms, simply

because the Africanist inside me will always revolt against such elitist establishments. Moreover, working for an international branch campus exempted me from following Higher Education's Research Excellence Framework (REF) routes. Nevertheless, by 2013 I started to publish again and paying more attention to theories and methodological premises. But I do miss the support system found in my home country, especially since it affected my research plans when working in highly volatile environments.

The seven publications (Table 1.2) that I choose for this PhD provide an 'exegesis that give an account of the collection and the research that informed the production of the articles, working towards a sense of doctoralness' (Niven and Grant, 2012, p. 107). Subsequently, in an effort to provide the essential coherency required for this PhD it is important to avoid 'a poorly written and badly organised piece [that] may leave examiners confused, baffled and puzzled' (Peacock, 2017, p. 127). I thus need 'to ensure that [my] arguments flow logically and the reader is lead seamlessly through the doctoral dissertation' (Peacock, 2017, p. 128), even when imperfect. These publications were published over a period of twelve years and represent different approaches and time frames, as contextualised within SA's macro-environment. Furthermore, my first two publications were archival-desktop based since I had limited access to the local stakeholders and saw myself as an outsider - white, female, English and a-political. I chose my second publication as the starting point for this thesis since it served me well in grasping the needs of my own communities, as well as creating my own voice and research identity. My publications therefore predominantly focused on the local nuances of my own microenvironment, the uThungulu Municipal district (UMD), eventually resonating with other communities too.

Table 1.2 Summary of publications

	DATE	TITLE	AUTHOR[S]	SOURCE	METHODOLOGY
1	2006	The good, the bad and the ugly: improving service delivery by replacing bad governance with goodness.	Muller, M.	Journal of Public Administration, conference proceedings, pp. 223-236.	Conceptual paper based on archival research.
2	2008	Good Governance and Ubuntu as prerequisites for poverty alleviation in	Muller, M.	Indilinga, African Journal Of Indigenous	Conceptual paper with quantitative survey

	DATE	TITLE	AUTHOR[S]	SOURCE	METHODOLOGY
		South Africa: a case study of uThungulu District Municipality, Rural Northern Natal.		Knowledge Systems, 7(2), pp. 198-210.	strategies: 195 questionnaires.
3	**2008**	In Church and Government we trust: the politics of religion in secular Post-Apartheid South Africa.	Muller, M.	International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 3(9), pp. 129-135.	Empirical study with quantitative survey strategy: 89 questionnaires.
4	**2008**	The Amakhosi – Councillors' Interface: the need for multi-directional capacity building and accommodation.	Muller, M. and Zulu, N.M.C.	Journal of Public Administration, 43(3.1), pp. 285-293.	Empirical case study based on Interpretivist philosophy.
5	**2013**	Poverty alleviation through social self-defence: a new political discourse?	Muller, M. and Mkhize, M.L.	2nd International Conference on Emerging Research Paradigms in Business and Social Sciences, pp. 174-201.	Empirical study with qualitative survey strategy: 45 semi-structured interviews.
6	**2016**	Social Self-Defence: Where Grievances, Opportunities and Protests Collide.	Muller, M. and Mkhize, M.L.	World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 12(4), pp. 433-456.	Empirical study with qualitative survey strategy: 45 semi-structured interviews.
7	**2017**	Democracy's embedded paradoxes: are violent protests the new discourse?	Muller, M.	Protests: Past, Present and Future, New York: pp. 47-75.	Conceptual reflexive paper based on past research.

As shown in Table 1.2, I was the principal researcher although publications no. 4, 5 and 6, were co-written by fellow researchers. Appendices 1-3 contain the written confirmation regarding the co-authors' contributions. I felt that these seven publications were the most connected with each other, showing the trajectory of my own research that finally culminated in my *follower relationship model* and *follower matrix* (Figures 3.4 and 3.5 respectively). These published works were not pre-planned with the aim of obtaining a PhD, although their diverse trajectories finally resulted in the creation of the FRM, subsequently providing an original contribution to knowledge.

The main aim of this thesis is therefore to ascertain whether citizens[5] can be re-positioned within the leader-follower relationship. By retrospectively reflecting on my publications' contexts this thesis

(1) Determines the inter-relationship that exists between the contexts, followers and leader-follower behaviours.
(2) Ascertains the relevance of the 'in-betweeners' (in-OUT-group), as informed by pseudo-engagement and imperfect leader-follower relationships.
(3) Identifies the correlations between public sphere and workplace environments.

This PhD does not follow a traditionally structured thesis given that the content has already been in the public domain since 2006. The subsequent outline of the thesis is as follow:

Chapter 1 introduces my own personal research journey and positionality when reflecting on my publications. It furthermore reflects on my evolving philosophical stance and methodological approach.

Chapter 2 focuses on the re-appraisal of literature in order to re-position this thesis' publications with current trends. It also shows the underpinning constructs that shape leader-follower relationships, the causal underbelly and relationship determinants, as perceived by the situated followers and influenced by imperfect situations.

Chapter 3 re-constructs the under-researched areas of the follower, specifically referring to my *follower matrix* and *follower relationship model*. This chapter also re-visits and reflects on my seven publications, as underpinned by critical discourse analysis. It finally concludes by elaborating on this thesis' knowledge contributions, its inter-relatedness with organisational studies and the possibilities of future research.

Finally, by re-constructing my publications in both a reflexive and retrospective manner, this thesis will affirm that *all the many arrows indeed fly to one mark*.

1.5 Summary

We are all shaped by the organisations -whether micro or mega - we live and work in, as moulded by politics and socio-economic contexts. Imperfect at best. Despite us trying

[5] Eventually referred to as followers, as discussed in publication no. 7.

to dismiss the interrelatedness between these factors, they are undeniably significant influences in directing our leaders and followers. Additionally, identifying with others give us meaning, a sense of community. However, when marginalisation occurs, resistance can be triggered, affecting leader-follower relationships and organisations. By giving the followers greater prominence it is hoped that relationships can improve between leaders and followers.

Chapter 1 provided a brief rationale on how this doctoral journey connects with our frustrations and hopes. More so, my thoughts, challenges and successes that led to this moment were highlighted, ultimately presenting my own positionality. It also provided insights into my own research journey and the foci of my publications: the followers. The under-researched follower re-gain prominence when I applied reflexivity whilst re-appraising my publications. By re-constructing my publications I created new concepts and developed a *follower relationship model*, ultimately aiming to empower the voice of the neglected and marginalised follower.

This chapter furthermore dealt with the methodology that I utilised when re-appraising my publications. Critical discourse analysis, as coupled with constructivism and reflexivity, provide the much-needed platforms when executing such re-appraisals. CDA aptly focuses on the interrelatedness of language, relationships and power, acknowledging the importance of history and social relations. Constructivism furthermore shows that our habitus and social fields affect our relationships. Whereas reflexivity allows greater understanding regarding the positionality of both the researched and researcher, specifically adding credibility and clarity pertaining my own fluctuating positions as an outsider. Thus, by completing this PhDP I hope that the 'insignificance of it all' diminishes, moving towards greater significance.

The following chapter de-constructs my publications in order to arrive at the three main themes that will form the basis of this thesis: state of the nation, governance and leader-follower dyad, as underpinned by the causal underbelly and relationship determinants.

CHAPTER 2 MY RESEARCH JOURNEY: LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD

2.1 Introduction

To make sense of the observable is difficult. Deeper reflection on the *why* is required, especially when grand theories fail to move beyond the generalisation of phenomena, thus neglecting to connect the different constructs and causes that inform our actions. Granted, not all of us are comfortable in probing deep enough to arrive at the underpinning causes. I am one of those that avoid discussing causalities, assigning my heritage, culture and positionalities as the core reasons. Sometimes it is simply easier to conform to the larger rhetoric, than to stand up for our values or those of a marginalised group. But I can no longer claim such superficiality.

Over the years my positionality influenced my voice and behaviour. Battling to overcome (personal) stereotyping and gendered prejudice, I gradually allowed my voice to be heard, especially for the vulnerable. Empowerment endeavours helped in forging a new narrative for myself and my colleagues. Ironically, I am also a neutralist, who avoids calling out the core causes of our problems, citing my own security and allegations of implicit biasness as the main explanations. I finally found the courage to pinpoint the causes of our own behaviours whilst writing this thesis, albeit remaining reluctant to share it with others.

And I guess this is what this chapter is all about. Reflecting on our past whilst looking forward, moving towards a better future. In order to do that one needs to acknowledge that (a) we live in a complex, inter-dependent society that are informed by our contexts and leaders (Figure 2.1, 2.3 and Table 2.1); (b) patronage, prejudice and defiance (Figure 2.3) are the core causes that influence much of our relationships and behaviours; (c) our adherence to laws, values and leadership determine our relationships and transform us into social self-defence agents, or not (Figure 3.3, Tables 2.2 and 3.2); (d) public and the private are intertwined with corresponding trends and behaviours (Figure 3.8). Thus, by simultaneously looking back on my research and re-connecting with current theoretical trends and events, I can start to create a new discourse and move forward.

This chapter therefore retrospectively reflect on my publications, probing in order to find the connection between the causes and the different constructs that shape our behaviours and relationships. The narrative of this chapter is furthermore

contextualised within South Africa's public sphere that is, for the purpose of this thesis, interpreted as the mega-organisation that serves as the primary environment in which leaders and citizens co-exist (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The citizens-followers' positions (Appendix 8) within LFRs shape the formation of groups – the IN-group, OUT-group, and in-OUT-group (Figures 3.2, 3.5 and Tables 3.6 and 3.7) – that can be found in whichever domain. Nonetheless, organisational applications have been highlighted with the use of the insight boxes. This chapter also pays greater theoretical attention to the leader-follower dyad since it forms the crux of all the identified intertextualities. Lastly, chapter 2 will also expand on the darker side of leadership (Section 2.5.2), which ultimately results in the re-positioning of the follower (Section 3.3), as situated within my *follower relationship model* (Section 3.3.3).

2.2. Re-visiting the publications: theoretical premise and pathways

As a reflexivist it is important to acknowledge that there are several layers of truth, as linked to my identified themes, causes and determinants. By undertaking the critical discourse analysis (CDA) when analysing the 'text and talk' (Section 1.4.2), I attain 'distance from the data, embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2017, p. 87). Moreover, if I was to take an aerial view of my research track, or as Gennaro (2015, p. 286) calls it, 'a Google map of your research', I realise that the inter-connections are clear, as evident in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The google map of my research journey and its three pathways



When re-reading my publications one notices that they are juxtaposed against theories such as participatory democracy and leadership, and (in)directly underpinned by agency and grievances theories (Table 2.1). However, in order to arrive at the *why* that informs my FRM, greater effort was needed in dissecting the text and its inter-textualities.

Figure 2.2 Applying critical discourse analysis



Clarification and contextualisation therefore occurred after I summarised and synthesised the publications (Tables 1.2, 2.1 and 3.1). By reflecting on the areas that are similar and different, I clarified the various contexts and positioning of the participants (Section 3.2 and Appendix 9). The next step was to re-categorise the texts, starting within a broader context before narrowing down into the core areas. By finally placing the publications' discourse in the pre-determined areas, themes, causes and determinants were identified, as depicted in Figure 2.1.

The dominant themes (Table 2.1) such as good governance, service delivery, inequality, local government, protests, and values were identified and narrowed down into three pathways: the state of the nation, governance and the leader-follower dyad (Figure 2.1). These three pathways formed the overarching context in which our everyday lives occur, with the leader-followers dyad interpreted as the core of it all. Perhaps my own experiences made this more of a subjective observation given that much of my work-related problems arise from ineffective leadership that affected my own leader-follower relationships. Subsequently, the division of these pathways were based on the publications' texts and my positionalities, which resulted in my FRM.

Table 2.1 Selected publications' theories, context and pathways

	SHORTENED TITLE	CONTEXT and THEORY	PRIMARY PATHWAYS
1	The good, the bad and the ugly	**Context, 1999-2005:** SA overview **Theory:** Woller's theory of bureaucracy; participatory democracy, representative leadership	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** n/a
2	Good governance and Ubuntu	**Context, 1999-2006:** uThungulu district Municipality **Theory:** Ubuntu, participatory democracy, representative leadership and accountability	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** n/a
3	In church and government we trust	**Context, 1999- 2006:** SA overview **Theory:** theopolitics, participatory democracy, representative leadership	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** n/a
4	The Amakhosi-Councillors' interface	**Context, 1999-2006:** uMhlathuze Municipality **Theory:** democratically elected vs traditional leaders, training, effective leadership	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** n/a
5	Poverty alleviation through social self-defence	**Context, 2011-13:** Midvaal Municipal district **Theory:** political participation, participatory democracy, representative leadership	**State of the Nation:** Ineffective service delivery, inequality, protests, corruption, violent democracy **Governance:** Renewed commitment to economic development, dysfunctional local government, detached values **LFR:** SSD
6	Social self-defence	**Context, 2011-13:** Midvaal Municipal district **Theory:** social identity, grievances and political opportunity structures, political trust	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** SSD
7	Democracy's embedded paradoxes	**Context, 1999 - 2017:** SA overview **Theory:** Leader-member exchange, agency and grievances, paradoxes, social identity, grievances and political opportunity structures	**State of the Nation:** service delivery, inequality, protests, elected leaders **Governance:** good governance, local government, values **LFR:** SSD and FRM

Understandably, there is always more than one truth, with my interpretations influenced by my positionalities that mirror my own experiences: my outsider status, career pathways and research methodology. Nonetheless, by applying CDA techniques and continuous self-reflection I obtained some distance.

2.3 Looking back: South Africa's trappings

The past is strapped to our backs.
We do not have to see it; we can always feel it.
(Mclaughlin, 1963, p. 85).

'South Africa's post-Apartheid landscape remains volatile with centuries of oppression and racial segregation firmly entrenching inequality and violence, negatively affecting our democratic ethos and economic prosperity' (Publication 7, p. 47). Our pathways are closely related to both our macro- and microenvironments, connecting SA's socio-economic, political and legal milieus, or as I collectively refer to them, the State of the Nation. These components are major *contextual influencers* for South Africans and their leaders, affecting our everyday lives and future hopes. They encompass key aspects of our nation, as built on the principles of human rights, freedoms, non-racialism, supremacy of the Constitution and universal adult suffrage (Republic of South Africa, 1996). *Politically*, it means to respect and strengthen our democratic mechanisms and governmental institutions that are closely connected to the legitimacy of the government, as affirmed by our electoral voices (Venter, 1998; Everatt, 2016). *Legally*, SA's Constitution serves as the fundamental law within which the government must operate, providing the indisputable checks-and-balances that guide our government, leaders and citizens. Perceived as a highly progressive Constitution (McKinley, 2010), it does protect the operationalisation of its guaranteed principles, as seen in the government's latest [illegal] land redistribution schemes. Additionally, laws such as the 'Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) states that municipalities should strengthen welfare and social development, fair representation, education, training and skills development' (Publication 4, p. 289), irrespective of leaders' political agendas.

Economically, despite being a 'middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of natural resources and well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors' (*The World Factbook*, 2017, p. 3), 'two economies persist: the first is an advanced, sophisticated economy, based on skilled labour, which is becoming more globally competitive. The second is a mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector' (Publication 1, p. 230). SA's GDP decreased with 0.7% during the first quarter of 2017 (Stats SA, 2017a, p. 1), with the economy moveing into recession by 2018 (Henderson,

2018; Ritchie, 2018). Unemployment, poverty, and inequality remain a challenge, especially since the poverty levels mostly affect 'children, black Africans, females, people from rural areas, and those with little or no education' (Stats SA, 2017b, p. 1). Furthermore, 'poverty symbolises the inability of individuals or communities to live a socially acceptable life as opposed to wealth that symbolises facilities and availability of adequate resources' (Publication 1, p. 225).

Archbishop Desmond Tutu coined the post-apartheid SA as a rainbow nation, aiming to unify people of different colour, race and tribe. Yet, our *social* fibre remains challenged (McKinley, 2010), plagued by inequality, racism, unemployment and HIV/AIDS. Of course our historical roots of colonialism and apartheid created our imbalanced landscape, but when one applies Ubuntu values such as 'solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, and collective unity' citizens can once again re-connect (Publication 2, p. 202).

Governance in itself implies many different interpretations, such as 'social self-governance', 'responsible economic governance' or 'political governance' (Liddle, 2007, p. 399). Irrespective of the different interpretations, 'good governance remains an important barometer on governments and can be best understood as a set of eight major characteristics: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability' (Publication 1, p. 225). This thesis will reduce its many variations by referring in general to the *policies, regulations* and *values* that shape our expectations and demands (Venter, 1998; Powell *et al.*, 2014). Policies and regulations provide parameters for both the governmental tiers and citizens, allowing proper functioning and adjustment, when needed (Van Niekerk *et al.*, 2001; Chikulo, 2013; Sithole and Mathonsi, 2015). *Values* shape our thoughts and actions (Kaase, 1999; Agle *et al.*, 2011; Bryson and Crosby, 2014; Koenane and Mangena, 2017); underscoring our perceptions of those around us (Grover, 2014). In SA, the values discussed in Insight 2.1 inform our leadership and government administrators alike; and assist society and managers in delivering 'public services and to confront a myriad of complex social problems' (Liddle, 2018, p. 661). Ideally, by re-introducing Ubuntu, 'corruption and selfishness can be reversed' (Publication 2, p. 207).

Insight 2.1 What are these values?

Faith-based values: justice, freedom, equality, and human dignity (Publication 3).

Universal rights: equality, dignity, freedom, security, freedom of religion and expression, and rights related to environment, housing, health, education, etc. (Chapter 2 of the SA Constitution).

Community-based ethos: Ubuntu's key tenets are 'compromise, helpfulness, trust, respect, unselfishness, sharing, community, social justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and caring for others' (Muller, 2015, p. 169).

Public values: social justice, sustainability, impartiality, transparency, obedience, efficiency, lawfulness, dedication, serviceability, responsiveness that depend on honesty, accountability, expertise and reliability (Gabel-Shemueli and Capell, 2013, p. 592).

Public service delivery values: Integrity, transparency, publicity, accountability, equity, non-discrimination, Quality, professionalism, reliability, general interest (Raga and Taylor, 2005, p. 25).

Admittedly, both state of the nation and governance (the first two layers in Figure 2.1) are not unique to studies that focus on nations, governing systems and/or local communities, but they remain important, nonetheless. However, the leader-follower dyad (third layer) is the core of this study, simply because leaders and followers are the key actors and influencers that shape our environment, being both inter-dependant and interrelated. Given that followers are usually treated as the passive subjects, this thesis acknowledges the importance of the followers within the LFRs by repositioning them within my FRM (Insight 1.1).

'A follower is seen as a person who acknowledges the focal leader as a continuing source of guidance and inspiration, regardless of whether there is any formal reporting relationships' (Publication 7, p. 53). Citizens, coined as followers can be grouped as part of their leaders' inner circle (IN-group); or not identifying at all with their leaders (OUT-group); or be the 'in-betweeners', the in-OUT-group (Figure 3.2). Followers identify with leaders based on shared values (Jackson and Johnson, 2012; Tee *et al.*, 2013; Epitropaki *et al.*, 2017), needs, political party affiliations and/or accessibility to sources of power (Mora and Ticlau, 2012; Orazi *et al.*, 2013). The leader-follower dyad therefore refers to the relationships that citizens have, or aspire to have, with their leaders. Leaders themselves are typically elected and operate within both macro-and microenvironments. These public leaders are to deliver on certain mandates, as associated with service delivery, political parties' manifestos and government programmes. Leaders are enigmas at best, perceived as either deceptive or authentic, effective or incompetent, ethical or not (Van Wart, 2003, 2013b; Chandler, 2009; Northouse, 2013; Koenane and Mangena, 2017). Subsequently, leaders influence our actions and re-actions, which can spiral into social self-defence (SSD). SSD's

implications are dual: it can either result in defiance or the abandonment of ethical values, as shown in Insight 2.2.

Insight 2.2 SSD's dual implications

SSD kicks in when change remains evasive. Followers, belonging to either the in-OUT-group or OUT-group, can subsequently disrupt their environments, especially if weak state mechanisms and leadership negatively affect their environments. However, SSD is not only limited to resistance. It can equally push followers to relinquish their own moral compass and join an unethical leader in order to survive. Either way, SSD is not ideal since it deviates from expected behaviour and disrupt at best.

What does it all mean? Ultimately, leaders and followers co-exist within their shared environments, shaped by the components of the three identified pathways: state of the nation, governance and leader-follower dyad. To claim otherwise is surely questionable. Subsequently, these pathways were sub-categorised into what I would call the 'causal underbelly', affirming the intertextualities between the actors and the contexts (Figure 2.3). The causal underbelly asserts that certain underlying links persisted over time and remain prominent with patronage, prejudice and defiance identified as fixtures, continuously affecting our public and private lives, irrespective of time and place. Additionally, they continue to shape LFRs, as well as my own discourse, admittedly less forthcoming in my publications. Hence the need to elaborate on the causal underbelly, as loosely contextualised within our own South African narratives.

'South Africa is now brandished a failed state, embedding violent democracy and racial economic inequality' (Publication 7, p. 48). For some it is a nation of distrust (Andreasson, 2006; Cuthbertson, 2008; Mottiar and Bond, 2012), whereas others see it as a land of hope, unity and opportunities. For me, the fundamental desires of South Africans stay constant: quality of life, equality and accessibility to resources. Given that SA experiences 'high levels of absolute and relative poverty … factors such as education, health, HIV/AIDS, and employment, disability and crime' become interrelated (Publication 2, p. 200). Thus, survivalism eventually evolves into SSD (Publications 5-7), as embraced by the in-OUT-group. Despite supporting their elected leaders, their economic struggles persist, with many still not having access to housing or employment (Adato *et al.*, 2006; Armstrong *et al.*, 2008; Bond, 2013; Omarjee, 2017; Mkokeli, 2018). Patronage and the corruption of state apparatus also remain (Petlane, 2009; Chipkin, 2013; Adeleke, 2017; Burke, 2018), even though the shape and magnitude of it all are varies (Raga and Taylor, 2005; Southall, 2008). Subsequently, cultures of defiance and/or protectionism stay strong, irrespective of group identity and political party affiliation (Alexander, 2010; Twala, 2014; Paret, 2015), although

heavily influenced by our socio-economic environment (Laderchi *et al.*, 2003; Seekings, 2007; Seekings and Kasper, 2015) and race (Publication 6).

Figure 2.3 South Africa's causal underbelly



As shown in Figure 2.3 the scale tips more towards the state of the nation's defiance and prejudice, primarily because I perceive them as the nexus of our discourse, resulting in imperfect LFRs and subsequent behaviours. These causalities are embedded in our historical and current narratives, with patronage perceived as a direct result of prejudice, whilst defiance retain its reactionary propensities. The following section is brief, neither capturing *all* the detailed nuances of the different actors and their contexts, nor emphasising the ultimate *scientific truth*, but rather what matters: 'the story and its beliefs that continue to inform the actions' (Alford and O'Flynn, 2009, p. 183). Of me, and them.

2.3.1 The causal underbelly of governance: patronage

Within a local context the 'lack of good governance can lead to councillors selling their discretionary powers with government officials contracting government business to themselves, friends and family members' (Publication 2, p. 201). Corruption is a global epidemic (Fritzen *et al.*, 2014) and takes on many forms such as 'bribery, patronage, nepotism, embezzlement, and influence peddling' (Twala, 2014, p. 164). Africa is well-known for its corrupt political systems and practices, which are firmly based on patronage and mutual expectations of reciprocity (Hyslop, 2005; Von Holdt, 2013; Twala, 2014; Beresford, 2015), replacing accountability with 'informal, deeply personalised patron-client networks' (Beresford, 2015, p. 226). SA was not spared,

changing into 'just another racially divided African kleptocracy' (Bullard, 2007, as cited in Southall 2008, p. 282), characterised by secrecy and patronage (Habtemichael and Cloete, 2010). This thesis will therefore refer to patronage as the key form of corruption and the main causal underbelly of governance, since it aptly connects with both leaders and followers in the public sphere. Corruption and patronage become the justified norm when large sections of the society battle to survive, resulting in leaders demanding unquestioned loyalty from their followers. Subsequently, the corrupt and loyalist followers are found within the IN-group, with the marginalised masses, the 'in-betweeners' - the in-OUT-group - excluded.

These 'new elites' [attachments] to different forms of social and cultural capital enhanced the high visibility of inequality and social exclusion' (Publication 1, p. 231). This current discourse therefore shows that 'SA's democracy is besieged from all directions' (Masenya, 2017, p. 147), with the state elite accused of 'careerism, personal enrichment and corruption' (Southall, 2008, p. 282), as underscored by neo-patrimonialism and political clientelism (Masenya, 2017, p. 147). Leaders now tend to blend the 'personal rule with the bureaucratic order, sometimes twist(ing) its logic, functions and output' (Lodge, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, the scarcity of resources results in intra-elite factionalism within the ANC, ultimately leading to the 'subordination of state, legal and constitutional institutions to the goals of personal and factional enrichment' (Von Holdt, 2013, p. 595). A 'moral economy' (Hyslop, 2005, p. 774) is subsequently replaced by 'a local moral order within the elite, legitimating this as an avenue for overcoming the constitutional and policy constraints of the democratic settlement in order to establish their own economic bases' (Von Holdt, 2013, p. 595). With the ascension of Jacob Zuma to the presidency, the personalisation of power has escalated (Lodge, 2014), firmly establishing 'gatekeeper politics, as well as traditionalist and ethnic sentiments' (Beresford, 2015, p. 226).

'Political connections and loyalty replace community participation' (Publication 5, p. 185), with clientelism occurring within the IN-group, 'rallying political support and in return the patron distributes public goods and resources' (Masenya, 2017, p. 148). Whilst clientelism seems to represent the voice of the followers, equal access to goods and services are not guaranteed resulting in the in-OUT-group's frustrations when not part of their leaders' inner circles. 'State responses to protests were brutal, criminalising the poor and disregarding a better life for all' (Publication 6, p. 444). Such silencing tactics

resonates with the darker side of leadership that shows a growing propensity to disrespect human rights (Everatt, 2016). Moreover, the ANC leadership is riddled with malpractice and corrupt leaders that result in the 'monetarisation of relationships' from within (Southall, 2008, p. 282), as well as crony capitalism and tenderpreneurship[6] (Masenya, 2017).

Insight 2.3 Patronage in the workplace

Popular terms used to describe patronage in the workplace are favouritism or nepotism. And I am sure many of us can relate to cases where a family member is appointed, or a friend receives a lucrative tender, typically side-stepping rules and procedures. Our managers are surrounded by like-minded friends and family members (cronies), praising their leader and supporting him/her unconditionally. Cronies, a familiar word used in SA, denote such unethical behaviour and corruption, whether found in the workplace or elsewhere.

The ANC's descent into patronage creates an endemic culture of short-cuts and entitlement that deprives its leadership of its moral compass (Tangri and Southall, 2008, p. 282), threatening the socio-economic fibre for generations to come. 'Are leaders becoming increasingly contradictory in their pledges and actions, blurring the public mandate with their own narcissistic propensities' (Publication 7, p. 52)? Hence, patronage still dominates our narrative, affecting our LFRs, especially for those who live at the periphery of the IN-group and yet being robbed from essential and sustainable benefits: the in-OUT-group. Nevertheless, the OUT-group experiences the same frustrations, albeit from a greater distance.

2.3.2 The state of the nation's causal underbelly: prejudice

SA is infamously known for its racist heritage where the 'complex interplay of identities – ethnic, social, gender, cultural, linguistic, political and class – informed our racist language and personal relationships'(Macdonald, 2015, p. 173). Nonetheless, under the banner of a rainbow nation SA strove for unity by focusing on 'a common non-racial South African national identity' (Seekings, 2008, p. 6). Nyawasha also perceives SA as a single nation, albeit 'imagined religiously, culturally, politically, or even in some instance, economically' (2016, p. 230). However, our discourse is firmly placed within a racialist narrative, with SA remaining a highly racialised society (Booysen, 1999;

[6] When one abuses one's political power in order to be awarded lucrative tenders for personal gain.

Southall, 2000; Conradie, 2016; Kynoch, 2016): an 'incontrovertible truth' (Taylor, 2012, as cited in Macdonald, 2015, p. 173). This was confirmed when President (Pres.) Mbeki's (1999-2008) classified SA as a racially divided, dualistic nation, comprised of the prosperous whites and poor blacks, re-affirming that the legacies of apartheid remain (Seekings, 2008; Nyawasha, 2016). The prevalence of our racist underbelly is thus acknowledged in this thesis, though reducing its discourse to the less obtrusive, yet omnipresent, prejudice.

Contemporary SA is now defined by 'Africanist racial solidarity and nostalgic recollections of patriarchal social order' (Abrahams, 2016, p. 105). Thus, racist rhetoric flourishes, especially when leaders use 'tactical racialism' to attract Black support (Macdonald, 2015, p. 146). Perpetuating such divisive racial identities are seen with official forms still making use of race categories, as well as the execution of racially inclined policies such as Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment (Giliomee *et al.*, 2001; Lipton, 2014; Macdonald, 2015). Thus, to embrace a non-racialist society seems 'blurrily aspirational' (Anciano, 2016, p. 196).

As much as there is a move towards a de-racialised society, some leaders cling to racist rhetoric by labelling opposing voices as racist stereotypes (Giliomee *et al.*, 2001). Within the workplace I encountered many such instances where professionalism was reduced to racism, exacerbated by additional stereotyping regarding gender bias. On a national platform, the same was observed when Pres. Mbeki blamed white racism for continued black impoverishment: 'Racist ideology has been used' he argues, 'to justify and promote the further entrenchment of the unacceptable reality' (Giliomee *et al.*, 2001, p. 163). The fear of being labelled as such thus devoid the South African narrative from free speech and accountability, embracing denialism in both our public and professional spaces.

Insight 2.4 Prejudice in the workplace

Prejudice starts with our own intrinsic sense of likes and dislikes, or stereotypes, that affect our behaviour, recruitment and development practices. Workplace bias and racism find theoretical footing in patriarchy, critical race theory and/or social identity theory that shape our subjectivity and subsequent discriminatory methods.

Unfortunately, prejudice is not only reduced to our skin colour, but to ethnicity and economic class too: including some, but excluding many more (Chipkin, 2016). Prejudice and racism therefore remain part of the narrative, infiltrating our actions, thoughts and leader-follower relationships.

2.3.3 The state of the nation's causal underbelly: defiance

The new SA was born out of protest (Bedasso and Obikili, 2016), violently resisting (Kynoch, 2016) the oppressive systems of colonialism and apartheid (Von Holdt, 2013). Our rich history therefore nurtured a protest culture (Alexander, 2010; Alexander and Pfaffe, 2014; Von Holdt, 2014; Paret, 2015; Duncan, 2016), with the citizens making their own townships ungovernable (Mottiar and Bond, 2012; Paret, 2015) and thus permanently embedding 'expressive acts that communicate grievances through disruption of societal arrangements' (Duncan, 2016, p. 1). By 2004, the post-apartheid government faced huge challenges, as linked to the 'poor or non-delivery of subsidised low-income housing, water, electricity and sanitation services' (Thomas, 2010, p. 27), aggravated by 'evictions, poor communication with communities, leadership, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and management' (Publication 5, p. 182) triggering the *rebellion of the poor* (Alexander, 2010). Thus, grassroots protests were 'against both the quality of service delivery and public representation of grassroots service delivery needs' (Publication 5, p. 182). Such *defiance* are now a daily occurrence and take place in 'wards that have higher unemployment rates and worse access to services than the average ward' (Publication 5, p. 182), citing 'public frustration at socio-economic inequalities; poor municipal service delivery; dysfunctionality in one-third of the country's municipalities; lingering racism; a 26.7% level of unemployment; and government misuse of public funds' (Rule, 2018, p. 144).

Subsequently, leaders continue their 'assault on the poor … [resulting in] more and more evictions, disconnections, and retrenchments' (Desai, 2002, p. 5). The relationship between violence and collective defiance is therefore nothing new (Paret, 2015) and inescapable (Runciman, 2016). By ignoring the plight of the poor, perceived as those belonging to the in-OUT-group or OUT-group, defiance is also applied by the leadership, depicting the poor as the undeserving (Everatt, 2008). Furthermore, 'violence has increasingly been deployed within party structures, as groups and individuals manoeuvre for advantage', setting the path for 'organised and patriotic gangsterism' (Kynoch, 2016, p. 70).

'Violence is the only language that our government understands. Look we have been submitting memos, but nothing was done. We became violent and our problems were immediately resolved. It is clear that violence is a solution to all problems' (Kynoch, 2016, p. 77). Yet, as a protest nation (Duncan, 2016), South Africans defy unresponsive

leadership in their fight for socio-economic security and well-being. When violence attains desirable outcomes, processes and structures do become less effective, thus creating a violent democracy (Von Holdt, 2013).

The rebellion of the poor therefore paves the way for the embeddedness of SSD, pushed by both the in-OUT and/or OUT-groups. Greed also permeates into our leadership, with party members fighting each other for greater access to resources. They thus de-couple themselves from their public mandates and set the tone for followers' behaviour towards each other. As much as SA moved away from oppressive systems, it seems the historical battle for resources and power, found prominence once more. Violence, defiance and protests are thus permanent fixtures of our landscape, impacting on all of us.

Insight 2.5 Defiance in the workplace

The typical term used to describe organisational defiance is deviant citizen behaviour, where staff deviate from normative organisational behaviour. Resistance in the SA workplace is infamously called 'go-slow' where staff can be at work but not doing any work or doing it 'too slow'. Organisational signs of defiance/resistance are absenteeism, presenteeism, resignations, whistleblowing and/or workplace violence.

The brief discussion on patronage, prejudice and defiance showcases the 'macrotopic relatedness, pluri-perspectivity, and argumentativity' of SA's discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2017, p. 91). Their positions were juxtaposed against SA's socio-economic problems that shape our power positions, leader-follower relationships and social action (Wodak, 2015). These intertextualities therefore serve as the main premise that informs the remainder of this chapter.

2.4 Moving forward: de-constructing the [not so] obvious

The creation of my *follower relationship model* allowed me to de-construct my publications and find alternative ways in re-assessing my own narratives. The model re-located the publications' commonalities within the broader context of the public sphere, as linked to both leaders and their followers. In order to re-position the follower, one first needs to understand the core determinants that influence followers within the leader-follower relationships. The macro-topical elements are now narrowed down to four common determinants and are addressed throughout my seven publications (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). These four determinants - lawfulness, values, SSD agents and leadership - are underscored by the causal underbelly and pathways, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.3.

Insight 2.6 Follower relationship model's four determinants

What do these determinants mean, especially in the workplace? *Lawfulness* refers to the fact that we abide by rules, procedure and laws, or not. Patronage (or cronyism) and corruption show a decline in our sense of lawfulness, moving to the opposing side of unethical behaviour. *Values* like integrity, honesty, transparency, inclusion, fairness, and equity shape organisational cultures and behaviours. *SSD agents* are those marginalised staff, excluded from consultations, career advancement opportunities and organisational care, resulting in frustration and organisational detachment. *Leadership* refers to our section head, line manager and CEO, shaping organisational culture and performances.

Table 2.2 reiterates the placing of these determinants within the broader pathways, indicating with a *capital* YES (notably discussed) or a *lower-case* yes (less evident) the degree to which these determinants are covered.

Table 2.2 Connecting the publications with FRM determinants

	SHORTENED TITLE	STATE OF THE NATION	GOVERNANCE	LEADER-FOLLOWER DYAD	
		Lawfulness	Values	Leadership	SSD Agents
1	The good, the bad and the ugly	YES	yes	YES	Yes
2	Good governance and Ubuntu	YES	YES	YES	NO
3	In church and government we trust	yes	YES	YES	YES
4	The Amakhosi – councillors' interface	YES	YES	YES	NO
5	Poverty alleviation through social self-defence	yes	YES	YES	YES
6	Social self-defence	YES	YES	YES	YES
7	Democracy's embedded paradoxes	YES	YES	YES	YES

Figure 2.4 furthermore visualises how these publications evolved into my FRM, ultimately adding pluri-perspectivity (Reisigl and Wodak, 2017) to the thesis' main aim.

Figure 2.4 My publications' interconnectedness and relationships



How did I arrive at these themes? Despite the government's successes, citizens continued to protest, mirroring their defiance and disillusionment. To determine the rationale for such defiance, SSD emerged. But again, the mere creation of a new concept proved insignificant. Realising that most leadership theories focus on leaders (and not followers), I re-examined the key reasons for followers' defiance. By piecing them together it showed that lawfulness, values, SSD agents and leadership (Table 2.2) indeed resonate with the followers. The basis of my FRM was therefore identified, ultimately aiming to re-position the followers within the LFRs, as constantly influenced by their environments and the causal underbelly. These determinants are significant, allowing both followers and leaders to identify with its paradoxical forces (Figure 3.2), as well as acknowledging that imperfect conditions and personalities affect outputs and LFRs (Figure 3.4). Moreover, these determinants show the different layers of truth, as based on my current positionality, specifically influenced by my distance and Middle Eastern environment that strictly adheres to laws, [religious] values and effective leadership. Lastly, it is important to note that the causal underbelly does not override these determinants but adds greater insight and intertextualities that ultimately inform my FRM.

2.4.1 Lawfulness

This thesis, and this section specifically, has no intention to replicate all the legal developments of the last couple of decades, but rather to re-connect with patronage

by primarily covering the opposing areas of lawfulness. As much as lawlessness becomes the default discussion point, it is also important to acknowledge that lawfulness is the idealistic opposing end and relationship determinant that is being pushed and pulled between a perfect or imperfect position (Figure 3.3).

SA's transition to democracy required a complete overhaul of its repressive laws and segregationist practices. As a constitutional democracy the constitution now serves as the highest law, as strengthened by an independent judiciary and watchdogs like the Constitutional Court, Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Public Protector (Venter, 1998; Deegan, 2011; Gumede, 2015). Our leadership perceive them as 'guardians of democracy with moral authority, that are placed above politics' (Gibson and Caldeira, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, in all the 'programmes and legislative frameworks of government, common threads such as accountability, transparency, participation and involvement' (Publication 1, p. 233) are noted.

However, the Freedom House[7] (2018) identified 'an overall decline in democratic governance as the country struggle[d] with increasing state corruption and ongoing efforts by the ruling ANC to control state institutions and the judiciary' (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2016). With the revolution betrayed, the neo-bourgeoisie is involved in 'scandalous enrichment and immoderate money making and plunges into the mire of corruption and pleasure' (Southall, 2014, pp. 333–334), threatening accountability and legitimacy (Lindberg, 2003).

Insight 2.7 Who are the most corrupt nations?

Transparency International ranks SA the 73rd most corrupt state (out of 180) with Afghanistan and Somalia being the most corrupt. Denmark and New Zealand are the two least corrupt states. Typical reasons for democratic states to be ranked so high are 'corruption and the absence of political accountability [that] tend to feed off each other' (Dudley, 2019, p. 3).

As shown in Appendix 4, an 'elaborate framework of policies, laws and mechanisms intended to ensure the integrity of public servants and politicians' in curbing corruption (Bruce, 2014, p. 50) and promoting good governance (Koenane and Mangena, 2017;

[7] A U.S. government-funded non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights (Freedom House, 2018).

Plessing, 2017). But they seem toothless since corruption - thus, unlawfulness - remains as widespread as ever (Fritzen *et al.*, 2014; Southall, 2016):

> *'In the fierce competition for access … law becomes a formidable weapon. For those who have transgressed, control holds the prospect of immunity. For those seeking the downfall of powerful rivals, control might tip the balance. The goal, then, is selective application of the law'* (Von Holdt, 2013, p. 595).

Insight 2.8 National leaders and corruption: Pres. Zuma under the spotlight

The election of Pres. Zuma, previously stripped from his vice-Presidency due to corruption charges, is a case in point. His close ties with businessmen resulted in a new phenomenon called *state capture* that saw many lucrative deals awarded to civil servants, family members and other (Zuma) loyalists; permanently cementing cronyism, patronage and personalised violence. At the time of his 2018 (forced) resignation he faced 783 charges of corruption (Vahed and Desai, 2017), as well as surviving seven votes of no confidence in Parliament. And yet, he remains a powerful political force.

Lipton (2014, p. 14) furthermore describes Zuma's secretive ways as the creation of a 'shadow state, abusing his powers not only against the opposition, but against his rivals' as well. The deployment of ANC patrons into public and private sector weakens accountability and the political will to combat patronage (Southall, 2008; Lodge, 2014; Mkhize, 2015; Bornman, 2018). The re-appointment of corrupt officials (Cotterill, 2017; Campbell, 2018; Mahlati, 2018) strengthens the notion that the new leadership corpse is 'self-interested and prone to pursue their self-interest through divisive alliances, benefits from government and party interventions, i.e. a misuse of public resources' (Chipkin, 2013, p. 220).

Insight 2.9 Lawlessness at work

According to the 'Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey (2018) South Africa's rate of reported 'economic crime at 77% is higher than the global average at 49%' (Anonymous, 2018, p. 2). Employee fraud and white-collar fraud steadily increase, despite zero-tolerance policies in the workplace.

Yet, despite high levels of corruption eroding social trust (Fritzen *et al.*, 2014) many citizens will continue to trust their leaders, especially when they can benefit from corruption (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003); ultimately weakening anti-corruption measures (Chipkin, 2013; Naidoo, 2013; Southall, 2014; Everatt, 2016). The inability of key role-players within the ANC, Courts and Parliament to curb corruption and poor leadership therefore reiterates that the ruling party is now 'inward-looking, self-seeking and self-preserving – as opposed to an outward, public-oriented focus on delivery' (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2016, p. 920). It therefore remains unclear whether SA leaders and their followers would want to re-capture their moral compass and commitment to lawfulness.

2.4.2 Values

The public sector has one core duty: to serve the public good (Pedersen, 2013; Liddle, 2018) with government playing an important role by guaranteeing such public values (Bryson and Crosby, 2014). Values form the crux of any society, connecting across socio-economic situations, racial boundaries and public or private spheres; affecting our attitudes and behaviours toward the social world (Graf *et al.*, 2011; Wijewardena *et al.*, 2014; Qu *et al.*, 2017). Accordingly, values are seen as the 'internal moral compass' (Gabel-Shemueli and Capell, 2013, p. 591) that can neither be dictated by government alone, nor reduced to personal relations only. Such a micro-ethic outlook need to expand and inform ethical behaviour, whether individual or institutional (Raga and Taylor, 2005).

The inclusion of the African moral theory of Ubuntu[8] in our Constitution (Metz and Gaie, 2010; Johnston, 2014) shows a commitment to this idealistic ethos (Table 4.3), as underscored by initiatives such as Batho Pele (meaning *people first*) that promote a spirit of *we belong, we care, we serve* (Raga and Taylor, 2005; Muxe, 2007; Le Pere, 2017). Such brotherliness and good neighbourliness correspond with our humanness by relating to others in a positive way (Metz and Gaie, 2010). Ubuntu's moral goodness (Koenane and Mangena, 2017) serves therefore as the antithesis to indifferent or narcissistic individuals, acting as a 'philosophical break from South Africa's colonial/apartheid past and an ideological vehicle for a revitalised (South) Africa' (McDonald, 2010, p. 139). Thus, citizens would be aware of the contingency of their individual and collective commitment' (Muxe, 2007, p. 94). However, given its roots in African philosophy, Ubuntu is also criticised for remaining too traditional in its outlook and thus (indirectly) supporting nepotism and affirmative action (Muller, 2015). Nonetheless, its ethical premise can inform leader-follower relationships as well as workplace operations and conduct.

[8] Ubuntu - 'umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu' - translates to 'a person is a person through other persons or 'I am because we are' (Muller, 2015, p. 169)

Table 2.3 Tenets of Ubuntu

Humanness	Warmth, tolerance, understanding, peace, humanity
Caring	Empathy, sympathy, helpfulness, charitable, friendliness
Sharing	Giving (unconditionally), redistribution, open handedness
Respect	Commitment, dignity, obedience, order and humility
Compassion	Love, cohesion, informality, forgiveness, spontaneity

Source: Muller, 2015, p. 169.

As much as 'traditional authorities were seen as guardians of the African values and customs', elected leaders and civil servants are equally to embrace the notion of caring and serving (Mawere, 2014, p. 3), effectively connecting the social and the political. Followers' moral identity lens can also act as 'a perceptual filter of leaders' honesty' (Grover, 2014, p. 49), although they tend to judge more according to political party affiliations and power positions, than ethics per se.

Insight 2.10 Values in the workplace

Employees' own personal values and moral compass shape their behaviour at work and how they relate to their leaders. Leaders' personal values like 'honesty and integrity, concern for others, fairness, and justice' therefore affect their 'perceptions of situations, organisational successes and play a role in their interpersonal relationships' (Russell, 2001, pp. 76–77). However, Ubuntu in the workplace remains absent despite its adherence to collective decision-making, servant leadership and applying integrity throughout all the processes. Unfortunately, when condoning nepotism and affirmative action, its acceptance into the workplace might not occur at all (Muller, 2015).

What happens when the ANC leaders exchange their humanistic philosophy of Ubuntu (Lipton, 2014; Koenane, 2017) for a 'mercenary, acquisitive spirit that promote patronage, arrogance, bureaucratic indifference and corruption within its ranks' (Mbeki, 2005, as cited in Southall, 2008, p. 296)? Many believe that the consequences are found in our poor leadership and service delivery track records (Hyslop, 2005; Booysen, 2007; Alexander, 2010; Lodge, 2013; Von Holdt, 2013), ultimately resulting in leaders no longer having any claims to their 'moral legitimacy' (Gumede, 2015, p. 338). Subsequently, political trust diminishes, as exacerbated by 'debt traps, ineffective tax bases and aloof councillors' (Publication 6, p. 442).

Measuring trust involves the [political] community, institutions and [political] actors that are ranked against democratic values such as freedoms, participation, tolerance, respect for institutions and the rule of law. Subsequently Askvik (2010, p. 25) distinguishes between 'identity-based (common group identity) and performance-based (institutional capability) trust in explaining patterns of popular trust in public

institutions in post-apartheid South Africa'. He also argues that performance-based trust will prevail in the long-run since socialisation memories and the 'liberation struggle card' narrative will fade. Critical citizenry is now starting to re-shape trust that in turn can re-strengthen the legitimacy of the leaders and institutions (Wale, 2013; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016).

Insight 2.11 Who do South Africans trust?

Trust is linked to South Africans' confidence in the impartiality and effectiveness of institutions, with the most trust shown towards 'religious institutions (67%), the Public Protector (64.4%) and the Constitutional Court (59.3%)' (Potgieter, 2017, p. 44).

Leaders are thus more effective when they accept not only the public's interest as their guide and inspiration, but also share similar values with their followers (Gallop, 2011; Grover, 2014). However, when they replace values such as social justice, lawfulness, serviceability and responsiveness with self-fulfilment and greed, they indirectly create a fertile ground for the emerging of SSD agents.

2.4.3 Social self-defence agents

'South Africa exhibits that most bitter of social outcomes: destitution amid plenty'
(Madisha, 2005, as cited in Andreasson, 2006, p. 303).

This section focuses on the interrelationship between economic and social factors that impact communities' quality of life, as underscored by theoretical underpinnings such as social identity, grievances and relative deprivation. 'Many studies have correlated these theories with political protests theories (Klandermans *et al.*, 2001; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Ginges and Atran, 2009; Dalton *et al.*, 2010), specifically since defending one's social self, as linked to basic human rights and social goods, becomes a necessity' (Publication 7, p. 51-2).

It is not within the scope of this study to extensively cover specifics regarding the social and the economic, or the 'emotionality versus the rationality' (Zafirovski, 1998, p. 166). But rather to show the connectivity between societal life and economic realities, by 'stressing the moral commitments in economic life where both morality and utility provide inherent and divergent satisfactions and fundamentally different sources of value' (Ibid). Hence, the intertextualities between the various macro-environmental factors are highlighted since they continuously shape the moral compass and developmental discourse of the new SA.

The South African society reflects a 'legacy of socially-engineered inequality' (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2016) that resulted in 'interracial economic inequality' (Gordon, 2018, p. 354) and 'income poverty' (Seekings, 2007, p. 4), which necessitate state intervention (Naidoo, 2011; De Jager and Steenekamp, 2016). After all, the 'alleged 2 million new jobs created by 2004 were mainly based in the informal sector, lacking security, regulation, and living wage or benefits. In other words, 'homemakers who help sustain themselves and their families out of backyard vegetable plots or who keep a chicken are part of the new employed class' (Publication 6, p. 442). The economic insecurity of South Africans developed into social (Adato *et al.*, 2006) and financial (Wentzel *et al.*, 2016) exclusion, subsequently cementing service delivery inequalities (Sartorius and Sartorius, 2016) and daily protests (Alexander, 2010; Gumede, 2015; Everatt, 2016). Thus, our new democracy has to ensure that social justice and redistribution of wealth occur that will warrant 'equal status, equal respect and social equality' for the historically disadvantaged (Gumede, 2015, p. 329).

Insight 2.12 Service delivery or re-distribution?

Are LFRs and SSD agents only defined by the quality of service delivery? Or is it more about the re-distribution of wealth and resources? There is no doubt that the underlying frustrations among the poor and marginalised are their lack of access to resources and wealth. As much as SA did try to redistribute wealth through programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), it was not enough. This thesis is not about the socialist ideology of equality and redistribution, but rather arguing that frustrations and anger are triggered by service delivery, since it symbolises everything that is not changing despite promises and funding. And it affects the followers' everyday life, reminding them of the unfairness of life, of uneven development and of leadership that robs them of a better future.

SA did initially succeed in the redistribution of wealth and resources, but underemployment (Khan, 2005, as cited in Von Holdt, 2013) and unemployment remain high at 27.2% (Trading Economics, 2018), with Moody's Investors Service credit rating currently hovering at one notch above junk (Gumede and Bartenstein, 2018). Hence, the high level of income inequality continue to infuse popular discontent that threatens social stability (Bedasso and Obikili, 2016). And as much as the racial divide have narrowed, one cannot avoid the fact that class politics have re-entered the post-apartheid landscape (Andreasson, 2006; Beresford, 2012). Seeking patronage from local elites is therefore hardly surprising.

Figure 2.5 A conceptual framework for service delivery inequality



Source: Sartorius and Sartorius, 2016, p. 3339.

Moreover, the inequality of service delivery - 'the provision of public activities, benefits or satisfactions to citizens that relates to the provision of public goods and services' - (Publication 5, p. 181) remain (Figure 2.5). Due to all the protests and service delivery backlogs, the 'Local Government Turnaround Strategy was established in 2009 to redress local government's financial and administrative troubles, but with no real success. This resulted in yet another [2014] attempt to improve local government with its Back To Basics: Serving Our Communities Better initiative' (Publication 6, p. 442). Nonetheless, 'two-thirds of our municipalities are classified as dysfunctional' (Publication 6), exacerbated by the culture of deploying cadres into prominent positions that strengthens corruption and ineffective municipal management practices (Sartorius and Sartorius, 2016). Based on my 2004 dataset 'almost 55% concurred that government misrepresents its citizens; 32% felt alienated from government (Publication 3, p. 131). Public leaders' poor track records are also 'compounded by [their] arrogant, incompetent and indifferent behaviour' (Twala, 2014, p. 164). Grievances, defined as the 'feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life such as living standards, employment, health care, human rights, and safety' (Klandermans *et al*. 2001:42) escalates when expectations remain unfulfilled (Publication 7, p. 52). Traditional platforms for voicing change have moved towards alternatives: activism (especially among the homeless and youth) and defiance (Oyedemi and Mahlatji, 2016). The escalations of protests, specifically emanating from 'shack settlements and townships rather than the better resourced suburbs' (Mottiar

and Bond, 2012, p. 310), are indicative that protests are primarily class-based and that blind loyalty is now replaced with confrontational insistence for a better future.

Hence, the emergence of SSD, defined as 'when a significant part of a desperate community takes counter measures as a last resort to secure their socio-economic well-being' (Publications 5-7). When public leaders ignore their followers, SSD agents take centre stage, willing to challenge their leaders whilst remaining committed to their democratic values (Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016). These agents are active and assertive (Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016; Koenane and Mangena, 2017) and experience the 'anxieties about the state of the social fabric and the increasingly fractious character of the polity' (Chipkin, 2016); a victim of systematic unfairness (Gumede, 2015, p. 336), disillusioned by unmet expectations (Duncan, 2016; Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016; Oyedemi and Mahlatji, 2016) and broken electoral promises (Oyedemi and Mahlatji, 2016).

Insight 2.13 Who are the social self-defence agents?

They are the working class, the massive population of the survivalists, the rural poor and the unemployed, who aspire to overcome their marginalisation and poverty. They are the activists and the frustrated, eager for change and desperate to move upwards to join the ranks of the black bourgeoisie and the associated state-based petty bourgeoisie (Von Holdt, 2013).

'The government is taking us for granted. It promised us a better life, but nothing is happening' (Interviewee 25, as cited in Publication 5, p. 191). Such sentiment, as coupled with their dire socio-economic circumstances, mould our agential citizens. SSD agents therefore become the 'instrument for ensuring a social contract with the people' (Twala, 2014, p. 162). Otherwise, exclusion, deprivation and violence become embedded (Allan and Heese, 2011; Aderemi and Mekoa, 2017).

Insight 2.14 Social self-defence agents in the workplace

These employees, being either part of the in-OUT-group or OUT-group, perceive to be subject to unfair treatment, whether it is favouritism or exclusion in general. Do they become desperate? Well, why not? Inflation increases but salaries remain stagnant; IN-group colleagues (perceived as unqualified or undeserving) are promoted, thus mocking career advancement, inclusion or social justice. Hence, an increase in any of the following: absenteeism, presenteeism, disobedience, resignations, whistleblowing, and/or workplace violence. After all, '(US) workplace violence accounted for 15 percent of all work-related fatal occupational injuries in 2015, with homicides escalating to 458 in 2017' (Heathfield, 2019, p. 1).

'When public leaders de-couple public intentions and values, their dyadic leader-follower relationships change' (Publication 7, p. 53). It is then important to restore trust between SSD agents and their leaders. The FRM can play an important interventionist role.

But let us first have a closer look into leadership in order to comprehend the complexities of our imperfect leader-follower relationships.

2.4.4 Leadership

As the world changes, so do the expectations of leadership
(Van Wart, 2013b, p. 523).

Leadership remains a contentious topic, a 'complex social phenomenon' (Liddle, 2010, p. 657), with clear-cut definitions subject to 'permanent' dispute (Albrecht, 2005; Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Iszatt-White and Saunders, 2014; Hughes *et al.*, 2015). Leadership is indeed a well-researched field, especially within the organisational context (Albrecht, 2005; Liddle, 2010; Gallop, 2011; Day *et al.*, 2014; Dinh *et al.*, 2014; Dionne *et al.*, 2014), with public leadership research substantially expanding since 2000 (Van Wart, 2003, 2013a; Albrecht, 2005; Kjaer, 2013). Then again, as a preamble to my FRM (Publication 7), public leadership, as linked with followership, is less forthcoming. Appendix 5 therefore shows a synthesised summary regarding the most recent studies' focus, albeit reduced to the remit of this thesis and not necessarily focusing on SA.

Both Northouse and Rowe (2007, as cited in Amanchukwu *et al.*, 2015, p. 6) described leadership as 'a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal', thus a 'social influence process' (Hollander, 1964, as cited in Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 9). Sullivan *et al.*, (2012, p. 42) acknowledges that leadership analyses remain focused on 'traits (personal characteristics), styles (behaviours) and contingencies (factors that influence effectiveness)'. Additional approaches to leadership range from motivational to servant and/or authentic leadership styles (Choi, 2007; Pekerti and Sendjaya, 2010; Sendjaya and Cooper, 2011; Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura, 2014; Men and Stacks, 2014; Cunha *et al.*, 2016). Thus, by being 'agents of change' (deVer, 2009, p. 4) leaders' effectiveness is closely related to the (social) context 'where patterns over time must be considered, accordingly becoming the collective incremental influence in and around the system' (Osborn *et al.*, 2002, p. 798).

Subsequently, public leadership's roles, values and styles are highly influenced by their contexts, resources and follower relations that result in leadership styles varying between either transactional, transformational, authentic and/or servant (Van Wart, 2013a; Rotberg, 2014; Hughes *et al.*, 2015; Althaus, 2016; Shim *et al.*, 2016). Moreover,

the public leadership domain can either be seen as 'political, organisational or community based' (Van Wart, 2013b, p. 536). Given that my publications have not specifically focussed on either administrative or community leadership, references to leadership have always been in the context of public leadership, as located in the field of public administration. The public leaders' description, as used in this thesis, are those

> *'democratically elected representatives who are vulnerable to de-selection, and operate within, as well as influence a constitutional and legal framework. They have permission to govern according to declared policies as set out in law, and extends to all citizens'* (Morrell and Hartley, 2006, p. 484).

However, 'responsiveness to national rather than sectoral or narrow party needs is exceedingly difficult in South Africa, challenging our expectations of our leadership' (Rotberg, 2014, p. 245). Nonetheless, as much as economic development strengthens democracy, it is equally true that political leadership makes it real.

Insight 2.15 The organisational leader

Organisationally, leaders are usually interpreted as the heads of a department, line managers and/or CEO's. Subjects or employees are automatically part of the leadership equation, executing their organisation's vision and line managers instructions. But the way managers relate to their subjects are indicative of an explicit leadership style and organisational culture that result in specific follower groups, eventually affecting productivity, goal achievements and employee well-being.

And herein lies the challenge for our leaders and their followers: can their interdependency allow for greater equity, fairness and (more) effective leadership; or will patronage, prejudice and defiance shape our future dyads?

2.5 The leader-follower relationship

'Without followers there are plainly no leaders'
(Hollander, 1993, as cited in Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 237).

Studies of leaders portray leadership as 'a phenomena embedded in the leader' (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 3), thus remaining too leader-centric (Van Knippenberg *et al.*, 2004; Yukl, 2013; Oc, 2018; Tse *et al.*, 2018), 'hierarchical, heroic, power-centric, and disconnected from ethical values' (Van Wart, 2013b, p. 534). And yet, as early as 1948, Stogdill opined that leadership can be conceptualised as a relationship, characterised as purposeful, active and working exchanges (Leach and Wilson, 2002; Pierce and Newstrom, 2011), inextricably linking followers and leaders on how they think, feel, and behave (Albrecht, 2005). Relationships between followers and leaders are

therefore omnipresent (Wang *et al.*, 2005; Oc, 2018), irrespective of leadership approach or context.

Leadership theories that acknowledged the importance of follower relationships developed in the 1970s. Theories such as situational, leader-member exchange and servant leadership drew attention to followers, albeit interpreting them as passive recipients of leader exchanges. But somehow leadership theories continued to focus on 'role, personality, behaviour, influence and guidance' (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 3), neglecting the key partner in any leadership relationship: the followers. As much as leadership theories such as servant, authentic, charismatic and transformational pay attention to followers, in-depth analyses regarding their influence on leaders are overlooked (Van Knippenberg *et al.*, 2004; Pierce and Newstrom, 2011).

Nonetheless, studies focusing on LFRs are increasing, focusing not only on the interaction between leaders and followers, but also the context within which such relationships occur (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Oc and Bashshur, 2013; Grover, 2014). Accordingly, relational leadership theory perceives the relationships between leaders and followers as co-created and mutually dependent (Grover, 2014) with Tse *et al.* (2018) assigning positive and negative affects to such social exchange relationships. Moreover, Murphy (1941, as cited in Pierce and Newstrom, 2011) and Oc (2018) draw attention to the situation, or context, of such LFRs, thus steering away from leadership studies that treat followers as dependent variables (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Grover, 2014). By framing relationships within the broader contexts, greater acknowledgement is given to the interrelationships that exist between leaders, followers and their situations.

LFRs are therefore 'complex and multidimensional, filled with perception, cognition, and actual behaviour, characterised by determinants such as identification, loyalty, possessiveness, affect, commitment and attachment, as informed by trust and fairness' (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 26). Such LFRs are typically seen as mutually beneficial with leaders providing a 'vision, direction, protection and security, whilst followers offer commitment, effort, cooperation, sacrifice, respect and obedience in return (Iszatt-White and Saunders, 2014, p. 107). Exchange relationships between leaders and followers occur (Yukl, 2013; Hughes *et al.*, 2015; Chiniara and Bentein, 2018; Tse *et al.*, 2018), with outcomes linked to 'trust, group cohesion, affection and group performance' (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 6).

In order to understand the premise of my FRM a closer look at the leader-member exchange theory is needed. This will not only connect with my publications, but also provide context, interconnectivity and theoretical underpinnings for my *follower relationship model*.

2.5.1 The leader-member exchange theory

The leader-member exchange theory (LMX) is primarily centred on the interactions between leaders and followers, perceived as a one-on-one dyad (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Wang *et al.*, 2005; Dulebohn *et al.*, 2012; Mazur, 2012; Chiniara and Bentein, 2018), with leaders specifically developing separate exchange relationships with each of their followers (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Dulebohn *et al.*, 2012; Mazur, 2012). Interactions between leaders and followers are typically evaluated in terms of high and low quality exchanges (Brimhall *et al.*, 2017; Chiniara and Bentein, 2018), as moulded by the level of leadership fairness and context-specifics. LFRs were initially characterised by a vertical dyad linkage between leaders and their trusted followers, known as the IN-group. Those members (or followers) that are excluded from the leader's inner-circle are categorised as the OUT-group, with relationships typically seen as transactional, distrustful, less influential and of a lower quality (Epitropaki and Martin, 2013; Yukl, 2013). Followers in high LMX relationships frequently interact with their leaders, have access to their leaders' resources (Davis and Gardner, 2004) and receive their leaders' 'support, confidence, encouragement and consideration' (Epitropaki and Martin, 2013, p. 303). Thus, high quality LMX IN-groups were more 'motivational, responsive and better treated than OUT-groups, with the latter perceived as short-term economic exchanges, ultimately receiving less benefits overall. These individual dyads do add an element of discrimination, defying values such as equality and fairness (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Chiniara and Bentein, 2018), omitting larger groups altogether (Howell and Shamir, 2005).

From 1992 onwards the vertical dyad approach started to evolve into a reciprocal social exchange between leaders and members (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Wang *et al.*, 2005; Tse *et al.*, 2018), changing the focus from 'differences within groups to dyads regardless of groups to the combination of dyads into groups and networks' (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995, p. 220). Thus, LMX changed from being rooted within role theory to being embedded within the social exchange domain (Dulebohn *et al.*, 2012), that emphasises

long term reciprocal relationships and based on diffused obligations. Such social exchange relationships (SLMX) are characterised by socio-economic aspects of exchange, experienced as a 'give and take' relationship, trusting that the partner will reciprocate in kind, thus high LMX (Kuvaas *et al.*, 2012).

Epitropaki and Martin (2013, p. 303) suggest that resources theory with its varied types of resources – money, goods, service, status, information, and affiliation – also act as exchange variables within the context of LMX. This stance correlates with Kuvaas *et al.* (2012, p. 756), who argue that the 'short-term economic exchange of behaviours' (ELMX) cannot be reduced to low LMX, but should be seen as carrying the same weight than social exchanges, i.e. two different constructs that are equally influential regarding LFR. Moreover, relative LMX (RLMX) succeeded in re-directing LFRs toward social contexts and groups, acknowledging that follower identity and affection are relatively related to the average LMX quality of other group members within the collective context (Tse *et al.*, 2012). Thus, when applying social comparison theory, Chiniara and Bentein (2018, p. 334) categorise such differentiated relationships as exchange quality differentiation (LMX differentiation) where followers naturally observe and make use of 'social comparison information' regarding the quality of treatment they receive. Subsequently, exchange theorists attribute varying LMX processes along a 'continuum of reciprocity that range from negative to balance to generalised, as described in terms of the equivalence, immediacy, and interests that are characteristic of a particular exchange relationship' (Davis and Gardner, 2004, p. 405).

Which leadership style is the most applicable with respect to LMX? Arguing against such thinking, Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) believe that different leadership styles apply to different types of dyads, as analysed on different levels. However, transactional and servant leadership are the most applicable to LMX, as related to Fiedler's contingency leadership style. Although Choi (2007) believes that democratic leadership is best associated with follower involvement and commitment; with Van Dierendonck *et al.* (2014) preferring transformational leadership over servant leadership when looking at the overall effectiveness of leaders. However, place leadership 'reinsert[s] questions of agency' by moving away from overly focusing on structural factors at the expense of understanding the human drives of change (Sotarauta and Beer, 2016, p. 211). Lastly, Epitropaki and Martin (2004) and Oc's (2018) studies on implicit leadership also

emphasises the importance of followers since their beliefs and assumptions regarding their leaders shape how they assess them (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Van Gils *et al.*, 2010; Hart, 2011; Stock and Özbek-Potthoff, 2014).

Nonetheless, the South African followers - perceived to be loyal, greedy, distrustful and/or alienated - are shaped by contexts, leadership and values. Their traits therefore shape their assumptions and behaviours, following either a path of defiance or compliance. Overall, leader-member exchange theory remains popular among scholars and leaders, as shown in Appendix 7. As a model it is highly descriptive and easy to relate to, especially since many of us have experienced differentiation where some groups receive more benefits than others. As such LMX validates our own personal experiences by focusing on the micro-level, as applicable across contexts. On the other hand it can serve as a warning to leaders when unfair practices emerge, nudging leaders to create many dyads but in a fair and equitable manner. Finally, LMX offers 'both description - the importance to acknowledge groups - and prescription where leaders should create positive relationships with all subordinates and provide new opportunities' (Northouse, 2013, pp. 170–171).

As much as positives are evident pertaining to LMX, some negatives are equally clear. LMX predominantly focuses on outcomes instead of antecedents (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011), especially since the multi-dimensionality of the antecedents challenges field studies (Mazur, 2012; Northouse, 2013). Additionally, LMX does not always pay attention to economic exchanges, retaining its untested descriptive stance (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011). Most importantly it reinforces the development of privileged groups and discrimination by creating IN and OUT groups. Contextual factors are not adequately addressed with questions remaining on how to measure the process since there are no uniform relationships (Northouse, 2013). Lastly, LMX fails to explain how LFRs are created (Iszatt-White and Saunders, 2014) and how to deal with the 'in-betweeners' (referred to as the in-OUT-group).

This is where this thesis steps up to fill the gap. For the simple reason that life's complexed imperfectness devoid followers their rightful place in LFRs. One cannot compartmentalise life in such clear-cut manners; and yet academia does. Exchanges and relationship are forged based on our intrinsic values and beliefs, as shaped by our environments and leadership. Thus by creating the 'in-betweeners' allow LMX to apply greater in-depth understanding of the relationships forged between followers and

leaders, and the influence the 'in-betweeners' (in-OUT-group) can have on everyday events. They are typically large in number (Figure 3.1) and can re-shape behaviour and policy directives. By acknowledging this group, prejudice and defiance will decline, establishing greater trust and commitment to shared values and principles.

My *follower relationship model*, as situated within LMX, thus recognises the importance of the in-OUT-group and that the imperfections of it all equally affect our LFRs, especially when executed under the banner of deception.

2.5.2 The darker side of leadership

What happens when LFRs occur in adverse conditions, moulded by deceptive, unethical leaders and imperfect environments, ultimately alienating followers and diminishing the public service ethos? Can relationships truly be simplified into either-or type of categories: the *in* versus the *out* group? Or do we stay firm in our belief that negative leadership is more a leader behavioural trait than leader*ship* (Schilling, 2009, p. 102), arguing that negative behaviours merely showcase the 'absence of effective leadership behaviour' (Einarsen *et al.*, 2007, p. 207)?

Schyns and Schilling (2013) claim that the area of destructive leadership remains 'unexplored or inconclusive, since much depends on the followers' perceptions on the leaders' behaviour; acknowledging that it is equally complicated to determine if destructive leaders' negative behaviours are intentional, or not. Again, such negative behaviour can be physical or non-physical, with the former seen as more destructive (Einarsen *et al.*, 2007). The potentially 'ugly side of leadership' (Naseer *et al.*, 2016, p. 14) is a reality; a frequent occurrence. Subsequently, Schyns and Schilling (2013, p. 139) describe 'destructive leader behaviour as voluntary acts which most would perceive as harmful and deviant towards followers and which can either be physical or verbal, active or passive, direct or indirect'. Theorists covering the dark side of leadership (Appendix 6) thus label negative leadership as *destructive*, (Einarsen *et al.*, 2007; Schilling, 2009; Aasland *et al.*, 2010; Thoroughgood *et al.*, 2012; Schyns and Schilling, 2013), *despotic* (Schilling, 2009; Schyns and Schilling, 2013; Naseer *et al.*, 2016) and *toxic* (Padilla *et al.*, 2007; Pelletier, 2012; Thoroughgood *et al.*, 2012; Yavaş, 2016). Moreover, authoritarian and despotic leaders act in an 'unethical, tyrannical and inauthentic' manner, resulting in Einarsen *et al.*'s (2007, p. 211) creation of three leadership styles namely 'tyrannical, derailed and supportive-disloyal'.

'Public leaders also tend to impose their pre-designed, party-directed planning programs, cementing the notions that the party is everything and the constituency is nothing, except during election times when it is required to vote for a specific party' (Publication 5, p. 179). Negative leadership performances can subsequently be placed on a continuum ranging from ineffective-incompetent to destructive-unethical with the latter including behaviours such as intimidation, manipulation, coercion and one-way communication, rather than persuasion, influence and commitment (Padilla *et al.*, 2007, p. 179). According to Yildiz (2018, p. 482) social exchange theory relates to LFR, where followers will continue to 'engage in relationships so long as expected rewards outweigh the expected social costs'. This correlates with social exchange relationships (SLMX) where South African followers continue to vote for their leaders, provided socio-economic expectations are met that can range from improved service delivery to economic upliftment.

Where do the followers fit in? Are their behaviours a response to their leaders or do they initiate responses? Do they have negative follower traits that one needs to consider? Five followership styles exist that are directly linked to the type of LFR and follower identification: 'alienated, conformist, pragmatist, passive, and exemplary' (Hughes *et al.*, 2015, p. 20). The exemplary follower is hard working, independent and appreciated by effective leaders, with alienated followers seen as being negative and adversarial (Ibid). Padilla *et al.*'s (2007) toxic triangle (Figure 2.5) shows not only the inter-relationship between leaders, followers and their conducive environments, but also the sub-groups that one can find within the LFR, as aligned with their 'social self that refers to *social categorisations of self and others*' (Publication 7, p. 51). They therefore assign charisma and narcissism to the destructive leaders, with the susceptible followers seen as either conformers or colluders, co-existing in a conducive environment (Padilla *et al.*, 2007). Apart from social exchange theory, researchers such as Thoroughgood (2012, p. 900) also utilised Barbuto's (2000) theory of follower compliance, which acknowledges that power and influence are relative with follower compliance based on their perceptions regarding leaders' behaviours, as triggered intentionally or unintentionally by leaders.

Figure 2.6 The toxic triangle



Source: Padilla et al., 2007, p. 180.

However, it is important to be mindful that followers act and re-act differently across economic, social, and cultural contexts (Thoroughgood *et al.*, 2012) and that no matter what, destructive leaders always act intentional (Wu *et al.*, 2018), involving a variety of behaviour (Aasland *et al.*, 2010).

Insight 2.16 Contextualising the toxic triangle

Public sphere: political parties' support base remained intact over the years, with followers supporting leaders according to party lines and electoral promises, with the masses known as sentimental and naïve supporters. Rationality is tainted by our historical and cultural settings that inevitably result in prejudice, defiance and patronage, as exploited and supported by deceptive leaders. A deceptive triangle.

Organisationally, new appointees' psychological contract is based on the ideal notions of a perfect organisation where leaders are accommodative and fair. However, deception, dishonesty and detachment create a conducive environment that result in disillusion and alienation: a toxic workplace in the making.

Leaders and followers thus co-exist in imperfect conditions, being imperfect themselves. The toxic triangle (Figure 2.6) furthermore shows that LFR remains relevant in today's imperfect society: on the one hand both the IN-group and leaders are shaped by the macro-environment[9] that forges destructive leaders and susceptible followers. On the other hand, the in-OUT and OUT-groups, as influenced by situations and socio-

[9] Referred to by this thesis as state of the nation and governance and underscored by patronage, defiance and prejudice.

economic conditions, subsequently merge into SSD agents, defying leaders in their quest for justice and quality of life. To a large extent, these destructive leaders and susceptible followers can dismiss the outsiders (in-OUT-group and OUT-group) altogether. This is not sustainable given that SA is now seen as a protest nation (Duncan, 2016) and veering towards a permanent violent democracy (Von Holdt, 2013, 2014). Hence the toxic triangle is very much applicable to both the SA context and LMX.

2.6 Re-visiting the under-researched: the situated follower

It becomes important to re-visit the under-researched followers and to re-position them within LMX especially when the situated follower determines a leader's effectiveness and level of influence towards them (Yukl, 2013). The followers' identity is subsequently strongly attached to their leader, community and/or both, which Kark *et al.* (2003) respectively refer to as the relational and/or collective self. Despite being heterogenous, 'experiencing limited trust and diverse needs (Emmett, 2000), community participation allows them to voice their self-expressed values' (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008, as cited in Publication 7, p. 51). Such references connect with social identity theory where the leaders and followers enact 'a particular social identity based on the social context in which they are operating' (Tee *et al.*, 2013, p. 903).

Self-categorisation theory (Publication 7) furthermore suggests that followers shape their identity by focusing not only on their own idiosyncrasies but relate it to their groups' attributes as well (Tee *et al.*, 2013, p. 903). As such, Scandura (1991, as cited in Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 28) links leader-follower relationships with the 'social comparison processes that operates within groups, as linked to fairness and the distribution of outcomes'. To focus on groups are important since they provide 'safety, resources and support' (Van Dierendonck *et al.*, 2014, p. 594), particularly in times of uncertainty that consequently operationalise self-categorisation theory, as underscored by social identity theory (Publication 7). It is thus important to appreciate the likelihood that followers, as a group, collectively influence the leader and their subsequent relations' outcomes (Howell and Shamir, 2005; Tee *et al.*, 2013) in order to increase their social group's benefits whilst excluding others (Fowler and Kam, 2007, as cited in Publication 7, p. 51).

Oc (2018, p. 920) also focuses on followership that allows a 'follower-centered perspective, [that] broadens the focus to include follower decisions, behaviours and

attitudes'. Others, such as Pierce and Newstrom (2011, p. 238), believe in the reciprocal inter-contextuality of leader, follower and context, as situated within reciprocal leadership: 'an interactive and dynamic process whereby the leader influences the follower, the follower influences the leader and both are influenced by the context surrounding this leader-follower relationships'. This is possibly best understood when studying Oc's (2018) perspective on leadership context that shows the interrelationship between leader, follower and context (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7 The integrative framework linking context, followers and leadership



Source: Oc, 2018, p. 220.

Within the above framework, Oc's omnibus context refers to the 'top-down effects of societal trends, economic conditions, national culture, or other macro-level factors' (2018, p. 219). Whereas the discrete context links to the 'specific situational variables that influence behaviour directly or moderate relationships (Ibid). Furthermore, by utilising social information processing theory, followers seek out environmental signals that inform their behaviours and relationships, specifically within the social context (Samnani and Singh, 2013).

Insight 2.17 Oc's integrative model: a public sphere's interpretation

Our contexts are omnipresent and mould both leaders and followers, steering us towards stability and growth, or not. Our people's beliefs and actions are also intrinsically linked with the *then* and *now*, acknowledging that our culture, history, institutions and socio-economic contexts will continue to influence us discreetly, or otherwise. Relative deprivation and social comparisons create dissent among followers, especially for the in-OUT-group and OUT-group; affecting their levels of trust and support towards institutions and leaders. However, the IN-group shows positive leader prototypicality, trying to retain their status quo of privilege and power. The public sphere therefore becomes the battleground for the in-OUT-group and OUT-group, struggling to re-position themselves.

One of the main questions to address with such a contextual approach is whether LFRs will adapt when environmental contexts change. Situated agency accordingly explains

why and how individual actors - working within the same political, financial and institutional context - arrive at different interpretations of leadership for collaboration, and the implications of these different interpretations for the practice of local leadership' (Sullivan *et al.*, 2012, p. 42). Such diverse interpretations correspond with the notion that leadership is 'multi-level, processual, contextual and interactive' (Ibid).

Insight 2.18 SSD reconnection

Hence, social self-defence becomes a multi-layered concept given that leaders come and go, and our own perceptions, situations and agency change. Relative deprivation and social comparisons create dissent and cement SSD among the in-OUT-group and OUT-group, thus affecting their levels of trust and support towards institutions and leader. However, when leadership rotation occur, will they remain within the same category or do they move upwards? Moreover, do some followers sacrifice their values and perceptions in order to become an insider? The answers to these questions are not concrete, but one fact is clear: the gap between the rich and the poor increase. However, certain leaders (like Zuma) managed to increase the insider group tremendously, simply because his charisma, greed and arrogance won over more followers who started to embrace his values and practice. Thus, their situations have changed, but at a cost, especially when operating outside the parameters of the law. SSD agents' resistance and violent revolt is now as strong as ever, diminishing some of these cronies' influence.

As seen in Figure 2.8, social influences derive from such individual followers, or those situated within a group. Followers connect more easily to leaders that share similarities in 'values, beliefs, religion, gender, and ethnic background… [thus having] more trust in a leader who appears to be one of them, [making] more favourable attributions about the leader' (Yukl, 2013, p. 231). This perceived similarity effect is called leader prototypicality (Ibid) and ultimately affects follower and leader behaviour (Oc and Bashshur, 2013).

Figure 2.8 A model of followers' social influence on leaders



Source: Adapted from Oc and Bashshur, 2013, p. 923.

However, when prototypicality is absent with followers neither identifying with their leaders, nor assessing their leaders' competence and effectiveness favourably, LFRs and behaviour change. The extent to which leaders pay attention to these followers serve as a boundary condition for their relationships (Oc and Bashshur, 2013) with leaders either resisting or conforming to their followers' influences, triggering SSD, or not.

2.7 Summary

Friedman opined that the 'government only does what people wants, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs' (Publication 1, p. 226). In a perfect world one would agree on such a notion, claiming that the public leaders serve their constituencies truthfully and effectively, committed to laws and public service ethos. And it would not be wrong to assume the same occurs within the workplace, where employees' input and requirements are met in an unbiased manner.

Yet the reality is fraught with paradoxes, dis-illusions and inequalities. Not only do our unique socio-economic situations affect our everyday behaviour, but underpinning factors such as prejudice and patronage, can result in injustice and defiance. Likewise, leader-follower relationships form the centre of our environments, as determined by our sense of lawfulness and values. Such relationships are based on exchanges and reciprocity, made even more prominent when followers have positional advantages over the others. And this is where social justice, equality and fairness suffer: the unfair advantage that both the in-group and deceptive leaders have over the others.

Thus, when situations remain dire, social self-defence emerges with the outsiders and 'in-betweeners' taking up the role of SSD agents, desperately trying to improve their own environments. Leaders that disregard the plight of the others, naively assuming followers will remain passive and loyal, soon encounters defiance and protests. Followers, no longer willing to be taken for granted, will start to re-position themselves within the LFRs, eager to reclaim their rights.

Acknowledging that the world is indeed imperfect, greater attention can be given on how to reshape LFRs, by empowering the followers and instilling a greater sense of deliberation among leaders. Thus, the need to re-position both leaders and followers.

The following concluding chapter will highlight the similarities and differences of my published works, connecting the general themes and texts with my follower matrix and FRM, ultimately aiming to add greater significance to our own narratives.

CHAPTER 3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IT ALL

3.1 Introduction

Writing a concluding chapter is never an easy task, and at this stage of my PhDP journey, quite daunting.

One thing that I do know with certainty is that there is no turning back. This final chapter will therefore conclude this thesis by re-connecting all the chapters with the main aim of this thesis: re-positioning the followers within the leader-follower relationship. This chapter will first synthesise my published works, by highlighting their trajectories (Section 3.2), commonalities and differences. Second, the re-positioning of the followers within leader-follower relationships are discussed, specifically within the context of my *follower relationship model* and *follower matrix* (Section 3.3). Third, connecting the two divides, namely the public sphere and organisation are emphasised in Section 3.4. Lastly, the contributions of this thesis as well as future research opportunities (Sections 3.5 and 3.6) will conclude this chapter.

3.2 My publications' reflexive synthesis

Reflecting on my publications is both an uneasy and satisfying exercise. Fairclough's CDA techniques – describe, explain and interpret - gave me the much-needed direction when re-constructing my work (Table 1.1, Figure 2.1 and Appendix 9). The following section expands on my research trajectory (Figure 3.1), whilst simultaneously providing context and insight into my de-constructed publications. The synthesis of my publications (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1) includes a brief summary of my publications as well as the similarities and differences that exist. The use of *italicised* quotes show the paradoxical intertextualities of text and meaning, which informed much of my research and affirmed my own stance throughout.

My publications tried to make sense of the observable world by re-constructing contexts, texts and relationships, gradually moving from the macro to the micro level of our situations, as interlinked with agency theory. Theoretically, my own positionality steered me towards subjective epistemology, acknowledging that the theory of knowledge is socially and historically constructed; with our social systems situated in the 'taken for granted' truth. Accordingly, a social constructivist approach seems appropriate given that our leaders and followers experience different layers of truth:

manipulated, hidden or de-coupled from the public conversations. Consequently, with a society spiraling out of control, Cunliffe's (2003) perception that the truth is in crisis, turns into a weary affirmation.

Table 3.1 Selected publications' summaries

	YEAR	SHORTENED TITLE	SUMMARISED REFLECTION
1	2006	The good, the bad and the ugly	Despite noble programmes and initiatives such as Batho Pele, grassroots alienation and ineffective governance flourish, negatively affecting the poorest of the poor. Political freedom is no longer enough to curb economic inequality and development.
2	2008	Good governance and Ubuntu	Poverty prevails in the uThungulu district municipality, as exacerbated by a dual economy and poor service delivery. Collective action and values are to be re-invigorated – Ubuntu- in order to secure a better future for all.
3	2008	In church and government we trust	South Africa's two main institutions of trust – the church and government – fall short in representing the voice of the followers. Secularism, by replacing theopolitics, succeed in alienating many followers that result in distrust and dissatisfaction.
4	2008	The Amakhosi-Councillors' interface	An insider's reflection on the need for an institute to train traditional leaders. By strengthening their relevance in a democratic society allows for successful integration of the modern and the traditional.
5	2013	Poverty alleviation through social self-defence	Aloof leaders, alienated followers and ineffective poverty alleviation efforts create fertile grounds for protests. Social self-defence emerges as a model to improve leader-follower dialogue and socio-economic conditions, as pushed by the marginalised and desperate poor.
6	2016	Social self-defence	Unequal development, corruption, poor leadership and an economy in recession permanently cement citizens' sense of desperateness and anger. SA is now labelled as both a protest nation and a violent democracy, triggering social self-defence.
7	2017	Democracy's embedded paradoxes	The quality of institutions and leadership are juxtaposed against poverty traps and violence, arguing that corruption and poor leadership negatively affect followers'. Paradoxical determinants are recognised as important factors in strengthening leader-follower relationships and reducing the permanency of social self-defence.

As an outsider - having lived in the UAE for almost 10 years – I admittedly have more clarity on my publications' trajectory, being able to visualise the path that led me to my FRM. And as much as my publication endeavours were random at best, I now realise that I indirectly and subconsciously pivoted from a macro to an individual-level perspective, as highlighted in the bottom-left, blue quadrant (Figure 3.1). This makes sense since our life experiences move between the macro and the micro, arriving at a place where

relationships can alter one's actions. Especially when social self-defence and leader-follower relationships collide, or not.

Figure 3.1 Reflexivity and my selected publications



Figure 3.1 therefore shows the pathway of my published works with publication 1 covering the state of the South African nation, ten years after the abolishment of apartheid. Publication 2 was an attempt to connect with my own micro-environment, assessing our district municipality against values such as Ubuntu and Batho Pele. Publication 3 swayed a little more to our normative institutions of trust - government and church – where my data showed the beginning of discontent surfacing since leaders and followers were no longer automatically agreeing on emotional issues such as abortion or capital punishment. Publication 4 was a direct result of my empowering endeavours, realising that traditions were exploited in the new SA with capacity building correlating with political party lines, usually at the detriment of the local communities. Publications 5 and 6 resulted in the creation of social self-defence (SSD) which was used to coin the rationale behind South Africans' protests, and ideally to be avoided. Publication 7 was the beginning stage of the follower relationship model, still unknown to me at this stage, but a natural culmination of my work until now. And what better way to try and add significance to our contexts by allowing followers to become more effective when shaping their leaders' behaviour by using my FRM.

My publications predominantly adopted an interpretivist philosophy by utilising a case study (Publication 4) and survey strategies (Publications 2, 3 and 5). Data generation was via interviews (Publication 5), questionnaires (Publications 2 and 3) and archival research (Publication 1). Altogether, this resulted in four conceptual papers (Publications 1, 4, 5 and 6) and three empirical studies (Publications 2, 3, and 7). Moreover, two publications were co-written by a colleague, Nonhlanla Zulu (Publication 4) and a Masters' student, Mandla Mkhize (Publications 5 and 6). In order to comply with the University of Gloucestershire's regulations, I obtained written consent from them, as seen in appendices 1-3. Many others assisted me in my research endeavours, but only two contributed to the publications submitted for this thesis.

My research and thus my publications evolved according to my own projects and real-time events; and are a reflection on SA in its transition to a free, equal and fair society. The transitions experienced during the first ten years of our new democratic society were tremendous, albeit marred by unmet expectations and broken promises. Change was not easy but welcomed by most. Nonetheless, cracks were starting to show, as attributed to unrealistic electioneering promises and inexperienced leadership. Service delivery and good governance were the buzzwords in those days, perceived as the most tangible proof of transformation successes. Yet, despite many legal frameworks and socio-economic programmes, the overall goal of poverty alleviation and municipal success stories were limited, marred by unqualified administrators and corrupt leaders. '*We must be impatient with those in the public services who see themselves as pen-pushers and guardians of rubberstamps, thieves intent on self-enrichment, bureaucrats who think they have a right to ignore the vision of Batho Pele, who come to work as late as possible and to knock off as early as possible'* (Mbeki, 2004 as cited in Publication 2, p. 203). Notwithstanding national leadership narratives, nepotism thrived, as underscored by the ANC's style of cadre deployments. Protests began to re-emerge, which caught the elected leaders off-guard, especially since these claims raised warning bells as early as 1997. Failing to improve, SA continued to be ranked as a highly corrupt nation. Moreover, poor leadership resulted in citizens' disillusions: *'Yes, I know the Councillor since we voted the councillor into office. I do not think the councillor is doing enough to help us. The only thing councillors know is to make empty promises'* (Interviewee 4, as cited in Publication 6, p. 446). Such a statement surprised me since one would argue that party loyalty, as coupled with extensive redistribution initiatives,

would appease the masses. But it seems that the peripheral SSD Agents (followers) have started to voice their frustration, occasionally displaying their frustration by means of protests.

Narrowing my general focus towards my own lived-in experiences resulted in two publications, as situated within the uThungulu district municipality (UDM), a semi-rural community in Kwa-Zulu Natal that is marred by poverty, unemployment, violence and HIV/AIDS. A paradox from within, socio-economic inequalities are evident when comparing the affluent communities of the City of uMhlathuze with other municipalities that face severe hardships and poor standards of living. Despite the city being known as an industrial tourist hotspot many surrounding rural communities do not see such wealth and quality service delivery. Additional paradoxes are noted when comparing its leadership: qualified municipal managers with a zero tolerance for corruption co-leading with traditional leaders that are less qualified and not electorally mandated to govern. The connection with Ubuntu was therefore a symbolic correlation between modern governance, African values and traditional leadership as underscored by the African Renaissance narrative of those years. By emphasising Ubuntu's principle of collectivism, citizens could act collectively, pushing for a greater communitarian ethos. Yet, the embracing of Ubuntu is but a pipe dream. Collectivism was replaced by narcissism and ethical values were traded for corruption.

'*We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another'* (Solomon, 2006, as cited in Publication 3, p. 131). Given that SA is a highly religious society I also swayed towards theopolitics, exploring citizens' perceptions regarding the popular themes of reconciliation and forgiveness, as linked to our dominant institutions of trust: churches and government. Highly controversial issues that dominated the discourse in the early years of our democracy - death sentence, abortion, homosexuality and land redistribution – served as the connectors among the different stakeholders. But the disjointedness between followers and their leaders became evident: their leaders (whether public or religious) secured a liberal secular society despite their followers opposing such initiatives. Regardless of the citizens showing distrust and alienation towards churches and government, protests were not considered as a viable option during the early years of the new SA. Having experienced decades of intense political violence it made sense for citizens to avoid protests, especially since SA was still seen as the poster boy for peaceful transitions. However,

approaching institutions of trust in times of need were clearly no longer an option either. Moving once again closer to my own home-base I also started to focus on our traditional leaders, perceived by many as institutions of trust. Being the custodians of their culture and peoples, they also have constitutional responsibilities to serve their communities customarily, culturally and developmentally. But two issues challenged their stance in our new democratic SA: (1) they were not elected into their positions, with many seen as beneficiaries of patronage and not to be trusted; (2) they were not trained or well-equipped to serve their societies, as expected within a modern political system. Embarking on capacity building exercises my colleagues and I partnered up with university leaders, public NGO's and American partners to provide opportunities that cemented sustainable relations between leaders, followers and the academia. These different partnerships and projects were proof that diverse stakeholders can improve local communities, moving away from political agendas towards greater collectivism.

My publications started to pivot from a general situational reflection regarding good governance and service delivery towards participatory democracy, as influenced by ineffective public management and uneven development. Positive participatory mechanisms, good governance and authentic leadership were slowly replaced by pseudo-democracy that negatively affected public engagement and highlighted a society fraught with dysfunctional institutions, complacency and deception: *'Yes. People are angry. We voted but there is no change. We are tired of promises and lies'* (Interviewee 9, as cited in Publication 5, p. 191). Yet, leaders ignored their followers' since their *'macro-statistics of overall achievements'* (Booysen, 2007, as cited in Publication 6, p. 443) were conveniently more reliable. Other versions of truth were found with statements such as Mbeki positing that the *'strengthening of the democratic system should be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future* (Publication 5, p. 177). However, notions remained that the *'party is everything and the constituency is nothing, excluding election times when it is required to vote for a specific party'* (Publication 6, p. 10), as re-affirmed by a protestor: '*The government is taking us for granted. It promised us a better life, but nothing is happening*' (Interviewee 25, as cited in Publication 5, p. 191).

Other micro-level focus areas - the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and the Midvaal Local Municipality – formed the basis of my fifth and sixth publications.

Two specific settlements - Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle - are a microcosmic representation of SA's dual economy marred by high levels of poverty, unemployment and frequent protests. Their wealthier neighbours (like Sandton, Vereeniging and Meyerton) are within a 5-36 km radius fuelling horizontal resentments and grievances since the '*poorer of the poor compares themselves with other municipal residents and upwards with respect to the elite and middle class'* (Publication 7, p. 52). The countless efforts made by the national leadership to deal with inequality and service delivery were unsuccessful, especially when political interference and corruption occurred. By shifting my focus towards citizens, as determined by their own agential propensities and dire situations, social self-defence was created to contextualise and shape their voices and grievances. After all, Wilkes (2004, p. 571) confirmed that *'those most deprived have the most to gain (and least to lose) when trying to change the political and economic realities* (Publication 7, p. 52).

The creation of SSD encapsulated the rationale for followers that, in hindsight, found its theoretical premise in Giddens' agency and structuration theories, as linked with participatory mechanisms: *'Councillors do not care about our needs. After voting for them, they disappear'* (Interviewee 43, as cited in Publication 5, p. 192). Should aloof leaders and uneven economic development prevail, the marginalised and frustrated citizen would become the mouthpiece of SSD, permanently embedding SSD, violence and protests. By 2013 protests were occurring on a frequent basis, perceived as the only way to attract leadership attention towards the followers' plight. As a result I started to pivot towards the citizens, realising that unsuccessful transitions and changes were undoubtedly connecting them with their leaders and situations. It was equally clear that in many municipalities pro-poor and sustainable service delivery measurements remained ineffective, broadening the developmental gap, cementing frustration and violence as an alternative participatory mechanism. *'I know the councillor. But councillors are useless. Councillors only think for themselves and their friends. That is why there is too much corruption at municipal level'* (Interviewee 1, as cited in Publication 6, p. 446). Corrupt leadership, as enhanced by a sub-culture of patronage and cronyism, furthermore, deprived the followers from upward mobility, paving the way for a culture of SSD. *'Ironically, when the ANC turns against the masses, labelling the poor as the ultra-left, it effectively denounces its own developmental agendas, becoming the target of its own historical tactics of ungovernable townships'*

(Publication 6, p. 444). Thus, by being treated as the undeserving poor, many citizens perceive their leader-follower relationships as both opportunistic and dysfunctional. Protests were justified within the SSD discourse, challenging public leadership on a frequent basis.

Focusing on the followers' voice the publications explored the causes underlying events that took place within the transitional South African society, eventually acknowledging the importance of leader-follower relationships. Subsequently, further studies led to the acknowledgement that imperfectness and paradoxical narratives prevail, as situated within our societal contexts and shaped by our agential propensities. SA is now labelled as a violent democracy, a protest nation at best. Leadership changes brought a brief sense of hope to the citizens, but petty political-party infighting threatens our vulnerable new government.

Overall it is clear that my publications are connected, sharing the same contexts and common themes (Table 3.1 and Figures 2.1 and 3.1). The similarities are found within the broader South African environment that are comprised of the political, economic, social and legal settings. The narratives surrounding these settings are pre-dominantly based within post-apartheid SA, at the start of its second decade of democracy (2004 onwards). Set within the broader theme of transition, my publications reflected on the achievements and struggles that South Africans face, a transitional scorecard of sorts, irrespective of locality. And as much as the publications focused on different geographical areas (Publications 2, 3, 5 and 6) the areas of discussions remained firmly embedded within service delivery, good governance and participatory democracy, underscored by socio-economic inequality and citizens' expectations (Publications 1-3,5-7). Despite certain discussion points – ubuntu, traditional leadership, churches, protests and social self-defence - being more pronounced, they remained firmly embedded within South Africa's national contexts. The level of uneven development, as coupled with poor leadership, shaped citizens' expectations and behaviour that ultimately morphed into alienation and disillusion. References to protests, corruption and racism were evident in all publications, except one, publication 4. Discussions regarding government's anti-poverty and good governance interventions were found throughout as well as elaborating on the different means of participation. However, pseudoism negatively affected the constitutional mechanisms of democracy and engagement, ultimately spilling-over into economic inequality, socio-economic

protests and political corruption. Shifting between different communities' stakeholders (Publications 2, 3, 5 and 6) brought additional insight into the various levels of dissatisfaction, primarily observed among the marginalised poor. The gradual prominence of defiance, patronage and prejudice naturally coincided with my publications' narrative (Publications 1-3) with the severity of discontent and alienation coinciding with publications 5-7. The subsequent creation of social self-defence (Publications 5 and 6) provided a platform that rationalised the escalations in protests and violence.

Some differences do exist, as subdivided into three stages: stage one refers to publications 1-4, with stage two linking to publications 5 and 6 whilst stage three connect with publication 7. My focus moved from a general context to local situations that led to SSD, finally resulting in my FRM. Thus, despite the overall narrative concentrating predominantly on the macro-environment of SA, the inclusion of specific geographical areas - uThungulu district municipality; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and the Midvaal Local Municipality – allowed for different stories to take centre stage. The specific communities of Mhlathuze, Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle showed a direct correlation between different political allegiances and effective governance. Thus, as much as publication 2 focused on the uThungulu district municipality, collectivism and Ubuntu became the connective tissue pertaining situations, citizens and leadership. The same applies to publication 3, emphasising the strenuous relationship between church and government, as shaped by the intricacies of our collective history as perceived through the eyes of the devotees. Publication 4 was a direct result of the national discussion surrounding the relevance of traditional leaders, although I extrapolated it to the microlevel of capacity building and leadership empowerment. Publications 5 and 6 firmly placed the followers at the forefront of discussions, as linked to defiance and SSD. Publication 7 was the final effort to connect with my previous publications and the first step into creating a *follower relationship model.*

Theoretically, some differences were noted (Table 2.1), albeit most noticeable with publications 6 and 7. Publication 1 was loosely based on Woller's theory of bureaucracy, whilst publications 2-5 were centred on participatory democracy and representative leadership. Coinciding with my re-location to the UAE I included more

theories in publications 6 and 7 by particularly utilising social identity, grievances, political opportunity structures and agency theories.

Given my current outsider stance, I realised that my despair and cynical observations remain unchanged:

(1) The state of our nation showed tremendous potential with the abolishment of apartheid. Pro-poor policies and a plethora of laws and programmes paved the way for a more prosperous and equal society. Yet, we are still experiencing economic apartheid, with a dual economy threatening our societal core.
(2) Values such as freedom of religions, equality, human rights and Ubuntu are enshrined in our Constitution. Twenty-four years later it seems but a pipe dream, with too many public leaders and followers sacrificing the collective humanness for selfishness and corruption. Ubuntu in itself remains rhetorical at best.
(3) Good governance subsequently fails, despite embracing Batho Pele and other initiatives to reconnect with the citizens and deliver sustainable service delivery. Realising that two thirds of our municipalities remain dysfunctional, more than a decade later, is truly disheartening.
(4) Public leadership was once a beacon of ethical values, driven by the desire to redress the injustices of our past and to flourish once more. But public leadership has been on a downward spiral since the late 1990's. Sub-cultures of patronage and cronyism challenged our young democracy's developmental agenda resulting in leaders being more unethical and less committed to the public good. Nonetheless, some success stories are evident, such as uMhlathuze municipality where municipal management rose above political party sabotage, maximizing citizen participation and good governance for the betterment of the local communities. Unfortunately, so many other municipalities still struggle, with leadership doing more harm than good.
(5) Social self-defence has thus found a fertile ground to flourish: unemployment, deceptive leadership, ineffective public servants and poor service delivery result in defiance and violence.

Finally, by building on the commonality among my published works, the following sections place greater emphasis on the followers by re-constructing their positions within leader-follower relationships, as finally situated within my *follower relationship model.*

3.3 Re-positioning the follower

'Better followership begets better leadership'
(Kellerman, 2008, as cited in Hughes *et al.*, 2015, p. 328).

Leadership studies neglect the importance of followers, perceiving them typically as subordinates, a means to an end. Followership studies equally tend to focus on compartmentalising followers within broad categories, thus neglecting those who do not necessarily conform to any of the quadrants within a typical matrix. Furthermore, attention towards public sector and toxic environments are also less forthcoming. In

order to re-claim the voice of the followers the following section elucidates on this thesis' LMX adaptation that allows for leader-follower relationships to become part of the public sphere by re-positioning the in-betweeners in such a way that they can become effective followers, ultimately improving leadership.

3.3.1 The followers and their relationship determinants

Since LMX only focuses on organisational studies (Appendix 7) I had to re-construct it to fit into SA's public sphere as well as to accommodate the in-OUT-group. *First*, I classified the state as the mega-organisation, comprised of two sets of primary actors: (1) the SA citizens (referred to as followers, thus no longer called members); and (2) the leaders who are publicly elected. This mega-organisation also includes the political, economic, legal, and social contexts, as underlined by its causal underbelly (prejudice, defiance and patronage).

Second, the followers' relationships are categorised (Figure 3.2 and Appendix 8) according to their positionality towards their leaders:

(1) IN-group [I-G] belongs to the leader's inner circle.
(2) OUT-group [O-G] is excluded from the inner circle, identifying with other leaders and thus belonging to other groups [or political parties].
(3) In-OUT-group [i-O-G] is the 'in-betweeners', typically excluded from personalised relationships due to patronage, intra-elite factionalism and personalised leadership.

As shown in Figure 3.2, there is a size discrepancy (between the I-G and i-O-G) that depicts the relativity of social exchanges that occur:

(1) Within the IN-group: the larger in-OUT-group (i-O-G) reflects the masses supporting the leader (via political party affiliation and voting support), yet receiving fewer benefits than the I-G.
(2) The much smaller, elitist IN-group (I-G) receives disproportionally more benefits; thus, experiencing a high quality LMX, ELMX and SLMX.
(3) The OUT-Group (O-G) refers to those who are experiencing low quality LMX, SLMX and ELMX. In SA the O-G belongs to the opposition parties that are typically much smaller in numbers and influence.

Figure 3.2 Adaptation of leadership and followers' domains



Source: Adapted from Pierce and Newstrom, 2011, p. 28.

Third, the leaders are elected leaders such as mayors, councillors or national political party leaders. Value congruencies are necessities but when dark leadership emerges, leaders become detached from their public service ethos. Such leaders begin to capitalise on patronage and naive followers, perceiving themselves as above the law. When the darker side of such relationships surface - as moulded by the leaders, followers and their environment - where else do we start than here, my *follower relationship model*?

Additionally, survivalism pushes followers into directions never considered before, as encapsulated by social self-defence that becomes a destructive barometer on public service performance, leadership effectiveness and LFRs. As much as SSD provides an academic rationale for follower behaviour, it is to be avoided since the 'normal' will be replaced with alternative actions and detrimental behaviours.

My FRM (Figure 3.4) helps in 'steering away from embedding SSD and violence by re-balancing the determinants of values, lawfulness, SSD agents and leadership styles that are deemed important for their relationships' (Publication 7). By finding a balance among the opposing forces at play within each dimension, the model not only acknowledges that 'these determinants are dynamic, but that they could also improve relationships between leaders and followers' (Publication 7). The FRM therefore situates followers and leaders' on opposing spectrums (Publication no. 7), as underscored by the LFRs four determinants. This approach serves three purposes:

(1) To acknowledge that life is filled with *paradoxes*, affecting our thoughts and actions. Moreover, both followers and leaders - knowingly or not - frequently participate in such contradictory activities and behaviour. These paradoxes can lead to deception or destruction, and based on the message or situation, such paradoxical behaviour can be either misconstrued or supported, no matter who the leader, follower, or environment (Publication 7).

(2) To subsequently affirm that followers' *behaviour* can bring about change and/or cement the status quo with respect to their leaders' everyday actions and messages. Such behaviour depends on the followers' position within the LFR and the degree to which their own socio-economic environment shapes their expectations and actions.

(3) To confirm that the core themes of my publications (Figure 2.1) relate with both the paradoxes and the followers that are informed by values, lawfulness, SSD and the followers' affiliation towards their leaders (Publication 7).

Figure 3.3 The follower relationship model's determinants and paradoxical forces



Source: Adapted from Publication 7, p. 56.

Insight 3.1 FRM's four determinants

Our environments and actors (whether leader or followers) are imperfect at best, shifting between positive and negative feelings, perceptions and positions. Any actor can infrequently or constantly support or oppose these four determinants. These fluctuations are referred to as the paradoxical push-pull forces that eventually result in scoring leaders when creating a quadrangle. Based on the followers' own situations, norms and values, they perceive and assess their leaders that result in follower groupings; subsequently informing leader-follower relationships.

This means that both leaders and followers can, at any given time, display positive or negative behaviour (we all had such moments: being truthful and deceitful at the same time). However, unmet expectations result in disillusion and dissatisfaction, gearing followers towards defiance or alienation.

Additionally, social comparisons and relative deprivation do inform LFRs, pushing followers to move towards reactive behaviour, swapping allegiance with defiance and morphing into SSD agents: taking control by trying to reverse their situations'

desperateness. However, many will also resist change, unwilling to let go of their positions of power and of privilege. Hence the dual fluidity that can emerge among SSD agents.

Table 3.2 The follower relationship model determinants

TRAIT	POSITIVE SCALE		NEGATIVE SCALE
Lawfulness	**OBEYING RULES AND LAWS** Adhere to rules and laws; nepotism frowned upon Respect governance structures and processes Evidence of accountability and transparency Anti-corruption watchdogs strong	communication, credibility, competence	**ABOVE THE LAW** Disrespect laws: cronyism and clientelism rampant Interference in governance structures Abuse of power and eluding transparency High levels of corruption
Values	**COLLECTIVE VALUES** Adhering to constitutional and democratic values Ubuntu and public values respected Ethical behaviour promoted Batho Pele prioritised		**PERSONAL POWER** Lip-service to democratic principles Individualised, selfish values Whistle-blowers persecuted Nepotism, cronyism and self-enrichment
Leadership style	**SERVANT - TRANSFORMATIONAL STYLE** People centred leadership Serving people Deliberative dialogue important Authentic leader: constructive and reflective Inclusiveness		**DECEPTIVE - DESTRUCTIVE STYLE** Individually centred Paying lip-service to values Alienated from followers (i-O-g and O-g) Narcissistic and surrounded by cronies Exclusion prevails
SSD agents	**STABLE ENVIRONMENT** Economic growth evident and safe environment Grassroots content Equal distribution of resources and opportunities Effective service delivery Perceived leaders to be legitimate Engenders change and exercise agency	MEDIATING FACTORS:	**UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT** Poverty remains and unequal distribution of resources and opportunities Protests and revolt against systems and leaders Ineffective service delivery and unsafe environment See leaders as illegitimate and corrupt Disruptive and defiant

Subsequently, these determinants are played out in Figure 3.3 where they affect LFRs, impacting on both the society and its actors. This model, as discussed in the most basic manner in publication 7, makes provision for both positive and negative factors that influence follower groupings and broad environmental outcomes.

3.3.2 The follower relationship model, explained

The FRM explains the relationships between a limited set of constructs showing that the outcomes are resultant from certain inputs, groups positionings and exchanges, as shaped by situations and relationships determinants. By accommodating imperfectness, the FRM firmly acknowledges the paradoxes both leaders and followers face, as well as their inter-relatedness and interdependence. The FRMs

interconnectivities and multi-pluralities are thus elaborated in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and Appendix 8.

Table 3.3 The follower relationship model constructs

CONTEXT	The FRM encapsulates our daily situations which are closely linked to the state of the nation, governance, and their causal underbelly: prejudice, defiance and patronage. The contexts inform both leaders and followers since they are all interconnected.
FOLLOWER ATTRIBUTES	Generic attributes are given to the followers that reflect their own personalities, preferences, perceptions, positionalities and/or norms. These attributes are fluid since one can change as one matures, which is why it was difficult to truly assign specific attributes to the three groups.
LEADER ATTRIBUTES	Broad characteristics are assigned to our leaders, as perceived by the followers and portrayed by the media/others, such as opposition parties. Two types were identified: servant-transformational vs deceptive-destructive. These were the most appropriate types for the purpose of this thesis, and by no means nullifying other styles, nor implying that they are inseparable from each other.
RELATIONSHIP DETERMINANTS	These four themes allow followers to identify with certain groups and leaders by connecting their preferences, as shaped by their own norms, culture, language, race, socio-economic situations and societal events. As citizens, or followers, they subsequently project their hopes or frustrations onto their leaders that result in followers' groups.
MEDIATING FACTORS	Certain elements remain intact, irrespective of leadership style or follower groups: communication, credibility, and competence. Followers experience or perceive leaders in certain ways, as based on situations. The ability to successfully communicate can win over followers, or not. Credibility and competence affect outcomes of any relationship, goals and service delivery. These factors can increase the quality of leader-follower relationships and reduce negative outcomes. But the opposite is also true.
GROUP FORMATION	The followers are accordingly categorised into three groups, the insider group (IN-group); outsiders (OUT-group); and/or the 'in-betweeners' (in-OUT-group). These followers' groups represent different relationships and styles that represents the various degrees of LMX, SLMX and ELMX they have with their leaders.
SOCIAL INFLUENCES	Based on their group and/or individual identities these groups vary in strength and size. As such differing degrees of exchanges occur that inevitably affect the degree of their social and socio-political influences over their leaders.
OUTCOMES	The followers, as agents of their own well-being and showing a certain type of leader-follower relationship, manage to obtain three different outcomes: maintain the status quo, disrupt the society or defy the leadership's authority and legitimacy.
DYNAMICS	The arrows are indicative of the dynamic nature of the FRM. The relational determinants, as influenced by the mediating factors, shape the three groups that subsequently affect their influence impact. Based on the outcome, leaders can then choose to conform, ignore or resist the followers, which eventually can sway followers to change their allegiance or not.

Figure 3.4 The follower relationship model



Figure 3.5 The follower matrix



The followers' matrix (Figure 3.5) depicts the placing of the various groups as linked to the varying degrees of follower identification and positionality towards their leaders and underscored by the determinants and categories found in Figure 3.4. The IN-group was deliberately sub-divided into either the colluders or the conformers given that many IN-group members are not necessarily deceptive and corrupt, and their level of association and access to their leaders differ. However the OUT- and in-OUT-groups are clearer regarding their values and position, as informed by the relationship determinants. For example, the 'in-betweeners' are close to the leader and inner circle (high positionality) but are still functioning on the periphery, and thus excluded. Subsequently, identification with the leader can start to diminish, hence low leader identification emerges.

As an interventionist model FRM informs and empowers both followers and leaders to deal with change, reduce dysfunctionalities and improve engagement. Followers re-strategise and re-gain access to resources and power, thus pushing for greater inclusiveness. Whereas leaders, by re-focusing on FRM's determinants, improve collaboration and performance, ultimately reducing defiance, unconscious biasness and deception. Thus, it becomes necessary that followers manage their own positionality, as linked to their own leadership assessment. The following section therefore aims to inform the stakeholders on how to utilise my FRM.

3.3.3 *Utilising the follower relationship model*

Quantifying leader-follower relationships is not easy since much is based on individual perceptions and subjectivity. Adding actual statistics (as shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6) to such subjective determinants is difficult. For example, what accounts as frequent protests: 10 or 400 per year? How does one measure corrupt leaders when so many are untouchable? I therefore abolished the actual statistical measuring of events and rather allocated a score of 10 for each dimension, thus acknowledging that subjectivity takes centre stage.

Table 3.4 South African Leadership traits

	PRESIDENT	PERSON SPECIFIC TRAITS
1994 - 1999	Nelson Mandela	Visionary, transformational leadership style showing moral authority; intellectually honest and legitimate leader (Marx, 1997; Lipton, 2014; Rotberg, 2014). *His ability to listen and talk secured a relative peaceful transition and earned him respect across racial and class lines.*
1999 - 2008	Thabo Mbeki	Modernist and technocratically Africanist (Kaarsholm, 2009, p. 414), rational intellect and transactional (Rotberg, 2014), socially aloof (Lodge, 2014) and an outsider (Bond, 2004; Gumede, 2005). *His pride and intellect promoted dis-engagement.*
2009 - 2018	Jacob Zuma	Uneducated and charismatic (Jurek and Scime, 2014; Rotberg, 2014), eclectically inclusivist and traditionalist (Kaarsholm, 2009), transactional, unethical (Rotberg, 2014) and patriarchal (Abrahams, 2016). *His (ethnic) pride resulted in disconnect and corruption.*
2018 -	Cyril Ramaphosa	Shrewd trade unionist leader, anti-corruption (Mbatha, 2018), coalitional leader, strategist and negotiator (De Klerk, 2018). *However, his past is chequered with controversy and corrupt deals, which makes a definite assessment dubious at this stage.*

Insight 3.2 Why these leaders?

I deliberately chose these well-known South African (national) leaders, since the reader can more easily identify with them. Although followers will relate to different (local) leaders that impact on their immediate contexts.

For example: there are 73 parliamentary constituencies in London, which are sub-classified as borough constituencies. Followers can identify with various leaders that represent their constituency and needs the best, ultimately representing their voice in Parliament (Members of Parliament, 2019).

The next section will briefly show how one can assess leaders (Table 3.4), as based on your follower positionality (in-OUT-group and IN-group); whereas the organisational perspective will be addressed with the insight boxes.

3.3.3.1 The in-betweeners' perspective (in-OUT-group)

As an *in-betweener* (in-OUT-group), I might perceive certain leaders (Table 3.5) more positively, given that I can identify with them, as linked to my own values and positionality. On a scale of 10, I could place Pres. Mandela on a more positive scale (scoring 8/10) than Pres. Zuma (scoring 2/10), since the former's ethical values are aligned with my own; plus, he positively changed my socio-economic environment. Pres. Mandela's transformational (and charismatic) leadership style also resonate more positively (scoring 7/10). Lastly, his adherence to law and sense of social justice positively tipped the scale (scoring 7/10). Since there were limited riots and protests during Pres. Mandela's rule, I scored SSD agents a 3/10. With the use of Excel (Table 3.5), a tabular depiction is created to show how leaders perform on the scale (total is shown in red) and visualised by the quadrangle (Figure 3.6), as based on my perceptions.

Table 3.5 Assessing leaders: an in-OUT-group perspective

in-OUT-Group perspective	Transformational & Servant	Transactional	Narcissistic & Deceptive	Deceptive & transformational
	Mandela	Mbeki	Zuma	Ramaphosa
SSD agents	3	5	8	4
Values	8	5	2	6
Leadership style	7	5	2	6
Lawful	7	6	2	6
40	**25**	**21**	**14**	**22**

Given Pres. Mandela's iconic status he scored an overall 25/40. His quadrangle is not a perfect one because I do not think one can at any given stage reach a perfect score. However, in areas that are of importance to an in-OUT-group follower, he scores highly. Such a leader manages to connect with citizens across political party lines, reduce conflict and transform the socio-economic landscape. As an in-betweener I will remain loyal to Mandela but will shift allegiance once Pres. Mbeki and Pres. Zuma reign, moving closer to the OUT-group or remain as an 'in-betweener', albeit more frustrated. The verdict on Pres. Ramaphosa is still out given his sketchy track record and short term in Office.

Insight 3.3 Using the quadrangle in the workplace

Organisations are comprised with different business units that perform very well and/or competing against each other for greater access to resources. Suh units/departments consist of many powerful individuals and leaders vying for a top spot or retaining their position. They have certain values, ideas, ambitions that connect with other peers. Based on individual attributes, staff can identify with those sharing similar behaviours or visions, shaping leader-follower relationships. But when employees are not sure on whom to join, or when trust is limited and politics everywhere, staff can utilise the FRM and its quadrangle to find clarity on their LFR and level of support. Thus, instead of guessing, they can tick off the boxes when comparing managers/individuals.

Such a model can also assist leaders in determining best fit for a new project or for HR managers to deal with group conflict or low organisation culture. Prominent employees can be assessed and 'measured' by using the FRM in order to successfully deal with the pending matter.

Figure 3.6 The deceptive leadership quadrangle: an in-OUT-group perspective



Insight 3.4 In the workplace: an in-OUT-group perspective

Our employment memories and experiences usually involve leaders and peers, having been appointed to specific positions, as based on our experience and skills. We accept such positions since we feel that we can add value to a company. But once the 'honeymoon period' is over, we sometimes realise that the grass was not that green; that we might have been a 'tick-off-the-box' kind of an appointment or being excluded from the departmental management, dismissed at best for not fitting in with the 'boys club'. And as much as we stay professional and work exceptionally hard for the sake of the company, we are still excluded from the 'kitchen cabinet', unable to contribute to strategic planning, action plans and overall input. Loyalty, productivity and commitment will weaken. Ultimately resistance occurs, taking on many forms like apathy, disengagement, alienation and poor leader identification.

3.3.3.2 The insiders' perspective (IN-group)

From an *IN-group* perspective my assessments of Pres. Mandela and Zuma will differ because my identity strongly connects with Pres. Zuma's paternalistic way of operating. I am 'convinced' of the personal benefits when supporting him, if I am not already one of his cronies. I will score him higher in most (negative, right sided) aspects since he 'represents' my values. His disrespect for the law is exactly what I like and what 'we' need in order to retain our wealthy and powerful positions. Protests would be acknowledged, albeit lowered in score. If I really distrust the media, I could even score him lower since protests 'never' occurred, hence SSD agents are inactive, scoring lower. Nonetheless, a different score will emerge, as seen in Table 3.6 and visualised in Figure 3.7, as justified through the eyes of the insider.

Table 3.6 Assessing leaders: an IN-group perspective

IN-Group perspective	Transformational & Servant	Transactional	Narcissistic & Deceptive	Deceptive & transformational
	Mandela	Mbeki	Zuma	Ramaphosa
SSD agents	3	4	6	4
Values	6	4	7	4
Leadership style	5	4	8	4
Lawful	6	5	6	4
40	20	17	27	16

Insight 3.5 In the workplace: an IN-group perspective

Most of us want to belong, to feel part of a group, disliking exclusion. Many of us had experiences where we were part of a smaller management circle, connected because of shared values and equal commitment towards organisational successes. We are part of the IN-group for all the right reasons: experience, skills, organisational compatibility, and hard-working: thus positive organisational citizenship.

But there are also other inner-circles at play in an organisation: a leader being surrounded by like-minded 'munchkins' that got inner-circle status because of their own collusion propensities, raw ambitions and shrewd manipulation skills. Or simply because they are from the same neighbourhood or family. This is the negative IN-group that causes tension and distrust by distancing themselves from the other insiders and exploiting their own positionalities for their own selfish reasons.

Based on my own value systems and socio-economic stressors I can decide to join either group, by calculating the best suited leader for me, whether short term or long term. The dire needs of my own situation will push me, for better or worst.

Thus, by perceiving leaders' behaviour from a specific perspective, followers can either move closer to them, or not. 'These quadrangles therefore acknowledge that there is

no perfect leader or perfect balance between the four paradoxical determinants' (Publication 7). However, a positive leadership style, such as transformational and/or servant leader, can provide a better balance among all the determinants, creating a balanced quadrangle. Such a leader tends to respect laws and subscribe to collective values, as well as refrain from negative and deceptive behaviours like corruption and cronyism, stimulating economic growth and societal development.

Figure 3.7 The Deceptive leadership quadrangle: an IN-group perspective



This model was therefore an effective mechanism that allows followers to analyse their leaders by observing how the scales can tip, linking their own lived-in experiences and perceptions with their leaders' actions. These determinants underscore public sector values and mandates; with both leaders and followers identifying with them.

The FRM thus positively re-connects the leaders and the followers, placing them perhaps on an equal footing. Hence, such a model allows, for the first time, to re-claim the followers' voice and to strengthen their relationships with their leaders, irrespective of their group's positionality. Followers will be able to observe leaders' behaviour, correlating it against their own set of beliefs, expectations and values. A greater sense of partnership between leaders and followers can be achieved by informing their actions and future choices. Furthermore, the FRM ultimately improves leader-follower relationships, deliberative decision making and inclusivity. These quadrangles allow

managers and followers to quantify their perspectives and positions so as to improve LFRs, by re-claiming and re-positioning followers despite paradoxical forces, imperfect situations and dark leadership. A small step towards the right direction.

3.4 Connecting the two divides

My research pathways inadvertently mirrored my own positionality, as linked to my own private and professional micro-environment. My positionalities were shaped by my own sense of belonging or distance, which ultimately reflected my career paths' shifting contexts, experiences and sentiments. Similarly, as a professional and linked to my own organisational positions, I wore many follower hats. Nonetheless, as an expatriate my thoughts and feelings towards SA remains firmly within the OUT-group. However, as a I climb the ranks once more within my current organisation, I am keen to stay away from the political sphere, especially within the UAE context. My professional positions, once more, alternate between the in-OUT- and OUT-group. As a South African expatriate, I do not exclusively belong to any organisational grouping, which replicates my own [follower] relationship with my immediate line managers and top leadership.

Therefore some might wonder if this thesis is correctly situated within management and whether it can truly inform management studies. I would stubbornly and loudly affirm the linkage, given that we are all followers and in some stages leaders, whether publicly or organisationally. I will adamantly contest the notion that the two spheres are independent units of study, and therefore not connected. This thesis' emphasis on followers and contexts is therefore of equal value to organisations, with values such as respect, accountability, justice, equity and fairness being part of my everyday life, and yours. Promoting transparency and the elimination of prejudice and patronage should concern both organisational and public followers. Did I ever wear the hat of an SSD agent? Yes, I did, and I will continue to defy dark leadership propensities when need to, thus weakening pseudoism and strengthening followership simultaneously.

Hence, organisational ecology acknowledges the dynamic interplay between organisational citizens and their macro-environmental conditions (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Rong and Shi, 2014); with organisational studies equally concerned about group dynamics, organisational culture and citizen behaviour (Burnes, 2014). Human relations research started as early as the 1920's with the Hawthorne

experiments trying to determine the impact of our environments on group dynamics (albeit testing the effect of lightning on production), employee behaviour and social structures. Organisational behaviour is therefore a direct result of managers and individuals co-existing in shared environments where they are influenced by internal dynamics and external forces. Hence, LMX remains relevant, allowing insight into positive behaviour such as job satisfaction, employee engagement and productivity.

Yet, much of the literature keeps on focusing on the traits of our leaders, assigning perfect attributes to them, as executed in perfect office environments, applying perfect models and frameworks (Albrecht, 2005; Chandler, 2009; Pierce and Newstrom, 2011). And yes, many leaders are authentic, inspirational and transformational when showing empathy towards employees and creating a caring workplace. But *our* world, *our* personal lives and *our* organisations are anything *but* perfect. More worryingly is the fact that employees, or followers, are simply perceived as subjects, passive recipients of their leaders' instructions (Pierce and Newstrom, 2011; Schyns and Schilling, 2013). Research thus neglects the followers, despite their organisational value, and the fact that most resignations are caused by poor relationships with line managers (Barrett-Poindexter, 2018).

Finally, research started to focus on dark leadership, acknowledging that organisational politics, deceptive leaders and imperfect office environments can result in deviant organisational behaviour; whilst patronage, unfairness and prejudice can lead to impression management and power games, weakening organisational cultures and reducing effective teams to that of a detached and defiant workforce. My connection between the public sphere and organisational studies have been established. To show the connection between the two apparent opposites might be a challenge, but the (below) interconnectivity-visualisation diagram (Figure 3.8) creates a condensed re-connect with this thesis' discussion points and insight boxes.

Figure 3.8 The interconnectivity between the public sphere and organisation



These pathways - or contexts - are found in any organisation:

(1) The workplace - is comprised of the
   a. *Social* referring to group dynamics, social relationships, and equity.
   b. *Political* interpreted as factions, struggle for power and resources and group membership.
   c. *Legal* refers to the legal frameworks in which employees operate.
   d. *Economic* factors refer to the economic strength of company that affects salaries, promotions and turnover. Most importantly, the employees' own economic situation (or stressors) that shape the relationship determinants, or not.

(2) Workplace governance - denotes to organisational culture that informs the *values* and *policies* of the company and its managers. Rules and procedures also guide managers and staff pertaining acceptable norms and behaviour. Any HR enthusiast will insist in adding the psychological contract since it forms the crux of any employee-employer relationship.

(3) Manager-staff relationships - connects with all the groups, although the OUT- and in-OUT-groups morph into *SSD agents.* They feel marginalised by not receiving fair and equal treatment regarding wages, training and promotions. *Service delivery* that serves as a trigger point in the public arena is now perceived as organisational fairness as exercised through reward, appraisal and development practices and policies. Equity regarding salaries and career advancement are thus important indicators.

FRM therefore re-positions the followers within LFR, as informed by its four determinants. The causal underbelly that underscores the imperfectness of our LFR, contexts and organisations are interpreted as follow:

(1) *Patronage*: patron-client networks occur where loyalist and leaders' supporters receive preferential treatment, having unfair advantage over others. Nepotism and cronyism are typical forms of patronage.

(2) *Prejudice*: discriminatory practices also occur within organisations, as embedded in organisational culture and HR practices. Examples are seen in recruitment practices, lack

of diversity in both networking and mentoring opportunities, succession planning and promotion, excluding the outsiders based on ethnicity, language and religion; or mere stereotyping as linked to critical race theory, social identity theory or patriarchy.

(3) *Defiance*: Subsequent deviant behaviour will take place among the in-OUT-group or OUT-group members resulting in a demoralised workforce that result in increased absenteeism, presenteeism, resignations, harassment, bullying and disobeying rules.

Thus, as much as organisational culture studies acknowledge the hidden assumptions of employees (Burnes, 2014; Pattinson, 2015; Medhurst and Albrecht, 2016), they are not effectively connecting defiance with LMX, contexts and dark leadership. Dark leadership research has shown that organisational environments can be toxic (Padilla *et al.*, 2007; Thoroughgood *et al.*, 2012), as strengthened by destructive leaders and conducive environments. with susceptible followers furthermore allowing deviant organisational behaviour, as shown in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7 The consequences of dark leadership and deviant behaviour

PUBLIC SPHERE	ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
OVERALL CONTEXTS • Economic losses due to corruption, protests and patronage • Poor service delivery • Societal discord • Increase in crime • Degradation of infrastructure • Weakening of public service ethos	**OVERALL CONTEXTS** • Financial losses • Not meeting goals • Damaged reputation • Poor productivity • Poor record in fairness and transparency • Well-being absent • Volatile workplace • Demoralised workforce
AS LINKED TO (NEGATIVE) LEADERSHIP • Protests • Alienation from leaders • Violence and disobedience • Voter Apathy • Intimidation and corruption • Reduced commitment to leadership and political parties	**AS LINKED TO (NEGATIVE) LEADERSHIP** • Defiance • Disillusionment with Leaders • Alienation towards managers • Absenteeism and/or presenteeism • Resignations • Poor organisational commitment • Harassment (& charges) • Corruption + Nepotism • Mismatch of values
AS LINKED TO (NEGATIVE) FOLLOWERSHIP • Demoralisation in communities • Self-enrichment • Unfair treatment • Community violence • Intimidation • Emerging SSD agent	**AS LINKED TO (NEGATIVE) FOLLOWERSHIP** • Productivity decline • Alienation towards IN-group • Bullying • Disobeying rules • Workplace violence • Whistle blowers Weakened organisational culture • Emerging SSD agent

Competent, servant leaders can acknowledge the intricacies of employee behaviour and environmental contexts in order to implement change management and retain staff, thus reducing negative leader-follower relationships.

3.5 Contributions

The significance of this thesis is seen within both leadership and organisational studies by emphasising followership that shapes relationships, behaviours and outcomes. Additionally, the FRM and its groups allow leaders and HR practitioners to redress the hidden assumptions of organisation culture by identifying relationship determinants that can create organisational equilibrium, inclusion and deliberative consultations. By identifying the linkage between imperfect leader-follower relationships and the causal underbelly to employee behaviour, one can start to reduce discriminatory practices. Change agents' use of my FRM can secure greater understanding pertaining change management, participatory mechanisms and improved communication. Managerial significance is thus derived by expanding the causes-consequences of leader-follower relationships, as seen through the lenses of the followers.

It is evident that this PhD's contributions are based in the fields of followership and leadership that are placed within societies that experience transition; as well as organisations facing change. This thesis successfully addresses the main aim since the creation of my *follower relationship model* and *follower matrix* affirm that followers' positionality within LFRs are both fluid and important. Evidence of addressing the objectives is shown in Appendix 17.

The original contribution to knowledge is thus threefold:

A. LEADERSHIP

(1) Transformed an organisational leadership theory, LMX, into a public leadership theory, shifting focus towards follower relationships, rather than political party affiliations.

(2) Leader-member exchange (LMX) is [de]constructed by
   a. Changing terminology swapping leader-member exchange (LMX) with leader-follower relationships (LFRs) and replacing members with followers
   b. Emphasising contexts, not just relationships and exchanges.
   c. Creating an additional layer that shape relationships: the causal underbelly (prejudice, defiance and patronage).
   d. Acknowledgement of dark leadership and the (negative) interplay between leaders, followers and contexts

(3) Re-directing organisational research trends by accepting that paradoxes and imperfections add significant nuances to the LFR and dark leadership.

B. FOLLOWERSHIP

(1) Created the 'in-betweeners': this in-OUT group is a new follower group within FRM & LFR context.
(2) Created the follower matrix that can assist leaders and followers alike to identify the hidden groups in society and/or organisations.
(3) Recognised the importance of followers' agential propensities as linked to situations.
(4) Emphasised the importance and presence of agential and situated followers that can influence leaders' performance and behaviour, especially as self-defence agents.

C. FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIP MODEL

(1) Showed the interplay between contexts, followers, determinants and leaders by creating three follower groupings and showing the consequences of certain followers' positions within LFRs.
(1) Allowed followers and leaders to move beyond the negative fall-out from dark leadership and deviant follower behaviour.
(2) Permitted stakeholders to take stock of their own positionalities and re-direct their relationships and behaviours towards a better situational/organisational fit.
(3) Created paradoxical determinants (lawfulness, social self-defence agents, values, leadership) that show the interconnectivity between positionality and underlying value systems.
(4) Created quadrangles that allow visualisation of LFR that inform managers and followers on their positioning in order to re-direct defiance and/or dark leadership.

Thus, this thesis provided a more balanced leader-follower relationship paradigm that necessitates effective participatory mechanisms, servant leaders and empowered followers when facing transitions and change. Leader-follower relationships were de-constructed to fit into the public sphere; but also re-constructed for organisational purposes. This study also acknowledged that both the public and organisational spheres are at best imperfect and dysfunctional, resulting in negative outcomes especially when leaders are de-coupled from their own values and followers. Effective change management thus requires leaders to reconnect with values, laws and followers that will improve organisational citizenship and efficiencies. Nonetheless, change agents can position stakeholders in different contexts to strengthen accountability and good governance, thus moving away from pseudoism.

3.6 Future research

Despite adding new knowledge to the fields of followership and leadership future research endeavours are a definitive next step. Areas that need further investigation are linked to [1] ***testing*** and [2] capturing the different challenges within the public and organisational ***domains.***

Neither my *follower relationship model* nor my *matrix* have been **tested**. The quantifiability of the model is also untested. By following interpretivist approaches I need to verify whether the constructs are relatable, applicable and adjustable.

Regarding *followers* certain questions require further research: Will the 'in-betweeners' expand beyond the FRM groupings, superseding LFRs and thus cementing leaderless groups that are forceful voices, nonetheless? What are the followers' perceptions regarding FRM, determinants, causal underbelly and group formation, as based on their own positionality and identification with leaders? Will the use of diagnostic models such as the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire or the Mor Barak Inclusion-Exclusion Scale add greater insight regarding the psychological behavioural aspects of followers, as linked to organisational studies?

Additionally, there is a need to provide a stronger African voice to predominantly western contexts and research. The cultural richness of Africa, as coupled with our unique histories and journeys, will add greater depth to followership and leadership thinking. By expanding *leadership* styles that will create a clearer African appreciation is of equal significance and is already a work in progress. Moreover, does place leadership fit into my research? Can I narrow it down to the organisational and public sphere? And would I be able to connect with larger research groups in order to add a new African voice to current projects and initiatives?

It would be of equal value to determine whether there are any tensions observed within municipalities regarding ineffective leadership, competent technocrats and political appointees. By testing FRM and the follower matrix I can ascertain whether patronage also result in organisational behavioural change and defiance. Moreover, within any organisation, change agents, teams and leaders can test the FRM to verify that it assists in change management, recruitment and learning, whilst also ascertain if it enhances positive organisational citizenship and strong organisational culture. The quantifiability and applicability of the quadrangles, as linked to the paradoxical determinants, can also be tested. Additionally, by testing LFRs and FRM within international subsidiaries I can add greater understanding regarding expatriates' career pathways and their own unique LFRs and positionalities.

Aspects pertaining the globality of defiance, as linked to local *domains,* are exciting areas to explore especially since 2019 was marred by uncharacteristically high numbers of

protests across the globe, challenging democratic and authoritarian governments alike. Governmental decisions and actions - whether social, economic or political – triggered protests across the world: UK (Brexit); Hong Kong (the umbrella movement); Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Bolivia, Argentina, France (Yellow Vests), to mention a few. Can these protestors be SSD agents or simply leaderless movements? Are they part of the OUT-group or in-OUT-group and will their defiance see any positive results? Testing my FRM among the marginalised and affluent public sector sections would establish whether followers' can utilise FRM in order to shape their own positionalities and LFRs. Additionally, their insight into relationships' determinants and the causal underbelly would result in adaptation or verification of this thesis. These events create a sense of relevance towards my thesis, as well as a feeling of urgency. Hence, the public sphere needs special recognition and priority.

These areas and questions are filled with promise and excitement, a sign that the conclusion of this thesis only leads to more opportunities than initially imagined.

3.7 My concluding thoughts

We live in an imperfect world, filled with flawed followers and leaders, and an environment burning. Popular movements are everywhere, with followers showing increased signs of frustrations towards their leaders' rhetoric and detachment. A world eager for change. Yet, we are not truly moving closer to change.

Are the followers' voices heard? Are their dire situations redressed? No, they are not. Hence the need to re-position the followers within the leader-follower relationships, re-claiming their voice amongst all the prejudice and patronage they experience. Leaders need to re-direct themselves, by re-connecting with values that matter to all of us, thus steering away from victimisation, greed and detachment.

This thesis main aim therefore was to re-*position the followers within the leader-follower relationships, as experienced within South Africa's public sphere*. This thesis achieved this main aim by re-connecting my publications with current theoretical trends and de-constructing public leadership theory. By re-claiming the position of the followers this thesis has identified the factors that inform the followers position in LFR, as well as identifying the causal relationship between these themes and leader-follower behaviours.

Contributions to new knowledge is observed with the creation of a *follower relationship model*, follower matrix and a new follower group: the *'in-betweeners'* (in-OUT-group) that can transfer into *social self-defence agents*. Common contexts or pathways can now be applied in both the workplace and public sphere, as shaped by prejudice, defiance and patronage, and of course dark leadership. Moreover, the importance of leader-follower relationships and contexts are re-claimed.

Personally, the insignificance of my research nudged me to this exact moment, following many different journeys along the way. Will my journey end, once I complete this PhDP? Surely not, since I will continue to focus on the unsung stories of the followers, more specifically the 'in-betweeners' and outsiders. And as much as the submission of this thesis indicates the last stage of my PhD journey, I know that many other pathways will continue to entice me to keep on trying to add significance. One step at a time.

EPILOGUE

This thesis represents me: a researcher, a survivor and an outsider. But more importantly this thesis stands for all those defying deceptive leadership whilst fighting for a better life. And a right to be heard. Yes, as a social constructivist I never managed to escape my identity and the role that the environment has played into that. I created meaning and connections by identifying certain themes that play a huge role in the South African society, which highlighted the multidimensionality of our lives - publicly or organisationally - as seen through the lenses of the followers. This thesis is also about my imperfect research journey that re-connects the contradictory, and yet interrelated forces that shape our ever-changing positions within the flawed world we all live in.

Will a magic wand fix all our problems, creating equality, accountability and fairness? Of course not, but awareness of our imperfectness, coupled with tools such as the follower relationship model, can help us to move towards a better place, one step at a time.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Aasland, M. S., Skogstad, A., Notelaers, G., Nielsen, M. B. and Einarsen, S. (2010) 'The Prevalence of Destructive Leadership Behaviour', *British Journal of Management*, 21, pp. 438–452.

Abrahams, C. (2016) 'Twenty Years of Social Cohesion and Nation-Building in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(1), pp. 95–107.

Adato, M., Carter, M. R. and May, J. (2006) 'Exploring poverty traps and social exclusion in South Africa using qualitative and quantitative data', *Journal of Development Studies*, 42(2), pp. 226–247.

Adeleke, F. (2017) *South Africa has work to do to make government more accountable*, *The Conversation*.

Aderemi, B. D. and Mekoa, I. (2017) 'Preventing and Managing Electoral Violence as a Threat to Democracy in South Africa', *The Anthropologist*, 29(2–3), pp. 192–201.

Agle, B. R., Sears, G. J., Sonnenfeld, J. A. and Ward, A. (2011) 'Value Congruence and Charismatic Leadership in CEO – Top Manager Relationships : An Empirical Investigation Sefa Hayibor', *Journal of Business Ethics*, 102, pp. 237–254.

Albrecht, S. (2005) 'Leadership Climate in the Public Sector: Feelings Matter Too!', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 8(5), pp. 397–416.

Alexander, P. (2010) 'Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis', *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(123), pp. 25–40.

Alexander, P. and Pfaffe, P. (2014) 'Social Relationships to the Means and Ends of Protest in South Africa's Ongoing Rebellion of the Poor: The Balfour Insurrections', *Social Movement Studies*, pp. 204–221.

Alford, J. and O'Flynn, J. (2009) 'Making sense of public value: Concepts, critiques and emergent meanings', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 32(3–4), pp. 171–191.

Allan, K. and Heese, K. (2011) Understanding why service delivery protests take place

and who is to blame, *Municipal IQ*, Available at: https://www.municipaliq.co.za/publications/articles/sunday_indep.pdf [Accessed on 5 July 2013].

Althaus, C. (2016) 'The Administrative Sherpa and the Journey of Public Service Leadership', *Administration and Society*, 48(4), pp. 395–420.

Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2018) *Reflexive methodology: new vistas for qualitative research*. 3rd edn. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Amanchukwu, R. N., Stanley, G. J. and Ololube, N. P. (2015) 'A Review of Leadership Theories, Principles and Styles and Their Relevance to Educational Management', *Management*, 5(1), pp. 6–14.

Anciano, F. (2016) 'A Dying Ideal: Non-Racialism and Political Parties in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(2), pp. 195–214.

Andersen, C. J. and Tverdova, Y. V. (2003) 'Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), pp. 91–109.

Andreasson, S. (2006) 'The African National Congress and its critics: "Predatory liberalism", black empowerment and intra-alliance tensions in post-apartheid South Africa', *Democratization*, 13(2), pp. 303–322.

Anonymous (2018) 'This is the most common type of fraud in South Africa', *BusinessTech,* Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/240279/this-is-the-most-common-type-of-fraud-in-south-africa/ [Accessed on 7 April 2019].

Armstrong, P., Lekezwa, B. and Siebrits, K. (2008) 'Poverty in South Africa : A profile based on recent household surveys Poverty in South Africa : A profile based on recent household surveys', *Statistics*, pp. 1–26.

Arnold, J. A., Arad, S., Rhoades, J. A. and Drasgow, F. (2000) 'The empowering leadership questionnaire : the construction and validation of a new scale for measuring leader behaviors', 269, pp. 249–269.

Askvik, S. (2010) 'The dynamics of political trust in South Africa, 1995-2006', *Politikon*,

37(1), pp. 25–44.

Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. (2001) *The practice of social research.* Cape Town: Oxford. University Press.

Baker, C. R. and Omilion-Hodges, L. M. (2013) 'The Effect of Leader-Member Exchange Differentiation Within Work Units on Coworker Exchange and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors', *Communication Research Reports*, 30(4), pp. 313–322.

Barbuto, J. E. and Wheeler, D. W. (2006) 'Scale development and construct clarification of servant leadership', *Group and Organization Management*, 31(3), pp. 300–326.

Barrett-Poindexter, J. (2018) *Reasons for Resignation*, *Glassdoor*, Available at: https://www.glassdoor.com/employers/blog/10-reasons-employees-resign/ [Accessed on 16 April 2019].

Bealer, D. and Bhanugopan, R. (2014) 'Transactional and transformational leadership behaviour of expatriate and national managers in the UAE: a cross-cultural comparative analysis', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 25(2), pp. 293–316.

Becker, J. A. H., Halbesleben, J. R. B. and Dan O'Hair, H. (2005) 'Defensive Communication and Burnout in the Workplace: The Mediating Role of Leader–Member Exchange', *Communication Research Reports*, 22(2), pp. 143–150.

Bedasso, B. E. and Obikili, N. (2016) 'A Dream Deferred: The Microfoundations of Direct Political Action in Pre- and Post-democratisation South Africa', *Journal of Development Studies*, 52(1), pp. 130–146.

Bénit-Gbaffou, C. and Katsaura, O. (2014) 'Community Leadership and the Construction of Political Legitimacy: Unpacking Bourdieu's "Political Capital" in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38(5), pp. 1807–1832.

Beresford, A. (2012) 'The politics of regenerative nationalism in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38(4), pp. 863–884.

Beresford, A. (2015) 'Power, patronage, and gatekeeper politics in South Africa', *African*

Affairs, 114(455), pp. 226–248.

Blaxter, L., Hughes, C. and Tight, M. (2010) *How to research*. 4th edn. New York: Open University Press.

Blommaert, J. and Bulcaen, C. (2000) 'Critical Discourse Analysis', *The Annual Review of Anthropology*, 29, pp. 447–66.

Bochel, H. and Bochel, C. (2010) 'Local political leadership and the modernisation of local government', *Local Government Studies*, 36(6), pp. 723–737.

Bond, P. (2004) 'The ANC's "Left Turn" & South African sub-imperialism', *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(102), pp. 599–616.

Bond, P. (2012) 'South African People Power since the mid-1980s: two steps forward, one back', *Third World Quarterly*, 33(2), pp. 243–264.

Bond, P. (2013) 'Debt, Uneven Development and Capitalist Crisis in South Africa: from Moody's macroeconomic monitoring to Marikana microfinance mashonisas', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(4), pp. 569–592.

Booysen, S. (1999) 'Election 1999 and Scenarios for Opposition Politics in South Africa', *Politikon*, 26(2), pp. 249–258.

Booysen, S. (2007) 'With the ballot and the brick: The politics of attaining service delivery', *Progress in Development Studies*, 7(1), pp. 21–32.

Bornman, J. (2018) 'Increase in reports of corruption in 2017', *News24*, Available at: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/increase-in-reports-of-corruption-in-2017-corruption-watch-20180404 [Accessed on 26 August 2018].

Bourdieu, P. (1995) 'Physical Space, Social Space and Habitus', in *Vilhelm Aubert Memorial Lecture*, pp. 7–22.

Brimhall, K. C., Mor Barak, M. E., Hurlburt, M., McArdle, J. J., Palinkas, L. and Henwood, B. (2017) 'Increasing Workplace Inclusion: The Promise of Leader-Member Exchange', *Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership and Governance*, 41(3), pp. 222–239.

Brouer, R. L., Duke, A., Treadway, D. C. and Ferris, G. R. (2009) 'The moderating effect of political skill on the demographic dissimilarity - Leader-member exchange quality relationship', *Leadership Quarterly*, 20(2), pp. 61–69.

Brower, H. H., David Schoorman, F., Hoon Tan, H. and Brower, H. (2000) 'A Model Of Relational Leadership: The Integration of Trust and Leader Member Exhange', *Leadership Quarterly*, 11(2), pp. 227–250.

Bruce, D. (2014) 'Control , discipline and punish ? South Africa', *SA Crime Quarterly*, 48, pp. 48–62.

Brunell, A. B., Gentry, W. A., Campbell, W. K., Hoffman, B. J., Kuhnert, K. W. and Demarree, K. G. (2008) 'Leader emergence: The case of the narcissistic leader', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(12), pp. 1663–1676.

Brunetto, Y., Shacklock, K., Bartram, T., Leggat, S. G., Farr-Wharton, R., Stanton, P. and Casimir, G. (2012) 'Comparing the impact of leader-member exchange, psychological empowerment and affective commitment upon Australian public and private sector nurses: Implications for retention', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 23(11), pp. 2238–2255.

Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2003) *Business Research Methods*. 3rd edn, *Business Research Methods*. 3rd edn. London: Oxford University Press.

Bryson, J. M. and Crosby, B. C. (2014) 'Public Value Governance: Moving beyond Traditional Public Administration and the New Public Management', *Public Administration Review*, 74(4), pp. 445–456.

Burke, J. (2018) *Zuma in the dock: South Africa's ex-president faces corruption charges*, *The Guardian*, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/south-africa-jacob-zuma-court-corruption-charges [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Burnes, B. (2014) *Managing change*. 6th edn. London: Pearson.

Burr, V. (2003) *Social Constructionism*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Campbell, J. (2018) 'Recently-appointed Minister of Public Enterprises Pravin Gordhan

Ramaphosa Administration Moves to Clean up SOEs in South Africa', *Council on Foreign Relations: Africa in Transition*.

Chandler, D. J. (2009) 'The Perfect Storm of Leaders' Unethical Behavior: A Conceptual Framework', *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, 5(1), pp. 69–93.

Chen, Y., Yu, E. and Son, J. (2014) 'Beyond leader-member exchange (LMX) differentiation: An indigenous approach to leader-member relationship differentiation', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(3), pp. 611–627.

Chikulo, B. C. (2013) 'Developmental local governance and service delivery in South Africa: Progress, achievements and challenges', *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 28(1), pp. 35–64.

Chiniara, M. and Bentein, K. (2018) 'The servant leadership advantage: When perceiving low differentiation in leader-member relationship quality influences team cohesion, team task performance and service OCB', *Leadership Quarterly*, 29(2), pp. 333–345.

Chipkin, I. (2013) 'Whither the State? Corruption, Institutions and State-Building in South Africa', *Politikon*, 40(2), pp. 211–231.

Chipkin, I. (2016) 'The Decline of African Nationalism and the State of South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(2), pp. 215–227.

Choi, S. (2007) 'Democratic Leadership : The Lessons of Exemplary Models for Democratic Governance', *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, 2(3), pp. 243–262.

Chughtai, A. A. (2016) 'Servant Leadership and Follower Outcomes: Mediating Effects of Organizational Identification and Psychological Safety', *The Journal of Psychology*, 150(7), pp. 866–880.

Clarke, G. and Lunt, I. (2014) 'The concept of "originality" in the Ph.D.: How is it interpreted by examiners?', *Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education*, 39(7), pp. 803–820.

Cogliser, C. C., Schriesheim, C. A., Scandura, T. A. and Gardner, W. L. (2009) 'Balance in leader and follower perceptions of leader-member exchange: Relationships with

performance and work attitudes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 20(3), pp. 452–465.

Conger, J. A. (1990) 'The Dark Side of Leadership', *Organizational Dynamics*, 19(2), pp. 44–55.

Conradie, M. (2016) 'New South Africa Speak: race talk in an undergraduate debate on racialisation in post-apartheid South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 34(4), pp. 479–497.

Corruption Watch (2015) *Corruption and the Law in South Africa – Part one*.

Cotterill, J. (2017) 'South Africa's Eskom reappoints chief tarnished by corruption report', *Financial Times*.

Creswell, J. W. (2007) *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Crosby, B. C. and Bryson, J. M. (2005) 'A leadership framework for cross-sector collaboration', *Public Management Review*, 7(2), pp. 177–201.

Crosby, B. C. and Bryson, J. M. (2017) 'Why leadership of public leadership research matters: and what to do about it', *Public Management Review*, pp. 1–22.

Crotty, M. (1998) *Introduction: the research process*, *The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process*. London: Sage Publications.

Cunha, M., Fortes, A., Gomes, E., Rego, A. and Rodrigues, F. (2016) 'Ambidextrous leadership, paradox and contingency: evidence from Angola', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 5192, pp. 1–26.

Cunliffe, A. L. (2003) 'Reflexive inuiry in organizational research: questions and possibilies', *Human Relations*, 56(8), pp. 983–1003.

Cuthbertson, G. (2008) 'South Africa's democracy: from celebration to crisis', *African Identities*, 6(3), pp. 293–304.

Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A. and Weldon, S. (2010) 'The individual-institutional nexus of protest behaviour', *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(1), pp. 51–73.

Davila, A. and Elvira, M. M. (2012) 'Humanistic leadership: Lessons from Latin America', *Journal of World Business*, 47(4), pp. 548–554.

Davis, W. D. and Gardner, W. L. (2004) 'Perceptions of politics and organizational cynicism: An attributional and leader-member exchange perspective', *Leadership Quarterly*, 15(4), pp. 439–465.

Day, D. V., Fleenor, J. W., Atwater, L. E., Sturm, R. E. and McKee, R. A. (2014) 'Advances in leader and leadership development: A review of 25 years of research and theory', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(1), pp. 63–82.

Deegan, H. (2011) *Politics South Africa*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Desai, A. (2002) 'Neoliberalism and Resistance in South Africa', *Monthly Review Press*, pp. 16–29.

De Ver, H. L. (2009) *Conceptions of Leadership*, DLP Background Paper. Sydney. Australian Press.

De Vries, M. F. R. K. and Miller, D. (1985) 'Narcissism and Leadership: An Object Relations Perspective', *Human Relations*, 38(6), pp. 583–601.

Dinh, J. E., Lord, R. G., Gardner, W. L., Meuser, J. D., Liden, R. C. and Hu, J. (2014) 'Leadership theory and research in the new millennium: Current theoretical trends and changing perspectives', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(1), pp. 36–62.

Dionne, S. D., Gupta, A., Sotak, K. L., Shirreffs, K. A., Serban, A., Hao, C., Kim, D. and Yammarino, F. J. (2014) 'A 25-year perspective on levels of analysis in leadership research', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(1), pp. 6–35.

Donia, M. B. ., Raja, U., Panaccio, A. and Wang, Z. (2016) 'Servant leadership and employee outcomes : the moderating role of subordinates ' motives', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 25(5), pp. 722–734.

Dudley, D. (2019) 'The Most Corrupt Countries In The World', *Forbes*, Available at: www.transparency.org/cpi [Accessed on 2 February 2019].

Dulebohn, J. H., Bommer, W. H., Liden, R. C., Brouer, R. L. and Ferris, G. R. (2011) 'A

Meta-Analysis of Antecedents and Consequences of Leader-Member Exchange: Integrating the Past With an Eye Toward the Future', *Journal of Management*, 38(6), pp. 1715–1759.

Dulebohn, J. H., Bommer, W. H., Liden, R. C., Brouer, R. L. and Ferris, G. R. (2012) 'A Meta-Analysis of Antecedents and Consequences of Leader-Member Exchange: Integrating the Past With an Eye Toward the Future', *Journal of Management*, 38(6), pp. 1715–1759.

Duncan, J. (2016) *Protest Nation: The Right to Protest in South Africa*. Durban: UKZN University Press.

Dyhrberg-Noerregaard, N. and Kjaer, U. (2014) 'Non-Zero-Sum Leadership Games: Is Facilitative Leadership a Win-Win?', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 37(4), pp. 249–258.

Egbert, J. and Sanden, S. (2014) *Foundations of education research: Understanding theoretical components*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009) 'Political leadership and bureaucratic autonomy: Effects of agencification', *Governance*, 22(4), pp. 673–688.

Einarsen, S., Aasland, M. S. and Skogstad, A. (2007) 'Destructive leadership behaviour: A definition and conceptual model', *Leadership Quarterly*, 18(3), pp. 207–216.

Elcock, H. and Fenwick, J. (2012) 'The political leadership matrix: A tool for analysis', *Public Money and Management*, 32(2), pp. 87–94.

Emmett, T. (2000) 'Beyond community participation? Alternative routes to civil engagement and development in South Africa', *Development Southern Africa*, 17(4), pp. 501–518.

Epitropaki, O., Kark, R., Mainemelis, C. and Lord, R. G. (2017) 'Leadership and followership identity processes: A multilevel review', *Leadership Quarterly*, 28(1), pp. 104–129.

Epitropaki, O. and Martin, R. (2004) 'Implicit Leadership Theories in Applied Settings: Factor Structure, Generalizability, and Stability Over Time', *Journal of Applied*

Psychology, 89(2), pp. 293–310.

Epitropaki, O. and Martin, R. (2013) 'Transformational-transactional leadership and upward influence: The role of Relative Leader-Member Exchanges (RLMX) and Perceived Organizational Support (POS)', *Leadership Quarterly*, 24(2), pp. 299–315.

Everatt, D. (2008) 'The Undeserving Poor: Poverty and the Politics of Service Delivery in the Poorest Nodes of South Africa', *Politikon*, 35(3), pp. 293–319.

Everatt, D. (2016) 'The Era of Ineluctability? Post-Apartheid South Africa After 20 Years of Democratic Elections', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(1), pp. 49–64.

Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997) 'Discourse As Social Interaction', in *Discourse As Social Interaction*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 258–284.

Felfe, J. and Schyns, B. (2010) 'Followers' personality and the perception of transformational leadership: Further evidence for the similarity hypothesis', *British Journal of Management*, 21(2), pp. 393–410.

Fenwick, J. and Elcock, H. (2005) 'New development: The elected mayor and local leadership', *Public Money and Management*, 25(1), pp. 61–66.

Finlay, L. (2006) '" Rigour ", " Ethical Integrity " or " Artistry "? Reflexively reviewing criteria for evaluating qualitative research', *British Journal of Occupational Therapy*, 69(7), pp. 319–326.

Focht, A. and Ponton, M. (2015) 'Identifying Primary Characteristics of Servant Leadership: DELPHI STUDY', *International Journal of Leadership Studies*, 9(1), pp. 44–61.

Fowler, J. H. and Kam, C. D. (2007) 'Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation', *Journal of Politics*, 69(03), pp. 813–827.

Francis, K., Mills, J., Chapman, Y. and Birks, M. (2009) 'Doctoral dissertations by publication: building scholarly capacity whilst advancing new knowledge in the discipline of nursing', *International Journal of Doctoral Studies*, 4, pp. 97–106.

Freedom House (2018) *Freedom House,* Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/

[Accessed on 26 August 2018].

Fritzen, S. A., Serritzlew, S. and Svendsen, G. T. (2014) 'Corruption, Trust and their Public Sector Consequences: Introduction to the Special Edition', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 16(2), pp. 117–120.

Gabel-Shemueli, R. and Capell, B. (2013) 'Public sector values : between the real and the ideal', *Cross Cultural Management*, 20(4), pp. 586–606.

Gajendran, R. S. and Joshi, A. (2012) 'Innovation in globally distributed teams: The role of LMX, communication frequency, and member influence on team decisions.', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 97(6), pp. 1252–1261.

Gallop, G. (2011) 'New development: Public leadership, public value and the public interest', *Public Money & Management*, 31(5), pp. 371–376.

Geer-Frazier, B. (2014) 'Complexity leadership generates innovation, learning, and adaptation of the organization', *Emergence: Complexity and Organization*, 16(3), pp. 105–116.

Gennaro, S. (2015) 'Building a Research Trajectory', *Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, 47(4), pp. 285–286.

Gibson, J. L. and Caldeira, G. A. (2003) 'Defenders of democracy? Legitimacy, popular acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court', *Journal of Politics*, 65(1), pp. 1–30.

Giessner, S. R., van Knippenberg, D. and Sleebos, E. (2009) 'License to fail? How leader group prototypicality moderates the effects of leader performance on perceptions of leadership effectiveness', *Leadership Quarterly*, 20(3), pp. 434–451.

Gilbert, N. and Stoneman, P. (2016) *Researching Social Life*. 4th edn. London: Sage Publications.

Giliomee, H., Myburgh, J. and Schlemmer, L. (2001) 'Dominant Party Rule , Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa', *Democratization*, 8(1), pp. 161–182.

Ginges, J. and Atran, S. (2009) 'What motivates participation in violent political action:

selective incentives or parochial altruism?', *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1167, pp. 115–23.

Golafshani, N. (2003) 'Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research', *The Qualitative Report*, 8(4), pp. 597–607.

Gordon, S. L. (2018) 'Racial animosity and political party partisanship in South Africa: the case of the African National Congress and the Black African majority', *Democratization*, 25(2), pp. 351–368.

Gouws, A. and Schulz-Herzenberg, C. (2016) 'What's trust got to do with it? Measuring levels of political trust in South Africa 20 years after democratic transition', *Politikon*, 43(1), pp. 7–29.

Graen, G. B. and Uhl-Bien, M. (1995) 'Relationship-based approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory of leadership over 25 years: Applying a multi-level multa-domain perspective', *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, pp. 219–247.

Graf, M. M., van Quaquebeke, N. and van Dick, R. (2011) 'Two Independent Value Orientations: Ideal and Counter-Ideal Leader Values and Their Impact on Followers' Respect for and Identification with Their Leaders', *Journal of Business Ethics*, 104(2), pp. 185–195.

Gregersen, S., Vincent-Höper, S. and Nienhaus, A. (2016) 'Job-related resources, leader–member exchange and well-being–a longitudinal study', *Work and Stress*, 30(4), pp. 356–373.

Grix, J. (2010) *The Foundations of Research*. 2nd edn. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grover, S. L. (2014) 'Moral Identity as a Lens for Interpreting Honesty of Indirect Leaders', *Journal of Change Management*, 14(1), pp. 48–65.

Grover, S. L., Nadisic, T. and Patient, D. L. (2012) 'Bringing Together Different Perspectives on Ethical Leadership', *Journal of Change Management*, 12(4), pp. 377–381.

Gumede, A. and Bartenstein, B. (2018) 'Moody's relief: keeps SA credit rating one notch

above junk, changes outlook to stable', *BizNews,* Available at: https://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2018/03/24/moodys-sa-credit-rating-outlook-stable [Accessed on 30 August 2018].

Gumede, W. (2015) 'Marikana: A crisis of legitimacy in the institutions that form the foundations of South Africas 1994 post-apartheid political settlement', *Social Dynamics*, 41(2), pp. 327–343.

Gumede, W. M. (2005) *Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC.* Cape Town: Struik Publishers.

Habtemichael, F. and Cloete, F. (2010) 'Complexity thinking in the fight against corruption: Some perspectives from South Africa', *Politikon*, 37(1), pp. 85–105.

Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. (1989) *Organizational ecology*. Harvard University Press.

Harris, T. B., Li, N. and Kirkman, B. L. (2014) 'Leader-member exchange (LMX) in context: How LMX differentiation and LMX relational separation attenuate LMX's influence on OCB and turnover intention', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(2), pp. 314–328.

Hart, P. T. (2011) 'Evaluating public leadership: Towards an assessment framework', *Public Money and Management*, 31(5), pp. 323–330.

Haynie, J. J., Cullen, K. L., Lester, H. F., Winter, J. and Svyantek, D. J. (2014) 'Differentiated leader-member exchange, justice climate, and performance: Main and interactive effects', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(5), pp. 912–922.

Heathfield, S. M. (2019) *Workplace Violence and Who Typically Commits It*, Available at: https://www.thebalancecareers.com/workplace-violence-violence-can-happen-here-1918316 [Accessed on 8 April 2018].

Henderson, R. (2018) 'Sanlam Urges S. Africa to Tone Down on Policy to Lift Growth', *Bloomberg*, Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-06/sanlam-urges-s-africa-to-tone-down-policy-noise-to-lift-economy [Accessed on 7 September 2017].

Heres, L. and Lasthuizen, K. (2012) 'What's the Difference? Ethical Leadership in Public, Hybrid and Private Sector Organizations', *Journal of Change Management*, 12(4), pp.

441–466.

Howell, J. M. and Shamir, B. (2005) 'The Role of Followers in the Charismatic Leadership Process : Relationships and Their Consequences', *Academy of Management Review*, 30(1), pp. 96–112.

Huberts, L. W. J. C., Kaptein, M. and Lasthuizen, K. (2007) 'A study of the impact of three leadership styles on integrity violations committed by police officers', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 30(4), pp. 587–607.

Hughes, R. L., Ginnett, R. C. and Curphy, G. J. (2015) *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*. 8th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hyslop, J. (2005) 'Political corruption: Before and after apartheid', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 31(4), pp. 773–789.

Iszatt-White, M. and Saunders, C. (2014) *Leadership*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, E. M. and Johnson, R. E. (2012) 'When opposites do (and do not) attract: Interplay of leader and follower self-identities and its consequences for leader-member exchange', *Leadership Quarterly*, 23(3), pp. 488–501.

De Jager, N. and Steenekamp, C. L. (2016) 'The changing political culture of the African National Congress', *Democratization*, 23(5), pp. 919–939.

Jahedi, M., Abdullah, F. S. and Mukundan, J. (2014) 'An Overview of Focal Approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis', *International Journal of Education and Literacy Studies*, 2(4), pp. 195–196.

Janks, H. (1997) 'Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 18(3), pp. 329–342.

Johnston, A. (2014) *South Africa - inventing the nation*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Jurek, S. J. and Scime, A. (2014) 'Achieving democratic leadership: A data-mined prescription', *Social Science Quarterly*, 95(1), pp. 97–110.

Kaarsholm, P. (2009) 'Public spheres, hidden politics and struggles over space:

Boundaries of public engagement in post-apartheid South Africa', *Social Dynamics*, 35(2), pp. 411–422.

Kaase, M. (1999) 'Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalised political participation in Western Europe', *West European Politics*, 22(3), pp. 1–21.

Karakitapoğlu-Aygün, Z. and Gumusluoglu, L. (2013) 'The bright and dark sides of leadership: Transformational vs. non-transformational leadership in a non-Western context', *Leadership*, 9(1), pp. 107–133.

Kark, R., Shamir, B. and Chen, G. (2003) 'The Two Faces of Transformational Leadership: Empowerment and Dependency', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(2), pp. 246–255.

Keuschnigg, M. and Schikora, J. (2014) 'The dark side of leadership: An experiment on religious heterogeneity and cooperation in India', *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 48, pp. 19–26.

Khoo, H. S. and Burch, G. S. J. (2008) 'The "dark side" of leadership personality and transformational leadership: An exploratory study', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 44(1), pp. 86–97.

Kjaer, U. (2013) 'Local Political Leadership: The Art of Circulating Political Capital', *Local Government Studies*, 39(2), pp. 253–272.

Klandermans, B., Roefs, M. and Olivier, J. (2001) 'Grievance Formation in a Country in Transition: South Africa, 1994-1998', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(1), pp. 41–54.

De Klerk, M. (2018) 'Lessons in leadership for Ramaphosa from Madiba, Mbeki and Zuma', *Business Day,* Available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-07-24-lessons-in-leadership-for-ramaphosa-from-madiba-mbeki-and-zuma/ [Accessed on 15 January 2019].

Koenane, M. L. J. (2017) 'The role and significance of traditional leadership in the governance of modern democratic South Africa', *Africa Review*, 0(1), pp. 1–14.

Koenane, M. L. and Mangena, F. (2017) 'Ethics , accountability and democracy as pillars of good governance Case of South Africa', *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 9(5), pp. 61–73.

Kressel, K. (1997) 'Practice-Relevant Research in Mediation: Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm', *Negotiation Journal*, pp. 143–160.

Kuvaas, B., Buch, R., Dysvik, A. and Haerem, T. (2012) 'Economic and social leader-member exchange relationships and follower performance', *Leadership Quarterly*, 23(5), pp. 756–765.

Kynoch, G. (2016) 'Apartheid's Afterlives: Violence, Policing and the South African State', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(1), pp. 65–78.

Laderchi, C. R., Saith, R. and Stewart, F. (2003) 'Does it matter that we do not agree on the definition of poverty? A comparison of four approaches', *Oxford Development Studies*, 31(3), pp. 243–274.

Lavigne, E. (2017) *Defining a Research Trajectory: A calm place*, Available at: http://acalmplace.org/impostor-syndrome/2017/1/30/defining-a-research-trajectory [Accessed on 25 April 2018].

Lavine, M. (2014) 'Paradoxical Leadership and the Competing Values Framework', *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 50(2), pp. 189–205.

Leach, S. and Wilson, D. (2002) 'Rethinking local political leadership.', *Public Administration*, 80(4), pp. 665–689.

Lee, S. T. and Cheng, I. H. (2011) 'Characteristics and dimensions of ethical leadership in public relations', *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 23(1), pp. 46–74.

Le Pere, G. (2017) 'Ubuntu As Foreign Policy: the Ambiguities of South Africa'S Brand Image and Identity', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39(1), pp. 93–115.

Liddle, J. (2007) 'Challenges to democratic legitimacy, scrutiny, accountability in the UK national and local state', *Public Administration Quarterly*, pp. 397–428.

Liddle, J. (2010) 'Twenty-first-century public leadership within complex governance systems: Some reflections', *The Policy Press*, 38(4), pp. 657–663.

Liddle, J. (2018) 'Aligning vertical structures and horizontal relationships: collaborative leadership and accountability mec hanisms to enhance economic growth in England',

International Review of Administrative Sciences, 84(4), pp. 659–674.

Lindberg, S. I. (2003) '"It's our time to 'chop'": Do elections in Africa feed neo-patrimonialism rather than counteract it?', *Democratization*, 10(2), pp. 121–140.

Ling, Q., Lin, M. and Wu, X. (2016) 'The trickle-down effect of servant leadership on frontline employee service behaviors and performance: A multilevel study of Chinese hotels', *Tourism Management*, 52, pp. 341–368.

Ling, Q., Liu, F. and Wu, X. (2017) 'Servant Versus Authentic Leadership: Assessing Effectiveness in China's Hospitality Industry', *Cornell Hospitality Quarterly*, 58(1), pp. 53–68.

Linstead, S., Maréchal, G. and Griffin, R. W. (2014) 'Theorizing and Researching the Dark Side of Organization', *Organization Studies*, 35(2), pp. 165–188.

Lipton, M. (2014) 'Is South Africa's constitutional democracy being consolidated or eroded?', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21(1), pp. 1–26.

Little, L. M., Gooty, J. and Williams, M. (2016) 'The role of leader emotion management in leader-member exchange and follower outcomes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 85–97.

Liu, D., Liao, H. U. I. and Loi, R. (2012) 'The dark side of leadership : a three-level investigation of the cascading effect of abusive supervision on employee creativity', *Academy of Management Journal*, 55(5), pp. 1187–1212.

Lodge, T. (2013) 'The African National Congress and the regeneration of political power', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31(2), pp. 325–327.

Lodge, T. (2014) 'Neo-patrimonial politics in the ANC', *African Affairs*, 113(450), pp. 1–23.

Lowndes, V. and Leach, S. (2004) 'Understanding local political leadership: Constitutions, contexts and capabilities', *Local Government Studies*, 30(4), pp. 557–575.

Luo, B., Zheng, S., Ji, H. and Liang, L. (2018) 'Ambidextrous leadership and TMT-member

ambidextrous behavior: the role of TMT behavioral integration and TMT risk propensity', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 29(2), pp. 338–359.

Ma, L. and Qu, Q. (2010) 'Differentiation in leader-member exchange: A hierarchical linear modeling approach', *Leadership Quarterly*, 21(5), pp. 733–744.

Macdonald, G. (2015) 'Racial Politics and Campaign Strategy in South Africa's 2009 Election', *Politikon*, 42(2), pp. 155–176.

Mahlati, Z. (2018) 'ANC defends Yengeni appointment as chair of crime and corruption group.', *IOL News,* Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-defends-yengeni-appointment-as-chair-of-crime-and-corruption-group-15690297 [Accessed on 26 August 2018].

Malterud, K. (2001) 'Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines', *The Lancet*, 358, pp. 483–488.

Mandela, N. R. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*. London: Abacus.

Markham, S. E., Yammarino, F. J., Murry, W. D. and Palanski, M. E. (2010) 'Leader-member exchange, shared values, and performance: Agreement and levels of analysis do matter', *Leadership Quarterly*, 21(3), pp. 469–480.

Marx, A. W. (1997) 'Apartheid's end: South Africa's transition from racial domination', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20(3), pp. 474–496.

Masenya, M. J. (2017) 'Neo-Patrimonialism, Corruption and Governance in South Africa', *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 9(9), pp. 146–156.

Mathieu, C., Neumann, C. S., Hare, R. D. and Babiak, P. (2014) 'A dark side of leadership: Corporate psychopathy and its influence on employee well-being and job satisfaction', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 59, pp. 83–88.

Mawere, M. (2014) 'Traditional Leadership , Democracy and Social Equality in Africa : the Role of Traditional Leadership in Emboldening', *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 5(5.3), pp. 1–11.

Mazur, K. (2012) 'Leader-Member Exchange and Individual Performance. The Meta-analysis', *Management*, 16(2), pp. 40–53.

Mbatha, K. (2018) 'The thuma mina magic is working, getting countries to invest in SA', *City Press*, Available at: https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/the-thuma-mina-magic-is-working-getting-countries-to-invest-in-sa-20180724 [Accessed on 27 July 2018].

McDonald, D. A. (2010) 'Ubuntu bashing: The marketisation of "African values" in South Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(124), pp. 139–152.

McKinley, D. T. (2010) 'South Africa: Progressive constitution, conservative country', *Pambazuka News*.

Mclaughlin, M. (1963) *Quotes and Sayings*, *The Neurotic's Notebook*.

Medhurst, A. and Albrecht, S. (2016) 'Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management : An Article information ', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 11(2), pp. 22–45.

Members of Parliament (2019) *Conservative Members*.

Men, L. R. and Stacks, D. (2014) 'The Effects of Authentic Leadership on Strategic Internal Communication and Employee-Organization Relationships', *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 26(4), pp. 301–324.

Mertens, D. M. (2010) *Research and Evaluation in Education and Psychology*. 3rd edn. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Metz, T. and Gaie, J. B. R. (2010) 'The African ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for research on morality', *Journal of Moral Education*, 39(3), pp. 273–290.

Miao, Q., Newman, A., Schwarz, G. and Xu, L. (2014) 'Servant leadership, trust, and the organizational commitment of public sector employees in China', *Public Administration*, 92(3), pp. 727–743.

Mkhize, M. C. (2015) 'Is South Africa's 20 years of democracy in crisis? Examining the impact of unrest incidents in local protests in the post-apartheid South Africa',

African Security Review, 24(2), pp. 190–206.

Mkokeli, S. (2018) 'Ramaphosa Shine Fades as Reality Bites South African Economy', *Bloomberg,* Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-18/ramaphosa-s-shine-fades-as-reality-bites-south-african-economy?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&utm_campaign=Pol&cmpId=GP.Pol. [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Mogashoa, T. (2014) 'Understanding Critical Discourse Analysis in Qualitative Research', *International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education*, 1(7), pp. 104–113.

Mora, C. and Ticlau, T. (2012) 'Transformational leadership in the public sector . A pilot study using MLQ to evaluate leadership style in Cluj county local authorities', *Review of research and social intervention*, 36, pp. 74–98.

Morrell, K. and Hartley, J. (2006) 'A model of political leadership', *Human Relations*, 59(4), pp. 483–504.

Mottiar, S. and Bond, P. (2012) 'The Politics of Discontent and Social Protest in Durban', *Politikon*, 39(3), pp. 309–330.

Muller, M. (2015) 'African Philosophy of Ubuntu', in O'Gorman, K. and MacIntosh, R. (eds) *Introducing management in a global context*. Goodfellow Publishers., p. 312.

Muxe, N. G. (2007) 'Ubuntu as public policy in South Africa: A conceptual framework', *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, 2(1), pp. 88–100.

Naidoo, K. (2011) 'Poverty and socio-political transition: Perceptions in four racially demarcated residential sites in Gauteng', *Development Southern Africa*, 28(5), pp. 627–639.

Naidoo, V. (2013) 'The politics of anti-corruption enforcement in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31(4), pp. 523–542.

Naseer, S., Raja, U., Syed, F., Donia, M. B. L. and Darr, W. (2016) 'Perils of being close to a bad leader in a bad environment: Exploring the combined effects of despotic leadership, leader member exchange, and perceived organizational politics on behaviors', *Leadership Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 14–33.

Neal, M. W. and Tansey, R. (2010) 'The dynamics of effective corrupt leadership: Lessons from Rafik Hariri's political career in Lebanon', *Leadership Quarterly*, 21(1), pp. 33–49.

Nelson, K., Boudrias, J. S., Brunet, L., Morin, D., De Civita, M., Savoie, A. and Alderson, M. (2014) 'Authentic leadership and psychological well-being at work of nurses: The mediating role of work climate at the individual level of analysis', *Burnout Research*, 1(2), pp. 90–101.

Newman, J. (2011) 'Public leadership as publicmaking', *Public Money and Management*, 31(5), pp. 315–322.

Niven, P. and Grant, C. (2012) 'PhDs by publications: An "easy way out"?', *Teaching in Higher Education*, 17(1), pp. 105–111.

Northouse, P. G. (2013) *Leadership:Theory and Practice*. 6th edn. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Nyawasha, T. S. (2016) 'The Nation and its Politics: Discussing Political Modernity in the "Other" South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(2), pp. 229–242.

Nyberg, D. and Sveningsson, S. (2014) 'Paradoxes of authentic leadership: Leader identity struggles', *Leadership*, 10(4), pp. 437–455.

O'Gorman, K. and MacIntosh, R. (2014) *Research Methods for Business and Management*. 2nd edn, *the Global Management Series*. 2nd edn. London: Goodfellow Publishers.

O'Reilly, K. (2012) 'Ethnographic returning, qualitative longitudinal research and the reflexive analysis of social practice', *Sociological Review*, 60(3), pp. 518–536.

Oc, B. (2018) 'Contextual leadership: A systematic review of how contextual factors shape leadership and its outcomes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 29(1), pp. 218–235.

Oc, B. and Bashshur, M. R. (2013) 'Followership, leadership and social influence', *Leadership Quarterly*, 24(6), pp. 919–934.

Omarjee, L. (2017) More than 50% of SA's population is living in poverty*, Fin24,*

Available at: https://www.fin24.com/Economy/more-than-50-of-sas-population-is-living-in-poverty-20170822 [Accessed on 24 July 2018].

Ong, C. W., Roberts, R., Arthur, C. A., Woodman, T. and Akehurst, S. (2016) 'The Leader Ship Is Sinking: A Temporal Investigation of Narcissistic Leadership', *Journal of Personality*, 84(2), pp. 237–247.

Orazi, D. C., Turrini, A. and Valotti, G. (2013) 'Public sector leadership : new perspectives for research and practice', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 79(3), pp. 486–504.

Osborn, R. N., Hunt, J. G. and Jauch, L. R. (2002) 'Toward a contextual theory of leadership', *Leadership Quarterly*, 13(6), pp. 797–837.

Owens, B. P., Wallace, A. S. and Waldman, D. A. (2015) 'Leader narcissism and follower outcomes: The counterbalancing effect of leader humility', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 100(4), pp. 1203–1213.

Oyedemi, T. and Mahlatji, D. (2016) 'The "Born-free" Non-voting Youth: A Study of Voter Apathy Among a Selected Cohort of South African Youth', *Politikon*, 43(3), pp. 311–323.

Padilla, A., Hogan, R. and Kaiser, R. B. (2007) 'The toxic triangle: Destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive environments', *Leadership Quarterly*, 18(3), pp. 176–194.

Pan, W., Sun, L. Y. and Chow, I. H. S. (2012) 'Leader-Member Exchange and Employee Creativity: Test of a Multilevel Moderated Mediation Model', *Human Performance*, 25(5), pp. 432–451.

Paret, M. (2015) 'Violence and democracy in South Africa's community protests', *Review of African Political Economy*, 42(143), pp. 107–123.

Parolini, J. L. (2007) *Investigating the distinctions between transformational and servant leadership*, Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Regent University.

Parry, K. and Proctor-Thomson, S. (2002) 'Leadership, culture and performance: The case of the New Zealand public sector', *Journal of Change Management*, 3(4), pp.

376–399.

Pattinson, H. M. (2015) 'Book essay on "leadership & cultural webs in organizations: Weaver's tales"', *Journal of Business Research*, 68(12), pp. 2628–2633.

Peacock, S. (2017) 'The PhD By Publication', *International Journal of Doctoral Studies*, 12(12), pp. 123–134.

Pedersen, M. J. (2013) 'Public Service Motivation and Attraction to Public Versus Private Sector Employment: Academic Field of Study as Moderator?', *International Public Management Journal*, 16(3), pp. 357–385.

Pekerti, A. A. and Sendjaya, S. (2010) 'Exploring servant leadership across cultures: Comparative study in Australia and Indonesia', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 21(5), pp. 754–780.

Pelletier, K. L. (2012) 'Perceptions of and reactions to leader toxicity: Do leader-follower relationships and identification with victim matter?', *Leadership Quarterly*, 23(3), pp. 412–424.

Petlane, T. (2009) Spectre of Corruption Threatens Democracy, *South African Institute of International Affairs*. Johannesburg: SAIIA Press.

Pierce, J. L. and Newstrom, J. W. (2011) *Leaders and the Leadership Process: Readings, self-assessments and applications*. 6th edn. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.

Pillow, W. (2003) 'Confession , catharsis , or cure ? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as methodological power in qualitative research', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 16(2), pp. 175–196.

Plessing, J. (2017) 'Challenging Elite Understandings of Citizen Participation in South Africa', *Politikon*, 44(1), pp. 73–91.

Potgieter, E. (2017) *SA Reconciliation Barometer 2017*, Available at: www.ijr.org.za [Accessed on 26 August 2018].

Powell, D. M., O'Donovan, M. and De Visser, J. (2014) 'Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014', pp. 1–14. Cape Town.

Qu, Y. E., Dasborough, M. T., Zhou, M. and Todorova, G. (2017) 'Should Authentic Leaders Value Power ? A Study of Leaders ' Values and Perceived Value Congruence', *Journal of Business Ethics*, 7(6), pp. 1–18.

Raga, K. and Taylor, D. (2005) 'Impact of Accountability and Ethics on Public Service Delivery: A South African Perspective.', *The Public Manager*, 34, pp. 22–26.

Rawolle, S. and Lingard, B. (2008) 'The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and researching education policy', *Journal of Education Policy*, 23(6), pp. 729–741.

Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2017) *The discourse-historical approach: The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*. London: McGrawHill.

Republic of South Africa (1996) *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*.

Ricard, L. M., Klijn, E. H., Lewis, J. M. and Ysa, T. (2017) 'Assessing public leadership styles for innovation: a comparison of Copenhagen, Rotterdam and Barcelona', *Public Management Review*, 19(2), pp. 134–156.

Ritchie, G. (2018) 'SA's economy dips into recession dashing economists hopes', *Mail & Guardian,* Avaiable at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-04-sas-economy-dips-into-recession-dashing-economists-hopes [Accessed on7 September 2018].

Roberts, C. M. (2010) *The dissertation journey : a practical and comprehensive guide to planning, writing, and defending your dissertation*. 2nd edn. California: Corwin Press.

Robins, L. and Kanowski, P. (2008) 'PhD by Publication : A Student 's Perspective', *Journal of Research Practice*, 4(2), pp. 1–20.

Rong, K. and Shi, Y. (2014) *Business Ecosystems: Constructs, Configurations, and the Nurturing Process*. Sydney: Springer.

Rotberg, R. I. (2014) 'The Need for Strengthened Political Leadership', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 652(1), pp. 238–256.

Rule, S. P. (2018) 'Geography and voting: the growth of urban opposition in South Africa two decades after democratisation', *South African Geographical Journal*, 100(2), pp. 141–161.

Runciman, C. (2016) 'The "ballot and the brick": protest, voting and non-voting in post-apartheid South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 34(4), pp. 419–436.

Russell, R. F. (2001) 'The role of values in servant leadership', *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 22(2), pp. 76–84.

Ryan, M. and Ryan, M. (2012) *Developing a systematic, cross-faculty approach to teaching and assessing reflection in higher education*. Queensland University of Technology.

Samnani, A. and Singh, P. (2013) 'When leaders victimize : The role of charismatic leaders in facilitating group pressures', *The Leadership Quarterly*, 24(1), pp. 189–202.

Sartorius, K. and Sartorius, B. (2016) 'Service delivery inequality in South African municipal areas: A new way to account for inter-jurisdictional differences', *Urban Studies*, 53(15), pp. 3336–3355.

Scandura, T. A. and Lankau, M. J. (1996) 'Developing diverse leaders: A Leader-Member Exchange approach', *Leadership Quarterly*, 7(2), pp. 243–263.

Schilling, J. (2009) 'From Ineffectiveness to Destruction: A Qualitative Study on the Meaning of Negative Leadership', *Leadership*, 5(1), pp. 102–128.

Schneider, F. (2013) *How to Do a Discourse Analysis*, *PoliticsEastAsia*, Available at: http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/ [Accessed on 6 October 2019].

Schriesheim, C. A., Castro, S. L. and Cogliser, C. C. (1999) 'Leader-member exchange (LMX) research: A comprehensive review of theory, measurement, and data-analytic practices', *The Leadership Quarterly*, 10(1), pp. 63–113.

Schriesheim, C. A., Wu, J. B. and Cooper, C. D. (2011) 'A two-study investigation of item wording effects on leader-follower convergence in descriptions of the leader-member exchange (LMX) relationship', *Leadership Quarterly*, 22(5), pp. 881–892.

Schyns, B. and Croon, M. A. (2006) 'A model of task demands, social structure, and leader-member exchange and their relationship to job satisfaction', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 17(4), pp. 602–615.

Schyns, B. and Day, D. (2010) 'Critique and review of leader-member exchange theory: Issues of agreement, consensus, and excellence', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 19(1), pp. 1–29.

Schyns, B. and Schilling, J. (2013) 'How bad are the effects of bad leaders? A meta-analysis of destructive leadership and its outcomes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 24(1), pp. 138–158.

Seekings, J. (2007) *Poverty and Inequality after Apartheid*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research Social Surveys Unit.

Seekings, J. (2008) 'Deserving individuals and groups: The post-apartheid state's justification of the shape of South Africa's system of social assistance', *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, 68(1), pp. 28–52.

Seekings, J. and Kasper, N. N. (2015) *Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sendjaya, S. and Cooper, B. (2011) 'Servant Leadership Behaviour Scale : A hierarchical model and test of construct validity', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology,* 20(3), pp. 416–436.

Shafer, J. F. (2009) 'Convinced of Their Own Deceptive Aura of Greatness : Narcissism, Stress, and the Derailment of Charismatic Leaders', *Chrestomathy: Annual Review of Undergraduate Research*, 8, pp. 200–216.

Shim, D., Park, H. H. and Eom, T. H. (2016) 'Public servant leadership: Myth or powerful reality?', *International Review of Public Administration*, 21(1), pp. 3–20.

Silverman, D. (2013) *Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook*. 4th edn. London: Routledge.

Sithole, S. L. and Mathonsi, N. S. (2015) 'Local Governance Service Delivery Issues during Apartheid and Post-apartheid South Africa', *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, 3(3), p. 5.

Sotarauta, M. and Beer, A. (2016) 'Governance, agency and place leadership: lessons from a cross-national analysis', *Regional Studies*, 51(2), pp. 210–223.

Southall, R. (2000) 'The state of democracy in South Africa', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 38(3), pp. 147–170.

Southall, R. (2008) 'The ANC for sale? money, morality & business in South Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(2), pp. 281–299.

Southall, R. (2014) 'From liberation movement to party machine? The ANC in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 32(3), pp. 331–348.

Southall, R. (2016) 'The coming crisis of Zuma's ANC: the party state confronts fiscal crisis', *Review of African Political Economy*, 43(147), pp. 73–88.

Stats SA (2017a) *GDP in the first quarter of 2017 contracted by 0,7%*.

Stats SA (2017b) *Poverty on the rise in South Africa*.

Stock, R. M. and Özbek-Potthoff, G. (2014) 'Implicit leadership in an intercultural context: Theory extension and empirical investigation', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 25(12), pp. 1651–1668.

Sue-Chan, C., Au, A. K. C. and Hackett, R. D. (2012) 'Trust as a mediator of the relationship between leader/member behavior and leader-member-exchange quality', *Journal of World Business*, 47(3), pp. 459–468.

Sullivan, H., Williams, P. and Jeffares, S. (2012) 'Leadership for Collaboration: Situated agency in practice', *Public Management Review*, 14(1), pp. 41–66.

Tangri, R. and Southall, R. (2008) 'The Politics of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34(3), pp. 699–716.

Tee, E. Y. J., Paulsen, N. and Ashkanasy, N. M. (2013) 'Revisiting followership through a social identity perspective: The role of collective follower emotion and action', *Leadership Quarterly*, 24(6), pp. 902–918.

The World Factbook (2017), Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html [Accessed on 8 July 2018].

Thomas, C. G. (2010) 'Why the homeless rebel: Housing struggles in post-apartheid South Africa', *African Historical Review*, 42(2), pp. 27–47.

Thoroughgood, C. N., Padilla, A., Hunter, S. T. and Tate, B. W. (2012) 'The susceptible circle: A taxonomy of followers associated with destructive leadership', *Leadership Quarterly*, 23(5), pp. 897–917.

Trading Economics (2018) *South Africa Unemployment Rate*, *Trading Economics*, Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate [Accessed on 30 August 2018].

Trinchero, E., Borgonovi, E. and Farr-Wharton, B. (2014) 'Leader–member exchange, affective commitment, engagement, wellbeing, and intention to leave: public versus private sector Italian nurses', *Public Money and Management*, 34(6), pp. 381–388.

Tsai, C. Y., Dionne, S. D., Wang, A. C., Spain, S. M., Yammarino, F. J. and Cheng, B. S. (2017) 'Effects of relational schema congruence on leader-member exchange', *Leadership Quarterly*, 28(2), pp. 268–284.

Tse, H. H. M., Troth, A. C., Ashkanasy, N. M. and Collins, A. L. (2018) 'Affect and leader-member exchange in the new millennium: A state-of-art review and guiding framework', *Leadership Quarterly*, 29(1), pp. 135–149.

Tse, H. H. M., Ashkanasy, N. M. and Dasborough, M. T. (2012) 'Relative leader-member exchange, negative affectivity and social identification: A moderated-mediation examination', *Leadership Quarterly*, 23(3), pp. 354–366.

Tuan, T. (2017) 'Knowledge Sharing in Public Organizations: The Roles of Servant Leadership and Organizational Citizenship Behavior', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 40(4), pp. 361–373.

Tuncdogan, A., Acar, O. A. and Stam, D. (2017) 'Individual differences as antecedents of leader behavior: Towards an understanding of multi-level outcomes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 28(1), pp. 40–64.

Twala, C. (2014) 'The Causes and Socio-political Impact of the Service Delivery Protests to the South African Citizenry: A Real Public Discourse', *Journal of Social Sciences*, 39(2), pp. 159–167.

Vahed, G. and Desai, A. (2017) 'Stuck in the middle? Indians in South Africa's fading

rainbow', *South Asian Diaspora*, 9(2), pp. 147–162.

Van Dierendonck, D., Stam, D., Boersma, P., de Windt, N. and Alkema, J. (2014) 'Same difference? Exploring the differential mechanisms linking servant leadership and transformational leadership to follower outcomes', *Leadership Quarterly*, 25(3), pp. 544–562.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2006) 'Discourse, context and cognition', *Discourse Studies*, 8(1), pp. 159–177.

Van Gils, S., Van Quaquebeke, N. and Van Knippenberg, D. (2010) 'The X-factor: On the relevance of implicit leadership and followership theories for leader-member exchange agreement', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 19(3), pp. 333–363.

Van Knippenberg, D., VanKnippenberg, B., De Cremer, D. and Hogg, M. A. (2004) 'Leadership, self, and identity: A review and research agenda', *Leadership Quarterly*, 15(6), pp. 825–856.

Van Knippenberg, D. (2011) 'Embodying who we are: Leader group prototypicality and leadership effectiveness', *Leadership Quarterly*, 22(6), pp. 1078–1091.

Van Niekerk, D., Van der Waldt, G. and Jonker, A. (2001) *Governance, politics & policy in South Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Venter, A. (1998) *Government and Politics in the New South Africa.* 2nd edn. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Publishers.

Vogel, R. and Masal, D. (2015) 'Public Leadership: A review of the literature and framework for future research', *Public Management Review*, 17(8), pp. 1165–1189.

Von Holdt, K. (2013) 'South Africa: the transition to violent democracy', *Review of African Political Economy*, 40(138), pp. 589–604.

Von Holdt, K. (2014) 'On violent democracy', *Sociological Review*, 62(S2), pp. 129–151.

Wale, K. (2013) *Confronting Exclusion: Time for Radical Reconciliation. SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2013 Report*.

Wall, S. (2008) 'Easier Said than Done : Writing an Autoethnography', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 7(1), pp. 38–53.

Wallace, M., O'Reilly, D., Morris, J. and Deem, R. (2011) 'Public Service Leaders As "Change Agents" - for whom?: Responses to Leadership Development Provision in England', *Public Management Review*, 13(1), pp. 65–93.

Wang, H., Law, K. S., Hackett, R. D., Wang, D. and Chen, Z. X. (2005) 'Leader-member exchange as a mediator of the relationship between transformational leadership and followers' performance and organizational citizenship behavior', *Academy of Management Journal*, 48(3), pp. 420–432.

Van Wart, M. (2003) 'Public-sector leadership theory: An assessment', *Public Administration Review*, 63(2), pp. 214–228.

Van Wart, M. (2013a) 'Administrative leadership theory: A reassessment after 10 years', *Public Administration*, 91(3), pp. 521–543.

Van Wart, M. (2013b) 'Lessons from Leadership Theory and the Contemporary Challenges of Leaders', *Public Administration Review*, 73(4), pp. 553–565.

Welzel, C. and Inglehart, R. (2008) 'The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization', *Journal of Democracy*, 19(1), pp. 126–140.

Wentzel, J. P., Diatha, K. S. and Yadavalli, V. S. S. (2016) 'An investigation into factors impacting financial exclusion at the bottom of the pyramid in South Africa', *Development Southern Africa*, 33(2), pp. 203–214.

Wijewardena, N., Samaratunge, R. and Härtel, C. (2014) 'Creating Better Employees through Positive Leadership Behavior in the Public Sector', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 37(5), pp. 288–298.

Wilkes, R. (2004) 'Nation Politics : Deprivation, Resources, and Participation in Collective Action', 74(4), pp. 570–589.

Wilson-Prangley, A. and Olivier, J. (2016) 'Integrative Public Leadership in the private sector in South Africa', *Development Southern Africa*, 33(2), pp. 258–271.

Wodak, R. (2015) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach’, *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction*.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2014) ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology’, in *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies (Introducing Qualitative Methods series)*. London: McGrawHill, pp. 1–33.

Wu, M., Peng, Z. and Estay, C. (2018) ‘How destructive leadership influences compulsory organizational citizenship behavior’, *Chinese Management Studies*, 12(2), pp. 453–468.

Yavaş, A. (2016) ‘Sectoral Differences in the Perception of Toxic Leadership’, *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 229, pp. 267–276.

Yeo, M., Ananthram, S., Teo, S. T. T. and Pearson, C. A. (2015) ‘Leader–Member Exchange and Relational Quality in a Singapore Public Sector Organization’, *Public Management Review*, 17(10), pp. 1379–1402.

Yildiz, S. M. (2018) ‘An empirical analysis of the leader–member exchange and employee turnover intentions mediated by mobbing: evidence from sport organisations’, *Economic Research*, 31(1), pp. 480–497.

Yu, D. and Liang, J. (2004) ‘A new model for examining the leader – member exchange (lmx) theory’, *Human Resource Development International*, 7(2), pp. 251–264.

Yukl, G. (2013) *Leadership in Organizations*. 8th edn. New York: Pearson.

Zafirovski, M. (1998) ‘Socio-economics and rational choice theory: Specification of their relations’, *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 27(2), pp. 165–205.

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Statement of Authorship

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP OF PUBLICATION

On behalf of Marlene Muller

By M.L MKHIZE

I am registering for a PhD by Existing Published or Creative works. A condition of the registration is that I have a statement from collaborating authors confirming the contribution made by myself to jointly authored work. In our case the work is:

Insert details of publication(s)

- MULLER, M. and MKHIZE, M.L. (2016) 'Social self-defence: where grievances, opportunities and protests collide', World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, Vol. 12, no 4, pp.433-456.

I would be grateful if you would supply the percentage of work in that article that is attributable to me by completing and signing the following statement.

I confirm that Marlene Muller contributed 100% to the above publication.

Signature [redacted]

Date [redacted]

Appendix 2 Statement of Authorship

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP OF PUBLICATION

On behalf of Marlene Muller

By M.L MKHIZE

I am registering for a PhD by Existing Published or Creative works. A condition of the registration is that I have a statement from collaborating authors confirming the contribution made by myself to jointly authored work. In our case the work is:

Insert details of publication(s)

- MULLER, M. & MKHIZE, M. *Poverty Alleviation Through Social Self-Defense: a new political discourse?* 2ND International Conference on Emerging Research Paradigms in Business and Social Sciences, 26–28 November 2013, Dubai, UAE.

I would be grateful if you would supply the percentage of work in that article that is attributable to me by completing and signing the following statement.

I confirm that Marlene Muller contributed 90% to the above publication.

Signature [redacted]

Date [redacted]

Appendix 3 Statement of Authorship

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP OF PUBLICATION

On behalf of Marlene Muller

By N M C Zulu

I am registering for a PhD by Existing Published or Creative works. A condition of the registration is that I have a statement from collaborating authors confirming the contribution made by myself to jointly authored work. In our case the work is:

Insert details of publication

- MULLER, M. & ZULU, N.M.C. 2008. The Amakhosi – councillors' interface: the need for multi-directional capacity building and accommodation. Journal of Public Administration.

I would be grateful if you would supply the percentage of work in that article that is attributable to me by completing and signing the following statement.

I confirm that Marlene Muller contributed 100% to the above publication.

Signature [redacted]

Date [redacted]

Appendix 4 Overview of key legislative and accountability frameworks

NO	YEAR	TITLE
INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK & DOMESTIC LEGISLATION		
1	1977	Criminal Procedure Act
2	1994	Public Service Act
3	1996	The Constitution
4	1998	Executive Members Ethics Act 82 of 1998
5	1998	Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998
6	1998	Competition Act
7	1998	Witness Protection Act
8	1999	Public Finance Management Act (Number 1 of 1999)
10	2000	Protected Disclosure Act
11	2000	Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000
12	2000	Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
13	2001	Code of Conduct
14	2001	Public Service Regulations
15	2002	Public service anti- corruption strategy
16	2003	Minimum anti-corruption capacity in all departments
17	2003	General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act
18	2003	Municipal Finance Management Act
19	2004	Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act
20	2007	ANC discussion document: Revolutionary Morality: The ANC and Business
21	2008	Companies Act
22	2011	Public Sector Integrity Management Framework
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS		
23		Independent Police Investigative Directorate
24		Specialised Commercial Crime Unit

NO	YEAR	TITLE
25		Office of Witness Protection
26		National Prosecuting Authority
27		Asset Forfeiture Unit
28		Public Protector
29		Financial Intelligence Centre
30		National Anti-Corruption Hotline
31		Public Service Commission
32		Special Investigations Unit (SIU)
33		Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation
34		Public Service Management Bill identifies
NEW PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS		
35	2013	Office of Standards and Compliance
36	2013	Ethics, Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit
37	2013	Public Service Charter
38	2013	National School of Government
39	2014	Public Administration Management Bill

Sources: Naidoo, 2013; Bruce, 2014; Corruption Watch, 2015

Appendix 5 Leadership style or theory

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
1.	Chiniara and Bentein	(2018)	Servant Leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	Quantitative	229 employees in 67 teams
2.	Luo et al.	(2018)	Ambidextrous Leadership	Private Sector	China	Quantitative: questionnaires	21 CEOs and 114 top management team members
3.	Oc	(2018)	Contextual Leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A
4.	Tuan	(2017)	Servant Leadership	Public Sector	Vietnam	Quantitative: survey	562 employees and 197 department managers
5.	Ricard	(2017)	Public Leadership	Public Sector	Copenhagen, Rotterdam and Barcelona	Quantitative: questionnaires	365 senior public managers
6.	Ling *et al.*	(2017)	Servant Versus Authentic Leadership	Private Sector	China	Quantitative: Hierarchical linear modelling	1,132 employee–supervisor pair
7.	Cunha *et al.*	(2016)	Ambidextrous Leadership	Private Sector	Angola	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	91 managers
8.	Donia *et al.*	(2016)	Servant Leadership	Private Sector	Pakistan	Quantitative: survey	192 supervisor-subordinate dyads
9.	Wilson-Prangley and Olivier	(2016)	Integrative Public Leadership	Private Sector	South Africa	Qualitative: interviews	16 business leaders
10.	Chughtai	(2016)	Servant Leadership	Private Sector	Pakistan	Quantitative: questionnaires	174 full-time employees

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
11.	Ling et al.	(2016)	Servant Leadership	Private Sector	China	Quantitative: Exploratory factor analysis	435 staff members
12.	Shim et al.	(2016)	Public servant leadership	Public Sector	Korea	Quantitative: Dierendonck's conceptual model	471 local government employees
13.	Vogel and Masal	(2015)	Public Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	787 Journal Articles in English
14.	Focht and Ponton	(2015)	Servant Leadership	N.A.	N.A.	Quantitative: Delphi study	N.A.
15.	Lavine	(2014)	Paradoxical Leadership	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
16.	Bealer and Bhanugopan	(2014)	Transactional and Transformational Leadership	Private Sector	United Arab Emirates	Quantitative: questionnaires	213 expatriate managers
17.	Benit-Gbaffou and Katsaura	(2014)	Community Leadership	Public Sector	South Africa	N.A. (commentary)	N.A.
18.	Geer-Frazier	(2014)	Complexity Leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	N.A	N.A
19.	Miao et al.	(2014)	Servant Leadership	Public Sector	China	Quantitative: questionnaires	239 respondents
20.	Rotberg	(2014)	Political leadership	Public Sector	South Africa	Literature Review	N.A
21.	Nelson *et al.*	(2014)	Authentic leadership	Public Sector	Canada	Quantitative: questionnaires	859 respondents
22.	Nyberg and Sveningsson	(2014)	Authentic Leadership	Private Sector	Sweden	Qualitative: in-depth interview	9 respondents

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
23.	Miao et al.	(2014)	Servant Leadership	Public Sector	China	Quantitative: questionnaires	239 respondents
24.	Dyhrberg-Noerregaard and Kjaer	(2014)	Facilitative Leadership	Public Sector	Denmark	Quantitative: questionnaires	205 respondents
25.	Wijewardena *et al.*	(2014)	Public Sector Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Conceptual model	N.A
26.	Orazi, *et al.*	(2013)	Public Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Quantitative: Content Analysis	N.A.
27.	Van Wart	(2013b)	Administrative Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Quantitative: Content Analysis	N.A.
28.	Grover *et al.*	(2012)	Ethical Leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	5 articles
29.	Davila and Elvira	(2012)	Humanistic leadership	N.A.	N.A.	Quantitative: Content Analysis	N.A.
30.	Elcock and Fenwick	(2012)	Political leadership	Public Sector	UK, USA, Germany	Quantitative: postal surveys Qualitative: in-depth interview	18 elected mayors + councillors
31.	Heres and Lasthuizen	(2012)	Ethical Leadership	Public, Hybrid and Private Sector	The Netherlands	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	18 respondents
32.	Hart	(2011)	Public Sector Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
33.	Lee and Cheng	(2011)	Public Sector Leadership	Private Sector	United States	Qualitative: in-depth interviews	20 public relations executives
34.	Wallace	(2011)	Public Leadership	Public Sector	England	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	96 interviewees

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
35.	Newman	(2011)	Public Leadership	Public Sector	UK	Quantitative: Content Analysis	N.A.
36.	Pekerti and Sendjaya	(2010)	Servant Leadership	Private Sector	Australia and Indonesia	Quantitative: Content Analysis	555 employees
37.	Bochel and Bochel	(2010)	Local Political Leadership	Public Sector	England, Scotland and Wales	Qualitative: in-depth interview	30 respondents
38.	Egeberg and Trondal	(2009)	Political leadership	Public Sector	Norway	Quantitative: questionnaires	7000 respondents
39.	Huberts *et al.*	(2007)	Ethical Leadership	Public Sector	United States	Quantitative: Questionnaire	2390 public servants
40.	Parolini	(2007)	Transformational and Servant leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A
41.	Morrell and Hartley	(2006)	Political Leadership Model	Public Sector	England and Wales	N.A.	N.A.
42.	Barbuto and Wheeler	(2006)	Servant Leadership	Public Sector	USA	Quantitative: questionnaires	80 leaders and 388 raters
43.	Crosby and Bryson	(2005)	Collaborative Leadership	Public Sector	United States	N.A.	N.A.
44.	Elcock and Fenwick	(2005)	Political leadership	Public Sector	UK, USA, Germany	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	17 respondents
45.	Lowndes and Leach	(2004)	Local Political Leadership	Public Sector	England and Wales	Qualitative: interviews and workshops	Unknown
46.	Van Wart	(2003)	Public Sector Leadership	Public Sector	N.A.	Quantitative: Content Analysis	N.A.
47.	Parry and	(2002)	Transformational Leadership	Public Sector	New Zealand	Quantitative: comparative structural equation modelling	578 respondents

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
	Proctor-Thomson						
48.	Leach and Wilson	(2002)	Local Political Leadership	Public Sector	Britain	Literature Review	N.A
49.	Brower *et al.*	(2000)	Relational Leadership	Private Sector	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
50.	Arnold *et al.*	(2000)	Empowering leadership	Private Sector	USA	Quantitative: questionnaires Qualitative: in-depth interview	774 respondents

Appendix 6 Dark leadership

NO	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
1.	Ong *et al.*	(2016)	Narcissistic	Private Sector	N.A.	Quantitative	264 students
2.	Naseer *et al.*	(2016)	Despotic leadership	Private Sector	Pakistan	Quantitative: Questionnaires	480 respondent-peer dyads
3.	Owens *et al.*	(2015)	Leader Narcissism	Private Sector	USA	Quantitative: Questionnaires	876 respondents
4.	Keuschnigg and Schikora	(2014)	Dark side	N.A.	India	Quantitative: Game	432 Hindu and Muslim subjects
5.	Mathieu *et al.*	(2014)	Dark side	Private and Public Sector	Canada	Quantitative: Survey	Study 1: 136 employees; Study 2: 515 employees
6.	Linstead *et al.*	(2014)	Dark Side of Organization	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
7.	Karakitapoglu-Aygun and Gumusluoglu	(2013)	Transformational vs. Non-transformational	Private Sector	Turkey	Qualitative: semi-structured interviews	31 knowledge workers
8.	Samnani and Singh	(2013)	Dark side (of charismatic leadership)	Private Sector	N.A.	N.A. (Commentary)	N.A.
9.	Liu et al.	(2012)	Dark side (employee creativity)	Private Sector	United States	Quantitative: Questionnaires	762 team members in automobile parts manufacturing firm
10.	Pelletier	(2012)	Toxic leaders	Private Sector	USA	Quantitative: experimental 2×3 between-subjects factorial design	298 respondents
11.	Aasland *et al.*	(2010)	Destructive leadership	Private Sector	Norway	Quantitative: self-completed questionnaires	Employees between 18-65 years

NO	AUTHORS	DATE	LEADERSHIP	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
							employed in a Norwegian firm in the last six months
12.	Neal	(2010)	Corrupt leadership	Public Sector	Lebanon	Historical case-study method	N.A.
13.	Chandler	(2009)	Dark side	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
14.	Shafer	(2009)	Unethical leadership	Private Sector	USA	Archival research	119 participants
15.	Brunell *et al.*	(2008)	Narcissism	N.A.	N.A.	Quantitative: Questionnaires	432 psychology students
16.	Khoo and Burch	(2008)	Dark side (leadership personality and transformational leadership)	Private Sector	New Zealand	Quantitative: Survey	80 business leaders and senior managers
17.	Padilla *et al.*	(2007)	Destructive	Public and Private	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
18.	Einarsen *et al.*	(2007)	Destructive leadership	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
19.	Conger	(1990)	Unethical leadership	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
20.	De Vries and Miller	(1985)	Narcissism	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.

Appendix 7 Leader-member exchange theory

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
1.	Chiniara	(2018)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	130 teams, 403 employees
2.	Oc	(2018)	N.A	N.A.	Conceptual model	N.A
3.	Tse et al.	(2018)	Private Sector	Organisational: Australia	Literature Review	80 peer reviewed articles
4.	Yildiz	(2018)	Public Sector	Public Sector	Quantitative: Questionnaires	111 employees
5.	Brimhall *et al.*	(2017)	Public Sector	Public: USA	Quantitative: Questionnaires	363 employees (staff, supervisors and administrators)
6.	Epitropaki *et al.*	(2017)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
7.	Tsai et al.	(2017)	Private Sector	Organisational: Taiwan	Quantitative: Questionnaires	113 leader and 205 followers
8.	Tuncdogan *et al.*	(2017)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
9.	Gregersen *et al.*	(2016)	Private Sector	Organisational: Germany	Quantitative: Questionnaires	343 employees
10.	Little *et al.*	(2016)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: online Questionnaires	163 respondents
11.	Yeo et al.	(2015)	Public Sector	Public Sector: Singapore	Quantitative: Questionnaires	560 heads of units
12.	Vogel and Masal	(2015)	Public Sector	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
13.	Chen et al.	(2014)	Private Sector	Organisational: China	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	60 groups and 228 employees
14.	Dinh et al.	(2014)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
15.	Harris *et al.*	(2014)	Public Sector	Organisational: China	Quantitative: Questionnaires	223 followers and their leaders situated across 60 workgroups
16.	Haynie *et al.*	(2014)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Questionnaires	292 subordinates and 48 supervisors
17.	Trinchero *et al.*	(2014)	Public Sector	Public and Private: Italy	Quantitative: Surveys	773 nurses
18.	Wijewardena *et al.*	(2014)	Public Sector	N.A.	Conceptual model	N.A
19.	Epitropaki and Martin	(2013)	Private Sector	Organisational: British	Quantitative: questionnaires and pre-paid return envelopes	394 employees
20.	Oc and Bashshur	(2013)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
21.	Baker and Omilion-Hodges	(2013)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: online Questionnaires	67 work units
22.	Samnani and Singh	(2013)	Private Sector	N.A.	N.A. (Commentary)	N.A.
23.	Brunetto *et al.*	(2012)	Public and Private	Public and Private: Australia	Qualitative and Quantitative	1283 nurses
24.	Kuvaas *et al.*	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: Norway	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	557 employees
25.	Pan et al.	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: China	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	367 subordinates and 98 supervisors

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
26.	Pelletier	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: experimental 2×3 between-subjects factorial design	298 respondents
27.	Tse et al.	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: Australia	Quantitative: Questionnaires	388 managers and employees
28.	Gajendran and Joshi	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA, Europe, Japan, Korea, and Australia	Quantitative: online Questionnaires	167 individuals from 40 teams
29.	Sue-Chan *et al.*	(2012)	Private Sector	Organisational: Malaysia	Quantitative: online Questionnaires	1000 supervisors and subordinates
30.	Dulebohn *et al.*	(2011)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
31.	Schriesheim *et al.*	(2011)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Questionnaires	48 MBA students and 148 full time employed executive MBA students
32.	Van Knippenberg	(2011)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
33.	Felfe and Schyns	(2010)	Private Sector	Organisational: UK	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	153 clerical workers
34.	Ma and Qu	(2010)	Private Sector	Organisational: China	Quantitative: Self-completed Questionnaires	223 employees of 6 companies
35.	Markham *et al.*	(2010)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Questionnaires	100 managers and subordinates
36.	Schyns and Day	(2010)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A. (Commentary)	N.A.
37.	Brouer *et al.*	(2009)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Self-completed surveys	190 employees
38.	Cogliser *et al.*	(2009)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	285 employees and supervisors

NO.	AUTHORS	DATE	SECTOR	CONTEXT	METHODOLOGY	SAMPLE
39.	Giessner *et al.*	(2009)	Public Sector	Political parties: Germany	Quantitative: experimental field research	87 participants
40.	Schyns and Croon	(2006)	Private Sector	Organisational: East Germany	Quantitative: Structural equation modelling; questionnaires	326 employees
41.	Becker *et al.*	(2005)	Private Sector	Organisational: USA	Quantitative: Surveys	81 fire-fighters and managers
42.	Wang et al.	(2005)	Private Sector	Organisational: China	Quantitative: Survey Questionnaires	162 leader-follower dyads
43.	Yu and Liang	(2004)	Private Sector	Organisational: China	N.A.	N.A.
44.	Brower *et al.*	(2000)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
45.	Schriesheim *et al*	(1999)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
46.	Scandura and Lankau	(1996)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.
47.	Graen and Uhl-Bien	(1995)	N.A.	N.A.	Literature Review	N.A.

Appendix 8 The followers: characteristics, relationships and impact

TYPE	CHARACTERISTICS and STYLES	INPUT and OUTPUT	ORGANISATIONAL	PUBLIC SPHERE	DECEPTIVE LEADERSHIP
IN-group	**INNER CIRCLE, PRIVILEGED** 1. Strong reciprocal relationship 2. Strong identification with leaders 3. Direct, social exchange 4. Prototypicality exists 5. Loyal, personal relationships **STYLE** 1. colluders (incl. acolytes, opportunists) 2. conformist & exemplary	**Input:** Loyal, rational or naive support, push same mandate as leader. **Output:** benefits, access to resources and power.	Job security, promotion, access to resources and power. HIGH LMX, SMLX and ELMX	Political party members, family connections, clans, and fiefdoms extending grip on systems via investment/pay-offs.	Protection against law, integrated within governmental institutions, allowing patronage, nepotism and cronyism. Group values replaced by individual needs; thus making identification with dark leaders easier and rewarding.
OUT-group	**OUTSIDERS, DISTANCED** 1. No social exchange relationships 2. Belong to other groups, if at all 3. Alternative group identity 4. Transactional relationships 5. Alienated, independent, pragmatist and passive	**Input:** basic effort, resist mandate of leader. **Output:** limited benefits, no access to resources and power. Demands dismissed.	No job security and promotion. LOW LMX, SMLX and ELMX	Belong to opposition parties, perceived as fence sitters and un-patriotic.	Demands dismissed as moans, prejudice prevail Victims of unfair treatment and patronage
In-OUT-group	**IN-BETWEENERS, MARGINALISED** 1. Part of the larger IN-group 2. Weak reciprocal relationship 3. Receiving short-medium term benefits 4. Medium leader identification 5. Aspiring, conformist or potentially alienated	**Input:** (some) loyal, naive support **Output:** poor service delivery, unmet expectations and unfulfilled promises. Emerging of SSD agents	Job security but limited perks and access to resources MEDIUM LMX, SMLX and ELMX	Belong to political party but part of larger IN-group, excluded from inner circle.	Colluders: comprised of lost souls, authoritarians and bystanders, occasionally identifying with leader Alternative behaviour noted

SLMX: social exchange relationship **ELMX:** economic exchange relationship **SSD**: social self-defence

Appendix 9 Applying CDA

	DESCRIBE			INTERPRET			EXPLAIN
	Context	Statements	Sources used	Balance, meaning	Positionality	Meaning	intertextuality & interdisciplinary
1. The good, the bad and the ugly	Post-apartheid legacy [2006] Political and economic development (poverty [multi-faceted], inequality, dual economic, measured via service delivery)	Lip service, p. 233; frustration and disillusion. Mbeki > people involvement = future, p. 232; Friedman, p. 226 p. 226,230, 232	White papers, UND reports, laws, Friedman, Allan. Think tanks> IASIA, Municipal IQ, Minister Pres speeches (Mbeki, Manuel), books, journals, SA regional poverty network. Objective, academic sighting towards progressive voices	Arguments for and against governmental successes, as linked to service delivery and good governance (Development local government)	Outsider, superficial reflection. Career push to stay relevance result in steering towards public management research. Trying to be part of insiders I embrace ubuntu	IDP: accommodate + consult Batho Pele > p 1st, linked to Friedman and Mbeki quote. Yet, despite $ and intentions >> success rate slow and < impressive re representation + dual economy elimination	good governance >><<based on legal frameworks and government strategies service delivery and good governance
2. Good governance and Ubuntu	Good governance, sustainable development and ubuntu; dlg	Changing inner attitudes (Ferguson), p. *233*	Primary data: MM + JB. UDM stats. Naledi	Development local government + ubuntu accessibility		Claim to be connected and focused on people and needs, yet people feel disconnected. Trad values 2 b re-introduced > collective humanity and ownership > successes	interrelatedness between good governance, service delivery and Ubuntu, but within the micro-context of the uThungulu district municipality (UDM)
3. In church and government we trust	religio-political history interrelationship between values and leadership	Villa-Vicencio p. 131; Solomon (reconnect with ubuntu > intrinsic) p 131. Mandela, p. 129	Primary data: MM Apartheid bible; data theologian scholars like de Gruchy, Loubser, Villa-Vicencio, Jordaan, Boesak	interrelationship between values and leadership, disconnect between national narrative and individual values/opinions. Followers alienation occur (p. 131 stats)	Outsider status firmly established, still clinging to some elements of political science and religious studies	direct disconnection + distrust between followers and their leadership	Theopolitics: interrelationship between government and church. trust, leadership and values ==related 2 political parties, churches and gov. >><< death sentence, abortion, homosexuality, and land redistribution = connectors

	DESCRIBE			INTERPRET			EXPLAIN
	Context	Statements	Sources used	Balance, meaning	Positionality	Meaning	intertextuality & interdisciplinary
4. The Amakhosi-Councilors' interface	Trad leaders > custodians of culture. KZNLGTL > dev, empower, training	Case study; diverse stakeholders	Partnerships, local collaborations, leadership support, NGO $; white paper LG; TL&Gov Frwrk	p. 286/7> discrepancies in laws/white papers. Tension > trad vs modern. Post-apartheid patronage	In-OUT-group re Amakhosi although work shows insider position.	Successful, not sustainable. Own > intrinsically involved yet still outsider	Elected vs traditional, leadership <> culture ><development <>soc
5. Poverty alleviation through social self-defence	Participatory > violent> reactionary> source of discontent>>Service delivery. Gauteng region ineffective + unresponsive response from government, political trust decrease. Soc equality X. confrontational vs silent voice (re participation), crony capitalism, p. 184. History repeating	Rebellion of the poor, p.182; criminalising the poor (Goebel, p. 185); identity coalitions (Mogale, p. 185) + p. 191	Primary data= interviews > reflection unknowingly started. Lived-in experiences. Protests, riots, violence. Secondary> V Holdt, Alexander, Booyse, Akinboade.	Lip service evident. Centralist propensities reduce voice of all >> nepotism situational analysis	Outsider status firmly established, especially mirroring my expatriate status in UAE	SSD a rationale for protests	Global audience > Different sources used
6. Social self-defence	21 years LATER, individual-institutional basis of grassroots protests Relative deprivation, political distrust.	p.434. From deserving to undeserving+ Our lives, Protest nation, p. 437. Distributive grievances. Party is everything and constituencies nothing, p. 440	Grievance and political opportunity structure, soc id theory, p. 435. Structuration theory and agency	Self> inherently contextual-dependent; social judgment [436]. Unions > vacuum, global vs national vs local actors. Political id = race, culture. P. 441-442 new interpretation of employed.	Outsider status re SA remains, professionally moving towards in-OUT-group	SSD closely connected with participation, frustration and grievances	Political trust linked to socio-economic growth, equality, Ballot and the brick, social id, relative deprivation. Intergroup comparisons fuel intra-group identity. Protests > government action/attention, p. 444

	DESCRIBE			INTERPRET			EXPLAIN
	Context	Statements	Sources used	Balance, meaning	Positionality	Meaning	intertextuality & interdisciplinary
7. Democracy' s embedded paradoxes	Socio-economics of politics as linked to grievances	Sensational process of democratisation > failed state > viol democracy and racial economic equality	Self-reflection	SSD democracy barometer	Outsider status re SA remains, professionally moving towards in-OUT-group	Boils down to followers having a stronger voice than acknowledged by leaders and themselves.	Linked with literature, newspapers reports

Appendix 10 Publication no. 1

The good, the bad and the ugly: improving service delivery by replacing bad governance with goodness

Journal of Public Administration



Conference Proceedings ▼ September 2006

SOUTH AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

(Incorporating SAIPA Tydskrif vir Publieke Administrasie/Journal of Public Administration)

P.O. Box 14257
Hatfield
0028
South Africa
Tel: +27 12 420 3606 Tel/Fax: +27 12 362 5614

ISSN: 0036-0767

EDITORIAL POLICY AND MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

EDITORIAL POLICY

1. The *Journal of Public Administration* is a quarterly journal is issued on behalf of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).
2. The purpose of the *Journal* is to further the understanding of the theory and practice of Public Administration and Management by publishing articles of interest to practitioners and scholars in English.
3. The *Journal* publishes peer-reviewed articles, review articles, case studies, exemplar profiles, viewpoints and research results from practitioners of all grades and professions, academics and other specialists on the broad spectrum of administrative concerns regarding local, provincial, national, and international affairs.
4. All manuscripts are circulated anonymously to specialist referees for evaluation. Reports from referees may be made available to authors but the names of the referees will be withheld. On the basis of the referees' reports, content and other deficiencies, the Editor reserves the right to make minor alterations or to reject any manuscript.
5. Copyright of articles published in the *Journal* vests in the *Journal* and may not be published or reproduced in any form without the prior consent of the Editor.
6. **Warning:** Infringement of copyright exposes offenders to criminal proceedings that could result in civil actions and/or a fine/imprisonment and a criminal record. Therefore, authors are advised to acknowledge the origin of any content in an article or other contribution obtained from another source.
7. Reprints of articles can be obtained from the Editor on the payment of a prescribed Fee.
8. Opinions expressed in the *Journal* are, however, those of the individual authors, and are not necessarily subscribed to by the Editor, Editorial Committee or the Editorial Board.
9. Authors are required to pay a fee of R300-00 per page for any article or research results printed in the *Journal*. Payment is due on receiving confirmation from the Editor that a contribution is to be published in a particular issue of the *Journal*. Authors should consult their respective faculties or employer to establish the responsibility for the payment. An article will only be published once payment has been received. Payment should be made directly to the *Journal of Public Administration*, but proof of payment must also be submitted to the Editor to avoid any possible delay in the publication of a contribution.

MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

Except in special cases where prior permission has been obtained, articles should not exceed 5 000 words. Prospective contributors are specifically requested to ensure that the language and technical aspects of their contributions are of high standard. THREE identical copies of a manuscript, typed in **1.5 line spacing**, **12pt Times New Roman** should be submitted. A **disk** should also be submitted. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an English **abstract** of up to 200 words. Since manuscripts are circulated anonymously for evaluation, the name and affiliation of the author(s) should appear on the separate page. If the manuscript is accepted, a computer disk with the text, preferably in **MS Word or WordPerfect** must be sent to the Editor. Only the **Harvard style** will be accepted for references.

All manuscripts must be accompanied by a covering letter in which the author(s) state(s) that the manuscript has not been submitted or will not be submitted or published or is not being published elsewhere in any form unless rejected by the Editor of the *Journal of Public Administration.*

THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: IMPROVING SERVICE DELIVERY BY REPLACING BAD GOVERNANCE WITH GOODNESS

M. Muller
University of Zululand

ABSTRACT

South Africa's second decade of democracy challenges the notion of a better life for all. The gap between the rich and the poor as well as the lack of service delivery challenges the euphoria of our young democracy. Political domination in local government has resulted in poor governance and service delivery. Key management positions have been awarded to unqualified politicians, resulting in delayed service delivery and grassroots' alienation.

Strains on the government are seen with the outbreak of more and more riots, protesting against lack of service delivery, transparency, freedom and equality. The distorted successes of its progressive policies together with the high level of corruption in South Africa threaten political and social stability that is related to good governance. South Africa as a developmental state urgently needs to redress its two economies as linked to sustainable service delivery and good governance.

The paper therefore concentrates on *sustainable* service delivery as closely associated with good governance. Can bureaucratic ineffectiveness, mistrust and politicisation of administration be rectified? Are good governance and progressive policies enough to guarantee sustainable development and poverty alleviation? How much do citizens and bureaucrats take ownership of their collective responsibilities and obligations? Local government will remain in permanent fixture if accountability and public participation are replaced with nepotism and disassociation with traditional leaders.

INTRODUCTION

Global initiatives to redress poverty have been widely applauded. For the first time ever, Africa is showing potential economic growth and is veered in the direction of good governance[1], interpreted as equally important when aiming to be sustain-

able. It does seem indisputable that poverty alleviation should be linked with democracy and good governance.

The continental and regional thrust to grow economically is still severely challenged. However, South Africa itself has seen an economic growth of nearly of 5% in 2004-2005 (Manuel, 2006: 1). Unfortunately, South Africa's dual economies remain an obstacle to equality and stability. It therefore becomes imperative to bridge the gap between its first and second economies.

Within a developmental local government, public managers continue to face serious challenges as characterised by the previous apartheid-administration's racist and fragmented policies resulting in corruption and uneven development. In line with its liberal constitution, can South Africa prevent the repeated mistakes of the past such as uneven service delivery, poor governance and corruption?

Clearly South Africa's transition to democracy as a normative political system serves and enhances good governance. Subsequently poverty should be more easily rectified as well as enhancing service delivery (Wiki Encyclopedia, 2006b:1). Democracy's requirement of public officials to adopt and exercise a democratic ethos needs to be deepened in order to overcome bureaucratic ineffectiveness, mistrust and politicisation of administration.

This paper therefore explores the link between poverty alleviation, good governance and enhanced, sustainable service delivery. Finally, as stated in the *White Paper of Local Government,* 1998 that it has become vital that a strong, synergetic partnership between central and local government, civil society organisations and private and donor communities be galvanised to rectify associated inefficiencies strengthened citizen participation and accessibility to developmental local government are investigated.

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE SERVICE DELIVERY WITHIN THE DEVELOPMENTAL SOUTH AFRICA

Interrelating poverty and sustainable service delivery with good governance

In order to grasp the interrelatedness of good governance and service delivery within a sustainable and developmental environment it becomes crucial to unpack the following concepts.

Poverty symbolises the inability of individuals or communities to live a socially acceptable life as opposed to wealth that symbolises facilities and availability of adequate resources.

The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen defines poverty[2] as:

> *(having) various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and morality from illness; homelessness and*

inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterised by lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life... (Naledi, 1998: 1).

Economic growth can reduce poverty but not necessarily inequality. Should South Africa follow suit and implement the *Newly Industrialised Economies'* (NIE) interventionist strategies when eliminating poverty and inequality (May, 1998:2)? The way forward should not only be government-government but also business-business, parliament-parliament and people-people (Benn, 2005:20).

***Good governance*:** In short governance implies *to rule and being ruled in accordance to social norms and values* (Luvuno, 2003:3). To ensure sustainable human development, actions must be taken to work towards this ideal. This becomes more apparent when major donors and international financial institutions, like the IMF or World Bank, increasingly demand conditionalities when determining aid and loans by ensuring that reform and good governance are undertaken.

Good governance[3] can be best understood as a set of eight major characteristics: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. These characteristics assure that corruption is minimised; the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making.

Within the paradigm of public management the principles of good governance go even further when linking efficiency and responsiveness with the value-oriented *Batho Pele* doctrine. Local government must continuously strive for improving its organisational development, to be transparent, accountable and accessible (Gildenhuys and Knipe, 2000: 90-135). When allowing citizens to partake in IDP (Integrated Development Plan) processes and accommodating diverse role-players' needs service-delivery becomes collectively owned and likely to be more successful.

Sustainable service delivery within a public administration paradigm can be described as the implementation mechanism of public policies, ultimately striving to deliver services to the public. The capacity to deliver sustainable services is closely linked to the abilities of public organisations to deliver certain tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably. Should municipalities have the capacity to deliver it would imply that they can absorb responsibilities and operate more efficiently and independently. These capacities are once again closely link to accountability and good governance (Cloete, 2002:279). The challenge therefore lies to capacitate local government as well as to ensure that whatever successes they have regarding service delivery, that it remain *sustainable.*

Sustainable development:

Sustainable development demands ways of living, working and being that enable all people of the world to lead healthy, fulfilling, and economically secure lives without destroying the environment and without endangering the future welfare of people and the planet (Wiki Encyclopedia, 2006a:1).

Although UN definitions of sustainable development vary, its 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reiterates the *interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars* of sustainable development as economic development, social development, and environmental protection (Wiki Encyclopedia, 2006a:1).

To aptly summarise sustainable development one can consider the 2005 UK Sustainable Development Strategy that states,

> *... (Sustainable development) has the objective of enabling all people throughout the world to satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a better quality of life, without compromising the quality of life of future generations (Wiki encyclopedia 2006a).*

In short, by following a people-centred developmental approach to development sustainability will be cemented.

Corruption is the

> *abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. Public officials improperly and illegally enrich themselves or those close to them by abusing their entrusted public power. As a result service delivery and effective administration are sacrificed, especially in rural areas*[4] *(Luvuno, 2003:3)."*

Public resources that could have been utilised for sustainable development are diverted to self-enrichment schemes, sacrificing good governance ethos.

When assessing President Mbeki's State of the Nation Address in 2006, Stephen Friedman makes it clear that government is attempting to address the technical problems they face with respect to service delivery and corruption. He however firmly reiterates the fact that government's attempt will be in vain if citizens are not involved. In other words, people need to take ownership and become engaged. Greater accountability derives from active citizen participation resulting in more responsible and representative governments. Friedman's opinion is reflected in the following quote: "government only does what the people wants, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs (Friedman, 2006:20)."

The synergies between citizens and government are crucial. Good governance will become more attainable when Batho Pele and Ubuntu[5] are the premises from which they interrelate. However, the lack of a tough stance on corruption by Pres. Mbeki's 2006 State of the Nation speech leads to people not to trust government, which again leads to energies not being channeled in a pro-active way. This needs to be tackled if good governance is to be sustainable.

BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON SOUTH AFRICA'S LEVEL OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

Apartheid's policies of segregation and discrimination left legacies of inequality, poverty and dismal economic growth. Biasness towards the white minority denied the black majority opportunities to accumulate *human and physical capital*

(Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN), 2006:1). Labor market policies protected white workers whereas inferior education and influx control limited competition and access to other race groups (O' Meara, 1996:26). Apartheid promoted inequality further by unequally distributing resources such as land, mining rights and access to capital. Marginalisation resulted in a large sector of the population to menial and poorly paid sectors of the labor market. Through the state, the real effects were noted in oppression, uneven development, and exploitation, inherent of all capitalist systems (Leatt *et al*, 1986:67).

The apartheid bureaucracy promoted governance that was racially fragmented, resulting in corruption, inefficiency and ineffectiveness, corrupt law enforcement and political instability. Besides the executive branch of government that needs to adhere to good governance practices, our administrative component also need to embrace ethics and integrity as mechanisms to reverse apartheid legacies (Luvuno, 2003:1).

Figure A: Poverty in South Africa

Race	Classified as poor
African	61%
Colored	38%
Indian	5%
White	1%

Progress Report, Welfare, 1999 cited in National Report on Social Development 1995-2000[6]

Decades of political isolation, sanctions and disinvestment negatively impacted on South Africa's apartheid economy. The economic and political policies of the eighties resulted in stagnant GDP growth and a weakening in total investment[7] (Knight, 2004:1).

The new democratic dispensation

In 1994 the Government of National Unity inherited therefore a country of gross racial inequities with high chronic unemployment. By following progressive programs and policies such as the *Reconstruction and Development Program* (RDP) and GEAR (*Growth, Employment and Redistribution*), tremendous progress has been made in education, health care, housing and providing basic services[8]. But poverty continues to be widespread, income disparities remain unabridged, unemployment steadily increases (soaring to a 40% in 2005) and many people lack access to basic necessities, as constitutionally guaranteed.

The *Congress of South African Trade Unions* (COSATU) noted in 1992: "While Africans make up 76% of the population, their share of income amounts to only 29% of the total. Whites, who are less than 13% of the population, take away 58.5% of total income" (Knight, 2004: 10).

Figure B: South Africa's GDP, 1996-2003

Gross Domestic Product, inflation and budget deficit								
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003*
GDP, current market prices, R millions	617,954	685,730	738,926	800,769	888,454	983,450	1,120,895	NA
Real GDP Growth	4.3%	2.6%	0.8%	2.0%	3.5%	2.7%	3.6%	1.9%
GDP per capita, % change	2.1%	0.5%	-1.3%	-0.1%	1.5%	0.7%	1.6%	NA
Inflation	7.3%	8.6%	6.9%	5.2%	5.4%	5.7%	9.2%	5.8%
Budget Deficit % GDP, FY	-5.1%	-5.0%	-3.7%	-2.8%	-2.2%	-2.0%	-1.5%	-1.1%
NA = Not Available FY = Fiscal year. * GDP Preliminary								

Knight, 2004:10

In 1997, a *Participatory Poverty Assessment* (PPA) was undertaken in South Africa, where the poor described their poverty as:

- Alienation from kinship and the community
- Food insecurity
- Crowded homes
- Use of basic forms of energy
- A lack of adequate paid, secure jobs
- *Fragmentation of the family* (SARPN, 2006:1).

In fact, poverty as a multi-faceted concept can not only be measured in terms of inadequate incomes and consumption. Security, independence and self-respect are as important. However, the deficiency of money (income) and resources provide the best proxy for being classified as poor (SARPN, 2006:1).

High levels of both absolute poverty[9] and relative poverty[10] exist in South Africa. Poverty is also interrelated with factors such as education, health, HIV/AIDS, unemployment, disability and crime. (SARPN, 2006:1).

Figure C: South Africa's unemployment figures, 2003

EMPLOYMENT,[11] MARCH 2003		
Sector	**Thousands**	**Percent**
Formal Sector, excluding commercial agriculture	7,358	63.6%
Commercial Agriculture	865	7.5%
Informal Sector	1,845	16.0%
Subsistence & Small Scale Agriculture	420	3.6%
Domestic Service	1,005	8.7%
Unspecified	72	0.6%
TOTAL EMPLOYED	**11,565**	**100.00%**

Knight, 2004:10

South Africa's HDI in 1998 was 20,2%: 25,9% of citizens were expected not to live beyond 40 years of age; the adult illiteracy rate was 15,4; 13% of the population was living without access to safe water; 25 % of population had no access to health services; and 9 % of children under the age of five years were under-weight (SARPN, 2006:1).

As a result of poverty inequality[12] continues to dominate the socio-economic landscape of South Africa. South Africa is rated as the 5th most unequal state in the world. Equal access to resources and opportunities to everyone are but a distant dream. Policies have been created in South Africa to redress inequality such as increasing the relative income share of the least well-off, lowering the income 'ceiling' and promoting economic inclusion (Gelb, 2003:75).

A progressive agenda can overcome South Africa's malaise. The South African government "needs to engage the state, organisations in civil society and the citizenry in the fight against the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment (Pahad, 2005:27)." The ongoing implementation of Batho Pele and Ubuntu are therefore crucial in eradicating inequalities.

SOUTH AFRICA'S SECOND DECADE OF DEMOCRACY

As government reflects in its review the successes and challenges in *Towards a Ten Year Review* (October 2003), *two economies* persist in the country.

> *The first is an advanced, sophisticated economy, based on skilled labor, which is becoming more globally competitive. The second is a mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector.*

Reducing the high rate of unemployment is crucial to reducing poverty. Government policies, including increased public and private investment, expanding education and skills training, job creation through infrastructure development and support for small, micro and medium size business are an important starting point (Knight, 2004:13).)

Challenges of equitable development

South Africa is the most developed and modern country in Africa with extensive natural resources, a developed agricultural sector and significant manufacturing. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 was $104,2 billion – larger than any other country in Africa. But South Africa suffers from recurring unemployment and one the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the world. Some 50% of South Africa's people live in poverty; at least seven million people live in shacks in informal settlements (Knight, 2004: 13).

Despite experiencing economic growth every year since 1994, South Africa is still unable to reduce unemployment due to population growth, urbanisation and increased labor force participation. Jobs created in the informal sector have been lost in the formal sector (Knight, 2004:13).

Government programmes have greatly reduced poverty. Through its housing subsidy programme at least seven million people have been housed. The government's programs to provide free basic water and free basic electricity have also had a tremendous impact. Social grants, especially to the elderly and children, have benefit nearly 8 million people and, if fully implemented by getting all eligible people registered, could almost cut the poverty rate in half. The government's HIV/AIDS programme is beginning to have a real impact and the provision of anti-retroviral drugs will prolong lives (South Africa 2003).

Unlike the case of absolute poverty, rising standards of living will not be sufficient to eliminate relative poverty if the resources available to the wealthy increase at a faster rate than the resources available to the poor. Increases in relative poverty are not necessarily less onerous than increases in absolute poverty – they can lead to social disintegration,

growing violence,[13] segmentation, emotional suffering, and ethnic and racial conflict (Naledi, 1998:2).

In terms of addressing poverty and inequality, May (1998:3) suggested that

> *understanding durable inequalities...requires knowing who possesses what resources vis-à-vis others and how resources are mobilised. Elites with access to economic resources can also control cultural capital [such as knowledge and information normally formalised through educational credentials] and social capital (networks that protect group privilege through formal and informal rules of exclusion). New elites in the context of South Africa's transition faced a need to signify their right to these forms of social and cultural capital... (By means of) conspicuous consumption consumerism was reinforced in the society, enhancing high visibility of inequality ... (and) social exclusion.*

Vision 2014 – Forward to the Second Decade of Freedom

The mandate of the ruling party for the 2nd decade of democracy entails the following key priority areas (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2005:1):

- reduce unemployment[14] by half by 2014;
- reduce poverty by half by 2014;
- provide the skills required by the economy;
- ensure that South Africans are able to exercise their constitutional rights with dignity;
- government services should be provided with compassion;
- government services should improve, including services which will reduce the major preventable causes of death, including health and crime prevention services;
- reduce the number of serious and priority crimes and causes awaiting trial; and
- position South Africa as an effective progressive force in global relations

The Consolidated Report of the *Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South Africa* found that South Africa's economy was unlikely to create enough jobs (formal and informal) and as a result a system based on *tiding people over* until they found employment was not sufficient to reduce poverty. Existing social security programs reduce the average poverty gap by 23 per cent. By contrast BIG would reduce the poverty gap by 74% and free an additional 6.3 million people from poverty. The report found that BIG was affordable and administratively positive (Knight, 2004:14).

Challenging good governance and service delivery

Despite national policies the district and local government spheres are the areas that need serious attention and intervention. Apart from Project Consolidate, spatial development frameworks and other initiative, rural KwaZulu Natal statistics are truly worrisome. It is the most populous province in South Africa with the highest number of HIV/AIDS and unemployed people. Interventions should both be governmentally mandated as well as community

driven. When ownerships by both government and grassroots are not in place poverty and inequality will continue. Local economic development, when focused on poverty alleviation and tourism is essential for bridging the divide between rural and urban. Development of social capital through skills development is another area of importance. Government's *Project Consolidate, Spatial Development and Land Use Frameworks, Performance Management Systems, ASGISA*[15], and its *Integrated Environmental Programs* are attempts to address grassroots challenges and to accelerate service delivery (Boughey, 2006:28).

Decades of struggle to attain freedom prove that democracy is to be the system that will guarantee freedom and human rights as best as possible. As Dahl (1999:64) has stated, *democracy in the ideal sense is a necessary condition for the best political order"* South Africa should embrace the challenge of maintaining political order. This requires the successful integration of socialist programs. Additionally the public sector must apply an administrative culture that is governed by democratic ethos so as to reduce corruption and poor service delivery (Luvuno, 2003:12). *The strengthening of the democratic system should (also) be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future* (Mbeki, 2005:1).

Can the Public Sector guarantee equitable public administration processes to all South African races? How possible is it to deliver quality services to the poorest of the poor communities at a low cost? How equity-prone are our government policies? How can citizen participation enhance social equity[16]? Is a national integrity system free from corruption and political pressures?

Absence of good governance can be associated with bureaucratic discretionary power which includes (Longseth, 1997:53-55):

- "Councilors 'selling' their discretionary powers.
- Government officials taking percentage on government contracts, which are then often paid into family bank accounts.
- Government officials contracting government business to themselves, friends and family members either through fly-by-night companies and 'partners' or even openly to themselves as 'consultants'.
- Government officials receiving excessive performance bonuses and hospitality' from government contractors.
- Political parties using the prospect of power, or its continuation, to levy large rents on profitable business in return for government contracts which may be dressed as volunteering work or donation to a designated charity."

Woller's (1998:105) theory of bureaucracy emphasises *hierarchical accountability, technical expertise*[17] and *scientific rationality.* In line with government legislation democratic and bureaucratic principles, as well as a new reconstructed administrative culture[18], should provide a strong basis for reinforcing a strong sense of duty (deontology) by public officials of all races with behavior and attitude that promote good governance in South Africa (Luvuno, 2003: 20).

Government's stance is quite clear on corrupt officials and poor records of service excellence as seen in the establishment of mechanisms that ensure ethical governance[19].

> *We must be impatient with those in the public service who see themselves as pen-pushers and guardians of rubber stamps, thieves intent on self-enrichment, bureaucrats who think they have a right to ignore the vision of Batho Pele, who come to work as late as possible, work as little as possible and knock off as early as possible. (Mbeki, 2004:18).*

But, is lip service enough?

It is clear that in all the programmes and legislative frameworks of government, commonalities are identified as accountability, transparency, participation and involvement. Clearly municipalities should take their cues from citizens. Unstructured participation and therefore destructive behavior entrenches alienation as well as uprisings (Mkaza, 2006).

Mkaza (2006) suggests that local governments are challenged by time constraints, ineffective bureaucracy, post-elections apathy and lack of capacity. To address these issues capacity should be strengthened regarding human capital (linked to skills and competencies), material resources and financial resources (not overly dependent on tax revenue).

Additionally, the responsibility to deliver was left to the actual municipalities themselves, using new and untested methods detailed in the Local Government: Systems Act, 2000 to bring about the much vaunted but overly-ambitious *developmental* local government. Subsequently not all municipalities have the capacity to deliver or have access to adequate resources. Intra-organisational transformation fatigue as characterised by varying degrees of organisational stress, conflict and a high degree of staff turnover and loss of capacity furthermore hampers sustainable service delivery. Highly publicised salary packages of municipal managers and inadequate service delivery output discredit local government even further (Horner, 2006; 15 & Mapela, 2006: 12).

Great concerns also lies with the fact that some municipalities are significantly bigger, and poorer, but with the same tax base as before. The culture of non-payment hinders

Figure 4: Absolute value of local government's share in national revenue



Allan 2006

financial viable local government. Public-private partnerships are also politicised which leads businesses sceptical.

Although local government raises 2/3 of revenue itself, the ability to raise revenue varies dramatically from one municipality to the next. Poorer, less-capacitated municipalities are more dependent on national transfers than wealthier municipalities. The 2004 Intergovernmental Review reports that the highest dependency on national sources of revenue was Bohlabelo at 92% with the lowest dependency Cape Town at 3%. Access to national transfers, especially over the period of change and uncertainty in the last ten years when sources of funding were generally reduced, was critical to most municipalities (Allan 2006).

DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Developmental local government[20] is local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve the quality of their lives (*White Paper on Local Government,* March 1998). As an official operative policy it mainly aims at creating synergies between various sectors, issues and institutional processes across line ministries, with the intention of maximising impact on local communities. Within this revised schema for entrenching equality the developmental role of local government is central[21].

Deepening accessibility and accountability

Over a period of ten years local government has progressed from being an hierarchical tier of government to an equal, autonomous sphere. The new local government system was initiated through the South African Constitution, 1996, which elevated local government as *distinctive, interdependent and interrelated* to the national and provincial spheres.

The legislative frameworks were provided by the *Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act,* 1998, the *Local Government: Municipal Structures Act,* 1998, and the *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act,* 2000. The *Municipal Properties Rates Act,* 2004 and the *Municipal Finance Management Act,* 2003 assisted in refining the new local governmental system. Additionally, the number of municipalities has been rationalised from 843 to 284 in an extensive re-demarcation process.

The new local government system succeeded in its goal of radically overhauling and transforming local government across the country. The amalgamation of previously separate parts of localities ensured in general greater access to wealth and services (Allan, 2006).

However despite the legal transformation, instability and problematic service delivery continues. It becomes clear that a balance should be struck between representative democracy and participatory democracy. Municipalities must assist and encourage communities to participate more actively in IDP's. Structured participation is crucial and channels of participation should be widely convened to citizens. Education should play

a crucial role in informing people about their rights and duties. Spirit of *self reliance and NOT entitlement and victim mentality* should be cemented. Volunteerism where the community starts to rely on its own strength and capacity, as seen in the USA, are added criteria for participatory democracy (Mkaza 2006).

Municipalities need to restructure as well. The *Batho Pele* doctrine should become a personal conviction as related to their personal commitment to serving people. Professionalism as entrenched in accountability and professional conduct must be non-negotiable. Regular feedbacks and performance monitoring should be standard procedure

Equally important is the acknowledging and accommodation of traditional leadership. Within rural local government their impact is still very important. When they are alienated from the political processes citizen disillusionment will commence.

Moving towards sustainable service delivery

Municipal service delivery since democracy can be assessed by analysing how well municipalities have spent their budgets over the last ten years, specifically spending on new projects and spending on recurring costs (Allan 2006). Ideally one would like to see the reducing of backlogs and increasing of spending in new projects.

As seen in Figure 4, instead of a general increase in spending, both capital and operational expenditure fluctuate greatly, mirroring the instability over the period. This clearly affects sustainable service delivery.

Figure 5: Expenditure, Year on Year, 1997-2004



CONCLUSION

It is clear that South Africa has successfully transformed into a three-sphere government, with co-operation as its constitutional basis. Moving from a hierarchical local government to a decentralised sustainable local government structure is challenging enough. When existing in environments of poverty, inequality and political interference, sustainable service delivery could be sacrificed. Moving forward requires great discipline, commitment and embracement of good governance. The lack of sustainable service delivery demands capacitating local government. Professional staff should be retained, as based on performance criteria. Provincial and national government must continue with their constant support. Depoliticising local government is crucial if stability and sustainable service delivery is to be retained. For goodness to prevail, the bad performance records of some local governments need to be replaced by sustainable good governance and democratic ethos. Then only can prosperity become a reality.

The establishment of the African Union (AU) as well as the implementation of NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is seen as progressive indicators for good governance.

NOTES

1 The establishment of the African Union (AU) as well as the implementation of NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is seen as progressive indicators for good governance.

2 Ideally, both income-based and access-based approaches should be used in relation to census data.

3 For comprehensive information, see Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 90-135).

4 Corrupt practices have the greatest impact on small municipalities and its citizens. Good governance practices are the most effective when ensuring service deliveries.

5 Ubuntu requires one to respect others if one is to respect him or herself. When embracing these fundamental values, good governance is more attainable.

6 The unemployment rate for Africans is 42.5% compared to 4.6% for whites (Knight, 2004: 1).

7 GDP dropped from 26% in 1980 to 15% in 1994 (Knight, 2004:1).

8 See Bhorat & Kanbur (2005) for a comprehensive analysis and assessment.

9 Absolute poverty is related to a basic, fixed level of economic resources, which will prevent physical and social suffering due to material deprivation (Naledi, 1998:2).

10 Relative poverty identifies poor households as those whose incomes (their economic resources) fall significantly below the average level of income in the economy. Relative poverty captures a sense of 'economic distance" and injustice in society (Naledi, 1998:2).

11 "These employment figures must be viewed with caution. They are based on the Labor Force Survey: the 2001 survey showed 359,000 people employed in subsistence agriculture, the 2002 survey 792,000 and the 2003 survey 420,000. A survey in 2000 indicated that there were 943,000 farming operations in the former homelands (Knight, 2004: 15)."

12 Gini coefficient in 1995 on household income was 0,60. The Theil-T index allows assessing inequality within-group and between-group components. In South Africa 40% to be between-race, 33% due to intra-African inequality and 21% due to intra-White inequality (SARPN, 2006:1).

13 Evidence is seen by means of voter dissatisfaction, riots and defiance of national leadership. How effective is decentralisation?

14 The term unemployment includes discouraged job seekers and in 2005 unemployment has increased to 41.8%. The chronic structural nature of unemployment is demonstrated by the fact that 70% of the unemployed have been jobless

for over a year and almost 60% have never been employed. People under 30 face an unemployment rate of 61%. The jobless rate is far higher than in other lower-middle income countries (Knight, 2004: 14).

15 The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative.

16 Decisions and public policies should always aim to neither harm the interest of one group, nor to advance the interest of another group undeservedly or to the detriment of other groups (Luvuno, 2003: 12).

17 Project Consolidate has identified serious capacity constraints arising from a shortage of properly qualified managers, professional and technical personnel (Mbeki, 2004:15).

18 Bueno & Dwyver (2002:9-11) attributes uprightness, honesty, fairness, justice, accountability, responsibility, impartiality, equity, sound judgments, compliance with governing rules and responsiveness as essential values to adhere to.

19 Such as the Auditor-General, Standing Committees, Public Protector and Human Rights Commission (Van Niekerk *et al*, 2001:126

20 For a comprehensive study on developmental local government within a globalised context see Mogale in Mhone & Edigheij,2003.

21 For a comprehensive study on developmental local government, see Parnell *et al*, 2002.

BIBILIOGRAPHY

Allan, K. 2006. *A critical reflection on local government performance.* Paper delivered at the 5th Annual Service Delivery Learning Academy, June 2006.

Amoro-Reye, T. 2003. *Ethical questions and the moral answers.* New Jersey: Sage Publishers.

Benn, H. 2005. From 2005 to 2015, a progressive partnership to make poverty history in Africa. *Progressive Politics,* 4(2), Summer 2005,16-24.

Bhorat, H. & Kanbur, R. 2005. Poverty and wellbeing in post apartheid South Africa: an overview of data, outcomes and policy. <http://www.polity.org.za> (15 November 2005).

Boughey, J. 2006. University of Zululand and its community. Workshop. Unpublished, 15 February 2006.

Bueno, K.B. & Dwyver, Q. 2002. *The moral push and pull of the society.* Hempstead: Wheatsheaf Publishers.

Cloete, F. 2002. Capacity-building for sustainable local governance in South Africa. In Parnell, S., Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. & Wooldridge, D. 2002. *Democratising local government: the South African experiment.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Dahl, R.A. 1999. *Dilemmas of pluralist democracy. Autonomy vs. Control.* New Haven and London: Yale Press.

Friedman, S. 2006. The President's plan won't work without the people's participation. *Sunday Times,* 25 February 2006:20.

Gelb, S. 2003. *Inequality in South Africa: nature, causes and responses.* <http://www.polity.org.za>. (13 November 2005).

Gildenhuys, J.S.E. & Knipe, A. 2000. *The organisation of government: an introduction.* Pretoria: J L Van Schaik.

Harner, B. 2006. Townsfolk pay R40m for collapsing services. *Sunday Times,* 25 February 2006:12.

Knight, R. 2004. *A Decade of Democracy: Economic Policy and Development in South Africa.* <http://richardknight.homestead.com/files/sieconomicpolicy2004.htm> (16 February 2006).

Leatt, J.; Kneifel, T. & Nurnberger, K. (eds.) 1986. *Contending ideologies in South Africa.* Cape Town: David Philip Publishers.

Longseth, P. 1997. *Civil service reform: Experience from Uganda.* Washington: World Bank.

Luvuno, L. L. 2003. *The necessity of ethics and integrity in promoting good governance in South Africa.* <http://www.iiasiisa.be> (17 February 2006).

Manuel, T. A. 2006. B*udget speech by the South Africa Minister of Finance, delivered on 15 February 2006.* http://www.info.gov.za-speeches-2006.06 (16 February 2006).

Mapela, N. 2006. Fat bonuses for officials at ailing municipalities. *Sunday Times,* 8 January 2006:9.

May, J.1998.*Poverty and inequality in South Africa.* <http://www.polity.org.za/gocdocs/reports/pov.htm> (27 September 2000).

Mbeki, T. 2004. *State of the nation address.* <http://www.info.gov.za-speeches-2004> (17 February 2006).

Mbeki, T. 2005. The challenge of equitable development – what is the progressive agenda? *Progressive Politics,* 4(2), Summer 2005, 6-16.

Mkaza., T. L. 2006. Local governance: deepening accountability and involvement in service delivery. Paper delivered at the the 5th annual service delivery Learning academy, June 2006.

Mogale, T. 2003. Developmental local government and decentralised service delivery in the democratic South Africa. In Mhone, G. & Edigheij, O. 2003. *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenges of globalization.* Cape Town: UCT press.

O' Meara, D.1996. *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994.* Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Parnell, S., Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. & Wooldridge, D. 2002. *Democratising local government: the South African experiment.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Naidoo, R. 2001. *Poverty alleviation through social dialogue: the role of trade unions in South Africa.* <http://www.naledi.org.za> (31 January 2006).

National Labour and Economic Development Institution (Naledi), 1998. *Poverty and economics in South Africa.* <http://www.naledi.org.za/pubs/1998/heintz1.html> (20 November 2005).

Pahad, E. 2005. Political participation and civic engagement. *Progressive Politics,* 4(2), Summer 2005, 24-31.

Republic of South Africa, 1996. *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.* Pretoria: Government Press.

South Africa Government. 2003. *Towards a Ten Year Review.* Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) on behalf of The Presidency, October 2003.

Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (SARPN). 2005. *South Africa's development path and the government's programme of action.* <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/e0000006/page2.php> 18 November 2005.

Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (SARPN). 2006. *An overview of poverty and inequality in South Africa.* <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/e0000006/page2.php> 31 January 2006.

Van Niekerk, D.; Van der Waldt, G.; & Jonker, A. 2001. *Governance, politics & policy in South Africa.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia Encyclopedia. 2006a. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development> (20 February 2006).

Wikipedia Encyclopedia. 2006b. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_governance> (20 February 2006).

Woller, D. (ed.). 1998. Towards a reconciliation of the bureaucratic and democratic ethics. *Administration and Society*, 6(12),100-111.

Appendix 11 Publication no. 2

Good governance and Ubuntu as prerequisites for poverty alleviation in South Africa: a case study of uThungulu District Municipality, rural Northern Natal

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND UBUNTU AS PREREQUISITES FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN NORTHERN KWAZULU-NATAL

Marléne Muller
University of Zululand, South Africa
[redacted]

ABSTRACT

South Africa's young democracy continues to show teething problems as mirrored in the continuous gap that exist between the rich and the poor. These inequalities severely confront municipalities' efforts to eradicate poverty and enhance sustainable development. The article attempts to answer the question: can these developmental local governments successfully redress their two economies as linked to equity, sustainable development and good governance? The traditional notion that policies and government structures are adequate guarantors of a quality of life, good governance and sustainable development is questioned. The interrelatedness between good governance, ubuntu and poverty alleviation is therefore explored.

Keywords: Uthungulu District Municipality, poverty alleviation, ubuntu, good governance and sustainable development.

INTRODUCTION

The whole world stands together in its plight to make poverty history united despite diversities. For the first time ever Africa is showing potential economic growth and is veering in the direction of good governance, interpreted as equally important when aiming to be sustainable.

Despite experiencing annual economic growth of nearly 5% in 2004-2005 (Manuel, 2006: 1), South Africa remains a developmental state with a dual economy. Strains on effective governance are clearly noted within the Uthungulu District Municipality (UDM). The politics of money and unequal resource allocation among the different municipalities challenges local service delivery, transparency, freedom and equality.

Can the UDM and its municipalities prevent the mistakes of the past by enhancing bureaucratic effectiveness and eliminating electorate distrust and political interference?

More importantly, do the local citizens and bureaucrats take ownership of their collective responsibilities and obligations? Should the national state become even more proactive in its interventionist strategies or shall the principles of Batho Pele and ubuntu rise to our second democratic era's challenges?

This paper opens the debate by contextualizing poverty, good governance and developmental local government. Recommendations and discussions are based on the following illustration, reiterating the fact that poverty alleviation, sustainable development and good governance are dependent on all citizens to address, as exercised within the paradigm of ubuntu.



Figure A: Foundations for prosperity, equality and growth.

ASSESSING THE INTERRELATEDNESS BETWEEN POVERTY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND UBUNTU AS EXERCISED WITHIN A DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL MILIEU

South Africa's poor

In 1994 the Government of National Unity inherited a country of gross racial inequities with high chronic unemployment. By following progressive programs and policies such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), tremendous progress has been made in education, health care, housing and providing basic services.[1] But poverty continues to be widespread, income disparities remain unabridged, unemployment steadily increases (soaring to a 40% in 2005) and many people lack access to basic necessities, as constitutionally guaranteed.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) noted in 1992: "While Africans make up 76% of the population, their share of income amounts to only 29% of the total. Whites, who are less than 13% of the population, take away 58.5% of total income" (Knight, 2004: 10).

The 1997 Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) of South Africa, described the poor's interpretation of their own poverty as: alienation, food insecurity, crowded homes, use of basic forms of energy, a lack of adequate paid secure jobs and fragmentation of the family." In fact, poverty as a multi-faceted concept cannot only be measured in terms of inadequate incomes and consumption. Security,

1 See Bhorat and Kanbur (2005) for a comprehensive analysis and assessment.

independence and self-respect are as important. However, the deficiency of money (income) and resources provides the best proxy for being classified as poor (SARPN, 2006: 1).

High levels of both absolute poverty[2] and relative poverty[3] exist in South Africa. Poverty is also interrelated with factors such as education, health, HIV/AIDS, unemployment, disability and crime (SARPN, 2006: 1). When a district such as Ilembe, KwaZulu-Natal, is still plagued with illiteracy and unemployment poverty seems to be inevitable (Table 1).

In the northern regions of KwaZulu-Natal strategically located district municipalities, such as Uthungulu, are faced with severe challenges. Eighty percent of its population resides in isolated rural areas with fifty percent under the age of 19. Fifty-four percent of them are females. Poor infrastructure continues to co-exist within Richards Bay, a financially viable area. The discrepancies are ironic when one realizes that unemployment and basic quality services are still not addressed as seen in Tables 1 and 2 (Boughey, 2006: 13).

Table 1: Uthungulu district municipality's backlogs for sanitation to RDP standard (Boughey, 2006: 15).

Local Municipality	% of Households under RDP standard			
	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Mbonambi	98.5	88.9	83.8	80.4
Ntambanana	76.2	76.2	72.5	70.7
Umlalazi	85.2	85.2	80.8	77.9
Mthonjaneni	94.9	94.9	89.9	86.2
Nkandla	94	88.3	84.1	81.3
Uthungulu	89.1	86.2	81.8	78.9

Table 2: Uthungulu Quality of Life Survey, 2004 (Boughey, 2006: 14).

Local Municipality	Households with no Members employed	Dependants per person employed
Mbonambi	51.22	8
Mthonjaneni	83.66	35
Nkandla	79.26	22
Ntambanana	76.15	19
Umhlathuze	34.84	4
Umlalazi	55.04	9
Uthungulu	**59.02**	**9**

2 Absolute poverty is related to a basic, fixed level of economic resources which will prevent physical and social suffering due to material deprivation (Naledi, 1998: 2).

3 Relative poverty identifies poor households as those whose incomes (their economic resources) fall significantly below the average level of income in the economy. Relative poverty captures a sense of "economic distance" and injustice in society (Naledi, 1998: 2).

As a result of poverty, inequality[4] continues to dominate the socio-economic landscape of South Africa. South Africa is rated as the fifth most unequal state in the world. Equal access to resources and opportunities to everyone are but a distant dream. Policies have been created in South Africa to redress inequality such as increasing the relative income share of the least well-off, lowering the income 'ceiling' and promoting economic inclusion (Gelb, 2003: 75).



Figure B: Causal interrelationships of poverty.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Good governance's[5] major characteristics are citizen participation, respect and adherence to the rule of law, transparency, government responsiveness, consensus oriented among government and the different stakeholders, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. These characteristics assure that corruption is minimized; the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making.

Within a local context the lack of good governance can lead to:

- Councilors 'selling' their discretionary powers.
- Government officials taking percentage on government contracts, which are then often paid into family bank accounts.

---

4 Gini coefficient in 1995 on household income was 0,60. The Theil-T index allows assessing inequality within-group and between-group components. In South Africa 40% to be between-race, 33% due to intra-African inequality and 21% due to intra-White inequality (SARPN, 2006: 1).

5 For comprehensive information, see Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 90-135).

- Government officials contracting government business to themselves, friends and family members either through fly-by-night companies and 'partners' or even openly to themselves as 'consultants'.
- Government officials receiving excessive performance bonuses and 'hospitality' from government contractors.
- Political parties using the prospect of power, or its continuation, to levy large rents on profitable businesses in return for government contracts which may be dressed as volunteering work or donation to a designated charity (Longseth, 1997: 53-55).

Friedman (Friedman, 2006: 20) acknowledges government's attempts to address the technical problems they face with respect to service delivery and corruption. He however firmly reiterates the fact that government's attempt will be in vain if citizens are not involved: "government only does what the people want, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs." Hence, the need for good governance.

UBUNTU

Ubuntu articulates important values such as respect, human dignity and compassion. The process of nation building in post-apartheid South Africa requires an authentic respect for human/individual rights and related values and an honest appreciation of differences (van Binsbergen, 2002). When referring to ubuntu one addresses important values such as group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity and collective unity. The cardinal belief of ubuntu is that a person can only be a person through the help of others, which means umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu in Xhosa.

Ubuntu furthermore emphasizes consensus, diversity and requires one to respect others if one is to respect him or herself (van Binsbergen, 2002). Amid calls for an African Renaissance (Teffo, 1997: 19-21), ubuntu calls on Africans to be true to themselves.

By re-discovering and re-iterating one's pride, self-respect, self-identity and achievements, ubuntu integrates and operationalises the African Renaissance's emphasis of humanness and hence democracy. When embracing these fundamental values, good governance becomes more attainable.

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The new local government system succeeded in radical transformation. Developmental local government (DLG)[6] further commits itself to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives (White Paper on Local Government, March 1998).

---

6 For a comprehensive study on developmental local government within a globalised context see Mogale (Mhone and Edigheij, 2003).

The main developmental roles of DLG are therefore to provide community leadership; promote social and economic wellbeing; co-ordinate and integrate all efforts to develop the municipal area and promote and build local democracy (Venter and Landsberg, 2006).

DLG successes are its radical transformation; the integration of previously separate parts of localities and a local vote allowing equal representation structurally closer to the people. However, certain failures remain:

- transformation fatigue characterized by organizational stress, conflict, high degree of staff turnover and loss of capacity; high salary packages for top managers;
- inadequate recognition of the capacity problem; and
- managerial purges associated with changes of political leadership (Allan, 2006).

CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY'S NEED FOR A TRADITIONAL UBUNTU IMPETUS

> "The strengthening of the democratic system should (also) be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future" (Mbeki, 2005: 1).

Within the context of a local authority, the concept of democracy means full responsibility for socio-economic development; regular general elections of community representatives (councillors) by residents; acceptance of full public accountability for the management and administration of public affairs; self-development and self-reliance; recognition and acceptance of the existence of interest groups to freely participate in public affairs; two-way communication process between residents/citizens and councillors or community leaders.

It becomes clear that certain conditions are essential for linking democracy with DLG. These conditions are personal commitment to Batho Pele; educated citizens; free access to information; professionalism, accountability, regular feedbacks and performance monitoring are non-negotiable; a liberal ethos is important; acknowledgment of traditional leadership; material prosperity and economic development; local pride is essential; and political stability.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S CHALLENGES

> "We must be impatient with those in the public service who see themselves as pen-pushers and guardians of rubber stamps, thieves intent on self-enrichment, bureaucrats who think they have a right to ignore the vision of Batho Pele, who come to work as late as possible, work as little as possible and knock off as early as possible" (Mbeki, 2004: 18). But is lip service enough?

It is clear that in all the programs and legislative frameworks of government, commonalities are identified as accountability, transparency, participation and

involvement. Clearly municipalities should take their cues from citizens. Unstructured participation and therefore destructive behavior entrenches alienation as well as uprisings (Mkaza, 2006).

Mkaza (2006) suggests that local governments are challenged by time constraints, ineffective bureaucracy, post-elections apathy and lack of capacity. To address these issues capacity should be strengthened regarding human capital (linked to skills and competencies), material resources and financial resources (not overly dependent on tax revenue).

Additionally, the responsibility to deliver was "left to the actual municipalities themselves, using new and untested methods detailed in the Systems Act to bring about the much vaunted but overly-ambitious 'developmental' local government". Subsequently not all local governments have the capacity to deliver or have access to adequate resources. Intra-organizational transformation fatigue as characterised by varying degrees of organizational stress, conflict and a high degree of staff turnover and loss of capacity furthermore hampers sustainable service delivery. Highly publicised salary packages of Municipal managers and inadequate service delivery output discredit local government even further (Horner, 2006: 15; Mapela, 2006: 12).

Great concerns also lies with the fact that some municipalities within UDM are also significantly bigger, and poorer, but with the same tax base as before. The culture of non-payment hinders financially viable local government. Public-private partnerships are also politicised which leads to business scepticism.

THE GAP BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS CITIZENRY

Lack of citizen participation and identification with local governments become clear when studying figures C and D. Participatory democracy becomes crucial in linking communities with their municipalities. When the local electorate fails to identify and participate in local governmental activities, such as the IDP consultation process, good governance becomes problematic. Certain municipalities within UDM are actively mobilizing community partnerships with themselves, but apathy still prevails. In the poorer municipalities, poverty's various dimensions clearly become an obstacle. Volunteerism where the community starts to rely on its own strength and capacity are added necessities for participatory democracy (Mkaza, 2006), and therefore ubuntu.



Figure C: Local voters' perception on government's accessibility, UDM.



Figure D: Local voters' perception on government's accessibility, UDM.

CHALLENGING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S PROGRESSIVENESS

A progressive agenda can overcome South Africa's malaise. The South African government "needs to engage the state, organizations in civil society and the citizenry in the fight against the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment" (Pahad, 2005: 27).



Figure E: Government's intervention strategy regarding poor performing Municipalities.

Indeed, government programs have greatly reduced poverty, however, rising standards of living will not be sufficient to eliminate relative poverty if the resources available to the wealthy increase at a faster rate than the resources available to the poor. Increases in relative poverty are not necessarily less onerous than increases in absolute poverty — they can lead to social disintegration, growing violence,[7] segmentation, emotional suffering and ethnic and racial conflict (Naledi, 1998: 2).

Government's Spatial Development and Land Use Frameworks, Performance Management Systems, ASGISA[8] and its Integrated Environmental Programs are attempts to address grassroots challenges and to accelerate service delivery (Boughey, 2006: 28). But how effective is DLG when government is forced to supply additional support structures such as Project Consolidate?

Despite these interventions the district and local government spheres are the areas that need serious attention and intervention. Rural KZN statistics are truly worrisome being the most populous province in South Africa with the highest number of HIV/AIDS and unemployed people. Interventions should both be governmentally mandated as well as community driven. When ownerships by both government and grassroots are not in place poverty, sustainable development and equality will continue. Local economic development, when focused on poverty alleviation and tourism, is essential for bridging the divide between rural and urban. Development of social capital through skills development is another area of importance (Boughey, 2006).

As a case in point, UDM is one of the targeted areas of Project Consolidate. After some years, statistics have improved, but surely capacity and ineffective

---

7 Evidence is seen by means of voter dissatisfaction, riots and defiance of national leadership. How effective is decentralization?

8 The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative.

resources and manpower hinder local government's service delivery record. The lack of equal progress and citizen participation indicates that governments' strategies are only limitedly successful, especially when good governance is absent. What can be done in order to enhance these intervention strategies of government?

NECESSITATING THE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN UBUNTU AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

It becomes crucial that ubuntu becomes constant in guaranteeing good governance since political and citizen inclusiveness is embraced. By re-introducing ubuntu, corruption and selfishness can become successfully reversed which results in positive spin-offs.

However, by blindly adhering to a philosophy without realizing the potential dangers can also become problematic. Ubuntu's emphasis of sameness can have reverse effects when discarding diversity. By embracing a "mutually recognized humanity" can lead to sugarcoating and the dismissal of differences.

So how do we move forward? Clearly the challenges do not only lie with government policies and programs of action. The societal obligations to social equity and democratic ethos are as crucial as it is essential for government and public service sectors. Rich and poor, black and white, unemployed and MD's of companies need to embrace and maintain high ethical and moral standards. Ubuntu must become an integral part of society.



Figure F: Ubuntu as the connective tissue.

With ubuntu as the connective tissue between good governance and democracy, the following becomes an integrated part of society:

- instilling a spirit of self-reliance and pride;
- Batho Pele that leads to happy and connected peoples;
- creater volunteerism;
- community identity and awareness;
- community information base;
- community trial-and-error resource for problem solving;
- community decision making resource; resulting in
- more effective communication;
- a greater grasp of the balance between representative democracy and participatory democracy;
- the development of more mechanisms and structures to involve communities;
- capacitating of local ward committees;
- empowering a sustainable civil society;
- ensuring greater transparency and accountability; and
- institutionalising civic education.

THUS, ubuntu becomes a critical factor and a cultural investment in the developmental process.

CONCLUSION

> "The greatest revolution in our generation is that of human beings, who by changing the inner attitudes of their minds, can change the outer aspects of their lives" (Ferguson).

As citizens of this rainbow nation we need to unite and move forward as human beings. We need to start to act with integrity and teach our children the values of Ubuntu and Batho Pele. Gone are the days that policy initiatives and a top-down approach by government were all that was needed to help its people. As South Africans we need to unite in our efforts to create an equal society free from unemployment, inequalities and poverty.

> "It is up to all of us, through our National Effort, to build a winning nation, to do all the things that will ensure that the mountains and the hills of our country break forth into singing" (Mbeki, 2006: 19).

REFERENCES

Allan, K. (2006). *A Critical Reflection on Local Government Performance.* Paper Delivered at the 5th Annual Service Delivery Learning Academy, June 2006.

Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. (2005). "*Poverty and Wellbeing in Post* A*partheid South Africa: An Overview of Data, Outcomes and Policy." http:www.polity.org.za*. Accessed on: 15 November 2005.

Boughey, J. (2006). "*University of Zululand and its Community Workshop."* Unpublished. 15 February 2006.

Friedman, S. (2006). "The President's Plan Won't Work Without the People's Participation." *Sunday Times,* 25 February 2006.

Gelb, S. (2003). "Inequality in South Africa: Nature, Causes and Responses." *http/www.polity.org.za*. Accessed on: 13 November 2005.

Gildenhuys, J.S.E. and Knipe, A. (2000). *The Organization of Government: An Introduction.* Pretoria: JL Van Schaik.

Knight, R. (2004). "A Decade of Democracy: Economic Policy and Development in South Africa." *http://richardknight.homestead.com/files/sieconomicpolicy 2004.htm.* Accessed on: 16 February 2006.

Longseth, P. (1997). *Civil Service Reform: Experience from Uganda.* Washington: World Bank.

Luvuno, L.L. (2003). "The Necessity of Ethics and Integrity in Promoting Good Governance in South Africa." *http://www.iiasiisa.be.* Accessed on: 17 February 2006.

Manuel, T.A. (2006). Budget Speech by the South Africa Minister of Finance, Delivered on 15 February 2006. *http://www.info.gov.za-speeches-2006.06.* Accessed on: 16 February 2006.

Mapela, N. (2006). "Fat Bonuses for Officials at Ailing Municipalities." *Sunday Times*, 8 January 2006: 9.

Mbeki, T. (2004). State of the Nation Address. *http://www.info.gov.za-speeches-2004.* Accessed on: 17 February 2006.

Mbeki, T. (2005). "The Challenge of Equitable Development – What is the Progressive Agenda?" *Progressive Politics,* 4(2): 6-16. Summer 2005.

Mbeki, T. (2006). State of the Nation Address. *http://www.info.gov.za-speeches-2006.* Accessed on: 17 February 2006.

Mhone, G. and Edigheji, O. (eds) (2003). *Governance in the New South Africa: The Challenges of Globalization.* Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Mkaza, T.L. (2006). *Local Governance: Deepening Accountability and Involvement in Service Delivery.* Paper Delivered at the 5th Annual Service Delivery Learning Academy, June 2006.

National Labour and Economic Development Institution (Naledi) (1998). "Poverty and Economics in South Africa." *http://www.naledi.org.za/pubs/1998/heintz1.html.* Accessed on: 20 November 2005.

Pahad, E. (2005). "Political Participation and Civic Engagement." *Progressive Politics* 4(2): 24-31. Summer 2005.

Republic of South Africa (1998). *White Paper on Local Government.* Pretoria: Government Press.

Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (SARPN). 2006. "An Overview of Poverty and Inequality in South Africa." *http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/e0000006/page2.php.* Accessed on: 31 January 2006.

Teffo, Joe. (1997). An African Renaissance: Could it be Realized? *Woord & Daad*, 37: 361.

Van Binsbergen, W. (2002). Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society. *African Religion. http://www.shikanda.net/african_religion/page2-10.php.* Accessed on: May 2007.

Venter, A. and Landsberg, C. (2006). *Government and Politics in the New South Africa.* Pretoria: JL van Schaik Publishers.

Appendix 12 Publication no. 3

In church and government we trust: the politics of religion in secular post-apartheid South Africa

The International JOURNAL of INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume 3, Number 9

In Church and Government we Trust: The Politics of Religion in Secular Post-Apartheid South Africa

Marlene Muller

COMMON GROUND

www.socialsciences-journal.com

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES
http://www.SocialSciences-Journal.com

First published in 2008 in Melbourne, Australia by Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd
www.CommonGroundPublishing.com.

ISSN: 1833-1882
Publisher Site: http://www.SocialSciences-Journal.com

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES is a peer refereed journal. Full papers submitted for publication are refereed by Associate Editors through anonymous referee processes.

Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGCreator multichannel typesetting system
http://www.CommonGroundSoftware.com.

In Church and Government we Trust: The Politics of Religion in Secular Post-Apartheid South Africa

Marlene Muller, University of Zululand, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Abstract: In 1994, South Africa ventured into a secular, constitutional state system when it replaced the immoral religio-political oppressiveness of the Apartheid government. This transformative, democratic state guarantees freedom, transparency, basic human rights and inclusiveness. Paradoxically, more than 70% South African Christians experience high levels of dissatisfaction, alienation, apathy and non-accessibility towards their secular government. Ironically, cohabitation between church and government become once again unavoidable when both claim guardianship over their followers. Hence, the politics of religion in a developmental, secular state is apparent. Unfortunately, South Africans continue to face poverty, HIV/Aids, crime and corruption, which ultimately deprive them of a good life. Additionally, both church and government are struggling to come to terms with their redefined roles as protector and guarantor of the collective good. Surveys conducted since 1999 in rural KwaZulu-Natal challenge the secularity of South Africa as well as defying the church and state's claims of representation and independence. This Theopolitical research project emphasized that within the socio-political nexus, the state and church, with their distinct yet complimentary responsibilities, could continue to promote transformation and transparency, despite secularism. It furthermore explored whether the transformed and detached church and government truly reflected the needs of their followers.

Keywords: Secularism, South Africa, State, Church, Theopolitics, Democracy, ANC

Introduction

DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM were voted in with the African National Congress' (ANC) electoral victory during the 1994 elections, but the political wonder soon started to make way for unfulfilled promises and expectations. The transitional period clearly marked a new direction government undertook to promote constitutional democracy. However, South Africa remained in a phase of dysphoria where scarcities, corruption and lack of economic redistribution are seen as the main catalysts of anxieties and disillusion.

The inter-relationship of Christianity and politics in South Africa is interesting and illuminating for a number of reasons:

- First, with almost 70% of its adult population professing some form of Christianity, South Africa qualifies as one of the most Christian nations in the world; and
- Second, since 1652 churches have historically played a key role in South African politics. This role was especially magnified during the Apartheid era when churches were major actors in both affirming and/or condemning Apartheid.

Within a Theopolitical context, the questions need to be asked whether:

- Relationships between the church and state will decrease, due to South Africa's secular character;
- Government and churches' top structures really took into account the feelings and expectations of their respected bases of support when they changed their policies and institutional structures;
- Changes were really inspired by the grassroots; and, to conclude
- Do the dynamics of Theopolitics continue to exist within a secular environment?

Contextualising the History of Theopolitics within South Africa

Nelson Mandela (1994:109) wrote in his book *Long walk to freedom* that all South Africans were born politicised and that it often spiralled down into one's everyday life, beliefs, thinking, and actions. Ever since the Europeans set foot on South African soil at the Cape, feelings of superiority and tools of oppression were utilised to undermine the self worth of all racial groups other than the settlers. The "superiority" of the White race, based on their Protestant Christianity and level of civilisation, was already seen in the practices of slavery, racial discrimination, and segregation, as well as the fact that only the Whites held strategic administrative, economic and political positions in South Africa (Marais, 1952:289). Van Jaarsveld (in Loubser, 1987:18) best explains this mentality of the settlers when he de-

scribes it as moulded by "physical detachment from their mother country, isolation in the interior, social and economic factors, … their cultural heritage and the Old Testament". Pillay (1995:71) attributed the close relationship between church and state to an automatic extension of *cuius regio eius religio* where the unity of the state was confirmed in the unity of religious belief.

The historical relation between politics and religion indicates that the predominantly White National Party (NP) was based on the religious prescriptions of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) (Roskin, 1997:423). Kinghorn refers to ideological theology that became prominent in the mission policy for the DRC as early as 1827 (Prozesky, 1990:60). The Apartheid Bible was officially opened in 1935 when the DRC's missionary policy firmly promoted segregation amongst the different racial groups. Furthermore, the theology of the DRC did not contribute to the abolition of South Africa's state theology's "justification of the status quo with its racism, capitalism and totalitarianism" (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:257).

The resistance to the *Theos Politicos* of Apartheid South Africa resulted in the ultimate liberation of South Africa's political system. However, will South Africa be able to fill the vacuum left by the absence of an overarching belief system? For so long was the struggle characterised by regaining freedom that once obtained, lack of direction and leadership challenged the fibre of society. South Africa's moral degeneration is indicative of a crumbling society. The question arises whether religion, or the *Theos* aspect of the polity, should be redressed or accommodated. Can democracy effectively accommodate the demands of Theopolitics, Christianity, social justice, and redistribution?

Liberation theology in South Africa was never directly associated with the ANC and its liberation struggle. Nevertheless, prominent members of the South African Council of Churches like Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu and Trevor Huddlestone constantly tried to influence the National Party's (NP) oppressive Apartheid policies (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:168,227 & 235). Even today, prominent church leaders influence South Africa's government by reiterating the constant importance of theology and religion per se within a secular context. This remains an important observation since it is clear that Theopolitics will continue to influence leaders when injustices are evident or ill-planned policies lead to social degradation (Villa-Vicencio, 1991:610).

The Religious Dimension of Secularism in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Apartheid was a sin and a heretical doctrine (Loubser, 1987:55). As all political systems tend to react in the realm of oppression and immorality, South Africa ventured into a secular, constitutional state system. As guaranteed by the 1996 Constitution religious freedom and freedom of association together with respect for others will be guaranteed. Given the fact that religion has influenced South African politics and society in such an overwhelming manner, it remains questionable whether the separation between state and church will be respected.

It is apparent that the cohabitation between state and church has indeed not disappeared (Gordin & Fabricius, 2006:1). The vociferousness of prominent religious figures such as Rev. F. Chikane and Archbishops Tutu and Ndungane; the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); the annual Zionist gathering in Polokwane; the National Religious Leaders' Forum, as well as religious-orientated political parties like the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) continue to show the close and unbreakable connection between religion and government (*Sapa*, 2004a:1). South African religions played different roles to different peoples during the country's troubled history: some (such as the majority of English churches) provided a "comfort zone" for the poor and downtrodden, whilst others, such as the DRC and Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (APK), offered a "justifying zone" for the Whites. These different roles of the church will continue in this new secular chapter of post-Apartheid South African politics, albeit with different demographical role-players.

It is doubtful that secularisation will estrange people from their religious roots. Socio-political theology will continue to determine the interrelationships between church and government. Within the socio-political nexus, the state and church and their distinct yet complementary responsibilities, will continue to promote transformation and transparency, despite economic hardships (Forrest, 2002:12).

Secular Governance based on a Biblical Vision

> The ANC and SACP commitment to a Marxist classless society is a secular expression of a Biblical social vision (Villa-Vicencio, 1996:120).

The close symbiotic relationship that existed between the DRC and NP during Apartheid changed drastically with the power shifts. The new relationship between the ANC and Anglican Church also demanded refocusing since their roles have changed drastically. Moving away from being a liberation movement to that of a government, the ANC had to accommodate new expectations and roles. Subsequently, the Anglican Church's traditional role

also needed redefining (Mabanga, 2004:8). Continuing to be the voice of the oppressed and poor, the church kept a check on government and its application of secular values within the context of human rights. When clashes with religious values occur, what are the new role of churches and their relationship with government? Can government processes promote and protect Christian visions and ideals? Human development implies religious and spiritual development. Hence, the RDP vision of reconstruction and development links with these religious and spiritual dimensions (Omi, 1996:52).

Currently the South African government accepts the interrelationship between the church and the state. However, the Mandela government showed a reluctance to accommodate outspoken prescriptive interferences from religious role-players (Forrest, 2002:12). It is thus inadmissible that an intimate interrelationship would continue between the top structures of the Government and the churches.

Politics and Theology: Their Separate yet Inseparable Ways

South Africa's drastic political changes since 1990 automatically demanded transformation in other areas of life as well. Moving away from an oppressive theocratic state to a secular, liberal state required attitudes, laws, governance and political culture to adjust accordingly. Religio-political socialisation that was enforced or developed over decades needed transformation. How far would the secular government go in distancing itself from religious interference? How willing are churches to become a marginalised social agent within a political context proclaiming secular and pluralistic values? Where do political parties fit in?

In developing a framework which allows for the testing of the applicability and relevance of Theopolitics, extensive surveys have been conducted in the uThungulu District Municipality of Kwa-Zulu Natal since 1999. This area microscopically reflected the racial and economic demographics of South Africa. It also depicted South Africa's religious and political party affiliation appropriately, as linked to race and language. Both the DRC and Anglican Church have congregations in these areas.

The Question of Political Representativeness

With the legalisation of abortion in 1996 (RSA 1996b), outrage was felt across the different strata of South African religious society. Government remained firm in its opinion that the moral choice lies with the individual and not with government. The question of government's connectivity with its Christian citizenry was greatly intensified with these legal and moral documents. The validity of representativeness of its electorate became subsequently more blurred.

Sixty five percent of respondents strongly disapproved of the legalisation of abortion, as supported by their respective political parties. The fact that only half a percent strongly approved, clearly questions the validity of government's claim of citizen representation.

A similar outcry from Christian communities and parties was apparent when government legally endorsed same-sex marriages. Congregations from different religious denominations felt that the Civil Union Act of 2006 was unbiblical and immoral (Pillay, 2006:1). The Anglican Church, a vocal supporter of gay marriages (Anglican Church Press Statement, 1997:1) did not oppose the Act. In 2007, the DRC, after years of struggling to come to terms with its gay pastors, overwhelmingly voted in their favour (Malan, 2005:1). Yet, grassroots rejected homosexuality completely.

Typical of democracies, the ruling political party (in this case, the ANC government) represents the needs and visions of its followers. Based on effective leadership, policies and statements will mostly reflect the majority of followers' interests. The thin line between political parties' representation and governmental assessment of what is best for the state becomes vague at times:

- Almost fifty five percent concurred that government misrepresents its citizens;
- Thirty two percent felt alienated from government;
- Distance between citizens and government became accentuated when realising that 58% felt that little effort was made to approach government or political parties' representatives when they were concerned on issues such as abortion and the capital punishment; and
- Only four percent attempted to approach government.

The validity of governmental representativeness becomes then questionable. How representative is our democratic government?

Relevance of the Church

> We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another (Solomon, 2006:1)

The most notable issues that have surfaced over the last couple of years are the issues on homosexuality, integration, abortion and capital punishment. From a historical background, the right to life and equal access to the benefits of democracy are indisputable

(Ndungane, 2002: 34). However, moral concerns emerged when "the right to life" becomes dismissible when undergoing an abortion. Government clearly saw itself as the protector rather than the guiding light. Moral choices lied now with the individual.

The moral divide became more problematic when citizens, by respecting the constitutional right to life, also desired a decrease in crime. One argument, as underscored by religious parties as well, strove to restore the death sentence as a deterrent to hardened criminals and their violent acts of crime. Government and church opposed this demand from society. Unfortunately, violent crimes continued. The increase in domestic violence and violence against women was worrying. Government aimed to shift the responsibility back to communities by re-emphasising moral values and campaigns such as the "16 days of Activism" (no violence against women and children). However, sexual acts of violence have rocked the Catholic Church. Moreover, the former deputy President, and Chair of South Africa's *Moral Regeneration Initiative*, Jacob Zuma's rape and corruption trials[1] mock the essence of these campaigns. Consequently, people become more cynical and disillusioned (Denis *et al*, 1999:95).

An even more contentious issue is the rights of gays and gay pastors (Ngcobo, 2006:16). Self-described gay priests are condemned within neo-conservative churches such as the DRC (Retief, 1999:7). The more liberal church, referring specifically to the Anglican Church, did not view gay clergy and homosexuality in the same light. Nevertheless, the divisions continue within the structures of both these churches, specifically the gap that widens between ordinary church members and those of higher rank (Denis *et al*, 1999:95).

Within the DRC, the thorny issue of reintegration with its other sister churches is clearly not resolved as yet (Mofok, 1999:1-3). Racial tensions and lack of constructive dialogue, as influenced by years of Apartheid socialisation hampered any efforts from the Synod level. Even in the eighties, "the gap between prophetic Synodical resolutions and the interests of the members of the congregation severely taxed the resources of the ministries" (De Gruchy, 1986b:33). By 2001, despite various initiatives, integration into one church was still more of a dream than a reality.

Looking at these thorny issues and lack of consensus one needs to ask:

- How much input was allowed by ordinary members regarding the church stance on these issues?
- Were conformity pressures present (i.e. pressure from eagerness to please government rather than opposing government)?
- How much emphasis was put on constitutional rights rather than Biblical values and norms?
- How effective can democracy be when leaders themselves do not respect the sacredness of their position[2]?

The "neutrality" of churches also came under the spotlight. Many (52%) felt that church leaderships were not always in touch with their congregations' sentiments and opinions. Equally concerning is that, despite being classified as a religious community, only 38% of respondents identified with their churches. It becomes clear that the majority of interviewees felt that the church could reconnect with its followers. Moral issues such as abortion and gay marriages alienate the government and church leadership from their followers.

The lack of discussion sessions with ordinary members is clearly deepening the divide. Around 30% of churchgoers felt that politicians should be required to explain complex government decisions. The issue of church attendance could be resolved when societal concerns are more directly addressed and explained by leadership structures. Can the church truly claim to be the voice of the people when so many feel that they cannot identify with their church? Is the church truly a reflection of its members? The dubious answer lies in the fact that 61% did not identify with their churches. Will the numbers increase in the future?

Democracy as the Connective Tissue

> … democracy needs to rediscover its *spiritual heritage*, while Christianity needs to develop a theology adequate for its participation in the *realisation of a just democratic world order* (De Gruchy, 1995).

As noted by Dongo (1998: 29) a system, focussing on the "liberation of mankind from all manner of servitude, injustices, discrimination and humiliations" is the only way forward if stability and unification are to be achieved in South Africa. To suggest that Christianity and democracy are mutually dependent on one another is to a certain extent overstressing the influence of the church and Christians on political systems. However, to imply that Christians never played a role in society is correspondingly a far cry from the truth.

[1] Jacob Zuma was acquitted on the rape charges, while the corruption investigation is ongoing.
[2] Prominent anti-Apartheid cleric, Rev. Alan Boesak abused his position of power when he committed fraudulent acts. He was sentenced to jail in 1999.

The argument has already shown that certain Christian groups, by means of the Bible and the Church, justified and exploited their religion to discriminate and tyrannise. Fortunately, those times have passed and the majority of South Africa's Christians nowadays embrace "justice, freedom, equality and human dignity" (Dongo, 1998:29). What is apparent is that, from a Theopolitical context, democracy is most compatible with Christianity. Saying so does not necessarily exclude ideologies such as socialism from the Christian equation.

According to Prozesky and De Gruchy (1990:223-225) the essential characteristics of good government ought to be equality and justice (linking again with the ANC's classless society vision). Should these attributes be applied, subsequent values like human rights and the rule of law will follow automatically.

When governments' main foci became law and order, or total freedoms at the cost of equity and justice, chaos or oppression would surely follow. Capitalism and complete freedoms, resulting in individualism, surely do not promote equity when they are at the expense of the disadvantaged. A staunch communist such as Chris Hani (Villa-Vicencio, 1996: 114-130) believed that obligations to imperfect governments are closely linked to the moral legitimacy of such governments. When imperfect laws infringed on one's value perceptions, unconditional government obedience became more problematic.

It became apparent that citizens, political parties and churches share the same views on South Africa's *immoral* laws. Respondents of the Anglican Church showed that 64% strongly disapproved of the legalisation of abortion, with the DRC's response reflected 49%. Directing the same question to the churchgoers' perception of their political parties' view on abortion, only 38% showed strong disapproval. Were political parties out of touch with their electorate? Obviously these huge discrepancies in church and political parties' level of identification and representation cannot be ignored. Are these un-representative laws not the first step towards increased voter dissatisfaction and alienation? Is immorality less of an issue than economic hardship and poor service delivery?

Friedman (2006:20) made it clear that government's attempt to redress service delivery and corruption will be in vain if citizens are not involved. Greater accountability and legitimacy derive from active citizen participation**,** resulting in more responsible and representative governments. Friedman's opinion was reflected in the following quote:"government only does what the people want, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs".

Agencies in a Sacral-Secular Context

Political Parties as Agencies

> Heavy lies the head that wears the crown. Heavier lies the head that aspires to secular values, but wears the crown of a conservative religious country. Such is the case of the ANC government. How does the ANC promote its progressive, secular policies in the context of fervent religiosity and conservatism (Jordaan, 2006:1)?

The fact that political parties are no longer the only agents for people, makes one wonder whether the church will start to step into the political domain once again? A decrease in card-carrying members of the ANC and other parties, strengthens this assumption as well as the increase of NGO's and proactive civil society. However, one should also bear in mind that churches themselves see a decrease in membership, as seen with respect to church attendance. The sensitivity of our history also prevented churches from becoming proactive, critical watchdogs and spokespersons on behalf of their followers. Who is currently South Africans' vehicle of conscience and morality? Are the carriers of morality government, a political party or a church? Alternatively, does it lie with the individual?

What level of interaction existed between the churches, political parties, interest groups and with government? Of significance, is the creation of specific religious orientated political parties. Whether it is the lack of effective and united church pressure and influence, or the lack of morality within government, the fact remains that religion is surfacing again within the political paradigm. Looking at the founding principles of political parties such as the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) definitely reconfirmed Theopolitics. Openly proclaiming Christianity does not imply that other political parties are not believers. However, given the strong history of party discipline, which is typical of parliamentary democracies, Christians do not necessarily vote according to their own convictions. The ACDP and the CDP, within the culture of parliamentary democracy, felt that the Christian faith can more easily influence the outcome of voting processes when all that needs to be taken into consideration are the voters' convictions, which are also in line with political party policies.

Will the citizens trust and subsequently vote for these parties in the light of our history and current emphasis on secularism? The 2004 electoral results did not reflect voter's confidence in these Christians parties. When 66.2% did not belong to any political party, citizen apathy was in the making, as confirmed

by the 96% of respondents that did not participate in political activities.

Can religion then be connected with electoral politics or is it too soon to predict? Are these Christian-based political parties representative of their followers' opinion regarding structural and policy changes? The verification becomes problematic since statistics on membership of these parties' is not easy to trace. However, political parties' validity is surely tested when a mere 4% has participated in political demonstrations.

South African political parties embrace democracy, rule of law and human rights. Notwithstanding the moral commonalities that existed between them, the elections in 1999 and 2004 still reflected racial and ethnic sentiments. Socio-economic issues and historic-demographical aspects still manipulated voter identification. Despite lack of service delivery or immoral laws, voters also remained loyal to their parties. It becomes clear that popular expectations as set against economic realities and socio-political challenges are still not reflected in voting powers. When studying the trends of electoral outcomes since 1994, it is obvious those voters still voted for the same parties and that opposition parties are not strong enough in their alternatives. The 2005 Local Government elections reflected a greater tendency towards voter concern over socio-economic issues, as well as voters staying away in protest. The economic hardships and level of poor government performance are still not enough to result in competitive alternatives.

The Church as an Agency

Frank Chikane, a prominent anti-Apartheid activist and former General-Secretary of the South Africa Council of Churches is now working in the office of the President. High ranking government officials are also church leaders. The question is: "do our new Black leaders continue to struggle for the reign of God or the struggle stop in 1994"?

Relationships between church and state in South Africa were never at any given time uniform (Pillay, 1995:81). This historical ambiguity of the South African church can be categorised into any three groupings:

- Those who opposed the theology of Apartheid;
- Those churches who provided theological justification of the doctrine of Apartheid; and
- Those churches that remained neutral (Cochrane, *et al*, 1991:37).

Clearly, Theopolitics has a continuing role to play in South Africa and remains a definite constant when an overwhelming 81% felt that their churches are instrumental in the spiritual and moral upliftment of their congregations. When looking at the role that churches played in the past, there is no doubt that they can be extremely important mechanisms for democratisation, namely:

- Promote reconciliation and reconstruction;
- Instil attitudes that will enhance the acceptance of plurality and human rights;
- Provide the moral fibre for political leaders;
- Supply social cohesion at times of fragmentation;
- Provide an educational zone for teachings about democracy;
- Connect with their congregation's needs and attitudes, due to the commitment of members towards their churches instead of their political parties (De Gruchy, 1995:185-187).

Can one proclaim that the Churches are still the most effective watchdogs? It seems as if the religio-political role players changed in the new South Africa. New watchdogs, such as the Anglican Church, have replaced the DRC, formerly a mouthpiece and tool for the NP government. However, can the economic deprivation of the Whites force the DRC to re-activate itself and become more involved in politics in order to promote its members' needs? Additionally the DRC has experienced internal problems among its followers and other sister churches. A new era for the church as a reflection of society has emerged. Can the DRC refill the vacuum that was left due to Apartheid? Can the church transform itself into a unifying force in this transitional period? Are there changes within the church and how do the followers feel when for instance, people of colour are allowed in the DRC? Can a united church front among all its sister churches be established, or are there too many schisms within the DRC? Can the Council of South African Churches speak in a united voice against evils and immoral policies? All these questions lead to the redefining of the political responsibility of the church in South Africa. Can we have a faith without ideology (Loubser, 1987:163-171)?

What is also apparent was the fact that church leaders no longer automatically side with liberation movements they supported during the struggle. Archbishop Tutu was one of the first to acknowledge that "they (church leaders) were no longer the political representatives of the oppressed" (De Gruchy, 1995: 211). Democracy and freedoms have been attained, indeed by means of the interrelationship that existed between political and religious role-players. But, true to Biblical prescriptions, churches remained as the moral watchdog over the secular leaders and therefore this does not exempt government from any criticisms that might be thrown at them.

These criticisms are evident in the verbal attacks between Archbishop Tutu and the ANC and NP, in relation to the final Truth and Reconciliation Com-

mission's (TRC) report, as well as the church efforts to fight HIV/Aids. Objectivity and sensitivity to a great extent reflected in this report that resulted in all role-players being reprimanded for the inhumane actions that they at times enacted. Needless to say, it was not supported by the ANC and the NP.

The fact that churches represent a large section of society helps in the strengthening of civil society and promotes individual insight into democratic values and procedures. The prophetic role which the church can exert on national government remains important but even more importantly is the creation of a participatory culture among the grassroots (Pothier, 1999:3).

Concluding Remarks

The interrelationship between church and state has dominated South Africa's history. Contradictory uses and abuses of religion for the sake of political power and freedom have been prominent since 1652. South Africa's new Constitution is now the ultimate watchdog for and guarantor of moral, political and socio-economic freedoms and values.

Together with newly created religious-oriented political parties, government and society continues to exercise Theopolitics. However, caution should still be exercised by leaders within government and church. The lack of dialogue and consultation amongst leaders and their followers result in disillusion, estrangement and misrepresentation on the part of churchgoers and the electorate. Both political and religious role-players should aim to become more representative, accommodative and reconciliatory. These processes are not easy and without obstacles. After all, the transition to democracy remains a permanent condition.

References

Cochrane, J., de Gruchy, J. & Petersen, R. (eds) 1991. In word and deed: towards a practical theology for social transformation. Hilton: Kendal & Strachan (Pty) Ltd.

De Gruchy, J.W. 1986b. The church struggle in South Africa. 2nd edition. Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

De Gruchy, J.W. & Prozesky, M. 1990. Christianity in South Africa. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

De Gruchy, J. W.1995. Christianity and democracy: a theology for a just world order. Cape Town: David Philip Publishers.

Denis, P.; Mlotshwa, T. & Mukuka, G. (eds) 1999. The casspir and the cross: voices of black clergy in the Natal Midlands. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications.

Dongo, M. 1998. "Establishing democracy in Southern Africa" in Mills, G (ed) Southern Africa into the next millennium. Johannesburg: SAIIA Press.

Forrest, D. 2002. "A prisoner of hope" in Mail & Guardian. 15-21 November. (12).

Friedman, S. 2006. "The President's plan won't work without the people's participation" in Sunday Times. 25 February. (20).

Jordaan, D. 2006. "Secularism versus religion: a South African case study" in Centre for international political studies: electronic briefing paper. No 79/2006. (1-4).

Loubser, J.A. 1987. The Apartheid Bible: a critical review of racial theology in South Africa. Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman Ltd.

MANDELA, N. 1994. Long walk to freedom. London: Abacus Books.

Mofok, L. 1999. "Divided they stand" in Sunday Times (online edition).
< http://www.suntimes.co.za/1999/06/13/news/gauteng/njhb04.htm > (13 June 1999).

Ndungane, N. 2002. "We must speak truth to power" in Mail & Guardian, 1 -7 November. (34).

Ngcobo, N. 2006. "No homosexual marriages on our premises – bishop" in City Press, 10 December 2006. (6).

Omi, S.C.B. (ed). 1996. "Church and State" in Grace and truth: a journal of Catholic reflection. Vol 13, no 3 – November. (49-55).

PILLAY, G.J. 1995. "Church, state and Christian pluralism in South Africa – a historical overview" in Studia Historia Ecclesiasticae, XXI: 2, 1995. (71-86).

Pillay, T. 2006. "Priests can't marry gays" in Sunday Times Extra. 10 December. (1).

Pothier, M. (ed). Economic justice in South Africa: a pastoral statement. Pretoria: Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference. May 1999.

Prozesky, M. 1990. Christianity in South Africa. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Solomon, H. 2006. "State Sanctioned Religious Fundamentalism: Perspectives from Washington and Tehran" in Centre for international political studies. No 2/2006. (1-3).

VILLA-VICENCIO, C. 1986. Between Christ and Caesar: classic and contemporary texts on church and state. Cape Town: David Philip.

About the Author

Marlene Muller

After studying French for 2 years in Belgium, Marléne Muller joined the University of Zululand in 1995 as a lecturer in the Department of Political Science & Public Administration. Being passionate about capacity building and adult education she has initiated and administered various training initiatives, as sponsored by provincial government and local businesses. She is currently the academic coordinator of a multi-million dollar project, aiming at strengthening Cooperatives in the KZN region. As Chairperson of the Gender Equity Forum in UniZul, she has also directed and initiated various successful endeavors in demystifying gender biasness. Besides administering additional community outreach projects, she is also part of the Editorial Board of her Faculty's in-house academic Journal, JCAL as well as GETT Propelled, a gender-based in-house Journal. The successes of her activities were seen in the numerous awards she has received in 2007, as well as a 2008 scholarship to Canada. Her love for a variety of multi-disciplinary fields are evident. She has delivered numerous papers and articles in the fields of conflict management, multi party politics, foreign policy, local government, good governance and ubuntu. She was also the only South African representing KwaZulu-Natal in the 2007 Hawaiian Interdisciplinary Social Science Conference.

The International JOURNAL of INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMON GROUND

Please visit the Journal website at http://www.SocialSciences-Journal.com
for further information about the Journal or to subscribe.

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS JOURNALS

International Journal of the Arts in Society
Creates a space for dialogue on innovative theories and practices in the arts, and their inter-relationships with society.
ISSN: 1833-1866
http://www.Arts-Journal.com

International Journal of the Book
Explores the past, present and future of books, publishing, libraries, information, literacy and learning in the information society. ISSN: 1447-9567
http://www.Book-Journal.com

Design Principles and Practices: An International Journal
Examines the meaning and purpose of 'design' while also speaking in grounded ways about the task of design and the use of designed artefacts and processes. ISSN: 1833-1874
http://www.Design-Journal.com

International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations
Provides a forum for discussion and builds a body of knowledge on the forms and dynamics of difference and diversity.
ISSN: 1447-9583
http://www.Diversity-Journal.com

International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability
Draws from the various fields and perspectives through which we can address fundamental questions of sustainability.
ISSN: 1832-2077
http://www.Sustainability-Journal.com

Global Studies Journal
Maps and interprets new trends and patterns in globalization. ISSN 1835-4432
http://www.GlobalStudiesJournal.com

International Journal of the Humanities
Discusses the role of the humanities in contemplating the future and the human, in an era otherwise dominated by scientific, technical and economic rationalisms. ISSN: 1447-9559
http://www.Humanities-Journal.com

International Journal of the Inclusive Museum
Addresses the key question: How can the institution of the museum become more inclusive? ISSN 1835-2014
http://www.Museum-Journal.com

International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences
Discusses disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to knowledge creation within and across the various social sciences and between the social, natural and applied sciences.
ISSN: 1833-1882
http://www.Socialsciences-Journal.com

International Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Change Management
Creates a space for discussion of the nature and future of organisations, in all their forms and manifestations.
ISSN: 1447-9575
http://www.Management-Journal.com

International Journal of Learning
Sets out to foster inquiry, invite dialogue and build a body of knowledge on the nature and future of learning.
ISSN: 1447-9540
http://www.Learning-Journal.com

International Journal of Technology, Knowledge and Society
Focuses on a range of critically important themes in the various fields that address the complex and subtle relationships between technology, knowledge and society. ISSN: 1832-3669
http://www.Technology-Journal.com

Journal of the World Universities Forum
Explores the meaning and purpose of the academy in times of striking social transformation.
ISSN 1835-2030
http://www.Universities-Journal.com

FOR SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT
subscriptions@commonground.com.au

Appendix 13 Publication no. 4

The Amakhosi-Councillors' interface: the need for multi-directional capacity building and accommodation

Journal of Public Administration

Volume 43 number 3.1 ▼ October 2008
Conference proceedings

SOUTH AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

(Incorporating SAIPA Tydskrif vir Publieke Administrasie/Journal of Public Administration)

P.O. Box 14257

Hatfield

0028

South Africa

Tel: +27 12 420 3606 Tel/Fax: +27 12 362 5614

ISSN: 0036-0767

EDITORIAL POLICY AND MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

EDITORIAL POLICY

1. The *Journal of Public Administration* is a quarterly journal is issued on behalf of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).
2. The purpose of the *Journal* is to further the understanding of the theory and practice of Public Administration and Management by publishing articles of interest to practitioners and scholars in English.
3. The *Journal* publishes peer-reviewed articles, review articles, case studies, exemplar profiles, viewpoints and research results from practitioners of all grades and professions, academics and other specialists on the broad spectrum of administrative concerns regarding local, provincial, national, and international affairs.
4. All manuscripts are circulated anonymously to specialist referees for evaluation. Reports from referees may be made available to authors but the names of the referees will be withheld. On the basis of the referees' reports, content and other deficiencies, the Editor reserves the right to make minor alterations or to reject any manuscript.
5. Copyright of articles published in the *Journal* vests in the *Journal* and may not be published or reproduced in any form without the prior consent of the Editor.
6. **Warning:** Infringement of copyright exposes offenders to criminal proceedings that could result in civil actions and/or a fine/imprisonment and a criminal record. Therefore, authors are advised to acknowledge the origin of any content in an article or other contribution obtained from another source.
7. Reprints of articles can be obtained from the Editor on the payment of a prescribed Fee.
8. Opinions expressed in the *Journal* are, however, those of the individual authors, and are not necessarily subscribed to by the Editor, Editorial Committee or the Editorial Board.
9. Authors are required to pay a fee of R300-00 per page for any article or research results printed in the *Journal*. Payment is due on receiving confirmation from the Editor that a contribution is to be published in a particular issue of the *Journal*. Authors should consult their respective faculties or employer to establish the responsibility for the payment. An article will only be published once payment has been received. Payment should be made directly to the *Journal of Public Administration*, but proof of payment must also be submitted to the Editor to avoid any possible delay in the publication of a contribution.

MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

Except in special cases where prior permission has been obtained, articles should not exceed 5 000 words. Prospective contributors are specifically requested to ensure that the language and technical aspects of their contributions are of high standard. THREE identical copies of a manuscript, typed in **1.5 line spacing**, **12pt Times New Roman** should be submitted. A **disk** should also be submitted. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an English **abstract** of up to 200 words. Since manuscripts are circulated anonymously for evaluation, the name and affiliation of the author(s) should appear on the separate page. If the manuscript is accepted, a computer disk with the text, preferably in **MS Word or WordPerfect** must be sent to the Editor. Only the **Harvard style** will be accepted for references.

All manuscripts must be accompanied by a covering letter in which the author(s) state(s) that the manuscript has not been submitted or will not be submitted or published or is not being published elsewhere in any form unless rejected by the Editor of the *Journal of Public Administration.*

THE AMAKHOSI–COUNCILLORS' INTERFACE: THE NEED FOR MULTI DIRECTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ACCOMMODATION

M. Muller
N. Zulu
University of Zululand

ABSTRACT

As a developmental state, South Africa's local government are continuously facing major challenges. KwaZulu-Natal itself experiences severe poverty, incessant HIV/Aids casualties and unemployment. Being the foot-soldiers of democracy, our municipalities carry the brunt of discontent and societal pressures. Hence, elected political office bearers and municipal administrators are mandated to undergo training so as to enhance their municipalities' capacity and delivery record. But where is the recognition of traditional leaders? Where are the incentives to train them alongside municipal officials? *South Africa's Constitution,* 1996 mandates traditional leaders to ensure that services are delivered to their members in a sustainable way. Their relevance depends to a large extent on how the institution serves its communities customarily, culturally and developmentally. Within the uMhlathuze Municipality, in partnership with various stakeholders, training of the aMakhosi (traditional leaders) is seen as non-negotiable. Yet, the actual interaction between elected political office bearers, local communities and the aMakhosi remain limited and inefficient. Subsequently, service deliveries are affected.

The University of Zululand in partnership with its in-house KZN Institute for Local Government and Traditional Leadership and other corporate entities, embarked on extensive capacity building endeavours. The overarching aims are to capacitate local community leaders as well as to bridge the gap between those elected members, officials and the aMakhosi. This is an ongoing project and serves to test the applicability and relevance of capacity building of the aMakhosi as an important tool for effective service delivery.

INTRODUCTION

Traditional leaders are the custodians of culture in society. The institution of traditional leadership has served the African people over many years and in various forms. The relevance of the institution of traditional leadership currently depends to a large extent on how the institution serves its communities customarily, culturally and developmentally. The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,* 1996 specifically recognizes the validity of African customary law and the system of traditional leadership associated with it.

The recognition of local government in the South African Constitution, 1996 as a sphere of government in its own right has enhanced the status of local government. Municipalities are now in the forefront of public service delivery. In addition, aMakhosi continue to play an important part in many issues that affect the daily lives of their people.

The Constitutional status that the House of Traditional Leaders and traditional leaders received, recognises their importance, validity, status and role. Furthermore, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003) completely overhauled the House of Traditional Leadership and remodelled it according to South Africa's new structure of government. The Constitution gives municipalities, including areas under the traditional leadership, the obligation to ensure that services are delivered to their citizens in a sustainable way (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 4).

However, the interrelationship between elected councillors and aMakhosi seem to be strained despite their common developmental agendas. Constructive, non-political synergies and co-operation seem limited, challenging development and democracy. As an attempt to redress the numerous deadlocks, capacity building, as linked to training, was identified by various stakeholders. Subsequently, the KZN ILGTL and its partners embarked on empowerment programmes, aiming specifically to bridge the gap between the councillors and the aMakhosi via training and capacity building initiatives. The paper therefore explores the relevance and successfulness of these endeavours.

THE COUNCILLOR-AMAKHOSI INTERFACE

The developmental mandate of local government requires new capabilities, attitudes and approaches. Relations between municipal councils, traditional leaders and the administration need improvements. Both councillors and aMakhosi are now the custodians of their peoples, cultures and needs. Unfortunately, rivalries, misperception and poor representation diminished the input of the aMakhosi in municipal affairs. This resulted in deadlocks since traditional leaders in KZN are more assertive in locating themselves within their local government affairs (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 3-4).

Service deliveries' conflicting agencies

The White Paper on Local Government (1998a) recommends that "the institution of traditional leadership" should play a role closest to the people". This is directly the opposite of the 1994 ANC election manifesto, as based on the *Reconstruction and Development*

Programme (RDP). The RDP was emphatic that democratically elected local government structures should play this role. The White Paper on Local Government (1998a) thus makes a major shift in government policy, and has grave consequences for the possibility of democracy in rural areas. Similarly, the Constitution has explicitly added development functions to democratically elected local government structures. Yet, the White Paper recommends that traditional authorities should continue performing these tasks.

The *Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act,* 2003 (Act 41 of 2003) positions the institution of traditional leadership at the centre of development, next to their counterparts, the democratically elected councillors. Developmental functions of traditional councils are for example to facilitate the involvement of traditional communities in the development or amendment of municipalities' integrated development plan (IDPs) in whose area the community resides. Hence, the roles and functions of traditional leadership are to promote the ideals of co-operative governance, integrated development planning and sustainable development.

Additionally, the amendment of the *Local Government: Municipal Structures Act,* 1998 (1998b) successfully increased the presentation of traditional authorities from 10% to 20% of the total number of councillors. Further to this amendment, traditional authorities would not only be represented at a local government sphere, but also at a district and in the case of KwaZulu Natal, metropolitan municipality too. However, they do not have any voting rights, effectively reducing traditional authorities to the status of observers.

Can these conflicting mandates be redressed by training alone?

Mechanisms to enhance local service deliveries

To address developmental challenges, government has put into place various development programmes whose implementation is to be driven at national, provincial and local government spheres through co-ordinated and integrated arrangements aimed at achieving commonly shared development objectives. Although government has assumed the leading role in advancing development in South Africa, there is commonly held agreement that this responsibility has to be shared with other non-state actors, including the private sector, labour organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community-based organisations (CBOs) (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 5)

Given the above-mentioned institutional arrangements incorporating the government, private sector, and NGO community stakeholders, there is a daily strife to deliver quality public services in order to address the country's development challenges. However, it has since emerged that the biggest challenge faced, is that of ensuring effective and efficient delivery of quality public services to the people. In effect, this means that development and its associated impact have to benefit everyone.

Developmental government provides that local government has to assume a holistic role by developing and stimulating local economies. In order to achieve this, local municipalities have to create supporting policy and institutional instruments like integrated development plans (IDPs) and local economic development plans (LEDPs). It is through such planning that municipalities will define their developmental leadership in the health,

infrastructure, education, and economic and related fields in order to create an enabling environment within which local economies will thrive (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 4-5).

While municipalities and traditional leaders have been given the responsibility of delivering quality public services, they have not succeeded in meeting the expectations as defined in their IDPs and LEDPs. Whilst they are succeeding in achieving some of their planned objectives such as new low-cost housing targets, municipalities and traditional leaders continue to perform poorly when it comes to other objectives, especially economic development objectives. For example, year after year, municipalities do not succeed in achieving their specified targeted amounts of local and foreign direct investment in the local economy (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 4 -5).

Challenges of poor performance in KwaZulu Natal

Despite selective service delivery successes, especially related to infrastructural programmes, municipalities are still marred by ineffectiveness and poor performance. Unpacking the dismal record of service delivery the following seems to be applicable:

- lack of requisite skills result in poorly skilled traditional leadership and local economic development officials being unable to facilitate the necessary planning and implementation processes;
- poor social mobilisation and facilitation lead to poorly informed development plans and activities;
- poor communication between a municipality and the traditional structures;
- absence of a meaningful definition of governance roles between and amongst councillors, appointed officials, as well as traditional leaders, resulting appointed officials blaming councillors for making unrealistic promises to their constituents, which officials cannot practically deliver on; and
- in some local communities there is lack of co-operation amongst traditional leaders and councillors (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 5-7).

Ignorance, the shortage of suitable human skills and capacity to drive and implement the plethora of development programmes, projects and services seriously hamper progress. Whilst appreciated, it seems that even training and development measures by South African Local Government Association (SALGA) are not enough to address this problem (Somers, 2007: 3). The efforts of the Council for Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) also do not go unnoticed in terms of assisting traditional leaders to locate themselves meaningfully in the country's government arrangements.

The new mandate of municipalities and traditional leaders, with additional developmental functions, require new capabilities, attitudes, and approaches on the part of municipalities and the entire institution of traditional leadership. In order to meet the challenge of building stronger, functional, and traditional leaders, additional and more acute inclusive training and capacity building initiatives have to be undertaken (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 8).

KwaZulu Natal (KZN) is marred by an acute backlog with regard to the delivery of many government services and development programmes. To expedite development

in this province, there is a need for a multi-pronged approach in order to complement government efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of local municipalities' mandate to deliver services.

Being a traditionally grounded nation, the majority of people of KZN, the Zulus, still submit to and are subject to traditional leadership arrangements that feature the Izinduna, aMakhosi and their sovereign leader, King Zwelithini. As part of the people's history traditional leaders still have the authority on many issues that affect the daily lives of their subjects. For example, they still grant dwelling land to families on what is considered tribal authority land. It must also be noted that this phenomenon is not unique to KZN but prevails in other provinces such as the Eastern Cape and Limpopo (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 8).

However, what complicates the KZN challenge and makes it unique is that the traditional leadership structures in this province are more assertive in locating themselves within the local government affairs which undeniably demands more attention. Can the development of silos of municipalities and aMakhosi be avoided?

CAPACITY BUILDING: MANDATES AND INITIATIVES

The *Local Government: Municipal Systems Act,* 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) clearly states that local government must engage with communities with respect to municipal affairs (as linked to planning and service delivery); establish an efficient, effective and transparent local government system that conforms to constitutional principles; and by creating a harmonious relationships between councils, administrations and local communities through the acknowledgement of their rights and duties.

Administratively, municipalities should also strengthen welfare and social development; fair representation; education; training and skills development; as well as participation in the workplace (Gildenhuys, 1996: 19). However, power remains a constant problem for local government's endeavour to promote democracy, equity and development. Local systems of governance can experience high levels of stress and strains due to power struggles among stakeholders, whether personal or political.

Furthermore, the *White Paper on Municipal Service Partnership* (MSP) states that "for historical reasons, the majority of councils in South Africa require assistance with capacity enhancement so that they can fulfil their executive functions and responsibilities in line with the expectations of the society". The White Paper also identifies technical assistance as a crucial component of effective implementation of MSP and states that

> *without an effective network technical support for MSP contract management and compliance, those municipalities that lack experience in performance monitoring run the risk of being unable to sustain their MSP's. Subsequently, municipal councils will need a network, of technical support mechanisms, including formalised training, on-the-job training, experienced technical advice, and information dissemination and experience sharing.*

By establishing the KZN Institute of Local Government and Traditional Leadership (KZN ILGTL), the University of Zululand is responding to the government's challenge to develop

the capacity of municipalities to meet their constitutional responsibility as well as the expectations of their communities.

KZN Institute of Local Government and Traditional Leaders

Chief amongst its reasons for existence, the KZN Institute of Local Government & Traditional Leadership (KZN ILGTL) seeks to emasculate the general efforts to develop and strengthen local government in the province. KZN ILGTL plans to achieve this by inclusively building the capacity of both the municipality and the traditional leadership structures (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 4).

The rationale is that by acknowledging the role that each of these structures play in matters of local government, mutual co-existence and collaboration can be fostered and promoted resulting in more effective municipalities. In particular, the KZN ILGTL aims to enhance local government skills through the delivery and implementation of various needs-based training programmes.

As a Local Facilitation Agent the KZN ILGTL primarily strives for the following:

- a dualistic approach to empowerment, capacity building and development as in line with national and local directives: focusing not only on managerial levels within local government but equally emphasizing previously disadvantaged and disempowered grassroots' level role-players such as the aMakhosi and elected councillors;
- to provide and assure relevant and quality training as directed by local government legislation and community needs;
- to identify and adopt municipalities in order to assist, uplift and capacitate them;
- to coach councillors, managers and traditional authorities the skills of leadership as related to emotional and intelligent equipped management;
- to be sensitive and responsive towards South Africa's unique cultural and traditional composition;
- to enhance and strengthen women empowerment;
- to provide assistance, training and counselling in the field of HIV/AIDS;
- to provide learnership programmes, ultimately contributing to empowerment and income generating abilities for the community at large;
- to focus on skills development programmes with the ultimate goal of capacity building;
- to enhance the managerial skills of municipal managers by providing assistance in diversity management and administration;
- to train councillors, managers and traditional authorities the skills of conflict management and resolution;
- to empower local government structures with financial skills as laid down by the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003
- to instruct local government institutions on the areas of policy development, programme development and implementation;
- to inculcate a culture of ethical governance;
- to strengthen monitoring and reporting capacities of municipalities; and

- to coach councillors, managers and traditional authorities on the skills of communication

Operationalisation of partnerships and training endeavours

Together with its partners such as the Independent Development Trust (IDT), Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), ABSA, South African Local Government Association (SALGA), Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University (FAMU) and Skills Fountain greater development capacities were achieved (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 1).

Committed to people-centred models of development, specifically within the paradigm of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP), the following benefits were achieved:

- adequate servicing of targeted district municipalities (ISRDP nodes), which include Umkhanyakhude, Zululand as well as Uthungulu;
- by channelling resources institutional delivery capacities regarding identified municipalities were enhanced; and
- by being part of the IDT's Communities of Practice (COP) greater co-ordination with national initiatives were achieved (KZN ILGTL, 2005: 2).

Projects

The KZN ILGTL was instrumental in the successful implementation of the following projects:

- training of aMakhosi and councillors within the districts of Umkhanyakhude, Uthungulu and Zululand:
  - KwaDube Tribal Council,
  - Sokhulu Tribal Council,
  - Mkwanazi Tribal Council,
  - Mbonambi Tribal Council,
  - Nibela Tribal Council,
  - Mbila Tribal Council, and
  - Hlaibisa Tribal Council.
- various baseline surveys and training needs analysis for IDT, especially focussing on the municipalities of Mtubatuba, Big five False Bay, Umkhanyakhude (DM), Hlabisa, Jozini and Umhlabuyalingana;
- the training of women of the Matshana Reserve to be economically self-sufficient. This is in conjunction with Skills Fountain and the Department of Education;
- collecting and assessing data from the ISRDP nodes for the purpose of redefining success models of governance, in collaboration with IDT;
- creating district LED-coordinating forums;
- promote SMMEs in tourism;
- promotion of ward-level planning; and
- student exchange programmes, exchange of course material and guest lecturing in partnership with FAMU (KZN ILGTL, 2008: 4 & KZN ILGTL, 2007: 5).

Challenges and successes

Many Section 21 companies struggle on a continuous basis due to the lack of staff, infrastructure and funding. KZN ILGTL is no exception. Notwithstanding generous grants that were received from IDT and RBM, operational costs continue to escalate and hamper greater interventions within the communities.

Some continuous problems are:

- high level of illiteracy;
- traditional leaders and councillors continue to show a lack of will, skills and capacity to work with one another, for example the Sokhulu Tribal Council was adamant in having training in their own jurisdictions and without councillors;
- training-saturation;
- accredited Service Providers are expensive and scarce;
- poorly skilled LED officers hampers planning and implementation processes;
- poor communication between municipalities and traditional structures;
- political associations are a frequent deterrent for workable partnerships;
- some programmes remain too generic in scope and content; and
- poor cooperation between councillors and traditional leaders continue (KZN ILGTL, 2008: 4 & KZN ILGTL, 2007: 5).

Tangible successes are abounding, but the intangible impact of capacity building is equally rewarding. Great progress was therefore made in:

- obtaining political buy-ins from Councillors and Amakhosi pertaining the KZN ILGTL's programmes;
- continuous funding from various stakeholders;
- on-going support from municipalities, House of Traditional Leaders and King Zwelethini;
- house of Traditional Leaders (situated in Umkhanyakude DM) embraced capacity building efforts;
- students and unemployed were given opportunities to partake in baseline surveys, obtaining valuable experience and financial backing; and
- the Mbila Traditional authority's excellent management report resulted in it being recognised as a Model of Best Practice that will be showcased with other Authorities (KZN ILGTL, 2008: 5 & KZN ILGTL, 2007: 7).

CONCLUSION

Developmental projects and capacity building initiatives must be embraced by all community stakeholders, as connected by their mutual desire for progress, equity and growth. KZN ILGTL is the only institute that is housed within a tertiary institution, aiming specifically to address the challenges of capacity building and training, as contextualised within a local governmental set-up and closely linked with traditional leaders.

The KZN ILGTL continues to do groundbreaking work in redressing the barriers between elected officials, municipal administrations and the aMakhosi. Forging partners with prominent stakeholders not only could guarantee collective ownership but also enhance social cohesion. These capacity building initiatives should encourage other community leaders across the country to take ownership of their own development and collective duties. Perseverance, education, volunteerism and commitment to a better life for all will definitely lead to a better South Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bekker, K. (ed). 1996. *Citizen participation in local government.* Pretoria: J L Van Schaik.

Gildenhuys, A.J. 1996. Analysing democracy for local government. In Bekker, K. *Citizen participation in local government.* Pretoria: J L Van Schaik. (11-29).

KZN ILGTL. 2005. *KZN Institute for Local Government & Traditional Leadership: Foundation documents.* Unpublished.

KZN ILGTL. 2006. *KZN Institute for Local Government & Traditional Leadership: Progress Report,* May 2006. Unpublished.

KZN ILGTL. 2007. *KZN Institute for Local Government & Traditional Leadership: Annual Report,* December 2007. Unpublished.

KZN ILGTL, 2008. *KZN Institute for Local Government & Traditional Leadership: Progress Report,* June 2008. Unpublished.

SOMERS, O. 2007. *Synergy in the field of local government training to achieve parity and accreditation.* Unpublished paper delivered at the Institute of Municipal Finance Officers Annual Conference: 10 – 12 September 2007.

South Africa (Republic). 1996a. *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.* Pretoria: Government Printers.

South Africa (Republic). 1998a. *The White Paper on Local Government issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development.* Government Gazette, Vol. 393, No 18739. 13 March. Pretoria: Government Printers.

South Africa (Republic). 1998b. *Local Government: Municipal Structures Act,* 1998 (Act 117 of 1998). Pretoria: Government Printers.

South Africa (Republic). 2000. *Local Government: Municipal Systems,* 2000 (Act 32 of 2000). Pretoria: Government Printers.

South Africa (Republic). 2003. *Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework,* 2003 (Act 41 of 2003). Pretoria: Government Printers.

Appendix 14 Publication no. 5

Poverty alleviation through social self-defence: a new political discourse?

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

Professor Ajit Karnik	Dr. Alun Epps	Dr. Kay Sanderson
Editor	Editor	Editor
ERPBSS Conference Chair	Research Chair	Research Committee Member

Middlesex University Dubai

ISBN: 978-9948-20-593-7
November 2013

POVERTY ALLEVIATION THROUGH SOCIAL SELF-DEFENCE: a new political discourse?

Marlene Muller
School of Management and Languages
Heriot -Watt University Dubai Campus
P.O. Box: 294345
Tel: [redacted]
Fax: [redacted]
Dubai International Academic City
UAE
Email: [redacted]

and

Mandlenkosi Lawrence Mkhize
Department of Governance and Political Transformation
University of the Free State
South Africa
Email: [redacted]

Word count: 5873 words

POVERTY ALLEVIATION THROUGH SOCIAL SELF-DEFENCE: a new political discourse?

Abstract

South Africa (SA) will soon celebrate two decades of democracy, as entrenched in freedom and human dignity. Despite its political success, economic disparities between the rich and poor persist, threatening the social fabric of its communities. Suffering from transformation fatigue (Allan, 2008), poor service delivery by local governments re-enforces grass-roots alienation, poverty and political instability. The aim of this paper is to capture the views of the local communities that are involved in political protests as a way of putting pressure on their governments to address their socio-political and economic needs. The paper is based on a qualitative research study conducted within the Midvaal Local Municipality and the Thembelihle informal settlement, examining specifically local citizens' perceptions on whether and how the new democratic dispensation in South Africa contributes to poverty alleviation and effective service delivery.

In spite of the adoption of integrative development planning and executing programs of participation, the voice of the citizen is still inconsequential. Our major finding is that the notion of representation is sacrificed for personal gain and selective economic development, leaving the citizenry disillusioned. Consequently, as a measure of social self-defence, many citizens believe that political protests are the best way of making local governments hear their voices.

The implication of our findings is that failure by governments to alleviate poverty among communities and to improve service delivery, leads to the justification of violent protests, which if ignored, could delegitimize government and threaten development, ultimately legitimising social self-defence.

Keywords:

Social self-defence, poverty alleviation, service delivery, local government, violence

POVERTY ALLEVIATION THROUGH SOCIAL SELF-DEFENCE: a new political discourse?

1. Introduction

Participatory democracy encapsulates a political culture of responsive leadership that encourages active community participation. The South African scenario currently juxtaposes four types of community participation, namely participatory, confrontational, spectatorship as well as the silent voice (Williams, 2006; Clapper, 1996). The voice of the citizen is often interpreted as emotional and politically motivated; and subsequently dismissed. As recipients of poor service delivery and ineffective governance, marginalisation continues to re-enter the political playing field, with the poor ultimately expressing themselves through protests (Booysen, 2007; Alexander, 2010).

The responsiveness of local government remains largely ineffective, despite adopting integrative development planning and embracing participative governance. Exacerbated by effects of distorted economic development as well as poor governance, voter discontent and disillusionment continues to increase (Muller, 2009). With political trust declining many revert to protest actions as the last resort, that guarantee attention and redress (Booysen, 2007; Askvik, 2010). A weakened civil society, coupled with a government prone to "act, rather than lead" (Reddy, 2010, p. 202), firmly entrenches a political society embracing protests as the most successful participative mechanism.

This paper explores the perceptions of local communities that are prone to protesting as a way of drawing the attention of those charged with governance to their economic, social plight and poor service delivery by local authorities. In the context of this paper the term social self-defence has been coined to refer to actions taken by people in despair and literally implies "counter measures that are taken as a last resort by a significant part of a desperate community to secure their economic well-being". The paper, therefore argues that social self-defence has become a norm, as citizens strive to re-claim a quality of life and basic human rights for themselves.

The paper is organised into five sections. The first two provide an insight into how South Africa's local government jeopardises development and community participation. The third section discusses the methodology employed in this study followed by a presentation of findings, while the fourth discusses these findings in the light of the notion of social self-defence as an emerging new political discourse in South Africa. Finally, a conclusion and suggestions for future research are given.

2. Local government, democracy and community participation

It can be argued that community participation is the connective tissue between democracy, development and local government. Mbeki (2005, p.1) posits that "the strengthening of the democratic system should (also) be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future".

2.1 The interrelationship between democracy, local government and development

Democracy and freedoms were endorsed with the African National Congress' (ANC) electoral victory during the 1994 elections, clearly cementing constitutional democracy (Southall, 2000). However, the speed of transformation also created a "phase of dysphoria" (Roskin, 2001, p. 94) where scarcities, corruption and lack of equitable economic redistribution became the main catalysts of anxieties and dissatisfaction.

The constitutionalisation of local government laid the foundation for strong democratic governance and a conceptual shift from local governments being administrative service delivery agents to being autonomous spheres. This resulted in municipalities becoming the "hands and feet" of government, "committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives" (White Paper on Local Government, 1998). As a 'developmental arm' of government, its main tasks are then to ensure service delivery as well as bringing democracy to the people (Koelble and LiPuma, 2010, p. 566). Furthermore, being a distinct sphere of government local government is tasked with "serving its communities by ensuring the provision

of household infrastructure, viable local economic development, community empowerment and redistribution of resources" (Bekink, 2007, pp. 73-75).

Democracy at the local level should therefore focus on "community participation, majority rule, consultation, discussion and responsible leadership when informing and guiding their constituencies" (Geldenhuys, 1996, p. 17). Hence, the decision-making process for local governments should always be kept as close as possible to a vigilant, pro-active and informed citizenry (Vyas-Doorgapersad and Muller, 2006). When citizens refrain from participating in local affairs, governmental inaction occurs. As Friedman (2006, p. 20) aptly affirms: "government only does what the people want, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs". Furthermore, the Municipal Systems Act (2000) clearly states that local government must "engage with communities with respect to municipal affairs (as linked to planning and service delivery); establish an efficient, effective and transparent local government system that conforms to constitutional principles; and by creating harmonious relationships between councils, administrations and local communities through the acknowledgement of their rights and duties" (Municipal Structures Act, 1998).

It is clear that decentralised local governments' developmental mandates are closely connected with participative democracy and accountability (Muller, 2006; Mehrotra and Jarrett, 2002), allowing citizens to become the watchdogs of democracy; necessitating the co-existence of an independent civil society, and collectively striving for a strong local economy. However, local government becomes undemocratic when views are neglected and minorities dominate because of their wealth, access to officials, and high levels of education; when the illiterate and the poorest of the poor are not accommodated and/or acknowledged in decision-making processes; with open dialogue being absent (Geldenhuys, 1996).

Both the Municipal Structures Act (1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (2000) provide a broad framework for a participatory local democracy, enhancing positive feelings among citizens since they can exert some influence, apathy is reduced resulting in minimizing the abuse of powers, even allowing deprivation when sufficient information is shared among all (Clapper, 1996, p. 75-76). Two main participatory mechanisms are Councillors and Ward Committees, accommodating

effective community participation in the affairs of the municipality. Ward Committees are community-based advisory committees, with the Ward Councillor acting as chairperson. The Councillor has to report back to his/her constituencies (wards) on a quarterly basis in terms of the Code of Conduct (De Visser, 2005).

By accommodating community participation, responsive leadership will always have the advantage of receiving primary information from the local communities, resulting in quality decisions and appropriate programmes. However, informed debates are mainly non-existent, negatively affecting ward committees and policies (Piper and Deacon, 2009). Leaders also tend to impose their "pre-designed, party-directed planning programmes", cementing the notions that the "party is everything and the constituency is nothing, except during election times when it is required to vote for a specific party" (Williams, 2006, p. 198). Such behaviour threatens the core of democracy, nullifying voters' input, making a mockery of public opinion and electoral mechanisms. Nonetheless, Booysen (2007) confirms that despite voter discontent, people remain loyal to their political parties, albeit more critical and demanding regarding service delivery.

Can protests and votes work hand in hand to improve development and service delivery?

2.2 Citizen participation and the service delivery mandate

South Africa's municipalities are in crises, with more than two-thirds marred by poor service delivery (Koelble and LiPuma, 2012). Developmental local government presupposes the recognition of the linkages between development, service delivery and community participation (Mogale, 2003). Brynard (1996, pp. 45-48) subsequently identifies various forms of participation such as 'Structural and Consultative Participation' involve formal groups that have clearly defined prerogatives and responsibilities, such as community forums; 'Open Participation' that occurs on an ad-hoc basis; 'Informal Participation', which centres on citizens taking the initiative to approach local officials; 'Constituent Participation' that entails the organising and promotion of interest groups that can identify issues and contribute to their political constituencies; and 'Evaluative Participation', which occurs when services are pledged during times of election upon which the citizen can evaluate performances. Williams (2006, p. 212)

furthermore names 'Confrontational Participation' where people have reached breaking point, and Clapper (1996, p. 59) recognising the 'Silent Voice' as the apathetic participant due to possible lack of knowledge, ignorance, illiteracy, perceiving government as illegitimate, and/or isolation. Lastly, Williams' (2006, p. 210) 'Spectator Participation' furthermore describes those who attend highly publicised and well-organised rallies (or *Imbizos*) of political parties, creating a false sense of community participation.

Municipal-citizen partnerships consequently allow consensual agreements and the enhancement of the institutionalisation of service delivery systems through interventions and improved communications (Vyas-Doorgapersad and Muller, 2006). Booysen (2007, p. 21) therefore coins the 'politics of service delivery' as both a "top-down and bottom-up process", where the legislative frameworks ensure effective governance and budgets (top-down approach), with the bottom-up processes reflecting on peoples' struggles for service delivery, as exacerbated by politics, ignorance and inefficiencies. Although legislation promotes participatory governance (Piper and Deacon, 2009) it clearly opposes any interference in governing matters: primarily enabling participation in "integrated development planning (IDP), performance management, budgetary processes and strategic decisions around service delivery; as well as enabling participation through capacity building in the community among the staff and councilors (De Visser, 2005, p. 99).

Ward Committees have experienced many challenges given the fact that political parties have secured representation in them and that establishing procedures is not only time consuming, but costly as well. Poor communication with the grass-roots as well as the latter's lack of local governmental know-how, further challenges resources, decisions, policies and service delivery (De Visser, 2005; Burger, 2005 and Piper and Deacon, 2009). If local government is comprised of only political party representatives (characteristic of interparty competition and squabbles), ideology and political agendas will replace the service ethos. This can ultimately heighten corruption, nepotism and maladministration at municipal level.

The following section will elaborate on how these frustrations lead to desperation, violent protests, ultimately justified by social self-defence.

3. Local government's democracy deficit

3.1 Poor service delivery and protests

Fox and Meyer (1995) (as cited in Akinboade *et al.*, 2013, p. 461) describe service delivery "as the provision of public activities, benefits or satisfactions to the citizens (and) relates both to the provision of tangible public goods and intangible services." South Africa's Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs highlights "water supply, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal" (Akinboade *et al.*, 2013, p. 462) as the most prominent services to render.

Poverty alleviation requires effective and sustainable service delivery (Burger, 2005). Sustainable and equitable development demands effective governance and constructive citizen participation, thus ensuring a quality of life for all, as constitutionally guaranteed (Cameron, 2001). The ANC has made tremendous efforts in addressing the plight of the poor and developmental challenges (Muller and Zulu, 2008). Many progressive programs and policies have been introduced since 1994 such as the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Program); Spatial Development and Land Use Frameworks; Local economic development (LED); ASGISA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative); Project Consolidate, BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) and GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) (Muller, 2009:199). Due to all the protests and service delivery backlogs, the Local Government Turnaround Strategy was established in 2009 aiming to address the financial and administrative troubles; reduce staff turnovers in local government; closer coordination between the spheres of government and IDP's; avoid the 'one size fits all' approach in the IDP's (Mgwebi, 2010, as cited in Mkhize, 2013, p 19). Yet, the ANC government fails to stimulate economic growth and improve its service delivery programmes, as citizens become cynical and dissatisfied. When citizens are evicted from their dwellings and provision of services are cut-off, vicious cycles of non-payment and revolt against structures and institutions. 'Debt traps',' ineffective tax bases' and 'aloof Councillors' (Booysen, 2007, p. 24) furthermore hamper political trust. Subsequently, with leaders and institutions failing to protect citizens' constitutional rights, their 'pent-up anger'

(Booysen, 2007, p. 24) results in protests; which are a last resort to defend their property, dignity and rights. Hence, social self-defence emerges.

Additionally, Burger (2005, p. 487) also states that when both government officials and community representatives are poorly skilled and educated, service delivery can be of "inferior quality". Moreover, when jobless growth remains a fixture, protests will increase according to Census 2001 stating that: "protests take place in wards: (1) that have higher unemployment rates than the average ward in their municipalities . . . [and] (2) that have worse access to services than the average ward in their municipalities" (Alexander, 2010, p. 32).

Table 1

Number of protests marches per province (years 2004/5 to 2007/8)

	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	Total
Gauteng	1932	2205	1888	1451	7476
Western Cape	557	511	577	642	2287
KwaZulu-Natal	1891	2529	1774	1146	7340
Limpopo	660	915	665	642	2882
Eastern Cape	754	1383	1626	733	4496
North West	1108	1341	1159	1502	5110
Free State	506	728	713	483	2430
Mpumulanga	295	336	337	4	972
Northern Cape	301	489	427	400	1617
Total	8004	10,437	9166	7003	34,610

Source: Adapted from Alexander (2010, p. 27).

Frequent surveys concur that living conditions in SA have indeed improved, although many remain cynical, claiming that the gap between national statistics and public opinion remains as wide as ever (Davids and Gaibie, 2011), not to mention the huge social and special inequities that affect everyone (Binns and Nel, 2002). The Afrobarometer 2008 SA survey (Davids and Gaibie, 2011, p. 231) showed that many citizens (22.5%) felt that their living conditions were "fairly bad"; "very bad" (21,3%), or not happy (21%), with government continuously focusing on "macro-statistics of overall achievements (Booysen, 2007, p. 23) thus ignoring local sentiments, it is no wonder that local protests have increased since 2004, "amounting to a rebellion of the poor" (Alexander, 2010, p. 25). Alexander (2010) also noted in Table 1 that these

'gatherings' increased in provinces such as Gauteng and North West with some of the most unrest-related protests occurring directly before and after local government elections (Table 2).

Table 2

Types of demonstrations (years 2004/5 to 2007/8)

	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	Total
Peaceful	7382	9577 *9809*	8486 *8703*	6304	31,749
Unrest-related	622	860 *954*	680 *743*	699	2861
Total	8004	10,437 *10,763*	9166 *9446*	7003	34,610

Source: Adapted from Alexander (2010, p. 28).

Booysen, 2007, (as cited in Alexander, 2010, p. 25) believes that grass-roots protests are "against both the quality of service delivery and public representation of grass-roots' service delivery needs" with Pitman, 2007, (as cited in Alexander, 2010, p. 25) rejecting this "economistic approach" believing that protests represent "citizenship, understood as the material benefits of full social inclusion … as well as the right to be taken seriously when thinking and speaking through community organisations". Additional reasons for protests are "inadequate housing; evictions; unemployment; poor communication with communities; poor leadership; corruption; nepotism; maladministration and management" (Goebel, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013, p. 467-8). Atkinson, 2007 (as cited in Alexander, 2010, p. 29) also believes that "poor maintenance and management of services … (as well as) councillors that engage in self-enrichment and lead fat-cat lifestyles" are added causes. IDPs , the enablers of "integrated development and management of a municipal area by a municipal Council" (Binns and Nel, 2002, p. 923) seem to be failing in their mandate since inequitable development and poor community consultation persist.

Booysen (2007) recalls that in 2004, prior to the 2006 local government elections, 5 805 legal protests were noted in Parliament, together with 881 classified as illegal protests. Alexander (2010, p. 26) describe these gatherings to demands that range from "wage increase; high crime rates; resistance to government policy; service charges and solidarity". The first service delivery

protest occurred in 2004, sending a strong message to local government (Booysen, 2007), successfully creating a platform for continuous protests, as seen in Table 3.

Table 3

Number of service delivery protests (January 2004 to October 2010)



Source: Mkhize (2013, p. 62).

3.2 Government's reactive measures

When a dominant one party system exists (Roskin, 2009), checks and balances disappear, especially when the electorates remain sentimentally attached to their political parties. The absence of strong opposition allows "crony capitalism" (Reddy, 2010, p. 192) to flourish, extending the gap between the rich and poor. Subsequently, South Africa's dual economy remains fixed (Muller, 2009), with development not only along racial lines (Davids and Gaibie, 2011), but also entrenching economic apartheid (Schneider, 2003). Despite South Africa's historical struggles for freedom, democracy and equity, the will of the people and collective good are not always realised. Representative of the national sphere and its democratic centralist platform (Giliomee *et al.*, 2001), few opposition parties reign over municipalities. Subsequently, local government's claims of democratic responsiveness are frequently questioned.

Since protests and their subsequent media coverage attract Councillors' attention and action, confidence in the efficacy of protests was affirmed; valued as a tool in "supplementing democracy and associated delivery" (Booysen, 2007, p. 25). As seen in Table 3, regardless of leadership change, protests continued to dominate local governments, reaching a high of 83% in 2009, even though Pres. Zuma was seen as the people's leader, as opposed to his predecessor, Pres. Mbeki (Etzo, 2010). Nonetheless, the lack of strong opposition continues to fuel protests as a de facto voice.

Participative developmental local government, primarily focussing on resource mobilisation with redistributive mandates, is mainly misunderstood by local actors and unknown by political players. Political connections and loyalties (or 'identity coalitions') replace community participation and substitute material interests with political groupings (Mogale, 2003, p. 219). These affiliations are misrepresentative of communities and are threatening the notions of good governance and responsive democracy. Political parties' claim of being the true voice of their followers, become therefore highly questionable. Mhone and Edigheij (2003, p. 220) refer to these propensities as "a substitute for public opinion, a set of political well connected organisations whose only difference with governing elite is the fact that the former held office and the latter did not". Once again the poor, women and other marginalised groups are being excluded from decision-making processes.

Nevertheless, the ANC did start to make changes with respect to accountability and efficiencies at the local levels (Booysen, 2007). However, on many occasions, state responses to protests were brutal, "criminalising the poor" and disregarding a "better life for all" (Goebel, 2011, p. 372).

Despite renewed commitment to better governance, citizens remain cynical. Subsequently, social self-defence re-emerges. The following section briefly discusses the methodology we adopted from this paper. Our aim was to understand why grass-roots (deprived communities) feel alienated from their leaders, and why they resort to protests which are at times violent.

4. Methodology

4.1 Research methodology

The study adopts an interpretative approach, that utilises qualitative data in order to address the core question: Is violent social self-defence South Africa's new political discourse? We selected two case studies focusing on the Midvaal Local Municipality (MLM) and Thembelihle Informal Settlement. Such a qualitative approach allowed us to understand why deprived communities use social-self defence to reclaim their rights. The two cases were selected because they present an interesting scenario in the South African political space. The bone of contention is poor service delivery, which is apt because the two municipalities fall under different political parties: MLM falls under the leadership of the (opposition) Democratic Alliance, whilst Thembelihle is controlled by the ruling ANC party.

We focussed on the following research objectives:

1. To capture citizens' perceptions on whether protests in Thembelihle informal settlement and MLM reflect their frustration with their local governments' poor service delivery.
2. To ascertain citizens' perceptions on the extent to which the local governments of MLM and Thembelihle informal settlement facilitate their participation on how they are governed and in community development.

Berg's (2004, p. 12) definition of research approaches research as a "mechanism of bringing together both theory and reality". This study's interpretative and exploratory approach emphasises Babbie and Mouton's (2001, p. 4) claim that "research is about identifying a social problem, debate the challenges and propose possible answers" to the identified issues. By following a situational analysis, the municipalities' citizens were serving as 'social actors' identifying their perceptions on issues and challenges currently associated with poor service delivery and violent protests. Forty-five interviews among citizens residing in these two municipalities were conducted. We therefore reasoned that an interpretive research philosophy would adequately acknowledge the significance of these social actors (Saunders, *et al.,* 2009; Walter, 2006). The use of survey strategies furthermore allow numerous perspectives, succeeding in addressing more specific issues that the recipients of service delivery felt as being

important (Newton, 2010) staff to provide. Additionally, these strategies provided us with greater flexibility and in-depth interpretations (Zikmund, *et al.*, 2011).

By using a multi-method approach that focused on semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Saunders, *et al.*, 2009; Walter, 2006), data was collected in a more amenable climate, emphasising the importance of personal contact (reinforcing the situational analysis of citizens as social actors), allowing uncomplicated interpretations as well as obtaining fit-for-purpose consistencies (Saunders, et al., 2009; Zikmund, *et al.*, 2011). The semi-structured interviews furthermore allowed the interviewer to probe deeper (Whitting, 2008). Attempts to have in-depth interviews with councillors were fruitless, with no one availing him/herself. The primary aim was thus to determine whether citizens from each municipality shared the same levels of understanding regarding violent protests, service delivery and local government's role in ensuring a better life for all. We subsequently felt that 'generaliseablilty' was reduced, replacing it with 'internal validity and contextual understanding' (Maxwell, 2005, p. 80).

We also experienced saturation since no new findings were generated after interviewing 45 citizens (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005). Of course, the use of such a small sample is one of the main criticisms of qualitative research making generalisations more difficult. We remained convinced that such small samples still have the potential to inform policy makers by focusing on matters that concern citizens, irrespective of policies and poverty alleviation programmes (Creswell, 2009). Creswell's (2009) methods of analysis, greater organisation of data will occur that enhances validity. The continuous and consistent verification in content and method resulted in the research data being consistent (Creswell, 2009). We furthermore aimed to reduce biasness by being as non-judgemental and non-leading as possible (Maxwell, 2005; Jackson 2012). Research validity necessitates the implementing of a participant-consent model (Saunders, *et al.*, 2009) as well as the precision of the findings that were tested by the researcher and participant (Creswell 2009). Lastly, ethical methods remain paramount for any research endeavour. The "interconnected stakeholders" of research are "the respondent, the researcher and the organisation" (Wallace 2007, p. 78), with varying agendas amongst themselves. We therefore

guaranteed anonymity for respondents as well as allowing them to verify their transcripts' correctness, ensuring trust, honesty and validity among the various stakeholders.

The significance of this study is three-fold:

1) A new phenomenon, coined as social self-defence, provides a closer look at why people justify their resort to violent protests despite the availability of legitimate and peaceful democratic channels of participation.
2) The situational analyses connect with citizens' disillusionment in democratic processes, reinforcing survivalism, therefore cementing social self-defence as a permanent fixture in the absence of effective government and sustainable service delivery processes.
3) The possible juxtaposing of social self-defence onto other states and regions will create theoretical bases for governments and institutions' future actions when addressing poverty, economic growth and instability.

By using the analysis techniques of Creswell (2009) two key themes emerged namely (1) level of service delivery and (2) lack of inclusive participation with local government representatives.

1. THEME 1: INADEQUATE LEVELS OF SERVICE DELIVERY

a. Slight improvement regarding service delivery and economic development is evident over the last 10 years.
b. Violence is the language municipalities understand in order to address poor service delivery.
c. Poor service delivery starts from the national government and cascades down to local authorities.
d. Poor service delivery may be attributed corrupt leaders.

2. THEME 2: LACK OF DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

a. Once elected most councillors become inactive.
b. Ineffective ward committees.
c. National government is not monitoring service delivery.

d. Representatives do not attend meetings at times so cannot report back
e. Most of those charged with governance are not clear about the development plans
f. The poor are excluded from decisions that affect them.

The next section discusses the data collected through the interviews but first provides some background and context about the municipalities.

4.2 Background and context

Historically, South Africa's municipalities were highly politicised and fragmented firmly cementing racial segregationist policies and development. In an effort to unite these entities and to secure the redistribution of power and development, the Municipal Structures Act (1998) instituted three types of municipalities, strengthening the three spheres of governmental cooperation and operationalising democracy and service delivery. These municipal categories were different in size, powers, resources and responsibilities with category A representing metropolitan areas, in charge of their municipal executive and legislative authority. Category B municipalities were established in the local areas, which form part of a category C municipality, also known as district municipalities. Category B municipalities share municipal executive and legislative authority with a category C municipality (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2013). According to Section 152(1) of the South African Constitution (1996), local government will "provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; Ensure provision of services in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic development; and provide a safe and healthy environment and encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government."

The Midvaal Local Municipality (MLM), together with the Emfuleni and Lesedi Local Municipality, constitute the Sedibeng District Municipality and is a category B municipality, sharing municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality, within which its area falls. MLM's population growth has exploded from 60 000 in 2001 to 100 000 in 2011 (Municipal IQ, 2009, p. 14). Thembelihle is an informal settlement situated in Lenasia, south of Johannesburg and is a category B municipality, marred by relocation issues and unsafe living conditions. The community of Thembelihle depends on the manual labour they sell

to the Indian community surrounding the informal settlement, as unemployment is rife, promoting regular protests.

When comparing MLM and Thembelihle informal settlement, it is clear that there are huge discrepancies pertaining to basic services and good governance practices. Education, health and safety are some of the basic rights of citizens. However, whereas MLM shows adequate provision of services, Thembelihle experiences the complete opposite. The Midvaal Local Municipality and Thembelihle informal settlement are two very different examples of local government. Differences in resources, developmental agendas and participative democratic mechanisms are evident. Mismanagement of resources and people's hope results in residents feeling disillusioned, discontent and protesting seen as the only option, especially in Thembelihle informal settlement.

The resultant responses to the semi-structured interviews are indicative of the issues and frustrations of these local communities, as identified with these themes:

THEME 1: INADEQUATE LEVELS OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Continuous poor service delivery result in violent protests with many females being against the blocking of roads, burning of tyres and the participation of children in poor service delivery protests. Moreover, the majority of male interviewees felt that children should participate in these protests, whereas female residents totally disagreed. Many residents believe that political protests provide a viable communication conduit, with the political age ranging from young children to senior citizens.

Interviewee 9: "Yes. People are angry. We voted but there is no change. We are tired of promises and lies. We demand change now and in our life time. We support the ANC Youth League, which wants economic freedom now."

Interviewee 25: "Yes. The government is taking us for granted. It promised us a better life but nothing is happening. Although we do not want a civil war or the violence we saw between the ANC and Inkatha, but the government is living us without any choice."

Interviewee 31: "You know someone who is hungry can do anything to get food. People who are angry can do anything to change their situations. So lack of services can make people to fight with the government. The government must stop using the police to kill us like Andries Tatane in Free State. One day we will get weapons and fight fire with fire."

It is clear that residents feel that corruption is unacceptable and that it is prevalent on a national scale, trickling down to local levels of government. The high levels of corruption become a clear cause for poor service delivery.

Focus group 1: "I know the councillor. But councillors are useless. Councillors only think for themselves and their friends. That is why there is too much corruption at municipal level."
Interviewee 41: "Local government alone cannot deliver good and sustainable services as there is too much corruption in the municipalities and shortage of skilled employees."

THEME 2: LACK OF DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

Participatory democratic mechanisms such as ward committees, as led by locally elected Councillors, are another issue of contention. Political visibility is strong prior to local elections with many unrealistic promises made to the citizens. Post-election visibility of councillors is mostly absent, increasing the gap between the leaders and the electorate. Ward Committees are unknown to many with many seeing it as ineffective since the timings of meetings and frequency of such meetings are out of touch with the locals' capabilities to attend. Street politics and civil

initiatives are gaining in popularity. Citizens themselves create forums to address issues, sides-stepping legitimate avenues of consultation and participation.

> *Interviewee 43:* *"I know the councillor through the posters, which were hanging all everywhere before the elections. Councillors do not care about our needs. After voting for them, they disappear."*
>
> *Focus group 2:* *"No, I am not aware of ward committees. I am only aware of the street committees we created ourselves to fight crime, connect illegal electricity in our shacks and organise protest marches."*

The ANC government promised in its 2006 local election campaign that (1) unemployment will be halved by 2014; (2) it will provide effective, accountable and democratic government; (3) speed up delivery of free basic services; and (4) ensure responsive, effective and accountable councillors. Despite some progress in sanitation, housing and unemployment many issues remain. Table 4 shows the distorted developments that continue to exist, with ineffective service delivery still evident in Thembelihle informal settlement.

Table 3

Comparison between Midvaal Local Municipality and Thembelihle Informal settlement

	Midvaal Local Municipality	Thembelihle Informal Settlement
Population	100 000	23 000
Ruling party	Democratic Alliance (DA) since 2006	African National Congress
Unemployment	Low	High
Service delivery rating	Very good	Very Poor
Literacy Rate	60% illiterate	High
Budget	R77 685 850 (2010)	Unknown

	Midvaal Local Municipality	Thembelihle Informal Settlement
Access to clean water	71%	1000 shacks (illegal households) received water
Access to electricity	79%	Only streetlights
Education	24 schools	0 schools
Health services	4 hospitals and clinics	1 mobile clinic
Safety and security	4 police stations	1 mobile police vehicle
Economy	Services sector (57%); manufacturing (31%); Government (18%), Business Services (18%), trade (14%).	Manufacturing, informal shops, brick laying
Violent protests	No	"protest hotspot"
Challenges	Informal settlements; land invasion; crime; reduce unemployment more	Relocating to nearby Vlakfontein; unemployment; improve basic service delivery; non-threatening political interaction; economic development, education
Audit Report	5th consecutive unqualified audit, ranked in top 10% of local government.	Not applicable
Corruption	Numerous preventative measures	Unknown
Development progress	Satisfactory and continues to expand	Absent and unsatisfactory
Access to councillors	Easy means and regular meetings	Councillors unknown or threatening locals. Street Politics more effective.
Trust in local government	Good	High distrust.

Sources: MLM IDP, 2011; Tselapedi and Dugard, 2013.

It remains worrisome that the majority of citizens in this research felt disconnected with their councillors resulting in

1. "An inability to constructively connect and discuss their needs and demands.
2. Low levels of participation, whether in ward meetings or IDP sessions.
3. An increase in distrust and disillusionment that result in frustrations and protest"

It becomes clear that the grass-roots are frustrated, feeling distanced from their elected Councillors. Many laws and policies are in place to assist the developmental agenda of local governments, yet, as seen with the respondents' answers, they feel distanced and unaware of them. Service delivery and citizen participation are the basis for poverty alleviation, but hardly any respondents knew anything about IDPs or who their Councillors are, not to mention the purpose of ward committees. Corruption and a lack of skills among local government officials and Councillors threaten both democracy and service delivery. Political leadership also affect the success rates of service delivery and democratic participation, with the DA-led MLM paving the way for greater development and stability. When faith in a better future no longer exists, protests become a way of citizen participation. Subsequently, social self-defence becomes entrenched, validating any action (violence or peaceful) that will protect individuals' basic rights to services and freedoms.

The government is setting a precedent by responding promptly to demonstrations; however ad hoc approaches cannot lead to sustainability and stability. Considering the number of the protests, if the issues were being addressed the situation would have improved by now. By accommodating violence as a new political voice, governments not only institutionalise and approve violence, but also replace hard fought democratic participation mechanisms. From the citizens' perspective, it becomes their right to protest and reverts to violent means if democratic channels are no longer viable options, cementing social self-defence at grassroots. Local governments' tasks of being the foot soldiers of democracy and service delivery are replaced with protests and violence, justified by the notion of social self-defence.

These trends are indeed troublesome. What is really lacking: is it training? Is it monitoring? Alternatively, is it a cultural issue, reminiscent of the apartheid era? Who is driving the empowerment programmes in the municipalities if they do not take into account the needs of the communities? On the other hand, is it a problem of resources or poor collection of rates and some municipal charges? Surely the plethora of polices, programmes and laws guarantee dual partnerships between government and citizens? With adequate budgets in place to redress service delivery backlogs, progress should be more noticeable. When government continue to ignore legitimate channels of participation (even executing bulldozing tactics with the Thembelihle

residents, matters are not resolved. Trust disappear, investors' confidence decrease and cost increase; alienation with citizens become systemic.

Clearly, people remain in despair and will continue to take counter measures as a last resort to secure their economic well-being; social self-defence.

5. Conclusion

This study revealed that many South Africans are in a permanent state of despair and frustration, lacking political trust and faith in its hard-fought democratic mechanisms. It is clear that local governments' developmental agendas remain problematic. Not only do participatory mechanisms fail to reach the electorate, but also internal weaknesses furthermore hamper the legislative and procedural mandates for a 'better life'. Subsequently, sustainable and efficient service delivery remains unimpressive, resulting in voter apathy or frustrations.

Future research and government initiatives need to operationalise educational initiatives, bringing best practice models of governance to the table for all stakeholders. The more successful municipalities, like Umhlathuze (East coast of South Africa) Municipality, should be show cased on a national level. Political appointments are wrong and more effective hands-on training on matters of good governance and transparent financial management become essential for all office-holders. Continuous political engagement need to replace the fourth-yearly opportunistic electioneering campaigns. The privatisation of certain services remains an on-going debate, with some municipalities effectively outsourcing non-essential services. The greatest issue is whether citizens themselves are willing to take ownership in changing their own circumstances, steering away from violent ways when protecting their social well-being.

When protests become a valid way of political communication, red flags are to surface. However, with government acknowledging many of these protests by jumping into action, protests seem to become the political norm. Clearly social self-defence is finding resonance with the community members. After all, "our lives are not important, only our vote".

6. List of References

Akinboade, O.A., M.P. Mokwena and Kinfack, E.C. (2013) Understanding citizens' participation in service delivery protests in South Africa's Sedibeng district municipality, *International Journal of Social Economics*, **40**(5), 458-478.

Alexander, P. (2010) Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis, *Review of African Political Economy*, **37**(123), 25-40.

Allan, K. (2006) *A critical reflection on local government performance*, Paper delivered at the 5th Annual Service Delivery Learning Academy, June 2006.

Anonymous, (2012) Interviewed on 5 September 2012 by Mkhize, L.M.

Askvik, S. (2010) The Dynamics of Political Trust in South Africa, 1995–2006, *Politikon*: *South African Journal of Political Studies*, **37**(1), 25-44.

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001) *The practice of social research*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Bekink, B. (2006) *Principles of South African local government law*, Durban: Butterworths.

Bekker, K. (eds) (1996) *Citizen participation in local government*, Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik.

Binns, T. and Nel, E. (2002) Devolving Development: Integrated Development Planning and Developmental Local Government in Post-apartheid South Africa, *Regional Studies*, **36**(8), 921-932

Booysen, S. (2007) With the ballot and the brick: the politics of attaining service delivery, *Progress in Development Studies*, **7**(1), 21–32.

Brynard, P.A. (1996) Realities of citizen participation, in Bekker, K. *Citizen participation in local government*, Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 39-51.

Burger, R. (2005) What we have learnt from post-1994 innovations in pro-poor service delivery in South Africa: a case study-based analysis, *Development Southern Africa*, **22**(4), 483-500.

Cameron, R. (2001) The Upliftment of South African Local Government?, *Local Government Studies*, **27**(3), 97-118.

Clapper, V.A. (1996) Positioning citizen participation in democratic local government, in Bekker, K. *Citizen participation in local government,* Pretoria: J.L.van Schaik, 51- 69.

Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2013) *Municipal types*, Available at: http://www.cogta.gov.za/subwebsites/publications/type_muni/muni_type.htm [Accessed on 5 July 2013)

Creswell, J.W. (2009) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method Approaches*, 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, Inc. Los Angeles

Davids, Y.D. and Gaibie, F. (2011) Quality of Life in Post-Apartheid South Africa, *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, **38**(2), 231-256.

De Visser, J. (2005) *Developmental local government: a case study of South Africa*, Brussels: Intersentia publishers.

Etzo, S. (2010) The unfinished business of democratization': struggles for services and accountability in South African cities, *Democratization*, **17**(3), 564-586.

Friedman, S. (2006) 'The President's plan won't work without the people's participation', in *Sunday Times*. 25 February 2006, 20.

Geldenhuys, A.J. (1996) Analysing democracy for local government, in Bekker, K. *Citizen participation in local government.* Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 11-29.

Giliomee ,H., Myburgh,J. and Schlemmer, L. (2001) Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, *Democratization*, **8**(1), 161-182.

Goebel, A. (2011) 'Our Struggle is for the Full Loaf': Protests, Social Welfare and Gendered Citizenship in South Africa, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, **37**(02), 369-388.

Jackson, S.L. (2012) *Research methods and Statistics: a critical thinking approach*, 4th ed. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning.

Koelble, T.A. and LiPuma, E. (2010) Institutional obstacles to service delivery in South Africa, *Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies*, **36**(3), 565-589.

Liamputtong, P. and Izzy, D. (2005) *Qualitative research methods*, 2nd ed., London: Oxford University Press.

Local government municipal systems Act (2000) Act 32, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Maxwell, J.A. (2005) *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, London: Sage Publications.

Mbeki, T. (2005) The challenge of equitable development – what is the progressive agenda? In *Progressive Politics*, **4**(2), 6-16.

Mehrotra, S. and Jarrett, S.W. (2002) Improving basic health service delivery in low-income countries: 'voice' to the poor, *Social Science & Medicine*, **54**, 1685–1690.

Mhone, G. (2003) Democratisation, economic liberalisation and the quest for sustainable development in South Africa, in Mhone, G & Edigheiji, O (Eds) 2003 *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenges of globalization.* Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 18-69.

Mhone, G. and Edigheji, O. (Eds) (2003) *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenges of globalization* Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Mkhize, L.M. (2013) *Assessing citizens' perceptions on the interrelationship between poor service delivery and political instability in South Africa: 2000-2010*, unpublished dissertation, University of the Free State.

Mogale, T. (2003) Developmental local government and decentralised service delivery in the democratic South Africa, in Mhone, G. and Edigheiji, O. (eds) 2003, *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenges of globalization*, Cape town: University of Cape Town Press, 215-244.

Muller, M. (2006) The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Improving service delivery by replacing bad governance with goodness, *Journal of Public Administration*, 223-240.

Muller, M. (2009) Good Governance and Ubuntu as prerequisites for poverty alleviation in South Africa: a Case Study of Uthungulu District Municipality, Rural Northern Natal, in *Indilinga, African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, **7**(2), 98-223.

Municipal structures Act (1998) Act 117, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Municipal, IQ, 2009. Press release: municipal IQ's updated municipal hotspots results, 17 November. Available at www.municipalIQ.co.za (accessed 20 November 2009).

Piper, L. and Deacon, R. (2009) Too Dependent to Participate: Ward Committees and Local Democratisation in South Africa, *Local Government Studies*, **35(**4), 415-433.

Reddy, T. (2010) ANC Decline, Social Mobilization and Political Society: Understanding South Africa's Evolving Political Culture, *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, **37**(2-3), 185-206.

Roskin, M.G. (2001) *Hard road to democracy: four developing nations*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishers.

Rué, J., Amador, M., Gené, J., Rambla, F.X., Pividori, C., Pividori, I., Torres-Hostench, O., Bosco, A., Armengol, J. and Font, A. (2010) Towards an Understanding of Quality in Higher Education: The ELQ/AQA08 Model as an Evaluation Tool, *Quality in Higher Education*, **16**(3), 285-295.

Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009) *Research methods for business students*, 5th ed., Essex: Pearson Education Ltd.

Schneider, G. (2003) Neoliberalism and economic justice in South Africa: revisiting the debate on economic apartheid, *Review of Social Economy*, **61**(1), 23-50.

South African Constitution (1996) Act 108, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Southall, R. (2000) The state of democracy in South Africa, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, **38**(3), 147-170.

Tselapedi, T. and Dugard, J. (2013) 'Reclaiming power: A case study of the Thembelihle Crisis Committee' *Active citizenship matters: Perspectives from Civil Society on Local Governance in South Africa*, Good Governance Learning network: Isandla Institute. Available at: http://www.ggln.org.za/publications/state-of-local-governance-research-project/Active%20Citizenship%20Matters_SoLG%20Publication%202013-web.pdf [Accessed on 22 July 2013] 57-66

Vyas-Doorgapersad, S and Muller, M. (2006) Municipal-community partnerships: A strategy for efficient service delivery in South Africa, *Journal of Public Administration*, 388-407.

Wallace, R. (2007) Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall, *Ethics [online]*, **(118)**, 24-36. Available: http://www.ebscohost.com/ [Accessed 23 October 2012].

Walter, M. (ed) (2006) *Social Research methods: an Australian perspective*, Victoria: Oxford University Press.

White Paper on Local Government (1998) Act 393, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Whitting, L.S. (2008) Semi-structured interviews: Guidance for novice researchers, *Nursing Standard*, **22**(23), 35-40.

Williams, J.J. (2006) Community participation: Lessons from post-apartheid South Africa, *Policy Studies*, **27**(3), 197-217.

Wilson, S. (2005) Johannesburg's informal settlement plan: the view from Mandelaville and Thembelihle, University of the Witwatersrand. Available at:

http://www.ewisa.co.za/ewisawaterworks/misc/MunicipalDocuments/NCDisPixley_Ka_Seme/ [Accessed on 21 July 2013].

Yin, R.K. (2009) *Case study Research: Design and Methods*, Sage Publication, Los Angeles.

Zikmund, W. G., Babin, B. J., Carr, J. C. and Griffin, M. (2010) *Business research methods*, 8th ed., Mason: Cengage Learning.

Appendix 15 Publication no. 6

Social self-defence: where grievances, opportunities and protests collide

Social self-defence: where grievances, opportunities and protests collide

Marlene Muller*

School of Management and Languages,
Heriot-Watt University Dubai Campus,
P.O. Box 294345, Dubai International Academic City, UAE
Fax: [redacted]
Email: [redacted]
*Corresponding author

Mandlenkosi Lawrence Mkhize

Department of Governance and Political Transformation,
University of the Free State, South Africa
Email: [redacted]

Abstract: Twenty-one years into democracy has transformed South Africa into a protest nation, mirroring the social self's aspirations for development and equality. The voice of the poor remains marginalised, resulting in weakened democratic institutions that threaten grassroots' quality of life. As a newly created concept, social self-defence materialises when a significant part of a desperate community takes counter measures to secure their socio-economic well-being. Theoretically, this article connects social self-defence with the individual-institutional basis of grassroots' protests, as underpinned by the theories of grievance and political opportunity structure. A qualitative survey investigated the reasoning behind political protests within two diverse South African communities affected by unequal economic growth and violent protests. From the findings, the article concludes that relative deprivation and ineffective participatory democracy re-ignite the social self. By not strengthening democratic mechanisms, social self-defence will continue to challenge ineffective local governments, demanding improved opportunities.

Keywords: social self-defence; SSD; relative deprivation; grievance theory; poverty; participatory democracy; violent protests; social self; South Africa; protest nation; political opportunity structure theory.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Muller, M. and Mkhize, M.L. (2016) 'Social self-defence: where grievances, opportunities and protests collide', *World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.433–456.

Biographical notes: Marlene Muller is currently at the School of Management and Languages' UG Program Director at Heriot-Watt University, Dubai International Academic City. Her fields of interest range from international human resource management to local governance.

Mandlenkosi Lawrence Mkhize conducted this research as part of his degree fulfilments when he was a Magister student in the Department of Governance and Political Transformation, at the University of the Free State, South Africa. Marlene Muller was his supervisor.

This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled 'Poverty alleviation through social self-defence: a new political discourse?' presented at the Second International Conference on Emerging Research Paradigms in Business and Social Sciences, Dubai, UAE, 26–28 November 2013.

1 Introduction

In 1994, South Africa witnessed the dawn of a new political dispensation, guaranteeing political freedom and a quality of life for all. The creation of numerous institutions and laws strengthened participatory democracy, good governance and political equality. Yet, the poorest of the poor continue to struggle to gain a rightful place within South Africa's rainbow nation despite the ANC government's anti-poverty interventions (Everatt, 2008; COGTA, 2014). Everatt (2008, p.293) believes that "the poor have moved from being central to post-apartheid reconstruction to being depicted by political leaders as lacking moral fibre and depending on 'handouts' – from deserving to undeserving". South Africa's dominant one party system (Roskin, 2001) is firmly entrenched at a national level, with votes no longer a guarantee for voicing change and improving service delivery. With local government elections perceived as ineffective, non-electoral activities occur, trying to re-assert grassroots' political voice and social-economic rights.

Discarding the voice of the people is costly in terms of democratic ethos, stability and economic growth (Coetzer, 2012). Many studies have correlated social identity, relative deprivation and grievances with political protests theories (Dalton et al., 2010; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Ginges and Atran, 2009; Klandermans et al., 2001), specifically claiming that altruism resulted in the sacrificing of the social self for the greater good. Subsequently, defending one's social self, as linked to basic human rights and social goods, becomes a necessity. However, when weak democratic institutions increase disillusionment, disobedience and political distrust, the altruistic nature of societies fade. "Our lives are not important, only our vote" (Interviewee No. 23, interviewed in March 2013) aptly reflect communities' sentiments, specifically within the informal settlements of the Midvaal Local Municipality (MLM) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, the foci of this article. Social self-defence (SSD) (author's own concept) mechanisms therefore found a resonance among the poor, demanding a voice amongst the plethora of policies and ineffective local government apparatus. This article argues that the social self is transforming into a *SSD* mechanism, deconstructing the political landscape of democratic South Africa. Furthermore, SSD adds depth to the theories of grievance and political opportunity structure (POS), re-connecting with the social self and opposing the dictates of altruism.

An exploratory, qualitative survey among 45 participants determined the rationale behind socio-political protests, testing the validity of the main research question, "is social self-defence South Africa's new political discourse?" By no means does this study try to generalise and apply the results to other areas affected by political protests and violence; nor does it discard the impact of dependent variables such as education, gender, and the level that political activism can effect. Nonetheless, by exploring the grassroots' perceptions on poor service delivery, authorities' acknowledgment of their grievances can re-direct their poverty alleviation initiatives and improve the current ineffective democratic participatory mechanisms. Failing to adhere to the protestors' demands could

severely threaten government and development, ultimately bolstering SSD and instability.

The structure of the article is comprised of six parts with the first part introducing social self-defence and the rationale for this study. The second part provides insight into the theoretical premises of this article, extrapolating social self-defence with the theories of grievance and political opportunity structure. The contextual review serves as the third part, connecting these theories within the realm of South Africa's local government. This part furthermore exposes South Africa's post-apartheid landscape, which, despite institutional and legal transformations, continues to be marred with protests and inequalities, connecting service delivery grievances with local governmental ineffectiveness and economic despair. The fourth part elaborates on this study's research context, methodology and results, linking social self-defence and socio-political protests with the informal settlements' residents in Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle. The fifth part discusses and reinforces the relationship that exists between grievances, political opportunity structures and poor service delivery, with social self-defence perceived as the new political discourse for the poor. Lastly, the sixth part concludes that when economic despair and local government ineffectiveness persist, grievances and frustration will be permanently embedded in social self-defence.

2 Theoretical review

Critical theory demands the connection of theory with practice by focusing on the ways in which "the cases of unnecessary suffering in the world, and the structures of injustice associated with such suffering, might best be dismantled" [O'Neill, (2010), p.127]. Political participation acts as a way for citizens to influence public officials, as informed by their notion of social and political trust, known as social capital (Zhang and Seltzer, 2010). Governments' legitimacy strongly depends on such political trust, especially when operationalising a developmental and representative agenda. Community engagement refers specifically to grass-root participation, excluding other public and private stakeholders (Head, 2007). Although communities are rarely homogenous, experiencing limited trust and diverse needs (Emmet, 2000), political participation allows them to voice their self-expressed values (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008) and improve their struggles against poverty and ineffective service delivery.

O'Neill (2010, p.128) defines political violence as the "exercise of physical force to kill, injure or harm other human beings in pursuit of a political end". His narrow definition is by no means eliminating other subjects or means of violence, nor does he proclaim violence to be just when promoting the political good. However, when community protests become violent in trying to reduce oppression or unnecessary suffering, justification of such (violent) protests occurs (O'Neill, 2010). With inequality and injustice continuing, violent protests increase. When governments favourably react to these protests (Bond, 2007), societies' moral and political fibre become threatened.

Social identity theory assigns the sense of self within a broader social group setting and can develop when partial interest-driven disintegration occurs (Mead, 1913). Many see politics therefore through the lenses of social groups, to which they belong, aiming to increase their benefits and excluding others (Fowler and Kam, 2007). The social self becomes a reflection of the social identity, which refers "to social categorisations of self

and others, self-categories that define the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with members of certain social categories, in contrast to other social categories" [Turner et al., (1994), p.454]. Social psychologists therefore believe that the self is inherently 'contextual-dependent', as expressed through a dynamic process of 'social judgement', allowing self-identity to be fluid and flexible to the social reality [Turner et al., (1994), p.459]. It is important to note that social defence is an "alternative to military defence based on popular non-violent resistance to aggression, using means such as rallies, non-cooperation, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins and alternative social institutions" [Martin, (1999), p.535]. Political discontent enhances these types of non-violent protests, escalating in intensity as frustrations grow.

Economically, globalisation has seen the global increase of trade and capital movements, cementing interdependencies among nations (Martens et al., 2010), increasing economic development, accessibility to technologies and managerial expertise, as well as reducing trade protectionism (Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004). Whether globalisation allows developing nations greater access to open markets, technologies, ideas and export-led growth (Solimano, 1999, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004); or decrease national control over the economy (Tandon, 1999, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004) and increase inequality (Basu, 2006; Wade, 2004) remains a contentious issue. Bhensdadia and Dana (2004) state that trade openness therefore enhance foreign direct investments and faster growth, with the income of the poor tumbling when states' GDP per capita declines. Hammer and Naschold's [2000, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, (2004), p.464] found that growth-poverty elasticity in low and high inequality countries was –0.93 and –0.34, respectively, strengthening the argument that inequality hampers growth. However, when the poor remains trapped in cycles of unemployment and insecurity, Stiglitz' [2002, cited in Koechlin, (2006), p.256] assessment of globalisation resonates with many: "Globalisation is not making life better for those most in need of its promised benefits … [S]omething has gone horribly wrong".

"The power, vulnerability and destructiveness of financial markets are out of control in South Africa, now among the most unequal, economically volatile and protest-intensive countries worldwide" [Bond, (2013), p.569]. Although the informal sector's employment grew by 41,000 in 2014s 4th quarter (Stats SA, 2014a), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) ranked SA with the 8th highest unemployment rate in the world (BusinessTech, 2015; Chandran, 2015). Within the period of 2000 and 2015, the unemployment rate was averaging around 25.27% (Ferreira, 2015), with 2013's youth unemployment figures recorded as 63% of the total youth labour force (Oosthuizen and Cassim, 2014). Mobilisation of the poor and unemployed becomes inevitable. Even with fears that SA's poverty and inequality will result in social turmoil, townships' protests remain local government driven, with the desire for a new economic order (Friedman, 2012) of lesser importance. Ironically, trade unions fail to encapsulate the plight of the unemployed, leaving a vacuum for the voice of the poor to defend themselves.

This article combines the concepts of social self and social defence into a new term, *SSD*, elevating it to the level of low levels of violent protests, reactive to negative socio-economic realities. SSD attempts to relate to the actions that individuals take when facing daily despair. Hence, when political mechanisms no longer result in socio-economic improvement, grassroots become detached and frustrated, channelling their anger towards local governments, the foot soldiers of democracy. SSD will consequently adopt the following operational definition: "When a significant part of a

desperate community takes counter measures as a last resort to secure their socio-economic well-being". Socio-economic hardships primarily shape SSD, albeit acknowledging that political discontent can equally attribute to frustrations. Desperateness is concerned with the continuous cycles of poverty citizens face, as exasperated by unemployment, limited access to water, electricity, education and health. Despite receiving government grants, grassroots struggle to see improvement. Desperateness replaces trust, viewing protests as a complimentary tool to the ballot paper when defending one's plight for basic human rights and improved socio-economic conditions. Counter measures in this operational definition denotes non-electoral participatory activities such as strikes, demonstrations, petition marches, planned insurrections, boycotts and public meetings (Piven and Cloward, 1991), aiming to change political outcomes such as social goods (Vráblíková, 2014). Whether an open or closed political system exists, citizens revert to desperate measures in order to draw attention to their plight, especially when electoral mechanisms are ineffective. Although the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya resulted in revolutionary changes, a 'protest nation' (Bond, 2013; Ngwane, 2014) such as South Africa, retains its governmental status quo despite the increase of protests. Irrespective of geography and regime, the justification of violent actions continue when injustice (Bond, 2012), lack of rights and economic deprivation remain a fixture (O'Neill, 2010). SSD result in citizens claiming back their rights, by either changing authoritarian regimes or improving political participatory mechanisms, discarding altruism's self-sacrificing propensities.

Grievances are predominantly the rationale behind protests. Klandermans et al. (2001, p.42) define grievances as the "feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life such as housing, living standard, income, employment, health care, human rights, safety, and education". Wilkes (2004, p.571), therefore, believes that those most deprived have the most to gain (and least to lose) when trying to change the political and economic realities. Grievance theory comprises of three elements: relative deprivation, polarisation and horizontal inequality. With respect to relative deprivation, Gurr (1970, cited in Klandermans et al., 2001) believes that grievances deepen when comparing oneself with other groups or with oneself (reflecting on your past and/or contemplating one's own future expectations); even more so when economic inequalities increase, triggering political mobilisation, as seen in South Africa (Bond, 2012; Alexander, 2010; Akinboade et al., 2014). Additional versions of the relative deprivation theory were introduced by Crosby (1982) and Muller (1980) (cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004), distinguishing between deserved and entitled outcomes, whereas Tyler and Smith (1998, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004) believed people preferred bottom-down comparisons instead of upward comparisons when examining their self-worth. Hegtvedt and Markovsky [1995, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, (2004), p.43] furthermore claim that evaluators' societal positions also influence the 'perceived fairness of equality'.

It is also noticeable that culture, socio-economic status, religion, and class determine political identity. South Africa's political identity remains strongly influenced by race (Lipton, 2014; McCorley, 2013) with the transition to class as a 'determinant of distributive grievances' [Klandermans et al., (2001), p.52] significantly affecting citizens' opportunities and status.

Within South Africa's context, the poorer of the poor compares themselves both horizontally (comparing with other municipal residents) and upwards (elite and middle class). It is important to note that this article refrains from incorporating social movement

and resource mobilisation theories, simply because the combination of social injustice and relative deprivation continue to be strong reasons for protests and grievances (Dalton et al., 2010; Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). Aligned with the theme of this article, Dalton et al. (2010, p.57) state that personal dissatisfaction in less developed nations equates to severe economic deprivation and a 'struggle to survive'. Economic inequality among ethnically polarised groups strengthens violent propensities, especially when inter-group comparisons fuel intra-group identity (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). Horizontal inequality additionally refers to elements of high asset inequality, discrimination in public spending, economic mismanagement and grievances related to resource rents (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009).

Grievance theorists claim that democratic societies provide opportunities for grievances protests (Dalton et al., 2010; Wilkes, 2004), especially within decentralised political systems (Vráblíková, 2014). POS theory signifies the importance of political systems and the opportunities to participate in political activities. It furthermore considers whether institutional structures and political processes influence political participation, with open systems facilitating greater activity (Dalton et al., 2010). Such open systems are mostly associated with democratic societies, where individuals can freely express themselves, without any fear. The acceptance of political demonstrations is higher in such societies, cementing their democratic ethos. Vráblíková (2014) claims that highly decentralised government structures increase political activities. The three components of decentralisation relate to "territorial decentralisation; horizontal separation of power among national structures; and separation of power within these institutions" [Vráblíková, (2014), p.208]. The increase of governmental access points therefore makes non-electoral political participation more frequent, enhancing the input of grass-root citizens.

It is against the backdrop of these political-institutional and socio-economic factors that the following section will aim to contextualise SSD.

3 Contextual review

> "The strengthening of the democratic system should (also) be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future" [Mbeki, (2005), p.1].

Centuries of violence, racism, inequality and oppression were dismantled by South Africa's liberation movements, bolstered by international isolation and citizen revolts (violent or otherwise). Community-based democracy, primarily noted in 'townships' (the working class' residential areas), 'shack settlements (residential areas for the low-income class) and shop floors (trade union mobilisation efforts), strengthened the power of the people (Bond, 2012). Victory was finally attained when democracy and freedoms were voted in during the 1994 elections, cementing South Africa's constitutional democracy (Southall, 2000). By abolishing Apartheid's oppressive governmental structures and law, South Africa's Government decentralised its unitary system by introducing three spheres of government: national, provincial and local with all three being simultaneously autonomous and interdependent (Venter and Landsberg, 2006). The separation of powers and checks-and-balances were also introduced; followed by a Constitutional Court and a Bill of Rights (Gildenhuys and Knipe, 2000; Lipton, 2014). These mechanisms provide the foundation for balancing power among the

different branches of government, additionally enhancing accountability and political participatory opportunities (Vráblíková, 2014).The Constitution's Bill of Rights ensured specific rights to South Africans: "Section 9 entrenches the rights to free expression, association and access to information" (and Sections 26–29) ensuring "everyone has the right to housing … health services, sufficient food and water … social security … and basic education" [Lipton, (2014), p.11]. However, the speed of transformation also created a 'phase of dysphoria' [Roskin, (2001), p.94] where scarcities, corruption and lack of equal economic redistribution became the main catalysts for anxieties and dissatisfaction. Despite the riddance of apartheid laws, a strong racial-based class system followed (Bond, 2012).

SA's post-apartheid economic landscape remains troubled, exacerbated by its 2014 debit rating being downgraded to an all-time low by Moody's to a BAA2 (Global Credit Research, 2014); Standard and Poor to one level above junk, and with Fitch lowering it to a negative (Potelwa, 2015). The drivers for economic growth seem ineffective, despite South Africa trying to steer away from its two-decade neo-liberal discourses. Criticisms about the efficacy of the government's new growth path (Fine, 2012) and biasness toward pro-poor programming (Rogerson, 2006) therefore remain. With an economy that only grew by 1.5% in 2014 (Stats SA, 2014b), coupled with a Gini index of 0.63, South Africa's ranking as the fourth most unequal society in the world (Chitiga et al., 2014; Bond, 2013) not only cements its economic inequality (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009), but also provide fertile soil for SSD.

The constitutionalisation of local government laid the foundation for strong democratic governance and a conceptual shift from local governments acting as administrative service delivery agents to being autonomous spheres. As a 'developmental arm' of government, the decentralised local government need to ensure service delivery as well as bringing democratic opportunities to the people [Koelble and LiPuma, (2010), p.566]. Furthermore, being a distinct sphere of government, local government is tasked with "serving its communities by ensuring the provision of household infrastructure, viable local economic development, community empowerment and redistribution of resources" [Bekink, (2006), pp.73–75]. Based on the principles of good governance, local governments need to provide mechanisms for citizen participation; respect laws; secure transparency and enhanced responsiveness; be consensus driven; and promote equity, inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability (Muller, 2009). It is clear that decentralised local governments' developmental mandates are closely connected with participative democracy and accountability (Muller, 2006; Mehrotra and Jarrett, 2002), allowing citizens to become the watchdogs of democracy and its apparatus; necessitating the co-existence of an independent civil society, and collectively striving for a strong local economy. By 2014, municipalities' track records are dire with only 7% functioning well; 30% reasonably functional; 32% almost dysfunctional and 31% in need of immediate intervention, experiencing total dysfunctionality [COGTA, (2014), p.6]. Since service delivery regarding households' accessibility to water, sanitation and refuse removal (Figure 1) only slightly improved, marginalisation remains, with the poorest of poor ultimately finding a voice through their protests (Booysen, 2007; Alexander, 2010).

Both the Municipal Structures Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000) provide two main participatory mechanisms for its 278 municipalities: councillors and ward committees, striving to accommodate effective community participation in the affairs of the municipality. Ward

committees are community-based advisory committees, with the ward councillor acting as chairperson (De Visser, 2005). By accommodating community participation, responsive leadership has the advantage of receiving primary information from the local communities, resulting in quality decisions and appropriate programs. However, informed debates are mainly non-existent, negatively affecting ward committees and policies (Piper and Deacon, 2009). Leaders also tend to impose their 'pre-designed, party-directed planning programs', cementing the notions that the "party is everything and the constituency is nothing, excluding election times when it is required to vote for a specific party" [Williams, (2006), p.198]. Such behaviour threatens the core of democracy, reducing voters' input, making a mockery of public opinion and electoral mechanisms. Booysen (2007) confirms that despite voter discontent, political party loyalty remains strong, albeit more critical. However, when protests supplements political participation, can the ballot-and-brick tactics (Booysen, 2007) allow protests and votes to work interchangeably to improve democracy and service delivery, cementing SSD in the process?

Figure 1 Access to basic services for households 2001 and 2011 (see online version for colours)



Source: COGTA (2014, p.5)

Furthermore, the responsiveness of local government remains largely ineffective, despite exercising Integrative Development Planning (IDP) and executing participative governance. With political trust declining many revert to protest actions as the last resort, guaranteeing government attention and redress (Booysen, 2007; Askvik, 2010). A weakened civil society, coupled with a government prone to 'act, rather than lead' [Reddy, (2010), p.202], firmly entrenches a political society embracing protests as a complimentary participative mechanism. Local government becomes undemocratic and less effective when citizens' views are neglected; with cronies dominating due to their wealth and access to officials; when the illiterate and the poorest of the poor are not accommodated and/or acknowledged in decision-making processes; and with open dialogue being absent (Tsotetsi, 2015; Geldenhuys, 1996).

Akinboade et al. (2013, p.461) describe service delivery "as the provision of public activities, benefits or satisfactions to the citizens (and) relates both to the provision of tangible public goods and intangible services". Booysen (2007, p.21) coins the 'politics of service delivery' as both a 'top-down and bottom-up process', where the legislative

frameworks ensure effective governance and budgets (top-down approach), and the bottom-up processes reflecting on the peoples' struggles for service delivery, as exacerbated by politics, corruption, factional infighting, ignorance and inefficiencies (Goebel, 2011). The majority of protests are a revolt against municipal deficiencies, whether service delivery or governance related (Figure 2). With municipal elections held every five years (Electoral Commission, South Africa, 2015), South Africa's protests clearly increased prior to local elections (Figure 2), with the first service delivery protests noted in 2004. Jumping from 10 to 35 within one year was indicative of the grassroots' dissatisfaction with service delivery, seeing protests escalating even more with 2010s 107 protests (Mkhize, 2013). By 2014, protests reached its peak (COGTA, 2014), coinciding with the national elections held in the same year, and marred by the highest levels of violence recorded thus far (Powell et al., 2014). The most aggrieved issues that re-appear on a yearly basis are poor service delivery, electricity, water and sanitation, infrastructure, land and housing (Powell et al., 2014). South Africa's track record (Figure 1) reflects such backlogs as well as the lack of significant progress in some of these essential areas.

Figure 2 Number of service delivery protests (January 2004 to October 2010) (see online version for colours)



Source: Mkhize (2013, p.62)

The poor is therefore negatively affected by service deliveries, specifically those in the informal sector. Bardhan (2006, p.1393) believes that despite globalisation's 'openness to foreign trade', cuts in public budgets make the poor even more vulnerable to reduced social protection from the state. It is however important to reiterate that the ANC has indeed made tremendous efforts in addressing the plight of the poor as seen with initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP); Local Economic Development (LED); Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South Africa (ASGISA); Project Consolidate, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Muller, 2009). The 2002 national LED policy document, 'Refocusing Development on the Poor' targeted specifically the marginalised and low-income communities, supporting a 'bottom-up' approach with the communities taking centre stage to sustainable development [Rogerson, (2006), p.42]. Social grants have also helped to reduce poverty among those households struggling with unemployment,

assisting around 30% of the population in issuing 16.2 million social grants by mid-2013 (Oosthuizen and Cassim, 2014).

Due to all the protests and service delivery backlogs, the Local Government Turnaround Strategy was established in 2009 aiming to re-dress local governments' financial and administrative troubles; reduce staff turnovers; allow closer coordination between the spheres of government and Integrated Development Planning (IDPs); and to avoid the 'one size fits all' approach in the IDPs [Mkhize, (2013), p.19]. With 2014 marred by even more service delivery protests, the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) launched yet another initiative to improve local government: 'Back to Basics: serving our communities better'. This initiative focuses once more on good governance; public participation; financial management; infrastructure services and institutional capacity. Distinctions are now made between the three levels of government and their respective roles and responsibilities, aiming to reduce not only service delivery protests but rescuing municipalities that are facing total collapse (COGTA, 2014).

Bhensdadia and Dana (2004) note that poverty is not always directly connected to income, even though many are moving in and out of income poverty. Insecurity sets in when those with jobs face joblessness again due to the negative fall-outs of globalisation, natural disasters and inflation. The developmental agenda of South Africa should create conditions that can secure greater job opportunities, instead of defining it away (Bond, 2007). As Bond [(2007), p. 131] states: "the alleged two million new 'jobs' created by 2004 were mainly based in the informal sector, lacking security, regulation, a living wage or benefits". Bell [2004 cited in Bond, (2007), p.131] furthermore explained: "Homemakers who help sustain themselves and their families out of backyard vegetable plots or who keep a few chickens are part of the new employed class. In fact, that vast army of the barely hidden jobless who stand forlornly on street corners for hire or who sell coat hangers, rubbish bags or hands full of sweets at traffic lights or railway stations in the hope of making a few rand all add to this two million jobs figure".

When citizens are evicted from their dwellings and provision of services are cut-off by local government, the vicious cycles of non-payment and revolt against local government structures and institutions occur. 'Debt traps', 'ineffective tax bases' and 'aloof councillors' [Booysen, (2007), p.24] furthermore hamper political trust within local government. Subsequently, with leaders and institutions failing to protect citizens' constitutional rights, their 'pent-up anger' (Booysen, 2007) result in protests; a last resort to defend their property, dignity and rights. Additionally, Burger (2005, p.487) states that when both government officials and community representatives are poorly skilled and educated, service delivery can be of 'inferior quality'. Moreover, when jobless growth remains a fixture, protests and poverty will increase.

Everatt (2008) furthermore believes that the ever-increasing scope of target groups result in ineffective anti-poverty policies and programs. The ANC's 2007 Social Transformation program shows that the ANC is prioritising 56 target groups such as Black people, rural areas, African people, communities, low-income groups, African women, rural South Africans, women, the poor, families, households, people with disabilities, poor communities, small businesses, children, vulnerable children, young people, informal settlements, etc. (Everatt, 2008). Clearly, the agenda is obscured and unfocused? Frequent surveys concur that living conditions in SA have indeed improved,

although cynics claim that the gap between national statistics and public opinion remains as wide as ever (Davids and Gaibie, 2011), not to mention the huge social inequities that affect everyone (Binns and Nel, 2002). A strong class system is bridging the racial divide, although eight out of ten targeted poor (Everatt, 2008) reinforces the theories of relative deprivation and grievances. Davids and Gaibie [(2011), p.231] state that many citizens (22.5%) felt that their living conditions were 'fairly bad'; 'very bad' (21, 3%), or not happy (21%). Grievances are further played down when governments continuously focus on 'macro-statistics of overall achievements' [Booysen, (2007), p.23], thus ignoring local sentiments. Although Bond (2012, p.260) believes that many protests are rather 'fragmented, spontaneous and localised', aptly coining them as 'popcorn protests', Alexander (2010, p.25) more readily considers these local protests as 'a rebellion of the poor', bolstering SSD.

As shown in Figure 3, the Civic Protests Barometer (2007–2014) illustrates the increase of violent protests, as measured between 2007 and 2014. Although two thirds of the violent protests manifested into the destruction of property, physical attacks and the loss of life (Powell et al., 2014), it remains unclear what proportion can be attributed to service delivery protests specifically. Booysen [2007, cited in Alexander, (2010), p.25] believes that grassroots' protests are "against both the quality of service delivery and public representation of grassroots' service delivery needs". Pitman [2007, cited in Alexander, (2010), p.25] rejects this 'economistic approach', believing that protests represent "citizenship, understood as the material benefits of full social inclusion … as well as the right to be taken seriously when thinking and speaking through community organisations". Additional reasons for protests are inadequate housing; evictions; unemployment; poor communication with communities; poor leadership; corruption; factional infighting; nepotism; maladministration and management (Bond, 2012; Goebel, 2011; Akinboade et al., 2013). Booysen (2007) recalls that in 2004, prior to the 2006 local government elections, 5,805 legal protests were noted in Parliament, together with 881 classified as illegal protests. The first service delivery protest occurred in 2004, sending a strong message to local government (Booysen, 2007), and successfully creating a platform for continuous protests, as seen in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 3 Proportion of protests involving violence (2007–2014) (see online version for colours)



Source: Powell et al. (2014, p.5)

The voice of the citizen is most effective when casting a vote, ensuring not only representation and accountability, but also a responsive and legitimate government. However, when a dominant one party system exists (Roskin, 2001), checks-and-balances disappear, especially when the electorates remain sentimentally attached to their political parties. The absence of strong opposition results in 'crony capitalism' to flourish [Reddy, (2010), p.192], extending the gap between the rich and poor. Since protests and their subsequent media coverage force councillors' attention and action, confidence in the efficacy of protests was affirmed; valued as a tool in "supplementing democracy and associated delivery" [Booysen, (2007), p.25]. As seen in Figure 2, regardless of changes in the ANC leadership, protests continued to dominate the political landscape, reaching an all-time high in 2010. Despite the continuance of service delivery protests, government rotation at a national level does not occur, supporting Booysen's (2007) claim that party sentiment (and votes) remain intact. These protests, although called rebellious by some (Pithouse, 2013; Ngwane, 2014; Coetzer, 2012; Alexander, 2010) do not show similarities with protests across the globe, specifically referring to the Arab Spring that were not service delivery driven, but primarily against authoritarian regimes (Hinnebusch, 2006) and economic decline (Bogaert and Emperador, 2011; Campante and Chor, 2012). The subsequent changes in these governments affected their political-economic landscape (Moghadam, 2013), de-stabilising many.

Political connections and loyalties replace community participation and substitute material interests with political groupings (Mogale, 2003). These political affiliations are misrepresentative of communities and are threatening the notions of good governance and responsive democracy. Political parties' claim of being the true voice of their followers, become therefore highly questionable, especially when substituting public opinion (Mhone and Edigheji, 2003). Once again the poor and other marginalised groups are being excluded from decision-making processes, feeling neglected at best (Goebel, 2011). Nevertheless, the ANC did start to make changes with respect to accountability and efficiencies at the local levels (Booysen, 2007). However, on many occasions, state responses to protests were brutal, 'criminalising the poor' and disregarding a better life for all [Goebel, (2011), p.372]. Ironically, when the ANC turns against the masses, labelling the poor as the ultra-left, it effectively denounces its own developmental agendas, becoming the target of its own historical tactics of ungovernable townships (Goebel, 2011). The bottom-up approaches to local developmental mandates are now reduced to mere lip-services, threatening community driven democracy, grassroots' trust and confidence.

Despite renewed commitment to better governance, citizens remain cynical. "Most community protests are peaceful. When protests get disruptive it often means that peaceful means, such as imbizos (gathering), local councils, and even the president's hotline and the public protector, have been exhausted" [Ngwane, cited in Grant, (2014), p.1]. Police 'repression' of such protests is also not the solution since it "merely intensifies people's bitterness and alienation" [Alexander, cited in Grant, (2014), p.1]. When the political-welfare agenda becomes too wide to ensure effective poverty alleviation (Everatt, 2008), money and initiatives will fall through the cracks. The following section focuses on the research objective which determines the reasons why grassroots feel hopeless, alienated from their leaders, and resort to protests. By framing grassroots' perceptions within the domain of local government, SSD's connectivity with grievances and POS is achieved.

4 Research context, methodology and results

Structuration theory attempts to bridge the gap that exist between the "notions of structure and agency in social life", ultimately aiming to overcome the dichotomy of "structural versus interactional perspectives" [Bryman and Bell, (2003), p.7], successfully aligning with critical theory. In this article, structuration theory can be used to explain the grassroots' use of their agency to drive social change. Such an interpretative approach, as based on qualitative data, aims to address the core research question: is SSD South Africa's new political discourse?

This study focuses on the informal settlements of the MLM and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, specifically Sicelo Shiceka (SIS) and Thembelihle (TIS). South Africa's metropoles are classified as Category A municipalities that execute all the functions of local governments. On the other hand, the MLM, together with the Emfuleni and Lesedi Local Municipality, constitutes the Sedibeng District Municipality (Sedibeng Annual Report, 2012/2013) and is a category B municipality, sharing municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality, within which area it falls.

Thembelihle is an informal settlement situated in Lenasia, south of Johannesburg and is a category B municipality, marred by relocation issues and unsafe living conditions. The community of Thembelihle depends on the manual labour they sell to the Indian community surrounding the informal settlement, as unemployment is rife in the area. Service delivery protests occur regularly (Miya, 2015; Mkhize, 2013) with many residents feeling abandoned by local officials (Ngobeni, 2014). MLM's population growth has grown from 60,000 in 2001 to 100,000 in 2011 (Municipal IQ, 2009). Municipal records show that 71% of MLM residents have access to clean water, 79% have access to electricity, 24 schools, four police stations and hospitals (Midvaal IDP, 2013; Sedibeng Annual Report, 2012/2013), ultimately concurring its service delivery rating of 'very good'. However, despite the successful economic growth of MLM, uneven development is most apparent in Sicelo Shiceka, located 5km from Meyerton (MLM's administrative centre). Although there are areas with access to walkable pathways and roads, only 450 houses are planned for its 4,500 households. According to Sibanda and Fieuw (2012), sanitation and potable water are still not accessible to all, with only nine taps available for the 4,500 shacks (illegal housing). The residents are furthermore vulnerable to 'HIV/AIDS, crime, violence, xenophobia and unemployment' [Chirau, (2014), p.5]. With 23,000 residents, only a thousand in TIS have shacks, with no electricity (only streetlights), no schools and only one mobile clinic and police vehicle available. Whilst MLM is governed by the Democratic Alliance (South Africa's main opposition party), TIS' residents are governed by the ANC.

This article ascertained the individual-institutional basis of SSD, as underpinned by Gurr's grievance theory and the POS theory. The primary research objective was therefore to determine the citizens' perceptions on whether protests in the informal settlements of Thembelihle and Sicelo Shiceka reflect their frustration with their local governments' administrative and managerial inefficiencies, especially when comparing with the successes of the main cities or towns.

Table 1 Interviews' themes and responses

Themes	*Responses*
Poor service delivery leads to political instability	*Interviewee 9*: "Yes. People are angry. We voted but there is no change. We are tired of promises and lies. We demand change now and in our life time. We support the ANC Youth League, which wants economic freedom now."
	Interviewee 25: "Yes. The government is taking us for granted. It promised us a better life but nothing is happening. Although we do not want a civil war or the violence we saw between the ANC and Inkatha, but the government is leaving us without any choice."
Against violent protests	*Many females were against the blocking of roads, burning of tyres and the participation of children in poor service delivery protests.*
	Interviewee 4: "Personally I do not think that it is right for children to be part of service delivery protests. They should be at school to prepare their future. However, there are some people in our community who use children during the protests."
	Majority of male interviewees felt that children should participate in these protests, whereas female residents totally disagreed.
Enough was done to combat corruption	*Interviewee 1*: "I know the councilor. But councilors are useless. Councilors only think for themselves and their friends. That is why there is too much corruption at municipal level."
	Interviewee 41: "Local government alone cannot deliver good and sustainable services as there is too much corruption in the municipalities and shortage of skilled employees. Actually the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) should investigate government officials who own tenders and are involved in corruption activities."
Dissatisfied with councillors	*Interviewee 43*: "I know the councillor through the posters, which were hanging all everywhere before the elections. Councillors do not care about our needs. After voting for them, they disappear."
	Interviewee 4: "Yes, I know the Councilor since we voted the councilor into office. I do not think the councilor is doing enough to help us. The only thing councilors know is to make empty promises."
Unaware of ward committees	*Interviewee 2*: "I do not attend the meetings because they are called at night. We do not have transport to attend those meetings at night. Why are the meetings not held in our area and over the weekends when everyone is at home?"
	Interviewee 15: "No, I am not aware of ward committees. I am only aware of the street committees we created ourselves to fight crime, connect illegal electricity in our shacks and organise protest marches."
	Interviewee 23: "Yes, there are ward committees. We attend the committee meetings but there is no change. Our lives are not important, only our vote is important."
	Interviewee 12: "What is a ward committee? It is the people themselves who call meetings whereby we discuss issues like crime and lack of progress in our area."

Source: Mkhize (2013)

The study was an exploratory survey, involving 45 interviews among citizens residing in these two settlements. Seventeen participants were from SIS with the remaining 28 residing in TIS. All of the respondents were aged 17–57. Random sampling was done and with the use of semi-structured interviews, reliability was obtained. Confidentiality

was imperative, ensuring trust and honesty between interviewer and interviewee. With the use of Creswell's (2009) analysis techniques, codes were established resulting in two main themes as linked to the dominant sub-themes:

Theme 1 *Inadequate levels of service delivery*: Although there was some local improvement over the last ten years, local government was not the only source of blame for poor service delivery. Many respondents felt that provincial and national governments should be more involved with service delivery. Violence is a valid option when experiencing poor service delivery, with corrupt local councillors' additionally hampering service delivery and political participation.

Theme 2 *Level of local government's accessibility and representativeness*: It became apparent that most councillors are unknown and/or inactive to the interviewees with ward committees seen as ineffective and/or inactive, or worst, unknown. Many do not attend meetings regularly or are being unaware of IDPs. Some interviewees felt that the national government needed to assist more with service delivery.

The findings in Table 1 show that the majority of the interviewees thought that the municipalities fail to provide basic services because of their lack of capacity, with some feeling that the national government should intervene. The operationalising of participative democracy remains a challenge since many do not attend meetings regularly, especially when held during weeknights (see Table 1, interviewees 2, 15, 23 and 12). Given the lack of electricity and safety apparatus for many residents, it is questionable why councillors schedule such meetings during night-time. Such steps indeed alienate residents from their leaders.

Ward councillors remain an issue as well, especially when they are either perceived as 'useless, corrupt, and a distant poster picture' (see Table 1, interviewees 1, 4, and 43). When residents are cynical about democratic mechanisms such as ward committees and meetings, effort is required to redress these perceptions. Many residents in TIS and SIS believe that protests are a viable communication tool, especially if political agendas replace community needs (see Table 1, interviewees 4, 41 and 43). Gendered views on protests and the involvement of children were noticeable, with most females opposing youngsters to protest. Education is still important for females; whereas males were much more political and adamant that children should partake in protest marches (see Table 1, row 2).

When comparing SIS and TIS with their neighbors such as Soweto, Sandton and Meyerton, it is clear that there are huge discrepancies pertaining basic services. Education, health and safety are some of the basic rights guaranteed to all citizens. However, whereas MLM's Meyerton shows adequate provision of services, SIS experiences the complete opposite. The same can be said about TIS. Differences in resources, developmental agendas and participative democratic mechanisms are evident. Mismanagement of resources and the neglect of people's demands result in residents feeling disillusioned (see Table 1, interviewees 1, 4, 23 and 25), with discontent and protests becoming the only option (see Table 1, interviewees 9 and 25).

The following section reflects on the applicability of SSD as a new political discourse within South Africa.

5 Discussion

The openness of systems, whether political or economic, provide greater opportunities for societies. An open economic system offers access to overseas markets and benefits from globalisation's export-led growth, economic development, and foreign direct investment (Martens et al., 2010; Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004), ideally reaching the pockets of the poor. Decentralised political systems also create greater opportunities for its citizens, opening up when exercising participatory democracy, checks-and-balances and the separation of powers among government branches (Vráblíková, 2014; Roskin, 2001). Community-driven democracy (Bond, 2012) therefore enhances greater dialogue and political activities.

However, South Africa's history was characterised by closed systems, furthermore divided by class, race and uneven wealth distribution (Roskin, 2001). Apartheid's oppressiveness resulted in communities resisting; fighting for a quality of life and a voice in their own affairs. A community-based democracy typified the grassroots' development of a strong culture of protests (Bond, 2012), violence and non-payment, striving for openness, access and economic prosperity.

Resistance, isolation and violence led to the abolishment of apartheid, with the first democratic elections (Roskin, 2001; Southall, 2000) confirming South Africa's new political landscape that subscribes to greater openness and equality. Through the lifting of sanctions notable economic growth occurred, assisting the redistributive and developmental agenda of the government (Koelble and LiPuma, 2010; Rogerson, 2006). Openness was strengthened with the constitutional safeguarding of checks-and-balances, separation of powers and decentralised governmental levels and institutions (Vráblíková, 2014; Gildenhuys and Knipe, 2000; Lipton, 2014). However, despite 21 years of reforms and progressive policies, South Africa continues to be afflicted by extreme levels of inequality; challenged furthermore by poor economic growth, corruption (Goebel, 2011; Akinboade et al., 2013; Bond, 2012), low credit ratings and soaring unemployment rates (Stats SA, 2014b; Chitiga et al., 2014; Global Credit Research, 2014; Potelwa, 2015). Even though poverty is not always directly connected to income, insecurity does remain (Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004), especially when joblessness cannot be rectified via globalisation and LED. When government only focuses on the macro successes of its achievements (Booysen, 2007), the voice of the poor and unemployed are sidelined. Political openness are equally tarnished by cronyism, aloof councillors, maladministration and a weakened civil society (Reddy, 2010; Goebel, 2011; Booysen, 2007) that not only diminishes political trust and participation (Geldenhuys, 1996; Mhone and Edigheji, 2003), but reinforces grievances and protests (Figures 2 and 3).

Dissatisfaction among the poorest of poor therefore sees a new level of desperateness entering South Africa's political landscape. Signs of greater socio-economic divide and development unfortunately distort the successes of the government, as seen with Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle. SSD formed the basis of this article by ascertaining the individual-institutional nexus of South Africa's post-apartheid landscape, as based within its operational definition: "When a significant part of a desperate community takes counter measures as a last resort to secure their socio-economic well-being". SSD accordingly focuses on citizens' actions when facing a sense of desperateness. When governmental mandates and programs fail in improving the lives of the poor (Figure 1), grassroots start to feel neglected and frustrated, channelling their anger towards local governments, the statutory champions of LED and participatory

democracy. Since economic and political measures frequently fail to redress inequality and deprivation, grassroots' grievances intensify, resonating with SSD. The social self, as connected with SSD, is therefore gaining momentum within South Africa's socio-political landscape. Booysen (2007) consequently believes that grassroots' protests are directed against poor service delivery as coupled with the ineffective representation of their service delivery needs. The bottom-up democratic input (Rogerson, 2006) from residents remains mediocre at best, stimulating a rebellion by the poor (Alexander, 2010).

Grievances and relative deprivation, as experienced in the face of constant suffering and disillusionment, replace the notions of altruism and hope. When top-down party political programs hinder grassroots' participative agenda (Williams, 2006; Booysen, 2007), effective citizen participation and poverty alleviation initiatives suffer. Furthermore, when the aloof councillors and administrators fail to show insight into protests and service delivery progress, Hegtvedt and Markovsky's (1995, cited in Bhensdadia and Dana, 2004) societal positioning theory materialises. The despair found in both Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle reiterate the individual's sense of social identity along with the notions of relative deprivation, pushing grassroots to service delivery protests and violence (Figures 2 and 3). Mismanagement, unequal distribution of resources and distorted development are glaringly obvious when inter-group comparisons occur between these informal settlements (Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle) and their more affluent neighbours. Polarisation and horizontal inequalities (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009) therefore remain fixed, exacerbated by cronyism, corruption, and ineffective democratic institutions (Goebel, 2011; Reddy, 2010; Bond, 2012). Distributive grievances (Klandermans et al., 2001) deepen due to the permanencies of horizontal inequality, successfully realising SSD.

Unfortunately, social injustices prevail where the poor, despite being the main targets and recipients of governmental anti-poverty programs, remain a marginalised and undeserving poor (Everatt, 2008). SSD becomes a powerful tool when signs of improvement are dim, as in the case of Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle. When the social self and social categories perceive reality as a desperate situation, protests become a SSD mechanism that could indeed improve conditions or instigate political change (Alexander, 2010). Justification of non-electoral activities, even violent protests, is not ideal, but perceived as just (Sections 3 and 4). Depriving the young and old of necessities such as water and electricity (Figure 1), SSD becomes the rationale behind protests, re-igniting a culture of non-payment, resistance and violence.

Indeed, the POS theory, as embedded in open systems, allow for greater participation with decentralised local government structures and mechanisms providing platforms for improved and frequent participation (Dalton et al., 2010; Vráblíková, 2014). Seen as the foot soldiers of democracy, local governmental channels such as ward meetings, Integrated Development Plan (IDP) meetings and Imbizos allow citizens to not only express their desires and concerns, but also to secure commitment to their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The regular elections of national and local governments additionally enhance governmental legitimacy. Electioneering steers political party agendas that dominate the media and rallies, ensuring greater political opportunities. However, as seen in Sections 3 and 4, effective local government apparatus, as managed by elected councillors are absent, failing to connect with residents (Goebel, 2011; Ngobeni, 2014). Furthermore, when councillors are literally unknown to their constituencies (Section 4), and associated with party-sentimental agendas (Goebel, 2011; Williams, 2006; Mogale,

2003), the deepening of grievances and protests do occur (Grant, 2014). Electioneering promises furthermore allow expectations to increase, only to see inactions during post-elections periods with protests peaking prior to election years (Figure 2). Although the openness of South Africa's democratic society is clear when observing participatory mechanisms with laws protecting citizens' rights to association and expression, other legal restrictions result in many a protest being declared illegal (Goebel, 2011). Typically, two approaches occur when dealing with protests: authorities either accommodate or suppress. When the police use brutality to disperse crowds, effectively criminalising the voice of the poor (Goebel, 2011), resentment and alienation strengthen. Alternatively, by accommodating grass-root demands through violent protests, the 'ballot and the brick' approach becomes a complimentary mechanism of participatory democracy (Booysen, 2007). Lastly, with a dominant party system South African elections seldom operate as a tool for change and accountability, leaving many politicians overly self-assured, sidestepping accountability and performance. Self-interest therefore overrules representativeness. However, in MLM healthy electioneering and competition do exist, successfully redirecting councillors and political parties to represent their constituents' needs.

Although change in leadership or enhanced community participation cannot necessarily correct all the wrongs when redressing South Africa's problems, constitutional rights can be reclaimed with improved leadership, participatory mechanisms and poverty alleviation initiatives. Moreover, by narrowing down the target groups of the poor (Everatt, 2008) and the unemployed (Bond, 2007) greater success will be achieved when operationalising government's political-welfare agenda (Everatt, 2008). Politicians that create unrealistic expectations when electioneering (Williams, 2006) provide fertile ground for resentment and eventual SSD, specifically when horizontal inequality remains. Unqualified local government officials require training, with greater emphasis placed on transparency, accountability and good governance. Local governments are to re-connect with the historical importance of community-based democracy, showing interest and compassion on a frequent basis, opening channels of communication and consultation. Many mechanisms are already in place and can easily alleviate tensions. However, should the status quo remains, popcorn protests (Bond, 2012) will become a fixture, as underscored by SSD.

Clearly, grievances, opportunities and protests collide. This article questions local governments' successful operationalising of democratic mechanisms and poverty alleviation mandates. Despite a plethora of programs and structures to strengthen democracy, the voice of the people remains unheard, reducing opportunities to voice their self-expressed values. The ineffectiveness of its neo-liberal macro-economic policies (Fine, 2012) furthermore threaten anti-poverty initiatives. Local government, legislatively closest to the people, remains absent and ineffective. Furthermore, with elected officials being unskilled, uninterested and party-driven, factional infighting occurs, reducing political representativeness and opportunities. Leadership becomes absent and reactive, diminishing the effectiveness of many anti-poverty strategies.

Thus, when disillusionment regarding democratic mechanisms arise many passive citizens revert to protests. SSD becomes more and more embedded, especially when hard fought freedoms and rights to a quality of life are at stake.

6 Conclusions

Despite the fact that this South African study is limited to only two informal settlements, Sicelo Shiceka and Thembelihle, the sample of 45 interviewees still provides insight into SSD locality within the individual-institutional nexus of local government. Additional studies within other protest-prone states can determine whether SSD is indeed applicable in a global context, irrespective of ideology or geography.

This study revealed that many South Africans are in a permanent state of despair and frustration, lacking political trust in its hard-fought democratic mechanisms. It is clear that local governments' developmental agendas remain problematic. Not only do participatory mechanisms fail to reach the electorate, but also internal weaknesses furthermore hamper the legislative and procedural mandates for a 'better life'. Subsequently, sustainable and efficient service delivery remains unimpressive, resulting in voter apathy and/or frustrations.

Once protests become a valid way of political participation, democracy and economic stability are threatened. It is important that all spheres of government should take note of the ineffectiveness of their democratic apparatuses. When reality becomes the opposite of the intended poverty alleviation initiatives or participatory democratic mechanisms, citizens' voices become lost. To discard the voice of the poor threatens the democratic ethos of the society, reducing years of struggle to political denialism and disillusionment. Grievances are part of any society, but when they increase due to social injustice and relative deprivation, inequality and poverty continues, threatening constitutional guarantees.

Ineffective municipal administrations, hampered by infighting, corruption and impractical scheduling of meetings frustrate grassroots. Grievances deepen when continuous horizontal inequalities remain, as exacerbated by government criminalising the voice of the poor. Ward committees and councillors need to listen to the grievances of the peoples, and constantly aim to reduce these motivators for political protests. When responsive leadership are truly representative of the needs of their constituents, consensual politics will replace grievances and unjust practices. If however, politicians remain aloof and distanced, instability and protests will become a fixture. When grievances, opportunities and protests collide, SSD finds resonance with the poor, reinforcing the notion that, 'our lives are not important, only our vote'.

References

Akinboade, O.A., Mokwena, M.P. and Kinfack, E.C. (2013) 'Understanding citizens' participation in service delivery protests in South Africa's Sedibeng district municipality', *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp.458–478.

Akinboade, O.A., Mokwena, M.P. and Kinfack, E.C. (2014) 'Protesting for improved public service delivery in South Africa's Sedibeng district municipality', *Social Indicators Research*, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp.1–23.

Alexander, P. (2010) 'Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 37, No. 123, pp.25–40.

Askvik, S. (2010) 'The dynamics of political trust in South Africa, 1995–2006', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp.25–44.

Bardhan, P. (2006) 'Globalization and rural poverty', *World Development*, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp.1393–1404.

Basu, K. (2006) 'Globalization, poverty, and inequality: what is the relationship? What can be done?', *World Development*, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp.1361–1373.

Bekink, B. (2006) *Principles of South African Local Government Law*, Butterworths, Durban.

Bhensdadia, R.R. and Dana, L.P. (2004) 'Globalisation and rural poverty', *International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management*, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp.458–468.

Binns, T. and Nel, E. (2002) 'Devolving development: integrated development planning and developmental local government in post-apartheid South Africa', *Regional Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 8, pp.921–932.

Bogaert, K. and Emperador, M. (2011) 'Imagining the state through social protest: state reformation and the mobilizations of unemployed graduates in Morocco', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.241–259.

Bond, P. (2007) 'South Africa between neoliberalism and social democracy?: Respecting balance while sharpening differences', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp.125–146.

Bond, P. (2012) 'South African People Power since the mid-1980s: two steps forward, one back', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp.243–264.

Bond, P. (2013) 'Debt, uneven development and capitalist crisis in South Africa: from Moody's macroeconomic monitoring to Marikana microfinance mashonisas', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.569–592.

Booysen, S. (2007) 'With the ballot and the brick: the politics of attaining service delivery', *Progress in Development Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.21–32.

Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2003) *Business Research Methods*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Burger, R. (2005) 'What we have learnt from post-1994 innovations in pro-poor service delivery in South Africa: a case study-based analysis', *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp.483–500.

BusinessTech (2015) 'South Africa unemployment: 1994–2015', *Business Tech* [online] http://businesstech.co.za/news/international/77737/south-africa-unemployment-1994-2015/ (accessed 21 July 2015).

Campante, F.R. and Chor, D. (2012) 'Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.167–188.

Chandran, T. (2015) 'Top 10 countries with the highest unemployment rates', *Gulf Business* [online] http://gulfbusiness.com/2015/05/top-10-countries-highest-unemployment-rates/#.VbSIUPmqqko (accessed 23 July 2015).

Chirau, T.J. (2014) ''No good story to tell'-informal settlements still as big as 1994. A case of Midvaal Municipality in Sedibeng District', *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: Sociology & Culture*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.5–15.

Chitiga, M., Sekyere, E. and Tsoanamatsie, N. (2014) 'Income inequality and limitations of the gini index: the case of South Africa', *Human Science Research Council* [online] http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-november-2014/limitations-of-gini-index (accessed 20 July 2015).

Coetzer, P. (2012) 'Service delivery protests: non-delivery more symptom than cause', *Leadership* [online] http://www.leadershiponline.co.za/articles/service-delivery-protests-1655.html (accessed 3 March 2015).

Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) (2014) *Back to Basics: Serving our Communities Better* [online] http://www.cogta.gov.za/summit2014/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/plgsummit-backtobasics-discussion-document.pdf (accessed 4 March 2015).

Creswell, J.W. (2009) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd ed., Sage Publication, Los Angeles.

Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A. and Weldon, S. (2010) 'The individual-institutional Nexus of protest behaviour', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp.51–73.

Davids, Y.D. and Gaibie, F. (2011) 'Quality of life in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.231–256.

De Visser, J. (2005) *Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa*, Intersentia Publishers, Brussels.

Electoral Commission, South Africa (2015) *Election Types* [online] http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/ (accessed 25 August 2015).

Emmett, T. (2000) 'Beyond community participation? Alternative routes to civil engagement and development in South Africa', *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp.501–518.

Everatt, D. (2008) 'The undeserving poor: poverty and the politics of service delivery in the poorest nodes of South Africa', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp.293–319.

Ferreira, J. (2015) 'South Africa unemployment rate 2000–2015', *Trading Economics* [online] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate (accessed 20 July 2015).

Fine, B. (2012) 'Assessing South Africa's new growth path: framework for change?', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 39, No. 134, pp.551–568

Fowler, J.H. and Kam, C.D. (2007) 'Beyond the self: social identity, altruism, and political participation', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp.813–827.

Friedman, S. (2012) 'Beyond the fringe? South African social movements and the politics of redistribution', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 39, No. 131, pp.85–100.

Geldenhuys, A.J. (1996) 'Analysing democracy for local government', in Bekker, K. (Ed.): *Citizen Participation in Local Government*, pp.11–29, J.L. Van Schaik, Pretoria.

Gildenhuys, J.S.E. and Knipe, A. (2000) *The Organization of Government: An Introduction*, J.L. van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria.

Ginges, J. and Atran, S. (2009) 'What motivates participation in violent political action. Selective incentives or parochial altruism?', *Values, Empathy, and Fairness across Social Barriers: Annual New York Academy of Science*, Vol. 1167, pp.115–123.

Global Credit Research (2014) 'Rating action: Moody's downgrades South Africa to Baa2; outlook changed to stable', *Global Credit Research* [online] https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-South-Africa-to-Baa2-outlook-changed-to-stable--PR_312007 (accessed 20 July 2015).

Goebel, A. (2011) ''Our struggle is for the full loaf': protests, social welfare and gendered citizenship in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.369–388.

Grant, L. (2014) 'Research shows sharp increase in service delivery protests', *Mail and Guardian* [online] http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-protests (accessed 16 April 2015).

Head, B.W. (2007) 'Community engagement: participation on whose terms?', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.441–445.

Hinnebusch, R. (2006) 'Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: an overview and critique', *Democratization*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.373–395.

Klandermans, B., Roefs, M. and Olivier, J. (2001) 'Grievance formation in a country in transition: South Africa, 1994–1998', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp.41–54.

Koechlin, T. (2006) 'Stiglitz and his discontent', *Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.253–264.

Koelble, T.A. and LiPuma, E. (2010) 'Institutional obstacles to service delivery in South Africa', *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp.565–589.

Lipton, M. (2014) 'Is South Africa's constitutional democracy being consolidated or eroded?', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp.1–26.

Martens, P., Dreher, A. and Gaston, N. (2010) 'Globalisation, the global village and the civil society', *Futures*, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp.574–582.

Martin, B. (1999) 'Social defence strategy: the role of technology', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp.535–552.

Mbeki, T. (2005) 'The challenge of equitable development – what is the progressive agenda?', *Progressive Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.6–16.

McCorley, C. (2013) 'Structure, agency and regime change: a comparative analysis of social actors and regime change in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp.265–282.

Mead, G.H. (1913) 'The social self', *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. 10, No. 14, pp.374–380.

Mehrotra, S. and Jarrett, S.S.W. (2002) 'Improving basic health service delivery in low-income countries: 'voice' to the poor', *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 54, No. 11, pp.1685–1690.

Mhone, G. and Edigheji, O. (Eds.) (2003) *Governance in the New South Africa: The Challenges of Globalization*, University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town.

Midvaal IDP (2013) *Integrated Development Plan, 2013–2018*, Government Printers, Pretoria.

Miya, N. (2015) *Police in Gauteng Arrest 34 Service Delivery Protestors* [online] http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/61b71780477617c3a427e642d945d4b0/Policeundefinedarrestundefined34undefinedserviceundefineddeliveryundefinedprotestors-20152702 (accessed 20 July 2015).

Mkhize, L.M. (2013) *Assessing Citizens' Perceptions on the Interrelationship between Poor Service Delivery and Political Instability in South Africa: 2000–2010*, Unpublished dissertation, University of the Free State.

Mogale, T. (2003) 'Developmental local government and decentralised service delivery in the democratic South Africa', in Mhone, G. and Edigheiji, O. (Eds.): *Governance in the New South Africa: The Challenges of Globalization*, pp.215–244, University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town.

Moghadam, V.M. (2013) 'What is democracy? Promises and perils of the Arab Spring', *Current Sociology*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp.393–408.

Muller, M. (2006) 'The good, the bad and the ugly: improving service delivery by replacing bad governance with goodness', in *Journal of Public Administration, 2006: Proceedings of the SAAPAM/ASSADPAM Annual Conference, 'Improving Implementation for Accelerated Delivery'*, Durban, South Africa, pp.223–240.

Muller, M. (2009) 'Good governance and Ubuntu as prerequisites for poverty alleviation in South Africa: a Case Study of Uthungulu District Municipality, Rural Northern Natal', *Indilinga, African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.98–223.

Municipal IQ (2009) 'Press release: municipal IQ's updated municipal hotspots results', *Municipal IQ* [online] http://www.municipalIQ.co.za (accessed 20 November 2009).

Murshed, S.M. and Tadjoeddin, M.Z. (2009) 'Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict', *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp.87–111.

Ngobeni, L. (2014) 'Meyerton reels from destructive protests', *Eyewitness News* [online] http://ewn.co.za/2014/02/15/Meyerton-reels-from-destructive-protests (accessed 20 August 2015).

Ngwane, T. (2014) ''Protest nation': what's driving the demonstrations on the streets of South Africa?', *South African Civil Society Information Service* [online] http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1930 (accessed 27 February 2014).

O'Neill, S. (2010) 'Struggles against injustice: contemporary critical theory and political violence', *Journal of Global Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.127–139.

Oosthuizen, M. and Cassim, A. (2014) 'The State of Youth Unemployment in South Africa', *Brookings* [online] http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/08/15-youth-unemployment-south-africa-oosthuizen#ftn2 (accessed 20 July 2015).

Piper, L. and Deacon, R. (2009) 'Too dependent to participate: ward committees and local democratisation in South Africa', *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp.415–433.

Pithouse, R. (2013) 'The Riotous Underbelly of the New Normal', *South African Civil Society Information Service* [online] http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1557 (accessed 16 April 2015).

Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A. (1991) 'Collective protest: a critique of resource mobilization theory', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp.435–458.

Potelwa, X. (2015) 'South Africa's credit rating fundamentals unchanged, S&P says', *Bloomberg* [online] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-09/south-africa-s-credit-rating-fundamentals-unchanged-s-p-says (accessed 22 July 2015).

Powell, D.M., O'Donovan, M. and De Visser, J. (2014) 'Civic protests barometer report, 2007–2014', *Multi-level Government Initiative* [Online] http://mlgi.org.za/talking-good-governance/20150219%20Civic%20Protest%20Barometer%20Published%20%20DP.pdf (accessed 30 May 2015)

Reddy, T. (2010) 'ANC decline, social mobilization and political society: understanding South Africa's evolving political culture', *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 37, Nos. 2–3, pp.185–206.

Republic of South Africa (1998) *Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998*, Government Printers, Pretoria.

Republic of South Africa (2000) *Local Government Municipal Systems, Act 32 of 2000*, Government Printers, Pretoria.

Rogerson, C.M. (2006) 'Pro-poor local economic development in South Africa: the role of pro-poor tourism', *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp.37–60.

Roskin, M.G. (2001) *Hard Road to Democracy: Four Developing Nations*, Prentice-Hall Publishers, New Jersey.

Sedibeng Annual Report (2012/2013) Government Printers, Pretoria.

Sibanda, K. and Fieuw, W. (2012) 'Sicelo enumeration unlocks partnership with Midvaal Municipality', *South Africa SDI Alliance* [online] http://sasdialliance.org.za/sicelo-enumeration-midvaal/ (accessed 30 July 2015).

Southall, R. (2000) 'The state of democracy in South Africa', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp.147–170.

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2014a) 'Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 4, 2014', *Stats South Africa* [Online] http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2014.pdf (accessed 26 July 2015).

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2014b) 'Economic growth slows in 2014', *Stats South Africa* [online] http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=4184 (accessed 26 July 2015).

Tsotetsi, D. (2015) 'Thembelihle is burning', *SABC News* [online] http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/8e7e430047753c238267e642d945d4b0/Thembelihleundefinedisundefinedburning:undefinedTCC-20152702 (accessed 20 July 2015).

Turner, J.C., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A. and McGarty, C. (1994) 'Self and collective: cognition and social context', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp.454–463.

Venter, A. and Landsberg, C. (2006) *Government and Politics in the New South Africa*, J.L. van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria.

Vráblíková, K. (2014) 'How context matters? Mobilization, political opportunity structures and non-electoral political participation in old and new democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp.203–229.

Wade, R.H. (2004) 'Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?', *World Development*, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.567–589.

Welzel, C. and Inglehart, R. (2008) 'The role of ordinary people in democratization', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.19, No. 1, pp.126–140.

Wilkes, R. (2004) 'First nation politics: deprivation, resources, and participation in collective action', *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp.570–589.

Williams, J.J. (2006) 'Community participation: lessons from post-apartheid South Africa', *Policy Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.197–217.

Zhang, W. and Seltzer, T. (2010) 'Another piece of the puzzle: advancing social capital theory by examining the effect of political party relationship quality on political and civic participation', *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp.155–170.

Appendix 16 Publication no. 7

Democracy's embedded paradoxes: are violent protests the new discourse?



Protests and Riots

Past, Present and Future Perspectives

Alice Pichette
Editor

Social Issues, Justice and Status

NOVA

NOTICE TO THE READER

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-53613-036-2 (eBook)

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS

Chapter 3

Democracy's embedded paradoxes: are violent protests the new discourse?

Marlene Muller*

School of Social Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Dubai International Academic City, Dubai, U.A.E

ABSTRACT

South Africans value their institutions of trust, perceiving them as the protectors and guarantors of the collective good. Combined within the frameworks of laws, anti-poverty programs and democratic mechanisms government's commitment to the peoples' needs indicated a commitment to address inequality and accelerate service delivery. However, South Africa's post-Apartheid landscape remains volatile. Centuries of oppression and racial segregation firmly entrenched inequality and violence, negatively affecting its democratic ethos and economic prosperity. Once paraded as an example for its 'sensational process of democratisation' (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2003, p.1), SA is now brandished as a 'failed state' (Cartwright, 2015, p.1), embedding 'violent democracy' (von Holdt, 2014, p.129) and 'racial economic inequality' (Kangarlou, 2013, p. 1).

The social environment of politics affirms Social Self-Defence's (where the social self is transforming into a social self-defence mechanism) place within South Africa's socio-political landscape. The increase of service delivery protests confirm that top-down leadership and municipal management are ineffective, primarily failing to accommodate their constituencies' needs and operationalising policies. Debt traps and aloof councilors furthermore diminishes political trust. With 32% of municipalities categorized as dysfunctional, it is clear that democracy's foot soldiers have failed and that the lies of democracy continue to increase.

Can these embedded paradoxes result in South Africa spiraling out of control, cementing protests and violence as the new discourse? Or will Social Self-Defence serve as the democracy barometer, redirecting leaders towards stability, trust and substantive democracy?

Keywords: protests, violence, democracy, paradox theories, Social Self-Defence, debt, trust, South Africa.

* Corresponding Author address: Heriot-Watt University Dubai Campus, P.O.Box 294345, Dubai, UAE
Email: m.muller@hw.ac.uk

Word count: 234

INTRODUCTION

Many of us have participated in protests. As a South African I had my first public protest when I was a freshman studying politics; eager to claim a stake on the political stage. Of course I wanted to show my passionate commitment to certain values and ideologies; this was after all the time when both Communism and Apartheid were about to collapse. The late 1980's were exciting times, but also unknown territories for many. Despite enjoying the thrills of protesting I never became a serial protester. But, have I stopped protesting? No, and I don't think we should ever stop.

Nelson Mandela (1994:109) once wrote that all South Africans are born politicised and that it can affect all aspects of your life: your beliefs, actions and way of thinking. This is very true for South Africans, but equally applicable to all those who identify with the politics of life. Whether you are fighting for your rights as a young working mother or protesting a court ruling, protests occur frequently and/or sporadically; violently and/or peaceful; on the streets and/or quietly in a corridor. Why do we protest? What makes us to stand up and show our discontent? Do we feel frustrated with our institutions and leaders? Or are we simply tired of struggling? But more importantly, do our protests matter?

This chapter focusses on South Africa (SA) as a protest nation, primarily addressing the questions of ineffective political mechanisms, poor service delivery and destructive leadership as juxtaposed against social self-defence and South Africans' desire to fight for their constitutional rights and a better future. By concentrating on the leader-follower relationships, especially those followers not belonging to the African National Congress' (ANC) in-group, a behavioural follower barometer is developed, allowing followers to re-claim their voice and influence; and acquiring access to resources and opportunities once more. However, if destructive leadership and cronyism continue, a permanent state of violence, poverty and protests will overshadow SA's hard-fought struggles for democracy, prosperity and freedom. Is this the South Africa we fought for? Sacrificed for?

.1 The rainbow nation's spectacular beginnings

South Africa's political history is marred by centuries of violence, racism and oppression, cementing an extremely divisive nation, characterised by high levels of inequality, uneven development and a sub-culture of resistance. However, community-based democracy, primarily noted in townships and shop floors, consolidated the voice of the people (Bond, 2012), resulting in a powerful democratic movement. Victory against the oppressive Apartheid regime was finally attained when democracy and freedoms were voted in during the 1994 elections, forging a new political dispensation and ending many decades of suffering and protests. SA's constitutional democracy finally secured equality and basic freedoms, as enshrined in its Constitution's Bill of Rights that guarantees South Africans the right to 'free expression, association and access to information' with Sections 26–29 ensuring 'everyone has the right to housing … health services, sufficient food and water … social security … and basic education' (Lipton, 2014:11). Years of suffering are finally over. Our struggles were not in vain! Our protests and revolts secured a better future for all of us, a rainbow nation indeed.

The decentralisation of SA's government ensured greater political participatory opportunities and accountability for all. The constitutionalisation of local government resulted in

municipalities becoming the hands and feet of government, working with all community groups in finding 'sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives' (Republic of South Africa, 1998a). As a 'developmental arm' of government, municipalities' main tasks are to ensure service delivery and bringing democracy to the people (Koelble and LiPuma, 2010:566). By being a distinct sphere of government, local government is therefore clearly tasked with 'serving its communities by ensuring the provision of household infrastructure, viable local economic development, community empowerment and the redistribution of resources' (Bekink, 2006:73–75). Both the Municipal Structures Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998b) and the Municipal Systems Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000) granted two main participatory mechanisms for South Africa's 278 municipalities: councillors and ward committees, with the latter serving as community-based advisory committees and chaired by the ward councillor (De Visser, 2005). By accommodating community participation, representative leadership has the advantage of receiving primary information from the local communities, resulting in quality decisions and appropriate programs.

The ANC-led government has indeed made tremendous efforts in addressing the plight of the poor as seen with initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Program; Local Economic Development (LED); Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South Africa; Project Consolidate, Black Economic Empowerment and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Muller, 2009). The 2002 national LED policy document, 'Refocusing Development on the Poor' targeted specifically the marginalised and low income communities, supporting a 'bottom-up' approach with the communities taking centre stage to sustainable development (Rogerson, 2006:42). Social grants have also helped to reduce poverty among those households struggling with unemployment, assisting around 30% of the population in issuing 16.2 million social grants by mid-2013 (Oosthuizen and Cassim, 2014).

South Africa, seen as the economic powerhouse of Africa thus succeeded in creating millions of new jobs and houses, gradually bridging the gap between the rich and the poor (Kangarlou, 2013). Combined within the frameworks of laws, anti-poverty programs, democratic mechanisms and Batho Pele ('People First'), good governance found a fertile basis to address grassroots' challenges and accelerate service delivery. No wonder the rainbow nation is perceived as a 'sensational process of democratisation' (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2003:1).

.2 The [re]emergence of a protest nation

Despite South Africa's spectacular successes, a 'phase of dysphoria' (Roskin, 2001:94) followed where resource scarcities, corruption and lack of equal economic redistribution became the main catalysts for anxieties and dissatisfaction. Ironically, despite the riddance of Apartheid laws, a strong racial-based class system resurfaced (Bond, 2012). SA is now brandished as a 'failed state' (Cartwright, 2015:1), embedding 'violent democracy' (von Holdt, 2014:129) and (again) 'racial economic inequality' (Kangarlou, 2013:1). How did this happen? How could SA deteriorate so fast and so severely?

The Local Government Turnaround Strategy was subsequently established in 2009 aiming to re-dress local governments' financial and administrative woes and to allow closer coordination between the spheres of government and Integrated Development Planning (IDP's) (Mkhize, 2013:19). Another initiative to improve local government: 'Back to Basics: serving our communities better' (COGTA, 2014) was launched in 2014, but with limited success. All these post-Apartheid drivers for economic growth seemed ineffective, validated by Moody's all-time low 2017-rating of BAA3 (Moody's, 2017). With an economy that moved into recession,

coupled with a decrease of 0,7% in GDP during the first quarter of 2017 (Stats SA, 2017a) and a Gini index of 0.63, a highly unequal nation remains. In fact, poverty levels have increased since 2015, mostly affecting 'children, black Africans, females, people from rural areas, and those with little or no education' (Stats SA, 2017b:1). How can SA avoid further economic decline? How can SA defeat the endless poverty traps?

For a start, in order to alleviate poverty one requires effective and sustainable service delivery (Burger, 2005) as linked with sustainable development, effective governance and constructive citizen participation. Quality of Democracy (QoD) therefore refers to control, freedom and equality (Bühlmann, 2011) as well as inclusiveness and effectiveness (Bernauer et al., 2016). The strength of QoD allows for effective service delivery and participatory democracy, ensuring economic growth and socio-political equality. However, SA's dominant one-party system fails to ensure political competition and transparency (Merkel, et al., 2016); adversely strengthening institutionalised inequality and unequal development (Kangarlou, 2013). Categorised as a highly corrupt state clientelism, intra-elite conflict and corruption prevail (Van Holdt, 2013; Paret, 2015), threatening both the quality of democracy and service delivery.

The politics of service delivery becomes evident when more than two-thirds of SA's municipalities fail to address inequality and service delivery, pushing citizens to rely on non-democratic measures to attract attention and action. Despite sufficient funding and state mechanisms to improve livelihoods, ineffective leadership cement 'crony capitalism' (Reddy, 2010:192) and economic Apartheid (Schneider, 2003). Subsequently, disillusionment, disobedience and political distrust emerge, bolstering social self-defence (SSD), defined as 'when a significant part of a desperate community takes counter measures to secure their socio-economic well-being' (Muller and Mkhize, 2013, 2016). Socio-economic hardships shape SSD, as exacerbated by political discontent. Desperateness is thus concerned with the continuous cycles of poverty citizens face, intensified by unemployment and limited access to water, electricity, education and health. Desperateness also replaces trust, viewing protests as a complimentary tool to the ballot paper, especially when defending one's plight for basic human rights and improved socio-economic conditions. Counter measures in this operational definition denotes non-electoral participatory activities such as strikes, demonstrations, petition marches, and protests (Piven and Cloward, 1991), aiming to change socio-political outcomes.

Munck (2016:4) additionally assigns 'government decision making' and the 'social environment of politics' to QoD, affirming SSD's standing within South Africa's socio-political landscape. The increase of service delivery protests confirm that top-down leadership and municipal management are ineffective, primarily failing to accommodate their constituencies' needs and operationalising policies. Debt traps and aloof councilors (Booysen, 2007) furthermore diminishes political trust. Additionally, municipalities' 2014 track records are dire with only 7% functioning well; 30% reasonably functional; 32% almost dysfunctional and 31% in need of immediate intervention, experiencing total dysfunctionality (COGTA, 2014:6). Since service delivery regarding households' accessibility to water, sanitation and refuse removal only slightly improved, marginalisation remains, with the poorest of the poor ultimately seeking for alternative means to voice their discontent, i.e. protests (Booysen, 2007; Alexander, 2010). Booysen (2007:21) describes the politics of service delivery as both a 'top-down and bottom-up process', where the legislative frameworks ensure effective governance and budgets (top-down approach), whilst the bottom-up processes reflect peoples' struggles for service delivery.

However, informed consultation processes are mostly absent, negatively affecting ward committees and policy formulation (Piper and Deacon, 2009). Leaders also tend to impose their 'pre-designed, party-directed planning programs', cementing the notions that the 'party is

everything and the constituency is nothing, excluding election times when it is required to vote for a specific party' (Williams, 2006:198). Such behaviour threatens the core of democracy, reducing voters' input, making a mockery of public opinion and electoral mechanisms. When protests subsequently supplement political participation, ballot-and-brick tactics arise (Booysen, 2007), allowing both protests and electoral votes to simultaneously promote service delivery.

When citizens are evicted from their dwellings and provision of services are cut-off by local government, the vicious cycles of non-payment and revolt against local government institutions become frequent occurrences, reminiscent of Apartheid struggles. Subsequently, with leaders and institutions failing to protect citizens' constitutional rights, their pent-up anger (Booysen, 2007) result in protests; a last resort to defend their property, dignity and rights. Additionally, Burger (2005:487) states that when both government officials and community representatives are poorly skilled and educated, service delivery can be of 'inferior quality'. Moreover, when jobless growth remains a fixture the 'rebellion of the poor' (Alexander, 2010:25) increase, bolstering social self-defence once more.

Booysen (2007, as cited in Alexander, 2010:25) thus believes that grass-roots protests are 'against both the quality of service delivery and public representation of grass-roots' service delivery needs'. Additional reasons for protests are 'inadequate housing; evictions; unemployment; poor communication with communities; poor leadership; corruption; nepotism; maladministration and management' (Goebel, 2011; Akinboade et al., 2013:467-8). IDP's, the enablers of 'integrated development and management of a municipal area by a municipal Council' (Binns and Nel, 2002:923), remain weak regarding community-driven development initiatives. Booysen (2007) recalls that in 2004, more than 5000 legal protests were noted in Parliament, together with 881 classified as illegal protests. The first service delivery protests occurred in 2004, increasing from 35 in 2005 to 152 in 2017, with 2014 experiencing the highest number (191) of protests (Municipal IQ, 2017:1). These protests do not only send a strong message to local governments, but also indicates the embeddedness of SA's protesting landscape. Do elections still matter at all or are protests the new political discourse for the downtrodden?

.3 Are grievances, destruction and paradoxes embedded within SA?

Social identity theory allows self-association within a broader social group setting (Mead, 1913), with many experiencing politics through the lenses of social groups, aiming to increase their benefits and excluding others (Fowler and Kam, 2007). The social self subsequently becomes a reflection of the social identity, which refers 'to social categorisations of self and others, self-categories that define the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with members of certain social categories, in contrast to other social categories' (Turner et al., 1994:454). Although communities are rarely homogenous, experiencing limited trust and diverse needs (Emmet, 2000), political participation allows them to voice their self-expressed values (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). O'Neill (2010:128) defines political violence as the 'exercise of physical force to kill, injure or harm other human beings in pursuit of a political end'. The justification of such violent community protests are primarily based on citizens' desires to reduce oppression or unnecessary suffering (O'Neill, 2010). Given that inequality continues, violent protests in SA increase as well. When the ANC-led government repress these protests (again, resonating with the Apartheid struggles), societies' moral and political fibre become threatened.

Many studies have correlated social identity, relative deprivation and grievances with political protests theories (Dalton et al., 2010; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Ginges and Atran, 2009; Klandermans et al., 2001), specifically claiming that altruism resulted in the sacrificing of the

social self for the greater good. Subsequently, defending one's social self, as linked to basic human rights and social goods, becomes a necessity. However, weak democratic institutions increase disobedience and political distrust, effectively diminishing the altruistic nature of societies. 'Our lives are not important, only our vote' (Muller and Mkhize, 2013, 2016) aptly reflect communities' sentiments. Social self-defence (SSD) mechanisms thus found a resonance among the poor, demanding a voice amongst the plethora of ineffective policies and local government apparatus.

Klandermans et al. (2001:42) define grievances as the 'feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life such as housing, living standards, income, employment, health care, human rights, safety, and education'. Wilkes (2004:571) therefore believes that those most deprived have the most to gain (and least to lose) when trying to change the political and economic realities. Within South Africa's context, the poorer of the poor compares themselves both horizontally (comparing themselves with other municipal residents) and upwards with respect to the elite and middle class. Economic inequality among ethnically polarised groups strengthens violent propensities, especially when inter-group comparisons fuel intra-group identity (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). Grievance theorists consequently believe that democratic societies provide sufficient opportunities for grievances protests (Dalton et al., 2010; Wilkes, 2004), especially within decentralised political systems (Vráblíková, 2014).

Since protests and their subsequent media coverage attract leaders' attention and action, confidence in the efficacy of protests is affirmed; valuing protests as a tool in 'supplementing democracy and associated delivery' (Booysen, 2007:25). However, on many occasions, government responses to protests were brutal, 'criminalising' the poor and disregarding a better life for all (Goebel, 2011:372). Is such behaviour not contradicting SA's democratic values and service delivery mandates? Political connections and loyalties (or 'identity coalitions') replace community participation and substitute material interests with political groupings (Mogale, 2003:219). These affiliations are misrepresentative of communities and are threatening the notions of good governance and responsive democracy. Political parties' claim of being the true voice of their followers, become therefore highly questionable. Mhone and Edigheij (2003:220) refer to these propensities as 'a substitute for public opinion, a set of political well connected organisations whose only difference with governing elite is the fact that the former held office and the latter did not'. Despite renewed commitment to better governance, citizens remain cynical. 'Most community protests are peaceful. When protests get disruptive it often means that peaceful means, such as imbizos (gathering), local councils, and even the president's hotline and the public protector, have been exhausted' (Ngwane, cited in Grant, 2014:1). Police 'repression' of such protests is also not the solution since it 'merely intensifies people's bitterness and alienation' (Alexander, 2010, as cited in Grant, 2014:1), cementing a violent culture once again.

Are leaders becoming increasingly contradictory in their pledges and actions, blurring the public mandate with their own narcissistic propensities? How much does cronyism affect the poor? Are leaders permanently de-coupling themselves from their followers, favouring only some, at the cost of everyone else?

It is important to note that we live in a world filled with paradoxes and deceptions, an imperfect society at best. Many socially constructed versions of leadership (Nyberg & Sveningsson, 2014; Osborn, 2002) can challenge leaders, specifically when the followers are detached from their leaders and no longer share similar values (Grover, 2014; Gillath et al., 2010). Additionally, leadership theories assume faultless conditions and genuine intentions, discarding the imperfect and the darker side of leadership (Conger, 1990). Paradoxes abound with some of the earliest references seen in Machiavelli's The Prince, advising leaders to be 'sincere, religious and

merciful', but not necessarily discarding their darker side of being 'calculating, deceptive and ruthless' (Cronin, 2008:459). The dark side of leadership emerges when leadership styles are perceived as autocratic, unethical, and narcissistic (Chandler, 2009). Social scientists have neglected this 'dark side of leadership' by merely focusing on the narcissistic abuse of power (Conger, 1990; Sankowsky, 1995 as cited in Padilla, 2007:177), or blind fanaticism (Howell and Avolio, 1992, ibid); whereas others perceive destructive leadership as the absence of leadership (Einarsen et al., 2007).

Paradox theories thus attempt to eliminate the extant tensions, or at least find a way to accommodate such concurrent and competing demands (Smith & Lewis, 2011). A paradox simply implies the failure to comprehend 'recursive systems which operate in patterns of mutual restraint and coordination' (Hampden-Turner, 1981 as cited in Quinn, 1991:21). Smith and Lewis (2011) refers to the paradox perspective as 'contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time' (cited in Lavine, 2014:189). Within organisations such opposing, yet interrelated, elements are seen as 'collaboration-control, individual-collective, flexibility-efficiency, exploration-exploitation and profit-social responsibility' (Smith and Lewis, 2011:381). But what happens when publicly elected leaders are at the centre of such contradictions, de-coupling public intentions and values with false claims of authenticity and representation? What will the followers do? How do the leader-follower relationships adapt? Do these relationships change at all?

Politics is a dirty game and leaders seen as political opportunists, surviving on deception and exploiting their constituents' belief in the authenticity of their public leaders. The darker side of leadership becomes apparent when the leaders' personal needs become supreme, particularly when overriding their constituents' mandates and legal processes. Denialism and impression management occur more frequently, strengthening the leaders' power especially when restricting negative information, exaggerating their self-descriptions and creating the illusion of control by affirming selectively chosen information (Conger, 1990). Commitment is secured among the susceptible followers with those outside of the inner circle becoming more disillusioned and alienated. Padilla et al. (2007) refers to a toxic triangle that comprises of a destructive leader, susceptible followers and a conducive environment. Is such a toxic triangle applicable to SA? Are we indirectly mirroring such a scenario?

Finding a common definition of destructive leadership seems problematic referring at best to abusive supervision, bullies or derailed leaders. Einarsen et al., (2007:208) aptly defines destructive leadership as 'the systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organisation by undermining and/or sabotaging the organisation's goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates'. Padilla et al. (2007:179) furthermore argues that destructive leadership is 'seldom entirely destructive but does involve dominance and manipulation, with the leadership processes seen as a selfish orientation that compromises the quality of life for the constituents'.

When public leaders de-couple public intentions and values, their dyadic leader-follower relationships change. A follower is seen as 'a person who acknowledges the focal leader as a continuing source of guidance and inspiration, regardless of whether there is any formal reporting relationships' (Yukl, in Pierce and Newstrom, 2011:350), in other words 'those toward whom leadership is directed' (Northouse, 2013: 6). Leadership-support assumes mutually beneficial relationships for the in-group (regarded as an elite group of followers that have close ties with leaders, sharing commonalities like political, personal and/or clan affiliation; and expecting additional guarantees or benefits). Whereas the out-groups, seen as the outliers (Griffith, Connelly and Thiel, 2011), are not part of the elite in-group; are treated

in a transactional manner, with restricted access to resources and receiving minimum benefits (Northouse, 2013). Categorised as the opposition, they can face intimidation, bullying and marginalisation, exacerbating leadership discontent and alienation. However, many in-group members (political party members) also feel alienated from their leaders, especially when marginalisation and cronyism are systemically embedded by their leaders, negatively affecting the mass followers. Such [sub] in-groups can similarly revert to negative action (such as protests and violence) when their in-group benefits are minimal, allowing SSD to flourish.

Granted, today's public sector leaders are challenged by fiscal stress, globalisation and increased competition, reduced resources, unravelling of social consensus and lack of trust in political and administrative systems (Moynihan and Van Wart, 2013). But, contemporary leadership theory recognises leadership as a 'conjunction of leaders and followers' (Grover, 2014:49) and when South Africans (both the out-group and [sub] in-groups) continue to suffer, distrust towards their institutions of trust emerges, bolstering negative behavior and SSD. Can SSD serve as a behavioural tool to influence leader-follower relationships, and therefore, democracy? Will it make a difference?

.4 Followers as SSD agents: can they alter South Africa's future?

The responsiveness of our public leaders remains largely ineffective, despite exercising Integrative Development Planning (IDP) and executing participative governance. With political trust declining many revert to protest actions as the last resort, guaranteeing government attention and redress (Booysen, 2007; Askvik, 2010). A weakened civil society, coupled with a government prone to 'act, rather than lead' (Reddy, 2010:202), firmly entrenches a political society embracing protests as a complimentary participative mechanism. Local government becomes undemocratic and less effective when citizens' views are neglected; with cronies dominating due to their wealth and access to officials; when the illiterate and the poorest of the poor are not accommodated and/or acknowledged in decision-making processes; and with open dialogue being absent (Tsotetsi, 2015; Geldenhuys, 1996).

Leaders yield great power over resources and state mechanisms, pledging growth and a better society. Yet protests remain and the gap between the rich and the poor continue to increase. Research has shown that grassroots' confidence in leadership, churches, and governments are diminishing, with leaders perceived to be corrupt, paying more attention to their narcissistic selves than their followers' demands, needs and values. SSD shows that followers no longer choose to be passively adhering to deception and lip-service, but actively promoting a better society.

South Africa's public leaders have not fared well with respect to managing municipalities, citizens' expectations and service delivery. Government, treated as the overarching (public) organisation, is performing poorly and the public sector leadership is in disarray. The destructive leadership quadrangle comprises of contradictory yet interrelated dimensions of leaders, coupled with the socio-economic construct of paradoxical leadership. The toxic triangle of susceptible followers, a conducive environment and destructive leaders (Padilla, et al., 2007) therefore transform the followers into SSD agents. Leader-follower relationships are furthermore shaped by the four dimensions of (1) lawfulness, (2) values, (3) SSD agents and (4) leadership styles; as influenced by paradoxes such as elections-protests; representation-cronyism; collective values-narcissism; lawfulness-corruption. SSD agents ([sub] in/out group-followers) serve as a barometer that shapes relationships and re-introduce greater public commitments and effectiveness. When referring to Smith and Lewis' (2011) critical factors the following adaptations are implied:

1. Collaboration-control: The focus is on Leadership style (LS) that ranges from positive traits such as deliberative leadership and stewardship (LSS +) to the opposing narcissistic and destructive style (LSS-).
2. Individual-collective: Values are seen as collectively (V+) or individual (V-) based, with the latter treated as a negative form, de-coupled from open and democratic values or collectively based Ubuntu.
3. Flexibility-efficiency: The social construct of society informs and influences followers. Followers (in/out group) are seen as latent (SSD+) SSD agents, becoming only active when SSD is bolstered by the status quo of limited improvements experienced regarding economic growth, safety and health, hence becoming agents of SSD (SSD-).
4. Exploration-exploitation and profit-social responsibility: Leadership can obey the law (LWF+) or show signs of corruption (LWF-), ultimately displaying disrespect for the law and independence of government branches. Abuse of power is therefore seen as the opposing dimension of those obeying the law.

These paradoxical dimensions work against each other, seen as complementary yet interdependent forces that determines the state of affairs for a society, as linked to the leader and his/her followers. The below quadrangle acknowledges that there is no perfect leader or perfect balance between the four paradoxical dimensions. However, a positive leadership style such as stewardship and/or an authentic leader can provide a better balance among all the dimensions, creating a balanced quadrangle. Such a leader tend to respect laws and subscribe to collective values as well as refrain from negative behaviours like corruption and cronyism, stimulating economic growth and societal development. Whereas a narcissistic leader is scoring much lower on the positive scale (See Figure 2, left column). This leader focuses on self-glorification and enrichment, allowing favourable treatment of the in-group followers, at the expense of the rest. Subsequently respect for law and collective values, like Ubuntu, is limited, which negatively affects society and its socio-economic standing. Followers act as SSD agents, linked directly to their dyadic position with their leader; and whether their expectations are met, or not.



Figure 1 Destructive leadership and its paradoxical dimensions

In a nutshell, the more positive values are to the leader (for example, collective values), the more will the leader respect laws since collective values reject corruption that is based on narcissism and individual motives. Subsequently, the quadrangle will move towards the positive scale of the dimension. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical subjective construct of national leaders that 'ruled' SA.

Figure 2 furthermore explains how the paradoxical forces work against each other, with the leader-follower relationship seen as the nexus for both positive and negative forces. These forces are additionally prioritised, with numbers showing their importance when assessing leader-follower relationships. Research since 2004 has shown that South Africans treasure their collective values, expecting publically elected leaders to adhere to their constitutional mandates, promoting economic development and political equality. The respect for the law is seen as a non-negotiable with a responsive leader perceived as the most likely type of leader to deliberate with the grassroots, and to follow-through on promises.



Figure 2: The destructive leaders' quadrangle: critical factors, as seen from the opposing scales.

By applying the destructive leader quadrangle, followers' role within society can be enhanced by: (1) expanding their influential *potentialities* on their leaders' performance and behavior; (2) recognising that the imperfect *social-political contexts* for both in/out group can affect leader-follower dyadic; (3) and that followers' social self-defence propensities can act as a *citizen-behavioral tool*.

Mbeki (2005:1) posits that 'the strengthening of the democratic system should be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future'. It seems the tides are starting to turn in SA. Despite the fact that SA is a dominant one-party system, recent elections (2014's national elections and 2016's local elections) have shown that followers are re-emerging as a stronger influence on both local and national levels. Electoral support for the ANC has declined over the years, with an all-time low seen in the 2016 elections (Mail & Guardian, 2014). Many electoral strongholds have lost against opposition parties, primarily due to a revival of the followers' voice and determination to see change. Social Self-Defence at its best. Lip service

is now frowned upon, after all, to reduce decades of struggles and protests to an economically stagnating state, marred by inequality and corrupt leaders, are unacceptable. Granted, these followers that act as SSD agents, have used protests to attract action, but their democratic voice was also strengthened when casting their ballots.

What is worrying is that many eligible voters have refrained from voting; threatening democracy and cementing a protest nation. Equally worrying is the ongoing trends of the public leaders to capture the state and its mechanisms. By criminalising the poor (Goebel, 2011) and dismissing the voice of the protester, SA is indeed on a self-destructing course.

.5 Conclusion

SA seems to be at a crossroads. By failing to address QoD and sustainable service delivery, violent democracy will become a fixture. Alternatively, by acknowledging the effect of SSD on leader-follower relationships, substantive democracy can advance. But by discarding the voice of the people, rejecting the rule of law and denouncing the collective values of our society, more protests will place SA on a permanent violent discourse. The challenge is to secure more effective leadership, as aligned with the positive dimensions of the follower-behavioural tool. Can the followers defy the toxic triangles of society? Can their voices soar once more over the mountains, allowing democracy and freedoms to dictate our thoughts and actions? Will our public leaders rise to the new wave? Will the grassroots reclaim their place in society and history?

The road to freedom is indeed long and treacherous. But the voice of the followers, whether by bricks or by ballots, will allow SA to rise once more, spectacularly of course.

REFERENCES

Akinboade, O.A., Mokwena, M.P., Kinfack, E.C., (2013). Understanding Citizens' Participation in Service Delivery Protests in South Africa's Sedibeng District Municipality. *International Journal of Social Economics.* 40(5), 458-478.

Alexander, P., (2010). Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests – a Preliminary Analysis. *Review of African Political Economy*. 37(123), 25-40.

Askvik, S., (2010). The Dynamics of Political Trust in South Africa, 1995–2006. *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies.* 37(1), 25-44.

Bekink, B., (2006). *Principles of South African Local Government Law.* Durban: Butterworths.

Bekker, K., (1996). *Citizen Participation in Local Governmen*t. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Publishers.

Bernauer, J., Bühlmann, M., Vatter, A., Germann, M., (2016). Taking the Multidimensionality of Democracy Seriously: Institutional Patterns and The Quality Of Democracy. *European Political Science Review*. 8, 473-494.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index, (2003). *South Africa*. [Online] http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/27/business/south-africa-since-apartheid (Accessed on 31 July 2016).

Binns, T., Nel, E., (2002). Devolving Development: Integrated Development Planning and Developmental Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Regional Studies.* 36(8), 921-932.

Bond, P., (2012). South African People Power Since The Mid-1980s: Two Steps Forward, One back. *Third World Quarterly.* 33(2), 243–264.

Booysen, S., (2007). With the Ballot and The Brick: The Politics of Attaining Service Delivery. *Progress in Development Studies*. 7(1), 21–32.

Bühlmann, M., (2011). *The Quality of Democracy; Crises and Success stories*, IPSA-ECPR joint conference, Sao Paolo, February 16-19, 2011.

Burger, R., (2005). What We Have Learnt from Post-1994 Innovations in Pro-Poor Service Delivery in South Africa: a Case Study-Based Analysis. *Development Southern Africa*. 22(4), 483-500.

Cartwright, J., (2015). South Africa is a Failed State under Zuma the Illiterate Clansman. *Independent.* [Online] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/south-africa-is-a-failed-state-under-zuma-the-illiterate-clansman-a6777431.html (Accessed 26 July 2016).

Chandler, D.J., (2009). The Perfect Storm of Leaders' Unethical Behavior: A Conceptual Framework. *International Journal of Leadership Studies.* 5(1), 69-93.

COGTA, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, (2014), *Back to basics: Serving Our Communities Better*. [Online] http://www.cogta.gov.za/summit2014/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/plgsummit-backtobasics-discussion-document.pdf (accessed 4 March 2015).

Conger, J. A., (1990). The Dark Side of Leadership. *Organizational Dynamics.* 19(2), 44-55.

Cronin, T.E., (2008). All the World's a Stage…'Acting and the Art of Political Leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*. 19, 459-468.

Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., Weldon, S., (2010). The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*. 40, 51-73.

De Visser, J., (2005). *Developmental Local Government: a Case Study of South Africa*. Brussels: Intersentia Publishers.

Einarsen, S., Aasland, M.S., Skogstad, A., (2007). Destructive Leadership Behaviour: a Definition and Conceptual Model. *The Leadership Quarterly*. 18, 207-216.

Emmett, T., (2000), Beyond Community Participation? Alternative Routes to Civil Engagement and Development in South Africa. *Development Southern Africa*. 17(4), 501-518.

Fowler, J.H., Kam, C.D., (2007). Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation. *The Journal of Politics.* 69(3), 813-827.

Geldenhuys, A.J., (1996). Analysing Democracy for Local Government, in Bekker, K. (Editor), *Citizen Participation in Local Government.* (11–29). Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers.

Gillath, O., Sesko, A.K., Shaver, P.R., Chun, D.S., (2010). Attachment, Authenticity, and Honesty: Dispositional and Experimentally Induced Security Can Reduce Self- and Other-Deception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 98(5), 841– 855.

Ginges, J., Atran, S., (2009). What Motivates Participation in Violent Political Action. Selective Incentives or Parochial Altruism? Values, Empathy, and Fairness across Social Barriers. *Annual New York Academy of Science.* 1167, 115–123.

Goebel, A., (2011). Our Struggle is for the Full Loaf': Protests, Social Welfare and Gendered Citizenship in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 37(2), 369-388.

Grant, L., (2014). Research Shows Sharp Increase in Service Delivery Protests. *Mail & Guardian.* [Online] http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-protests (Accessed 16 April 2015).

Griffith, J.A., Connelly, S., Thiel, C.E., (2011). Leader Deception Influences on Leader-Member Exchange and Subordinate Organisational Commitment. *Journal of Leadership & Organisational Studies*. 18(4), 508-521.

Grover, S.L., (2014). Moral Identity as a Lens for Interpreting Honesty of Indirect Leaders. *Journal of Change Management*. 14(1), 48-65.

Kangarlou, T., (2013). South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust? *CNN Marketplace Africa*. [Online] http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/27/business/southafricasinceapartheid/ (Accessed 31 July 2016).

Klandermans, B., Roefs, M., Olivier, J., (2001). Grievance Formation in a Country in Transition: South Africa, 1994-1998. *Social Psychology Quarterly*. 64(1), 41-54.

Koelble, T.A., LiPuma, E., (2010). Institutional Obstacles to Service Delivery in South Africa. *Social Dynamics: A journal of African Studies*. 36(3), 565-589.

Lavine, M., (2014). Paradoxical Leadership and the Competing Values Framework. *The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science.* 50(2), 189-205.

Lipton, M., (2014). Is South Africa's Constitutional Democracy Being Consolidated or Eroded? *South African Journal of International Affairs.* 21(1), 1-26.

Mail & Guardian, (2014). Elections 2014: Voter turnout lower than in 2009. Mail & Guardian. [Online] https://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-09-voter-turnout-lower-than-in-2009. (Accessed on 15 July 2017).

Mandela, N., (1994). *Long Walk to Freedom.* New York: Macdonald Purnell.

Mbeki, T., (2005). The Challenge of Equitable Development – What is the Progressive Agenda? *Progressive Politics*. 4(2), 6-16.

Mead, G.H., (1913). The Social Self. *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*. 10(14), 374-380.

Merkel, W., Bochsler, D., Bousbah, K., Bühlmann, M., Giebler, H., Hänni, M., Heyne, L., Müller, L., Ruth, S., Wessels, B., (2016). *Democracy Barometer: Codebook*. Version 5. Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie.

Mhone, G., Edigheji, O., (Eds.). (2003). *Governance in the New South Africa: the Challenges of Globalization.* Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Mkhize, L.M., (2013). Assessing Citizens' Perceptions on the Interrelationship between Poor Service Delivery and Political Instability in South Africa: 2000-2010. *Unpublished dissertation.* University of the Free State.

Mogale, T., (2003). Developmental Local Government and Decentralised Service Delivery in the Democratic South Africa. In Mhone, G. and Edigheiji, O. (Eds.) *Governance in the*

New South Africa: the Challenges of Globalization (215-244). Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Moody's, (2017). *Moody's downgrades South Africa's rating to Baa3 and assigns negative outlook*. [Online] https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-South-Africas-rating-to-Baa3-and-assigns-negative--PR_367769 (Accessed August 2017).

Moynihan, D.P., Van Wart, M., (2013). Lessons from Leadership Theory and the Contemporary Challenge of Leaders. *Public Administration Review*. 73(4), 553-565.

Muller, M., (2009). Good Governance and Ubuntu as Prerequisites for Poverty Alleviation in South Africa: A Case Study of Uthungulu District Municipality, Rural Northern Natal. *Indilinga, African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*. 7(2), 98-223.

Muller, M., Mkhize, M., (2013). Poverty Alleviation through Social Self-Defence: a New Political Discourse? *2ND International Conference on Emerging Research Paradigms in Business and Social Sciences*, 26–28 November 2013, Dubai, UAE.

Muller, M. And Mkhize, M.L., (2016). Social self-Defence: Where Grievances, Opportunities and Protests Collide. *World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development.* 12(4), 433-456.

Munck, G.L., (2016). What is Democracy? A Reconceptualization of the Quality of Democracy. *Democratization.* 23(1), 1-26.

Municipal IQ., (2017). 2017 service delivery protests in a high range, but downward trend from May peak. *Municipal IQ.* [Online] www.municipalIQ.co.za (Accessed 28 October 2017).

Murshed, S.M., Tadjoeddin, M.Z., (2009). Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict. *Journal of International Development*. 21(1), 87-111.

Ngwane, T., (2014), 'Protest Nation': What's Driving the Demonstrations on the Streets of South Africa? *The South African Civil Society Information Service.* [Online] http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1930 (Accessed 27 February 2014).

Northouse, P.G., (2013). *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 6th Ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Nyberg, S., Sveningsson, S., (2014). Paradoxes of Authentic Leadership: Leader Identity Struggles. *Leadership.* 10(4), 437–455.

O'Neill, S., (2010). Struggles against injustice: contemporary critical theory and political violence. *Journal of Global Ethics*. 6(2), 127-139.

Oosthuizen, M., Cassim, A., (2014). The State of Youth Unemployment in South Africa. *Brookings* [Online] http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/08/15-youthunemployment-south-africa-oosthuizen#ftn2 (Accessed 20 July 2015).

Osborn, R.N., Hunt, J.G., Jauch, L.R., (2002). Toward a Contextual Theory of Leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly.*13, 797–837.

Padilla, A., Hogan, R., and Kaiser, R.B., (2007). The toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments. *The Leadership Quarterly*. 18,176-194.

Paret, M., (2015). Violence and Democracy in South Africa's Community Protests. *Review of African Political Economy*. 42(143), 107-123.

Pierce, J.L., Newstrom, J.W., (2011). *Leaders and the leadership process.* 6th Edition. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.

Piper, L., Deacon, R., (2009). Too Dependent to Participate: Ward Committees and Local Democratisation in South Africa. *Local Government Studies.* 35(4), 415-433.

Piven, F.F., Cloward, R.A., (1991). Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society.* 4(4), 435-458.

Quinn, R.E., (1991). *Beyond rational management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Reddy, T., (2010). ANC Decline, Social Mobilization and Political Society: Understanding South Africa's Evolving Political Culture. *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*. 37(2-3), 185-206.

Republic of South Africa (1998a) *The White Paper on Local Government*, Vol.393, No. 18739, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (1998b) *Municipal Structures Act*, 117 of 1998, Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (2000) *Local Government Municipal Systems*, Act 32 of 2000. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Rogerson, C.M., (2006). Pro-poor local Economic Development in South Africa: The Role of Pro-Poor Tourism. *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*. 11(1), 37–60.

Roskin, M.G., (2001). *Hard Road to Democracy: Four Developing Nations*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishers.

Schneider, G.E., (2003). Neoliberalism and Economic Justice in South Africa: Revisiting the Debate on Economic Apartheid. *Review of Social Economy*. 61(1), 23-50.

Smith, W. K., Lewis, M.W., (2011). Toward A Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing. *The Academy of Management Review*. 36(2), 381-403.

Statistics South Africa, (Stats SA), (2017a). SA GDP in the first quarter of 2017 contracted by 0,7%. *Stats SA* [Online] http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10005 (Accessed 15 August 2017).

Statistics South Africa, (Stats SA), (2017b). A Poverty on the rise in South Africa. *Stats SA* [Online] http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334 (Accessed 15 August 2017).

Tsotetsi, D., (2015). Thembelihle is Burning. *SABC News* [Online] http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/8e7e430047753c238267e642d945d4b0/Thembelihleundefinedisundefinedburning: undefinedTCC-20152702 (Accessed 20 July 2015).

Turner, J.C., Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., McGarty, C., (1994). Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 20(5), 454-463.

Von Holdt, K., (2013). South Africa: the Transition to Violent Democracy. *Review of African Political Economy*. 40(138), 589-604.

Von Holdt, K., (2014). On Violent Democracy. *The Sociological Review*. 62(S2), 129–151.

Vráblíková, K., (2014). How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures and Non-electoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies.* 47(2), 203-229.

Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., (2008). The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization. *Journal of Democracy*. 19(1), 126-140.

Wilkes, R., (2004). First Nation Politics: Deprivation, Resources, and Participation in Collective Action. *Sociological Inquiry*. 74(4), 570–589.

Williams, J.J., (2006). Community Participation: Lessons from Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Policy Studies*. 27(3), 97-217.

Yukl, G., (2013). *Leadership in organisations.* 8th Edition. Boston: Pearson.

Appendix 17 Connecting the thesis' objectives with discussion sections

AFFIRMATION	DISCUSSION
MAIN AIM: To ascertain whether citizens can be re-positioned within the LFR.	
The creation of my *follower relationship model* and *follower matrix* affirm that followers' positionality within LFR are both fluid and important.	• Figures 3.2; 3.4 and 3.5
Objective 1: Determines the inter-relationship that exists between the contexts, followers and leader-follower behaviours.	
State of the nation, governance and leader-follower dyad are the primary pathways that inform followers.	• Figures 2.1 and 2.4 • Insight boxes 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.7, 2.8, 2.11-2.14
Values, lawfulness, social self-defence agents and leadership are additional paradoxical factors that shape followers' assessments of their leadership that ultimately determine their LFRs.	• Figure 3.2 • Tables 2.2, 2.3, 3.2 • Insight boxes 1.5, 2.1-2.3, 2.6, 2.9, 2.10, 2.13-2.18, 3.1, 3.3-3.5
My FRM shows the interrelationship between factors, determinants, and attributes that shape followers' grouping and outcomes.	• Figure 3.4 • Tables 3.2 and 3.3 • Insight box 1.1
The quadrangles visualise the importance and lacing of these values when assessing leaders, as connected to followers' own attributes, as informed by the determinants and causal underbelly.	• Figures 3.6 and 3.7 • Tables 3.5 and 3.6 • Insight boxes 3.3-3.5
The causal underbelly confirms that patronage, defiance and prejudice influence LFRs. The FRM indicates the subsequent relationships and consequences that arise.	• Figures 2.7, 2.8, 3.4 • Insight box 2.1
Objective 2: Ascertains the relevance of the 'in-betweeners' (in-OUT-group), as informed by pseudo-engagement and imperfect leader-follower relationships.	
They are typically large in numbers, can shape outcomes and relationships and when transforming into SSD agents, they are a destructive yet effective force to reckon with. Both the FRM and follower matrix show the 'in-betweeners' relevance.	• Figures 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 • Table 3.3 • Insight boxes 1.4, 2.13 and 2.14
Imperfectness abound, creating deceptive (or dark) leaders and deviant followers. Our imperfect socio-economic conditions and political-historical environments furthermore exacerbate dark leadership and follower behaviours.	• Figures 2.5, 2.6,3.3-3.8 • Tables 3.2-3.4 and 3.6 • Insight boxes 1.5, 2.2-2.5, 2.8-2.13, 2.16
Objective 5: Identifies the correlations between public sphere and workplace environments.	
Reference to workplace contexts occurred throughout since our environments affect our behaviours and relationships.	• Figure 3.8 • Table 3.7 • Insight boxes 1.3, 1.4, 2.3-2.5, 2.9-2.10, 2.14-2.15, 3.3-3.5