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Introduction

The postsecular has been conceptualized, both in general terms and also in relation to particular countries and religious groups, as a historical shift in which religion is returning from the margins and the shadows to the centre ground of public life (Habermas 2008). From the perspective of religious groups, minorities in particular, narratives of the return of religion are problematic. We develop this argument with reference to British Muslims of Pakistani heritage, and Polish Muslims with mixed heritage. Though the UK and Poland differ religiously, politically and social-economically, both countries have experienced a decline in individual adherence to the majority Christian faith. Consequently, both fit within Jürgen Habermas’s conception of the postsecular as the historical successor of secularism:

A “post-secular” society must at some point have been in a “secular” state. The controversial term can therefore only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed in the post-War period.

(Habermas 2008: 1)

For Habermas, the postsecular emerges from and signals a change in consciousness whereby the ‘hushed up voice of religion’ is invited back into the public sphere (Cloke and Beaumont 2013: 44). The precondition for this postsecularity is conformity, on the part of the religious, to the
norms of ‘secular discourse’ (Habermas 2008:1). From this perspective, religion is regarded as a moral supplement to secular politics (Asad 2003). The postsecular follows—but fits into the space vacated by—secularism, just as secularism is said to have occupied the space once vacated by religion.

One reason why this understanding of the postsecular is problematic is its exclusivity. Cloke and Beaumont (2013) welcome the inclusion of progressive elements of religion into the public sphere. This claim, though important in itself, raises questions about how we might regard the contributions of religious individuals and groups who identify or do not identify as progressive, and who may identify or be identified as conservative. Distinctions between progressive and regressive religiosity risk ignoring the contributions of conservative religious groups (Fabian and Korolczuk 2017) and fail to capture the messy and complex ways in which religion influences the everyday (Mahmood 2005).

We challenge the ‘historical shift’ vision of postsecularism, not by advancing another grand history, but rather through a series of smaller stories, which highlight ways in which religious minorities have experienced the postsecular. This approach brings a postcolonial sensibility—one that means listening to subaltern groups rather than making assumptions about them or entertaining dominant representations of them (Spivak 1988)—to understandings of postsecularism. For our purposes, we ‘listen’ to Polish and British Pakistani Muslims in two ways: firstly by drawing upon published research by others, which offers insights into the ways in which religious experience and identification have been configured at different points in time, with particular reference to the past few decades; secondly, through empirical research of our own. The case study of Muslims in Poland draws upon interviews, conducted by Kasia Narkowicz in 2011–2012, which examined contemporary conflicts around religion and
secularism in that country. The second case study touches upon interviews with British Muslims of Pakistani heritage, which was conducted as part of a larger project led by Richard Phillips, on relationship practices and choices in a diverse society. All the participants’ names have been anonymized.

Listening to Polish and British Pakistani Muslims, we find that their religion never went away, not, at least, within the historical frame of these case studies, which include periods in which religion was seen to have been banished to the private sphere (in Communist Poland) or overshadowed by national and ethnic identities (in the case of first-generation British Pakistanis). Polish Muslims and Catholics did not simply wait for a non-secular present; they positioned themselves against secularism. Even when it was apparently subsumed within the private sphere by mainstream secularism and official atheism, and when it seemed to play second fiddle to other forms of identification including ethnicity and race, Islam has been present in the day-to-day lives of Polish and British Pakistani Muslims and has not only been limited to the private sphere. Though these groups have not always been seen as religious minorities, from the perspective of the mainstream, and though they have not always primarily emphasized the religious in their self-identification, it would be wrong to suggest that their religion was forgotten or unimportant, whether privately or publicly (a problematic dualism for many). Rather than rediscovering religion, these groups have always been religious—have always been Muslims—and have articulated this differently, through intersectional identities in which religion, culture, ethnicity, and race are all important, but are advanced differently and strategically in different contexts. These two case studies therefore contest conceptions of postsecularism as after secularism, presenting it instead as against secularism. These conceptions are encapsulated in some prominent representations of British Muslims of Pakistani heritage and Polish Muslims of mixed
heritage, representations that do not always accord with the ways in which members of these communities represent themselves, doing so for strategic reasons, rather than simply to describe themselves.

Practising Muslims in Poland

The chronological understanding of postsecularism—as after secularism—appears to closely match the experience of countries that were until recently officially secular. Secularism has been abandoned or defeated in different places for different reasons, but a large swathe of European countries has similar experiences, brought about by the demise of Communism and the fall of the Soviet Union. Postsecularism has been most pronounced where, as in Poland, a pronounced religious culture preceded Communism and was repressed, but not eradicated, by the atheism of that period. In such settings, religion was waiting in the wings, occasionally surfacing in public life, and it has resumed its central place in society. Without wishing to deny that there are fewer obstacles to the public expression of religion today than there were before 1989, we will contest the assumption that religion was effectively banished to the private sphere under the Communist system.

Poland was not only non-secular then: it was actively postsecular in the twofold sense that some religious people were contesting the official suppression of religion by the ruling Communist Party and others were practising their faith in ways and spaces that transcended the private sphere. First, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the mobilisation of the Solidarity pro-democracy movement. Danuta Wałęsa, the wife of opposition leader, and later President Lech Wałęsa, remembered Sunday mass as a chance to meet, organize, and strategize with fellow opposition movement colleagues in a safe space (Wałęsa 2011). The interventions of religion in the public sphere during key historical moments was similarly evident in the USA where black
churches provided spaces for the mobilisation of the civil rights movement (Calhoun et al 2011). The Polish Church was also active in formal process. It initiated dialogue with the Communist leadership when the regime realized it could no longer ignore dissent (Romanowski 2012). The role of the church has grown and changed since 1989; it is now an important ally of the populist right-wing government, with which it is pursuing the long-held project of Catholic nation-building (Jaskulowski et al 2018), and since 1989, intervening on issues such as abortion (Fuszara 1993, Guerra 2016) and migration (Narkowicz 2018). And yet, though Poland is now overtly non-secular, the part played by the Church in the pro-democracy movement prior to the fall of Communism reminds us that the nation was not entirely secular, even during that time. Even then, the admittance or imposition of religious voices in the political public sphere, where they articulated ideas of justice, rights, and morality as part of rational deliberation, was consistent with the postsecular, as Habermas (2008) defines the term.

Second, also under Communism, religious minorities were practising their faith in ways and spaces that transcended the private sphere. Muslims, who had been part of the religious Polish landscape since the tenth century when Tatars established a presence in what was then the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Antonowicz-Bauer 1984: 346; Pedziwiatr 2011), grew in number in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the ‘closed borders’ and isolation from much of the world during the Communist years, a significant Muslim migration took place during Communism. Arab students from ‘befriended’ countries such as Palestine, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq arrived to study at Polish universities (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr 2017).

Muslims in Communist Poland might be assumed to have confined their religious expression to the private sphere. But this narrative is challenged by stories that are told by Muslims in Poland about their religious identification and expression at this time which signal a growth and
diversification in the Muslim community. Despite a homogenous conception of the Polish nation-state that was exclusive of minorities already during Communism (Zaremba 2001), Muslims were able to actively practice their faith. Upon arrival, during the 1970s, the Muslim students quickly started organizing places of worship and established a vibrant religious community, separate from the Tatar Muslim community. Muslim prayer halls were established in various locations; at universities, in people’s homes, and in rented accommodation (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr 2017). An imam of a Warsaw mosque, interviewed by Kasia in 2011, recalls how he and his fellow Muslim students used the university space to organize and meet their religious needs:

The brothers arranged to have a room on the top floor of the student halls. It was not a room for other students but like an attic, and the director of the student hall agreed for that room to be a prayer space… And it was similar in other cities like Lublin, in Poznań, in Katowice, in Wrocław... it started with someone offering up their room for Friday prayers or the directors of those student halls designated a room in the building for the Muslim students to pray in.

… And already then Muslims started thinking that they wanted to have mosques and the activity started going in this direction.

As the imam recalled, despite an ostensibly anti-religious landscape in Poland during Communism, the arrival of the Arab students during that time contributed to a further diversification of non-secular spaces within secular institutions such as the university. With time, many smaller prayer halls were established, and some key Muslim centres were formed in the cities of Warsaw, Łódź, Wrocław, Katowice, Kraków, Poznań, Lublin, and Białystok.

In an interview reported in the Polish media, a Muslim convert argued that ‘it is not possible for a Muslim to lead a completely secular life’ (Gasior 2014:1). Some Muslim women, interviewed
by Kasia, made a similar point, refusing secularist pressure to leave their religions at the door step before entering the public sphere. Oliwia put it this way:

> What frightens non-Muslims, or what they can’t understand, is that religion in a Western sense is something private, like you go to your temple, you have something at home, you will pray when you feel like it, and so on. Islam is not like that, of course it depends on how every person understands it, but really… many people accuse Islam of not being a religion but an ideology and true, it is. I always say ‘yes you are right’!

She explained further that being a Muslim ‘relates to all things in society, what to do, what to eat, what to wear and so on’. From this perspective, secularism is not only not desirable, it is impossible. This impossibility challenges the idea of a rational, religiously neutral public sphere (Calhoun et al. 2011) and of a Habermasian postsecular space of translation, in which religion is welcome but on a limited, conditional basis, particularly one that favours unthreatening forms of Islam and those that are seen by others as ‘progressive’ and/or ‘moderate’. Here, as elsewhere in Europe, it is argued that in order to be accepted into public space, Muslims are required to ‘translate’ themselves, diluting their religious presence (Asad 2003: 159, 169).

Expression of both Catholicism and Islam in Polish public life runs from the officially secular Communist era to the overtly non-secular present. These and other religions have in some cases been mutually supportive. Some Polish Muslims say that they find it easier to be overtly religious in a society in which religion is accepted and commonplace. Oliwia commented that ‘Poland is a religious country’ and as such ‘it is still easier for us to keep our faith and culture here; as Muslims’. A similar point was made in an interview with a man called Marek, also interviewed in 2011, who told Kasia that ‘[Catholics] understand that religious convictions might entail practices that might seem weird to some people. I don’t know, Catholics in Poland still
have got an understanding for fasting, right?’ In these interviews, Polish Muslims felt that they did not need to translate themselves in order to be understood.

The continued presence of religion in Polish public life, not only after the fall of Communism but also before, questions simple historical claims that might be made about the secular past and the postsecular present. Catholics and Muslims, in their different ways, have not simply waited for a non-secular present, but they have consistently positioned themselves against secularism.

The next section, focussing upon another European Muslim minority, interrogates the ostensibly postsecular present from another angle. It contests simplistic but commonplace narratives about the rise of religiosity and the concomitant eclipse of ethnic and national identification among Muslims in Britain.

**Intersectional identities: Pakistani and Muslim**

Histories of British Pakistani Muslims in the UK typically portray a historical shift from Pakistani and Bangladeshi to Muslim identities. This narrative, describing a recent religious turn, is in keeping with wider histories of race and difference which trace a shift from nationality to race to religion, as primary means through which minorities are identified both in mainstream discourse such as government policies on multiculturalism, and also in claims about the ways in which minorities self-identify. Yet, this periodization is complicated, if not contradicted, by evidence of how members of this group identify and position themselves.

In his Foreword to Tariq Modood’s *Multicultural Politics*, Craig Calhoun observes that Britons with Pakistani heritage, many of whom migrated in the postwar period or descend from migrant communities established then, were ‘initially mostly termed “Pakistanis” (or more abusively, “Pakis”’), but have been ‘recategorized first as Asians and then as Muslims’ (Calhoun in Modood, 2005: x). Simultaneously, many of those who were previously categorized as
Pakistanis have come to distance themselves from Pakistan and disavow Pakistani identities, both of which have assumed ‘a burdensome set of undertones in the imaginary of both British Pakistanis and Britons’ alike’, according to Marta Bolognani (2014: 114). The move away from this (and other) national or ethnic identities and categories has taken place alongside another shift, in this case away from a singular, inclusive, strategically essentialist ‘black’ identity politics (Alexander 2000: 231). In the place of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and some other national and ethnic identities, and in place or instead of ‘black’ or other racial identities, many people have either positioned themselves or been positioned as Muslims (Modood 1992); or so it is said. This thumbnail sketch of communities and identities is simplistic, and it is at the very least complicated and sometimes contradicted outright by the ways in which members of minority groups speak and say they think about themselves. The shifts in how this minority are variously categorized by others and in how they tend to see or position themselves, which are not always the same thing and frequently diverge, should not be misunderstood as simply a shift in how people identify: moving away from culture and/or race and then to religion. First, the emergent Islamic identification does not banish the racial and political dimensions of the terms it has displaced. Rather, contemporary Islam encompasses and supersedes constructions of race. ‘Modood shows clearly that race—and racism—remained inextricably intertwined in the way British Muslims were’ and arguably still are ‘understood’ (Calhoun in Modood 2005: x). Since Islam has come to encompass political and racial dimensions, and is always about more than religion, the increasing propensity of individuals to identify or be identified with Islam should not be seen as a narrowly religious turn, nor as the exchange of one identity for another. It can be understood as a ‘positioning’ rather than ‘essence’ (Hall 1990: 226; quoted by Alexander 2000: 231).
It would be wrong to see the identities left behind by the shift towards Islam as irreligious or secular in the sense that religion would have been confined to the private sphere. Among those who identified primarily as Pakistani and those who still do, nationality was and still is widely assumed to define religion. According to Haleh Afshar, those who identify or identified as Pakistani ‘automatically assumed that this implied that they were Muslims’ (Afshar et al. 2006: 172; see also Modood et al 1997; Samad 1998). This assumption is reasonable given that most Pakistanis in the UK are indeed Muslims. Among the 625,000 or so Britons with Pakistani heritage who were living in England at the time of the 2001 Census, 92% were Muslims (Change Institute 2009: 30).

The shift from primarily Pakistani to Islamic identification has not really been a religious turn because those describing themselves in these shifting terms have not switched from national to religious identities, but from national identities in which religious identification was implicit, to religious identities in which nationality and/or race are implicit, important, and politicized. This shift is multifaceted, as are its drivers. Important, among these, are the possibilities that minorities find in focussing upon the things they hold in common (including faith) rather than those that have kept them apart (such as national lines between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). These commonalities bring the promise of solidarity in relation to external pressures. Meanwhile, identification with religion rather than culture can be empowering to particular members of these communities in their relationships with each other. Young British men and women with Pakistani heritage are among those who have found agency in speaking as Muslims. Doing so, they are able to make and justify life choices, some of which go against cultural traditions and family expectations (Lewis 2007; Mondal 2008).
Before focussing upon contemporary articulations of faith, it is important to acknowledge that the sometimes implicit Islam of earlier generations of British Pakistani Muslims was not just a private matter. Then, as now, their faith found public expression, for example, in the construction and attendance of mosques, and the production, sale, and consumption of halal food. First- and second-generation British Pakistanis did not conceal their faith; ‘they automatically assumed that [their country of origin] implied that they were Muslims’ (Modood et al. 1997; Afshar et al. 2006: 172).

Rather than a narrowly religious turn, the shift from Pakistani to Islamic identification has been a vehicle for some members of overlapping ethnic, racial, and religious communities, particularly younger women, to reject certain practices and relations and embrace others. Afshar et al. (2006: 171) generalise that ‘nationality is a poor identifier for women’ and that ‘the historical construction of nationhood and nationalism is masculine in terms of its character and demands’. It is ‘not surprising’, they conclude, that while ‘the primary identification of many older-generation British Pakistanis is with country … rather than religion’ (ibid.: 171), this is rejected by ‘second-generation migrant women’ (ibid.: 172). This is not to say that increasingly religiosity is simply a strategic move, motivated by the desire of young women to gain greater control over their lives, though there may be some element of that. In any case, the shift towards greater religious identification reflects changes in self-presentation, with shifting emphases rather than necessarily fundamental shifts in subjectivity.

These observations about the shifts in emphasis from national to religious identification are borne out in some of our own research, which includes interviews with young women of Pakistani heritage. Some of these young women distanced themselves from Pakistan and from Pakistani identities, identifying instead with Islam and as Muslims. Saamiya, who is 18 and lives
in Glasgow, explained that she identified primarily as a British Muslim. This, she explained, is ‘like not being the same as like a Pakistani Muslim where the girls would kind of stay home and do as they are told’. Pnina Werbner explains the particular attraction of Islam for these young women:

The girls argue that Islam accords equality to men and women, that it requires young people’s consent to a marriage and allows them to choose their own partner, and even to associate with their fiancés before marriage. Islam also opens up a much wider marriage market for young people.

(Werbner 2007:161)

Saamiya, like some others we spoke to as part of this research, acknowledged that Muslims sometimes fall short of ideals such as these, in how they live their lives, and in the ways in which their families, communities, and nations put their religion into practice. Their shift from Pakistani to Islamic (or British Islamic) identities was not a shift from national to religious identity, but from one way of being religious to another, where the latter is conceived as deeper and more committed, and also more assertive and liberated. Moving away from Pakistani identification, another young woman explained to us that she was able to reject some cultural practices that are identified as Pakistani, doing so in favour of others, which may be presented as Islamic and therefore harder for relatives to criticize. Laila, who is 30 and single, distanced herself from Pakistan, explaining that those born in Pakistan are told ‘this is how you get married’; they ‘weren’t allowed to go out dating’. Laila identified instead as British Asian; others present primarily as Muslims; in each case, they find scope to be more assertive about how they approach relationships and marriage, and other aspects of their lives.
These findings resonate with those of other researchers, who have found that increased religious identification can be empowering for women, particularly in relation to their ability to determine and perhaps to reject relationships and marriages. Afshar illustrates this point in relation to ‘mohajabehs’: women who have adopted strong forms of Islam. She argues that:

The assertive positions and ideas of the *mohajabehs* have, in practice, made them undesirable brides for the kinship network. They know too much about their rights and have too little respect for the ‘traditions’. Often these women are more learned in terms of *Koranic* teaching than their parents. It has become difficult to marry them off in arranged marriages and even more difficult to argue with them, since their arguments are always presented in terms of ‘the true Islam’. An interviewee for the Muslim diaspora research, an art student who wears hijab, told Franks, ‘The more Islamic I become, the less likely it is that I will be pushed into an unwanted marriage’. This is because her parents are unable to criticize her if she is following *Koranic* teaching. Young women often use their textual understanding of Islam to contest the traditions and restrictions imposed on them by their parents….


Here, Afshar (2006: 181) argues, ‘faith supersedes nationality’, but nationality persists, along with regional and kinship identity and allegiance. ‘Muslim women who talked to’ Haleh Afshar ‘generally accepted cultural, ethnic and national identities that defined them in different ways in different circumstances’ (Afshar et al. 2006: 176; drawing upon Afshar 1989; Vertovec 1998). In this context, faith is never reduced to a singular identity, and it is always more than abstract religiosity; for some, it is a form of self-assertion and empowerment. This assertiveness and self-possession comes across in many of the interviews we conducted with young British Pakistani Muslims. Ifrah, who has transitioned from wearing the hijab to the abaya, stresses the importance
of her faith, and the fact that she has not simply gone along with peers or family, but has actively
chosen how to express it in her clothing. She told us: ‘I am actually like properly into the religion
rather than, I am just wearing the scarf because everyone else wears it, because my parents told
me to wear it’ (Ifrah, 21, Female).
Crucially, though they relate primarily to personal relationships, and ultimately to marriage and
family, these expressions of religious identity are not simply private, as would be the case in an
totally secular context; they also reach into areas of public life. To the feminist mantra that ‘the
personal is political’, we must add another: ‘the religious is public’. Indeed, many of those whom
we interviewed as part of this project stressed that their religion could not be compartmentalized;
it informs and is expressed in all areas of their lives. As one 29-year-old woman put it, ‘I’m
Muslim and that kind of influences my morals and my decisions and the way I interact with
people’ (Janan). A similar point was made, more specifically and concretely, by Noor, a 27-year-
old woman, who also lives in Yorkshire. She contested the commonplace assumption that to be
modern or liberal—to participate in mainstream culture and politics—one must leave religion at
the door, particularly if one is a Muslim:

I view myself as someone liberal, but that is in my cultural attitudes. It might be that you
shouldn’t enforce things on other people, but as a Muslim I would view myself as quite kind
of, I wouldn’t say strict because it is another word I don’t like, but I don’t think that there is
anything that I am not doing that kind of makes me…liberal or modern, but at the same time
I don’t think I am necessarily backwards. So I just think the need or the suggestion people to
clarify what camp they are born into, is more damaging than useful.
Noor refused to separate her liberal convictions and Islamic faith, and as a result she brought a new dimension to the former, challenging widespread assumption that liberalism and Islam are incompatible, and at odds with each other (Massad 2015; Phillips 2016).

The tendency for women with similar backgrounds to identify in different ways—as British Asians, Asians, British Muslims, Muslims, and so on—underlines the complexity of histories of difference, and warns against a periodization that might suggest one form of identification has been supplanted by another, or even the more modest claim that one has assumed greater significance over time. In other words, this cautions against understanding the postsecular as after secularism—the period in which religion has resurfaced and been restored to prominence—and argues instead for an understanding of the postsecular as religious expression that is important not only in its own right, but also as a politics, not just after but actively against something: in this case, against the constraints of nationalism and national identification, and for the rights and freedoms that may come with the reduction of such constraints.

**Conclusion**

Contesting a simply linear, chronologically historical conception of postsecularism, in which this term is understood as *after secularism*, we have advanced an understanding of the postsecular as *against secularism*.

This distinction has counterparts in postcolonial theory, where the postcolonial has variously been understood as after *and against* colonialism. As in postcolonial criticism, this understanding of the post as more than chronology is important because it politicizes the term it qualifies, in this case postsecularism, and it recognizes the agency of those who identify with and mobilize it and, with it, their identification as religious. It also recognizes that some groups have been entirely excluded from the concept of the postsecular (see Habermas 2008) or included on the
condition that they translate themselves into a liberal public sphere (see Cloke 2012). This is particularly relevant for Muslim minorities, who have been constructed as ‘external to the essence of Europe’ (Asad 2003: 165). While the Habermasian (2006) concept of postsecularism offers a place for religion in the public sphere, where its role was previously limited, the motivation still is to enrich the secular society with ‘key resources for the creation of meaning and identity’ (Habermas 2006: 10).

For the Muslim minorities in two national contexts, post-Communist Poland and post-colonial Britain, leaving some parts of one’s faith in the private sphere was not possible because, as our interviewees stressed, ‘Islam is concerned with every aspect of life and you don’t divide the sacred and profane’ (Dagmara). ‘It relates to all things in society, what to do, what to eat, what to wear and so on, every sphere of life. Relations within your family, relations with your neighbour’ (Oliwia). Similarly, in the British case study, religion impacted on the ways people behaved in the private and the public sphere. One interviewee said: ‘I’m Muslim and that kind of influences my morals and my decisions and the way I interact with people’ (Maryam). Another emphasized how the abaya she chooses to wear outside her house represents her beliefs in public (Ifrah).

The distinction between after and against secularism, which we have stressed, is not simply a matter of definition. When the postsecular is conceived as against secularism, it assumes a more active—one might even say implicitly political—dimension. Here, religious minorities refuse to apologize for themselves, refuse to be self-effacing, and demand to be recognized. Through their overt religiosity, they also bring new dimensions to public life.
Notes

1 The PhD, funded by the European Research Council as part of the LiveDifference Research Programme led by Gill Valentine at the University of Sheffield, focused on spaces of conflict in the Polish public sphere. Fieldwork was conducted by Kasia Narkowicz in Warsaw between 2011 and 2012.

2 This project was led by Richard Phillips, with the involvement of Nafhesa Ali, Claire Chambers, Kasia Narkowicz, Raksha Pande, and Peter Hopkins. Interviews were conducted in 2016–2017. Interviewees discussed their relationship choices with reference to their Pakistani heritage and Islamic faith. Doing so, they revealed dynamics between ethnicity and religion, which inform this discussion of postsecularism.

Further reading


Lewis, P. (2007) Young, British and Muslim, London: Continuum. This book tracks the rise—we would say the resurgence—of identification with Islam among young people in Britain. It shows how this form of identification was empowering for those involved.


References


Guerra, S. (2016) ‘The Polish Catholic Church has become intertwined with Euroscepticism and the promotion of conservative “national values”’, Democratic Audit UK.


