Political institutions and financial cooperative development

Khafagy, Amr (2017) Political institutions and financial cooperative development. Journal of Institutional Economics, 13 (2). pp. 467-498. ISSN 1744-1374

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Abstract

This paper analyses the influence of political institutions on the development of financial cooperatives. It proposes a political economy theory where autocratic regimes deliberately oppose the development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector to maintain their political influence, and prevent the formation of strong pressure groups that can threaten the current political status quo and reduce the governing elites’ economic benefits from underdeveloped and exclusive financial sector. Using panel data from 65 developing countries from 1995–2014, the results show that democracy, political rights and civil liberties promote financial cooperative development. These results are robust in controlling for endogeneity as well as other economic and institutional factors.

Item Type: Article
Article Type: Article
Additional Information: This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of Institutional Economics http://doi.org/10.1017/S174413741600031X. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Millennium Economics Ltd 2016.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Financial cooperatives, autocratic regimes, cooperative development, political economic theory
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JC Political theory
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions: Schools and Research Institutes > Countryside and Community Research Institute
Research Priority Areas: Environmental Dynamics & Governance
Depositing User: Imogen Young
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2019 14:53
Last Modified: 07 May 2019 14:02
URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/6616

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