

**Socio-Political Impacts of the Contemporary Religious Movements in AJK  
Pakistan: An Empirical Study on Competing Visions of an Ideal Islamic  
Society**

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By

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## Abstract

The aim of this study was to explore the emergence of the three main religious movements in AJK Pakistan and empirically investigate how they utilise social and public spaces to achieve their vision for this society. These groups are recognized as Islamic revivalist movements; therefore, the study aims to explore and understand how religiously motivated values function as social visions to shape or transform a society. As AJK society is largely based on the *biraderi* or caste system, it is important to explore how the above mentioned religious groups, reconcile their religious ideals to address a socially-segregated society. The role of religion, or more specifically, Islam and Islamic activism, is examined by applying sociological methods; the socio-religious and socio-political activities of the Islamic movements are analysed within the paradigms of the Social Movement theory. The study focusses on three main research questions, (i) the emergence of the Islamic movements, (ii) how they utilise or mobilise resources and (iii) how the movements disseminate their values and message into society.

Aside from contemporary India and Pakistan, Kashmir has its own very long history of religion, politics, and independence as a kingdom. It consists of a Buddhist kingdom, a Brahman caste structured society, and a Sufi-oriented Muslim state, while the image of post-colonial Kashmir is totally different, which is divided, governed by foreign rules, and holds differing religious and secular ideologies. There are many active Islamic movements who are working in the name of revivalism, or reform, and who aim to bring changes to the society to make an ideal Islamic society according to their own perceived visions.

The focus of this study was upon the three social-religious movements that are seeking to bring changes to the AJK society. Jamat-e-Islami (JI) is a well-known Islamic revivalist movement in the subcontinent; which has more than six chapters in six South-Asian

countries. The movement uses many strategies to achieve its social, political and religious goals. In AJK, it is actively using different networks, such as education, health, welfare and politics. Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ) is a comparatively new movement, however, the strategies and methods it deploys are quite like those of the JI Movement, but differ in its application of ideology, vision and rhetoric. Khanqah-e-Fatimiya, or Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif (GS), is an apolitical movement that has evolved from within AJK. This movement represents the popular Sufi forms of Islam prevalent within AJK society. However, over the last 30 years, its substantial changes demonstrate elements of an internal revival within the AJK *tasawwuf* sects, which also emphasise 'economic and religious emancipation'. The study highlights how these movements adopt different tactics to promote their ideologies through a variety of means, hence, how socio-religious and socio-political strategies are operating in a society which is mainly based on the caste system. As an exploratory, qualitative and ethnographic study, the research is based on three case studies centred on the above mentioned Islamic movements.

The study concluded that all three movements had different goals and focus in AJK, for example, JI uses a state-centric approach, MQ mainly concentrates on society, whereas, the Sufi *tariqa* is an individual-centric movement. All three movements utilise an individual movement structure and apply differing methods to convey their message, in AJK.

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I dedicate this thesis to my father whose moral example has been a constant source of inspiration for me. Also to my grandmother who undertook responsibility for me following the untimely death of my mother.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my late father *Haji Muhammad Hassan* on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his death, who sacrificed his today for my tomorrow. I am grateful to him for teaching me to believe in myself, in Allah, and in my dreams, by demonstrating the power of honest earnings and of moral values.

**To**

The gentle soul of my mother, who nurtured in me the boundaries between good and evil, and right and wrong - before leaving this world when I was only a child.

**To**

My beloved grandmother who taught me how to love unconditionally, how to dedicate your comfort (when you needed the most) for someone you love.

May your souls rest in eternal peace.

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that the work in this thesis is carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of this thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award.

The thesis has not been presented to any other educational institution in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University.

Signed

Date. 31-12-2016

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

- AC** – Assistant Commissioner
- AJK**- Azad Jammu and Kashmir
- AK**- Azad Kashmir
- ATI**- Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam
- DC**- Deputy Commissioner
- FIR**- First Investigative Report
- GB**- Gilgit Baltistan
- GS**- Gulhar Sharif
- IAJK**- India Administered Jammu and Kashmir
- Ji**- Jamat-e-Islami
- JK**- Jammu and Kashmir
- JKAT**- Jammu & Kashmir Awami Tehreek
- JKLF**- Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
- JTI** – Jamait Talaba-e-Islami
- JUP**- Jami'at Ulama-e- Pakistan
- KPK**- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- LOC**- Line of Control
- MC** - Muslim Conference
- MQ**- Minhaj-ul-Qur'an
- NGO**- Non-Governmental Organisation
- NSMT**- New Social Movement Theories
- PAJK**- Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir
- PAT**- Pakistan Awami Tehreek
- PM**- Prime Minister
- PML**- Pakistan Muslim League

**PMLN**- Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

**PP**- People's Party

**PPP**- Pakistan People's Party

**PSF** - People Student Federation

**PTI**- Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

**PTV** - Pakistan Television

**RM**- Resource Mobilization

**RMT**- Resource Mobilization Theory

**RWP**- Rawalpindi

**SHO** - Station House Officer

**SJO**- Semi Jamat Organisation

**SMO**- Social Movement Organisation

**SMT**- Social Movement Theory

**UK** - United Kingdom

**UN**- United Nations

**US** - United States

## TRANSLITERATION

I use the transliteration of Arabic according to current usage in the relevant literature as simply as possible to prevent any confusion. The only attempt to Arabicize the transliteration in the text itself, however, is the presence of the right facing apostrophe ( ‘ ) referring to the letter ‘ayn ( ع - e.g. *shari‘a*) and the left facing apostrophe ( ’ ) referring to the letter *hamza* ( ء - e.g. Qur’an). Other letters such as غ- gh (*ghayb*); ث- th (*hadith*); خ- kh (*khutbah*); ذ- dh (*dhikr*); and ش- sh (*Sheikh*) have been used as a counterpart in English in such way. I italicize the foreign names that are followed immediately by the English equivalent in brackets. Or, if I use technical terms in English, I put the Arabic term in brackets.

Urdu versions of religious terms originally come from Arabic, such as *Zikr*, I prefer to use Arabic counterpart in English as aforementioned word *dhikr* unless quoting from the literature. Persian and Urdu names have been used less throughout the thesis compared to Arabic. *Namaz*, *Kasbah*, and *urs* are for example. Regarding pluralising the terms I use both adding the letter ‘s’ at the end of the Arabic words, such as *fatwas*, and Arabic plural form like *fatawa*. But I refrain from adding the letter ‘s’ to some words like *hadith* which create problems in pronouncing it.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 Introduction

The study firstly aims to explore the emergence of the three main Islamic revivalist movements from the 1980s onward in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), also known as Pakistan administered Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. Secondly, to empirically investigate how these movements utilise public arenas, such as education, health and politics to achieve their vision for society whilst deploying diverse ways to present their message. The groups are recognised as Islamic revivalist movements, therefore, the study aims to explore and understand how religious values function as part of their social vision to shape and transform the society. The society in AJK is largely based on strong *biraderi* ties or the caste system. Against such deeply rooted cultural dynamics, the revivalist groups are actively trying to transform the highly segregated society in AJK by utilising religious values and motivational strategies. The research aims to critically examine the religious discourse of these groups by adopting the analytical approaches suggested by the Social Movement Theory. The study aims to explore how their theological ideas are translated into distinct socio-political activism within the context of AJK Pakistan.

This study will use terms such as ‘Islamic activism’ which embodies the active role of religion for socio-political, religious and developmental purposes in the AJK. The study will focus on three movements of an Islamic nature; which have their own Islamic interpretations and vision for the society and state, which range from individuals to the society and state. The movements use diverse strategies and/or institutions to assert their vision of Islam, and Islamic approaches while applying several religious and political interpretations. The social institutions of the movements are used for several objectives and aims by the movements, which will be explored by using primary data from the movements themselves.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) is a self-governing state under Pakistani control. It covers an area of 5,134 square miles and has an estimated population of about four million. The literacy rate in AJK is high, ranking second after Islamabad; however, school facilities are at the lowest level, in comparison to elsewhere in Pakistan.

Currently, most of the population live in rural areas, which depend mainly on forestry, livestock and agriculture for subsistence (PDPAJK, 2013). The average per capita income is estimated to range from the US \$600 -5,000, while unemployment rates range from 35% to 50%. In line with national trends, indicators of social sector improvement, particularly health and population welfare are not encouraging (Choudhry, 2011).

Socially, AJK is based on *biraderis*, or kinship groups, that dominate every aspect of the region's social life. For example, social interactions, such as marriages and other social relationships are dependent upon inter-kin affiliations and loyalties. The politics, however, is driven more by caste structures than any specific political ideologies (Rehman, 2011).

In terms of religious belief and practice, Kashmiri society is about 99.5% Muslim (Census Data, 2011), with the majority practising within Sunni traditions. Religious activism was largely quiescent until the early 1980's as Vernon (1995, p.118) states: "Azad Kashmiri culture certainly became more publicly orthodox, with a spate of mosque-building and the founding of Islamic schools."

The process of Islamic revivalism overwhelmingly started in the mid-1980's and continues to present times, with the religious and social activism of the mainstream Islamic movements both indigenous to AJK and from outside the state, yet purposefully involved in the AJK region. These movements have brought and are still seeking to introduce changes on all levels of the area's society, beginning with administering charity for individuals; establishing major welfare projects, such as building and running hospitals, schools, colleges, universities,

mosques and madrassas. The use of religious motivation for the social and economic improvement of the society in AJK constitutes a significant social dynamic which this study aims to explore.

This study focuses upon the three-major socio-religious movements that are seeking to introduce socio-cultural changes within AJK, with the aim of transforming the society to support their religious ideals. Apart from matters of religious piety through worship and adaptations of religious ideals, the movements also seek to be involved in the social, political and cultural affairs of the people. This involvement is carried out using many techniques and strategies utilising various socio-political and economic forms, while being derived from Islamic models, which constitute Islamic activism, and the movements, describe the Islamic social movements.

This study of the interaction between structure and ideology, as Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) described, gives insight to the movements' interpretations and the actions taken in the name of Islam. These movements, through their various well-established networks, often invoke religious visions and values while engaging with diverse forms of social, political and Islamic activism.

Islamic movements operate in society and play a huge role to assist aggrieved groups or individuals in many spheres of life; by building social institutions parallel to the governments; often creating superior institutions in terms of quality (Wickham, 2004). The Islamic movements are perceived to be more transparent and credible when engaging with financial affairs, as compared to the governments in most Muslim countries. Social movements have their opponents, as in any society, that operate against them. Most of the time, these opponents are identified to be the government and/or its institutions, or other movements and political parties.

The role Islamic movements play, and strategies they utilise, are different from the political parties. The practice in Pakistan, and in AJK, is for the main political parties to keep the masses uneducated and underdeveloped and obtain their votes by promising reform and fairer wealth distribution. However, Islamic movements which are involved in the electoral politics use different strategies: they first educate the masses and then ask for their votes (Shakil, 2000). When it comes to the social institutions, such as educational, health and welfare; again, the institutions run by the movements appear far better than those of the government-run institutions, however, comparatively, in terms of quantity, they are very few.

At times, it is perceived that Islamic movements and their institutions are “middle-class networks” which cater to the needs of the “middle class” (Clark, 2004). However, in AJK the case seems different, as social ties are based on castes rather than classes, as it is perceived “blood is thicker than attitudes” (Clark, 2004, p.25).

Nevertheless, social movement theory offers a suitable interpretative framework to understand the impact of the Islamic movements in the light of the resource mobilisation, political opportunity, and framing process dynamics on the nature of the Islamic activism within the context of AJK Pakistan. Such aspects are neglected in the current academic literature; however, it has been noted that the phenomenon of Islamic activism only recently took place in the field of the sociology (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Wickham, 2004, Clark, 2004). As mentioned above, AJK is witnessing this anomaly on a large scale since 1980, and the activities of the movements have touched upon many aspects of the society, but this has not been explored yet.

After 9/11, research on Islamic activism mainly focused on the radical and transnational movements and their macro objectives, while local and society based impacts, and activities deployed by peaceful Islamic movements did not attract much attention due to the

overwhelming involvement of violent groups (Tugal, 2005; Zubeida 1989). Furthermore, most of the studies only focused on a single movement or a special aspect of the Islamic movements, such as the radical, or political agenda of an Islamic movement (Sikand, 2000; Roy, 2004; Rashid, 2006).

This study aims to focus on three movements possessing three different ideologies or visions and explores their diverse range of activities in a society with a specific cultural heritage. Ideology, is the set of beliefs that are used to justify, or challenge a given socio-political order and used to interpret the political world (Zald, 1999, p.262). However, for the purposes of this research, the study will not be using ideology in its strict Western context but as part of a “vision” held by the Islamic movements to shape society.

## **1.1 Research Questions**

This study aims to answer the three main research questions using a three-fold exploratory case study framework. These questions focus on exploring different aspects of the movements, in socio-religious and political fields.

- I. What are the historical and contemporary socio-cultural dynamics informing the emergence of the main socio-religious movements in AJK Pakistan?
- II. How do these movements utilise social institutions, such as, education, health and politics to disseminate their values and shape the society?
- III. How do these groups interpret the meaning of an ideal Islamic society and use religious motives as distinct strategies to achieve their perceived goals in AJK Pakistan?

## **1.2 The Three Movements**

The study will be conducted with a focus on three of the ten main identified religious movements that are active on multiple fronts for socio-political change and using Islamic visions of diverse natures. This will include Jamat-e-Islami, (JI) Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ) and the Sufi *tariqa* of Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif (GS) Kotli. The rationale to select these three movements is based on the diversity and impact of the movement on the society; hence, their socio-political and socio-economic strategies motivated by religion are quite new and mainly emerged after the 1980s.

### **Jamat-e-Islami (JI)**

JI is considered one of the most active Islamic revival movements at many levels; it plays a vital role in politics, education and welfare, through well-organised institutions. The movement uses many models to achieve social change and to build a society, although, the links between the actions and ideals are not clear, and sometimes do not reflect the realities on the ground, however, these are all strategic and rational actions (Wictorowicz, 2004). The movement is well-established as an Islamic revivalist movement in the literature on Islamic revivalism, whereas, in the local cultural and religious context of AJK, this is less explored by using sociological frameworks.

### **Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ)**

MQ is another Islamic movement which is active in Islamic revivalism through education, politics and social welfare, by using similar strategies to those deployed by JI, but the organisational approaches and interpretations of Islamic ideals differ in many aspects. The movement is a new development into Islamic revivalism from a Sufi-oriented approach, which is active at a variety of levels and invokes collective action in AJK and Pakistan.

## **Gulhar Sharif (GS)**

A *Naqshbandi Sufi tariqa* is also active in the AJK which deploys diverse strategies and approaches, but mainly utilises religious institutions, such as, mosques and *madrassa* networks. This movement is one which is representative of the popular practices of Islam in the AJK, on one hand, but on the other, it is also using society focussed socio-economic approaches and strategies. This is a departure from mere mediation between God and man, to mediation between man and society (Robinson, 2000).

All three movements have special characteristics and Islamic visions and/or Islamic interpretations to offer, from their emergence to mobilisation, and outlining an Islamic message, which makes every movement relevant to this study and unique.

### **1.3 Research Methodology of the Study**

The methodology of this study will be qualitative, (Chapter Five discusses the methodology of the study) chosen, because the nature of the research questions requires an in-depth examination of a social phenomenon. “Qualitative research is a broad approach to the study of social phenomena: its various genres are naturalistic and interpretive, and they draw multiple methods of inquiry” (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p.2). It can be used to explore people’s responses to a phenomenon as it places a value on studying human experience and interpretation of an issue within a specific socio-cultural context (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).

The research will adopt a qualitative case study strategy to explore the three research questions, with the primary data gathered through semi-structured interviews as presented in section (5.1). In qualitative interviewing there is much greater interest in the interviewee’s point of view rather than a researcher’s interests, as in structured interviews (Bryman, 2004, p.319). Elite sampling was used, whereby, the activists of the selected three movements were

approached using a snowball sampling strategy proposed by Bryman (2004, p.100). All the participants (22 in total) selected for interviews were male and female adults, who were participants and senior members or activists of the selected movements. Initially, the researcher engaged with some political activists, active members, imams, and policy makers, which established useful contacts with ideal participants. In many cases, general activists were asked to give a lead to an individual specialist in a specific required field, such as, in education, welfare, or politics.

In total, twenty-two interviews were recorded and made available for use in this study of the three movements. However, some interviewees abandoned the interviews and did not give consent to record or use them for the study, this was due to the suspicion created by the long conflict between India and Pakistan. Fieldwork was conducted in 2014 on the ground in AJK; while some observations were also conducted in the UK.

This study covers the deep historical backgrounds of the movements but mainly focuses on the Islamic activism from 1980 onwards because the widespread process of Islamisation initiated when the Army took control of the government in Pakistan and General Zia-ul-Haq became ruler of the country in 1978 (Gul, 2009).

The study uses a case study framework and an ethnographic approach to collect and analyse the collated data. The three case studies include interviews, observations and other documentary and audio and video evidence.

#### **1.4 Theoretical Framework**

There are many dimensions of the Islamic movements to be explored and differing approaches to study them, such as reductionist, essentialist, and historical institutions. Social Movement Theory provides the lens for the collection of the data and offers analytical tools; hence, three different approaches were used. Political Process approach or the newly developed Political Opportunity (PO) structure was utilised to explore the emergence of the movements or developments in the AJK. This approach considers that social movements emerge when political opportunities are created by the system in which they operate. The study will seek to determine if the case is similar with Islamic movements, generally, and in the AJK state, specifically, which has special socio-political and religious-cultural aspects.

The Resource Mobilisation (RM) approach is a well-developed approach of the social movement theory, this approach contends that the social movement mobilisation only occurs when adequate resources are available to the movements (Roots, 1990). This approach places more emphasis on the role of material resources than on the role of ideology (Wickham, 2004). This paradigm has been very useful to study the social institutions of the social movements from recruitment to their mobilisation (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Clark, 2004; Wickham, 2004). However, its application in a society like AJK is overlooked, which has both religion and the *biraderi* or caste-culture to consider. This approach will be used to analyse how these movements utilise social institutions or networks, and how their ideologies are used to motivate the masses for common causes, to achieve their goals.

New developments in Social Movement theory believe that if the political opportunities and resources are available, collective action is unlikely to occur if people do not have a shared understanding of something (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). The study also utilise a Framing Process (FP) approach, which stresses the articulation of the meanings and messages

for several relevant and intended audiences by the movements. This approach will facilitate the analysis of the method and techniques of the Islamic movements, explaining how they frame and present their understandings and vision of the Islamic and social models of the change for a society.

Apart from three above mentioned theoretical frames; other different sociological models such as “*Homo Culturus*” and “*Homo Islamicus*” (Dhudi, 2014) Social Exchange (Homans, 1958), theories from Ibn Khaldun and others, will be touched upon, exploring the literature on Islamic and social activism. These models will be analysed, compared with the approaches of the three movements and their use as perceived visions, including Islamic revivalism and its different models, such as crisis and success, cultural and economic models, discussed.

### **1.5 Organisation of the Study**

The study consists of eight chapters including the introduction and conclusion chapters. This introductory chapter aims to offer a broad introduction to the study and chapters in the rest of the thesis. Chapter Two examines the background of the AJK state; it aims to explore different significant aspects specific to AJK, socially, politically and in terms of religion. This will set the stage on which the study will be conducted because there is not much research in the area. Most of the remaining enquiry considers existing aspects of the region, such as, cultural, political and religious aspects central to AJK.

The aim of the Chapter Three is primarily to explore the three Islamic movements which are part of this study. However, prior to this, other religious movements and groups will be considered, followed by examining the established basis of Islamic activism, such as, revival, reform and renewal, then the emergence of the collective activism by the Islamic revivalist movements will be discussed. The rest of the chapter will explore the above mentioned three Islamic movements, JI, MQ and GS.

Chapter Four will survey the literature related to the main theoretical frameworks being used in the study, such as social movement theory, its evolution and application to study the Islamic activism. Islamic models of activism will also be explored regarding the emergence, need and application of revivalist ideas. The final two sections will focus on literature concerning sub-continental Islam, which will elicit a thorough understanding of the background to Islam in AJK and to the Islamic movements prevalent in the region.

Chapter Five will present the complete research methodology of the study; this is a qualitative study which will use an exploratory case study framework while deploying an ethnographic approach to data collection and analysis. The chapter will discuss the theoretical models used in the study, along with the tools of data collection, such as semi-structured interviews and observation, following which, methods of data analysis will be considered.

Chapter Six, the first empirical chapter, presents three case studies of the three selected movements, while the chapter follows the methodology articulated in the last chapter to present the data. Initially, the organisation of the presentation of data and findings will be detailed, followed by an outline of the participants, plus a short summary of the case study. Following on, will be a presentation of the data in the thematic manner of each movement, as case study one, on Jamat-e-Islami, case study two on Minhaj-ul-Qur'an and case study three, on Gulhar Sharif. Data collected on four clearly defined themes will also be analysed in this chapter.

Chapter Seven, centres on discussion, will consider the significant findings extracted from the analysis of the data. The study will utilise primary data, such as, interviews and observations and secondary evidence, such as, audio and video, literature and previous research in this chapter to build the argument. The chapter will compare the findings and conclusions drawn from the case studies conducted.

Chapter Eight, which is the final chapter, aims to conclude the study and present the recommendations for the targeted audience also proposed avenues for the further research will be suggested.

## CHAPTER TWO

### AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR: BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

#### **2.0 Introduction**

Apart from contemporary India and Pakistan, Kashmir has its own very long history of religion, politics and periods of independence, as well as, being integrated into different hegemonies. It consists of a Buddhist Kingdom, Brahman caste-structured society and a Sufi-oriented Muslim state. However, the image of post-colonial Kashmir is totally different; it is divided governed by foreign rules and has many religious and secular ideologies within its borders. This study focuses on the area known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) which is a self-governing state of Kashmir under Pakistani governmental administration.

The people of Azad Kashmir are 99.05% Muslim (Census, 2011) and belong mainly within Sunni traditions, overwhelmingly Sufi or *Barelvi* oriented Muslims. However, there are many other Islamic movements and *Jamats*, some of them are working actively for a religious revival or reform, and to bring about changes to devise an ideal Islamic society according to their own perceived visions. Therefore, before going into details of the movements, their strategies and discussing their visions and ideologies, it seems important initially, to explore some aspects of the AJK state where they are active.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the socio-political and religious fabric of AJK. Firstly, this study seeks to analyse how the movements were created and which dominant factors contributed to the emergence of the Islamic movements. Secondly, the aim is to assess the socio-cultural and religio-political nature of the society where these movements are operating by using different techniques. This will help the analysis of such factors which are receptive to the message of change, or at present hinder the path to religious change.

Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explore the geographical and historical background of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, then the basis for the establishment of India and Pakistan and the impact of the partition on the status of the state of the Jammu and Kashmir, which is essentially stuck between two countries. As the nature of the movements is religious, and more specifically Islamic religious movements, Sections 2.3 and 2.3.1 discuss the arrival of Islam in the state of Kashmir and then outlines the nature of the Islamic ideas and their dispersion in the region. This is followed by an introduction to contemporary Islam in AJK in Section 2.4, which aims to identify the Islamic identity of the state of AJK. The study found the Sufi brand of Islam to be the dominant Islamic ideology in the state, thereby, Section 2.4.1 presents an analysis of the transformation and renewal of the Sufi Islamic way followed by the Islamic nature of AJK in Section 2.4.2.

Section 2.5 and its sub-sections present the political and administrative structure of the current state of AJK with its special status and administrative features. This is followed by the presentation of the unique political identity of the state, and considers issues related to the political parties and movements in Section 2.6. Before the conclusion of the chapter in Section 2.8, the study discusses the *biraderi* or caste culture of the AJK in Section 2.7, which holds great importance for the cultural identity of the society and AJK region.

## **2.1 Historical Background of state of Jammu and Kashmir**

Before the partition of the Sub-Continent, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a total area of 84,471 square miles, was geographically divided into the following three expansive regions: Jammu Province, Kashmir Province and the Frontier Province of Ladakh and Gilgit towards the North.

Historically, these areas belonged to the Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir. On March 29, 1935, the British government took possession of the Gilgit Agency from the state

government, through an agreed lease of 60 years. The British feared Soviet expansionist moves, hence wanted to have defences ready with direct control of the region, which Lamb (1991, p.17) calls a 'strategic policy' of the British Government. During this period, the state flag remained hoisted over the official residency along with the Union Jack. However, from August 1, 1947, the areas were returned to the state government, because the British had decided to partition the Indian sub-continent. Currently, Gilgit and Baltistan are under the control of Pakistan and are treated as almost a fifth province of the country. The current political structure is directly formed by the central government as they have influence in AJK and vice versa. AJK is often presented as a separate country because it has its own prime minister and president, unlike other Pakistani provincial structures. This will be explored further in the coming sections.

## **2.2 The Partition of India and Status of Kashmir**

The Partition of India by the British Empire marked a new and very complex era for the largest princely state in India, the criterion set for the creation of two countries was based on the two religions or religious nations, Hindu and Muslims, which is famously known as the "two-nation theory" (Mawdudi, 1966, p.21). The British visualised creating two countries, India for the Hindus, and Pakistan for the Muslims, as there were 584 princely states both with Hindu and Muslim majorities (Mahmud, 2011). The states were encouraged to accede to India or Pakistan, the criterion was set that the majority Hindu states will accede to India and Muslim majority states will join Pakistan. When the Muslim ruler of the Hindu majority, Hyderabad, Asaf Jah VII tried to join Pakistan he was prevented from doing so, on the other hand, when the Hindu ruler of the majority Muslim state, Jammu and Kashmir, signed the instrument of accession with India it was accepted (Thukkar, 1988). Rehmani (2002, p.7) states it was expected that: "Kashmir is a majority Muslim state so automatically will fall in the lap of Pakistan". However, this did not happen due to the Hindu and Muslim political

leadership of Kashmir of the time, as the Dogra Maharaja was inclined towards the Hindu rulers of Delhi. On the other hand, the Muslim conference was inclined towards the Muslim league of Pakistan (Schofield, 2000).

Still, this is not a full picture, there is another independent or pro-independence narrative which believes that when Pakistan entered into the state its tribal men, or an irregular army of Mujahideen, forced the Maharaja to sign a conditional accession with India. Kadian (1992, p.115) contends that “Accession of Kashmir to India was different from other states, as Maharaja and Abdullah wanted to keep Kashmir more autonomous and preserve its culture and identity as *kashmiriyat*. Whatever the case is, contemporary J&K is stuck between these notions of pro-Pakistan, pro-India and independent Kashmir both from India and Pakistan. Khan (2012) states today all hegemonic approaches come either from Pakistani or Indian perspectives rather than from Kashmiri ideas, as in the early 1940s when the sentiment of *Kashmiriyat* was an assertion of cultural and political identity. These approaches have a huge impact on the social, political and of course religious or more specifically on the contemporary religious activism in AJK. Which will be detailed in the coming sections, regarding how it affects or plays its role to shape the contemporary AJK society?

### **2.3 Arrival of Islam in Kashmir in Historical Perspective:**

The arrival of Islam in Kashmir is marked with several claims from different historians; these claims include reference to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) himself that he sent some people to the king of the Kashmiri State, or that Umar bin Abdul Aziz was asked to send someone to teach Islam by a Hindu king (Sikan, 2000). However, these claims have no authentic or strong supporting evidence. There are some reports that a Muslim community was established by refugee Muslim soldiers from Sindh, who travelled with the then fleeing Hindu king after the arrival of Muhammad Bin Qasim in the 8<sup>th</sup> century (Sikand, 2000).

Significant details regarding the arrival of Islam emerged from 1320, when a Kashmiri king embraced Islam and his people entered Islam in large numbers, inspired by a Sufi preacher who travelled into Kashmir from Turkistan, Sayyid Sharf-ud-Din, famously known as Bulbul Shah (Khan, 2000, p.134). It is at this point that the best-known history of Islam starts as Kubravi Sufis of Persia arrived in Kashmir after 1388 and introduced many arts and crafts to the Kashmir and Kashmiris, which Arnold (1913, p.292) called “materialistic progress of Islam” (Khan, 1994; Jagmohn, 1991; and Sikand, 2000).

Transition to Islam is marked by different reasons, as people turned to Islam in their thousands, mainly from Hindu and Buddhist religions. Sikand asserts that: “The expression of Islam in Kashmir was actually the revolt of socially oppressed people against the domination of high-class Brahmins” (2000, p.7). He believes that when studying the arrival of Islam in Kashmir it should always be seen in the context of the caste-ridden society.

### **2.3.1 Role of Sufism in the Spread of Islam**

Sufism is an important factor inside the society and system, because what Sufis offered to people had great value, which was based on respect, peace and equality, and more importantly provided a refuge from caste ridden hardship and Brahman domination of the lower class by the higher. Contemporary academics consider those early Sufi movements as movements of Islamisation in Kashmir, which continued for centuries and played a huge role to shape the socio-religious culture of Kashmiri society (Khan, 1994). With Kubravi Sufis and other Sufi movements, such as, the Rishi Movement, which played a great role in the building of Islamic society and in the Islamisation of Kashmir in the past (Khan 1994). Sikand (2000) contends there is no village where there is not a shrine of a Sufi who devoted his life for the betterment of the people of Kashmir. This claim is generally about the Indian Administered Kashmir, but it also is very similar in AJK.

These shrines whether small or large, fall under the control of the government or individuals, and have become a source of revenue for both the *sajadasheen* or *matawalis*, who claim these belong to their ancestors, or those who manage them, or for the government if the revenue is high. Mcloughlin and Khan (2006), while exploring a government managed shrine, Khari Sharif in Mirpur, described the revenue in millions, whereas Puri (2012, p.61) contends that sometimes the annual revenue from Khari Sharif “exceeds all the tax collected in AJK”. Most of the Sufis, who are buried in those shrines, played their role to guide the people in religious or socio-political matters. A very good example is of Babaji Lar Sharif (d.1926), explored by Rao (2000) in rural Kashmir.

How this branch of Islam gained popularity, is seen from different perspectives. Jagmohn (1991, p.168) asserts that “Sufism arose from ‘inner rebellion of conscience’ against social injustices of the time, and as a reaction to the over-intellectualism to the hair-splitting of theologians”. The initial sentiment is very true with regards to the emergence, while the sentiment regarding the attitudes of the theologians seems a later development, which might be a cause of pushing the masses away from the ulama, and their exclusive hegemony on religious affairs.

A separate study is required to explore this phenomenon both in historical and contemporary context, as Sikand (2001) suggests that a complete revival is needed for this branch of Islam in Kashmir which has served as a social and reform movement against the Rajas of Kashmir or Brahmans’ exploitation and persecution of the lower-castes. On the other hand, this movement has played a huge role by raising the socio-economic standards of the Kashmiri people, for instance, Shah Hamadan and their family are known as the *Kubravi tariqa*, which introduced several crafts and skills brought with them from Iran. Impacts of the Rishi movement on the valley, and creating peace and social harmony, and even planting fruit trees is another example of the indigenous Kashmiri *tasawwuf*, and Sufi movements (Khan, 1994).

In this chapter and study, this branch of Islam will be explored at two levels – firstly, as a practical *tasawwuf* which was used for cleansing or inner reform of individuals, and secondly, as a historical phenomenon which was used, or can be used, for the betterment of society incorporating social and economic dimensions. The study will not investigate the philosophical treaties of this branch, such as, provided by Ibn-e-Arabi and Shah WaliUllah amongst others regarding abstract concepts of *Wahda-tu-Al-wajood and Shadat-tu-Al-shohood* (Metcalf, 1982; Ghazi, 2002; Sikand, 1999a) which are not a concern of the common people in an ethnographic and empirical study like this.

#### **2.4 Islam in Contemporary Azad Jammu and Kashmir**

Contemporary Islam in AJK is not the only Sufi branch of Islam, however, it is still a dominant one with similar features, but with the passage of time, local and international circumstances, it has evolved into different approaches and brands of Islamic traditions. These changes happened due to many factors; the first being the interaction of Kashmiris with other Islamic countries and their exposure to different Islamic ideologies in other parts of the Muslim world. In this regard, the most important role is played by Saudi Arabia and the economic migrants who travel there for employment. Primarily employed for manual labour, when workers return home they bring the ‘true’ Islam and Islamic teachings with them, however, this needs to be explored further.

Another important factor to consider, is the arrival of the new revival and reform movements in the Indian subcontinent and then their entrance into Kashmir from the nineteenth century which accelerated the process of change (Puri, 2012). Jagmohn (1991, p.167-8) quotes Sir Aurel Stein stating that: “Islam made its way in Kashmir not by forcible conquest but by gradual conversion.” It was adopted rapidly but did not replace local customs, beliefs and practices until recently, after the intrusion of Jamat-e-Islami and other fundamentalist Islamic

organizations. These organizations also consist of *jihadi* movements, including the original Kashmiri nationalists from 1990, or more specifically from 1989, when pure Islamic movements hijacked the concept of jihad and spread their brand of Islam with jihad, which was not the dominant religious form of the religion prevalent in the state. After jihad was stopped in the early 2000s, relief work was another crucial factor which played a huge role to both spread and establish different schools of thought in recent history. Such factors were highlighted globally through the international print media. However, it was also perceived suspiciously by some local Kashmiris, who adopted different viewpoints and approaches to understand and react towards it (Choudhry, 2011).

Sikand (2000) touched upon an idea that the Islamic tradition which introduced and then asserted Islam as a majority religion of the state and served the people religiously, socially, politically and economically with the belief that “religious emancipation is incomplete without economic emancipation” (p.17) and is left only for pilgrimage for the people to pray and request intercession. This religious tradition needed revival by themselves and by insider practitioners, when the process of Islamic revival started, Sufism was threatened, even by some revivalists, and it was blamed for the decline of the Muslim faith. There are many examples of such movements throughout the history of the Indian subcontinent. One example is the case of the *Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah* which compared *pirs* and their practices similarly to pre-Islam *Kuffar* and *Mushriks* (Pearson, 2008, p.78).

Contemporary AJK is a 99.5% Muslim state, but finer details about religious demographics are not available. It is here, where omissions in the literature on AJK are apparent. This is the same case with authentic or academic literature on the religious aspects of the Azad Kashmiri society. McLoughlin and Khan (2006), while exploring the Azad Kashmiri, or more specifically, Mirpuri diaspora in Britain, contend that: “Despite the undeniable significance of Mirpuri heritage to the social and cultural capital of large numbers of British Pakistanis, no

ethnography of popular religious literature and tradition in that region currently exists (p.291). However, some accounts confirm how some individual *ulama* and *pirs* played their role by leading their communities, sometimes geographically, and led their *biraderis* during the previous century (Rao, 2000). *Ulamas*, both with or without formal religious qualifications, who catered for the religious needs of the people such as, prayers, funerals, *Nikah* and *Khatams* (a tradition of gathering and reciting of Qur'an) and providing different set *adhkars*, especially in Barelvi schools, at the village level, were called *mian* or *miana* family.

Sufism has always been a dominating religious feature of AJK throughout the history of the state, but this tradition was deployed using different perspectives, until recently and somehow it continues. It is customary for *pirs* from several *khanqahs*, both from Pakistan and inside AJK to visit their *murids* to spend a night or two in a village, perhaps to connect with those who can not visit their centres regularly. They will conduct *Mehfil-e-Dhiker*, or circle of remembrance of Allah, which includes *naats* and other *Qaseedas* in the honour of the *khanqah* and the *pirs* from that *silsila* or chain, or more recently, a new phenomenon of celebrating *milad* in any month of the year, or to dedicate those gatherings as *milad* celebrations is emerging. People are served with *lunger*, or a feast but the most important practice is paying *shirni* to the visiting *pirs*, which is an amount of money from some *murids* or anyone who asks the *pir* for the prayers for his family's better future. This practice of *shirni* provides many stories where *pirs* would visit their *murids* after a birth of a child, especially a boy, and it would be their right to have livestock no matter how poor or needy a *murid* was. The *murids* did not have the courage to protest because of the fear of the *baddua*, or curse from the *pir*. This privatised mystical hegemony on the affairs of the people to "mediate between man and God" (Robinson, 2000, p.233) created special bonds between *pirs* and their disciples (Safi, 2000).

However, these practices are changing now and developing into mediation between man and the society, as Robinson (2000) depicts. Perhaps, such adjustments will be identified by the arrival of wealth in the state and a new modern educated generation of *pirs*, which come to compete with new Islamic revivalist movements to maintain their hegemony in society. Contemporary AJK social institutions established by Kashmiri and some Punjabi *pirs* are equivalent to some government institutions. *Pir* Alauddin Siddiqui, from Poonch, AJK, established the first private university in the state; he established a private medical college and hospital, again the first in the state, which the government could not do for many years. Some *pirs* from Punjab have also established networks of modern *madaris* for both male and female students which offer *ders-i-nizami*, or traditional religious education alongside state education up to university level qualifications in general subjects.

The inclusion of the *khanqahi* tradition in this study is to demonstrate how this tradition is playing different roles in the society, from building mosques, which has its speciality, setting madrasas for village children, and connecting to the people at a grassroots level through several networks. Such developments seem to signal a revival of the same Kashmiri Sufi traditions which were established by the Kubravi tariqa about seven centuries ago to engage people in developing their social, economic and religious life. In the contemporary AJK, the same traditional role is emerging again. I call this the required revival of the same tradition from within the tradition itself.

#### **2.4.1 New Developments in Sufi Movements in AJK**

As observed in the above sections, Sufism is the first and original branch of Islam in Kashmir. Today's AJK houses many religious identities, which include Sunni Islam; Bareilvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamat-e-Islami, Minhaj-ul-Qur'an. Tableeghi Jamat, Da'wat-e-Islami, and Jamat-u-Da'wa. Many of them are comparable ideologically, or have similar

religious doctrines, while they have established their own distinct identity and way of engagement with society. These groups are grouped under different categories, such as, reform movement, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith, neo-Sufis of reform and *tazkiya* and character building. Revival movements such as Jamat-e-Islami and Minhaj-ul-Qur'a the Tablighi Jamat and Da'wat-e-Islami in the field of *tableegh* and or missionary activities are also part of the contemporary Azad Kashmiri Islamic movements.

Puri (2012, p.59) contends that “the majority of the PAJK population adheres to the Barelvi school of thought, which is manifested by large numbers of devotees at the *mazaraats* of Sufi saints in the area”. Khan (2006) classifies this branch of Islam as a devotional Islam and describes their specific practices that mark their identity as:

*“What I call ‘devotional Islam’ can be characterised by specific ritual practices including miladsharif (Prophet's Birthday), giyarvinsharif, urs sharif (death anniversary of a saint), Qawwali (devotional music), dhikr (remembrance of God), khatam al-khawajgan (Conclusion of the Masters), Khatam (in honour of a deceased relative), Na't sharif (devotional poem in honour of the Prophet), distributing langar (blessed food) and so forth”* (Khan, 2006, p.26).

This branch of Islam is the most popular in AJK as well as in Pakistan at present, which was often overlooked due to its quiet nature in socio-political fields in Pakistan, as Bennet and Ramsey (2012) present. Barelvi ulama are the defenders of the Sufi beliefs and of the above-mentioned practices in the state, so a Barelvi automatically will fall under the Sufi or pir circle. However, some, but not all, Deobandis also practise Sufi traditions, hence, they will not associate themselves with the *mazarats* or shrines of the saints frequently, or with devotion. In my view, most of the recruitment for the revival and reform movements come

from the Barelvi school, though Minhaj-ul-Qur'an established its identity after separating from this school or at least from hard-core Barelvi *ulama*. This is the reason Khan (2006) calls them "neo-Barelvis" but on the other hand hard-core Barelvis do not associate with them and brand them a separate sect (Khan 2006).

It is worth noting at this point that any *Salafi* or like-minded movement in the state, or anyone without any specific religious identity who opposes these practices will be branded *Wahhabi* by this school and its adherents. It is worth noting here that *Salafi*: is derived from *salaf*, 'pious ancestors' name given to a neo-orthodox brand of Islamic reformism originating in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, aiming to regenerate Islam by return to the tradition represented by the "pious forefathers". (Encyclopedia of Islam). When Deobandis, Salafis or activists from Jamat-e-Islami treat these practices as *mushrikana* or polytheist practices, the Barelvis also react harshly by reply labelling them, Wahhabis, *Gustakh-e-Rasool* (blasphemers of the Prophet) and eventually *Kafirs*, which draws a clear line amongst them (Kaashmiri 1989). By promoting divisive issues, the movements try to assume religious hegemony over society using different strategies, such as maximum recruitment, in the name of *da'wah*. Another strategy is building mosques, whilst the *jihadi* factor played a most important role to recruit people for the Salafi movements. A mosque destroyed by the Barelvis, was built by Salafi jihadists who were not locals, which showed how this institution is an important means of control over the society. Choudhry (2013) asserts the strategy, agenda and role behind the construction of a mosque by the jihadist movements near the LOC provide the following incentives for the local people:

- They don't have to pay for the cost of construction
- (Don't) Pay for the Imam and other teachers
- (Don't) Pay the maintenance costs
- Children get free education and free meals.

(drshabirchudhry.blogspot.co.uk)

Hence, once a mosque is established it is very hard to change it into any other building or destroy it. This is a sensitive issue in both ways as it will bring benefits to the movement in the form of the recruitment. The jihadist movements during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), and later, were facilitated by the government of Pakistan to establish religious institutions in the country on a large scale (Bennet and Ramsey, 2012). These developments automatically sidelined the majority Barelvis, where all intentions of the writers were directed towards the study of those jihadist movements.

The arrival of the revival movements in AJK will be explored in the next chapter where these facilitating factors will be touched upon precisely, and their links with each other as either facilitator or as a hindrance for each other.

#### **2.4.2 Islamic Nature of Azad Kashmir: An Analysis**

While describing the nature of the Kashmiri society in the religious context, a famous 13<sup>th</sup> century Kashmiri historian Kilhan and author of *Raj Trangni* (Chronicles of Kings) which is written using *Hindutva* approach, mentioned that religion is a very dominant feature of the Kashmiri society and people, which always has played a huge role. He even goes further and asserts that Kashmiris and Kashmir only can be conquered using some sort of religious fusion, Kilhan (2012, P. 120), however, this claim appears incomplete and needs further exploration concerning mysticism and Hindutva theology. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) applied this approach in a sociological and rational paradigm. He stated the logic behind this, and even more specifically detailed psychological approaches and effects. According to him, nomadic people can be changed or mobilised for political purposes easily, using religious

manipulation, such as, promising or demonstrating sainthood or prophethood (Dhaouadi, 2014). In this case, as Kashmiri society is nomadic or more specifically village-based, this can be explored further in this study.

More recently after the creation of Pakistan when the banner of Islam was raised to make Pakistan an Islamic state, the secular rulers of Pakistan were not considering any vision of Islam or an Islamic state. Shahab (1998: 412-13) a Pakistani bureaucrat, described an interesting encounter amongst M.A. Gurmani, a minister (without portfolio) of Kashmir affairs and Azad Kashmiri people. While addressing Azad Kashmiri people, Gurmani invoked Islamic principles, after which Kashmiri people asked him to implement Islam and Islamic principles first in Kashmir, then in the light of this experiment they can implement it in Pakistan. The Minister took his locket off and showed them that it was a Qur'an, and proclaimed that they do not need to do any experiments as everything is written, upon which people were crying with joy, and out of respect (Shahab 1998, pp.422-424).

Gurmani had an office in Rawalpindi from where he was playing two groups of ruling Muslim Conference members against each other, (Saraf, 1977). This reflects how emotionally Kashmiris regarded Islam and an Islamic system. Apart from this, Shahab spent considerable time serving in Azad Kashmir where he described many incidents which show the simplicity and religious zeal of Kashmiris for Islam. Emotional attachment of the Kashmiris was also observed by the Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan in 1966, when they interacted with Kashmiri migrants. However, they considered it a temporary passion and felt the need to utilise it for more permanent and practical means (Siddiqi, 1966).

How AJK has become Islamic today, and which approach to Islam, is, or can be successful contemporarily, is a matter for deeper exploration. Perhaps, AJK will be one of the few Muslim states which have official Islamic judges or *Qadhis* in courts alongside the

conventional courts of law. I believe this phenomenon has a huge impact on the religious life of the people as AJK has two levels of *muftis* (people who issue official religious decrees) and *qadhis* who sit with the judges in the courts. *Muftis* at district and *tehsil* (sub-division) level manage and administer different religious affairs, such as, nikahs and government sponsored Qur'an schools. They issue *fatwas* on religious matters and settle religious issues amongst people. These officials are graduates of the traditional *dares-e-nizami*, while those who practise as *qadhis* are expected also to be law graduates.

Such a policy and approach, as outlined above, to the institutionalisation of Islam, and providing a platform for Islam, within government structures in AJK is something special: For it resembles the policy of the Mughals and other Muslim empires of inclusion of all segments of society into the state structure (Farooqi,1999). Due to this factor, AJK has not been beset by sectarian clashes, as compared to the neighbouring Punjab Province and other parts of Pakistan. Having *ulama* as part of the bureaucracy, encourages everyone to support the system; the guidance and religious decrees issued by the government employed *ulama* or *muftis* are more balanced than from traditional *madaris* and *ulama*.

## **2.5 Azad Jammu and Kashmir: The State and People**

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) (also used AJK) as an official name but commonly known as Azad Kashmir (AK) which means “free” Kashmir, goes back to its creation on 24th October 1947, when this strip was liberated by tribal men from the contemporary Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmiri or Poonch uprising (Mahmud, 2011, Snedden, 2012). The dispute erupted when India forcefully occupied the state with the invitation of the Kashmiri Maharaja who wanted to join India against the will of the majority people.

India and Pakistan have different versions of their claims, which are the basis of the long dispute between two countries. Lamb (1991, p.148) asserts that “by the beginning of

November 1947 both India and Pakistan had adopted public positions on the Kashmir question from which they have found it impossible to depart". This was the result of the end of the British colonisation of the subcontinent and the division of India into a Hindu majority state, and a Muslim majority Pakistan. A criterion was set for the princely states to join one of the two nations based on the majority population, whereby, the majority Hindus were to belong to India, and the majority Muslims would join Pakistan.

In the above-mentioned scenario, the perception of "freedom" or "*Azadi*" for 'Azad' Kashmir is perceived as its Muslim population freed from their Hindu Maharaja, and later from Hindu India which occupied the rest of Kashmir, that was yet to be freed (Rehman, 2011). This concept of *Azadi* leaves another underlying issue waiting to be unlocked; that is the freedom of IAJK from India. From its inception, this territory (AJK) and its government adopted the role of a 'war council' and later a 'base camp' for the freedom of the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

AJK shares many identities and cultural features with Kashmir, which were historically instilled and shared through centuries of a unified Kashmiri history. However, contemporary Kashmiris from different regions are losing many common features. Newberg (1995), while introducing AJK, contends that it (AJK) is called Jammu and Kashmir but Jammu is nowhere near, even majority Hindus in Jammu are not bothered by Azad Kashmir as 'Jammu'. Puri (2012, p.38) quotes the former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, who identified contemporary J&K into five main cultural divisions or regions with more common features, three on the IAJK such as Jammu, Valley and Ladakh, and two on the PAJK sides, such as, AJK and Gilgit Baltistan. Nonetheless, these factors all play a crucial role in the formation of the political and social structure of contemporary AJK, which will be examined in the coming sections.

According to the 1998 population census, the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir had a population of 2.973 million, which is estimated to have grown to 4.257 in 2013 (AJKPDP, 2013). There is not much up-to-date information on the state which is why Snedden (2012) termed the population, the 4 million forgotten people of Azad Kashmir. Almost 100% of the population is Muslim, while the rural to urban ratio is 88:12, and the population density is 320 persons per square kilometre, (AJ&K portal). Most of the area is hilly; people are dependent on the road infrastructure of neighbouring Punjab and KPK province to travel from the far south to the north of the state.

### **2.5.1 Economy and Prosperity**

AJK's economy is dependent upon the official budget set in Pakistan. However, resources available to the people are provided through forestry, and foreign remittances, predominantly from the Middle East and Europe, allowing the economic conditions for the people of Azad Kashmir to be better than rest of the Pakistan (Puri, 2012, p.109). AJK has the second highest literacy rate after Islamabad at 70%, but when it comes to infrastructure and facilities in the schools it is placed at the bottom of the table (AlifAilaan, 2016).

Economically, people of AJK are self-dependent when it comes to earnings, however; government jobs are attractive to the people which not only bring earnings along with an elevated social status. It is perceived that villagers in AJK, especially those who are closer to the LOC, are more prosperous than those on the IAJK side, while online bloggers and debaters show the infrastructure on the IAJK side as stronger than on the Pakistan side (Quora, 2016). However, a lot has changed following the 2005 earthquake which shattered thousands of lives, even a lot of the funds were channelled from Pakistan for the affected persons, families and to build damaged infrastructure (Cheema, 2006).

### **2.5.2 Political and Governmental Structure of AJK**

Azad Jammu and Kashmir has a parliamentary form of government. The president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir is the constitutional head of the state, while the prime minister, supported by a council of ministers, is the chief executive. Azad Kashmir has its own legislative assembly comprising 41 direct and 8 indirect members, a member each from technocrats, mashaiks or Ulama, overseas Kashmiris, plus 5 female members, Rehman, (2011). With this parliamentary system of the government, Azad Jammu and Kashmir's political system also comprises of the Kashmir Council, with the Prime Minister of Pakistan as the Chairman, which consists of 6 elected members, 3 ex-officio members, including the President of AJK (Vice-Chairman of the Council), the Prime Minister of AJK or his nominee, the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, and 5 members nominated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan from amongst the Federal Ministers and Members of Parliament (Rehman, 2011; Snedden, 2014; AJ&K portal).

### **2.5.3 Administrative Structure**

The administrative and political structure of Azad Kashmir is organised into three administrative divisions including Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad, Rehman (2011). The divisions are further divided into 10 districts and 30 sub-districts or *tehsils*. Local government is made up of 11 municipal committees, two municipal corporations, and 201 union councils, covering 2,000 villages, which are more populous than the cities (Rehman, 2011). Despite such a highly developed political infrastructure the status of Azad Kashmir as a sovereign state is still questioned by academics, because the state's foreign affairs, defences, postal services, travel documents and currency are administered through Pakistan (Rehman, 2011; Schofield, 2000).

Puri (2012) notes how the Pakistani establishment portrays AJK as an independent country because it has its own Prime Minister and President like any other parliamentary democracy, not as a Chief Minister of a province. However, the powers of the Prime Minister of AJK have always been questionable, when they contradicted any policy of the Pakistani establishment (Puri, 2012, Hewit, 1995; and Choudhry, 2011)

#### **2.5.4 Political Parties**

At present, the dominant trend in the mainstream politics of Azad Kashmir is to grab a share of the corrupt practices that defines the governance in this supposedly free part of divided Kashmir. Overall, the politics in AJK are split into two broader ideological camps: the accession to Pakistan or “*ilhaqi*” or “accessionist” politics juxtaposed against the pro-independent Kashmir or independence politics. The major accessionist parties include Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference, Pakistan People’s Party Azad Kashmir, Azad Kashmir Muslim League and Jamat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir (officially Minhaj-ul-Qur’an also falls under this category, however, their public stance is different from the others). Recently a Public Rights Party has also been formed which has focused on AJK only with a clear motivation to establish a distinct Kashmiri identity, however, to contest elections a declaration of accession to Pakistan is required (Rehman, 2011).

##### **2.5.4.1 Election Process and Importance**

Politically, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir government is elected through a public vote held every five years. This electoral process always raises questions regarding its legitimacy, and the extent to which fair processes are deployed by the sitting government in Islamabad along with the dubious practices of local politicians who use large sums of money and *biraderi* sentiments to influence the outcome of the election. The role of the *biraderism* will be discussed in the coming section in detail, however, briefly it is always expected that the party

in power in Islamabad will help their counterpart in AJK to establish their government, mainly with 12 seats from Kashmiri refugees settled in Pakistan as a ‘gift’ (Puri 2012, p.51). The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (now known as the Muslim League Nawaz PML-N) always helped their like-minded Muslim Conference (MC) colleagues in AJK. However, they have setup their own chapter in AJK after breaking MC as PMLNAJK (Puri, 2012). The Pakistan People’s Party of Bhuttos has also exercised this practice many times, as their counterparts have shown more loyalty to their Pakistani leadership.

These three parties have been in power, however, there are also 35 registered political parties in AJK (See Appendix IV) but some of them cannot participate in the electoral process which does not accept the Accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and are thus, not allowed to participate in the elections (Rehman, 2011; Choudhry, 2012). Newberg (1995, p.62) states that “Azad Kashmiri party politics exists with one eye on Islamabad, one on Srinagar, one on the local population”. Political parties must think about the mood of the government in Islamabad, they must raise the slogans for the freedom of the IAJK, while local issues such as development and jobs are also important, and of course catering for the needs of the *biraderis* has its own importance.

This is where Jamat-e-Islami and other religious movements, which derive from Pakistan, are looked upon suspiciously by the pro-independent elements in the state (Choudhry, 2012). This issue is explored in greater depth in the next section, and examines how space is created by the religious movements in AJK in a Political Process or Political Opportunity Structure defined by the social movement literature.

## 2.6 Pro-Pakistan and Independent Approaches in AJK

Two slogans are famous in AJK, which establish the identity of the Kashmiris for themselves and details their approach to the solution of the Kashmir problem. The first and more dominant slogan is the “*Kashmir Banega... Pakistan*” (Kashmir will become Pakistan), the second one is “*Kashmir Banega.... Khudmukhtar*” (Kashmir will become Independent). Both slogans have a long historical trajectory, ideologically and politically, even before the creation of Pakistan.

The division of the Subcontinent was based on the notion of the ‘Two Nation Theory.’ This means that Muslims and Hindus residing in a unified India, will form two separate states - one for majority Hindus, as India, and the second state for the Muslims as Pakistan (Mawdudi, 1966, p.21). The Muslim Conference, which has been a ruling party in AJK the most, passed a resolution on 19th July 1947, providing for the accession of Kashmir to the future Pakistan (Mawdudi, 1966). When Pakistan was established, and later when AJK was liberated or separated from the wider Kashmir, this party automatically became an advocate of the accession to Pakistan, while in strict terms, its independence is still pending until the Indian Administered region is liberated and joins too. This belief is instilled into the minds of the Azad Kashmiris from a grassroots level, such as, schools, through to government institutions.

Newberg (1995, p.65), contends that “The pictures of the future are derived from a singular Pakistani belief that Kashmiri accession to Pakistan is rightful and even inevitable”. This process has been in practice with the help of the Pakistani establishment, but it was accelerated with heightened religious sentiments in the 1980’s during the period of Zia-ul-Haq's rule in Pakistan from 1978 to 1988 (Hewit, 1995). Islamic sentiments emerging from the centre had a profound effect on Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Zia’s programme of

Islamisation was received by Abdul Qayyum Khan (MC Chief) as a broad-based Islamic agenda and the issue of self-determination was translated into the oppression of Muslims by the non-Muslims (Hewit,1995, p.117). This was the first serious attempt which put far-reaching religious effects on AJK. It was also the time when the US-led jihad, ongoing in Afghanistan against Russia, was institutionalised by the Pakistani authorities (Ahmad, 2009).

The second phase of a huge religious change in AJK commenced when the Afghan jihad succeeded, and Russia was pushed out of Afghanistan. No doubt, many Pakistanis and many Pakistani religious parties participated in the jihad, which also included members of Jamat-e-Islami. These people used the name of the religion and religious ideas to boost the confidence of the fighters. For the Pakistani *jihadis*, the exit route was identified into Kashmir, which Gul terms, a “masterful and cost-effective tactical manoeuvre” (Gul, 2009, p.12). Hewit (1995, p.107) contends that, “A large section of the militant wing of Hizbul-Mujaheddin and JI were Pakistanis charged up, and inspired by the Afghan example”. From this example, the *mujahideen* gathered the courage to win another war through jihad, and liberate another Muslim nation, before entering IAJK: the base camp was already known as AJK.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was already fighting for an independent and secular Kashmir, which was replaced by more religious and pro-Pakistan “Accessionist” movements (Jamal, 2009). Nationalistic viewpoints towards Pakistan, and the solution for Kashmir are completely different from pro-Pakistan ideas, and the contemporary religious movements. This can be seen in this statement from a hard-core nationalist activist from AJK:

“Pakistani establishment must acknowledge that Kashmir does not belong to India or Pakistan, it is not a religious issue. It is not territorial dispute; Kashmir dispute concerns people of Jammu and Kashmir’s unconditional

right of self-determination. Pakistan must not promote Kashmir issue as a Muslim issue or a religious dispute, as it will give rise to extremism and divide people of Jammu and Kashmir on religious lines” (Choudhry, 2011, p.148).

There is an abundance of literature on this issue, however, due to the constraints of this study, it is not possible to delve further into such concerns, because the focus here, is to examine how Islamic movements have been successful to create the spaces in the state in the above mentioned (2.6) scenario. Tahir-ul-Qadri and the movement organised a “Jihad-e-Kashmir” conference in 1990, where they promoted the Kashmir issue differently (Qadri, 1992). Firstly, Kashmir has been an independent Islamic state, centuries ago; therefore, it should be dealt with now as an independent state. Hence, current approaches to independence or accession were considered irrelevant, jihad should be incited for the freedom of Kashmir, not for its accession to Pakistan, and later any plebiscite should include a third option of independence too (Qadri, 1992). However, the opportunity hasn't arisen where the movement could use any such campaign on a large scale as it was deemed to change with the time and changing circumstances and its closeness with the Pakistani authorities. But it must be noted that however, their public stance about Kashmir is closer to self-determination or independent Kashmir but to contest the election in the state they are accepting the terms and condition of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.

Alongside other main political parties which campaign for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, JI became more credible because it worked for Kashmir and sacrificed lives to fight for the Kashmir cause, but when it came to vote, the realities were framed differently. JI contested the first election in the state in 1996 with the hope that they will win some seats based on their service for the Kashmir jihad, although, they managed to secure only one seat out of over 40 seats (Turabi, 1996). Jihad during the 1990's was made sacred for people in

the state, who perceived it as a sacred religious duty. Nationalists, however, started to question its broader aims and objectives for the state, when *jihadi* movements started recruiting people for their *masalik* and linked Kashmiri to Pakistani centres of those movements (Choudhry, 2011, 2013).

Ji has been the most successful movement to create pro-Pakistan sentiments, and whilst not involving themselves in sectarian conflicts openly. However, its promotion of jihad through print media and conferences to mobilise young people had no comparison to any other movements. Jagmohn, (1991) while focussing on IAJK, admits that, “Jammat created a sentiment of pro-Pakistan in the valley which would have not possible amongst some groups of the people” (1991, p174). This also reflects the importance and role of religious movements in AJK for Pakistan and its policy of keeping AJK. Kadian asserts that one option out of many is “for Pakistan is to keep firm control over Azad Kashmir and try to keep its political problems out of the world press” (1992, p.145).

On the other hand, Hewitt believes that Pakistan “normalised” Azad Kashmir within its own constitutional framework as a “quasi-autonomous zone” (1995, p.111). This study has been using the term Administered Kashmir but Snedden (2012) rightly called it more as “Pakistan-integrated” Kashmir rather “Pakistan-Administered”, which of course will have far reaching implications on the long-standing issue within the United Nations. This process of integration happened through many ways, such as, legislation; to control the democratic process, lenient officers to control the government institutions and, finally, through religion and religious movements to control the masses and ideas. Regarding the legal relationship of Pakistan to Kashmir, as Mahmud, (2011, p.119) asserts that, “there are some inherent contradictions in the constitution itself, which is contrary to Pakistan’s traditional stand on Kashmir as well as against the spirit of the UNSC resolutions” but still a pro-Pakistan approach is dominant in AJK.

Kadian (1992) and Vernon (1995) may be accurate in saying that the political (constitutional) rights given to Indian Kashmiris are greater than the Pakistani Kashmiris, while on the other hand, Pakistan has been more successful to integrate Azad Kashmir into Pakistan, by keeping the grievances minor when compared to India. As shown in the beginning of the section, there doesn't exist a single movement or party which supports or fights for accession of Kashmir to India.

## **2.7 *Biraderism: A Division and Identity***

*Biraderi*, *biradari* or *baradari* identity plays a vital role in the state on almost all levels, even in some government documents, such as land revenue, police and courts where *Biraderi* or caste of the individual is recorded clearly. However, the word used for this is “*qawom*”; in strict Urdu it means nation, but it is understood as a caste or *biraderi*. Rehman (2011) describes *Baradari* as a Persian word meaning ‘brotherhood’ and originating from the word *baradar* meaning ‘brother.’ Snedden (2012, p.130) warns that “*biradari* is not to be confused with the Hindu concept of caste (*varna*), which is based on “hierarchy”, as Chatterjee and Sharma assert that according to the Hindu caste divisions, it means more as “the superiority of the pure to the impure” (1994, p.3).

Snedden (2012) contends that Islam, which is the state religion of AJK, does not sanction *biradari* in the Koran, in the same way as some Hindu scriptures explains the caste system. However, it will be discussed later how religion and contemporary ideas of the movements are dealing with this acute cultural phenomenon. It must be noted that there are some influences of the Hindu culture of the caste system on the application of the *biraderi* patronage, or more broadly *biraderism*. Changing the *biraderi* is considered an awkward practice, however; it is changed for several reasons. Fawque (1933) gathered many court cases to show several reasons people changed their castes mainly to enter agricultural groups

or majority groups. In the contemporary AJK minority *biraderi* sometimes change or use different titles to reflect their affiliations with some influential groups.

The *biraderi* or caste system started mainly with economic professions; over the centuries it evolved to include the blood relations in the same economic group (Rao, 2000). Bonney, while exploring British Kashmiris, defines *biraderis* in these words: “Kinship groups encompassing immediate and extended family bloodlines” (2014, p.16). However, there is a smaller but also another significant system inside the *biraderis*. This is a sub-caste or *zat*, *jator* or *gote*, which seems a closer comparison to the caste system, or as Snedden describes “a group united by kin and/or shared blood” (2012, p.130). These definitions must not be confused with the existing tribal system which is different.

Chatterjee and Sharma (1994) describe tribes as mainly understood in terms of territorial boundaries, at least in matters of influence and hegemony. When the caste is viewed in sociological and political terms, the focus is directed towards the ‘ism’ or *biraderism*. In this case, a larger conception of *biraderi* plays a more significant role in different fields of life, most importantly, in politics and social cohesion inside the *biraderi*.

The role played by *biraderi* or more specifically *biraderism* is very significant in AJK which dominates almost every aspect of socio-political life for Kashmiris. Politics is the main field where *biraderism* operates on a large scale. Politicians mobilise their voters based on the *biraderi* (Snedden, 2012; Shabbir, 2013; Rehman, 2011). A fear is created amongst the *biraderi* that, if a candidate of the *biraderi* is not elected in the elections then the whole *biraderi* will be deprived of the jobs and other privileges derived from governmental institutions. Most of the time candidates of the majority *biraderis* win the elections, no matter how frequently they change their party and ideological basis, if there are any.

Contrary to the above-mentioned situation, there are always special groups inside the *biraderis* who enjoy most of the privileges when their desired *biraderi* candidate is elected. Puri (2012) calls this a “pajero group” which exists everywhere in the state; sometimes these people have no clear earning sources other than looted resources from government institutions, as their share from the main politicians. These issues are articulated by the political parties against each other as ills but it is an undeniable hidden reality which exists in the political field of the AJK.

In contradistinction, Islamic revival and political movements consider *biraderism* infiltrated with corruption as a disease, which only can be remedied when people vote and join real democratic and morally upright politics that are serving the state and people, even if they are not part of the government. The role of the castes in politics is well explored in India. Baskar and Wyatt, (2013, p.102) quote Mechilutti (2008) who asserts its importance in politics: “Identities based on substance make mass mobilisation among a large group much easier, especially when ritual differences internally dividing a caste are set aside”.

Most of the literature about the use of the *biraderi* or *biraderism* portrays this as a negative phenomenon, whereas, the aim of this study is not to offer moral determinations. Apart from its use in politics, *biraderi* plays a huge role in other aspects of social life. Most marriages take place within inter-*biraderi* networks, disregarding whether they have any previous links from one district to other. When the marriages are arranged in the intra-*biraderi*, or most importantly a boy or girl decide against the wishes of the parents, they are opposed firstly at the family level, then from the *biraderi*.

Mandal (2009,) asserts that *biraderism* “places the demands of the extended family above all else. Individuals are subordinated to it, and behaviour is regulated by the concepts of honour

and shame, which inhibit actions that might threaten the cohesion and self-identity of the family”.

This is one dimension, although *biraderi* can be used positively for different occasions, as it brings people from the same *biraderi* clan, closer easily, and through self-imposed constraints of moral responsibility and loyalty. People help their own *biraderi* fellows financially and socially during times of need, to maintain the respect and honour of the whole *biraderi*. Such factors, will be explored in further detail within the discussion chapter, by applying the primary data gathered for this study.

Apart from the above mentioned social division of the habitants of the AJK there exist some other divisions and identities amongst the Azad Kashmiris. Newberg (1995, p.63) classifies “three habitants in the state, one who originally lived there, those who arrived after 1947, later 1965 and 1971, also a victim of most recent conflict”. Apart from these, there are Kashmiris who are settled in different parts of Pakistan, mainly in Punjab and can play their role in the political and social matters of the state. There are also internally displaced people mainly from the areas near the LOC (line of control) settled in different cities or near the cities, which are considered as ‘*muhajir*’ or immigrants by the local population, even though their original homes are only a few miles away. However, the further they go, the more estranged they are considered.

Aftab Khan (unknown) explains this divide on different levels which also has some role in political and governmental structures:

In AJK, the ethnic divide is arguably based on our Districts and Divisions. For example, on the basis of districts - Sudhnuti v Poonch, Bagh v Havaili, Mirpur v Kotli, Bhimber v Mirpur, Muzaffarabad v Hattian or Neelum v Muzaffarabad. I would argue that political allegiances have a far stronger

influence on the basis of districts rather than racial identities where sharing resources or political positions of power matters. Similarly, the trend can be identified between divisions: Poonch Division v Muzaffarabad Division; Mirpur Division v Muzaffarabad Division and also on other alternatives groupings such as AJK people v Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) from Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir v Refugees settled in Pakistan.

Islamic movements are working in the presence of all the above-mentioned differences and groups, yet they are using a range of different strategies and approaches to tackle these issues. However, the main umbrella or source of all these approaches comes from Islam, and specifically, an interpretation of Islam which is being introduced differently from understandings of the faith which the Kashmiris are used to.

## **2.8 Conclusion**

The aims of this chapter were to explore the background of AJK for two reasons: firstly, to explore the socio-political background through which, and against which, the movements are operating for the social change. A term like “social change” or “development” in sociology or political science has just about as many meanings as readers and writers” (Rosser-Owen, etl, 1976, p.10). However, development also can be explained to include many dimensions, such as economic development, construction of large motorways and bridges, but on the other hand it also includes health and education standards of a nation which is considered as a real and long lasting development (Habib, 1963). In this research both meanings are used but based on the visions of the Islamic movements active in AJK. The aim was to provide a picture to enable an assessment of how state political structures are perceived as either as a

hurdle or a facilitator for the emergence of the movements. Secondly, a further objective was to explore the religious and cultural background of the society where these groups operate, promote their ideas and vision for the society. In the latter part of the study, data analysis can highlight the extent to which the strategies and approaches of the movements are useful for this society.

After studying the historical background of AJK in Sections (2.1) and (2.2), it can be concluded that AJK has its own history aside from that of Pakistan and India. AJK has a special status within Pakistan. Despite many criticisms and legal issues, Azad Kashmir is integrated into Pakistan through different socio-political, structural and institutional links, where religion and religious movements are also part, which was observed in Section (2.5) and its subsections. The study links the historical background of the state to more contemporary developments, such as, the status and political affairs of the state.

As mentioned above, the government set up in AJK on 24th October 1947 was an emergency provision during the war, a 'War-Council,' rather than becoming a proper government to run the socio-political affairs of the state (Snedden, 2012). Later, when the war ended, and people and political establishments provided an environment required a set up to run the system it was declared a 'Base camp' for future struggles to secure the freedom of the remaining part of the state. However, the politics of *biraderi* and self-interest have made this territory a 'race camp' to grab and control resources and to develop the status quo, utilised by certain groups of people.

Religiously, AJK or Azad Kashmir has different religious interpretations and traditions, some derive from historical backgrounds, whilst others are quite contemporary and still flourishing. Sufi forms of Islam, or *tasawwuf*, provides a dominant religious feature of the AJK state which was introduced from the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> century when Islam was established by

the Sufis in the region. However, with the passage of the time this religious tradition started to decline, due to the inactive and irrelevant approaches of the *pirs* to the society and people. Section (2.4.1) presented new developments in the Sufi traditions in the AJK, as mediation between man and society and a departure from the mere mediation between man and God.

Section (2.6) presented different political approaches in AJK including independent and pro-Pakistan groups, and their role in the political affairs of the state. This also appeared as a very important feature of the state and society which will be analysed with the ideology of the movements later in the study. Section 2.7 presented different aspects of the *biraderism* or caste and kinship culture of the AJK society, culture here means the shared beliefs and understandings mediated by and constituted by symbols and language of a group or society. (Zald, 1999, p.262). *Biraderism* appeared to be the main feature which is very significant in almost all the collective affairs of the people.

The study will be investigating, in the light of this background chapter, how the religious movements utilise social spaces to achieve their vision for society, and what the realities on the ground constitute, along with how they operate. The three groups will be seen as Islamic social movements; therefore, the study aims to explore and understand how religiously motivated values function through their social visions to shape or transform a society, which utilise socio-political structures and features, discussed previously above.

## CHAPTER THREE

### EMERGENCE OF THE CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN AJK

#### **3.0 Introduction**

In the previous chapter, the socio-political and religious fabric of the Azad Kashmiri society was explored. It is deduced that AJK holds specific features of politics, religion and culture which make Azad Kashmir what it is today. This study focuses on the 'Religio-social Movements' that are seeking to bring changes to the AJK society. These movements utilise diverse tactics to implement their visions of Islam and Islamic society deploying a variety of methods. The chapter refers mainly to the literature of the movements under investigation. Other available literature and important field work data related to the movements in the AJK will also be used to bridge the missing links.

The aim of this chapter is to explore three main Islamic movements which are part of the study. Section 3.1 will offer detailed background information on the AJK Islamic movements, both organised structures, and most importantly, discuss less formal means of imparting Islam.

Prior to the above discussion, Islamic concepts or approaches which derive from inside Islam will be studied. In the Section 3.2 Concepts of Islamic revival, reform and renewal will be studied to understand how these approaches are understood, and provide catalysts to the emergence of the Islamic movements. In the section 3.2.1, the focus will be on the formation of the organised phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and the need for the Islamic movements for the above-mentioned revival and reform for the Muslim religion and its societies.

However, the focus of this chapter will firstly explore the Gulhar Sharif Movement, a Sufi Tariqa, which is an apolitical movement, which utilises several strategies to promote its Islamic vision for the AJK society. As a home-grown Kashmiri Islamic movement, this

movement will be presented in Section 3.3. Secondly, two Islamic movements, Jamat-e-Islami and Minhaj-ul-Qur'an will be studied. These organisations utilise politics and other social institutions, such as, education, health and welfare, in the name of Islam, as their main strategies to disseminate their vision of Islam in society. Different aspects and approaches applied by Jamat-e-Islami, and its founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, will be studied in Sections 3.4 to 3.4.6.

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an requires a deeper exploration because it is a new movement which is absent in the academic literature. However, the strategies deployed are similar to Islamic social movements in the wider Muslim world. Its formation, religious discourses of its founder, and its aim and objectives will be studied in sections (3.5 to 3.5.8). To summarise the discussion throughout this chapter conclusions will be presented in Section 3.6.

### **3.1 Contemporary Islamic Movements in AJK**

Most of the studies on South Asian Islam have been focussed on the organised or formal Islamic movements, whilst regional or informal Islamic reformism has been neglected (Osella and Osella, 2007). It appears important to focus on this regional and informal Islam, as a background, before starting with the organised and formal Islamic movements.

Religious movements can be divided into many categories based on their religious identities such as *aqaed* or religious doctrines, background and activism. Traditional movements are focused on Islamic education and they perform their tasks through *madrasa* education, while setting up new *madrasas* as a charity, and building mosques. Ultimate aims are to enhance and promote their religious objectives and increase their levels of influence within the community. They aim to encourage the local population to send their children to their *madrasa* for Qur'anic education, either full or part time, after or before school, for a session of an hour or so, mostly free of charge. *Madrasa* and mosques are the type of resources

which help to create a power-base for the traditional Islamic movements. Such type of movements represents popular and local forms of Islam (Lapidus, 1983) and these movements in the AJK belong mainly to the Bareilvi, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith traditions. *Ulama*-led, these movements are known as “inward-looking” revivalist movements and mostly form around religiously educated people. The first two, mentioned initially above, are Alim-Sufi movements, whereas, the latter are literalist, intellectual movements (Naeem, 2009; Metcalf, 1941; Sanyal, 1999).

The second type of movements are the Sufi chains or *tariqas* and come from two classifications of the Sufis, type one which is concerned with the Shari‘a law, and type two Sufis are heavily shrine and *karamat* or miracle oriented, (Lapidus, 1983). However, the first category is not visible as the role of the Sufis has been reduced from the elite class, which they previously enjoyed with the political ruling class over the centuries, supplanted by the arrival of the new Western qualified ruling elite.

These movements have three types of approaches in the AJK, firstly; they will build their own institutions and base centres linked with a shrine of their elders which also includes a mosque and a religious educational institution. This will facilitate a relationship with their *murids* through the shrine and shrine based activities. In the second scenario, they will not directly establish an institution, but rather will support a local mosque or *madrassa* of like-minded companions, or of their *murids* anywhere in the society. This support will not be financial but can be moral, or may only consist of appreciation, hence, some itinerant Sufis fall into this category.

The third type of Sufi, are those who are more active and have both human and financial resources which include a wider sphere of influence in the society. They will try to spread their networks of mosques and *madrasas* either on a full-time basis, or as evening and

morning classes in the wider society. Whilst, at the same time, facilitating the teaching staff and *imams*, or those who are taught and trained according to the principles of the movement or *tariqa*; which is a chain of a Sufi order. In this case, the committee which is responsible for the financial resources consists of local people, most being *murids* of the present Sheykh or the *tariqa*. These Sufis are more organised and use different organisations, which is a new intervention in AJK Islam, previously discussed in the last chapter.

The third type of the movements are not traditional, or heavily based on the Sufis, and occasionally, may be classed as anti-Sufi movements. These movements are considered as “political” Islamic movements in the local context, and are more organised movements with a clear manifesto. These movements are not based overwhelmingly in a mosque and *madrasa*, like many traditional groups are, however, they utilise all other Islamic symbols of identification. They are sympathetic with mosques and *madrasas* of like-minded traditional movements, whilst those that don’t have their own institutions will link themselves with the types of centres, but might not be interested in establishing their own brand of mosque or *madrasas* as a priority. One reason might be that these are not well established in the society yet, and do not have their own trained and influential people locally to run these types of institutions. Secondly, it seems that to run a mosque or *madrasa* they must be transparent and show their affiliation with a specific sectarian background such as Barelvi, Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith in Sunni Islam. However, it can change at anytime because the mosque has huge importance, and in society are both based as a permanent resource and preserve religious sentiments.

In this chapter, two movements of the last category will be explored as Islamic revival movements or Islamic political movements; Jamat-e-Islamic and Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and another Sufi movement from the first category, which is also actively mediating between man

and society, but uses different strategies from the first two. This movement can be understood as an apolitical Sufi revivalist or renewalist movement, as seen in the last chapter.

### **3.2 Islamic Revival, Renewal and Reform**

Three movements were selected from AJK that are active in different fields in AJK to bring changes to the society and build a society using their own Islamic vision. For this purpose, they utilise different strategies, tactics and religious interpretations and explanations as a catalyst to mobilise the people. By revivalism, the researcher means, making the religion relevant to the larger society and taking it away from stagnation to activism in the changed circumstances, which is closer to Nasr's (1997, p.3) assertion: "Islamic revival as a social movement".

This study focuses on the Islamic revival in a specific location, however, as Yadegari (1986, p.38) contends that:

"Revivalism is a world-wide movement. It arose from a need to find solutions to problems facing oppressed peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The blacks of America also face problems similar to Third World nations. The basic problem is the social, political, and economic conditions of these oppressed people".

Hence, it has many faces and from local and global perspectives, it depends upon different factors, such as, the circumstances people face, and most importantly, is led by movements, intellectuals or by a free thinker. Revival, reform and renewal are used interchangeably in the classic Islamic literature; however, they have different literal meanings and scope. Contemporary intellectuals such as Fazlur Rahman (2000) and Osella and Osella (2007) contend that reform, or more specifically reformism is particularly troublesome as a term,

because it covers diverse scopes, but it must be noted our focus is on Islamic activism by the Islamic activists not by the intellectuals at large. In this study *Ihya* and *Tajdid* will mean simply revival and renewal, it is to re-activate or resurrect religious traditions and make them relevant to the people and their affairs. Reform will be used in the meanings of *islah* or straightening both individuals' behaviours and religious practices for the Islamic revival as an end goal as classified by Haj (2009).

A movement can be either a reformist or renewalist movement by choosing the way of changing some religious elements in the practices and beliefs of the people through reform or *islah* for the broader aim of Islamic revivalism. When it is promoting an ideology of returning to the practices of a perfect past, Islamic traditions and legacy, both religious and socio-political, will be classified as an Islamic revivalist movement. When the same movement is talking about leaving some aspects or practices or adopting more or different practices, that becomes a reformist movement. So, reform either in the practices and beliefs or reforming the intellectual heritage or Islamic sources by the intellectuals both will lead to the Islamic revivalism which is an end goal of every movement.




Figure 3.1

Today's revivalism has two different dimensions, one is the eradication of some Western influences and focuses on secular governments (Lapidus, 1983) and second is offering the alternative socio-economic models to those governments, (Zubaida, 2009; Robert, 2002; Wickham, 2002). Yadegari (1986 and 1989) mentions Ali Shariati in the similar terms, that in the process of reform, when it comes to the local context, the Islamic movements make it specific with religious aspects, whereas it should be general and should cover the whole society in the respect of keeping socio-cultural aspects of the society in the mind. Islamic revivalism consists of several modes and dimensions.

The three examples in practice are: revivalism by the political Islamic movements, or those that intend to have the political power to implement a socio-political Islam in a state. The second example is of the traditionalists, those who are more concerned with religious practices, beliefs and piety of the masses and of course if the government system falls under

this it is advantageous. The third type is of the radical Islamic movements, those that want to implement or impose Islam by using violent means (Iskauskaite, 2012, p.105).

This study is only focusing mainly on the first and then on the second type of the movements and their strategies in the light of the social movement theory, which falls under the “eclectic” state of Muslim thought (Al-Alwani, 1994, p3-4) which covers socio-political and socio-economical dimensions of the Islamic movements. As it is clarified that Islam has two main dimensions; ‘mystical intuition’ and ‘role of the man on this earth’, the first approach can be studied using theological and philosophical methods, while the second one, requires applying historical and sociological methods, which this study aims to achieve (Shariati, 1997, pp.60-61).

### **3.2.1 What is the Practice: Revivalist Movements or Individual *Mujjadids*?**

In the classical literature on the Islamic revivalism, the focus has been on the role of individual revivalists throughout the Islamic history, however, from the nineteenth century onwards the trend shifted to the revivalist movements (Saeed, 2006; Lahoud, 2005). There is a lot of literature on the approaches and focus of the Islamic revivalists in the different fields of Islam and Muslim lives.

Mawlana Mawdudi, like many other revivalist writers, invokes the built-in system of Islamic revival which does not only give justification for reviving Islam, but also a requirement based on the *hadith* of the Prophet that: “At the head of every century someone will come and revive the religion of Islam” (*Hadith*, 1535 Abu Dawud). Mawlana Mawdudi (1987) and Tahir-ul-Qadri (1996) both maintain there can be one person, a movement or movements.

This matter can be elaborated further while assessing the role of the individual revivalists as free thinkers and as organised movements for Islamic revivalism.

The movements seeking revivalism both highlight pros and cons. A movement will collectively mobilise many people and resources to change some aspects in the society, which has greater chances for success, but on the other hand, it will create more division and polarisation in the society which is against the basic ethics of Islam and the concept of *ummah* or a wider Muslim community. Over time, the movement will enclose itself in a shell of its members with separate identity-based loyalties and *'asabiyat*. Again, sometimes the movement becomes more important for the committed activists than the aims it supports for broader society and Islam. Furthermore, there are different types of movements providing a range of perspectives, such as, either state or society and their use of strategies, both violent and non-violent. However, currently, non-violent movements are more popular but measuring their success in the political field is a matter of further exploration beyond Olivier Roy's approach (Al-Sayyid, 2003).

While coming to the individual revivalists and reformers as free thinkers it can be viewed from Al-Ghazali to Iqbal who have made a huge impact at different levels. In the contemporary political arena of the Islamic states; Iran is considered as the most significant intervention. But, the Iranian revolution was a product of the earlier teachings of the free thinkers, such as, Ali Shari'ati (Yadegari, 1983). Another example can be given of Pakistan which was established based on a "Two-Nation Theory," which was initiated by Muhammad Iqbal (Mawdudi, 1966).

Individual thinkers or revivalist and reformists had the advantage of being less controversial and on the other hand the ability to think freely and change views according to the circumstances while keeping the focus on the broader society rather than their own members

as receivers of the message. This also can be linked with academic intellectuals or those who are critical of the revivalists and reformist approaches, but they only managed to spread their influence in the academic circles rather than to the masses (Saeed, 2006; Rahman 2001).

The politics of recognising someone as a revivalist itself is a matter of exploration, for instance, for one author a specific intellectual will be a revivalist, but for someone else a cause of Islamic decline. Mawdudi (1987) calls this *Mujaddid* and *Mutajaddid* as the earlier is true but later is false. Similarly, the same is the case with the Islamic movements and counter movements; all Islamic movements will be called Islamic revivalist movement but some of them will be in the response of existing revivalist movements (Isik, 1981). In the rest of the chapter and coming sections, three Islamic movements will be explored looking at their emergence, arrival in Kashmir and their vision in general, and for AJK society. The study will begin with the Sufi *tariqa* which appeared as a more local or indigenous movement in the AJK, and then progress to consider, Jamat-e-Islami and, finally, offer a discussion of Minhaj-ul-Qur'an.

### **3.3 Khanqah-e-Fatehiya: Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif Kotli AJK**

Khanqah-e-Fatehiya, more famously known as Hadhrat Sahib and *Pir* Sahib of Gulhar Sharif is a *Naqshbandi Tariqa* located in Kotli City, exerts a huge influence, specifically, in the district of Kotli and Mirpur and all over AJK, in general. In this section, the study will discuss the *tariqa*'s historical emergence and affiliation with Sufi traditions, alongside its role in the regional society from the time of arrival in Kashmir. However, this movement will be mainly considered in the light of the popular Islam of the *pirs* and *mazarat*, on the one hand, and as a holder of shared beliefs held by 'the host Barelvi community' of AJK, on the other hand, features which were discussed in the last chapter.

### 3.3.1 Family History of Hadhrat Sahib

Unlike most of the population of the Indian subcontinent that mainly derives from the same biological and religious continent of Hinduism or Buddhism, the Sufi or *pir* families link their origins generally to an early spiritual dignitary, and specifically, biologically with the Holy Prophet or his family (Lewis, 1985). It is based on the concept of *barakah* or charisma and confers the automatic right to the next leadership succession from the same family lineage of the *pirs*, (Kalambach, 2008, p.41). Most of the times this system of shrines and *pirs* is controlled by inherited living *pirs* in Pakistan and AJK (Ewing, 1983).

The family history of Hadhrat Sahib of Kotli is also described in hagiographies, providing evidence that this family comes from the lineage of the first Caliph, Abu Baker Al-Siddique, through his son Abdur Rahman. This branch (Al-Bakri Al-Siddiqi) originally ruled Yemen and left its governance to spread the *din*. This love for the *din* and knowledge brought them out of the Arabian Peninsula and into Iran, Hindustan, and finally into Kashmir (Mujjadadi, 2009; Naqasgbandi, 2014; Saeed, 2015). Hagiographical literature shows that many people from this family lineage have been employed in different posts, such as, administrative roles, including the governorship in Yemen, and members of the judiciary in Iran and India, while others held academic positions, such as teaching (Saeed, 2015). After leaving the Governorship of Yemen the *tariqa* established their own School of *Hadith* in Medina from which the famous Sufi of sub-continental India, Baha-ul-Din Zakriya, (1170-1268) graduated (Jamil, 2014, interview).

The most famous person of this family who arrived in Kashmir and settled there, is known as Qadhi Fatah-ul-Allah (d.1677). He arrived in Mirpur district at the request of the local Muslim ruler of the area to perform the duties as a *Qadhi* or judge. He was the one who built the first mosque in the Mirpur District (Saeed, 2015, p.18). This was the first mosque built by

any Muslim in the District, and was the beginning of a movement which is based on the building of hundreds of mosques and *madrasas* in the Azad Kashmir region, and still, the numbers are growing. People who benefitted from these institutions are in the thousands and they are employed in many walks of life, like; *huffaz* (Qur'an memorisers) Imams, teachers, lawyers, doctors, and so forth. But, the most important ones are those who are their disciples in the Sufi *tariqa* and connected with the centre, and actively involved in the social and missionary activities of the 'silent movement' (Shahid, 2014, interview).

Historically, Lewis (1985) elaborates that "in the early history of Indo-Pak, *pirs* were not only religious elite but the part of the political elite" (p.46), but during changes due to colonisation, the role of *pirs* was reduced only to the religious elite. This seems the case with this movement which comes both from the religious and political elite. As seen by the arrival of the revival and reform movements, the questions were posed by the new movements regarding their beliefs and practices. In the AJK context, Sufi *tariqas* or chains and shrines have been much different in many aspects; they were not known as a "social movement," rather individuals linked with a shrine or individual *pir*. However, this situation is changing since 1980, as was seen in section (2.3.1). The movement operates separately from the government and governmental institutions. This *tariqa* has made a huge impact on society, the results of which will be explored in Chapters Six and Seven. A Sufi movement, like this one, might oppose many policies and changes introduced by the government, but their forms of reaction will be different than that of recognised social movements and political parties.

Contemporary Sufi movements like this, utilise different strategies and tools to bring about positive change in society, expecting to build a society centred on their perceived vision, derived from Islamic sources including the Qur'an, hadiths, *sira* and a history of pious Muslim predecessors. If it is known that Islamic activists are more concerned with Islamic

history, rather than with any specific theories of change or modern methods for introducing change, then it will be true about this type of the “silent movement”.

Naqshbandi literature, such as, books and magazines also include topics of worship, piety, *barakah*, history of the elders and the *karamat* of the Sufis, as these matters are very hard to understand using any scientific approaches (Lewis, 1985). Sikand (2011) concludes that the downfall of the *pirs* started with their involvement with the affairs of “the other world” and by ignoring matters concerning people in this world, however, when it comes to their adherents these mystical ideas about *barakat* and *karamat* played a vital role to motivate individuals to engage with religious practices and activism (Elias, 2000; Safi, 2000; Robinson, 2000). The activists’ emphasis is more on the living Sufi and connection with him as an emotional entity, furthermore, religious practices, such as, *dhikr* or *adkaar*, as prescribed by the Sheykh and other daily compulsory prayers, are all special characteristics of *tasawwuf* and Sufism.

### **3.3.2 Teachings of the Movement**

The pioneer writers of *tasawwuf* literature used philosophical approaches which helped *tasawwuf* to enter other prevailing philosophical ideologies of the time, like Ghazali (d.1111), Ibn-e-Arabi (d.1240) amongst many others (Metcalf, 1982; Ghazi, 2002). Contemporary Sufis especially those who are shrine-based in the AJK don’t involve themselves in the intellectual and philosophical discussions relating to mystical topics in the Sufi tradition. Lapidus (1983, p.10) asserts that: “Sufism cannot be defined generally but can be described in its special case”. In the case of this movement and many others, normally Sufism will be used for those people who are involved with Sufi *ba’it*, or *ba’ya* and *mazarat* or shrines. This movement, like others, will be studied using the approaches of social movement theories, which will include considering the socio-economic models the movement utilises, which is a

new intervention in a society historically based on *mazarat*, as explored previously in section (2.3.1.).

The literature on recent Islamic activism in South Asia is more influenced and is more inclined towards Salafi or anti-Sufi movements or Deoband and Jamat movements which include political Islam and jihadism (Lahoud, 2005). One reason can be that the emergence of the contemporary Islamic revival and reform comes from the Salafi movements as described by Lahoud, (2005, p.17).

Contemporary Islamic socio-political movements did not come from *ulama* and Sufis (Lapidus, 1983, p.44). One exception applies to Pakistan and AJK about Minhaj-ul-Qur'an; which is a comparatively new movement. A couple of Sufi oriented political parties have been active in politics but have failed to make any huge difference, socially and politically. Some Sufi families participate in Pakistani politics but not based on their own ideology or political agenda, rather they ally with the main political parties to expand their influence in society and then integrate into the mainstream politics. These families are involved in mainstream politics, but not based on furthering Islamic political thought, nor to support a wider Islamic agenda. Instead, it has helped them to strengthen their own educational institutions, mainly *madrasas*.

It appears that there has not been any specific Sufi movement involving change, neither to ensure political or social change based on theological theories of revivalism and reform in AJK. Individual Sufis and shrines had an influence on society, but that is mainly aimed at linking individuals to the shrines or Sufis, or as Robinson (2000) contends, mediating between man and God rather than focusing on society and any specific social elements at large. However, this movement will be explored using the approach of mediating the man to the society.

Unlike the other two movements, this movement is different in many aspects as was described above. Their literature is also different from target-oriented religious movements which are based on promoting ideology, aims and objectives, and organisational structure. Literature of these Sufi movements comes with a different focus that mainly covers, as Safi (2000, p.265) presents, “Life, Times and Works”, however, very little attention is paid to the social role the Sufis play. Most attention is directed towards their family history and mystical stories or mystical encounters between the Sheykh and disciples; others are small pamphlets called *malfuzat* to memorise prayers and *adhkaar* for spiritual up lifting. Spiritual teachings prescribed by the Sufis are more practical than theoretical, so, a disciple who is closer to a Sufi will benefit more and is expected to possess more piety and peace, both inner and outer, i.e. calm, patience and humbleness.

The theme of *ikhlas* or sincerity was observed throughout the writings which are published by the disciples in the honour of the *khanqah* and Hadhrat Sahib, which means sincerity in *ibadat* and other practices in life. This and many other pieces of advice and counseling for the unsatisfied souls make huge differences in the behavior and lives of the people, while it provides them, and the movement, with wider acceptance amongst the people. Their methods of teachings are somehow contrary to the popular practices of the *pirs*, such as, collecting money from people. In turn, the *ulama* used mosques and *madrasas* mostly for sectarian debates and indoctrination rather than to motivate the masses to inspire sincerity in religious practices. Nasir (2011) rightly asserts that jihadist movements have been considered *mazarat*, centres of *shirk*, but they did not find any such elements in this centre. During the visit to the shrine the researcher also noticed many things different from the shrines everywhere else in the AJK, and Pakistan, as warnings and instructions were displayed clearly to avoid certain practices which are normal on the *mazarat* such as prostrations, mix gatherings and fun fairs around the *mazarat*.

Biographical and other literature shows the methods and techniques the movement uses to motivate and to develop spiritual traits of the activists or those linked with *khanqah*. The approaches and interpretations the movement utilises are not understandable using any scientific theories, because of the mystical nature of the events. Sometimes, Hadhrat Sahib discourages writing about any of these mystical incidents, and declares that the miracles are only from Allah the Almighty, but these types of events are mentioned in the literature (Saeed, 2015, p.61).

However, such miracles or *karamat*, have been accepted and have been very useful for the local population, which can be analysed using sociological approaches, such as the role and use of the ideas in the framing process. The focus of the movement is mainly on the fulfilment of the rituals such as compulsory worship, and secondary devotional activities. This includes both the male and female *sangees (murids)*, like everywhere else in the Sufi *tariqas* or movements, (Kalambach, 2008, p.38), this movement also gives equal status to women. Such inspiration comes from the personality of *Mae Sahiba* or the pious mother of the last Hadhrat Sahib. She had a huge role to maintain the *khanqah* and family, and in the character building of the female devotees (Saeed, 2015).

### **3.4 Jamat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir**

Jamat-e-Islami (JI) is included in this study due to its activities, strong ideological basis and its role in several fields of the lives of the people through networks of the people and organisations. In the coming sections, this movement will be explored historically, through their arrival in AJK, plus, their ideology or vision for an Islamic state and society will be considered. The section will start by contemplating the life of JI's founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, whose personality is central to the formation of the movement and its development.

### 3.4.1 Mawlana Mawdudi: A Prominent Revivalist

Sayyid Abu Al'la Mawdudi also known as Mawlana Mawdudi was born on September 30, 1903, into a pious Muslim family, at Aurangabad in the subcontinent of India (Jameelah, 1973). He started his career as a journalist and worked for numerous newspapers and journals in his twenties. There are controversies about his religious education, some consider him a “self-taught or self educated” Islamic scholar (Saeed, 2006; Jameelah, 1973). There are some reports that he learned Qur'an and Hadith with other Islamic sciences at a Deobandi seminary (Nasr, 1994), which asserted “his force in traditional religious scholarship” (Ali 2004, p.116).

Mawdudi engaged in the practical politics of the Caliphate Movement to restore the Ottoman Caliphate, which was led by the famous Ali brothers [Mohammad Ali Jauhar (d.1931) and Shaukat Ali (d.1938)], soon after the end of the World War One (Jameelah,1973). Mawdudi's curious personality forced him to do somethings more systematically, as after working for some years as an editor for different journals, in 1932 he started his own famous journal, *Terjuman-ul-Qur'an*, in which he tried to present his passionate vision of Islam and Islamic ideology, whereby, he promoted ideas of Islam as a complete code of life. Mawdudi nurtured himself as an Islamic philosopher and political activist through that journal.

Mawdudi's ideas of an Islamic state caused him to create a practical movement to carry forward and implement his ideology. In 1941 he founded Jamat-e-Islami, and this movement encompasses his socio-political and religious ideology and scheme of action (Saulat, 1979). Mawdudi had opposed the partition of India, but, after it came to pass in 1947, he moved to a newly established Pakistan (Nasr, 1994). In Pakistan, he advocated the establishment of an Islamic state more actively by engaging in the political process of the country. There, he continued his ideological ambitions including political and religious debate. Due to his involvement in the mobilisation of a contentious movement he was jailed and sentenced to

death, but later released (Jameelah, 1973). Apart from his political ideology and other publications, including his monthly journal, *Terjuman-ul-Qur'an*, his most famous work is the *Tafhim-ul-Qur'an*: an exegesis of the Qur'an - which linked his ideology derived from the Qur'an, to the masses at several socio-political and religious levels (Saulat, 1979).

### **3.4.2 Jamat-e-Islami: Carrier of an Islamic Agenda**

Jamat-e-Islami was founded in a united India in 1941; its reason and aim as presented in the members' convention:

“The movements and parties those were working in the Muslims; either they didn't understand the objectives of Islam or if they understood and explained their aims, but they chose the tracks which were not leading them to the aim”  
(Mawdudi, 1957, p.22)

This statement reflects his dissatisfaction with the existing Islamic or Muslim movements and parties which included traditional religious sects, such as, Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith and many other Sufi tariqas, and political parties; like the Muslim League (M.L) and the Khelafaha Movement. The problem with the M.L was articulated as Kaashmiri (1989, pp.183-84) describes that Mawdudi believed that although the Muslim League was demanding an Islamic state, they were not preparing for Islamic leadership, which makes the establishment of Islamic state less valuable and not different to any other Muslim majority country ruled with the Western tools of governing, Qasmi, (2010). These ideas were based on the understanding of Islam and interpretations offered by Mawdudi to promote and establish an Islamic state according to his vision of Islam. This would involve establishing a state led by a *Saleh* or a pious leader, equipped with Islamic principles of governance (Nasr 1994). He

firmly believed that, otherwise, there would be no difference, if there is no freedom to implement Islam and to live life according to the teachings of Islam (Mawdudi, 1989).

The explanations and interpretations Mawdudi provided were not unique to the sub-continental Islamic revivalism movements. However, his methodology and framework were new, and different in the form of the movement, and by presenting Islam as a complete code of life, supported by a deeper Islamic ideology (Ahmad, 1973). Kaashmiri (1989, p.155) takes this further by stating that: “Others chose one aspect or a mundane objective, but we (Jamatis) are rising up with real and complete Islam”. He initiated a movement for his agenda to carry it and implement it wherever they had a chance to do so.

Moten (2002, p.135) concludes, in the beginning, “the Jamat was an ideological revolutionary movement established to revive and preach Islam...with the creation of Pakistan in the name of Islam gave Jamat incentive to set the foundations of Islamic politics.” But with the migration of the movement’s leadership to the newly created Pakistan under the banner of Islam, it offered the movement the opportunity to demand a genuine Islamic state, as Lapidus (1983) contends, this is the reason why the Islamic revival in Pakistan is so much different from everywhere else in the world. Mawdudi (1968, p.21) presented a theory of Islamic political thought as an “antithesis” of Western secular democracy and political thought.

To explore the identity of the movement under the broad umbrella of Islamic revivalism, further using the Islamic political ideology of the movement it can be called an Islamic political movement. While studying Islamic political movements one can adopt three characteristics of the Islamic political movements as presented by Lahoud (2005, p.16) that a movement will be a political movement which demands to:

- Return to the Islamic principles of the past
- Comprehensive application of Islam in all spheres of life

- Call to bring about an Islamic state and society.

In the coming sections and chapters when words like political Islam, and political Islamic movements are used, it will refer to such movements with the above-mentioned characteristics.

### **3.4.3 Formation of Jamat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir**

As mentioned above, generally known as Jamat-e-Islami (JI) it was established on 26 of August in 1941 in British India (Jameelah, 1969). Rashid (2006, p.356) asserts: “JI is one of the most effectively organised religio-political movements and has played a critical role in shaping the nature and content of Islamic political discourse in Pakistan,” as its branches or chapters were created in other sub-continental countries and mainly Muslim states. Presently, Jamat has six chapters, such as Jamat-e-Islami or JI India, JI Pakistan, JI Bangladesh, JI Sri Lanka, JI Indian administered Kashmir, JI Pakistan administered Kashmir or JI AJK and JI Gilgit Baltistan, although, sometimes it is considered part of JI AJK. These established chapters refer to Mawlana Mawdudi as the founder and his religious manifestos, as they all follow the same basic literature of the movement for their ideological nurturing.

There is not much literature on the formation of Jamat-e-Islam in both parts of Kashmir except for a few Urdu books, and subsequently, websites of Jamat-e-Islami AJK and J&K. It can be understood from this statement that:

“A few sources attest the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami (AJK-JI), while a few others mention Jammu and Kashmir Jamat-e-Islami, though mainly reference is made to Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami. Hardly any literature is available on the evolution and history of the Jama'at in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. This is unfortunate”. (Global Security, 2011)

Even writers of this organisation failed to differentiate between the formation of JI and history of JI AJK and J&K.

Jamat-e-Islami Azad Kashmir, before this Jamat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, were formed in 1953 as a separate Jamat from JI Hind or India. Though this interaction started long before between individuals from Kashmir and Mawlana Mawdudi, local circles were formed since 1942 first in Jammu Province and then in Kashmir by:

“Tarabi, a theologian and science teacher who was among Islamist ideologue Maulana Abdul Ala Maududi's associates. Saduddin's central concern was freeing Islam in Jammu and Kashmir of the syncretic folk practices, which he, like many religious conservatives, believed had corrupted the essence of the faith”. (Global Security, 2011)

Jamat-e-Islami J&K was established or separated from the JI India due to different political environments (Ahsan, 2014), but Jamat-e-Islami AJK or Azad Jammu and Kashmir was founded much later and through the influence of JI Pakistan. Its main leadership was from AJK and some of those who migrated from IAK to PAJK. JI AJK was established on 13 July 1974, its reason of delayed formation was that the Muslim Conference was the main political party of AJK, as it seems from its name it showed and presented itself close to a religious party. As, the researcher discussed the formation of the Jamat with a senior activist Fazil, who is a senior Jamat leader in AJK, described this in these words:

*Mawlana and leader of Muslim Conference had good terms and he convinced Maulana that they don't need any other religious party in the AJK as they are fulfilling the gap of a religious movement. Because Sardar Abdul Qayyum had the trust of the Jamat and Islamic movements, he was*

*saying that in my presence there's no need for any other Islamic movement on ideological bases. (Fazil, 2014, Interviewee).*

Mawlana agreed that MC was a true alternative of JI in AJK, but that didn't last long because when Sardar Abdul Qayyum got into the government, the Jamat believed that he and his circumstances changed: One point was to make AJK a model Islamic government which was neglected by the MC leadership.

Fazil described these objectives for the formation of the Jamat in AJK:

*It was necessary to move forward the freedom movement, in the final meeting of 1974, 13 July, it was established in Rawalpindi by Mawlana Sadrudeen and Abdul Khaliq, it was on the martyred day. The first aim was to establish a state model of the Holy Prophet and then to work for the freedom of Kashmir, these were two main objectives.*

Both these were principle objectives: and to what extent has Jamat succeeded in achieving these, and, if so, what strategies has it used. These factors are central concerns of this study, which will be explored throughout the following chapters.

#### **3.4.4 Mawlana Mawdudi's Interaction with Kashmir**

Mawlana Mawdudi visited Kashmir for the first time and stayed in Kashmir for about a month, this visit was for religious and preaching activities (Kaashmiri, 1989). He was staying in a small village where a few people were upset by his presence, and declared him Wahhabi (follower of 18<sup>th</sup> century Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia) (Kaashmiri, 1989). Due to these protestations, Mawdudi had to change his residence - this shows the beginning of a movement and the attitudes it promoted. Kaashmiri (1989, p.205) describes circumstances in which the formation of the movement was so important in Kashmir as:

Because of century's ignorance and slavery people had forgotten the true concept of Islamic movement and Islam as a complete code of life, *din* became a mixture of the norms, gifts to the shrines, *Pirs* worships and superstitious beliefs, political leaders were using them in the name of Islam against the Muslims.

It seems such interpretations caused people to believe that Mawlana was a "Wahhabi." Many sections in the constitution of the Jamat in Kashmir, are directly affecting benefits and beliefs *pirs* have instilled into their *murids* or disciples, such as, "don't pray to anyone other than Allah, don't find shelter to anyone, don't ask anyone for help, no one has power in Allah's sultanate either they are Prophets or Awlya" (Kashmiri, 1989, p.31b). These and many other 'Do not's' are clearly for those people who are already Muslims, further, there is a long history of debates on these topics between Barelvi, Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi ulama: on these bases the latter two are declared Wahhabis, by the first one, and by the like-minded, or Sufis (Sanyal, 1999; Metcalf, 1941).

Jamat emerged from the local Kashmiri population as a religious movement which wanted to change beliefs and practices of the people which had been corrupted over the centuries. The Kashmiri society was overwhelmingly under the control of the *pirs* and Barelvi *ulama* which had set criteria that dictated whoever opposes certain practices will be labelled as Wahhabi. In this case, Jamat fell into this category for two reasons, firstly, as the religious interpretations they offered were almost the same, especially regarding the *pirs* and Barelvis, as those that were promoted by Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandis. Secondly, their leadership came from a Deobandi and Salafi background with the same rhetoric, which still seems the case in the AJK on a large scale. Rashid (2006, p.357) also asserts that "the movement has profound links with the conservative Deoband traditions". This will be examined in the light of the role

of culture in the emergence and mobilisation of a social movement by applying the models provided by sociological theories.

The next section will explore the literature of the movement to understand this emergence further, and examine the language/terminology used in the literature and interpretations provided by the movement's founder for *da'wah*, recruitment, and activists driving forward the mission of Islamisation of the state and society.

### **3.4.5 Beginning of Jamat Activities in AJK**

Jamat was formed in AJK, in 1974, however, its activists or trained people were already in AJK from the establishment of the Azad government in 1947 and the bureaucratic system (Kaashmiri, 1989). Mawlana Mawdudi made his first visit to AJK on 6<sup>th</sup> of Nov 1965; this was made following the relief work of the movement's activists in AJK, for the migrants from the IAJK (Siddiqi, 1966). He was honoured and appreciated by the AJK authorities for delivering relief to the affected people (Siqqiqi, 1966). Jamat organised different relief activities including providing food, clothes and setting up eight medical centres. In a few months, 203,306 patients benefitted from these health centres (Siddiqi, 1966). Jamat also set a plan to teach Kashmiri people Islam from that point onwards, but it shows some contradictions, on one hand, they said that Kashmiri people are Islam loving and they had strong emotions for Islam, however, they conceived these emotions temporary; but on the other hand, they said people cannot even read the first article of faith (Siddiqi, 1966, p,231).

This interaction continued for a long time as the ruling party of AJK always recognised relief activities of the movement, and Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan established personal relations with Mawlana Mawdudi (Siddiqi, 1966). The movement kept on evolving; in the 1980's it became involved in Afghan jihad, and then later from the 1990's onward, a Kashmir jihad became the focus. This was the turning point for the movement in AJK - to assert itself at all

levels, as the movement was everywhere in the AJK. Its magazines on Kashmir jihad, such as, “Jihad-e-Kashmir” and conferences referring to the names of the martyred *mujahideen*, played a huge role in its promotion (Turabi, 1996). The movement was involved in the AJK electoral politics for the first time in 1996, with the justification that they had played a role in the jihad so they should have a voice if the Kashmir issue is solved in the near future (Turabi, 1996). Their voice would only be provided if they secured seats in the parliament and they expected to win seven or eight seats, but managed to win only one, which was again due to their services for the jihad Kashmir (Turabi, 1996).

The relief activities started earlier in 1960, were transformed into permanent social welfare institutions with the passage of time and availability of resources. Today, Jamat has the largest social institutions in the AJK, ranging from education to health and welfare, which will be explored in Chapters Six and Seven. This study will try to explore the aims and objectives of the utilisation of these institutions using the social movement theory paradigms, and secondly, the Islamic ideals the movement utilises for the attainment of those goals.

#### **3.4.6 Islamic Discourses of Mawlana Mawdudi**

Mawdudi’s religious interpretations can be divided into different categories and for diverse audiences, which cover a multitude of topics on Islam, but when one delves more deeply, they can be classed under one umbrella term, which can be understood as Islamic revivalism, or reform. In this section, the focus will be on two aspects of Mawdudi’s literature, firstly, on the literature and approaches which were used at grassroots level to teach people about the true nature of the Islamic message, and secondly, his Islamic vision or ideology related to Islamic activism across many fields. It will be explored as a powerful motivational Islamic message in the practical or empirical fields of a Kashmiri context. The role of Islamic ideas for social movement activism is recognised generally in the Muslim world (Wickham, 2004)

but it needs to be explored in the AJK context further, providing attention to the importance of special religious and cultural aspects.

Mawlana Mawdudi offered many unique interpretations and his style of presentation was different from the traditional *ulama*, for instance, he interpreted the concept of *Ilah*, *Rab*, *Ibadat* and *Deen* quite differently, and promoted it passionately (Mawdudi, 1939). Similarly, a book based on his *khutbat*, or lectures, is very simple and it is one of the two books (another one is *dinyat*) which many newcomers or potential members will receive to make sense of Islam and as an introduction to his *da'wah* (Mawdudi, 1937). These lectures are mainly Friday sermons from 1937, for the common people to make sense of Islam and their relationship with it. He used basic concepts of Islam and tried to explain them in very simple and plain language and supported by many examples using local contexts. An example of his message is that one doesn't become Muslim by birth in a Muslim family like a *Brahman* or *Jaat* (a caste) becomes whatever his parents were, but to become a Muslim it requires knowledge and practice of some duties prescribed by Allah (Mawdudi, 1937).

Establishing a link with the Qur'an he gives an example of a letter from someone and a prescription by a doctor. In the case of a letter, if you do not understand it you will need someone who can read for you and tell you what is written on it; you will not keep it in the safe (Mawdudi, 1937). The same with a prescription from a doctor, you will not only read it but will act on what is written on it, as one cannot put it around his neck and expect that it will heal him; instead, one will go and buy the medicine.

Mawdudi's way of teaching can be understood from this that, "the Qur'an, which is a guide to enable Muslims to rule the world and live with respect, but we made it a book to treat magic and such other diseases" (Mawdudi, 1937).

He has used many examples where on occasions he criticised cultural practices and declared them a hypocritical attitude with teachings of Islam or *shirk*. He believes and preaches that it is not possible for a true Muslim to believe in Islam and practice any other system. For him, Islam is a complete religion and it expects a Muslim to become a “complete Muslim” in all his affairs (Mawdudi, 2014). He promotes an idea of a true Muslim, otherwise, there have been many Muslims who were Muslims by name only, instead of giving any benefit to Islam, as they only served to be causes of decay for Islam. To sum this up and link this with Islam, Mawdudi expects Muslims to form governments, and to acquire power or rule, because this is a gift from Allah and this should be only for those who have pure Islamic characteristics, because *din*, in fact, is a name of the government (Mawdudi, 1937).

He was not satisfied with the Islamic studies course offered by the government which covered basic Islamic *fiqh*, *ibadat*, and cleanliness “but they do not know what is Islam, what it is about, what it wants and why it wants, and its relationship with the human and life?” Mawdudi (1937, pp. 1-2). He used many examples of friendship which are relevant to students to motivate, mobilise and activate them for the Islamic cause. He provides an example: “It is like if you have a friend who claims to be your best friend and in time of need he not only denies to offer you help but also joins hands with your enemy or feels happy to see you in trouble he is not your friend same is your attitude with Islam” (Mawdudi, 1937, pp.26-27). If you claim to be Muslims and you don’t help Islam, then you are a hypocrite and not true Muslims.

These types of the motivational ideas make sense for the young students when they are in the golden era of their mental development, as they have curiosities and many questions in their minds. The student organisation was developed with this literature, while their political leadership was nurtured with the same literature, as it is considered exemplary. Today, even

leaders in the other parties when they do something of good character or stand by what is correct, they say proudly that they were trained by Mawlana Mawdudi.

Mawlana Mawdudi filled the gap left by the traditional *ulama*. The language and attitude of those trained in madrasas are different even today, they have a grasp of language and explanation (*tafsir*) whilst enjoying a monopoly in religious education, and its sciences, but on the other hand, it takes them away from the laymen. Hence, the topics they chose are very relevant to the older generation and the type of worship performed only by them. On the other hand, Mawdudi offered an alternative and encompassing the vision of Islam, which aimed to attract all segments of society under the umbrella of Islam, however, political Islam became more visible, which will be seen in the coming section.

### **3.4.7 Political Islam: An Approach or Ultimate Goal**

Mawlana Mawdudi's ideology starts from the rejection of three other ideologies in the world - either present or past. First is atheism, which according to him is "sheer ignorance," illustrating a materialistic code of morality based on a Machiavellian political system (Mawdudi, 1968). Second is polytheistic, which worships many Gods instead of one God, but it has no system to run all affairs of human life (Mawdudi, 1968). The third system is asceticism, as on one hand, it is "anti-Social and on the other, it presents God as a very weak entity by giving the wrong impression about the true God" (Mawdudi, 1968). He embarks on his point of view or Islamic agenda for social, political, economical and religious change after describing other world systems and their problems in detail. He describes Islam as: "An invigorating ethical theory which links up its whole ideology directly with Allah's absolute sovereignty" (Mawdudi 1976, p.23).

Mawdudi presents Islam as a complete code of life and ideology, not only in theory but practically (Mawdudi, 2008). Furthermore, he asserts that this system needs to be

implemented as a power, because without power to enforce, it is meaningless merely to believe in or present a doctrine or a way of life without power as it cannot stick in the minds or stay on the papers (Mawdudi, 1984). However, Khan (1982) believes that the dominance of any system of life comes after the dominance of its thought, therefore, the revival of Islam will happen only in this way. Jamat worked on both lines and still is active for the dominance of an Islamic ideology and a sound system of governance - which will be seen in this study.

Jamat at an early stage in British India was not concerned with politics, as it is now, which Moten (2002) describes. After the creation of Pakistan, Jamat focussed on political Islam however, Islamist ideology, provided, for example, by Qardawi (2008), doesn't accept "political Islam" as a separate thing from Islam. Mawdudi did not accept this and said this (politics) was his aim from the beginning of the movement; he even used very strong language against those who blamed him for such a change (Mawdudi, 1953).

Nasr (1996) also contends that Mawlana Mawdudi became more a politician than an intellectual or scholar, and Jamat turned into a political party from an Islamic movement. While interpreting Islam in Weller's (2007, p.269) words, it can be called a "political instrumentalisation of Islam" on a large scale in the subcontinent. However, it must be noted that he did not only promote his scheme of an Islamic state, path or Islamic revolution, but he also presented Islam as a holistic ideology and offered a structure of an Islamic government in a unique way (Rahnema, 1994, p.106).

When describing the broader concept of 'Islam and Allah' in his famous book '*Khilafat wa Malukiyat*' Mawdudi starts his first chapter presenting Allah's powers regarding the creation and maintaining the universe, and of course, the world (Mawdudi, 2012). He quotes more than 40 Qur'anic verses to assert Allah's powers. He contends that sovereignty belongs to Allah and only Prophets are His representatives on the earth, and so humans are the

vicegerents of the real owner of the earth, (Mawdudi, 2012). As it was mentioned earlier, that *din* is, in fact, the name of the government and that government is required by Allah, or Allah wants Muslims to have the power He gave to the Prophet Muhammad (s) in the form of the Medina state and caliphate of the Four Guided Caliphs.

Qur'anic interpretations and an ensuing practical struggle for them also forced Ahmad (1973) to say that Jamat has become a political party and involved heavily in politics, therefore, before the revival process started it was jeopardised. There is no doubt that Mawlana Mawdudi successfully interpreted the concept of politics from Qur'anic perspectives and made Islamic faith as a form of social action (Rahnema, 1994, p.108). However, on the other hand, it succeeded to motivate a special educated or trained generation with the Jamat approaches. Most people were influenced by traditional Islam and were not affected by such ideas (Lapidus, 1983). This led the Islamic faith to a more ambitious phase which did not concern the common people as Sikand (2011, p.29) believes in the Kashmiri context that, when faith was transformed into an ideology it was reduced more to powerful slogans.

All accounts above show that Jamat started something unique but has not succeeded, as was expected by such Islamic movements in the Muslim world. This is considered a mark of failure of political Islam, regarding the Jamat and other related movements (Nasr, 1996).

### **3.5 Tehreek-e-Minhaj-ul-Qur'an**

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is another Islamic movement of Pakistani origin which is also active in the AJK state at different levels, applying diverse approaches. In the coming sections, the movement will be explored from historical and ideological perspectives and by focusing on its differences and similarities with the JI and Sufi Movement outlined above.

#### **3.5.1 Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri**

Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, also known as Shaykh-ul-Islam, was born on February 19, 1951, in the historical city of Jhang Pakistan, and is the son of Shaykh Dr. Farida'd-Din al-Qadri, who was a doctor by profession, and a deeply active Sufi disciple (Al-Huseini, 1999). He was trained in both the Islamic and secular sciences, simultaneously. Tahir-ul-Qadri started his religious education under his father, and his formal classical education was initiated in Madina at the age of 12, in *Madrassa al-'Ulum Al-Shar'iyya*, (Qadri, 1998), which appears to be related to acquiring blessings. He received a first-class honours degree from the University of the Punjab in 1970. He studied classical Islamic sciences, perhaps *ders-e-nizami*, both from his father and other scholars, which enabled him to understand traditional Islamic sciences and the Arabic language. He earned his MA in Islamic Studies in 1972, from the University of the Punjab with a Gold Medal. After achieving LLB in 1974 he started to practise as a lawyer in the district courts of Jhang (Qadri, 1998). He moved to Lahore in 1978 and joined the University of the Punjab as a lecturer in law, and then gained a Ph.D. in Islamic Law (Hussaini, 1999). He was also a member of the Syndicate Senate and Academic Council of the University of the Punjab, which are the highest executive, administrative and academic bodies of the University (Hussaini, 1999).

*Mujjadad-e-Rawan sadi. ....Tahir-ul-Qadri*, (Revivalist of the current century.... Tahir-ul-Qadri); these are the repeated slogans activists of the movement chant - which the researcher

came across a few times in the UK. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri is a “living” revivalist philosopher, an Islamic scholar, a religious leader, a politician, a political activist and a revolutionary theorist, as perceived by the movement and its activists. These engagements will be explored in Chapters Six and Seven. On this basis, Philippon (2012, p.117) calls him an “all rounder”.

Almost, all literature on his personality, illuminates that he was born after the good news was given regarding the birth of Tahir to his father by the Holy Prophet (Hussaini, 1999). This is almost detailed in all the available literature which discusses his personality. In a pamphlet, “Minhaj-UI-Qur’an International: A Brief Introduction” (date unknown), they describe this phenomenon on the first page in these words: “*His birth had been foretold through a spiritual dream to his father.....his entire life would be devoted to the renaissance of Islam*” (2000). These assertions not only make his personality charismatic for the writers of his biographies (who are also his students) but also for the activists of his movement, which will be discussed later regarding how activists view his charismatic personality.

### **3.5.2 Formation of Minhaj-ul-Qur’an**

Minhaj-ul-Qur’an was founded in Lahore on 17<sup>th</sup> of October 1980, where Dr. Qadri used to deliver his Qur’an lectures. Accounts show that one day he came for his normal Qur’an lecture and informed his audience that he had something to tell them:

Though I have started Qur’an lessons but my aim is not to deliver only Qur’an lectures for the whole life but through these lectures I want to bring about a Global revolution because I want to spread message of the Qur’an, I am moving forward to change the system at the Global level. (Hussaini, 1999, p.144).

This section shows how he was concerned with the world and enthusiastic about his mission and vision he perceived for global Islam. He justifies the formation of another Islamic

movement in the presence of many existing Islamic movements and parties already available in Pakistan, as he believes some of them are sectarian and have limited scopes, whilst others are only working for education, whilst some are only concerned with *ibadat*, and other movements are concerned only with obtaining political power. So, according to him, there was not a single movement which is comprehensive and covers all aspects of Islam, and could offer a proper solution to all the problems (Al-Qadri, 1996).

Dr. Qadri provides justifications from the Qur'an and Islamic history as a basis to establish a movement. He quotes the verse (104:3) which questions if there should be an *ummah*, or a party, or movement amongst you who can promote the good and stop the bad. He describes this order as not specific with regards to only one movement, because it is not possible that everyone will agree with the methods of one movement. Early Islamic history illustrates that the companions had their own groups to represent their opinions (Al-Qadri, 1984).

In terms of semantics, Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is an Arabic name consisting of two parts which mean the 'way or method' of the Qur'an. This name was chosen from a book written by the late Dr. Burnah Ahmad Faruqi (1904-1995), who was also a supervisor of Tahir-ul-Qadri at Punjab University, Lahore (Hussaini, 1999). The influence of Faruqi's writings and approaches on Tahir-ul-Qadri will be discussed later in the chapter.

The logic behind the formation of a new movement is also a matter of interest, it was based on the belief that problems of today's *ummah* are not partial, and by applying limited strategies, one cannot solve the whole issues (Al-Qadri, 2000). Over the last 12 centuries, partial issues were solved with a single strategy, whereas, in the last two centuries, the Muslim *ummah* needs a full programme of change (Al-Qadri, 2000, p.75; 1998 p.131). It is an interesting and different approach from many other Islamic revivalist movements and

thinkers like Mawdudi, as this movement is seeking to rectify the ills from the last two centuries.

According to Dr. Qadri, problems emerged after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate when the Islamic world order was changed into a Western one, and then an American world order dominated (Al-Qadri, 1994). He believes this was the problem and Muslims must redress this balance in favour of Islam, whereby, Islamic countries instigate change by applying different strategies. When focusing on the state, Qadri maintains that an individual cannot challenge it, so to affect change within the state and improve its affairs, a movement is required that can contest it effectively (Al-Qadri, 1984).

### **3.5.3 Global outlook and Islamic Approach**

Today, Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is not confined only to Pakistan or Lahore, as it has networks in about 100 countries around the world, although the tactics and methods applied are different everywhere. It is involved in contentious politics in Pakistan, but acts like a *da'wah* and educational movement in the West. This movement has many organisations or networks now spread over Pakistan, which includes AJK. They run an educational network under the name of Minhaj Educational Society, a welfare organisation, student organisations, a Women's League, an *Ulama* Council and much more (Al-Qadri, 1996).

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an operate a political party under a different title, known as PAT (Pakistan Awwami Tehreek) or the Pakistan Mass Movement. Reasons for the disparity in names is possibly due to an awareness that when a movement is banned because of its political activities, then its other organisations are disrupted. Therefore, these movements register their political party and other organisations separately, as happened to Jamat-e-Islami J&K, when its school system was badly affected during the time Jamat was banned. Jamat-e-Islami contests elections under the banner of JI, but its other organisations are known by different

names, such as, the READ Foundation, Al-Khidmah and so on. Sometimes the organisations deny any link with the movements and declare that they are independent organisations because of the deeply embedded interests of the movements and organisations. However, this was not the case with Minhaj ul-Qur'an and its organisations.

In AJK, Minhaj and its organisations are active on different levels, but politically not effective yet. They are still building their foundations in the society, and they have some schools established in AJK, where they are also working in the welfare arena. They run *ulama* councils composed mainly of Barelvi *ulama*, or their own graduates. Internationally, Minhaj-ul-Qur'an and its networks are known by the name of the main movement their networks are operating in some Gulf countries, and in the West, including Scandinavian countries. Currently, Tahir-ul-Qadri is living in Canada, while the movement has several centres and networks in the UK, where activists are overwhelmingly Pakistani and Kashmiri migrants, or first generations of migrant families as observed during field work. The movement involves and portrays itself as a global movement concerned with different issues, such as, matters concerning the Muslim *ummah*, global peace, inter-faith dialogue, and so on. Some activities of the movement in the UK will be part of the case study on the movement and their links with the AJK Islamic activism, are referred to, wherever it is important to do so.

#### **3.5.4 Minhaj-ul-Qur'an AJK**

As was observed in Chapter 2 section (2.4) of the study, Sufi Islam has been the main religious brand of AJK society, while people were more connected to the *pirs* and *mazarat* which formed their religious identity, as described by Khan (2006) and Khan and Mcloghlin (2006). Sufis, or more specifically *pirs*, had the influence and control over religious matters

of the people, and occasionally on other social and family matters too. The hegemony, *pirs* had achieved, stems from historical antecedents, which were observed in Section (2.3).

When the revival movements reached Kashmir, the *pirs* and their supporters (Barelvi *ulama*) were threatened with both new arrivals and indigenous people being suspicious of one another. The new movements created competition for the existing movements and forced them to reassess their strategies and approaches to Islam. In response, some new movements emerged or arrived, one of which is Minhaj-ul-Qur'an, along with some existing ones, such as some Sufi *Tariqas* who became active through the adaptation of new strategies and the building of new institutions, as was noted in section (2.4.1). This provides a third dimension regarding the emergence of the Islamic revivalist movements in Pakistan, which was presented by Ahmad (1989) as differing from the main literature on Islamic movements. However, social movement theory literature addresses it as a “counter-movement” (MacCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1218) which will be seen later.

Like Jamat-e-Islami AJK, which arrived both from the East and West (i.e from India and Pakistan), the case with Minhaj-Ul-Qur'an is different, as it is a new movement of just over 35 years and of pure Pakistani and Punjabi origins. Minhaj-ul-Qur'an was established in the AJK for different reasons and using different strategies. Dr. Qadri used to deliver lectures on television, so he became famous amongst the people. Whenever someone wanted him to deliver a lecture, he asked them to make a network of the movement in their area, and would agree to deliver a lecture on behalf of his movement, as was described by the movement members. This was a response which was also critical for the new movement to spread its network and provided local religious people the opportunity to confirm their religious discourses with a scholar.

The researcher had a chance to meet an academic in his eighties, who was involved with this process to fulfil the needs of young people, and save them from joining Wahhabi movements in AJK. It seems logical and true that when Minhaj was established Kashmir jihad was at its peak, which was a very attractive group for the young people in the region to join, as Ashraf stated in the interview. Salafi and Deobandi movements were not only recruiting the young to fight against the Indian Army in the IAK, but they were preaching their ideology or “true and pure Islam” in AJK (Qadri 1992). This included building mosques and madrasas, on which Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and nationalist movements believe that these movements took Kalashnikovs back and equipped them with their ideologies and oaths to promote it further (Qadri, 1992; Choudhry 2013).

As mentioned above, Minhaj-ul-Qur’an was stabilised at a time in AJK when jihad was at its peak, and with jihad many other movements from Pakistan established socio-religious institutions in AJK. It seems that persevering Barelvi *ulama* and community, found Minhaj-ul-Qur’an the solution and response to those movements, which had a vision and strategies to appeal to the younger generation, against the rival movements. However, it must be noted that hard-core Barelvi *ulama* did not welcome the movement and its religious approach, or the interpretations of Dr. Qadri, and even declared the movement a separate sect, (Khan, 2006).

### **3.5.5 Origins of Tahir-ul-Qadri's Religious Discourses**

It is very common in the subcontinent that almost every Islamic movement either is religio-social, religio-political or religio-educational and missionary. Activities are linked to Shah Wali Ullah and Muhammad, whereby, the movement concerned, asserts themselves as true heirs of their intellectual legacy (Tanoli, 2000). Similarly, it can be seen the case with Minhaj-ul-Qur’an and Dr. Qadri, whereby Tahir-ul Qadri shows his link with Iqbal, and his

mission through his revolutionary mentor, Dr. Faruqi, who had a company with Iqbal at some point in his life (Faruqi, 1940). The link and ideological effects are described in these words:

The concepts Iqbal had introduced Dr. Burhan Faruqi tried to elaborate these and tried to create an ideological revolution in the light of Qur'an and Dr. Tahir-Ul Qadri changed these into an organised ideology and a live system and then transformed into a movement. (Tanoli, 2000 p.35)

There is no doubt that Faruqi raised serious issues about the Muslims and their problems in a systematic way, he introduced his famous Qura'nic theory of *tadhad*, or clash, or contradiction from the Qur'an and history, which he called the law of *tadhad* (Faruqi, 1996; Tanoli, 2000). He compares this with the Qur'anic concept of *rabubiyyat* to the scientific concept of evolution; that everything grows at a natural pace, but it should have some conditions. He believes that this law is a prerequisite for the results of every struggle and process; he believes it is not possible that there is not a law in the Qur'an that can guarantee the results of every struggle, and there must be a law that can assert the success of the action (Faruqi, 1996; Al-Qadri, 1996). Faruqi contends that a clash is a very natural process and it is not bad at all, in fact, it is important for the nurturing, as it is instilled naturally. For example, there is a clash between Adam and Iblis, Prophets faced hurdles in their way, bad against good, and so on (Faruqi, 1999 & 1996).

Dr. Qadri picked aspects from Dr. Faruqi's theory and elaborated them further, sometimes in the same tone and language, for instance, he asserts many times that Islamic movements should have a strong belief in the success of their mission (Qardi, 1996). Spirituality was a recommended path by Faruqi for the establishment of an Islamic society; his law of history theory explains that Islamic societies were based on three roles (Faruqi 1999). Rulers were responsible for the protection of the citizens' life, *ulama* were responsible for the law and

educational affairs of Islamic societies, and the Sufis were responsible for the character building of the masses (Faruqi, 1996).

Dr. Qadri and his movement emerged during the digital age. He started his career delivering lectures on television, and he gained popularity from his lectures on Pakistan Television or PTV (Zubair, 2014, interview). The number of lectures and books attributed to Dr. Qadri are described as a huge achievement, as there are over 5000 lectures and nearly 1000 published and unpublished books on over 50 topics, such as Qur'an, *hadith*, politics, history, law, *tasawwuf* and many more, (Hussaini, 1999).

Coming from a Sufi *tariqa* and actively practising *tasawwuf*, the religious rhetoric and language he uses, appear similar with Sufi explanations of Islam. It is the first movement of its kind in contemporary Pakistan and AJK. One aspect of this movement is the revival of spiritual values, which is imbued in the promotion of the Sufi practices. For instance, *dhikr* and other devotional practices including *'urs* and a reestablishment of the link with active Khanqahs, or shrines (Al-Qadri, 1996 p.25). Dr. Qadri and his movement have a distinguished feature of celebrating *milad*, or the birthday of the Holy Prophet, which includes a famous annual *milad* conference and *shab bidari*, or night of vigil.

Likewise, Jamat-e-Islami uses a great deal of Deobandi and Salafi rhetoric of da'wah and pointing out religious ills of the society, like *shirk*, *bid'a* and grave worshipping. On the other hand, Dr. Qadri applies Barelvi interpretations of Islam, which also include the intercession of the Prophet Muhammad. For Jamat and its likeminded groups, celebrating *milad* is a *bid'at*, whereas, Dr. Qadri says it is not only permissible and recommended but is a compulsory duty. Regarding intercession, he describes it is because of a wrong interpretation of Qur'anic verses and *jahalat* (ignorance) if someone links it with *shirk*, (Al-Qadri, 1999, p.262). Salafi or Deobandi movements are using the rhetoric of *tawhid* (Unity of God) which

is opposite of *shirk* or polytheist. It is natural that these movements will promote this ideology and they will check on all local practices.

Tahir-ul-Qadri comes both from Barelvi traditions, as he completed a *ders-e-nizami* course from a Barelvi seminary, hence, a strong Sufi Barelvi background makes his discourses naturally Barelvi and Sufi, especially where *tasawwuf* is part of the strategy, (Al-Qadri, 1996). Furthermore, when others have chosen *tawhid* as their brand, then the Sufi movements base their argument on the *risalat* or messenger-hood and personality of the Prophet Muhammad (Al-Qadri, 2001). These types of the interpretations are not rare, but it is a permanent discourse which distinguishes this movement from JI, Deobandi and other Salafi movements. As was observed in the last chapter, these issues matter a lot in the AJK context for the recruitment, retention, and success or failure of the movement.

### **3.5.6 Mustafavi Revolution or Social Change?**

The leadership of the Minhaj-ul-Qur'an constantly trying to prove that such movement is must needed at this time, the literature presents the movement a carrier of complete Islamic agenda.

The primary aim of the Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is to bring about a comprehensive and multidimensional change in the society.... Its leadership has not only introduced ideology but also provided a detailed strategy to be practically put into practice... it aims at reviving the true values and principles of Islam, eliminating the social, cultural ideological, moral, spiritual, economic legal and political decline of Ummah. (MQI, p.11, Qadri, 1998).

Dr. Qadri says in one of his interviews that he studied all movements in the world, including revolutions, plus all relevant theories offered either by Muslims or non-Muslims. Mawlana Mawdudi ideas were considered in detail, although he states that he found Muslim thinkers hopeless (Al-Qadri, 1996). He believes that the *batil* (the wrong) was hopeful about their theories and their required outcome, but truth was not hopeful about their ideology to succeed in their lives, but found types of excuses, such as, if they don't succeed in this life then they will get reward in hereafter (Al-Qadri, 1990; 1996). According to him, the strategy to bring about the required change should be a definite strategy which should guarantee the results (Al-Qadri, 1990; Hussaini, 1989; Tanoli, 2000).

*Nizam-e-Mustafa* (system of Mustafa) and *Mustafavi Inqilab* (Mustafavi Revolution) are the common slogans and a well-known language and terminology used by MQ (Al-Qadri, 1999). (Mustafa is one of the names of the Holy Prophet which means the chosen one). Normally, in the country and across the world, we will hear the names of *Islami Nizam*, or the Islamic system *nizam-e-shar'i*, a system of Shari'a, for political Islam. In Pakistan, the name of *Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa* or movement of Mustafavi system was used widely in the movement against the Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when all religious parties gathered under one umbrella to demand an Islamic system.

Normally, religious parties use the slogan and name of the *Islami Nizam* or Islamic system and *shar'i Nizam* or *shari'a* system, but Tahir-ul-Qadri explains this and gives reasons for using this name. He says that: "If *Din* means a system, then the right concept will be a system of Mustafa, not a system of Allah which includes shari'as of all other Prophets" (Al-Qadri, 1989, p.20). According to Dr. Qadri, *tawhid* is not an exclusive belief of Muslims, but it is a belief held by all religions, regardless of whether they spoiled it later. He provides an example of King Akbar of the Mughal dynasty, who introduced a new religion with the name

of “*Din-e-Ilahi*” or system of God, which was acceptable to everyone, including polytheists, but *Din-e-Muhammadi* or *Nizam-e-Mustafa*, is only specific to Islam (Al-Qadri, 1989, p.44).

While incorporating these concepts or systems, Dr. Qadri also defined religion as a *din*, such as Mawdudi, and other revivalists did. He is also in disagreement with the Western approach to Islam as a religion in the Christian and Judaism perspectives (Taj, 2011) but rather as a system parallel to the Western democratic system (Philippon, 2012).

### **3.5.7 Is Revolution a slogan or a reality?**

Tahir-ul-Qadri is known by many other titles, for instance, Sheikh-ul-Islam and Qibla Qaed-e-Mohtram, another famous title is Qaed-e-Inqilab or leader of the Revolution. It is boasted about proudly that after he got fame from his lectures on television he visited Iran, which activists believe was the first step toward revolution (Hussaini, 1989). Hussaini (1989) and Azmi (2001) note he renewed *bay‘at* at the hands of his Sufi Sheikh on the name of *Be‘yt-e-Inqilab* (Oath of revolution). Dr. Qadri became famous with this title in the country and wherever his followers went and spread his ideology of revolution which was his title. Sometimes he is considered as “over-ambitious,” because he is hopeful to see revolution happening in his life-time (Waraech, 2003).

As mentioned earlier, Dr. Qadri was inspired by Faruqi and claims to take his and Iqbal’s mission forward. The theory of the revolution which Minhaj-ul-Qur’an presents is derived from the writings of Faruqi (1996). Dr. Qadri uses this rhetoric quite frequently, and he has dedicated a whole book on this topic, *Qur’ani falsafa-e-Inqilab*, or the Qur’anic Philosophy of Revolution, in which he describes: “the revolution is name of the complete social change and transformation of life at the required standards” (Al-Qadri, 2000, 1985, p.45). He believes that revolutions occur after the clash of the human interests, which is a very normal process in all aspects of life from individual to economic, social and political.

The slogan of the revolution became more prominent and got attraction during the *Inqilab* March (revolution march) of 2014 towards Islamabad and a three-months sit-in. The hype created at this protest was felt by everyone and everywhere in the country, which included all the ultimatums and French Revolution style: ‘Parliament of the People’. But after the failure of that attempt and withdrawing from the electoral and democratic process, the political party or organisation became inactive but not dissolved, because it did not attain the required results after contesting two elections (Al Qadri, 1996). This creates more ambiguities and suspense because if they cannot bring about a revolution through peaceful political process, then a new type of required revolution is needed, and the next strategy must be considered. Revolution is high on the agenda, while an aim of this movement is to achieve this in Pakistan, and in AJK. Therefore, the objective of this study of the movement is to explain how they endeavour to attain this, the meaning of the revolution and the remit of the revolution and its purpose. This study aims to look at the methods and strategies used to achieve these objectives, including how the results translate into society, once the goals have been attained.

### **3.5.8 Manifesto of Minhaj-ul-Qur’an**

Movements like this do not have a single objective and they neither remain committed to one objective they were established for in the beginning; social movements change from time to time as they come across different situations. These following five are the core objectives which give the movement the justification to emerge in the presence of many other movements and have been constant from the beginning.

1. *T’aluqbillah* or Relationship with Allah
2. *Rabt-e-Risalat* or Connection to the Messengerhood
3. *Raj’u Ila-al-Qur’an* or Return to Qur’an

4. *Ittehad-e-Ummah* or Unity of a Muslim *Ummah*

5. *Mustafavi Inqilab* or Mustafavi Revolution

In English literature, both revival and reform are used interchangeably and frequently, in Urdu, *ahya* is used, which is closer to revival and renaissance, but in English, the word reform. As shown in the English introduction of the movement and its objectives:

- *Da'wah* and propagation of true Islamic teachings
- Reformation of the moral and spiritual affairs of an *umma*
- Revival of Islamic sciences
- Promotion and renaissance of Islam

And while describing the practical responsibilities of the movement reform is used in the meanings of *islah* (islah or reformation) and revival in a more broader sense both for *tajdeed* and *ahya* (revival or tajdeed and ahya-e-Deen), (Al-Qadri, 1996 p.100). Whatever the case, it seems they are not specific to the use of terms, such as, reform and revival, reform means general improvement of behaviour on a religious basis, while revival is concerned with reigniting the religious sciences and religious discourses, as seen above. In this chapter it is not possible to explore all literature and themes, neither is this a main aim of the study, however, giving meanings to the ideology through practice has its importance in Islamic activism literature (Yakan, 1984).

Whatever the meanings are, and how activists want to implement their agenda, will be explored in the analysis chapter. That is how activists and strategists describe it in a broader context, generally, and in the AJK context, specifically. This will include: phases of the movement, its strategies, themes described by activists, its organisations and other analysis related topics.

### 3.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore three Islamic movements which are part of the study, the focus was to study the emergence of the movements and their religious and socio-political discourses. Before starting the study of the movements, in Section 3.1 a brief introduction of the Islamic movement and other *jam'ats* were presented. Currently, in AJK there are many political parties and Islamic movements or *jam'ats* active in different spheres as discussed earlier. Other organised or collective networks are different NGOs of many types, religious, non-religious, regional and *biraderi* based groups, that support their fellow members or local population in different aspects of development and socio-political mobilisation.

Section 3.2 explored definitions of the revival, reform and renewal, which has different literal meanings but most of the times used interchangeably, especially by the movements and their activists, as opposed to intellectuals. Hence, the dynamics of an Islamic revival and reform through movements and individuals, are a new phenomenon of Islamic revivals, from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, Islamic revival itself is apparent through first-century *hijra* onwards. This was explored in section (3.2.1).

Gulhar Sharif movement, a Sufi *tariqa* was considered in section 3.3 as a background to the AJK Islam, and then again at a second level, as an internal revival to the Sufi or *pir* traditions from mere intercession between man and God, to between man and society. Sufi forms of Islam which formed the basis for an Islamic identity apparent within the Kashmiri state faced a huge downfall, due to the ineffectiveness of the new generation of Sufis or *pirs*. It is contended that Sufis after the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, became involved only in the mystical world and ignored issues of this world (Sikand, 2011). *Pirs* and their outdated literature became irrelevant to the people and this world, over a period of centuries, providing a chasm, which was filled by new revival movements entering Kashmir. However, currently, most of

the contemporary Sufis in AJK have started a process of their own internal revival, which is a new intervention in AJK Islam.

While studying the Jamat-e-Islami in sections 3.4-3.4.6, it appeared that JI emerged as a religio-reform movement to redirect the beliefs and practices of the Muslim population. With the passage of time, it changed more to a socio-political movement. Jamat mainly used literature of its founder Mawlana Mawdudi to attract young people into the movement from educational institutions, by applying unique religious interpretations. Activities of Jamat in AJK started with relief work, which later turned into permanent institutions.

The final part of the chapter, sections 3.5 and related sub-sections, revealed that Minhaj-ul-Qur'an and its founder made its space in the society using digital methods, such as, audio and video lectures. Tahir-ul-Qadri set the movement in 1980 with great ambitions using more Prophetic centric emotions and approaches. The movement has networks in over 90 countries in the world and claimed over half a million registered members until 2010 (MWL, 2009-10). This movement is also striving for an Islamic revival and global Islamic supremacy worldwide: however, tactics they utilise in Pakistan and AJK are different than those applied everywhere else.

All three movements have institutionalised approaches and strategies similar with social movement approaches. These approaches include: mobilisation of the masses, building resources and organisations, and framing their messages using modern media and or *da'wah* techniques.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter aims to survey the main literature related to the different aspects of the study. The objective of this chapter is firstly, to look at the definitions and basic concepts of the related fields. Secondly, the previous research and other academic works will be presented to identify the approaches and any lacunas the study aims to fill, however, the context of AJK society, religion, culture and political realities always will be in sight.

Religion continues to attract attention of social scientists and there is a large amount of literature on socio-political and economic roles and functions of religion within the context of the modern world; despite the predictions that it will vanish soon (Stark, 1996; Wallace, 1966). As Erasov (1991) contends, religions are falling, but in Asia, they are growing, such findings also emerged from the British census data of 2011.

Generally, Islam and especially political Islam has been the subject of many studies, but the social vision of Islamic movements has been less explored. Particularly, the social function of the religious movements within the context of contemporary Kashmiri society, where culture is based on a caste system, has not been explored at all. Due to the political conflict, Kashmir has attracted many researchers throughout the last 50 or more years (Lamb, 1997 & 1966; Vernon, 1995 & 2001; Schofield, 2000 & 1996; Wirsing, 2003; Rehman, 2011; Choudhry, 2012; Snedden 2012, Puri 2012). However, most studies address the political conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, secondly, their focus has been Indian administered Kashmir.

The state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir seems a “forgotten island” in the intellectual arena, or as earlier mentioned, Snedden (2012) describes “four million forgotten people of Azad Kashmir”. In the academic literature Azad Jammu and Kashmir is just cited with other parts of the divided state for completing a study project on Kashmiri issues, as a whole (Rehman, 2011, p.77).

It should also be noted that Islamic activism in Azad Jammu and Kashmir on a large scale only started from 1980’s and is still in its initial stages. This could be one of the reasons as to why there has been almost no substantial study concerning religious activism in AJK Pakistan. It seems there is not much literature on the AJK state, however, available important writings will be explored to understand the nature of AJK society in section (4.1).

Section 4.2 aims to present the basis of the social movement theory, followed by section 4.2.1 and 2, which aims to discuss the evolution and approaches of the social movement theories mainly, which are relevant to this study. Section 4.3 will deal with the application of the sociological models of the social movement theory on the Islamic social movements in the Muslim world, and see how it has been utilised, and how it can be utilised in an AJK context.

The emergence of Islamic activism will be seen in the section 4.3.1, particularly considering how Islamic activism emerged independently of a Western socio-political field. Before narrowing down the study of subcontinental Islam, section 4.4 will focus on the study of Islamic revivalism and its needs. This will explore the study of the Islamic revivalist thought and its models used as theoretical approaches. This section will then lead us to the study of the Islamic revivalist thought, and our focus will be on contemporary Islamic revivalism and revivalists in section 4.4.1. In the final section 4.5, main literature and religious ideas and practices of the contemporary sub-continental Islam will be explored to find the differences and commonalities of the contemporary Islamic movements.

#### **4.1 Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the Contemporary Literature**

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) commonly known as Azad Kashmir (AK) is part of the broader Jammu and Kashmir region, which is divided into: Indian Administered Kashmir Valley and Jammu region, however Gilgit Baltistan, Northern Areas, are under the direct control of Pakistan. Although Azad Kashmir is also under Pakistani control, however, its international status is very ambiguous, it is not a province of Pakistan, neither as an autonomous state as Schofield (2000) and Snedden (2012) conclude, a “local authority”.

Literature about Kashmir is written from different perspectives, mainly as mentioned above, most of the work is on India Administered Kashmir and then views on the Kashmir issue emerge from different perspectives. The Pakistani perspective, which mainly blames India and the atrocities of Indian army in Kashmir, influences the position of the Jamat-e-Islami and other pro-Pakistan parties and writers in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. This approach describes Indian administered Kashmir as “Indian Occupied Kashmir”. Whereas, the Indian perspective which blames Pakistan for interference in Kashmir and promoting terrorism, terms Azad Kashmir as “Pakistani Occupied Kashmir”. Other independent academic perspectives which mainly deal with historical, political and possible solutions to the conflict are more diverse in nature, they use the term IAJK, or Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir and PAJK or Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir (Puri, 2012).

Kashmir has attracted many writers and academic researchers on the partition of the subcontinent from across the world, who deal with different perspectives related to Kashmir. Schofield (1919 & 2000) and Lamb (1991 & 1997) explore broader Jammu and Kashmir in detail, which also includes some facts about the state of Azad Jammu & Kashmir in a political and historical manner. Schofield (2000, p.89) calls its status “neither a sovereign nor a province of Pakistan”. While discussing Azad Kashmir’s name she again refers to the

viewpoint of both countries, either is it “Azad” (free) from a Pakistani perspective, or “Occupied” which India asserts. Which “truth” (p.71) is more reliable is still to be decided by the United Nations. Lamb (1997, p.148) asserts that “both Pakistan and India adopted public positions on the Kashmir question from which they have found it impossible to depart.” These approaches or similar ones make AJK what it is today.

Socially, politically and historically, of course, religion and religious movements also have some effects derived from this. These issues are explored by Hewitt (1995), Kadian (1992), Newberg (1995), Jagmohn (1991) and more recently, Senedden (2012). These commentators all offer perspectives regarding the Kashmir issue and have touched on Azad Kashmir and its links with the Valley and Jammu, along with the role of religion and religious ideas to connect and mobilise the masses across the border.

The academic approaches outlined above are centred more on legal and diplomatic concerns. There are two other very important approaches in the AJK perspective, which are playing an important role to promote an identity for the local people, reflected in religious and nationalist rhetoric, which are pro-independence and pro-Pakistan, or desire accession to Pakistan.

Proponents of pro-Independence sentiments, are the nationalists who wish to make the whole of Kashmir an independent state, separate from both Pakistan and India, whereas, pro-Pakistan supporters want to join Pakistan. There are always some extreme and balanced approaches pertinent to the issue which are demonstrated by both sides, and expressed internally within both perspectives. This type of literature is mainly produced by pro-independence writers, with more recent proponents being articulated by Azad Kashmiris, such as, Choudhry (2011 & 2013), Asad (2010) and Rehman (2011). They present the local

sentiments expressed by some Azad Kashmiris, these perspectives are sometimes harsh, which is unusual, and somehow, a new departure towards Pakistan.

While exploring the historical and religio-social fabric of Kashmiri society, Sikand (2000, 2002) and Khan (1994) discuss the socio-religious nature of broader Kashmiri society, as a ‘Sufi oriented and caste-ridden culture.’ Hewitt (1995) focuses more deeply on AJK, or in his words, “other Kashmir,” and its transition to a contemporary Islamisation process. He considers that “Pakistan “normalised” AJK within its own constitutional framework as a “quasi-autonomous” zone (p.111). This is all having profound effects on the contemporary AJK society at different levels. These effects are explored using Social Movement Theory Frameworks and Islamic Activism models in the forthcoming chapters of the study, applied to a novel environment.

#### **4.2 What is the Theory or a Theoretical Framework?**

Dhaouadi (2014, p.23) states: “By definition, a theory is a thoughtful framework that can explain several different phenomena”. Galt & Smith (1976) define theory more systematically with its components which are important to understanding theory and its nature, and its application in social sciences. “If we understand theory to be primarily an organized and interactive body of generalizations which is more or less widely accepted as useful for understanding an identifiable subset of related conceptual problems, then the component generalizations are what we have chosen to call models, hypothesis, assumptions and laws” (Galt & Smith, 1976 p.21).

To understand the role and importance of theory or theoretical framework it needs further exploration regarding how it can be applied to Islamic movements. Roots (1990, p.8) mentions: “It is most likely that the cost of action will be minimised, and the benefits

maximised if action is strategic. Strategy, of course, is necessarily based on knowledge and all knowledge is rooted in and laden with theory. It follows that theory may be useful to movements and not merely to their more personally ambitious members”.

Above, the definitions cited stress the importance and role of the theory, both for the study of philosophical phenomenon, and social activism in the field of social movements.

#### **4.2.1 Social Movement Theory**

Social movement theory, or SMT, has been, and still is, an effective tool to study social movements which provides effective analytical measures; it is a vehicle to carry studies of social movements in this sub-field of sociology (Buechler, 2000). It evolved from psychological theory to specific social movement theory, and then gradually surfaced in its different forms. This now equates to economic models of cost and benefit structure (MacAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). As DeFay (unknown, p.3) contends that “the study of the contemporary social movements comes largely out of three different theoretical traditions: functionalism, Marxism and liberalism”. Classical theories were based on psychological factors to study collective behaviours and collective actions, including theories advanced by Karl Marx (1818-1883), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Adam Smith (1723-1790).

Marxism is concerned with the revolution of the lower (revolutionary) class against capitalists based on the dissatisfaction created by the disequilibrium of material resources (Morris and Herring, 1984). Furthermore, functionalism which asserts that human coexistence is based on mutual struggle and understandings, which again is driven by shared meanings people give to their circumstances (Roots,1990; Wilkinson, 1971; Kumar, 2000). However, these theories were not known as specific ‘social movement’ theories (Defay, unknown).

More specifically, 'Social movement' is a more recent phenomenon which developed out of the collective action and from the field of social science (Roots, 1990). Contemporary scholars or theorists of social movements and social activism define this phenomenon using several epistemological models. Tilly (1978, p.9) defines social movement theory as "Some particular set of beliefs as being the core component of the social movement". Smelser (1962, p.8) presents social movement theory as "Collective behaviour of mobilisation based on a belief which redefines social action". A more contemporary and comprehensive definition of the social movement theory is offered by McCarthy and Zald (1987, p.20) which will be utilised mainly in this study for analysis, and who define social movement theory as "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements ... of a society is an important attribute of them".

These definitions show that theory is a set of knowledge, based on the belief which directs types of collective action in a society. It was observed in these definitions that a shared belief is a basic element that motivates the masses for collective action in a society to bring about a change (Kumar, 2000).

#### **4.2.2 Social Movement Theory Approaches**

Social movement theory evolved including collective behaviour approaches, which were adopted to study revolutions and mass protest by the people against governments over time (Wilkinson, 1971; Beuchler, 2000). "Collective behaviour" approaches were mainly used to study spontaneous protests and short term contentious movements, where individuals joined the movement for personal objectives rather political ones (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003, p.165; Kumar, 2000). Later scholars of social movements in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, known as Chicago Sociologists, started to build more precise theories or frameworks to study all dimensions of social movements, such as, the emergence of a movement, reaching out to the people,

recruitment into the movements, and the use of strategies to secure objectives (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

A Resource Mobilisation Approach is one of the modern methodologies applied to social movement theory by McCarthy (1973), Zald (1977) and Tilly (1978), which offered an alternative perspective through arguing that collective action is a rational response that only can occur when adequate resources are available (Roots, 1990; Beuchler, 2000). This theory is considered an offshoot of the Liberal-Individualism approach advocated by Adam Smith (1723-1790).

This approach outlined above, offered tools to analyse social movements at different levels, such as, seeking to understanding why individuals join movements in the first place, and then how material resources are important for the movements (McAdam and Snow, 1997). Furthermore, how movements utilise materialistic and other resources to achieve their goals, hence, the role of these resources in the success and failure of the movements is also subject to analysis. The RM approach emphasises the role of resources for the success of the movement and for its mobilisation. This theory is based on the cost and benefit structure whilst its rationale model asserts that activists join the movements after seeing clear benefits or incentives (McAdam, 1997; Wickham, 2002).

Like many other classical theories, this is not a comprehensive or final theory for the study of the social movements, with many other social movement theories emerging, such as, New Social Movement Theories to fill the gaps of the RMT (Beuchler, 2000). However, the Resource Mobilisation paradigm is still an effective analytical tool, but it might not cover some aspects of the social movements. Buechler (2000) points out some elements that this paradigm is unable to analyse, as this approach doesn't regard grievances as an important factor for the movements to mobilise support, it also does not recognise any role of the

ideology in the emergence of a social movement (Beuchler, 2000; Wickham, 2002). It's heavily resourced or economic inclined model also neglects cultural and identity models in the success of the movements, as they are recognised by the New Social Movement Theories (Wiktorowicz, 2004). However, its importance and effectiveness to answer “How” type of the questions are well recognised. New Social Movement Theories or NSMT deals more effectively with “Why” type of the questions, (Kumar, 2000; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

In this research, it will help to answer the questions regarding how movements motivate individuals to join the movements and how they utilise social institutions to achieve their perceived goals within the state. The role of ideology is downplayed by the RM paradigm (Beuchler, 2000) but it is well recognised in the study of Islamic social movements, such as studies provided by Wickham (2002, p.120) who discusses how Islamic *da'wah* or missionary work, plays a role by mobilising people for the Islamic movements. He contends that “Islamic ideological outreach has done far more than altering the cost-benefit calculations of self-interested recruits” (p.148). Buechler (1993, p.221) is also confident to suggest: ideology provides a “vocabulary” to the activists and is a tool to “diagnose the problems and provide the alternatives”. RM approach might have been effective to analyse some special movements and at different places, but in the AJK context with Islamic ideology, or more precisely Islamic vision, other cultural aspects are also dominant factors to be explored.

Conglia and Carmin (2005) describe two very interesting aspects to be analysed under the social movement perspectives, as “cognitive” and “normative” attributes are offered as important factors to assist or impede the success of a movement. “Cognitive which is concerned with collective held values, belief and ideas, Normative are such as conventional wisdom and practices members believe are most appropriate in a given situation” (Conglia and Carmin, 2005, pp.206-208). A study of these aspects using social movement theory and

Islamic models will help to understand a caste-ridden society more effectively and logically in a unique setting, it will also create new avenues for the social movement theories to reshape or polish their approaches in a religious and special cultural society.

The second approach this study utilises is a political process approach offered by Charles Tilly (1978), which is more political than economic, such as RM. Goodwin and Jasper (2003, p.165), explain a political process approach is more concerned with political opportunity. This approach suggests that development of the movements is dependent on the opening or closing of the political system (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1994; Tilly, 1985). This approach offers the opportunity to study and analyse social movements with the available spaces or opportunities in the given political system for success and failure (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Considering Islamic activism solely as a political process approach, is unable to fulfil requirements to study Islamic movements, as they are not only political, as some are totally apolitical and don't fit only within the political opportunity structure. In this case, as suggested by Diani (1996) that frames and political opportunities are intervened (Bevington & Dixon, 2005, p.204). This approach holds central importance by offering tools to analyse the emergence of the movements in a political system.

While discussing the paradigms of social movement theories, Caniglia and Carmin (2005, p.205) conclude both resource mobilisation and political process: "as both resource mobilisation scholars and political process theorists view SMOs as an important resource for the social movements", but scholars of the political process approach neglect the link between individual and organisation in the process of the political opportunity structure, they "study social movement as success and failure rather SMO's process and structure" (p203). To fill this lacuna 'Framing Process' offers a viable solution by stressing its importance that

if political opportunities and mobilising structures are available but while there are no shared meanings that people give to the situation, collective action is not likely to happen (Snow and Benford, 1988).

In the case of ideology or Islamic vision and culture where both RM and Political Opportunity are silent, the framing process of social movement theory approach by Goffman (1988) gives a chance to explore how much role these two aspects i.e.: ideology and culture have on the mobilisation of ideological movements which are not recognised by RM approaches (Roots, 2000). It can be concluded that these three approaches are not able to stand alone and capable to help study and analyse Islamic movements, but as Munson (2001, p.488) contends that “mobilisation depends on the interactions among ideas, organisations and environments- not simply on one or the other of these three dimensions”.

In the next section, it will be explored how social movement theory has been utilised in the field of Islamic movements’ research in different parts of the world.

### **4.3 Study of Islamic Activism Using Social Movement Theory**

The second theoretical model of this study is based on the theological, or more specifically on the Islamic theological or Activism model of activism and social change. While selecting the above mentioned three sociological models, literature and theories, which deal with religion will make this study more valuable while assessing the role of religious beliefs as catalytic ideas, however, this research will not use Islamic theology as a strict ‘methodology of Islamic research’ by using Islamic sources and Islamic sciences systematically (Kavakci, 2008, p.9). Theology literally means the study of God, it is a discipline of religious thought that is restricted in its narrower sense, because of its origination and its format to Christianity, but in its broader sense, because of its themes, to other religions. The themes of theology are God,

man, the world salvation and eschatology (or study of last times). (Encyclopedia of Britannica, 18-p.274)

In order to study Islamic movements and society simultaneously, the endeavour started with Clark's (2004) work on *Islam, Charity and Activism*, who utilised social movement theory to study Islamic movements and their networks and institutions in Egypt. Her argument is based on "Islamic social institutions run by and for the middle class ... this process not only neglects the poor, it often comes at the expense of the poor" (Clark 2004, p.4). She calls this process vertical where one class is benefitting from the resources rather than horizontally (Ibid, p.7) to empower the poor and needy, which is required and expected by Islamic social movements everywhere.

Further investigation is required to determine differences when applying such approaches (outlined above) to an AJK context, regarding whether it is possible for Islamic movements to neglect the poor and make their power bases stronger at the expense of the poor. Apparently, it doesn't appear possible because society in AJK is not urbanised, influencing factors, which Clark experienced in the Middle East. In AJK, people are more socially connected, which makes them aware of each other in society. As AJK is a caste-ridden society, in the case of the same-caste or one caste enjoying all resources, this can be true, where one caste is representing a movement or mobilising a movement's resources in a certain area: In this way, it will hinder some goals of the movement in the state. As Clark (2004, p.25) asserts that "blood is thicker than attitudes" this notion will be explored in the AJK's caste based context, where socio-political and economic life is based on the caste-based preferences.

Clark utilised social movement theory to explore how different resources facilitate a movement to achieve its goals, which includes recruitment of the new members of the

movement using the material resources as incentives (Clark, 2004, p.30). It is understandable that it is easy to recruit individuals who are living a life of segregation, such as, in urban societies but recruiting people from some kinship type of the grouping means breaking them from their power centres. This process needs to be explored more deeply, specifically how people join an Islamic Social Movement and then cope with their *biraderi* based necessities. Clark's (2004) concept "blood is thicker than attitudes" can offer new insights to social movement theory in the *biraderi* structure. What difference it makes to the movement, if the *biraderi* ties are strong or weak, furthermore how ideology and *biraderi* can work together are matters of interest and exploration.

Wiktorowicz and others (2004) discuss Islamic Activism using social movement theory approaches as it is a comprehensive study to bridge between Islamic and Occidental or Western social movement theories (Bayat, 2005, p. 891). This study, like that of Bayat (2005), starts with justification to include Islamic activism and its agents of change to be considered as social activists, like any other social movement discussed in the literature. Islamic activists are considered as "strategic thinkers embedded in a political context which influences choices and decisions" (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.14). No doubt that Islamic movements acquired importance after the Islamic revolution in Iran (Ahmad, 2009), as the main social movement theories developed from mere psychological theories to RMT and new social movement theories (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Similarly, Islamic social movements also come through the same patterns of change. Resource Mobilisation Approach also suits this study best to facilitate exploration of Islamic movements as they use material and human resources systematically, whether these are networks, or places of worship and social institutions such as educational, health and welfare associations to achieve their broader goals (Clark, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Wickham, 2002).

Wiktorowicz (2004, p. 3-5) opens new avenues to study Islamic Activism using social movement theory approach as he claims to apply political, social and theological methodologies together. But at the same time, it makes this study type of macro project because it presents Islamic social movements in a global context which leaves many aspects of the Islamic social movements untouched at the local level and in many different contexts.

As Wiktorowicz asserts, this study addresses three aspects of the social movement theory “violence and contention, networks and alliances, and culture and framing” (2004, p.19). It is true many Islamic movements are involved in contentious politics but to reach that level they use many resources and tactics according to their needs and in the existing political settings (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). Furthermore, Islamic movements emerge with and to assert their interpretations of Islamic vision, but when it comes to the local socio-cultural trait of the society, these aspects are required to be explored, such as, in the AJK context.

Olesen (2009) and Singerman (2004) applied social movement theory on religious movements, but both discuss violence based activism. Olesen finds the basis of “Radical Islamic Activism” and Singerman’s focus was “translational Islamic activism” which is linked to international terror networks and recruitment. There is a lot to be explored in the local context of Islamic movements where they are formed and how they mainly aim to fix local problems, so this requires more research to explore these types of the movements, and the tactics they use in a specific culture and political environment, which is not contentious as Wiktorowicz (2004) and others present. Hence, this study will offer a chance to explore the activities of the three different Islamic social movements which are utilising several tactics and approaches for the society and state motivated by unique religious interpretations.

The above-mentioned studies cover many themes. Building a specific society, for example, an Islamic society is another theme which is required to be explored using social movement

theory approaches, and Islamic activism approaches, by way of comparison, where the “eyes of the subjects and the researcher don’t line up” (Wiktorowicz, 2004 p. 297).

Tugal (2009) utilised social movement theory to study a Turkish Islamic movement in Sultanbeyli District in Turkey, his argument is based on the New Social Movement theory and resource mobilisation theory approaches. He believes that most of the time people expect the social movement to be marching and protesting against the state, but this is not always the case, as some movements work silently in the society by changing everyday practices and conditions of the people (Tugal, 2009, p. 451). This is the case with new social movement theory approach as they are considered mainly identity focussed entities, not the state targeted or political movements (Tugal, 2009). Religious movements when they are working along these lines can be studied using this approach, although it is not a set rule that a movement working in this manner, will never turn to the state while they are using social spaces or institutions as their resources, hence, this approach is more concerned with short term movements in the main literature known as, ‘bubbles’ not “seeds” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003, p. 15). Sufi movements in the Kashmiri context can be studied through this approach, but again it depends on what strategies they utilise and targets they have set to achieve their goals, hence, if they are themselves completely apolitical, or they are assisting or collaborating with any other movement which has political goals to achieve in the state and society.

Cetin (2010) explores the Gulen Movement in detail, using the same three social movement theory paradigms (RM, PO, FP), which he calls a “multi-polar approach” (p.xxvi), applied to avoid reductionist approaches to the elements of a movement, however, by analysing only one movement, reduction happened on the societal level. Nevertheless, this study gives detailed insights into the use of social movements to analyse Islamic social movements. Cetin’s assertion that movements which avoid political contention, but work for social

change, such as, Sufi movements can be studied as Social Movements. Determining the role of spiritual resources and moral values propagated by the Sufi movements builds very strong social capital.

#### **4.3.1 Emergence of the Islamic Activism**

Zubaida (2009), Robert (2002) and Wickham (2002), argue that Islamic activism is based on two notions (1) cultural identity view points, and (2) a political economy model. In the first case, Islamic movements strive to eliminate Western influences on Muslim societies which entered during various periods of colonial rule. In the second case, they seek to prescribe the solution for the problems not solved by their governments, such as poverty, unemployment and corruption. These studies were carried out in an authoritarian context, which Wickham, (2004, p.13) calls “high-risk” Islamic activism, where Islamic movements operate under the strict restrictions of the non-democratic governments. In the context of AJK, movements have open spaces available to carry out their operations and sometimes they are facilitated by the government, his argument on the ideological framing and selective incentives can be explored in the AJK context.

Social movement theory has gone further when ideology was not considered as an element to mobilise collective action (Wickham, 2002), his argument, such as, an ideological “frame” can be elaborated further, in terms of how and when ideology plays its role to motivate people to join movements and strive to achieve the goals of the movement, focussing on the rationale and irrational approaches (Wickham 2002, p.119-122). This can be compared with SMT’s “selective incentive” approach to recruit members by giving them material, social or psychological incentives to join the movements (Wickham, 2002).

Woltering (2002) takes this point (outlined above) further and discusses Islamic activism, or more specifically, 'Islamism', which is heavily political and concerns making an Islamic society under the banner of political Islam. He describes different types or tactics of Islamic activism used to gain popular support - "the Islamist organisations may offer housing, food, work and education", also moral support like dignity and high moral standards (Woltering, 2002, p.1134).

Woltering's question about Islamic revivalist ideology requires further investigation regarding the "true Muslims in the past and contemporary now" (Ibid, p.1136). These are calculated actions and are most needed to fulfil peoples' material or socio-economic needs which are not fulfilled by ineffective governments. His approach concerns: Islamic activists are mainly focussed on the fixing of the local ailments of society. He takes it further by showing the importance of the services offered by the movement and then makes an interesting point that this is what people have read and heard about the services of the movements, "what about the people who actually *enter* these Islamic hospitals, or being *fed* and *housed* by them"? (Ibid, p.140). These models are also seen in practice in AJK, however, exploration is required to determine how ideological and material incentive models compete with the existing cultural models of caste and social groupings.

Amin (2012, p.405) explores Islamic social movements in a global context. His arguments are also based on "materialist and culturalist" approaches, utilising social movement theory approach he applies "material force" with the ideological or cultural approach. His argument that social movement theory has opened new spaces to study Islamic social movements. Before, this field was limited to three approaches: essentialist - which is studies Islam separately from social sciences, reductionist – involves studying Islam as an Arab entity, and a historical-institutional framework approach to study Islamic institutions separately (Amin, 2012, p. 407-409).

Apart from this literature based on the frameworks of the 'social movement theory' there are many other dimensions to study Islamic movements or simply Islamic mobilisation. Hwang (2009, p.20) presents Islamic movements and Islamic activism as "peaceful Islamic mobilisation" she argues that "it is not sufficient to examine what went wrong; we must also investigate what went right" (Ibid, p.22). Her study is based on the state-religion relationship using comparative case study methodology in Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. She believes that in Pakistan, only violent forms of Islamic mobilisation operate, which is based on incomplete information; however, her argument that, focusing on Arab Islam, and neglecting non-Arab Islam, which is the majority, is an important lacuna to be filled.

It appears that there are many theoretical approaches or frameworks to study collective efforts of organised groups of the people from different perspectives. Such approaches mainly fall under Western or non-theological paradigms. In the next sections, different Islamic models or frameworks of Islamic mobilisation and activism will be explored, to see how they address matters of social and political changes in Muslim cultural contexts.

#### **4.4 Origins of Islamic Revival**

Apart from the above discussed Western sociological and material models, Islam has its own theological and religio-political models to change or build ideal societies based on a perceived Islamic vision. These models are deeply imbedded in Islamic literature historically, however, the current themes might not reflect strict classical Islamic definitions, as defined and classified by contemporary academic intellectuals. The main theme which covers all paradigms of Islamic change, such as, Islamic activism, political Islam, modern Islam, Islamism or global Islam, *jihadi* Islam, and then Islamic movements is based on different ideas of change, such as, education, welfare, missionary and so forth, are all based in one way or other, on the idea of Islamic revival, renewal, and reform.

The literature on Islamic revival is classified into two fields, classical and contemporary. The idea of Islamic revival is taken from the hadith of the Holy Prophet who himself described that “God will send to His community at the head of each century those who will renew its faith for it” (*Hadith*). “*Tajdid*” is an Arabic term for revival or renewal used by scholars, whilst the one who initiates the process of renewal is called *mujaddid* a revivalist or renewer.

The contemporary Islamic revival process has emerged aiming to return Muslims to original or pure forms of Islam which were corrupted by Western ideologies during the colonial process through European colonialism. This is a ‘Cultural-identity’, viewpoint which is a reaction to the domination of Muslim societies by the West (Wickham, 2002). In the case of the classical revivalist scholars such as, Al-Ghazali (d.1111) Ibn-iTaymiyyah (d.1328) Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1624) and Shah Wali-Allah (d.1772) whose intellectual struggles acted to guard the Muslim community from alien philosophies, and cleanse practices which entered Muslim societies and intellects, with the passage of time.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism is different and vaster in its nature as Nafi (2004, p.34) contends: “during the last few decades of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, calls for reform and renewal resonated throughout the Muslim world”. The revivalists of this era tried to tackle different issues of Muslim societies using the approaches such as *jihad*, *ijtihad* and *tajdid*. The contemporary Islamic revivalism, which is part of this study is more diverse, this is calculated from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards (DeVries, 1980).

To understand different types of Islamic revival and types of literature on Islamic revivalism, the model presented by Haddad and Voll (1991) is more logical and is based on thematic patterns. Contemporary revival theories are considered in the response of different socio-

political circumstances than classical ones. As Haddad (1991, p.4) describes: “revivalist ideas are not generated in a vacuum but are a response to external and internal stimuli.”

In this regard, current revivalist ideas are, firstly, in reaction to the Western domination of Muslim countries, which is as mentioned as a ‘cultural-identity’ viewpoint. Secondly, to treat ailments of Muslim societies in the light of Islamic guidance, which can meet the materialistic requirements of the society while sticking with a pure form of Islamic ideology, which is classified as a ‘political economy model’ (Amin, 2012. 408-410). To elaborate this further, Islamic revivalist ideas can be divided into different themes and then can be elaborated further.

#### **4.4.1 Contemporary Islamic Revival**

After the Western occupation of the Muslim lands and subsequent decolonisation processes, Muslims and Islamic ideology faced setbacks. DeVeries (1980, p. 9) describes that many thought Islam or all other ideologies will disappear, and the world will bow down to the Western ideologies, such as, socialism or capitalism.

Ahmad (1973) and Ushama & Osmani (2006) describing the situation outlined above, contend that, it was a flood of new ideas which defeated the Islamic world on all fronts, some people just tried to save themselves and went out of the way of the flood, and only concentrated to save their faith, and this example is of the *darul-uloom Deoband* in the subcontinent.

The second policy was apologetic like the Muslim modernists of Sir Sayyid Ahmad and Abduh, both tried to “prepare a non-religious edition of the religion” (Ahmad, 1973, p.18). Ushama & Osmani (2006, p. 96) conclude it was “of total subservience to the Western thought” of Mustafa Kamal in Turkey, furthermore, Ahmad (1973) contends that this

imperialistic wave forced Muslims to think about Islam as a “complete code of life” and devise revivalist movements.

DeVeries (1980), Haghghat (2000), Dekmejian (1988) and Ahmad (2009) argue that against the ideological power of socialism and capitalism Islamic revivalist or revolutionary ideology surprised the world in 1978 when Khomeini's Islamic inspired revolution captured Iran and declared it Islamic republic. DeVeries (1980, p.9) characterised this as “Another segment of the humanity had opened a third real and viable alternation”. This revolutionary success opened new chapters in the study of Islamic political and social thought, seriously in the fields of political and revolutionary studies in the West, which Robinson describes as, a tide which began to turn towards the scholarship of the Muslim leadership and thought (Robinson, 2000, p.254).

However, in the Muslim world preaching and spreading of revival and reform ideology was part of its normal routine: Dhaoudi (2014) and Esposito (1991) believe that Islam poses a long tradition of revival and reform. These studies reflect religion possessing the power to bring about political change on a large scale. Haghghat (2000, p.256) notes that “religion as a political ideology” has shown much proficiency in the Iranian context due to a religious inclination of the people towards it. In this respect, AJK shows similarities, however, revolution appears out of question there, because revolutions are most likely to occur in repressive and weaker states rather in open and strong ones (Hwang, 2009, p.5).

Discussing contemporary revivalism, Lapidus (1997) argues that in the 1920s and 1930s Islamic revival movements created a wave of resurgence in Egypt and in the Indian subcontinent. The prominent Islamic revolutionary activist, Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979), also set the scheme for the establishment of an Islamic state which was taken seriously in the intellectual circles in the West and the Islamic world (Ushama & Osmani, 2006).

Muhammad Iqbal (d.1938) was first to propose a separate Islamic state for the Muslims of India, which was achieved later, based on his 'Two-Nation Theory' Naser (1994, p.5). However, regarding Mawdudi, Nasr (1994) states that Mawdudi viewed Islam as a holistic ideology with similarities to Western ideologies - while using an organisational weapon and mobilising resources (p.3-9).

During this period, outlined above, the dominant ideologies were Socialism and Communism, thus Mawdudi included all aspects of an individual and communal life, such as, politics, society, law, philosophy, economy and so forth, under the agendas of his revival ambitions, which Lapidus (1997, p. 448) terms as: "new Islam of commitment to an abstract concept of community and moral authority". Mawdudi did not only present the scheme or theory of Islamic revivalism but established a movement to implement his revival agenda - a language of motivation and mobilisation for political and socio-economic objectives imbedded into religious ideas, which was explored more deeply in chapter three. Lapidus' (1997, p.457) argument that, contemporary Islamic movements are a "response to and an expression of Muslim modernity", needs to be explored, however, his argument that Sufis are anti-education is not accurately reflective of sentiments in a contemporary AJK context.

Ali (2012, p.67) describes two very interesting aspects of the contemporary Islamic revival: "crisis perspective" and "success perspective." The first term is framed in response to the failure of modernist or secularist ideologies to solve the social and political problems of Muslim societies, while the second term refers to a historical process prescribed in Islamic traditions. He contends that a study of Islamic revivalist ideas has not been explored using any theoretical approach. Islamic movements were elaborated upon, using social movement theory approaches. Despite the absence of a theoretical basis, contemporary Islamic revivalism is an "important sociological phenomenon" (Ibid, pp. 68-69). This study touches upon aspects of these two perspectives, adding those mentioned above, and including the

‘cultural-identity’ and ‘political economy model’ which are more dominant and useful for the movements and their leaders to articulate their message of an Islamic revival in the AJK context.

Dhaoudi (2014, p.27) introduces an interesting approach to study Islamic revivalism, as he believes that Islamic revivalism is a social phenomenon. He contends that by neglecting the social analysis one cannot conclude its true nature. His “*Homo Cultures*” approach against the *Homo Islamicus* (Ibid, pp.25-27) approach can bring some interesting findings, for instance Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) described that “Bedouins can acquire royal authority only by making use of some religious colouring, such as prophet-hood or sainthood or some great religious events in general” (Ibid, p.30). He concludes that Arab society is based on two common cultural traits: religion and language. This solidarity combines these two factors together for collective action.

The Arab Spring provided inspiration, or provided space for the imitation of other Arabs based on ‘*asabiyah*, but notice of other Muslim changes in non-Arab countries, were not apparent. Within the natural community a force existed which Ibn Khaldun called *asabiyah*”commonly translated as “group feeling”. But it is more than that; it is a kind of loyalty based on blood which may be extended to include those not on the same blood but with common interests. (Sattar, 1980, p.16) Khaldun’s analysis is based on the decisive role of culture in the success of an Islamic revival, although confined to only one aspect of a revival. Furthermore, Arab culture is religious, which shares a common language of Islam, whereas, in AJK, culture and language differ from religion. In light of such observations, Movements might need to develop different strategies than those offered through Arab Islamic social movements, furthermore, in this case, the concept proposed by Ibn Khaldun of ‘Bedouins or nomadic and religious colouring’ also ‘*asabiyah* and “gaining group superiority through group feelings” (Khaldun, 1967, p.35) are very much relevant to an AJK perspective,

warranting further exploration. These studies offer several models of Islamic revivalism but these or some of them are needed to be brought, as Hunter (1988) prescribes, into the local contexts of the Muslim societies and explore their social, political, economic and cultural concerns.

#### **4.4.2 Islamic Revivalists and Application of Islamic Revivalism**

Ahmad (1973, p.38) describes earlier proponents of the revival or *ahya* theory as the lone thinkers - who did not have a chance, or try to spread or implement their agenda of *tajdid* through organised movements, or in other words, a state oriented or focused revival, such as, Waliullah and Ahmad Sirhindi, who remained limited to pen and paper. One exception applies to Umer bin Abdul Aziz (d.720) the Umayyad Caliph although he carried out his work only after he was appointed as a Caliph.

Contemporary revivalists had opportunities to elaborate on a revivalist scheme of change and action and observe its impacts on Muslim societies, through organised movements. In the case of the subcontinent, Muhammad Iqbal was the first intellectual of the twentieth century to propose a separate Islamic or Muslim state for the Muslims - this was for two reasons. Firstly, to establish a state separate from the Hindu majority, designed to save Muslims from the exploitation they faced from the Hindu majority.

The second purpose for Iqbal, was to revive Islam which was only possible in an Islamic state or government (Faruqi, 1996). However, Faruqi (1996) mentioned that Iqbal had an idea of developing an Islamic movement based on *ba'ya* (an oath of allegiance) to promote his revivalist vision, and Islamic state. However, it appears unrealistic to devise a separate movement by a person like Iqbal, whose whole focus was on the Muslim Ummah because movements at some point create *'asabiyah* and polarisation in the broader Muslim *ummah*, which was explored in Chapter Three section (3.3.1) in this study. Pledges of allegiance to

collective Islamic causes through *Ba'ya* is a historical and well-known method for activists and Islamic leadership to demonstrate loyalty, which is different from the contemporary Islamic movements' strategy of recruitment and collective commitment.

Mawdudi and Al-Banna, as Farouki & Nafi (2004) refer to them, as new “speakers” of Islam, articulated this agenda well and clearly. Through spreading their movements, Mawdudi and Al-Banna tried to promote examples of an intended or desired holy community. These were both internal or religious responses to the reformist thought of Abduhu (d.1905), Ahmad Khan (d.1898) and others who tried to reform Islamic tenets by imposing modernist philosophies of materialism and secularism. Mawdudi and Al-Banna asserted and put Islamic revivalist ideas as a strong motivational force for Islamic activists, however, it is contentious as to the extent to which they may be considered permanent and set rules for all times and places? Alternatively, such ideas may differ according to changing circumstances, or vary over space and time.

In other words, such perspectives, detailed above, can be translated into radical or extremist ideologies or alternatively, moderate ones. Mawdudi and Al-Banna can be referred to in this context, one is in an Arab framework, while the other in a non-Arab setting, but they both held the same agenda of establishing an Islamic state by replacing existing secular governments. However, it must be noted that Al-Banna and his movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged within the climate of an authoritarian regime, subjected to state persecution. Here, the addition of psychological analysis may shed further light.

As presented by Ibn Khaldun, sociological theories start from psychological premises and the physical environment (Schmidt, 1967, p.33). To assess the approach of any theorist, philosopher or religious scholar, an assessment of the possible impact of his psychological state, conditions and physical environment cannot be ignored.

Al-Alwani (1995) diagnoses some shortcomings regarding contemporary Islamic revivalist ideology and current revivalist movements. His argument is based on the application of revivalist ideas and the beginning of the crisis, wherein, if the crisis started centuries ago, then how can a diagnosis and application from the 20<sup>th</sup> century heal the problem? Whereas, Islamic societies and ideas were corrupted long ago, and Islamic lands were also conquered centuries before by the Mongols. He seems right in the sense that if contemporary revivalist ideas are one response to 20<sup>th</sup> century socio-political dynamics, or colonial, or secular invasions of Muslim lands, then we may consider Islamic societies exhibiting ideal forms before colonisation, only then can this can provide justification for the application of these remedies from the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Unless it is accepted that contemporary revivalism is a step forward of a continued process from the existing phenomenon, even though it only partially represents Islamic ideals.

Haddad (1991) and Ali (2012) present some similar themes on contemporary revivalism. As previously noted, the most prominent pioneers of contemporary Islamic revivalism were Mawadudi and Hasan Al-Banna. Firstly, justification for the revival manifesto they supported, was derived from the concept of success or historical continuity of the tradition which is based on the Islamic concept of *tajdid*. *Tajdid*, which means renewal, reform or regeneration but when used with revival means general *islah*, or straightening from ailments. This concept is to facilitate revival as manifested in Islamic history, whereupon, someone must come to review and revive the matters of the *ummah* and interpret the Qur'an and *hadith* in the contemporary context (Metcalf, 1982; Riza and Hussain, 2003; Lupidos, 1997; Nasr, 1994; Haddad, 1991). This is considered a requirement by the Holy Prophet to make Islam relevant for all time, so this process is not reactionary or defensive but a natural historical process which is also predicted and prescribed. Under the revival process, society is one focus for revivalists, as Haddad (1991, p. 23-25) states that this process is to judge existing

society, or attempt to return to an original pure form of Islam, and then to make Islam relevant to the current time, and compatible with modernity.

Islamic activists try to offer Islam as a more viable and practical way of life, and articulate it as a mobilising force by using different approaches and strategies sanctioned by motivational ideas. Riza and Hussain (2003, p.ix) begin their point that “revival is associated with an Islamic tradition that has not only created a spiritual, moral or socio-political vision but has organised and mobilised people to engage in public life”.

#### **4.5 Sub-Continental Islam**

To explore the ideological and theological basis of sub-continental Islam and related movements, Metcalf (1982) and Sanyal (1996) offer insights into the historical and ideological origins of the main contemporary Islamic movements in the subcontinent.

Metcalf (1982) explores the Deobandi movement in detail, via both historical and theological perspectives. This she terms, “a movement of reformist ulemas” (Ibid, p.355) which is concerned with fixing the religious practices of the Muslim masses. She discovers how the evolution of religious identities took shape in the subcontinent during the times of the British Empire (Metcalf, 1928, p. 342). Metcalf also looks at two other movements of that period, the Ahl-e-Hadith movement which she calls “an intellectual” (Ibid, p.276) movement and the Barelvi movement as a “reactionary” response, which did not rise with the intent to shape something new but was shaped as a reaction to the two trends, which then became a “preservatory” movement (Metcalf, 1982, p.265).

The Deobandi movement prepared *ulama* at a network of *madrasas* or religious schools, and subsequently dispatched them to different parts of the subcontinent to reform religious practices and beliefs. Like the Barelvis, they were Sufis and Hanafi, which is why they

displayed marked differences with Ahl-e-Hadith, while also possessing a history of rivalry with the Barelvi movement (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 138-45).

Sanyal (1996) explores the Barelvi movement or Ahl-e-Sunnat wa-al-Jam‘at (Ibid, p.49) in detail and compares it with the other two sects, uncovering their differences and reasons for rivalry. Today, all contemporary Sufi-minded movements and Sufi *tariqas* of South-Asian Muslims are based on the ideological standards set by the founder (some don't agree with the term founder) of this movement. Though Sufism existed well before Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921), he equipped Sufis with the necessary ideological tools to face new opponents. In the contemporary period (Sanyal, 1996, pp.160-165) every Sufi-linked mosque and shrine exhibit symbols which identify them. However, some Sufi-oriented *ulama* don't accept that they are Barelvi, or don't acknowledge it verbally, but adopt some symbols of identification, and practices solely developed by this movement and its founder.

Barelvi or Ahl-e-sunna wa-al-Jamat is considered a reform movement focusing on the Sunna of the Holy Prophet, through a strong attachment to the personality and the *Sunna* of the Holy Prophet (Sanyal, 1996) but significantly, it is a rural Sufi revival movement (Ibid, p.48). Barelvis engaged with two other Sunni movements through writing and debates concerning issues of religious practices and beliefs. Heightened contentions led them to issue fatwas or religious decrees to declare each other *kafirs* and *mushriks*, or non-Muslims and polytheists and innovators (Sanyal, 1996; Metcalf, 1982).

Disputes alluded to above, revolved around respect for the Holy Prophet, his knowledge of the unseen, intercession, the role of the *awaliya*, pious people or great saints, and the permissibility of celebrating the *milad* or birthday of the Holy Prophet (Metcalf, 1982; Jackson, 1988).

- Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith practitioners criticised Barlevis for visiting shrines and some shrine based and fixed-days practices, derided as innovations and un-Islamic (Metcalf, 1982). These differences were highlighted on such a large scale that they become permanent religious or sectarian identities of the Muslim communities in South Asian interpretations of Islam. These differences not only exist today but are also the base of Sunni Islam in the subcontinent. For instance, the perjorative term “Wahhabi” is applied by the Barelvi or like-minded movements activists to denigrate the other two movements (Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith) (Sanyal, 1996, p. 232) or for those who are linked with these two movements, including Jamat-e-Islami. Although the origin of this term exists in the 18<sup>th</sup> century movement of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), who originated from what is now Saudi Arabia.

Jackson (edt.1988) explored Indian Islam in detail including different religious practices and discussions around them, such as celebrating “*Milad* is opposed only by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, the Ahl-i-Hadith and even by a section of the Jamat-i-Islami” (Ibid, p.41). He also highlights some cultural practices, including marriages in the caste system and its importance, though he believes “economic, educational and other backgrounds also matter” (Ibid, p.55). Much of his information is general and might have changed over the time, for instance, Jamat-e-Islami has many chapters now and they operate in different local contexts.

The argument here is that all contemporary Sunni Islamic movements in AJK fall under one of these sects, such as, Barelvi, Deobandi and Salafi or Ahl-e-Hadith, ideologically. Interestingly, none of them, or some of them will accept that they have any ideological bases in these parent movements, but with enquiry, one can find their ideological links or affiliation, this will be explored further in Chapter Seven.

Apart from the above-mentioned literature related to this study, other literature will be considered where necessary. However, the study has utilised much of the literature in chapters two and three. Jamat-e-Islami being an active movement has attracted much academic attention from subcontinental commentators, along with significant interest displayed by writers from other regions of the world, over the past 50 years. Jamat itself comes from a strong ideological and intellectual basis, hence, written literature has been an important vehicle to deliver its message and vision to the masses, which was explored in the last chapter.

The aim of the study is to examine how religious ideas, practices and activities relate common people to Islam and society, to build an Islamic ideal society.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to survey significant literature on the main topics relevant to the study. This does not mean every piece of literature and all related ideas have been discussed, rather the focus has been to explore key texts and popular writing, which aid an understanding of the topic and present the most relevant approaches.

Section 4.1 focussed on important literature relevant to AJK. Sources elicited that AJK has special socio-political and religio-cultural dynamics, which require exploration using social movement theory approaches.

It is apparent that social movement theory is a purely Western sociological framework, which evolved over time, and emerges as a modern sophisticated framework. A study of Islamic movements was not applied to this theoretical framework for a long period of time, however, contemporary scholars of social movements have begun to analyse Islamic movements using this framework, even their scope and context has been limited. Section 4.2 and related

subsections explored how frameworks of the SMT can reveal new insights if they are applied in unique socio-cultural settings, such as, those provided by AJK. Islamic movements have their own frames of reference to understand revival and reform, whilst meeting the criterion for other sociological premises to be applied. Many studies have shown the potential for Islamic activism to offer new insights into socio-political, economic and cultural forms, but the study of local contexts is still under-developed, as presented in sections 4.3 and 4.3.1.

In the final sections including 4.4, the study explored the literature and approaches the movements utilise to present their Islamic agendas to motivate the people and develop interpretations of religious discourses. But the application of these both ‘sociological and theological’ models in the Kashmiri context is not yet tested. Hence, the approaches movements are using do not really reflect the reality on the ground. In the final empirical chapters of the study, the study will apply and explore these models further to elicit how they work in a society like of AJK.

In the final section 4.5, a short background to the prevailing Islamic models in the subcontinent were presented. It was concluded that contemporary Islamic movements in AJK may fall under one of the three prevailing Islamic movements, broadly as a sympathiser, or ideologically like minded.

In summary, the present state of Muslim thought as Al-Alwani (1994, pp.3-4) sums up under three approaches, such as, *authenticity*, which is known as traditional, *modernistic* which leaves Islam behind and stresses the adoption of Western thought, and an *eclectic* approach which is mainly adopted by Islamic modernist intellectuals. This necessitates adoption of sound aspects from traditional perspectives, and ideas taken from modern thought. While studying AJK Islam and Islamic movements, the study will consider these approaches where necessary.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **Research Methodology: Methodological Reflections on the Study of the Islamic Movements in AJK Pakistan**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

The objective of this study is to explore the socio-political impact of contemporary religious movements in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).

This chapter aims to discuss the adoption of an ‘exploratory qualitative interpretative-ethnographic’ research methodology used to investigate the central thesis questions relating to this enquiry.

In section 5.1 the chapter examines the ‘exploratory case study’ framework of the research method, which includes a discussion on the exploratory study in section 5.1.1 and the case study design in section 5.1.2.

Section 5.2 then describes the theoretical framework of the study, which includes a discussion of the ethnographic perspective in section 5.2.1 and the use of the Social Movement Theory (SMT) in section 5.2.2, this also includes an in-depth discussion on the three major frameworks of the SMT. Thus, section 5.2.2.1 explores the use of Resource Mobilisation: (RM), section 5.2.2.2 the Political Process (PP), and section 5.2.2.3 the Framing Process (FP).

The use of the data collection instruments is discussed in section 5.3, which includes the use of the semi-structured interviews (SSI) in section 5.3.1, observations in section 5.3.2 and the use of diaries/document analysis/audio-visual media in section 5.3.3

The use of the fieldwork procedures and principles are then discussed in section 5.4, which includes an analysis on the piloting of the study both in the UK and AJK in section 5.4.1. The major points noted from the pilot study include the use of the Urdu language to conduct SSI as noted in section 5.4.1.1 and the procedures and protocols to be followed in section 5.4.1.2. The sample of the participants and the use of non-probability sampling are described in section 5.4.2, whilst the venues used to conduct the fieldwork are delineated in section 5.4.3. The analysis of the captured data as denoted through the data collection instruments is then discussed in section 5.5. The adoption of the deductive approach is explicated in section 5.5.1, which includes the use of thematic coding, whereby, a two-stage ‘data analysis’ procedure is described in section 5.5.2. The validity of the data through triangulation and its potential for generalisation is then discussed in section 5.5.3

Section 5.6 discusses the compliance of this research project to the issues of anonymity and confidentiality, as well as, declaring the ‘insider’ status of the researcher in section 5.6.1. The limitations and problems encountered in conducting this research are discussed in section 5.6.2, with a review of this chapter in the concluding section 5.7.

### **5.1 Exploratory Case Study Framework**

Kerlinger (1973, p.2) observes that research is “a systematic quest for knowledge’ via a ‘... controlled, empirical and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed relations among natural phenomena”. Suddahazai (2015, pp.111-116) argues that this implies research is vital in furthering our understanding of the field, as existing methodologies or newly developed research instruments and strategies uncover new perspectives to identified problems. Verifying and testing the established body of knowledge and theories can extract fresh data to formulate these new understandings.

This study utilises an exploratory framework within a bounded multi case study design to address the central research questions of the thesis. Yin (2003, p.9) argues that the case study method allows for the exploration of the ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions even though the investigator may have little or no control over the environment and context. Thus, by engaging with participants through a case study method within an exploratory approach, the thesis can utilise interpretive tools to further understand the meanings people give to their situation. Saunders (2003) and Schwandt (1998) observe that interpretive techniques in qualitative research are used to help explore the subjectivity of the participants or in the specific example of this study, the activists of the movements in the AJK.

### 5.1.1 Exploratory Study

Saunders et al (2009, pp.138-139) identify three core types of research activity that can be conducted:

<b>Research Method</b>	<b>Description</b>
Descriptive	This form of research activity is conducted to present an authentic narrative of the specific phenomenon in its actual context as it exists and not in accordance to how the researcher has interpreted or perceived it.
Explanatory	As opposed to the descriptive type of research this method seeks to actively provide a personal narrative and analysis of the context as experienced and observed by the researcher.
Exploratory	This entails the exploration of ideas, theories and problems that have been either neglected or unidentified. The purpose of this type of the research is to uncover new knowledge and understandings.

Table 5.1 Adapted from Saunders et al (2009)

The nature of this study is exploratory as it seeks to “...ask questions... that may increase and broaden the extant knowledge of the field and allows for a fresh assessment of the phenomena in a new light” (Robson, 2002, p.59).

Adams and Schvaneveldt (1991, p.139-140) perceive the exploratory study to be like “...the activities of the traveller or explorer”, whereby, initially the research conducted is extremely broad and then becomes more specific as new ideas and phenomenon are discovered. Exploratory research entails that a detailed review of literature is conducted to explore the broad issues and studies in the field. This is then supported by primary methods for data acquisition such as a full schedule of interviews. This approach, therefore, allows the researcher to investigate the area of research from a new previously unexplored angle. Furthermore, it allows for the development of a thorough understanding of the issues and the context in which the study is being conducted.

### **5.1.2 Case Study Design**

Yin (2003) asserts that a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear. Furthermore, “...cases are often chosen not because they are extreme or unusual in some way but because they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be answered” (Brayman, 2004: 51).

This study will utilise three multiple cases, referred to as either *collective case studies* (Stake, 1995) or *comparative research design* (Brayman, 2004) to increase the external validity or generalizability of the study. This is opposed to the focus upon a single case study, which can raise questions of representation of the whole phenomenon (Brayman, 2004).

Thus, Yin (2003, p.4) argues that the use of the case study method can be “used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political and related phenomenon”.

The exploratory nature of the case studies also allows for the utilisation of multiple sources of data, such as, interviews, observations, documents, diaries, and audio/ visual evidence.

## **5.2 Theoretical Framework of the Study:**

The broad focus of the exploratory approach used in this study is to identify the social, political and religious factors impacting upon the contemporary religious activism in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the relationship between these factors. The study seeks to investigate these factors through the exploration of three central questions:

1. What are the historical and contemporary socio-cultural dynamics informing the emergence of the main socio-religious movements in AJK Pakistan?
2. How do these movements utilise social institutions, such as, education, health and politics to disseminate their values and shape the society?
3. How do these groups interpret the meaning of an ideal Islamic society and use religious motives as distinct strategies to achieve their perceived goals in AJK Pakistan?

### **5.2.1 Ethnographic Perspective**

To address these central questions, ethnographic perspectives inform the study. This implies that the study is not a full ethnographic study but utilises its approach to examining and exploring the social phenomenon.

Linguistically the term *ethnography* (composed of: *ethno*: tribe or a group and *-graphy*: to write or depict something) “...is a description and interpretation of a cultural and or a social group or system...” (Creswell, 1998). Furthermore, ethnography is a term that carries several historically situated meanings. In its most general sense, the term refers to a study of the culture that a given group of people more or less share. (Kuper and Kuper, 1996, p.263).

It is primarily conducted through participant-observation, one-to-one interviews, studying the meanings of behaviour, language and interactions of the culture sharing groups. Creswell (1998) argues that the notion of *culture* is amorphous, and thus, can be used for any group, which demonstrates some patterns to their daily life using behaviours, language and meanings they give to their actions. It is argued that the ethnographic perspective allows the study to explore the boundaries between the ideology, theory and actual actions of the movements. Whitehead (2004) argues that ethnography is more useful when one needs to understand the phenomenon in different contexts, such as historical, philosophical or ideological and contemporary practices. Therefore, ethnographic studies are holistic in their nature as the ethnographer attempts to describe as much as possible about a cultural system or social group, which may encompass the group’s history, religion, politics, economy and environment (Creswell, 1998).

However, as Bryman (2004) warns there is a definitive requirement for a rigorous effort to select a theoretical framework which is not only relevant to the field of the study but can guide the collection of data and data analysis in the unique socio-cultural field of inquiry.

Bryman and Bell (2015, p.7) argue that: “...characterizing the nature of the link between theory and research is by no means a straightforward matter...”

Traditionally, in conducting an ethnographic study, a theoretical framework is chosen pre-data collection. However, in utilizing a case study strategy the framework can be modified

during the study if it is necessary to do so. It must also be noted that either the collected data will be to test a theory or build a theory based on the collected data.

Yin (2003, p.23) observes that the case study strategy benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. He states, “the more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits...” He argues that the theory also helps in comparing and making a generalization of the empirical results of the case studies.

With specific regard to this study, the theoretical paradigm informing and guiding this research is Social Movement Theory (SMT). Contained within the theory are core themes of *structures* and *functions*, which guide research processes upon social Movements.

In discussing the notion of ***Structure***, it is understood to entail such factors as kinship or social structure of the socio-cultural group. The notion of ***Function*** refers to patterns of the social relations among members of the group that help to regulate behaviour.

Furthermore, the framework also recognises and encompasses the *ideational* and *materialistic* social and theological theories to provide meanings to the observed phenomenon.

***Ideational*** refers to those theories that seek to change and influence society through ideals, psychological and cognitive methods. In the AJK context, this translates to theological models of change, such as, Islamic revivalism, promoting Islamic ideologies, or more specifically, as Islamic visions through *da‘wah* and education. This model will be analysed using the sociological framework of the SMT, referred to as the *framing process*.

The *materialistic* theories conversely argue that society can be changed and influenced via material resources. This approach will be discussed under the *resource mobilization* paradigm of the SMT and within the AJK context, this theory is examined via multiple case studies.

The reason for selecting multiple case studies is that although a single case study may provide greater analysis, however, it misses a lot of other dimensions. Creswell (1998, pp. 86-87) argues that multiple case studies have the innate potential to cover greater ground although they will inherently lack the depth of a single case study investigation.

The aim of this thesis is to explore a phenomenon that entails multiple ideologies and strategies. Therefore, Morrow & Brown (1994) recommend that an ethnographic perspective is utilised so that "...the investigator can... compare cases of specific actors..."

Hence, notions of *Islamic activism* and *Islamic social movements* are formulated and informed by many different socio-politico and economic factors, which must all be accounted for in order to fully understand their intentions and actions.

Although the broad review of literature recognises the influence and impact of Islamic revivalist and reform movements, it has yet to focus specifically upon the 'four million forgotten people' of AJK (Snedden, 2012).

There exist in the majority Muslim state of AJK many different expressions of Islam and Islamic activism. This allows the thesis to explore many divergent issues and factors within established sociological theoretical frameworks.

Therefore, this study is informed by Creswell's (1998, pp.73-76) recommendations on ethnographic research:

- Deciphering the philosophical perspective of the theory guiding the research;
- Identifying the ideological effects of the theory upon the actors;

- Discussing the unique perspectives of the research;
- Utilising a variety of research strategies that allow for the gathering of a wide berth of data and its analysis.

### **5.2.2 Social Movement Theory (SMT)**

The study utilises three analytical frameworks derived from SMT, which guide the ethnographic nature of the case studies in this research.

#### **5.2.2.1 Resource Mobilisation: (RM)**

The concept of resource mobilisation (RM) analyses the mobilisation of social movements through the utilization of resources for the attainment of their perceived goals. This is explored via a thorough examination of the relationship dynamics between intra, and inter-organisational or institutional actors (Giddens and Sutton, 2014; Foweraker, 1995; Costain, 1992; Buechler, 1990).

The review of literature concurs that the emergence of the RM paradigm has evolved SMT from its sole concentration from psychological or behavioural factors to a significant recognition of the importance of material and capital resources. Buechler (2000, p.1) argues that RM perceives social movements to be “...normal, rational, institutionally rooted and political challenged by aggrieved groups...” McCarthy & Zald (1977, p.1213) recognised to be the principal founders of the RM paradigm, argue that classical theories, focusing solely on psychological and behavioural factors were “...abnormal, irrational, and non-institutional...as movements depend upon political, sociological and economic models...”

The core focus of the RM paradigm is the relationship between the material resources and the success the movement experiences.

McCarty and Zald (1977) observe that the role of the resources is crucial as these provide a means to practical results when mobilised diligently, systematically and with clear objectives and goals, such as incentivised recruitment and collective action.

Canel (1992, p.40) defines the mobilisation of the resources to be "...the process by which a group assembles resources and places them under collective control... and are employed for the purpose of pursuing group goals..."

This implies that the systematic organised use of resources formulates a pivotal element of RM, which social movement organisations (SMO) "...identify with their goals ... and try to implement those goals..." (McCarty and Zald, 1977, p.1218). This is conducted through the organisational structure, as its importance is key to the entire process. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1999, p.3) define this organisational structure to be all "...those collective vehicles, informal as well formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective actions..."

Therefore, RM has been effective in providing rational analytical tools to study social movements, but on the other hand, it has failed to include the role of ideology and other collective identities, such as, cultural and religious sentiments. Auyero (2004, pp.420-421) contends that this approach has overlooked the role of cultural-identities, everyday life and habits. Hence, social and environmental factors are significantly more at play than just a sole concentration upon resources. Tagul (2009) argues that in studying Islamic movements there are many other elements to be included, which are neglected by the social movement theorists in the literature on social movements. This includes factors, such as, mobilisation of resources not aimed at social and political change but focused upon the development and promotion of ideals in society and the political structure. For example, the case of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as analysed by Munson (2001) focuses on the reformation of religious and moral discourses, recruitment and building social institutions. Bayat (2005,

p.898) notes that the movements attempt to "...change behaviours, attitudes, cultural symbols and value systems... before confronting the state directly..."

#### **5.2.2.2 Political Process (PP)**

The utilisation of the *political process* framework by contemporary social movement theorists provides another vital approach. Munson (2001, p.494) argues that the fundamental focus of this approach is the relationship between a movement and its environment, "especially the political environment". The emphasis of this perspective is upon the political, organisational and structural aspects of social movements in a specific political system. It recognises the change, the movements desire by focusing on the interaction of the movements and an institutionalized political system.

Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1994; Tilly, 1985 and Gamson 1975, observe that political opportunities are external factors, which facilitate or hinder social movement in a political structure. They note that this approach is more politically inclined, thus, limiting the analysis and possible aspects the movements encounter or engage with. Although the study of the political structures utilising cause-effect factors presents new dimensions under this approach, it fails to recognise that the movements are not necessarily political in their nature or focussed solely upon the state structure.

However, Bevington & Dixon (2005), Goodwin & Jasper (1999) argue that the political structure alongside the environment is an avenue, which allows the social movements to emerge. Hence, they note that everything, which helps movements to mobilise or attain their goals, becomes a political opportunity. Caniglia and Carmin (2005) contend that the political opportunity structure is used to subsume many of the factors that are crucial to the development of the movements. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996, p.3) summarise this argument by claiming "...Social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of

political constraints and opportunities unique to the national contexts in which they are embedded...”

Although it can be argued that this approach is focused on politics and the anti-establishment protests or contention, which may follow (Shils, 1981). Furthermore, there are many social movements, which do not seek to challenge the political system openly but through the provisions of social services (Tugal, 2009).

### **5.2.2.3 Framing Process (FP)**

Babb (1996) and Snow & Benfor (1988) define FP to be a process by which individual interests, beliefs, and values either become congruent with the activities, ideas, and goals of the movement or fail to do so. Whilst Caniglia and Carmin (2005, p.205) state: “...the framing is a tool that is used by movement organisations to facilitate interpretation and provide a means for articulating problems, identifying alternatives and developing a rationale for movement activity...”

Buechler (1990, p.4) contends: “...Just as RM framework has downplayed grievances, it has also marginalized ideology...” This approach stresses the ideological framework and the role of ideology in shaping the activities of the movements. Wickham (2004, p.120) while defining the FP elaborates further upon Snow’s original definition as the “...conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action...”

Therefore, the construction of the frames is essential, especially those frames, which resemble the individual frames, are vital in attracting new members. Bayat (2005, p.903) contends that “the concept of framing also points to deliberate measures by movement leaders to fashion consensus, by utilising existing resources, techniques, means of

communication and networking...” It is also considered that the similarity and relevance of the frames to a culture will ease the process for the movement to expand within the given culture (Caniglia & Carmin (2005).

The FP operates on varying levels with its own unique models. The following are the main framing models used by social movements to present their agendas and model of change as identified in the review of the literature. Framing is used in accordance with the situation, context and objectives:

1. Framing for the movement actors
2. Framing for the wider public
3. Framing for the comparative or rival movements
4. Framing for media to portray their message

These aspects of the FP exist within the strategies of some if not all the Islamic movements globally. The review of the literature suggests that the Islamic movements in the AJK have also adopted these aspects of the FP. This was observed in chapter three detailing how Minhaj and Jamat selected their approaches towards AJK. This may entail religious, ideational or social framing ploys in accordance to the dictates of the context and situation.

### **5.3 Data Collection Instruments**

There are many different types of data collection tools available to conduct the case study research. The literature recommends the possible utilisation of document analysis, physical artefacts, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and archival records. Furthermore, audio and visual tools may also be employed to extract a greater amount of

data. Yin (2003, p.110) suggests, "...case studies not be limited to a single source of evidence. In fact, most of the better case studies rely on varieties of sources..."

### **5.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI)**

Due to the ethnographic nature of this study primary data was collected through the semi-structured interview process. It is imperative for the researcher to gain the trust of the participant actors to extract vital data and accurate information. To conduct this process, the researcher is expected to enquire "from more general to more deep and specific questions..." (Flick, 1998).

Bryman (2004, p.319) notes that in qualitative interviewing there is much greater interest in the interviewee's point of view rather than a researcher's interests, as with the structured interview process. Although there are a variety of possible interview styles from the highly formalised structured to the partially structured informal or completely unstructured and informal. This study utilises and adapts the semi-structured one-to-one interview technique, with pre-decided themes and topics. This interview technique will allow the researcher to alter the questions in accordance with the respondent's behaviour and approach.

### **5.3.2 Observations**

The review of the literature reveals that to conduct empirical research it is crucial for a researcher to observe and describe his/her own feelings and give opinions regarding the participants' attitude and behaviour in a natural environment and practices. For example, Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.99) note, "...Observation is a fundamental and highly important method in all qualitative inquiry..." Whilst Flick (1998, p.222) argues, "...observation enables the researcher to find out how something factually works or occurs..."

In accordance with the literature, there are two types of observations: structured and unstructured. In structured observation, the researcher observes the phenomenon systematically and formally, but in unstructured observation, researcher becomes part of the situation and behaves informally. Thus, for example in a mosque and study circle setting the observations would be informal but in schools and health centres they may be formal as the people present are aware of the researcher's role and the reason for being present. Therefore, participant observation provides more of an opportunity to get involved in the situation and gain the trust of the people as being part of the context.

Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.137) quote Becker and Geer (1969) who describe three significant benefits of participant observation:

- (a) Check definitions of terms participants use in the interview in natural settings;
- (b) To observe the events which were not covered by the participants in the interview;
- (c) To observe the situations which were mentioned in the interviews.

Yin (2003) seeks to point out that there is much to be noted during the observation process. Specifically, for this study, the practices of Islamic activists as described in the interview and literature will be observed. This entails visiting the social, educational, health, welfare and religious (including *masajid* and study circles) institutions of the movements.

Therefore, maximum effort will be made to confirm the claims made by the activists in the interviews, to observe them in the practice wherever possible. Activities of the movements and their activists are crucial to the study and the observation process allows for making sense of the practices of the movements' participants.

As this research is conducted without any hidden agendas or motives, the observation will not be covert. However, as the researcher is an insider in the context of culture and religion, the

researcher will have an advantage of grasping the underlying messages from the literature or interview.

### **5.3.3 Diaries/Document Analysis/Audio-Visual Media**

The two mentioned forms of data collection instruments would be supplemented with data collected through field diaries, the analysis of speeches, sermons and media reports. The utilisation of the research diary allows for the capture of emotive and intellectual perspectives during the entire conduct of the fieldwork. The diary or diaries are mainly unstructured and informal.

Other forms of data that may be captured through audio-visual means are speeches, sermons and active instruction to participants or the public. Furthermore, the researcher will also seek to conduct some documentary analysis of the movement's literature, material, paraphernalia, photographs and media based reports. This data is further supplemented through the review of literature that informed their ideological persuasions, their histories and experiences from both the insider and outsider perspectives in other regions of Pakistan and the world.

## **5.4 Fieldwork Procedures and Principles**

In accordance with the review of the literature and the pre-field study experience, it was decided to concentrate on three social movements operating in AJK. The reason for selecting these movements was their level of religious, political, social and economic influence in the region.

<b>Movement</b>	<b>Description</b>
Jamat-e-Islami or JI (Movement 1)	Considered to be one of the most active religious movements in AJK. It is politically active and has established educational and welfare organisations that are operating at every level of the society.
Minhaj-ul-Qur'an or MQ (Movement 2)	Movement is focused upon the active revival of the religious moral and ethical principles through education, politics and social welfare.
Gulhar Sharif Tariqa or GS (Movement 3)	The inclusion of a pure Sufi movement (Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif based in District of Kotli) is based on the popularity of the movement and its influence across AJK.

Table 5.2 three selected Islamic Social Movements in AJK

#### **5.4.1 Piloting the Study**

In attempting to undertake a pioneering empirical research project of this scale a number of pilot studies were conducted to test and adjust the data collection instruments prior to the actual fieldwork. Bryman (2004, p.159) observes that “...piloting the interview schedule before going into full-scale study helps to give confidence and experience...”

In relation to this research project, several pilot studies were conducted with members of the identified movements both in the UK and AJK in May 2014 and August 2014. The pilot studies provided invaluable feedback with regards to forming the approach, questioning techniques and content of the SSI.

Further, still, it was discovered through the AJK experience that the language utilised to conduct the interviews should be shifted from English to Urdu and more local.

##### **5.4.1.1 Language of the Interviews**

It was decided to conduct interviews in the Urdu language, the national language of the State. However, there are many other languages spoken throughout AJK, such as *Hindko*, *Gojri*,

*Pahari* and *Pothowari*, languages derived from the native Kashmiri language and Punjabi is spoken in the Punjab region of Pakistan and India. A common experience during the pilot studies revealed interviews often starting in Urdu while interviewees changed from Urdu to a local dialectical spoken language. It was felt those who shifted from Urdu to a local language were more open and blunt while answering some controversial and crucial questions.

#### **5.4.1.2 Procedures and Protocols**

Significant lessons learnt from the pilot studies entailed the development of professional procedures to follow pre-and post interview. The experiences were derived both from the UK after one pilot interview and again one in AJK before starting the formal fieldwork. A major realisation entailed the difficulty in keeping the discussion on track and relevant to AJK and other important themes. Therefore, the order of the thematic questions was reformulated to ensure that the most relevant questions were asked in the first half of the questionnaire. It was also noted that awkward or personal questions should only be asked if the participants had volunteered personal information in a previous question. It was realised that this was a unique aspect of the AJK culture that entailed the asking of personal questions, which could cause offence and misunderstanding. Furthermore, trust is a major issue in the region as it is technically still at war with India and extreme caution must be exercised in the style and manner the questions are asked and the personal conduct of the interviewer. This also included assuring the interviewee participants of complete confidentiality and anonymity. Allowing the participants autonomy to answer the questions posed. (see Appendix I)

Further lessons included the nature of the logistics required to conduct interviews in AJK, alongside the value of utilising electronic voice recorders to conduct interviews, which could then be transcribed into the written form. Although the value of taking notes was also made apparent as some recorded comments were inaudible or garbled.

### 5.4.2 Sampling

After conducting the pilot studies, it became apparent that the strategy used for sampling would have to be based on *elite* or purposive non-probability sampling. This implied that the selection of participants would be based upon the selection of well-informed or influential people inside the movements (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). However, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the security situation in the region and the general suspicion, which surrounds such activities, snowball sampling strategy was also employed. This entails “the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of the people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others...” Bryman, (2004, p.100). This approach was selected as it was considered the most appropriate to recruit participants for interviewing. This process started from personal *biraderi* links to reaching out to desired activists and movements. Personal links established with some interviewees were leveraged to contact more potential participants within specialist areas such as education, politics or welfare. Although many of the potential participants were keen to aid the research, however, some were uncomfortable with the idea of such research and spoke frankly only in a private capacity off the record.

Although the initial plan had entailed the recruitment of 30 participants in total, with 10 participants representing each of the three identified movements, which would be selected for the SSI process. However, in practice, this was not possible as only a selected number of people actively chose to participate from all movements.

(Table 5.3 summarises the number of participants willing to participate in the study)

<b>Movement</b>	<b>Number of Male Participants</b>	<b>Number of Female Participants</b>	<b>Total Participants</b>
Jamaat-e-Islami (Movement 1)	7	2	9
Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (Movement 2)	6	3	9
GS (Movement 3)	4	0	4

Table 5.3 Participant Sample Data

The interviewees are from a broad range of society and include political leaders, social activists, welfare activists, imams, policy makers within the institutions and organizations of the movements. Fieldwork was also limited to the habitants of AJK and activities of the selected movements from 1980 to 2014. This was because the literature has identified the end of the seventies to be the start of the Islamisation process in Pakistan and AJK on a significant level (Hewitt, 1995; Gul, 2009; Ahmad, 2009).

#### **5.4.3 Venues of the Interviews**

Most of the interviews took place in the AJK, but some of the interviews were conducted in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Pakistan, alongside cities in AJK due to the geography of the region, (See 2.1). The place of interviews ranged from the movements' offices to personal offices, mosques, homes of activists and other places facilitated by mutual friends or referees, such as, at business or medical centres.

## 5.5 Data Analysis

McMillan and Schumacher (2001, p.395) observe that the data analysis process allows for the systematisation of data into categories and identifying the potential and possible relationships between categories. This section introduces firstly, the deductive approach guiding the data analysis phase and then the specific coding method used to derive the themes.

### 5.5.1 Deductive Approach:

The study utilises a deductive or top-down approach to data analysis. This begins from a firm theoretical proposition that uses the existing theories and literature findings to guide the data analysis phase (Yin, 2003). This implies that crucial aspects of the research such as the themes can be identified through the literature and contrasted with the empirical findings.

The main theory used to guide this research is the SMT and its three approaches: RM, PP and FP. This procedure is recognized to help to keep the study ‘within its feasible limits’ (Yin, 2003, p. 23). This leads to the next stages, such as, observations and confirmation when using the deductive approach of the data analysis.

The themes identified were derived from the review of the literature to address the central research questions. However, during the analysis process, the researcher kept the options open to let the new themes emerge from the interviews and observations.

Table 5.4 summarises the identified themes

Identified Themes	Description
Recruitment or Joining the Movement: process, tools and techniques used by the movement.	Central questions were concerned with the process of joining the movement, the aim was to explore what tools and techniques

	movements use and what expectations the activists have, furthermore, how the movements set their footings in the AJK.
Resource Mobilisation or utilisation of the social institutions of the movements.	The focus of this theme was how these movements utilise social institutions, such as, education, health, politics and <i>da'wah</i> to achieve their perceived goals in the society.
Ideology/vision of the movement and its role in the society and in the formation of the movement.	Related mainly to the interpretation of Islam, a movement offers to the people of the AJK. Furthermore, the Islamic vision of the movement for the society and change was also added under this theme.
Maintaining the Process: openness or closure of the political and social structure	Aimed at the social structure of the society and the hurdles the movements encounter in a caste-based society. Further, to explore what factors impede or facilitate the movement.

Table 5.4 Identified themes

### 5.5.2 Thematic Coding

The initial approach utilised to begin the data analysis phase entails the transcribing and translation of data from Urdu to the English language. The data is then categorized through a coding process by using various colours to identify specific themes. For instance, the use of the colour red denotes revolutionary and political statements, whilst the use of the green colour signifies missionary or *da'wah* type of activities. These colour-coded statements are then categorised appropriately into their relevant groups or themes, this can be considered the thematic analysis approach.

Strauss (1987, pp.27-28) describes four stages of the thematic coding of the collected data as a starting point, which can help to build a clear picture of the case. He describes thematic

coding to be “...required where there is different phenomenon under study or where the comparison is required among the different groups and ideas derived from the research questions...”

- **Conditions:** Why and what has led to the situation or more appropriately the background of the case or situation.
- **Interaction among the actors:** Who acted and as a result what happened?
- **Strategies and tactics:** Explore the avoidance or adoption of strategies.
- **Consequences:** What changed as a consequence, or result of the all above actions.

Selecting the themes from the codes is a complex task that entails firstly the process of open coding, which is followed by more selective codes before leading to specific themes in the interview and observation stages. However, this process requires the coding to be precise as Wolcott (1994b) warns against the use of more than fifty codes or categories, as it becomes more complex and harder to link data with the theory derived from the literature.

To make this process succinct and practical the study has adopted the model developed by Nancy Porteous et al (1997) to categorise all data under the broader themes or codes, which they identify as topics at the initial or First stage (See Figure 5.5). This will also sort the important chunks of the interviews in a more appropriate and accessible place under a theme and then provide a description from the observations and other prior knowledge in the field, which Wolcott (1994b, p.12) identifies to be “putting the data in the tables or charts”.

Figure 5.5 provides an example of putting data into a table format

**First stage:**

Theme	Quotation	Findings
Politics	<i>Every Muslim is a politician by birth</i>	This reflects the importance of the political institutions for a movement.

Figure 5.5 Example of First Stage Coding

Creswell (1998) notes that all the collected qualitative data cannot be utilised in the study, thus, it must be reduced (reductionist approach). Flick (1998) argues that in the analytical process only the most important and relevant data should be included in the final analysis. In this process, all relevant or important quotations from the different respondents are to be placed under one final and relevant theme (Second Stage). (See Figure 5.6)

**Second Stage:**

Themes	Quotations	Findings	Approaches
Welfare	<i>If we deliver services to the people they will join us. (Bazmi)</i> <i>The welfare organization will be my own but it will forward objectives of the movement. (Ashraf)</i>	An example of asking for the votes; after services were delivered. (Observation) Many Organizations are independently registered which have no apparent link with the movement.	Resource Mobilization approach. Incentives. Economic model of revival

Figure 5.6 example of second stage coding

Once this second section has been completed Flick (1998) advises that a summary of the case or a short description should be constructed. This will help in building a more comprehensive case study that includes all the following three factors:

- Biography or description of the interviewee
- Description about the statement
- Their link with the statement and reasons

Creswell (1998, p.63) observes that when multiple cases are chosen a typical format is to first “provide a detailed description of each case and themes within the case, called a within-case analysis, followed by a thematic analysis across the cases called a cross-case-analysis...”

However, it has been deemed unnecessary to provide a description or biography of each interviewee as some participants or respondents were unwilling to provide many personal details.

### **5.5.3 Validity or Generalization in the Qualitative Research:**

It is accepted that qualitative research is different from quantitative research, Bryman (2004, p.273) asserts that the role of “measurement” cannot be applied in the qualitative research...”

However, this does not imply that no criterion should be employed. To ensure complete authenticity and provide credibility and validity to the study, two main approaches; member checking, and triangulation are utilised. First one is supplemented with explicit feedback from the participants in terms of confirming their statements and opinions. Broun and Clark (2013, pp.282-286) describe this aspect of the validity process to be difficult and time-consuming. This is explicitly proven to be even more onerous in this study as the case participants of the study are transnational and many live in remote areas of AJK.

Triangulation is, however, a more suitable and appropriate method to ensure validity in this study. The procedures used include the collation of multiple sources of evidence such as primary data collected from the SSI, Observations, field diaries and other secondary sources of data written and audio, video from the media.

Bryman (2004, p.285) suggests that generalizations about the validity and authenticity of the qualitative research are to generalize than to population as qualitative research generalize to the theory.

### **5.6 Ethical Issues:**

Bryman (2004, p.509) quotes Diener and Crandall (1978) outlining four major issues that all researchers must address before conducting any research-based projects:

- Whether there is *harm to participants*;
- Whether there is a *lack of informed consent*;
- Whether there is an *invasion of privacy*;
- Whether *deception is involved*.

These recommendations are also supported by the ‘British Educational Research Association (BERA, 2011) “...All educational research should be conducted within an ethic of respect for: The Person; Knowledge; Democratic Values; The Quality of Educational Research; Academic Freedom.”

Prior to conducting the field work, it was ensured that legitimate official access was gained to carry out observations. The researcher’s insider status implied that he was cognisant with the language and had contacts with activists in the AJK society and, thus, could gain access

to the movements through these personal relationships. Although a single educational organization denied this access, it was an anomaly.

o address the possible biases of religious affiliation, caste and political persuasions, the researcher used techniques of personal disclosure statements and memos throughout the research process to maintain transparency. Seeking the consent of the participants for the SSI proved to be challenging due to the ongoing security issues in the region. The researcher spent many days with some participants for the SSI but when the time came to record the interview, they eventually refused, citing security and trust issues. However, many of the potential participants were prepared to discuss anything off the record, if, those discussions were not made part of the data gathered. However, prior to the SSI process, the consent of the participants that took part was explicitly recorded, and confidentiality and the right of withdrawal from the study was assured. The researcher explained in detail the aims of the research to the participants, and anonymity was ensured for the participants, so that their identities would never be revealed.

### **5.6.1 Insider/ Outsider Researcher**

Insider and outsider is a critical reflection on the one's own role as a researcher. A researcher is considered as an insider when he belongs to the same group of the people with whom he is involved in the research process. However, there are always different positions a researcher may adopt, a researcher can be an insider and in the same situation, whilst being an outsider in a different perspective (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Both positions have advantages and disadvantages in certain situations, for instance, an insider researcher knows certain things about a culture, religion or any other element in an ethnographic research environment. However, the outsider has a distinct advantage over an insider when it comes to asking respondents questions, "that are stupid or blunt, that are not allowed for insiders..." (Bailey,

1996:15). When researcher becomes part of the group to gain participants' confidence and trust it solves issues of access as it appears in the case of Cetin (2010) but it is possible when only one group is under the study, and the researcher has nothing to hide or disclose about others. In this study the researcher felt many times that the participants appeared reluctant to pass on comments about the other movements which were the part of this study, sometimes they clearly mentioned others where it appeared the viewpoint the participants are offering are clearly a comparison. In such a situation the researcher was compelled to reassert his impartiality and confidentiality of the participants and of their viewpoints.

This study is about the religious phenomenon, not a religious study (theological) in itself; limits can apply for the researcher when he is coming from the same religion as an insider, because some aspects might not be of importance for the insider as they can be important for an outsider. McCutcheon (2007) notes that non-participant researchers as outsiders have greater chance to describe and explore participants' viewpoints, meanings and motivations the participants are not aware of in their daily practices. As McCutcheon asserts that the questions of the authority of the insider and outsider researchers' generalizations always will remain on surface.

### **5.6.2 Limitations of the Study**

This study covers three Islamic social movements in the AJK context, which use different strategies to change or build the society of their own perceived visions. The researcher recognizes that these are not the only three movements operating in the region, but these are three major movements amongst many. However, the aim was to explore the social movements in AJK through the SMT and the three movements identified could be examined with regards to the frameworks of RM, PP and FP. Furthermore, this study cannot be

considered as comprehensive because it is an exploratory study into a region that has traditionally been closed to outside research.

The identified limitations of the study include:

- **Opening up the Academic Field:** AJK is a closed society both geographically and in terms of academic research. Although this research is novel it also uncovers other areas that have yet to be examined academically, such as, the cultural aspects of the people and society. There is a dearth of literature on the religion and religious identities of the Azad Kashmiri people and their transition to Islam and Islamic identities and the formation of the movements in detail.
- **Access and Lack of Time:** Initially, thirty interviews from the three movements were planned alongside observations of all social institutions, such as, education, health, welfare, political and religious activities of the movements. However, the three available months to conduct the fieldwork proved not to be enough. Finding thirty people to participate proved to be extremely challenging, as people were suspicious of the motives of the study. Further issues included delays due to weather, which put limits on travelling, arranging and cancellation of the interviews alongside participant's withdrawing from recording the interviews. Health issues related to excessive travelling and poor hygiene while staying in the cities for meetings and observations also proved to be a hurdle.
- **Access into Organizations:** Access was denied from a famous educational organization active in AJK because they feared that this research project would officially link the organization with one of the movements. An incident quoted in a UK newspaper was used to justify this denial of access (Turner, C, 2014). On further

exploration some of the articles clearly linked some Islamic NGOs, including this one, with Islamic radical movements and terrorism (Westrop, S, 2014).

## **5.7 Conclusion**

The chapter was organised to present the overarching methodology by which this exploratory empirical study will be conducted. The first section began by examining the ‘exploratory’ research method, which encompassed a brief analysis of the central research questions and the examination of the literature. The chapter then sought to justify the adoption of the ethnographic methodological approach, before discussing the data collection instruments: semi structured interviews (SSI) and document analysis to capture the data from a ‘non-probability sampling group. The chapter then concluded by explicating the ethical nature of the research design and the insider status of the researcher. The chapter concluded by noting that the researcher experienced a number of issues relating to a dearth of academic research on the region, access and trust.

In the next chapter, the study discusses the data analysis of the qualitative empirical field study.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **ANALYSIS OF THE DATA**

#### **6.0 Introduction:**

This chapter aims to present the analysis of the gathered data through semi-structured interviews scheduled during the field work in AJK on three selected Islamic movements. This chapter will explore three Islamic movements using three case studies, Case Study One focuses upon Jamat-e-Islami, (JI) Case Study Two discusses Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ), while the aim of Case Study Three, is to explore Khanqah-e-Fatimiya or Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif (GS) Kotli.

Section (6.0) will give a brief introduction to the chapter and each movement. In (6.1) the analytical framework will be touched upon, followed by identified themes in section (6.2). Section (6.3) will offer sampling and a summary of the JI activists, then the main characteristics of the activists in a table form will be presented. In the rest of the section (6.4), thematic data analysis approach will be utilised for the case study one on JI Movement.

Semi structured-interviews and observation data gathered during the field work in the AJK will be used as primary evidence; however, observation data will be utilised as supporting evidence in the discussion and findings chapter. Data will be analysed using the three approaches of the social movement theory which aims to address three main research questions. A brief introduction of the movement and a summary and sketch table about activists will be presented at the beginning of each case study.

### **Case Study One: Jamat-e-Islami AJK:**

Jamat-e-Islami is one of the largest and famous Islamic movements in the Muslim world; the movement was explored in detail in chapter three of the study. Jamat believes in changing society using political power, it believes, or the language used reflects; that society and systems can only be changed when the movement has obtained political power. The movement uses the top down approach to achieve change, which is based on attainment of the power to change the existing system and then by implementation of their own. This is part of the belief of the activists as it is supported by the Qur'an and Sunna, further its importance is reflected in the main literature of the movement.

### **Case Study Two: Minhaj-ul-Qur'an:**

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is comparatively a new movement; it was established in Lahore, in central Punjab, and initiated by its founder Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri in 1980. Unlike Jamat-e-Islami, its founder is alive and active politically and religiously. In recent times, it entered contentious politics more forcefully and aggressively in 2012, and again, for the second time in 2014 after the movement members were killed by the Punjab police in a raid on its headquarters in Lahore.

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is also active in AJK (Azad Jammu Kashmir), but politically not as effective and visible as in Pakistan. The movement participates in elections in AJK but in a limited scope, it has never won a seat in the AJK assembly, so far. Unlike JI, MQ's political party is registered under the different name as JKAT (Jammu & Kashmir Awami Tehreek) but other institutions are in the name of the umbrella movement - Minhaj-ul-Qur'an.

In this case study and in the data analysis, the focus will be exploring the main research themes, from the interviews of the activists, however, primary data gathered through

observations will be used as supporting evidence in the discussion chapter. Secondary data, such as the speeches of Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri, comprising mainly video material, and other media appearances, such as, press conferences, talk shows, and speeches made during the rallies and Revolution March which were observed almost on a daily basis on Pakistani TV channels, will be utilised as supporting evidence in the discussion chapter.

### **Case Study Three: Pir Sahib of Gulhar Sharif:**

This movement was selected for several reasons; it is an indigenous movement from Kashmir; the shrine and the Sheikh holds great importance in local society, unlike many another traveller Pirs from other parts of Pakistan who only visit their *murids*. This movement or *tariqa* utilises different resources and activities to promote their agenda or message locally, the movement, however, appeared more influential and more credible than many other Sufi, *tariqas* specifically, in the Mirpur region and generally all over AJK. The movement is more organised than the many other Sufi *silasil*, or networks in the state, and from those which are outside the state, but have followings in AJK. Furthermore, their apolitical nature, tactics or strategies; which are mosque and madrasa, are widely accepted in the society.

However, the movement has different organisations for young people, and male and female activists, which includes different *halaqas* or groups of different people for those working in the private and government sectors. This was the first step to explore further how well organised and committed they are for *terbiyah* purposes when compared with any other local movement, especially in the Sufi *tariqas*. The most important aspects of this case study will be to explore religious vision or local Islam, which as we have seen in the second chapter played a crucial role in shaping the distinctive religious identity of AJK Islam.

## **6.1 Analytical Framework:**

For the analysis of the three case studies, three paradigms of social movement theory will be utilised as a lens to look at the different aspects of Islamic movements. For instance, a ‘Political Opportunity’ approach will be utilised to explore how the movements emerged and created their spaces in wider society and systems. Proponents of this approach believe that the movements emerge with the openness of political opportunities. A ‘Resource Mobilisation’ paradigm of social movement theory will be used to explore the role of the material and human resources and mobilization of organisations and networks. This approach focuses mainly on the utilization of the material resources by the movements, proponents of this approach believe that the movements cannot mobilize in the absence of material resources. It is believed that fluctuation of material resources determines success or failure of the movements.

The ‘Framing Process’ approach of social movement theory is considered very important, this approach places importance on the shared beliefs and understanding by the activists for the collective action in a society. This approach facilitates exploring the vision and ideational approaches the movements use to disseminate their values and messages across channels. These approaches will be compared with each other and by contrast be considered in view of the Islamic models of change and mobilisation.

## **6.2 Identified Themes**

In the table below are the main themes identified and derived from the literature review, social movement theory and pilot studies conducted first in the UK, and later slightly modified the language after conducting one more pilot study in AJK before starting the field

work. Three approaches of the social movement theory were the main tools to guide the whole process of the data collection and analysis to keep the study within feasible limits.

Themes	Description
Ideology and Vision	This means the religious interpretations the movements use to present their message and vision different from others for building the society of their own perceived vision.
Recruitment	This theme was selected to ask the opening questions regarding how the activists join the movement and the strategies movements use to bring them into the movement.
Resource Mobilisation	This theme explores the objectives and approaches the movements utilise to mobilise material resources, including institutions of the movements.
Maintaining the Process	Questions under this theme were asked to analyse all above-mentioned strategies and approaches against existing socio-political and religio-cultural phenomenon, as hurdles movements face.

Table 6.1 Semi Structure Interview (SSI) Themes

### 6.3 Sampling

Elite interviewing and purposive non-probability sampling were used to conduct interviews; to accomplish this, snowball sampling strategy was used to reach out to the participants, this has been discussed in detail in chapter five section (5.4.2).

## CASE STUDY ONE

### **6.4 Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Azad Jammu and Kashmir:**

The JI participants range from different age groups of fields of employment, such as, politics, welfare, education and policy makers. The activists were found to be very committed and ambitious with securing the aims and objectives of the movement, and had experienced working in different organisations attached to the movement. The following is a brief sketch of the activists who were interviewed, and subsequent discussions with them are utilised in the study. Pseudonyms are used for the participants, and as some positions or roles were unique this was essential to keep their identities confidential. At one place a name was changed twice to ensure privacy. (See Appendix II)

#### **Interview Participants**

<b>Interview Participant</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Time with JI</b>	<b>Position or Responsibility within JI</b>
Ashraf	32	10 Years	Sub-divisional post holder, runs an NGO
Bazmi	49	26 Years	District level leader, politician
Azeem	50	35 Years	Head of an organisation
Ehsan	55	34 Years	Head of an organisation, politician
Fazil	60	40 Years	Politician, policy maker
Hakeem	59	35 Years	Head of an organisation, policy maker
Dilpazir	57	38 years	State level responsibility, politician
Ghazala	25	7 Years	Member, teacher

Table 6.2 Sketch of the Participants of JI

#### **6.4.1 Ideology and Vision**

“He is Who has sent His messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth, that he may cause to prevail over all religions, however much the idolaters may be averse”.

(Qur’an 9:61)

Initial meetings with almost all JI members revealed that they were extremely aware of their movement’s ideological aims and objectives. These were centred upon a theological basis that utilised Qur’anic and Prophetic traditions to provide justification for the existence and cause of JI. According to the broad consensus of the participants interviewed JI was a social political movement working towards the supremacy of the Islamic ideology over the competing secular models as derived from the western ideological traditions:

*“Every Muslim is a politician by birth, that is ruling and superiority, no one can be a true Muslim unless he believes that the religion of the holy prophet should be superior to all other systems.” (Bazmi)*

The activists define their understanding of Islam not as a religion but as a *din*, a system, a complete code of life that can replace atheistic ideologies, such as, Communism, Socialism, Secularism or Capitalism. By using Qur’anic verses, they argue that ‘prevailing’, the *din* is their responsibility, or in other words a duty by Allah, which is neglected. Hence, this negligence has led to a major cause of Muslim’s problems and so the solution is to implement Islam within a political framework to attain success. Bazmi, a respected local religious leader, politician and active member of the movement argues further:

*“The purpose of the messengers was to do justice, and this only can be done when you have political power through recognised and authorised means”.*

Bazmi is determined to point out that if JI ignores the role of politics then the purpose of Islam cannot be accomplished. He further describes the JI and its identity to be characterised by three core objectives:

*“...D‘awati Islam, Jihadi Islam and Political Islam... People are happy about Dawati Islam... as they have no threat from the missionary Islam but they have problems with Jihadi and political Islam... Jihadi Islam is to remove hurdles in the way of our mission, whereas political Islam is to get political power and implement Islamic system”.*

He went on to state that with regards to *Jihadi Islam* in AJK:

*“Jihad is simply to strive... even we both are sitting and discussing Islam is a jihad, people don’t differentiate between jihad and Qittal... what we do in the AJK side is Jihad but when we fight in occupied Kashmir against the Kuffar or Hindus is Qittal... we only justify jihad in Azad Kashmir and Qittal is for Occupied Kashmir”.*

Bazmi then moves to describe a sacred sense and duty incumbent upon all Muslims:

*“...Politics is an incomplete name; really it is a belief for us that should be our breath...”*

A senior JI activist and politician, Dilpazir further substantiates this stance by rhetorically asking:

*“To make this din superior on all other dins... ask a politician, a molvi or a Pir sahib... are they working for this...?”*

There is an overt determination or obsession with equating the vision and objectives of the JI in solely political terms, and to acquire political power within the state by utilising the sacred Islamic resources as evidence for their claims. This is exemplified by a young emerging leader of the JI, Ashraf whom delineates the extent to which this perspective pervades the JI vision:

*“...Prophet’s whole life was dedicated to the establishment of the Din... His nurtured men first did the political decisions, to decide who will be their political leader then they buried Him....”*

Although his statement is factually questionable he is adamant that the political process was so crucial to the success of the early Muslims that even the death of the Prophet was superseded by the desire to appoint a new political heir. Furthermore, he moves on to relate the pertinence of the political objective of the JI by declaring that he is committed to a target which is to campaign for an assembly seat in the forthcoming elections (2021):

*“...I will win or gain an assembly seat for the Jamat... we will win from anywhere in my district...”*

Ashraf then supports his assertions by revealing that he has already begun the task of attaining this seat by working with his friends to establish a network of social activities in the region:

*“I am starting an NGO...I have started work... linked to the politics... education, health, basic needs and emergency relief work.”*

He then equates the work he is doing with that conducted by other successful models of socio-religious political parties elsewhere:

*“...This work will be like Justice and Development Party in Turkey... first, we will do work and then will reach the people that we have done this....”*

Although Ashraf is keen to discuss his political nous he also demonstrates an altruistic side that the other interviewed senior party members had rarely displayed:

*“Through health facilities, we will be helping the people and serving them, at the same time will be doing work of d’awa...”*

However, Ashraf ultimately reveals the deep-rooted indoctrination and loyalty to the JI party by revealing that his efforts are ultimately for the JI cause:

*“For instance, my efforts will be individualistic but its ultimate benefit will go to the Jamat because my identity is because of the Jamat...”*

The NGO is an ideal example of how he feels he can further the aims of the movement:

*“...That is my own but its objective, such as education department through that we will develop the concept of Ummah, and Islam as a code of life, which are Jamat’s two basic concepts, we will be developing and promoting these two...”*

The activists, therefore, are supporting the JI mission and objectives by establishing independent institutions that have not been commissioned by the Jamat, but their ultimate purpose is to benefit the movement and its goals. The education system, was identified by almost all the JI activists to be the most important tool in bringing about the required change in society. Ashraf, for instance, argued passionately that the immediate requirement was to reform the educational system:

*“...We need to fix our educational system because to change any system education is a basic factor...to set our national objectives, until our national objectives are not set we cannot do anything...”*

Ashraf then articulated his point by providing concrete examples of JI’s activities from a broader social context:

*“...Some of Jamat’s trusts are working, like Alghazali Educational Trust in Pakistan which has 100000 students, including needy and orphans... Jamat’s inspired people have Dar-e-Arqam schools they have 100000 students... Read Foundation... are all run by the Jamat and other `Jamati peoples to bring about the change...”*

To bring about that change through education, Hameed a founding member of an active educational network in AJK for the JI elaborated upon the curriculums and syllabus to prepare their students and future members:

*“...I think if we can teach our student only universally acceptable values ... such as honesty, truthfulness, patience and tolerance, this can make big difference and we can change the nation.”*

Hameed then shared a story of a student who found some money and returned it to the teachers. The school organised a function to appreciate the honesty of the student to encourage other students to have this quality. Regarding the national curriculum he pointed out a loophole created by the state school system, there are subjects about Islam and Islamic studies but like many other subjects the government system is not functioning properly to enable students to act upon Islamic teachings:

*“...We tell students to become good Muslims good humans and good Pakistanis, it doesn’t matter if they go into other parties this is acceptable for us, if we have prepared them good then this will help us to have good people in many places, our aim is preparing good people on a large scale.”*

For Hameed education is crucial in changing and creating an Islamic based society on the ideology of the movement:

*“We teach the same Islamic studies and Arabic which is prescribed by the national curriculum but we teach them properly and enable them to apply in their life... for instance, if they learn Arabic they should be able to read and understand the Qur’an...”*

This reflects JI’s vision towards attaining their aims and objectives of transforming an ignorant society steeped in secular or stagnant religious values to an enlightened Islamic society based upon their perceived Islamic principles as they have defined them.

Ehsan defiantly states that:

*“Some people say we might not come on the front through political way but then another way is changing the minds”*

#### **6.4.2 Recruitment: The Process and the Strategies:**

*“...Though I was a nationalist I was inspired by the Jamat... Some activists of the movement gave me some literature of the movement...I had many concerns about Jamat-e-Islami, I shared them all, most of them were the religious, and they cleared many concerns...” (Ashraf)*

During the interview schedules, it was revealed that most of the activists had post-graduate university level qualifications. Although JI’s policy is to recruit predominantly from educational institutions, they also have a strategy to counter questions regarding their religious identity:

*“I was a member of PSF (People’s Student Federation) there was also Jami’at (Jamaat’s student organisation) but my teachers discouraged me about the Jamat that they are Wahhabis and the Wahhabis’ are kaffirs... One day one of the Jamat activists took me for tea and then I asked him some questions... during the discussion, my mind changed...” (Azeem)*

The most effective tool used to recruit was according to the interviewees the use of literature:

*“First book of Sayyed Mawdudi I read was ‘Deenyat’ which appealed me a lot... It appealed to me that I should read this man; I started studying him...” (Ashraf)*

The JI activists in recounting their accounts of being recruited reiterated the use of literature to influence their thinking and it was mostly written work by Mawdudi:

*“First book of Mawdudi was ‘khutbat’ about... what is Islam? What is the purpose of our life? Then another small book ‘Salamati ka Rasta’... and I went for the big books and I all finished all available books in my district library in one month including, Tafheem-ul-Qur’an, and this all lit a candle in my heart... later when I came into the movement and continued reading.” (Azeem)*

However, for those targeted activists that are not initially convinced by the JI tactics of discussion and literature, the movement mobilises a relentless campaign to pursue these individuals:

*“Friends or the people of the Jamat do everything to make you join... A few people remain in contact with a person even for 10 years... and they don’t tell you... in the same way they kept me in the contact. When I was fully impressed, then in a function*

*some people said to me to take membership... I said to give me some time, but they put some questions in front of me and asked if I agree with these points of d'awa... I said yes I agree... then from there I became member..."* (Ashraf)

Ehsan also revealed that JI justifies this approach by referring to the example of the Holy Prophet, who had wanted Umar to join the nascent Islamic movement in Mecca and so he prayed to Allah to bring him into the fold.

*"...After joining this movement... they encouraged me to get education... Whatever respect I have in the society is because of the movement, otherwise, I would have retired as a school teacher or maximum as a lecturer..."* (Azeem)

Azeem clearly feels a sense of indebtedness to JI for helping him to achieve his career aims and goals. JI not only provided him with a platform to preach his religious and political views but also allowed him to gain an education. Furthermore, he mentions that due to his heritage, the *biraderi* system he hails from is considered as a lower status, thus, the opportunities normally open to a person such as him are limited.

However, due to JI, he has been able to surpass these social boundaries to become the head of an organisation established by friends in the movement working both in AJK and in some areas of Pakistan. He is also an author of more than ten books, a lecturer by profession, a journalist and writes for a prominent Pakistani newspaper. To do this all and reach this level it was only possible due to the movement or the platform provided by the movement.

Ashraf seems to concur with this observation:

*"...If we talk about the worldly things then self-development attracted me a lot... it is a disciplined life... I gained some skills such as self-confidence, communication skills, leadership organisational skills..."*

It seems that JI has presented its members with opportunities that allow them to live a higher more fulfilling life that entails not only material benefits but a sense of self-satisfaction due to

the political and social aims of the JI. This experience is not limited just to the male population or members, but is also described by the female members such as Ghazala:

*“...If I was not in the Jamat, I think perhaps where I am sitting today I would not be sitting here... because Jamat has taught us how to ask questions... how to behave... even how to sit... if you have a problem with a University Dean then how to manage it... if I was not in the movement, which nurtures so deeply... I don't know where would I have been today.”*

Bazmi explains that this justifies the underlining reason for the incessant pursuit of individuals, as it is centred in the desire of the JI Movement to see talented potential members succeed:

*“By Giving them services and making them believe that we can fight for their problems and eradicate their hurdles... people will not only walk with you but will take you on their shoulders... Giving justice, giving merit, development, welfare and solving their problems...”*

These ‘giving’s’ are the summary of those services Jamat offers to its members and those potential members who may join the movement or at least vote for the movement in the elections. According to Bazmi the giving of ‘justice’ reflects the strategy, which is used as protection or shelter against the system or against the exploitation of other social groups in the society.

Bazmi further exemplifies this approach by proceeding into a lengthy dialogue to illustrate the point by providing an example from a Prophetic tradition. The Prophet had carried luggage for an old woman who was running away from him and was unaware that he was the Prophet, and on finding out converted to Islam on the account of his behaviour and moral values. Bazmi was preaching more than engaging in a discussion on the overarching values that the ordinary people could not fathom until they had experienced them.

Ashraf observes that JI provides a form of social protection from the corrupt and exploiting official authorities:

*“... Jamat leadership either at the constituency level or the district level...live amongst the people and that’s why people are attracted towards them.... Yes, you can say this protection and they give the due respect to their members.”*

However, he was also aware of the fact that activists operating within the social structure of AJK required additional protection and thus the role of the traditional *biraderi* system was crucial. Thus, Ehsan observes that:

*“We cannot deny the role of the biraderis, we want to target bigger biraderis wherever they are stronger... for instance, the Jaat biraderi in Mirpur and Gujjar biraderi in Kotli district and so on in the other parts of AJK”.*

#### **6.4.3 Mobilization of the Material Resources:**

*“Al-khidmat has two hospitals... one is in Bagh (AJK) and another in RWP (Punjab)... Al-khidmat is working in ... disaster management, such as earthquake and flood relief... health... like hospitals, dispensaries and diagnosis centres... Orphan care programme... those kids living with mothers... each child gets R.S 2500 per month in Mirpur... we have 138 children this year... Next project we are launching in Kotli for 100 children... then we will spread to other districts... then; Qurbani, employment, clean water, winter and scholarship programme.” (Ehsan)*

The overwhelming aspect of the entire JI structure appears to be in its ability to engage and provide for the local communities in which it operates. Ehsan is desperate to point out that this is what makes it attractive to new potential members whilst retaining the loyalty of its existing activists. Projects of such magnitude are extremely well appreciated and received by the mainly isolated village populations in the mountainous regions, usually cut off from mainstream highways and cities of Pakistan.

Ehsan notes that the JI has justified its operations as it is:

*“...Serving people and giving them the message that although Jamat is out of the government but still serving ...but if Jamat with ... votes come into the power then it can serve... better...as they know we are trustworthy people... if we get the government we will do the same way... ”*

This is a unique perspective within the AJK context as often people associated with Islamic movements usually claim to be undertaking social work to earn *sawab* or credits from Allah. It also confirms that this was not an individual act but a rational strategy of the movement. A rational choice which is for a clear purpose of giving people confidence that they can deliver if they get into the power and that they are honest in dealing with material resources. Most importantly it reflects that the movement is concerned with acquiring political power through the high profile and visible projects.

For example, the health institution; a semi-Jamat Organization (SJO) has not been directly established or controlled by JI but was established by JI activists to work in the health and welfare sector. Such institutions offer quality services with minimum or for the poor free of charge, the standard offered by these institutions is unique and out class when compared with the government or other such private institutions. How the activists present these institutions and their vision can be seen in the following statement by Ahmad:

*“We have the same objectives, it is like one building which has separate rooms and departments... This all is to please Allah, we pay very good salaries to our staff we tell them you will get salaries but always try to get Allah’s pleasure..... I started Relief work at the time of the Kashmir uprising with the people or friends from other parts of the world... whatever I am doing today is the same work but it is more organised ... we have reached the oppressed people of the society...”*

This demonstrates how fervent and committed the JI activists are about the aims and objectives of the movement and organisations. Furthermore, those activists managing these organisations are like full time or life members of the movement, whatever good they will bring about even in their personal capacity the credit will be given to the movement and it will reflect the goals of the movement. It can be discerned from these examples that no matter who the person is, they are ultimately contributing towards the aims and objectives of the movement because according to them the movement enabled them to be at that level.

Ehsan passionately explains that all these activities ultimately help to develop and build confidence in the local people to run the affairs of the state and that they can deliver better services than the ruling political parties.

Bazmi explained that the activists are providing these services in line with the JI's aims and objectives and, thus, the services constitute a *neindra*, which the people must return to Jamat-e-Islami in the form of the votes. He used the term *neindra*, which is a small amount of money people pay at the time of the marriage dinner or meal. Socially, they are not only supposed to return that money or a bit extra, but are expected to be present at the others' ceremony. This is a continuous social norm and a 'social exchange' to keep people connected with each other.

#### **6.4.4 Maintaining the Process: Cultural and Organisational Clashes and Hurdles**

*“...Biraderism has a very crucial role in the society... but at the same time, it is a big problem and disease... It is like idol worshipping imposed by the status quo politicians to benefit from the innocent people... we need people with character to address this problem.... Biraderism is the biggest hurdle in way of our movement, and another one is sectarianism... Our society is divided into different classes these both are harmful to our movement...”*

Bazmi vociferously argues that although *biraderism* has an important role within the existing societal structure, the movement dislikes it because it is perceived to be a hurdle and a “*disease for the society*”. He compared it with polytheistic practices and declared that it was a symbol of hate and *jahiliya*.

Fazil, extremely concerned about the political affairs of Kashmir was forthright and perceived it to be:

*“...A dilemma... Kashmiris have been a victim of polarisation... There is biraderism.... We teach people that there is no role of biraderism in Islam... We are trying to break this idol... make people Muslims first through education...”*

Like the previously encountered activist, he also harbours ambitious to break this idol, which he believes to be the cause of many problems. He also advocates the role of education in countering this traditional division. However, when he is reminded about the high literacy rate in AJK, which surpasses all of Pakistan, he negates the statistics as he declares education to be encompassed within theological and political doctrines only and literacy to be a separate matter.

Hameed supports this assertion and argues that the political chicanery of the politicians has led to its abuse:

*“Politicians used biraderi ... with sectarianism... to become leaders, these ... are the causes of the problems in the society.”*

The fervent hatred for the *biraderi* system was a recurring theme, and Azeem who had conducted the interview in a rational and balanced fashion seemed incensed at the very mention of the notion:

*“Real teachings of Islam should reach to the people... biraderism is so at a height at the elections time people go to their castes rather to any ideology... no one applied to Allah to “send” him to a specific Biraderi...”*

An overwhelming number of the activists interviewed believed that *biraderism* was the biggest hurdle the movement faced. The solution prescribed by the activists was that they could eradicate this problem through education. However, an inherent contradiction existed in that the people benefitting from the *biraderi* centred system were the educated people. Hence, Ehsan’s response appeared to resonate with that reality:

*“We cannot deny the role of biraderis... we want to target bigger biraderis wherever they are stronger, for instance; Jaat biraderi in Mirpur and Gujjar biraderi in Kotli district and so on in the other parts of AJK...”*

Ehsan recognised the reality on the ground and this appeared to him to be a logical process. He went onto further state that the real problem JI faced was related more to sectarian fractionalization. Again, this was another point that all the activists interviewed had explicitly identified. Bazmi, for instance, began to tackle the ignorance that existed and how it distorted the reality of the JI movement:

*“Azizam, (dear); actually; the society we are living in had some misconceptions about the founder of the movement... they used to call him a Wahhabi... this is because of the ignorance... people even don't know what the Wahhabism is... those who promote that 'ideology' they have a separate Jamat but people made this a chaos in the minds of the ordinary peoples...”*

This inherent misunderstanding of JI greatly frustrates the activists and members and is reflected by how they are perceived by some people in the broader scale of AJK society. Hence, it is also a hurdle, which is causing problems as per the case of *biraderism*. Thus, the activists believe that many people don't vote for them in the elections and read their literature as they have a preconceived notion of them. Ghazala notes that from a female perspective it is almost the same response:

*“...Mostly, people call Jamat Wahhabi because we say whatever is in the Qur'an and Sunna take it and whatever is out leave it... also, whichever is doubtful leave it then people gives us the title of Wahhabi...”*

However, Fazil contends that this all is:

*“...The propaganda that Jamat is Wahhabi... but it has defused now, we sit with Deobandis now we sit with Bareilvis in their mosques read namaz behind them and they read to us...We are not the sectarian people we are close to Islam, whoever feels whichever is right can practise but not sectarianism, you will find all sects in the Jamat...”*

Fazil argues that these misconceptions and propaganda were systematically embedded into the minds of society at many levels. Azeem concurs and shares his experience from his school memories of 30 or 35 years ago:

*“My teachers discouraged me about the Jamat... that they are Wahhabis and the Wahhabis are kafirs... I believe it was because of ignorance... my friend and I joined the Jamat and we became famous that we becoming Wahhabis...(laughs)”*

Azeem had to break the boundaries set around him to join the movement; he says it happened due to the natural process of awareness and ‘knowledge’ gained. Furthermore, he argues that initially, he too, was sceptical:

*“Father of my friend returned from Saudi Arabia, who was against the shrines and practices, he said I was on the wrong way, Allah is one and after that, his messenger and then are Awliya (Saints) but there is a special way to believe in them (Saints)... Those who prostrate on the shrines are wrong and I had this objection to them (Jamat), that they are Wahhabis though morally they were very good...”*

Azeem elaborates that these conceptions were built up from the home environment to the educational institutions; society at large was practising different versions of Islam. When the JI challenged these alternative versions, they were instantly labelled as being extremists. He argues that these misconceptions and ignorance is preventing recruitment and their wider acceptance in society. Dilpazir exemplified himself as a victim of this perception:

*“I contested the election in 1998... I was in the position to win the election... I could have won the election if it was not affected by the sectarian blame... it was the problem and even it exists today... people said to me that you are a very good person but you are in Jamat-e-Islami... on these basis, I lost the election... they don’t realise that my goodness is due to Jamat-e-Islami.”*

He expressed his tragic struggle to be directly affected by the general attitude towards JI and identifies it as a dilemma.

#### **6.4.4.1 Framework of the Movement; the Prescribed Modifications:**

*“I think we need to change our existing model of the movement because our existing model has completed its age... this experience of change was done by Ikhwan they succeeded... Nahda party in Tunis did they also succeeded... Same was about the Hizb-ur-Rifa’s forward block in Turkey... For instance, it is a condition to be pious and (muttaqi) fearful to become a member, but on the basis of piety you can enter into the Jannat but not into the Assembly...” (Ashraf)*

Firstly, it's interesting to note that the degree to which the JI members are fully informed and aware of other global movements. Their rhetoric uses those examples to reflect how the local and existing political environment can be addressed accordingly. Ashraf is keen to point out that JI understands fully that although it wants to focus on the notions of piety or *Taqwa*, its mission is political and through that process, it can develop people with those special characteristics. However, Ashraf then moves onto argue unexpectedly with regards to what has transpired before, that JI is far from perfect and requires reform if it is to be successful:

*“One reason is that the culture of the movement is not of a political party... the person you want to declare as your candidate you should tell him 5 years before the elections... Our problem is... if someone has abilities he is not allowed to present himself... that he wants to go into this field... if he tries himself he will be disqualified, so I think our existing model should be reshaped...”*

This echoes an inner organisational complication to be addressed within the movement's framework or organisational structure. Bazmi shares this perspective and argues that the required change should address all segments of the society:

*“We need to approach all society... not only the educated ones and those with good character... it is our weakness to meet specific people and make an exclusive environment... Allah has created all, either they are clean or dirty, good or bad, it should be our duty to clean them and do their character building. We need to understand the will of Allah, he has not created anyone useless... we need to understand from the Sira of the Holy Prophet... how he saved people like Abdullah bin Obeye, who tortured Him... but He saved a dirty person like him...”*

Bazmi was almost lecturing very passionately, it reflects that most of the JI members join the movement at an early stage of their intellectual development process and are thus gradually nurtured over the course of a long period of time. These are the dedicated and well-trained activists those have effectively kept the movement going and helped it grow in numbers. He refers to the people as *“creating a special environment within the movement”*. He utilised the example of a JI programme, organised to discuss arrangements for the upcoming annual conference of the movement in Lahore. Though there were not many members at the district

level, but those who were there were: *“reflection of special chosen ones from their attitude and behaviour than the larger society”*.

According to Ehsan, this is not accidental but a rational and calculated approach:

*“Biggest problem is ignorance if people read our literature we can satisfy them... if some are satisfied then uneducated can follow them... We have 50 members in the city but if we had 500 we can win the election, our speed of making the members is too slow...”*

This reflects an overtly elitist approach, where the JI believes if they can prepare some people with the requisite knowledge and character then they can lead the masses or effectively the masses will automatically follow them. Ehsan continues about the ineffectiveness of this approach in AJK society:

*“Sometimes I think those movements which succeeded they expanded their movement structure... we need to expand to include more people of good character, those have vote bank and other abilities... Those who like Jamat and want to work for and have abilities, we should give them chance to come in the front row rather start from the back rows... for this, we need a structural change...”*

The argument being presented suggests that JI members are actively pursuing avenues to reach out to the ordinary local population of AJK. The activists recognise that:

*“The literature of the movement is too old... Mawlana Mawdudi ‘alaihe rahma’ (blessings be upon him) prepared the literature to face the problems of his time and at that time, he was facing socialism and communism... today the challenges have changed... even inside the movement, we have a challenge from our own activists, they aren’t ready to leave the things by Mawlana Mawdudi ‘alaihe rahma’ (blessings be upon him) even to modify it...” (Azeem)*

It is self-evident that initially, Mawlana Mawdudi’s writings attracted both marginalised youth, and educated classes to the movement. However, at the current time, the previous effectiveness of this literature is becoming ineffective, as competing sectarian movements alongside unprecedented situations unforeseen by Mawdudi arise to present new challenges. Activists like Ashraf cite examples of Islamic movements in Egypt, Turkey and Tunis to

extract fresh ideas and inspirations from which the JI can learn and reformulate its strategies. The success of the AK party in Turkey has particularly reinvigorated the Islamic activists in Pakistan, who are utilising that model to construct future policies and modus operandi.

*“I will prefer Turkish model based on the issues of the people... education and changing the minds... Not Egyptian model... which was heavily based on the Qur’an and hadeeth... but the other (Turkey) kept good relations with the army and brought the revolution in 15 years....” (Ehsan)*

It appears that the sentiments expressing the desperation to reform along contemporary international models are much in vogue amongst the young well-educated party activists:

*“We want to go door to door like in Turkey they tried and then succeeded, perhaps it’s our weakness we didn’t reach the people...” (Dilpazir)*

Alongside demonstrating global awareness of Islamic activism, the JI members and activists also show that they recognise their strength and weaknesses. They know what is required to become an influential political power in AJK and eventually to gain the necessary political power to transform society as Islamic movements in other parts of the world have done.

## CASE STUDY 2

### **6.5 Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ) AJK**

#### **6.5.1 Introduction:**

The same strategy which was presented at the beginning of the data analysis chapter will be utilised in this case study, which will focus on the themes and answer the main research questions of the study. In section (6.5.1) a summary of the activists and a sketch will be presented, followed by the presentation of data under four themes in section (6.6).

#### **6.5.2 Interview Participants:**

Interviews were conducted with the activists operating in movement related fields, such as, political, welfare and educational. The researcher had opportunities to conduct observations of some activities, almost every interviewee, which were 9 in total, 6 were of the men and 3 women. On two occasions during the interview of a single participant, one of their colleagues also gave his/her opinion, while during the observation of a school an Islamic studies teacher also offered valuable insights. But precise age and time of these activists with the movement will not be given, like other participants. Most of the activists were young as the movement is new, they were very much impressed or hugely influenced by the personality of their leader and founder of the Minhaj-ul-Qur'an Pakistan. The activists were more concerned with the affairs of Pakistan, the researcher had to remind them about their vision for the Kashmiri society.

The Minhaj Activists come from a range of fields and backgrounds, there were many similarities and differences, both in opinions and using the strategies to achieve the goals of the movement. Some were aware of the political and social issues of the society and the ground realities, but some others were more ambitious and over enthusiastic, most of them

had university level qualifications and were doing jobs in different fields. To sum it up, three types of activists can be classified, type one comes from the movement's university graduates, the second type comes from traditional religious education, but also holding university degrees in general subjects, such as, Islamic studies, Arabic and Urdu, while some held law degrees. The third type are young people recruited from colleges, or who are religiously inclined towards Sufi, or more specifically, Barelvi teachings of Islam, whereby, the movement provided them with a platform to work and socialise without getting any label of sectarian change. (See Appendix III)

Participant	Age/Years	Time with MQ / Years	Role or responsibility in the MQ
Yaqoob	33	20	District level/ policy maker
Faheem	52	28 Years	Finance officer
Amjad	39	19	District level responsibility/ Organizer/ Mobilizer
Salma (Female)	21	6	Student leader
Zubair	51	32	Central level role/ politician
Tanveer	29	8	District level, welfare worker
Shabnam (Female)	25	5	Educationist
Umer	35	3	Ulama Council senior member
Fozia (Female)	27	10	Senior member of Women's League
Shahnaz (Female)	20-25		Student leader

Ali	30-35		Islamic studies teacher
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**Table 6.3 Sketch of the MQ Participants.**

### **6.5.3 Ideology and Vision**

*“My background is religious you can say... but it is moderate and liberal to some extent... There is an organisation, which is a worldwide organisation... it is Tehreek-e-Minhaj-ul-Qur’an... from that platform we are working for the promotion of Islamic teachings... its work has got worldly recognition... UN gave Minhaj-ul-Qur’an ‘special consultative status’... this is the only Islamic movement in 58 Islamic countries... this is because of presenting the moderate face of Islam, peace harmony and interfaith coordination... it is an honour for Pakistan and for the founder of the movement...”*  
(Yaqoob)

Activists of the MQ movement begin their description of the organisation's overarching aim of promoting a moderate, peaceful form of Islam that is infused with the notions of *love*, *spiritualism* and *harmony*. Activists of the movement when describing their agenda, always mention all or some of these terms without due negligence. This is to counter to a large degree the negative perception of Islamic movements internationally.

Yaqoob, a college lecturer and expert about the affairs of the movement states that the growing sectarian gulf and violence in Pakistan means that the MQ tries to distinguish itself from these types of violent movements.

Umar, a member of the Ulama Council, an organisation of the movement consisting of individuals with some theological training, agreed with the approach of the MQ:

*“We want to introduce the moderate face of the religion in the society; we should not use force but use argument and logic...”*

Umar uses the Urdu term *e’tedal pasand*, implying moderation or literally, ‘*the one who likes the balance*’ to demonstrate how MQ attempts to maintain a balance in religious discourse at

a time when there is no balance or moderation due to extremist political and sectarian agendas.

*“His lectures make a person e’tedal pasand... that brought in me 90% change... he taught us what is Islam... he taught us what was at the time of the Holy Prophet... My whole family was Ahle hadeeth and were narrow-minded but through his lectures, I changed...” (Faheem)*

Faheem typifies the average member of the MQ, disillusioned with the alternatives and the increasing levels of corruption in the political system he was convinced the MQ had the answers after listening to Dr Qadri’s lectures. Yaqoob further corroborates this point:

*“Dr Sahib’s lectures inspired me, he gave me spiritual peace... He gave true attachment with Allah and Rasool... He showed me that there is no narrowness in the religion no hatred for other sects or other religions...” (Yaqoob)*

The activists, it appears have been inspired by the moderate approach of Dr Qadri, which they believe inculcates in them the principles of ‘*etedal pasand*’ as embodied by the prophetic teachings and is opposed to the restricted perceptions of other sectarian sects and orders.

*“The ideology of the Minhaj-ul-Qur’an is based on the love and respect for the Holy Prophet... This was the only sentiment people tried to degrade in last 150 or 200 years... Some fitnas (cords) were created to defeat Muslims... It was a conspiracy to eradicate love and respect of the Holy Prophet from our country and society... Dr Sahib worked on this like a Nabbaz (an expert) ... through his lectures and books.... We heard many speeches on this but Dr Sahib made it practicable to implement the system of the Holy Prophet in the Country... every speech of Dr Sahib is based on the respect of the Nabi, (Messenger) love for the Nabi and Ishq of the Nabi...” (Yaqoob)*

The single most apparent characteristic demonstrated by the activists of MQ was their veneration and zealous adoration for the personality of Prophet Muhammad (s). The entire basis for their discussion began and ended with adulating the prophetic way of life, as they perceived it.

Yaqoob began by recalling his personal experience of studying with the MQ University and his enthusiasm for the vision of the movement as promulgated by Dr. Qadri, the movement’s

founder. He refers to him as Dr. Sahib to imply the notion of respect for an elder in the Urdu vernacular. Yaqoob is so impressed by Dr Qadri's approach that he describes him as a *nabbaaz*, a term used to describe an expert doctor who diagnoses an illness, disease or disorder by checking the pulse of a patient. Yaqoob argues that the ills of the society are a result of the negligence and disrespect towards the Holy Prophet. This argument is reflective of the essential essence of the identity of the movement, which is Prophetic-centric. In the first instance, it is quite noticeable that the activists have been trained to use the art of poetry to venerate the prophetic personality, which both explains and furthers the vision and purpose of the movement:

*“Ye faqa kash mote se derta naheen zara; Roohe Muhammad nikal do is ke badan se...”*

(This hungry person has no fear of death; Take out spirit of Muhammad from his body)

(Allama Iqbal's poetry as recited by Yaqoob)

Yaqoob argues ferociously to counter the approaches which undermine and degrade the status of the Holy Prophet and eventually Islam to label Muslims as *mushriks* (polytheists). These movements he observes are there to destroy the Islamic message and character of harmony and peace.

Shahnaz and Salma, young female students from the student organisation of the movement are convinced of this so-called self-evident reality:

*“Every organisation either it is Minhaj-Ul-Qur'an or any other... first, should have a love for the Holy Prophet... Who faced so many difficulties for us... even He got Stoned for us, ....I will not go with Wahhabis, they still discuss Him... that; was He a noor or bashar...”*

The female activists believe that the demonstration of love for the holy Prophet is important for every Islamic movement. They are only in this movement because it is based on the love

of the Holy Prophet rather than to question his divine or mortal qualities.

Amjad observes that this is what distinguishes MQ from other movements:

*“This movement first time offered an ideology which is based on the practical basis of the Sirah and life of the Holy Prophet...we have some fundamental elements to follow in the life... such as our relationship to Allah... our connection to Messengerhood... return to the Qur’an... unity of Ummah... the revival of Din... Mustafvi revolution and social welfare...”*

This reflects their ideas and the practical implications of those visions, which are mainly based on the love of the Holy Prophet and a continuous connection with His personality. It appears that the aims and objectives of MQ are centred on personal character reformation based on an idealised model of the Prophet Muhammad (s). This also demonstrates how they want to introduce an active affiliation with him, which includes many practices and ideas that are supported by a mixture of their ideology and action plans. Hence, they label their objective as that which seeks to attain the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* instead of the Islamic or Shari’a System.

#### **6.5.4. Recruitment:**

*“Love of the Prophet is our biggest motto, which attracts people towards us, though sometimes people come to us through our welfare work, some other because of political work...”* (Amjad)

Amjad, with a Barelvi traditional background, clearly identifies the MQ to be distinct from the other sectarian groups due to their focus upon the Prophet. Therefore, the movement is geared towards the recruitment of young people, who have yet to be tainted by other sectarian ideologies. As the young people constitute a significant proportion of the population they represent the future. Thus, MQ has aimed specifically to attract those youngsters within established educational institutions, part of other student movements both religious, such as Jami‘at, and secular student organisations of the Peoples Party and Muslim League. Furthermore, both MQ activists Amjad and Yaqoob observe succinctly that most of the

youngsters in AJK are alienated by the traditional *ulama* because of their outdated methods and tactics. They describe a new educated generation that is beginning to question the accepted norms and traditions of the religion and the illogical explanations which failed to satisfy their understanding in terms of their own real lived experiences. The elitist approach of the traditionalists as identified in the literature review, becomes apparent through the discussion with the MQ members. Educated youth have sought to join religious orders through student organisations in colleges and universities because they offer them greater degrees of freedom alongside pious practice. The MQ movement according to Zubair is trying to capture the market of the Sufi minded youth:

*“ATI was established in the reaction of JTI for the love of the Holy Prophet... JTI was making people Ahl-e-hadith or Deobandi... ATI didn't have any political party neither it wanted, it was mainly on the base of Maslik (Sect)... I joined Minhaj-ul-Qur'an as it was a bigger movement and wanted to re-establish Islamic supremacy of 1100 years of Muslims over the world...”* (Zubair)

This statement appears to confirm the general notion presented by many activists that ATI is a Bareilvi student movement, which was established in reaction to JI's student movement. The Bareilvis believed that the JI was pushing people and students towards the Deobandi or Ahl-e-hadith perspectives. Zubair argues that the MQ movement recognised the need of the Bareilvi or Sufi like-minded students for an active movement with a strong leadership.

This religious framing would then remove students from local isolation into the wider world and to engagement with global issues. Umar, a *madrassa* graduate and a post-graduate from the government university furthers this perspective:

*“We focus on education we are not hard in the religion but we are m'otadil. Others are extremists and they are wrong so we wanted to attract youth, which was already fed-up with the extremists. We especially wanted to bring youth into the movement...”*

Although Umar hails from a traditional religious background, he is now a member of the *ulama* council of the Movement. However, in the interview, he revealed that he was

exhausted with the traditional *ulama*. He used the term *nojawan* (youth) to demonstrate the concern and focus of the movement and its importance and criticalness for the movement's future.

Tanveer, a young entrepreneur exemplifies the established members of the MQ who joined when at college:

*“The main thing which attracted me was their struggle for the islah of the youth... they are concerned with youth... My aim will be first my own islah then when I will go to others only then they will listen to us...”* (Tanveer)

Tanveer concentrates heavily on the notion of religious training or *islah*, to better the self and then others. He reiterated the argument that due to the failure of the traditional *ulama* this reformation of self-character was much desired, especially by the youth as the uncertainty of the social political climate around them caused them to reflect upon themselves and their ideals.

It is evident that MQ has utilised two broad approaches towards recruiting new members. Firstly, they have sought to entice younger activists primarily from other groups and movements within the universities and colleges of AJK. Secondly, they have effectively filled a lacuna left by the indigenous Sufi and Barelvi groups that have failed to coalesce into a meaningful socio-political organisation.

The inability of these groups to develop any unified or intellectual movement has meant that Dr. Qadri has become a spiritual and political role model and the traditional *ulama* perceived to be defunct.

### **6.5.5 Resource Mobilisation**

*“There is so much ignorance we cannot bring the change using any other tool but through fikri (ideational) change, we only can bring the change using ideational tools... Education is our biggest institution for this purpose... we made rapid development in this field... we have no other competitors in this field... we have more*

*than 600 schools... 42 colleges... a chartered university and thousands of other educational centres...*” (Yaqoob)

The notion of a systematic educational system that can instruct the youth formulates a crucial and core part of the MQ movement’s strategy to indoctrinate their students into the MQ message. Yaqoob stresses this point in a positive fashion, without realising that indoctrination has negative connotations within the review of the literature on education in general. Hence, he points out that all the social institutions take their title from the main movement i.e., Minhaj-ul-Qur’an.

Thus, the Minhaj-ul-Qur’an Educational Society is the umbrella organisation, which oversees the whole educational networks, such as, schools, colleges and university. Yaqoob is keen to promote the movement’s vision and goals to expand its network of the educational institutions all over the country. He reveals that currently, MQ has about 572 educational institutions including 42 colleges and one university. Their vision for the future is to establish one international university and a university in each province of Pakistan and one in AJK, also many colleges and schools. Furthermore, Yaqoob describes a network of schools run by MQ sympathisers and members that are not directly administrated by MQ but nevertheless promote their ideology.

Shabnam, a female principal of the girl’s section of an MQ model school proudly declares:

*“We are giving education to the kids... of course, they are part of the society... even when they will go to their homes they will leave some positive impacts on their families and larger society... Their activities and manners will reflect in the society what we teach them... this is the difference that we make to the society through education...”*

However, when Shabnam is pressed into discussing the actual values and nature of the positive impacts of the MQ education programme, she was slightly offended at having to explain something so given. Her attitude suggested that the process of education was

naturally given and anything that entailed studying some religious content was obviously beneficial for the students:

*“We do some activities which make our students special, we do halqa-e-durood (a devotional assembly)... show them CDs by Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri... point out them to do these things... we give them to do some things for home... this is different from other schools... no other school organises halqa-e-durood... as you have observed in the assembly that how the kids read (recite) durood... well, everyone reads Durood but we have set in the minds of the people that if their kids are here they will read this.”*

(Shabnam)

Other teachers and staff at the school further reflect this rather simplistic and parochial understanding of what entails education, and, especially Islamic education.

Ali exemplifies the point when he proudly boasts of his self-developed technique to teach the Qur’an:

*“I have made a formula to read and translate the Qur’an... I calculated that there are 2000 major words in the Qur’an... which of those 1500 we use in our local language in everyday life... I have chosen many words from the Pothwari (local) language... I am 99% satisfied, if we have a method then it takes one week to learn the thing... furthermore, you should have the attitude to teach...”* (Ali)

It can be deciphered that although the educational or pedagogical methods utilised to teach Islam and the Qur’an as priority subjects in the schools are evident, the teachers are also committed to working towards getting their students to gain a better understanding of the Qur’an and the Arabic language.

Furthermore, still, a serious concern for the educational leadership of the MQ is instilling an inherent respect and love of the Holy Prophet in the hearts of the students. Shabnam observes that they achieve this by hosting assemblies and the reading of the *Qaseeda Burda Shareef*, (a famous poem by Imam Busiri in the honour of the Holy Prophet). She also argues that the students learn these things and then they share them with their parents at home. It is then that their parents come into the school for the confirmation and

discussion upon these points. This claim by Shabnam confirms the notion that these students leave “*positive impacts on their families*”.

These notions of outreach to the entire family and communities have been extended from the educational centres and institutionalised under the aegis of the MQ movement’s devotional circles and other gatherings held in public spaces:

*“... A full-time event has been setup where anybody can apply to sit for reciting Salat and Salam on the beloved Prophet Muhammad (S)... a unique way to promote the love for the beloved Prophet and to increase spirituality...helping us to further our aims by connecting with everybody...” (Amjad)*

Amjad, an extremely close associate of Dr Qadri describes the establishment of these communal projects as not just an extension of the educational system but systematic programmes to transform the society:

*“I heard word “revolution” first time in my life from Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri’s tongue then heard its explanation that attracted me... then I was connected with them to achieve that...”*

It was apparent from the very animated body language such as the use of hands and fingers to gesture and the continual change in the tone of his voice that Amjad was deeply imbued with the MQ’s philosophy:

*“The sketch... Dr sahib offered... a continuous struggle... with the Prophet as the role model...we have some fundamental elements to follow in the life... such as our relationship to Allah... our connection to Messenger hood... return to the Qur’an... unity of Ummah... the revival of Deen...social welfare...this we call the Mustafvi revolution...”*

In utilising the term *revolution*, the activists were pressed further for explanations, and their definitions and understanding of such a powerful term. However, none of the activists really expounded on the term with regards to its meaning in the social scientific discourse.

Zubair, for example, perceived the notion of revolution as:

*“All other revolutions in the world were bloody... only the revolution of the Holy Prophet was a peaceful revolution...”*

Zubair argues that in promoting the notion of revolution the MQ movement is moving towards the actual concrete steps required to attain the supremacy of the Islamic faith:

*“The Main motive for the establishment of the movement was to reunite the Ummah... and reassertion of the supremacy of global Islam...”* (Zubair)

Unfortunately, Zubair alongside a large proportion of the activists interviewed was keen to provide the prophetic example of revolution but was short on the practical steps required for the attainment of such supremacy:

*“...If the Deen was only about prayers and fasting there would have been no fight at all... there could have an agreement between kafirs and Muslims to perform hajj and other worships.... but they knew that this religion will not remain into the mosque but will establish a state...”* (Zubair)

Although the activists were comfortable and appeared to discuss the Islamic revolution in terms of the global perspective, their strategy for AJK was extremely limited:

*“In Kashmir only will happen what is in Pakistan... our PMs (Prime Ministers) are dummies... further, we have a written agreement with the Minhaj-ul- Qur’an Pakistan that when the revolution comes there... we will not spare (leave untouched) Kashmiri government and its lootings as it is... we will bring change here too...”* (Zubair)

This could be construed as a negative and pessimistic approach to the AJK’s political reality or realistic in the sense of the reality on the ground. As Zubair is a senior leader of the MQ movement in AJK his perspectives reflect the organization's core outlook:

He describes the impact of the political organisation PAT (Pakistan Awami Tehreek) or Pakistan Mass Movement, under whom the Minhaj-ul-Qur’an AJK worked to organise and participate in the ‘revolution march’ and the three months sit-in.

Zubair reveals that during that event the MQ movement did not utilise any religious or political slogans except the concept of the Mustafvi Revolution or revolution of the Holy Prophet. Zubair states that their central argument was based upon the constitution of Pakistan, its democratic reforms, the basic human rights of all its citizens, the concept of Pakistan as a welfare state and corruption and terrorism-free state, which has blighted the nation. Amjad argued that MQ didn't use religious or political slogans because:

*“We are using the slogan of food, clothes, house, education, health and employment... these all are in Islam... if these needs of the people are fulfilled this will be Islam...”*  
(Amjad)

This reveals a clear tactical strategy of the MQ movement to approach the masses with those issues that are of their immediate concern rather than some idealistic goals that they probably don't even understand. Zubair and Amjad both state this is generating in their followers the concept of awareness:

*“Not ‘will’ ...we have brought a change in the society... we gave fresh thinking to the people... we changed people’s thinking... taught people how to speak... we told them about their rights and status in the society... so a huge change has started... Dr Sahib educated the nation for 70 days through his daily lectures... we believe it has changed minds of the people...”* (Amjad)

Amjad argues that the general attitude expressed by the activists was that their protest and sit-in was a success. He cites the media, which testified to the fact that Dr Qadri generated awareness in the public and even the leader of the PTI (Pakistan Tehreek Insaf), Imran Khan, supported Dr Qadri’s assertions that to contest elections under the current political system in Pakistan was useless.

Shahnaz however, addresses the alternative argument that the event was conceived a failure by some:

*“Our aim was to bring revolution in the thinking and minds of the people that has happened due to our revolution march.... We have some Wahhabi relatives they tease us about the sit-in and failure of the revolution...” (Shahnaz)*

There it seems an underlining sense of failure, however, with the protest and its call for revolution. As nothing materialised and no visible change occurred even senior MQ movement activists questioned the impact of the mass mobilisation and support for such an extended period, without any recourse or change:

*“We were expecting that when we will expose the government and its institutions then the Army or the Judiciary will topple down the government... but unfortunately, it did not happen it was only our ‘khushfehmi’... (credulity)...” (Zubair)*

### **6.5.6 Maintaining the Process**

*“Politically in the AJK... biraderism is a big problem...a hurdle in the way of development, and hindering the educated leadership to come into the power.... A Chaudhary (a biradri leader) in a village has control on the thinking of the people, religiously, socially and politically... he is bargaining about the fate of the people... Everyone is born free so he should remain free...” (Amjad)*

Amjad explains that the main hurdle that his activists, peers and he himself has encountered in AJK is the system of *biraderism*. He states that the MQ movement cannot operate in areas where there are strong *biradri* systems and alliances as they effectively control their entire socio-political landscape.

Yaqoob’s case exemplifies this bitter reality and the almost overt nature of its discrimination and prejudice:

*“After completion of my education, I came here and observed this disease... I applied for a job... everything was done well... I almost got that job but they asked me to put my caste in the section... I resisted and disliked it but when I disclosed that... I was refused... Biradri has a bigger role in here than in other cities of Pakistan despite being so civilised... this curse still exists in the AJK...”*

The activists from mainly outside the AJK context have naturally had a hard time accepting the cultural norms and traditional societal structure. However, the prejudice it generates is a concern and highly educated members of the movement such as Fozia discussed how the

discriminatory nature of the *biradri* system affected her directly. Fozia is a lecturer by profession, educated at the Minhaj University of the MQ movement in Lahore, she moved to AJK because of her husband's posting who was also a movement activist. She described her experience of living in a house for a year or so but when she got active during the Revolution March, her landlord came to know of her caste and political affiliation and they had to leave the property at short notice, due to their caste and political differences. These sentiments appear to grow even stronger and provide legitimacy to the argument as another party activist Umar without hesitation launches into a tirade against the abuse of the system:

*“If we see in the light of Islam... these tribes were made only for an identity but in the AJK biraderism is touching its heights... Allah made tribes for the identity but we are using for some other things... people are using those old customs, even education is not giving any benefits... Elite and biraderism are the biggest hurdles for the social change and in the way of the movement...”*

There are countless examples and statements about the dissatisfactions of the activists with the role of the *biraderism* in AJK. The main solutions they believe encompass an ever-expanding educational program and increasing awareness of these issues within the local society. However, by education, usually, the activists are referring to religious and moral training, which allows the individual to make a choice based upon his/her own volition. Amjad is vociferous in his opinion that people should have a right to self-determination based on their own free will:

*“...When you will enable people to think freely and decide... it will put positive effects on the society and politics... We are working through education, da'wa and politics... We are changing minds of the people... that will bring the change... But to implement it, we need power... for that, we are doing our work gradually through PAT...”*  
(Amjad)

This seems to reflect the common approach by all activists to solve their identified problems through the changing of minds and hearts of the people. This can be attained through

different tools, such as education and *da'wa* to change the minds, hearts and politics to implement those programs for the change.

Zubair although concerned with the system presents a new perspective that argues that the MQ is already involved in changing the biradri system from within:

*“There are problems of biraderism... we are trying to change it, our members are getting married out of caste... debar shareef (the local shrine) is also playing a role to break this and arranging out of caste marriages...” (Zubair)*

In utilising the institution of marriage, Zubair promotes the opinion that if people get married into different castes, tolerance towards other castes will increase. The *debar shareef*, a local shrine or Khanaqah, then has a duty to influence and support these types of cross caste unions.

The activists are extremely determined to work towards the aims and objectives of the movement and seem confident that their approach and framework will eventually succeed and help build a society on the same prophetic principles that they claim to be following. However, a second major issue identified by the activists is related to the lack of financial resources and assistance. Activists argue that if they had enough or adequate financial aid then they could effectively speed up the process of social change. Utilising social institutions such as politics, welfare, education and other data and study circles form a vital part of their strategy.

Umar, for example, is very enthusiastic about the role and impact of the movement in terms of the strategies they are utilising but most importantly he showed a setback due to lack of the financial resources:

*“We are serving the people through the religion and welfare... we are working in all fields of education and welfare... We are trying to deliver services to the people... we are working in the cities and can reach to the people in the cities but in the villages, we are unable to reach as we should... especially because of financial problems or lack of*

*the financial resources our positive role is being affected due to the lack of the material resources...”*

Tanveer, a district level activist who describes the main activities of the movement to be concerned with education health and welfare, supports this observation:

*“We are working on education and Falah-e-amma, (public welfare)... in the health sector, we haven’t set any proper institution yet... but sometimes financially support some poor patients... in other fields (of welfare) when the new educational year starts we help poor students by giving them books and uniforms... we have some students those get regular scholarships or monthly help...”*

This demonstrates their frustration, that although they are using the best approaches and certainly want to expand, however, the financial challenges present a concrete barrier through which they cannot penetrate at a fast-enough rate. However, despite the financial struggle activists reveal some interesting figures with regards to how much aid they can self-generate:

*“We give Eid packages and Ramadan packages... with the help of the local friends, we approximately deliver packages of RS: 100000 (1000 US\$) every year. We get guidance (encouragement) from the merkazi tanzeem (central organisation) to deliver packages such as Ramadan and Eid but we don’t get financial help from the central organisation...we collect money locally and then spend here on the people... however, we inform the merkaz (centre) that we have done this... In the AJK it is mobilised like this we don’t get anything from the merkaz (centre)...”*

It is evident that the AJK activists are not financially supported by their own central organisation in Pakistan. This provides real credence to their efforts and dedication to further the social and welfare duties incumbent upon them in AJK.

## CASE STUDY 3

### **6.6 Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif or Khanqah-e-Fatehiya Kotli AJK:**

#### **6.6.1 Introduction:**

Procedures which were followed in the last two case studies will also be utilised in this case study, however, the amount of data will not be so much as the two former case studies, due to its limited activism, silent nature, and different approach towards society. This movement is based in District Kotli and its main activities are mainly limited to two districts. The aim of choosing this movement was to explore and present popular Sufi or *Pir* strategies and new interventions in the Sufi phenomenon. This is a transformation from the individual *Pirs* to collective activism within the Sufi traditions of AJK which was explored in Chapter Two in section (2.4.1).

Section (6.7.2) will offer a summary of the activists and provide their outline in a table form. In the rest of the section (6.8) we will explore four themes of the study, while in the last three sections (6.9, 10 and 11) three conclusions of the three case studies will be presented.

#### **6.6.2 Interviews Participants:**

Most of the activists, *murids* or disciples in this type of the movements come through existing family ties and links with the *tariqa*. But sometimes people join them from outside of the existing family ties, in many cases, it appeared that the *murids* took *bay'a* for personal spiritual reasons. Which they call self-character building or gaining piety. There is not a strict criterion for joining the movement but to become an active member and to work with the movement it requires personal abilities and strong ties. The researcher encountered a range of the activists during the observations from the highly qualified through to ordinary villagers and those emotionally attached to the personality of the *Pir* Sahib and his family. Many of the

committed young activists come from the *madaris* and mosque network of the movement.

During the interviews, which are four in total, and are all detailing male participants, one is an Imam of a mosque of the movement, who studied at the *madrasa* of the movement. The second is an active member of an organisation, who works with the organisation established to focus on religious training or *terbiyah* of the members. The other two are senior members of the movement who are associated with the centre and decision-making process (See Appendix IV). The following is a table detailing the participants who took part in the study. The researcher spent a large amount of time with many other activists who subsequently abandoned the interviews and didn't give permission to use the discussions in the study.

**Interview Participants:**

<b>Participants</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Time with the Movement</b>	<b>Position or Responsibilities</b>
Jameel	39	From childhood	Central level/ policy maker
Shahid	30	11 years	Deputy Head of an organisation
Anwar	31	From childhood	Imam/ teacher
Abdullah	45	From childhood	Central level/ policy maker /preacher

Table 6.4 Sketch of the Participants of GS Movement

### **6.6.3 Ideology and Vision**

*“His method (Pir Sahib’s) focuses on individual’s character building, when you do character building of many individuals, when they come together they make a society...” (Jameel)*

Almost every activist of the movement described the single aim and objective of the *tariqa* or Sufi order to entail the development of an individual’s character and personality. Jameel, a senior activist involved with the centre within an advisory capacity described the purpose of his order:

*“...They (Pir Sahib) don’t believe in or practise any type of propaganda or publicity... they don’t want to get any political edge of the change through political endeavour...Yes, it is true... the method of the change and the way is different from the traditional or established social and political movements... we don't hold big rallies or by creating stunts... this is different from those...” (Jameel)*

Jameel is keen to point out that their Sufi *tariqa* is not geared towards attaining political or social power. Although Jameel is aware of the current study’s purpose and objectives - to interview the JI and MQ movement activists, he is keen to point out that there is no direct comparison with those movements. He emphasises on certain terms that the order is focussed exclusively on the development of individual personalities and not grand social goals. Shahid argues that individuals possessing good characters will naturally solve many ills and problems in the society. He then proceeds to elaborate that the aim of the *tariqa* is attained through special techniques and approaches, which other social and political movements are oblivious to:

*“...Basic thing they start from is personal purification... purification from jealousy... prejudice and other such things... which put positive effects on the person and society... The first thing you need to bring about a change is required your own character... if you are cruel and you expect people to become pious... this is not possible... it is the same like... if you do injustice and ask people to do justice...” (Shahid)*

Shahid, a lawyer by profession and former student leader of a religious socio-political movement reveals that he came into the movement because he was concerned about his own *tarbiyah* (nurturing):

*“...Who does the corruption? Are these not educated people? not literate? For instance, a Judge... a SHO (a police officer responsible for a police station) and a Deputy Commissioner all are educated people those who take bribe.... If one has not purification and character then nothing will change... I knew that I could be just like that...so I had to change and become a better man...”* (Shahid)

Shahid is extremely honest in his own self-assessment and states that he was drawn to the movement because of the rampant corruption and vice within the institutions that were there to uphold justice, law and order. The activists within this movement are attracted to the movement's desire to develop inner qualities, which ultimately strengthen the *kirdaar* or character of a person. Highly qualified individuals holding prominent positions in government but without self-development are according to Shahid the “*disease of our society*”. The *tariqa* is, therefore, aimed at such people and its aims and objectives are solely focused on this notion.

#### **6.6.4 Recruitment**

*“...I was inspired by this system (Sufism) they are not strict about Islam... otherwise today people are enforcing Islam on the gunpoint...I came here basically for my own islah... basically, when you meet people they say something else in the public but in private they are totally different. In this movement, they will do even more what they say to others...they have the character, simplicity, and honesty...”* (Shahid)

In terms of attracting and recruiting people to the movement, Shahid states that there is no overt strategy the *tariqa* employs. It is commonly known especially within AJK that the Sufi based Islamic movement is orientated towards the reformation of personality and character. They naturally attract new members seeking to find the path towards self-betterment and

development. Further, still, as the Sufi movements do not enforce or coerce people in their religious volitions, an increasing number of ordinary people alongside the intellectuals and professionals perceive it as a viable and plausible alternative to the political and militaristic movements in AJK.

*“...I have observed so many changes...I know many people who were sharabi (alcoholic)... they used to commit great sins... they used to fight... no respect for parents... used to beat their mothers... they were a burden on the society because of their acts... then they were inspired by the teachings of Hadhrat Sahib... some changed in days and nights but some others took time... There were some people working in the public departments... they used to take bribe... but slowly...slowly they left all this... Some left immediately, some in months and some in years, will you say if this is not a change...?”*

It is interesting to note that the activists or members of the *tariqa* credit their own teacher or Hadhrat Sahib (Honorific title: ‘Presence’) for the entire process of reformation. Both Jameel and Shahid state that it is the reputation of these teachers that attracts people to the movement.

*“...Go down the road and look at Kalia (a renowned transporter in the area)... who was famous for arrogance and all types of the social and religious ills... this person came near Hadhrat Sahib and now is a completely changed person...” (Shahid)*

This is a single example of a multitude of statements made with regards to the transforming qualities of Hadhrat Sahib. Shahid argues that because of globalisation, economic troubles, and political-social instability, people are desperate for new answers and perspectives. In the persona of Hadhrat Sahib, people searching for answers, find a man of enormous personal piety and purified character that drives a movement based upon ethical and moral norms, rather than forced ideologies and religious persuasions. Shahid states that all Hadhrat Sahib is seeking from his followers or potential new recruits, is an oath of allegiance to better themselves:

*“...There is not a permanent process for the recruitment... however, there is a special process called bay‘a... individuals take an oath to the movement and the teacher...so*

*people either end up with the movement through their families or some individuals who are dissatisfied with their life matters come into the movement or want improvements in their religious heights...”*

This *bay'a* or oath of allegiance essentially ties the new members into a relationship with the *Hadhrat Sahib* or head of the movement.

Abdullah a direct member of *Hadhrat Shibi's* family explained:

*“...The purpose of having a guide is to structure your life... Otherwise, as far as actions are concerned... one has to carry them out... themselves...”* (Abdullah)

Abdullah was keen to point out that the teacher effectively acts as a parent, mentor and guardian to ensure that the individual takes his/her first steps under his guidance and control.

As the individual grew in strength and character, *Hadhrat Sahib* would let them go to explore for themselves. He states that this is what attracts people to their movement, as they are seeking someone to show them how to develop and improve:

*“First we try to make a person a good human being, further a good Muslim and then give teachings of the spirituality...”*

Abdullah then shares the techniques and methods utilised for the *kirdar sazi* (character building) of the people:

*“We have developed some strategies for the t'aleem (education) and terbiyah (nurturing) of the people... one is with the name of Al-Salihoon (the pious) for the employees and retired people from the different fields of the life... this is on Sunday afternoon, which consists some awarad (supplications) and lectures...Another one is Al-'Asr on Friday for the youngsters those are educated and working in different fields... Same is for the educated and working women... some programmes are for the school and college students...”* (Abdullah)

Abdullah explains in detail that these are study circles consisting of different people, at various stages of their own self-development. Each individual segment represents a certain grade like a school or college class. He moves on to highlight the point that the movement is extremely organised and follows the ancient traditions as they were introduced to the AJK region hundreds of years ago.

Discussion with Shahid revealed how the activists are facilitated by the movement and networks:

“... They will get for 1 hour *terbiyah* lecture with Pir Sahib... with the topic on the need for *Ikhlas* (sincerity), *tawaba* (repentance), *gheeba* (back biting), *hasad* (jealousy) and such others regarding the personal *terbiyah* and piety and *Kirdar Sazi* (character building)...”

### **6.6.5 Resource Mobilisation**

“In Kashmir, my elders built a *masajid* (mosque) and got the name of *Maseeti Ale* (the ones who belong to the mosque...) it was our tradition of building the *masajid* and setting up the *Qur’anic* schools for the understanding of *Qur’an* and Islam... Though they were doing a lot of other things silently... like helping the people financially and developing their lives... but got fame with the *masajid* and (*ders*) *Qur’anic* School...”

Abdullah describes the endeavours of his movement to be characterised by the notion of the ‘*masajid* movement’. This formulates the essence of their core identity, resource and focuses in the society. The movement has a type of monopoly on the construction of the *masajid* all over AJK, especially within the districts of Mirpur and Kotli. Abdullah states that Kotli city is also known as *Madina-tu-al-Masajid* or the ‘city of the mosques’ due to the efforts of the movement. They provide a very specific construction structure that entails a dome with one or two extra rooms on the side or underneath the main mosque hall (See Appendix VII).

Jameel is proud to reveal that the *masajid* are known as the *masajid* of *Hadhrat Sahib*. Furthermore, they construct a small institution within the *masajid* vicinity referred to as the *ders* to teach the reading and memorisation of the *Qur’an*. Jameel states that at present this reflects the main motivating force behind the Mosque movement in AJK. He argues that even today in the city this *khanqah* or shrine is more famous with the name of *ders shareef* than the *darbar sharif*. They are renowned for their *Qur’anic* schools, *ders*, especially for memorisation of the *Qur’an*. Jameel declares that the

movement is responsible for over 750 masajid and is focused now on developing their educational services:

Abdullah links these all institutions with the socio-economic life of the people in very tender voice:

*“We have an educational system of the mosque and madrasas but we know people need some financial sources, so we only give them necessary religious qualification and then encourage them to go for further education either in the religious madrasas or universities and colleges. When they are graduated they get good adjustments and that’s what we want...”*

These not only reveal their approach to teach religion and religious education but their awareness of the reality of life and what is required for the students to earn a living, develop their careers and maintain their faith.

Jameel in an open and frank discussion observes that the senior leadership of the movement is aware of its limitations at present. Their reputation for building *masajid*, *madrasas* and *ders* had been their main mobilising force to disseminate their religious vision within the society of AJK. The seniors have sought to perfect that process:

*“Hadhrat Sahib and his elders, like... Qazi Fataha Ullah sahib... the main focus was on the masajid and Qur’an’s taleem and its memorization... it is the base of their work... masajid should be clean and people should be offering prayers... there is one guiding principle that the masjid should be better than your home... Wherever you go you will see Masjid is the most beautiful construction of that community... if the community is poor... maybe their masjid is not bigger but still will be beautiful... if the community is rich... their masjid is prominent than any other building there... The grace of the masjid should not be affected in any community in any way...”*

This demonstrates the absolute importance and centrality of the *masjid* building and maintenance process to the movement. Jameel explains the process in detail:

*“Actually there are three types of the masajid... from the time of Qadhi sahib and Bare janaban (Elder Hadhrat Sahib) First... where people come to Janaban to ask for the construction of a masjid... he will see how many people are there... are they namazis (who offer prayers) and how far they come from... Some people say they can give land*

*but the community is poor they can't afford construction... then it is built on the expenses of janaban and under his management... Second is... where some people give land and then they contribute some money and some (contribution) by Hadhrat Sahib... The third is where we buy land, where a masjid is needed if someone is not even able to donate land or he has financial requirements (we help for the construction)... in this case, then we buy land to build or expand a masjid, such as our ders shareef, where we purchased the land after assessment..." (Jameel)*

The differing criterion identified by Jameel demonstrates the sophisticated nature of the process and its vitality to the movement. Their strategy of public outreach reflects their open and mutually respected relationship with the public, and their continued support helps the masjid fund and maintain itself through increased number of devotees. Jameel also states that specialised training is provided to local imams to help them administer and attract more people into the mosques.

Anwar, a local *khateeb* and *imam* of a masjid completed his *ders-e-nizami* 'alim course from a *madrasa* in Lahore. On the completion of his nine years course, he reported back to Hadhrat Sahib to give him a job as an *imam* and *khateeb*. He states that his foremost duty entails a sense of responsibility:

*"We are appointed to serve the Din in all the forms people need... from teaching the kids to leading the 5 times prayers... Friday prayer and sermon..."*

For Anwar to attract new adherents and maintain the masjid he states that he will:

*"...Ask them (people) softly and without making them ashamed that why they don't come into the masjid...if someone is not regular in the masjid, I will ask him that I did not see him in the masjid, if he, his family and everything is ok...? In this way, I will not make him feel ashamed rather asking him why he did not come to the masjid... Suppose if I want someone to grow a beard, I will not ask him straight to grow it but if I look it once grown then I will say to him that, it really suits him if he can just trim it from the sides, it will give more encouragement and positivity than just ordering them... this is the earlier way of the hikmah (wisdom) of the Holy Prophet..."*

Anwar utilises a specialist approach that is designed to deflect the notion of shame and embarrassment from the targeted devotees or potential members.

Shahid also concurs with this approach and states that this peaceful harmonious method attracts people to the movement as it engages them rather judging their actions and behaviours and thus driving them further away from the *masjid* and the *din* of Islam. Both Anwar and Shahid identify this approach to be based on the Prophetic notion of *hikmah* (wisdom).

Shahid further explains that the unique and exceptional aspect of their approach is that it is not strictly limited to their movement or to their adherents. This he says is not the case with the politically motivated organisations and movements. They will try to deliver their services through their own means or members and then will try to tap the outcome of these to only benefit their own members and institutions. Shahid observes that this movement has a special type of experience with regards to administrating and running the *masajid* institutions and thus they openly and willingly leverage their expertise to all that seek it.

#### **6.6.6 Maintaining the Process**

*“Allah created a human being from one man and a woman: He divided us into the tribes or castes only for the identity... however, He (Allah) says the respected ones are those who have taqwa... Someone asked the Holy Prophet(s) that he loves his tribe... is it right or wrong...? The Holy Prophet (s) said it is not about the love but one should not support his tribe in the wrong doings... We think this is part of the society, this is known as ‘urf’ or custom... it is inevitable, we try to manage it without creating any clash... We try to tackle it properly like... when we send an imam to a mosque... we try to send one of the same biraderi, which is the majority biraderi near the mosque... It helps religious education and terbiyahh in a better and more effective way...”*  
(Abdullah)

This statement reveals how Abdullah perceives his understanding in the light of the Qur’an and Sunna about the *biraderi* and tribal system. He accepts the religious guidance about the purpose and accommodation of it. The movement has consciously sought to work with the

established societal structure instead of seeking to eradicate and destroy its cultural, social and personal values. Jameel demonstrates a similar attitude and explains their understanding of the *biraderi* system from both perspectives:

*“If it is positive then it is good... but if it is negative then it is very bad... This is one aspect of his (Hadhrat Sahib) teachings... he discourages prejudices based on biradrism... one is positive discrimination... and other is negative or prejudice, which is strongly discouraged here... People from all binaries are connected with derbar shareef... to keep this in check and balance is important... as it has a big impact on the society...”* (Abdullah)

It appears the activists are aware of appreciating the diversity of the region and the cultural values of the *biraderism* system in AJK:

*“...Every good thing should remain in the society and every bad thing should not be there... every society has some cultural perspectives and some social perspectives... by looking at that when the society thinks something is good it should prevail, society can progress by accepting each other and things together...”* (Abdullah)

This is the general attitude, which has been previously demonstrated that the movement does not seek to clash with society but accept its beneficial practices and negate the harmful. Furthermore, they argue that to change even the supposed harmful or anti-Islamic values and norms will take time:

*“...People don't give shares to women or daughters, it is not with the Islam but with their cultural or personal practices or personal greed... if they are affiliated with the khanqahi system and recognise divine teachings... that the daughters have a share in the inheritance and they start giving it... is it not a social change? It had no concept in the last 50/60 years but now people recognise it...”* (Jameel)

Jameel furthers this point by noting that the current Muslim understanding of Islam and the role of these Sufi groups have been influenced by the extremists and politically motivated groups. Therefore, the focus upon self-development has stagnated and the ethical and moral norms of society have lapsed:

*“This is a spiritual path and everyone has a share... the example is like a tree in the desert, where a seed is thrown by nature in severely unfavourable circumstances... it*

*bursts and becomes a tree... then it has environmental impacts in the desert where there is no trees or greenery... people come and sit under its shade.... Look at Indonesia or Malaysia... no Muslim military commanders went there... same in India... people did not embrace Islam through military commanders... but they embraced Islam and divine teachings of Islam in masses by the teachings and character of the Sufis...”*  
(Jameel)

Here there is a strong historical vindication for their movement, which at once justifies their approach and reproaches the politically motivated Islamic movements. Jameel extenuates this point and argues that the place of the spiritualist *tariqas* is without questioning the underlining cause for the growth and spread of Islam across the Asian continent:

*“How much impact of religion has on the society and people have an understanding of Islam, though Sufism it has mainly a spiritual impact on people, but we can see in other terms too... this district was one of the poorest regions in the AJK... Janaban arrived here and made it their centre... there was no industry in Kotli... even today maybe some small units but not industry... its consumer based economy, which was too poor 50/60 years ago... There were a couple of mosques... he arrived here and then slowly... slowly developed this area... and he worked with his hands during the construction...”*  
(Jameel)

This illustrates how the actions of the historical role models have been translated and reinitiated by the spiritual elders to inspire the next generation to continue the work. The activists can, therefore, relate to the examples of history within the local context because of the sacrifices and idealism demonstrated by their teachers. Jameel therefore, argues that the cause-effect relations of the movement and its activities in society have significant impacts on the development of that society at different levels both spiritually and materially:

*“...His focus was to build the character of the people, and teach people to earn even less but halal... because it has more barakah... ultimately you all have to die... You have to spend this life with a purpose, and that purpose is based on the spiritual enrichment...”* (Jameel)

## 6.7 CONCLUSION

### 6.7.1 Case Study One Conclusion:

The case study has demonstrated the processes by which the JI movement furthers its aims, objectives and visions; its recruitment policies and methods; the ways in which it maintains its processes socio-culturally; and how it frames its message in AJK alongside a contemporary critique from within the movement itself, it could engage and recruit the already politically enthused youth into the movement. The movement utilised Mawlana Mawdudi's literature to recruit directly from the educational institutions. They offered a unique perspective that was at times at odds with the local practices and understanding of Islam. The activists, therefore, adopted extraordinary measures and special approaches to recruiting bright young students, alongside established and respected members of the community and local institutions.

The interview schedule conducted with JI members, activists and leaders revealed a similar narrative to that uncovered through the review of the literature. The JI movement arrived in the AJK through a natural process of expansion that was facilitated by the social and political climate and culture. Although the participants discussed in detail the structure of JI in AJK, which was more influenced by the Pakistani JI movement. The Kashmir uprising in the '80s and '90s helped the movement to fill the socio-cultural space in which it could operate, invested a significant proportion of their time and energy to bring their targeted members into the movement.

The movement utilises many techniques and strategies to mobilise its resources in accordance with the desired objective of attaining political power. Its institutions and policy practices are specifically adapted to meet the challenges they encounter in AJK society. The case study demonstrated that incentives or social exchange mechanisms, such as, *neindra*, the creation of hospitals and schools were done exclusively to establish the altruistic perception of the JI

movement, through materialistic framing. This entailed at times, the movement claiming the success of independent institutions under the management of JI members and activists. Furthermore, independent entities or Jamat friendly institutions are established by the members exist to promote the vision and ideology of the movement and to facilitate the ultimate objectives of the JI.

The activists argued passionately that the central objective of attaining political power could only be attained through the established political process. This would then allow them to reform society along religious, moral and ethical principles in line with the teachings of Mawdudi. Religious explanations and interpretations they offer are directed towards that point, that the true interpretation and understanding of Islam can only be realised within a political agenda that seeks to prevail over all other competing ideologies.

However, the participants also revealed that the movement is struggling in AJK on several fronts. The major issues identified included its ideological clash with the indigenous system of *biraderism*, as most activists hail from such a system they identify inherent contradictions in trying to counter it. The other major obstacle cited entails the perception of their hostility towards other sectarian movements in the region. They face a constant barrage of accusations that label them as being antagonistic to the existence and practice of *Barelvi and Sufi* doctrines. This leads to an accusation being extremists or promoting a *Wahhabi* orientated form of Islam that is alien to the AJK landscape and history. This has naturally impacted their recruitment strategy and debilitated the opportunities for their activists to contest elections or receive enough votes to hold public offices. The activists of the JI movement are, however, reflective enough to declare openly that the movement must reform

along the lines of successful international Islamic parties to attain the desired success of acquiring political power in the region.

### **6.7.2 Case Study Two Conclusion:**

This case study was again conducted mainly using the interviews data. The study has revealed several notions and strategies utilised by the movement and perception of the activists. The case study can be summarised in three broad categories.

- It can be concluded that Minhaj-ul-Qur'an emerged in special circumstances, such as to tap young people into the movement and nurture them with their perceived vision of Islam. Its ideology is very much embedded with the personality of the Holy Prophet and reflects the Sufi and sub-continental Barelvi interpretations of Islam, reflecting what Khan (2006) terms a neo-Barelvi Movement. The personality of Dr Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri appeared also central to activists. Unlike JI, which uses literature to recruit new members, this movement uses more digital resources such as audio and video lectures of Dr Qadri to attract potential members, which of course has a special approach. This will be explored further using the political process approach in the discussion chapter, and to see how the local cultural and religious structure facilitates it or impedes the activities of the movement.
- The movement utilises different resources such as education, welfare, politics and *da'wa* to achieve its perceived goals in the society. It is important to conclude that the activities of the MQ are not at an advanced level, they are aware and want to mobilise resources to achieve their aims of social change although they are at an early stage, where they are focusing on recruitment and framing the ideology to gain public

legitimacy. Strategically, the structure of the movement used is different from JI, this movement is using a mass-centric strategy to reach and bring everyone into the movement, but the latter is using the elitist approach to recruit special and selected members. We will consider this in the discussion chapter in the light of the Resource Mobilisation Approach.

- This movement is using different notions and slogans, in some cases they use very strong notions of Islamic ideology while at other times they do not use the name of the religion at all. The personality of the Prophet Muhammad (s) is central and a focal point for the activists of the movement, most of the ideological and catalytic strategies revolve around this notion. This offers new insights to the study of the Islamic movement which uses several messages and approaches at once.

### **6.7.3 Case Study Three Conclusion:**

This case study has revealed exclusive rhetoric both by its activists and general feelings toward the society and social issues. Movement and activists have reflected their special approach to change the society or the individuals; the case study can be concluded in the following paragraphs.

Unlike the other two movements, which are concerned about global Islam, activists of this movement were concerned with the matters related to very local and personal affiliation with Islam and Islamic practices. They are aware of their role to address the social issues and bring about required change but the struggle they are experiencing is not contentious or anti-social, they want positive changes in the society but through a 'silent movement'. There are different types of people connected with the movement from highly qualified professionals to lay men and women, however, the researcher only had the chance to interact with male activists.

The researcher started working with the movement using the term a ‘religio-social movement’ but as it appeared from the mobilisation strategies of the movement and the activists illustrated; it might not fit under the strict definition of the social movement or more specifically a contentious movement which seeks to change society using political power or combative politics. In terms of cause-effect relationships, the impacts the movement has on society are huge in scale. As we have seen the movement has its aims and objectives, and special approaches. It uses special resources to build the society according to its perceived vision. It appeared much like a ‘mosque movement’ which is known by the local population from the last few centuries because the major institution the movement utilises is mosque networks. This approach also holds other networks and several supplementary resources, additionally, the main resource is human, which entrusts them with huge recognition in society.

Their attitude towards society is something special. It provides acceptance and they have less contentious frontiers to fight against. The movement has a special approach to reach out to the society and interact with people and tackle the issues related to biraderism. From the study of this movement, we also had a chance to get a religious reflection of the society and culture of AJK, which is a general acceptance of the Sufi form of Islam in AJK.

In the next chapter, we will compare these three movements to identify their nature, showing how they work in society and reflect society in the light of the ‘social movement’ and other relevant theories to create a clear picture of society, movements and the goals of the movements. Jamat-e-Islami appeared heavily political, which had an elitist recruitment approach. Minhaj-ul-Qur’an portrayed itself more revolutionary, while deploying a mass

recruitment strategy. In the case of the Sufi tariqa, we have seen it is more individualistic and society-centric in nature.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS:

#### **7.0 Introduction:**

The chapter aims to consolidate the data derived from the literature review, and the findings from the field work study. The discussion also encompasses the personal observational experience of the researcher, alongside the knowledge and understanding gained from visiting a volatile and highly politicised region of the world.

Due to an ongoing conflict with India and paramilitary activity in the region, outsiders to the movements, and from the AJK state, are not usually welcomed, hence, a dearth of literature and research on these movements in the area affected. Thus, when attempting to extract data from participants the researcher faced some resistance and frequently spent hours trying to appease interlocutors, participants, and others surrounding the people selected to interview. However, the data subsequently obtained was immensely rich, as it provided a first-hand account of the movements and the context in which they exist.

The procedure and methods for conducting the research were discussed in Chapter Five, which stipulated that the three major movements to be examined in AJK would be analysed within a case study framework. The three case studies used for data analysis focused on the Jamat-e-Islami (JI), the Minhaj-ul-Qur'an (MQ), and the movement of the Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif (GS) Kotli.

Significant findings from the analysis of the data will be discussed which were inherent to AJK socially, culturally, politically and religiously, and to Islamic movements ideologically, and related to activism. To understand the diverse dynamics of the three movements, three approaches from the social movement theory explained in section (5.2) will be utilised by comparing the similarities and differences of the strategies and visions characterising the

three movements. Furthermore, previous research on social activism will also be considered where it is relevant to the significant findings of the study, and theological models related to Islamic revivalism, both historically and contemporaneously, will be touched on where necessary. Observational data gathered during the field work along with secondary data will be used as supporting evidence for the significant findings which emerged from the three case studies in the last chapter.

### 7.1 Organisation of the findings derived from the data analysis procedure:

The findings of the study as derived from each individual case study have been extracted from each of the themes, as identified in the research methodology procedure.

Thus, the four themes: Ideology or Vision, Recruitment, Resource Mobilisation and Maintaining the Process, each produced a number of findings relating to each individual theme. This has been discussed in section (7.2) under each case study headings as individually listed findings.

A summary of the themes and findings is provided in the table below derived from the analysis of data in Chapter Six.

Themes	Case Study 1	Case Study 2	Case Study 3
Ideology/Vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political Power the aim and solution prescribed by Islam.</li> <li>• State centric Movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prophetic centric approach.</li> <li>• Moderate Islam with Revolution</li> <li>• Society centric Movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual character building</li> <li>• Barakah and Ikhlas</li> <li>• Individual centric Movement</li> </ul>
Recruitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selective Elitist approach</li> <li>• Platform for</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All-inclusive mass approach.</li> <li>• Fast track</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family ties</li> <li>• Self-Spiritual development</li> </ul>

	self-development. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ideological catalyst</li> </ul>		
Resource Mobilisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social Exchange of <i>Neindra</i></li> <li>• Provision of protection and social security</li> <li>• Perception Building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ideational change.</li> <li>• Global perception</li> <li>• Religious indoctrination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mosque Movement</li> <li>• Beginning of an internal revival</li> </ul>
Maintaining the Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Biradrism</i> - a hurdle.</li> <li>• Sectarian clash</li> <li>• Required change to the Movement framework</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Biraderism</i>-a hurdle.</li> <li>• Lack of Resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural friendly</li> <li>• Non-Contentious</li> </ul>

Table 7.1 Summary of the themes derived from analysis

The findings have been derived from the themes that were identified in the research methodology when utilising the interview data in the analysis process.

In section (7.2) the study will discuss significant findings derived from three case studies. The aim is firstly, to understand the deeper meanings participants give to their statements, and secondly, to see how the emerged notions work in AJK society. These findings will be seen in the existing socio-political and cultural phenomenon, regarding how they are used, perceived and the extent to which they prove effective for the purposes they are used for.

Section (7.3) compares the findings using the lens of the three approaches of social movement theory derived from all three case studies.

Section (7.3) presents the overarching discussion points and significant findings that seek to provide a broad picture of the three movements within the AJK context. It will be stated here that all three movements are working towards the betterment of the populace while operating at three differing levels of society.

## 7.2 Case Study One Jamat-e-Islami AJK:

JI was formed in AJK in 1974, not in the response to Western ideologies or their influences, as perceived in the main literature on Islamic movements, but in response to existing Muslim practices. It can be seen in the presence of the majority “Host Barelvi Community” and existing Sufi movements like the Sufi Movement which is part of this study. This can be confirmed as both Kaashmiri (1989) and Mawdudi described how Hindu practices entered Muslim societies and eventually people adopted them as a perceived Islamic way. Azeem (interviewee) said that he was influenced by the idea which Jamat promoted stating that: *“Visiting the shrines, bringing the water, eating the mud these all are Hindu norms and it is a cultural mix.”* Many similar accounts revealed how Jamat was earlier concerned and involved with the reform of many such religious beliefs and practices.

Azeem joined the movement after involvement in long discussions with the Jamati members. Ultimately, when he joined the movement, he said: *“I and my friend both became famous that we had become Wahhabis, (Laughter)....”*, this again shows that Jamat was concerned, and first tried reforming religious beliefs and practices, and ultimately became part of other controversial religious issues. The religious opportunity was created by the ineffectiveness of the dominant religious class, including *pirs* and *ulama*, but with the passage of time and changing circumstances, Jamat became more a socio-religious and political movement. However, that earlier impression which was built against the movement has not yet been removed completely.

Apparently, the data confirms the third dimension of the emergence of the revival movements presented by Ahmad (1989) that Islamic revival movements emerge in their responses to each other, which social movement literature calls “counter movement” (MaCarthy & Zald 1977). In this case, most of the Islamic movements can be classified as counter movements, because in one way or other the movements have their rivals. However,

the matter is less straight forward, as observed, all three movements adopt their own approaches and targeted aims.

Contemporary Jamat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir has developed to a different level. This is an Islamic social movement which holds several organisations and mobilisation techniques, and a political party which participates in the electoral process. However, the emergence occurred in different circumstances and environments, but it expanded over time by utilising available opportunities.

### **7.2.1 Recruitment Incentives**

Recruitment process and strategies JI utilises to recruit activists for its movement are of great interest. It appeared many activists joined the movement through its literature or more specifically, literature produced by Mawlana Mawdudi. Contents of that literature and other materials mentioned by the activists have been utilised in Chapter Three detailing the history and background of the movements.

It appeared that the movement was targeting recruitment from educational institutions. The most effective tool for recruitment was literature, which was mentioned by almost every member, and which shows its efficacy. The interpretation and style of presenting Islam in these educational institutions showed the effectiveness of delivering such Islamic messages for the intended individuals.

It was revealed that social institutions are utilised by the movement and its members from grass-root recruitment to the development of the general population, and to transform the mass public and elite into sympathizers. This notion is part of the Resource Mobilization paradigm of social movement theory. The recruitment mechanism of JI operates like an “invisible institution” chasing potential members over a long period. This method described

by activists regarding chasing potential members even without their knowledge, and who also offered examples and religious justifications for such a strategy. However, so far most of the recruitment has come from the governmental educational institutions, both from AJK and Pakistan, as most of the participants themselves were recruited from colleges and universities.

This recruitment process can be seen on one hand, as using cost and reward notions of the RM by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and on the other, by social exchange theorists, such as, Homans (1958) and Ekeh (1974), who state that joining the movements offers rewards, but the cost of social capital of the *biraderis* bonds also hold central value. The exchange of joining the movements imposes 'special moralities' and duties as costs against the rewards of different types, such as protection and self-development.

This mechanism of social exchange at an individual or vertical level of social class can work effectively, as was seen in the context of Egypt (Clark, 2004), but in a society where social capital is based on blood bonds, it appears difficult to bring in maximum numbers. The next strategy of the movements to attract maximum numbers of members to the movements is achieved by adopting other approaches, which are ideological and strategic framing.

In the case of JI, the criterion of the membership and procedure seems time-consuming which on one hand has benefits (of deep training), but on the other hand, is causing some problems, especially, in the political or democratic processes of the state. For instance, to become a full member of the movement requires a lot of cognitive training and time, which boosts knowledge and confidence of the activists, although they have very few members, whereas they should have hundreds of members in each city.

A Resource Mobilisation approach claims that people join movements after assessing the benefits or selective incentives. Similarly, the movement offers its members and supporters

many benefits, such as social security, particularly, for those minority *biraderis* who are exploited by the majority *biraderis*. Ashraf and Bazmi (interviewees) called it “protection” which people expect from the movement; as the movement fights for its voters and sympathisers at different levels from (*Thana* to the *Kachehri*) police stations to the courts, against the exploitation of the majority *biraderis* and political parties. This approach is very much instilled in the literature of the movement, as Mawlana Mawdudi set a plan for the members in the 1957 convention to help people at government institutions. So far, this approach seems successful and attractive for the aggrieved groups or individuals, where justice selectively favours the influential segments of society. This is a gap (in the political system) which Jamat is filling by using a pressure group strategy from student politics to the police stations by giving the oppressed a voice and power which they could not have achieved without the help of JI.

The question remains whether the efforts outlined above are enough for a political movement to win the elections in a society where politics is based on the *biraderism* or majority *biraderis*. All institutions are directed to gain political power for ultimate solutions if this is an incentive for the voters then main political parties can offer much “*bigger packages*” as Bazmi depicted. In this case, only committed members will be left to vote for the movement candidates. These alternative groupings based upon religion become part of the social capital at the cost of breaking away from the *biraderi*. While on the other hand, in the process of social exchange the members will be giving funds to the movement for the exchange of other benefits, such as social status, personal development, and a high position in an organisation of the movement. This was reflected by all interviewees when they were asked about the benefits of joining the movement.

### 7.2.2 Protection: Provision of the Social Security:

AJK society is based on *biraderism*. This ‘ism’ is sometimes good and useful for some but at the same time it is bad and problematic for others, for instance, it is good for strengthening social and family ties, as people help each other or their *biraderi* fellows at the times of need. It supports collectively organised events, such as marriages and deaths in the *biraderi* circles, and at times financial support is offered based on *biraderi* solidarity. Many *biraderis* have their own welfare organisations to help raise the standards of *biraderi* fellows, both through education and other means of financial help. Examples are of different foundations in the name of the *biraderis*. One famous example is the *Sudhan* educational network, which was established in 1934 to educate *Sudhan Biraderi* using the strategy of *muthi bher atta* or *chawal* (a fistful of flour or rice), other representations include the Gujjar, Jat and Mughal Foundations.

More problematically, this system outlined above, creates divisions and clear divides, particularly, at the time of the elections and during such communal issues where one must take a clear position of either “with” the *biraderi* or “against” it. It also hinders many competent and educated people from obtaining their fair rights based on their natural abilities. Whereas majority and influential *biraderis* have chances to develop, the minority *biraderis* are left behind on many occasions. This lacuna is filled by the Islamic movements like JI, that offer opportunities to bright-minded young people from the educational institutions and other walks of the life, to achieve social mobility. Islamic social movements provide a “platform” or a forum for social advancement. Deriving from the same culture and sections of society, the researcher was aware that these movements support some people to climb the educational and development ladder, however, the researcher was unable to find out that how those beneficiaries regard these privileges.

Being an insider, the researcher was aware of the *biraderis* which some activists belonged to. Those who come from minority *biraderis* are not politically active as candidates of the movement in the elections, although they also believe in change through political means. They appeared very much indebted to the movement for the benefits it gave to them, otherwise, they could not have achieved such material benefits and status in society.

The analysis of the data revealed that most of the participants felt that belonging to the group guaranteed the protection and security they needed in the social and institutional structure. It is very much embedded in the ‘social capital’ theories that, when one social group in the society gets stronger, ultimately it will threaten interests of the weaker groups, or even at times violates the genuine rights of others living in the same society. The same can be observed in the case of the majority and minority *biraderis* in the AJK context.

Majority *biraderis*, or sometimes some groups within those *biraderis*, have access and influence in the government system in the state. Sometimes it is very hard for the individuals to get their legal rights, or to lodge a FIR (First Investigation Report) at the police stations and bring cases to court without the help of influential politicians or the heads of the majority *biraderis*. To counter this issue, movements like Jamat-e-Islami provide alternatives to those power structures. Jamat will guard the affairs of the people, and in turn, such people or those beneficiaries will strengthen the movement. This is a loophole which offers the movement the opportunity to fill it, while it is also a tactic for the movement to utilise as a strategy.

After an interview, Bazmi was asked why people enter the Jamat and leave their *biraderi*. He described that no one can afford to leave *biraderi* until they secure protection elsewhere, while many people who come to the Jamat, do so because they need “*shelter*” at different

levels. One example was where he answered a phone call to help someone at the police station, where the police took a bribe to lodge a FIR, although they were still not helping the victims, because the other party involved had paid more, or was more influential. This is not something unprecedented in the society, but to secure one's rights one needs influence or power in the social and political structure.

### **7.2.3 Political Power: An Ultimate Aim**

Initially, 'politics' was chosen as a specific theme for activists who were operating in the political field, however, it emerged that almost all the members of JI were focussed on politics and concerned with achieving political goals. For their political agenda, they frequently used verses from the Qur'an and its message in political terms along with the Sunna or sayings and practices of the Prophet. This can be termed "political Islam" as it appears to be derived from the Qur'an and Sunna. The most commonly cited verse from this perspective was echoed by almost all participants which regarded the supremacy of Islam over all other *dins* (religions).

*"He is Who has sent His Messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth, that he may cause to prevail over all religions, however much the idolaters may be averse."* Qur'an (9:61)

Exploring the interpretation of this verse seems very important from different interpreters: Mawlana Mawdudi (1971) describes this verse in his famous commentary on the Qur'an in these words; "the Prophet was not sent to reconcile with them (kuffar and mushrikeen) but to prevail the guidance and Din of truth on all systems of life and its departments". Qutb (1989) explains that the *din* has been implemented practically in its real form once in the life of the Holy Prophet. Islahi (1979) asserts that this verse talks specifically about the *mushrekeen* (Idolaters) of the *Quraish* that has already happened, and in the Arab peninsula two religions cannot exist, but the *Din* of Allah will rule, which already has happened. Either these

prevailing outcomes had happened or must happen, which is a matter for deeper exploration in the state.

The activists define *din*, as a system of life, even a complete code of life, rather a mere religion, being the means with which to replace communism or socialism, secularism and capitalism as a viable alternative. When explaining this verse, the message of ‘prevailing’, is taken as their own responsibility, or in other words, a duty by Allah which is neglected and so is a cause of Muslim’s problems, and the solution lies in achieving political success or gaining political power.

Bazmi is a full-time politician and an active member of the movement, who engaged in a discussion about many other aspects of the movement and society, but as he was a well-known religious politician, his understanding of their political affairs and ideology was important to explore.

*“The purpose of the messengers was to do justice, and this only can be done when you have political power through recognised and authorised means”.*

He appeared immensely determined and clear, that if politics is left out of the system then the purpose of the Islam or revelation cannot be accomplished. Describing the movement and its identity, he mentioned three core objectives or fields the movement is working towards: *D‘awati Islam, Jihadi Islam and Political Islam*. He discussed the comprehensiveness of the movement and its problems with others.

This rhetoric of ‘*Jihadi Islam*’ was confirmed during some observations when the researcher was with the same activist in a programme. He used strong language to “*straighten the necks*” (to force someone to get on the right path) of those who exploit the system and the poor. However, the concept of politics was presented sacredly and as a very important element of

Islamic societies, because perhaps the reputation of the political profession is not seen in positive and honest terms.

*“Politics is an incomplete name, in fact, it is a belief for us that should be our breath (as important as breathing)”.* (Bazmi)

The factors outlined above all reflect the Jamat’s determination or commitment to capturing both the political power in the state and the system: this is not without a reason as it is a sacred mission required by the Qur’an. To achieve this goal, all the activities of the movement or institutions are directed towards this mission because it is considered as the only way to create a society reflective of their perceived vision an Islamic society based on the model, of Madinah.

It appeared the activists are aware that their political objectives and the purpose of all the strategies they are using, and resources they are mobilizing, are only used to achieve their perceived goals, most importantly the ultimate one, which is securing political power. It was observed how they utilised services and other resources, for instance, during a programme of the movement for the distribution of wheelchairs, a political leader of the movement clearly asked the beneficiaries of the services to vote for him at the elections in the return for these services as “*neindra*”.

*Neindra* is a small amount of money people pay at the time of the marriage dinner or meal, socially they are not only supposed to return that money or a bit extra but are expected to be present at the others’ ceremony. This is a continuing social norm and a ‘social exchange’ to keep people connected with each other through placing a “moral and economic” duty.

Do they use these social services only for incentives or is there any other purpose for this? There can be many in different areas, as incentives are mainly for short term relief and then to transfer this into a real result is another issue. Ehsan is a senior member of the welfare

organisation and is not only a rich man but also highly professional. He appeared realistic, honest and bold while answering the research questions. Because he was a senior member of al-Khidmat; a welfare organisation of the movement, an objective of the researcher was to gain the maximum amount of information about the welfare work and its aims, and how it is linked to the broader aims of the movement.

The movement is utilising social institutions rationally with a clear purpose. Ehsan termed it as “*building the impression.*” Firstly, it was to give people confidence that they can deliver if they get into the power, and secondly, prove they are honest in dealing with material resources. Most importantly, it reflects that the movement is concerned with securing political power which according to their beliefs is a remedy for all ills, but to reach a power centre they need to use a variety of tools and strategies, both material and ideational. This confirms the strategic approach of the social movements presented in social movement theories, that movements use strategic actions with minimum costs for the achievement of maximum benefits (Roots, 1990).

#### **7.2.4 Hurdles: Internal and External**

Jamat presented Islam as a complete code of life which was disseminated amongst the educated classes from the universities and colleges. On the one hand, it was successful for choosing only selected elite members, as Mawlana Mawdudi believed that some educated Muslims can lead the uneducated masses. This was reflected by some interviewees and then criticised as an omission, “*our approach of choosing only clean ones is wrong*” (people with credibility and piety) as a cost of this - the majority population was neglected. The language and means of delivery of the message used by the movement were also not effective for the wider public to understand terms, such as *iqamat-e-din*, (establishment of *din*), *hukumtt-e-*

*Ilahiyya*, (government of God) and many others. It was observed in the literature (Dhaouadi, 2014) that every society and people have their special trait. AJK society is culturally nomadic, according to Ibn Khaldun, for nomadic people ideological frameworks don't work effectively.

Jamat needed a language, and/or in the light of the social movement theory paradigm, a framing of their message to resonate within the larger society. The movement utilises many tactics and strategies to recruit members but when it comes to its policy to reach out to the broader society it appears to be failing. Either it is purposefully done to just keep very articulate people in the movement or is a shortcoming which needs to be rectified, as many members mentioned as a further matter for exploration to see its pros and cons.

If the movement wants to address the whole society it needs a complete approach to reforming all aspects of the society, which Yadegari (1986) describes as a deep-rooted revolution proposed by Iqbal and Afghani in thinking, in seeing, in feelings, in ideology and in culture, and for this, all the movements will need to bridge the gap between the educated, intellectuals, and laymen. This requires bringing the PhDs and no Ds on one page like the black movements in the U.S, and this will become possible only by dropping the ivory towers of the elitist approach in the movement. Wahidi (2001) also mentions Fazlur Rahman, who proposed changes in the framework and approaches of the contemporary Islamic movements in the subcontinent, otherwise, they will be altered by some sort of neo-Islamists, such as, followers of Javed Ahmad Ghamdi in Pakistan.

However, this process of selective recruitment and preparing a special cadre of elitists has its own importance in the literature of the social movements, as a well-trained and educated leadership plays a role as a crucial resource in the movement's organisations. Again, this approach has failed in the case of the "elite maslik" (Sanyal 1999; Metcalf,1941), such as,

the Barelvi movements led only by *ulama* which created a lacuna for both JI and MQ to make Islam relevant to both non-*ulama* and the masses.

Activists highlighted many other internal issues, one of which, was the framework of the movement to be modified. Ashraf wanted to change the existing criterion of the movement to select the candidates to contest the elections. He believed that Jamat is too focussed on the piety of the person, but with this quality, “*one surely can enter into the Janna but not into the Parliament*”. To tackle this, the movement must make changes and offer the chance to those who are interested in politics to present themselves for this job. Others reflected similar rhetoric to provide opportunities to other suitable people from the society to join the movement and start from the front rows. It was felt across the board that the activists wanted to make many changes in the existing framework of the movement including the above-mentioned language, and to consider the contemporary environment which has changed substantially from Mawlana Mawdudi’s era.

Jamat used its message in a society which was *pir* and *biraderi* dominated, which involved a clash with the dominant culture of the state, where it emerged to make Islam a complete code of life, but first, it involved a clash at the local level to introduce its own defined Islamic culture.

Historically, in a society where people accepted “*Gandah Singh*” if he remained Hindu, but was rejected when blamed for becoming a Wahhabi, it appears that Jamat and its approach did not tackle this issue intelligently. Was this approach its own or of the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith in AJK? It appeared that many participants derived from those, whose background is Deobandi or is influenced by the Saudi returnees, however, there are also young people who were recruited from Barelvi circles. Both factions have different approaches towards understanding Islam and existing practices. It appeared that the old

Deobandi leadership in the JI was more harsh or strict about the Barelvi practices, while the new generation recruited recently from the universities and colleges appeared more lenient towards some Barelvi practices.

Many existing religious practices and traditions have been preserved and even promoted by the AJK governments to maintain the harmonious and peaceful nature of Islam in the AJK region, as was revealed from a discussion with a former Prime Minister of the state. This can be compared with other parts of Pakistan which are burning in the flames of sectarian clashes, while AJK has not faced such problems. However, one factor is the participation of the *ulama* in the government system. AJK has a special court system aided by the *Qadhis*, along with district and sub-district *qadhis* and *muftis* to assist the government affairs related to Islam and Islamic law. This all-inclusive approach sets liabilities on everyone to save the system which is beneficial for all. This approach is very much of the Mughal Dynasty in India, where the government was responsible for the protection of the lives of the people, and the *ulama* had the responsibility for legal and educational affairs, whereas, Sufis played the role for the character building of the people (Faruqi, 1996).

Jamat considers existing religious culture as a hurdle and calls it “propaganda” against the movement. Before the data collection the researcher was not aware of its severity, though he knew this was an issue, but how it has affected the movement and its aims was a matter of exploration. Almost every activist described that they have this problem from society or from some people, which of course they believe is propaganda, which has affected the success of the movement at different levels. It was realised that to ask the questions on this issue was not easy either, also the activists were reluctant to discuss this topic. This was reflected by the activists, such as, people don’t vote for them in the elections, many people don’t read their literature with pre-set judgement or conceptions in their minds.

### **7.3 Case Study Two: Minhaj-ul-Qur'an.**

Minhaj-ul-Qur'an or MQ is active in AJK on several frontiers, but politically not as effective and powerful as in Pakistan. The movement participates in elections in AJK but in a limited scope, as it has never won a seat in the AJK assembly, so far. Unlike the JI movement, its political party is registered with a different name as JKAT (Jammu & Kashmir Awami Tehreek) but other institutions use the name of the umbrella movement under the name of Minhaj-ul-Qur'an. On the other hand, most of the social institutions of the JI use different names and are registered as separate institutions. The interviews were conducted with the activists who operate in different fields, such as, political, welfare and educational networks. There was also the opportunity to conduct observations of some activities. In section (7.3) and subsections, the significant findings will be discussed.

#### **7.3.1 Prophetic Centric Approach:**

During the data analysis process, it appeared that activists of this movement were very conscious of the personality of the Holy Prophet, as this topic formed the focus of their discussion. Almost every activist expressed some comments on this issue.

In a video lecture (CD571), Dr. Qadri reads the same verse of poetry by Iqbal which was read by many activists, Dr Qadri criticises the British for the role they played in the Islamic world during the colonial period. He said that the British created two *Fitnas* in the Islamic World, one was the creation of the Qadiyaniyat, and second was the creation of Wahhabism, to degrade the status of the Holy Prophet and call Muslims *mushriks* (polytheists). This is the reason they believe that these types of the movements have degraded the status of the Holy Prophet, in their view, this is to destroy Islam.

The movement run an institution known as “*Gosha-e-Durood*.” This is part of the Prophet Centric aim to enhance the love for the Holy Prophet. The institution is run and managed by a proper system and has a framework to manage the programme. For instance, there are special conditions to set and register it with the central *Gosha* in Lahore. It depends upon the local network of the movement to organise this event weekly or at least after two weeks, and the programme consists of recitation of the Qur’an and *Na‘at*, offering a purposefully recorded speech by Dr. Qardi, recording the numbers of how many times the *durood* was recited, along with expressing a special attitude towards the newcomers to get them involved with the movement. They claim their uniqueness in this regard, as it has special blessings for the one who recites it.

During one speech, Dr. Qadri asserts that he believes when the questions will be asked in the grave about the belief in the Holy Prophet, before the faithful answers, the Holy Prophet himself will give confirmation about his *ummati*, this ‘*ibadat*’ is reported to the Holy Prophet with the name and details of the one who sends these blessings and *sallam* to him.

The researcher had the opportunity to attend such events a couple of times in the UK, once in Nottingham, and at another occasion in London. The event in Nottingham was organised on a weekly basis in a local mosque on every Sunday after *dhur* prayer. The event in Nottingham was different or less structured than described in the procedure. After the *dhuhr* (noon) prayer, the Imam of the mosque announced to everyone that there will be a *durood mehfil* (sitting for *durood*). A big circled cloth was spread on the side of the prayer hall, with about 15 people were sitting in the circle. The local activist of the movement who was in his late 30’s, gave *tasbeehs* (beads) to everyone to recite (silently) and account for the numbers of recited *durood*. He had a file where he filled details of the *gosha-e-durood*, and after about 20

minutes he asked everyone to tell the numbers of the *tasbeehs* they recited, which he then calculated, and the final numbers were recorded. This was 8000 times for that day. At the end, the imam recited a dua. The event was only led by the Minhaj activist, while others there who participated were not Minhaj members. There was not any video lecture by Dr. Qadri or any special activity regarding the movement.

In the case of London, the event was much more organised and structured, because it was the Centre of Minhaj-ul-Qur'an International. This was the 108<sup>th</sup> event at this centre, which makes nine years of its completion, as *gosha-e-durood* is organised on the last Saturday evening of the month. The event started just before 8 pm in the main hall of the mosque, which was specially decorated for this purpose, whereby, it started with the recitation of the Qur'an and *Naat*. Most of the Minhaj activists wore red hats and for some of those who didn't have caps, they were provided to look prominent. The senior activists and some elders were sitting on the chairs in the square shape at the front of the prayer hall. There were about 300 to 400 people - both men, women and children. This devotional episode consisted of many *n'ats* and a special *mehfil-e-dhikr* of a Sufi *halqah* type, and where upon the main lights were turned off. While chanting many *azkaar* loudly, such as, *Allahhu, Lailaha Illallah*, and others which were led by a professional *n'at* reciter.

The Imam who was leading the event asked those attending to lower the gaze and divert their attention towards the Holy prophet or to one's Sheikh. At the end of the *dhikr*, the Imam delivered a lecture in English about the blessings of reciting or sending *durood* to the Holy Prophet, such as; if you recite hundreds and thousands of them, you will achieve a certain status in Jannah. Most of the people brought numbers of recited *durood* from their homes in the thousands and millions. They announced the positions of those who recited the most and

gave them rewards of a Qur'anic translation by Dr. Qadri and beads: the woman who won had recited 1 million times.

Apart from above-mentioned accounts, there are many other ways and practices to express love for the Holy Prophet in this movement, and in sub-continental devotional Islam. However, many practices are criticised as innovations by the Deobandi and other Salafi movements. The celebration of the *mawalid* or birth of the Holy Prophet is one of the most celebrated events in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. It is called *Eid-e-Milad*, which is on the day of 12<sup>th</sup> *Rabbi-ul-Awal* of the Islamic calendar. Mainly people organise processions and gatherings to celebrate it, but the movement organises an annual *milaad* Conference and night awakening in Lahore at Minar-e-Pakistan (Pakistan Tower), where thousands of people stay for a night in the presence of Dr. Qadri. This shows how the movement is using an approach to mobilise the people, offering a devotional activity but using strategic framing and developing a cognitive sacred culture. This strategic framing works from local circles to the central level, whereby, Zald et. al (1996, p.264) quotes Skockpol as promoting an ideology which generates energy and becomes a catalyst to make people join the movement.

### **7.3.2 Moderate Islam with Revolution:**

While exploring this movement, some terms echoed quite frequently, such as moderate, peace based Islamic teachings, love, spiritualism and a message of harmony. Activists of the movement when describing their agenda always mentioned all or some of these terms. The reasons seem very simple, which of course was described by the activists. In the international arena where Islamic movements are viewed negatively, within Pakistan some sectarian movements are involved in violent activities and use violence against their opponents, and in some cases against the state too. There are many reasons behind these issues to be reflected in their discussions during many occasions, however, it appeared that it was not used as a

strategy or a campaign, or as a legal-political and social framework, prescribed by scholars, like Kamali (2011) and Awar (2015).

Discussion with MQ activists revealed that the movement was established somehow as a response to the *Wahhabi* movements in the educational institutions which include influences of JI. Zubair stated: “*JTI was making people Ahl-e-hadith or Deobandi*”. Where as in society, as Yaqoob mentions, the movement was established to check on the “*conspiracy to eradicate love of the Holy Prophet from the society*” and the love of the Holy Prophet which is considered of fundamental importance to the Sufi and host Barelvi movements in AJK, along with some other features. These accounts lucidly reveal that the Islamic revival movements also emerge as a response to other movements, and a crisis perspective is not the only factor, and hence, from the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, it seems irrelevant at least in an AJK context. Approaches to an Islamic revival focused on the success and economic models of an Islamic revival, however, the movements don’t represent the full picture or a state structure, but build an impression by using low costs to secure the larger aims.

Secondly, most of the young people in AJK, and there is no exception in Pakistan, dismiss the traditional *ulama* because their old tactics are ineffective to attract the new educated generation. The religious explanations and logic they offer cannot satisfy them, and this notion was expressed by the activists in different words. This ineffectiveness of the traditional Barelvi *maslak* or sect which Metcalf (1982) and Sanyal (1996) call an ‘elitist *maslak*’, note that this elitist approach also pushed the educated youth away from them. Ultimately, to fulfil their religious needs they join organised religious movements, which have modern educated leadership and approaches to present Islam. This is the reason most of the people join these movements through the student organisations in the colleges and

universities, in this process this movement also tried to capture the market of the Sufi minded youth.

The activists present “Moderation” or moderate Islam. The movement used some strategies, such as, *fatwa* against terrorism, and peace conferences along with other activities, but they have not used this concept as a holistic strategy and a framework, (which was seen in the Literature Review chapter about moderation), for long term benefits, except framing for the time being. The movement claims to be a universal movement and the activists are very much impressed by the work conducted by their groups in other parts of the world. During the observations in the UK, it appeared that the movement is only facilitating the Pakistani or Kashmiri community by fulfilling their religious needs, such as, religious education for the children, devotional activities for the Barelvi Sufi migrants and to assert hegemony against rival movements, rather than an assertion of a universal Islam at a macro level.

It appears surprising on one hand that the movement is using devotional activities because, in almost every interview, participants described that the solution to all problems lies in the revolution, and then reuniting the universal Muslim *ummah*, which is only possible through a revolution.

The activists use the term, revolution, quite frequently, and they believe that this forms the basis of their movement. Dr. Qadri has used this term very frequently throughout his life in his literature, such as, *Prophet of Revolution and Scripture of Revolution*, (1985), *Qur’anic Philosophy of Revolution*, (2000) and so forth, while the same message has been delivered in his speeches. Once during an observation of a programme of the movement, whereas, it is normal for Muslims to start any holy event with the recitation of the Holy Qur’an, and when someone is invited to recite the Qur’an they use some holy words about the recitation, it was

instead a surprise for the researcher to hear the announcement that: “*now Ahmad* (not a real name) *is invited to recite the Saheefa-e-Inqilab* (the Scripture of Revolution).

The theme of the political mobilisation was also the Revolution March in 2014, so this is natural for the activists to be concerned or obsessed with this term. On another occasion, the researcher had the chance to meet one of the sons of Dr. Qadri and ask about the possibility of the revolution. He stated that we really need a revolution and there is no other way out of the current ailment of the country. He accepted that they had a type of rehearsal and we mobilised our activists to assess our strength and weakness. He said that the man (Dr Qadri) who is leading is highly intelligent and he knows a lot about what to do and how to do it.

The literature and approach presented by Dr. Qadri also confirms this, hence, the ideology Tahir-ul-Qadri presents will become contradictory if it doesn't happen in his life. We have seen in Chapter Three (3.6.6); that he believes in the theories which can give results in this life and not only in the hereafter, if they fail.

The movement has the same revolutionary approach for AJK, which has different socio-political dynamics, hence, the revolutions are not brought, but happen when a special socio-political environment is created. Afzaal (2003) presents the origin of Islam as a social movement. Jafri (1988) also describes Iqbal's approach that in the historical and religious literature, the revolutionary process is part of the initial stages of Islam, this was very natural as every religion at its formation period is always revolutionary. When it moves into the second stage of interpretation then it becomes multidimensional and adopts different schools of thought.

It seems this also is the case with the religious movements, in the beginning, they are over enthusiastic towards their perceived goals but when entering the bureaucratic process then they realise the true situation. In the beginning, the JI Movement has held similar ambitions and it is presented as an Islamic revolutionary movement (Moten 2002) and Nasr 1994). However, Ahmad and Ansari (1979) conclude, while presenting Mawdudi's ideas, that his revolutionary thought is not based on the strict model of a French or Russian revolution, but a gradual reform of the system and individuals, or as Ahmad (1996, P.89) calls it, an "intellectual revolution".

In this case, the theory of the founder of the MQ seems to be failing which was promoted to bring a revolution in his life. However, the revolutions happen in the repressive and weaker states (Hwang, 2012) which is not the case with AJK, and somehow, with Pakistan too.

A further approach to analyse this activity is left to strategic framing, if not a failure of political mobilisation, which was perceived by many people at the time, as shown by the respondents. This was a very important intervention which attracted much attention in the country in recent times. The motives can be classified into different sections to make it precise:

- (A) By mobilising the people, the movement measured its strength if the movement wants to go into the elections in the future.
- (B) The members were inactive for a long time, even the graduates of the university might have lost the connection with the movement and the centre through this activity they were activated, and their confidence was boosted with new ideas and vision.
- (C) The leader claimed that the movement will bring 10 million people to Islamabad, the target was given to the activists to bring 10 persons by each member, but they failed to do so. An activist said they overestimated the targets for their members, so it was

measured.

(D) Many interviews reflected that the activists were obsessed with the thought that the people are illiterate, and they need education, and the Revolution March created awareness which they claimed as their victory. The activists believed that the movement educated the nation and created awareness by the 70+ days of lectures by Tahir-ul-Qadri.

(E) Finally, if the government would have been toppled by the army or judiciary or the PM would have resigned, which was unlikely, it would have been their success without any blame on them. But on the other hand, they made themselves relevant in the system and in the country by showing their presence, which was felt strongly in the country and abroad, caused by this “relevantly” approach.

This explains the strategic framing process at its best, but as Zald (1996) has clarified that the framing can be both long term and short term, whereas, the aim of this mobilisation was to bring revolution, and change the corrupt system in days. The movement was aware of the realities and of its short-term objectives, whereby, it captured the attention of the media and people for months, in many cases, the framing in favour of the movement was built by the media itself. On one occasion, a very senior and prominent journalist while standing in the March venue, was reporting that these people are harmless and peaceful, and their trait is not of the violent people (Sama TV Pakistan).

### **7.3.3 Education an ideational tool for social change or for indoctrination?**

The movement utilises different social institutions but the school system it runs is of great importance. Currently, in AJK the movement has about 20 model schools, with all, or most of them in the Mirpur division. These are fully recognised by the movement's Education Society. Some members claimed that they have about 100 schools, but some of them are very small and even run only a couple of classes. The researcher had the chance to observe both types of the schools - fully recognised and semi-affiliated; semi-affiliated are schools which use all symbols of the movement's school network but are not fully recognised by the movement. Like, many other movements who use educational institutions to change the society, their educational institutions are set for the same purpose and with the same spirit.

As it was mentioned, MQ is a comparatively new movement, other social institutions of the movement are also in the initial stage, whereas, access was not granted to explore the educational organisations of the JI movement. Access was given to the educational networks of MQ. How the movement utilizes this institution is a matter of interest. Interview and observational data revealed that the movement cares about and teaches devotional aspects of Islam and the personality of the holy Prophet in schools. The movement also focuses on religious education with the set curriculum by the state, which is a process and need of "*fikri*" or ideational change.

The researcher had the opportunity for observation and to spend a day at the school and meet the staff. The school teaches one extra subject different from the government schools. The Islamic studies teacher, Ali, teaches this subject, and claimed his speciality in the field of teaching the subject. He described a special problem that we need to correct including many things regarding our daily Islamic practices; even the *Azan* or the call for prayer, is performed using the wrong words.

The respondents said that their students learn these things which they then share with their parents at home, and then their parents come into the school for confirmation. This confirms the same idea described by Shabnam, that these students leave “*positive impacts on their families*” which is part of the society and social impact.

The movement showed a special way of teaching and preparing students which in many ways can be called an intentional indoctrination of the students. Although, it is the society and nature of the majority society which allowed them to do so, otherwise JI cannot afford this in their school networks.

In the Kashmiri context, it was revealed that the cost of all the activities and focusing heavily on Pakistani politics, the movement has not set up strong institutions, however, we should give it a time margin before comparing with the other two movements and their institutions. Another reason is, that the movement has numbers of activists, but it still needs trained and influential leadership in AJK. Statements that: “*in AJK everything will happen which happens in Pakistan*” is a self-defeating approach which not only will delay their progress in AJK but will make them only a Pakistani movement working in AJK. A lack of financial resources appeared a problem for the movement in AJK, as the movement is mainly working in the urban areas, but to work at village level and build institutions will require more resources, both human and material.

When it came to society and the culture of AJK, the movement experienced a huge problem with the biradri system, like the JI members reflected. Many activists shared their experiences, such as, Fozia and Yqoob, who told their own experiences when they were victim of the system. The prescribed solution to tackle this issue was again interesting, which Zubair stated: “*our members are getting married in cross biraderi*”.

The movement wants to work with active Khanqahs which is part of its strategy which was seen in section (3.6.5), and tackle biraderism with the help of the Sufis. However, religiously they found the AJK more fertile and accepting of the religious message more than anywhere in Pakistan. This also includes their acceptance in the society religiously, because this movement doesn't face any sectarian hurdles. The religious message based on the personality of the Holy Prophet and strategies they use are somehow closer to the local religious culture of *tasawwuf* and sacredness or *barakah*.

#### **7.4 Case Study Three: The Gulhar Sharif Movement**

Khanqah-e- Fatahiya or Hadhrat Sahib of Gulhar Sharif (GS) is a more indigenous movement to AJK which appeared in a historical perspective, however, changes occurred over time, by the movement playing a more active role in AJK society. This movement is an active *khanqah* and has transformed over the last 20 years as an internal revival to Sufism in AJK. This is a shift from individual pirs to a collective socio-economic tasawwuf, focussed on the different social and economic developmental matters of the people, as was seen in section (2.4.1).

Unlike the other two movements, it appeared that there is not a strategic process of recruitment in this movement. However, there is a special process called *b'ait* in Urdu. Individuals either become involved with the movement through their families, while others who are dissatisfied with their lives enter it, along with those who want to improve their religious activism. Letter 27 is one such example concerning a person who is requesting *bay'a*. Hadhrat Sahib advised that, to get *bay'a* with a nearby *Pir* Sahib in the first place is better, further he explains that:

“The purpose of having a guide (Sheikh) is to structure your life. Otherwise, as far as

actions are concerned, one has to carry them out themselves. Peace be upon you ”

(Letter no 27, 14<sup>th</sup> of September 1995 p: 28-29)

This process creates a special relationship between a *pir* and *murid* and amongst the *murids*, as a *pir bahi*, or brothers under a *pir*, or in the *silsila*. Those who have no *pirs* used to be considered as *bepira*, or a person without a *pir*, which was considered as low in religious status, as observed by Choudhry (2012). However, it has changed now, especially amongst the new generation where no one seriously asks such questions regarding having a *pir* or *ba'it*.

This movement was described as “a silent movement” of character building, the movement presents *din* as sacred and something which needs to be handled very carefully. We studied this under the theme of *barakah*, a concept which has not clear deliniations, rather a sense of a sacred belief in something very sensitive. Perhaps, this reflects the reason presented by Ibn Khaldun about nomadic societies which can be mobilized easily by asserting beliefs in sainthood or prophethood (Dhaouadi, 2014).

Almost every activist of the movement described that they want to build their own character and then that of other individuals, which is the main aim of the *tariqa* or the Sufi chain. The participants were concerned with the character of individuals. They believed that if individuals possess good character then many societal problems can be solved. To build the character of individuals they believe in applying special techniques and approaches which are different to those used by other social and political movements.

The participants were concerned to develop a special type of personality with inner qualities in a person, targetting qualifications which strengthen the *kirdaar* or character of a person.

Examples were given regarding people performing their duties at the highest level in governmental institutions, and though they hold formal qualifications, they lack a special qualification offered by the *tariqa* or *tasawwuf*, which differentiates between literacy and education by morality or ethical values. Activists appeared to reflect perceived notions of change, whereby, aware of problems, which can be solved by applying a special technique focussing on individuals. This approach of propagating piety is considered a spiritual and moral resource derived from the Islamic social movement, which is different from Western social movements (Cetin, 2010) - this creates social capital and empowerment derived from faith.

#### **7.4.1 A Mosque Movement: Mosque a Mobilising Resource and Identity:**

This movement was identified as a “Mosque Movement,” because the mosque is their main identity, resource and focus in the society. This movement has a type of monopoly on the construction of the mosques all over Azad Kashmir generally, and in districts, Mirpur and Kotli, specifically. Kotli City is also known as *Madina-tu-Al-Masajid* or city of the mosques due to the efforts of the movement. They provide a special structure with a dome and with one or two extra rooms on the side, or underneath the main mosque hall. The mosques are known as a mosque of Hadhrat Sahib. Along with the mosques is a Qur’anic school which is called a *ders* by the locals, and attendance is either full-time or part-time. The movement is administering about 750 mosques, some fully and some partially, both in the state, and with some in Punjab. Even today, in the city this *khanqah* or shrine is more famous with the name of *ders sharif* than the *darbar sharif*. Their Qur’an schools or *ders*, especially for memorisation of the Qur’an, are famous all over the state, their *huffaz*, or memorizers of the Qur’an, are easily found in every part of the state.

#### **7.4.2 Movement and the Society; a Cultural Approval:**

During the fieldwork process while engaging with this movement some significant disclosures were noted. It was revealed that the movement held a special attitude towards society. Mainly this was based on avoiding clashes with society, while accepting many cultural norms as customs, are an essential part of any society. Posing questions on ‘maintaining the processes’ theme, were conducted to explore if the subjects have any problems and whether they noted any specific opponents in society. No serious concerns or hurdles were mentioned by the movement members. However, they have a special approach for AJK society, although that approach doesn’t disturb existing structures of the society at large, furthermore, it also seeks certain aspects to be changed or removed from the society and state, such as corruption, injustice and other social ills, but with the applications of the techniques of a silent and non-contentious movement. The strategies which appeared under the character building process and the impacts described by the activists reflect their desire to tackle social issues.

Questions concerning biraderism were the most significant aspect of the research themes for several reasons. *Biraderism* is part of the social fabric of AJK society, as it is an existing ‘social capital’ contrasted against the ‘new social capital’ offered by these movements: when it is so prominent it can be an impediment or an advantage for the movement, which depends on how a movement treats it.

This general attitude seen in previous sections highlights that their approach is not antisocial, and does not aim to clash with society. As it appeared, they are using both religious and cultural concepts quite easily to maintain a balanced society, although aware of the positive impacts which results from their teachings. Some of the participants were overwhelmed with

the special way and impacts of the Sufi Movements throughout Islamic history in general, and of this movement in a local context. Jameel during the interview continued counting the positive impacts of the movement on the society, from individual to society and government institutions.

Non-contentious, and displaying a socially-friendly manner has given this *tariqa* an acceptance in society. Their attitude towards people and religious practices, including non-involvement in controversial matters of religion and society, is their special approach. They don't deliver Friday sermons which are very common before the two Arabic language khutbas, which was surprising for the researcher to observe for one Friday prayer. There were thousands of people who were sitting silently, or reading their *adhkaar*. Later an Imam came who only recited the Qur'anic verses, *ahadith* and *durood* in both *khutabas*. For those who visit the *khanqah*, the management has issued special guidelines how to behave there, and how they can financially support the *khanqah* and mosque. Perhaps these all are the reasons for Nisar (2011) to assert that during the early 90s jihadist movements criticised many mazarat as centres of shirk, they did not find any such thing about this centre.

#### **7.4.3 Barakah: A Strong Belief and Motivating Notion:**

The researcher was already aware of the concept of '*barakah*' or blessing in any Sufi *tariqa*, but how it is practised in different forms is a matter of interest. Several visits were made to the *khanqah* which was also headquarters of the movement during the fieldwork. Interesting elements were revealed while observing how important it was for the common people and how they practise this spiritual tradition. During one observation after a Friday prayer, the researcher was given access to attend an after-Friday prayer programme. While attending the programme in the basement hall of the mosque, the researcher came across about 15 to 20

grooms sitting in the row and waiting for Hadhrat Sahib. First thoughts came to mind about a collective marriage ceremony, like many charities organise for poor people. Upon enquiry it was revealed that it was not a collective marriage ceremony, rather that these are individuals from different areas of the district and some from Mirpur district, who travelled to have their *nikah* performed by Hadhrat Sahib so they can start a prosperous, happy, and most importantly a blessed life, full of *barakah*.

The importance of this *barakah* or blessings can be illustrated by this incident which the researcher came across, once while waiting outside the *hujra* or the office of Hadhrat Sahib. When Hadhrat Sahib came, the researcher cleared his way while standing on the side. I was speechless when an angry *murid* or adherent of Hadhrat Sahib approached me and almost shouted at me in a mixture of British English and the local language questioning why I didn't offer him a handshake, or at least touch him, as he said that I missed a huge *barakah* or blessing:

*“O brother you don't know what you have missed”.*

These are not the only forms of *barakah*, but it is based both on the charismatic and Sufi approach of *tawajjoh*, or attention. This was further observed on another occasion in the presence of Hadhrat Sahib, two persons were found who were different from the others: one was a young man in his late 20s who was continuously staring at the face of Hadhrat Sahib for hours, while it was clearly observable that he was in pain with red and watering eyes, but he continued this practice until end of the programme. There was another man in his late 50s or may be in early 60s, who was not looking at his face at all, just staring down on the earth, even while standing in the queue to shake hands with Hadhrat Sahib, he kept his gaze lower.

This notion of *barakah* has many dimensions, both spiritual and material based on spiritual gains. In many cases, people wanted Hadhrat Sahib to touch their passports because they had a belief that this would assist them to obtain visas, and then lead to good jobs.

The movement used local notions and strategies which appealed to, and were understood by, common people.

### **7.5 Comparison and Contrast:**

All significant findings were discussed in the previous section of each movement. However, a broader picture will be presented here to compare the significant findings using the lens of the SMT.

The movements utilise religious messages using their own approaches. The first two movements presented religion as a complete code of life, most importantly, a *din* or system of life which needs to be implemented as a political system. This was a religious duty for the activists which is being neglected by both the ulama and society. When it came to the Sufi *tariqa*, the activists offered opposite explanations, for example, Shahid said: “*Show me! Where did Prophet say that if you don’t establish Islam then you are not a Muslim?*” This is also a position taken by mainstream society, where mixing religion with politics is considered awkward.

Opportunities are created through a lack of state institutions and the ineffectiveness of politicians to give Islamic movements legitimacy, and provision to present their political or Islamic political model, practically and exemplary. This holistic approach can be further observed, where activists can go if they wish to be raised with their leaders on the day of judgement, as on this matter supporters of the main political parties cannot risk their beliefs to this extent.

Both political movements (JI & MQ) use their resources to build their image in society. This can be called “material framing” which is to build a perception in society about the competency and honesty present within the society based on mobilising material resources. This was the case specific to JI, while MQ is also using the resources with similar intentions. JI has already gone through formation periods and it is at the stage where the organisation can bargain with state institutions, or with the main political parties to secure their role in the state using different tactics.

Minhaj-ul-Qur’an has been ‘framing conscious’ as they have shown different framings: framing for the activists, for the media, and for other actors which were noted in section (7.1). MQ is heavily based on respect and love for the Holy Prophet, as it is a well-known religious movement, and has even replaced the Barelvi ulama party known as JUP (Jami‘at Ulama-e-Pakistan) in Pakistan and their student movement - ATI. As part of the recent mobilisation, the movement focussed on the issues that are not purely religious. This was a drive or campaign, such as, electoral reforms, corruption, the welfare state, and sections of the constitutions, which are related to the qualifications of the members of the assembly.

The mobilisation and framing of the movement occurred on a large scale at a time when Islamic movements were under pressure in Pakistan and everywhere in the world. By marching towards Islamabad, and staging two sit-ins in 2011 and in 2014 they claim this derived their success, as they created awareness in the country about politics, so that common people became aware that politics is about honesty and is a job for honest people. This resulted in helping them to become relevant to the state, people and political system in the country. The importance of framing at the right time can be seen through the resignation of the JI leader in Pakistan, who gave a statement about the killing of army personnel at the hands of the Taliban, stating, either they are Shaheed or not. Tahir-ul-Qadri utilised this opportunity well and said that:

*“Those army personnel killed while fighting with the terrorists are the greatest Shaheeds”.*

(ARY TV Pakistan, Programme Khara Sach, 11/11/2013)

Where many religious parties were opposed to the operation by the army against the terrorists, Tahir-ul-Qadri supported this fully and organised rallies in the support of the forces. Throughout the history of Pakistan; most of the time JI has been closer to the Pakistan army, even sometimes known as its B team, while it appears that MQ and its leadership are trying to replace its role and present themselves for the services which JI has previously offered to the military establishment. If this is the case, then MQ must change significantly to work with military institutions, in return, it can get some opportunities to strengthen the movement and build institutions, but the costs also will be high.

Jamat-e-Islami and Minhaj-ul-Qur'an arrived into AJK at different times, for different objectives and with diverse approaches. Jamat saw *tasawwuf* as a problem, and its attitude was to eradicate it. For Minhaj, although some contemporary *khanqahs* have problems, but the organisation itself, was not conceived as a problem. Jamat used sentiments against *tasawwuf*, or against contemporary Pirs, whereas Minhaj used it as a strategy to bring people into the movement, as Rafique (2011) recalls that Tahir-ul-Qadri used the sweetness of *tasawwuf*. Both movements used the Qur'an and Sunna politically, and *din* as a system of life. Jamat does not want to miss the next train of opportunity, when Capitalism will break, as they missed the opportunity to lead the world after the fall of the Communism (Siddiqi, 2014). Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is also working to replace world order, on one hand, and training its activists to replace Pakistan's bureaucracy, on the other hand (Rafique, 2000).

All three aspects of the social movement theory appeared very significant for the movements, such as, the emergence, mobilisation and framing the message. Islamic movements do need political opportunities, not necessarily for emergence, but, to grow. Resources play an

important role, although movements use alternative strategies in their absence. Strategic framing plays a crucial role from recruitment to mobilisation, either it is based on religious vision, ideology, or socio-political and cultural approaches.

From the study of the three movements, it appeared the closer the framing is to the socio-religious and cultural aspects of the society the more successful and less contentious it will be. For instance, JI has clashed at two broader levels, biraderism and on religious doctrines. For MQ, biraderism appeared problematic, as they have wider religious acceptance, due to the religious nature of the majority population. GS appeared non-contentious, because they tolerate most of the existing cultural and religious norms, or the strategies they use are non-contentious. On the other hand, the GS movement has more permanent institutions in the society, such as mosque networks and *madradas*, which is due to its influence in the society, socio-culturally friendly and acceptive of the shared culture of the state, as seen in case of the Gulen Movement (Cetin, 2010).

## 7.6 Overarching Findings:

In the beginning, it appeared that all the three movements are operating against each other and to overcome each other for religious and socio-political hegemony. The movements use different strategies and approaches to strive for their perceived goals. It can be claimed that, however, the movements are different, their approaches are also different, although, they are operating in the same society. It may be contended, that the movements are not against each other as it appears in the society and state, as all three movements have different aims and objectives. However, it must be noted, as Lahoud (2005) also argues, that it is not easy to define the context of the Islamic movements because they do not set their own typologies.

Jamat-e-Islami is a “State Centric” movement with a top-down model of change, and its focus is to target power centres in the state, and then to identify very educated and potentially useful members to bring into the movement. Minhaj-ul-Qur’an has a different focus, it appeared “Society Centric,” as the aim of the movement is to reach out to the larger society and to recruit a maximum number of members without any discrimination, and to create sympathisers from those who can join the devotional activities. The third movement wants the maximum amount of the population to become or remain part of the Sufi and Prophetic centric activities.

While exploring the *GS tariqa* it was again different from the former two, as the movement can be classified as “Individual Centric.” The foci of this movement are the individuals who need nurturing to become good Muslims. This can be seen considering Homo Cultures approach against Homo Religious proposed by Dhaouadi (2014), which is more socially friendly and accepts many existing aspects of a society and people. The movement wants to work with those individuals who need the type of religio-psychological counselling to come out of the religious and social sins. But this is one aspect, a clear forward and back shift of

religio-psychological and religio-material models which can be seen in many instances, which focuses on ideas, beliefs and values, such as, the Gulen Movement (Cetin, 2010).

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

#### 8.0 Conclusion:

The aim of this study was to explore the three main Islamic movements in AJK and their impact on the society and state. Three key research questions focussed on the movements from their formation to their perceived end goals, which included probing the emergence of the movements, considering the utilisation of the social and public institutions, and the dissemination of their values and messages into the society. The social movement theory frameworks were selected to study the three selected movements and some of their institutions. The study also focussed on the theological and social models of the movements which are applied to support their agendas. Results of the application of the theoretical framework are summarised in the following table.

<b>Jamat Islami / State Focused Movement</b>	
<b>Political Opportunities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Jihad, 1980s Afghan Jihad and later the Kashmir Jihad offered Jamat the opportunity to expand its socio-political networks.</li> <li>➤ Openness and being receptive to political systems facilitated Jamat to participate in the main stream socio-political system.</li> </ul>
<b>Resources Mobilisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Educational Institutional</li> <li>➤ Socio-Welfare institutions</li> <li>➤ Health units</li> <li>➤ Political party</li> <li>➤ Student organisations and other networks of professionals</li> </ul>
<b>Framing Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Islam as a complete socio-political system</li> <li>➤ Delivery of the services for impression building</li> <li>➤ <i>Da'wah</i> / Propagation of true Islam which is different from local or cultural Islam</li> </ul>
<b>Clash/ Hurdles</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Cultural or <i>Biraderism</i></li> <li>➤ Religious or sectarian</li> <li>➤ Organisational structure and out-dated framework</li> </ul>
<b>Minhaj-ul-Quran/ Society Focussed Movement</b>	
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Opportunity for a Sufi socio-political movement</li> </ul>

<b>Opportunities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Post 9/11 war against terrorism and extremism</li> <li>➤ Need for a moderate Islamic movement</li> </ul>
<b>Resources Mobilisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Educational Network</li> <li>➤ Socio-welfare institutions</li> <li>➤ Political party</li> <li>➤ Student organisations and other networks of professionals</li> </ul>
<b>Framing Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Politics based on ethics and constitution</li> <li>➤ Islamic system based on the centrality of the Holy Prophet</li> <li>➤ Counter narrative against terrorism and extremism</li> </ul>
<b>Clashes/Hurdles</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Cultural or <i>biraderism</i></li> <li>➤ Lack of Resources</li> <li>➤ Lack of well trained and influential leadership at the AJK level</li> </ul>
<b>Gulhar Sharif Movement/ Individual Focused Movement</b>	
<b>Political Opportunities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Existing Sufi nature of the AJK state</li> <li>➤ Beginning of broader Islamisation process in Pakistan in the early 1980s</li> </ul>
<b>Resource Mobilisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Mosque and <i>madrassa</i> networks</li> <li>➤ Study circles of the professionals and young people</li> </ul>
<b>Framing Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Personal piety of the individuals</li> <li>➤ Development of the socio-religious ethical values</li> </ul>
<b>Clashes/Hurdles</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Not identified any serious ones</li> </ul>

**Table 8.1 Theoretical Results of the Study**

A review of the literature on the movements revealed that Islamic Social Movements have many layers and dimensions in their origins, both for the formation and further development into different phases. They rarely emerge and create short term policies but invariably formulate long term objectives which evolve and are adapted to changing circumstances and needs. The identity of these movements is marked by different actors - both internal and external. Identity is influenced by a range of factors, for example, what the movements' actors believe about themselves; how other rival movements perceive them; how they are viewed by the general-public, and how they are understood in a global context. These factors affect the movements and the nature of their activities because the movements are conscious of these issues. Regarding, how the Islamic movements and their approaches have changed, these transformations open new avenues, such as, "post- Islamism," which is a departure

from religion and responsibility to religiosity and rights (Bayat 2007: p11), which was observed within traditional Islam and in AJK, regarding Sufi Islam.

The background study on AJK in Chapter Two revealed that Sufism in AJK has shown new interventions highlighting a different, active tasawwuf than experienced 20/30 years ago, as Sufis, or more specifically pirs, have changed their approach to society and people. Either they are enforced by the Islamist movements to emulate their social institutions, or their own realisation has led to this recognition, or the emergence of an educated class and the *pirs* interaction with educated people in the state has started an internal-revival. The social institutions and religious projects started by the *pirs* show a clear departure from those utilised by previous 20<sup>th</sup> century Sufis and pirs in AJK.

Chapter Three detailing the three Islamic movements and a review of the literature, revealed that Islamic movements emerged in special circumstances and in response to different issues. However, over the time the movements changed their targets with the increasing availability of opportunities both internally, based on resources, and externally, with the openness or closeness of political and other prospects. Throughout the study of the three Islamic movements in the AJK, several dimensions were explored, such as historical, social, cultural and contemporary factors related to the movements, their approaches and aims.

The data and fieldwork revealed that Jamat activists accepted that the material services they provide to the people of the state are not sufficient, and they have no comparison with the state institutions. However, these services give Jamat benefits at different levels which were discussed in section (7.1), such as, giving people an impression that if they can deliver this with such quality even when they are not in the power, they can do this so much better when they are in power. Minhaj, also has similar intentions, such as recruiting people through welfare activities, whereby, this material framing gives them benefits, but this can be

affected easily by the state institutions if they can deliver properly. On the other hand, the GS movement utilises mainly religious institutions, such as mosques and madrasas, however, they also use some material resources at some levels, but their presentation is different, such as, civil responsibilities and piety, and not exposing the government and its shortcomings. The movement introduced new dimensions into Kashmiri society by offering material resources in the name of Islam, rather than relying on what was taught by the pirs over the centuries, whereas, the former is a more tangible exchange.

While analysing the activities and approaches of the movements with the frames of the social movement theory, several dimensions emerged. According to the political opportunity structure, movements only emerge with the openness of the political system, but Islamic movements appeared differently. Both internal factors, such as government policies, and external considerations, such as, global affairs, also play a vital role in the expansion or compression of the movements.

Resource mobilization plays an important role in the success, or more specifically, in the expansion of the movement, but it is not the only factor. Similarly, the framing process plays a huge role to disseminate the values of the movements or their vision of Islam, but it needs to be aligned more systematically. The closer the message is to, and the way of delivery in accordance with, local realities, the more the effective it appeared. Sometimes movements neglect the ground realities and only focus on their message and its delivery, which not only creates a type of clash with society but makes it difficult to understand or disseminate.

The movements face different types of hurdles in society. Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is not facing any severe sectarian blame from the majority society, except from other rival movements, levelling accusations that it "represents only Barelvis." All three movements have different cultural problems and ways of addressing them. For the Jamat, as was seen in maintaining

the process, it is facing hurdles at two levels of society, sectarian or religious issues, and then *biraderism*, as a cultural factor. Minhaj has some forms of wider acceptance in society, as it is part of their strategy to collaborate with active *khanqahs*. On the other hand, they are also a victim of the *biraderism*. Both movements curse *biraderism* as a disease, but the Sufi movement adopts a different approach towards *biraderism*. Sufis accept *biraderism*, or more specifically *biraderis*, and their positive role in AJK society, as established norms in society, however, they do have a special strategy to tackle it where things can go wrong.

The movements have different goals and focus in AJK, for example, JI uses a state-centric approach, MQ mainly focuses on society, whereas, the Sufi Tariqa is an individual-centric movement. All three movements have a special movement structure, but Jamat has a much stronger structure and better-trained members than Minhaj-ul-Qur'an. This helps them present the Islamic agenda more effectively.

The Sufi Movement also has organised workers, but they are not visible in broader society, as the other movements are. However, while comparing their activities, and the presence of members for learning and other meetings, the strength shown by the Sufi movement was far higher than the other two. The organisational structure of the JI movement doesn't allow it to recruit members using a "fast track mechanism" like other political parties. For a Jamat activist, it can take up to a few years to reach to a permanent member or *rukhn-e-jamat*. This is strongly felt by some movement activists and needed to be modified, as rather than going for a specific educated class, the movement needs to open its doors to everyone, like the Minhaj and the Sufi movements have done. On the other hand, even if it will solve the quantity issue, quality can still be affected badly, which is a trade mark of the movement.

Jamat acts both as a religious and political party, while local political and religious realities require them to bring large scale changes both into its organisational structure and religious

attitudes towards AJK society. At some levels, the attitude of the movement was wrongly selected for a society like Azad Kashmir, where Mawlana had writings about the benefits of Sufism, but the Jamat totally neglected this religious dimension, and failed to tackle it wisely, or use a drive to wipe out “Wahhabi propaganda”, which they did try once in Lahore to pay homage at a famous Sufi shrine in a rally. Will this be eradicated through education as Jamat believes, so that when people become educated these issues of sectarianism and *biraderism* will fade into the background. This shows their belief in education and changing society through ideational change, whereas they do not differentiate between education and literacy. Or will the arrival of Deobandi and Ahl-e-hadith movements make Jamat a more liberal and Barelvi friendly movement, or help to remove the Wahhabi label from the movement. These are matters which will be unleashed with time.

In short, Sufis want to build the character of individuals, while keeping the maximum number of people in contact, by using modifying strategies. Jamat-e-Islami is focussed on gaining political power using an elitist model, and at least bringing members into the position where they can bargain with the political parties or government institutions. Minhaj-ul-Quran is in the process of making themselves relevant to the society and socio-political institutions, where they can show their presence and relevance to the state. Jamat used the opportunity created in the name of jihad in the 1980s, whereas Minhaj, is using the opportunity created against terrorism as a counter narrative.

## 8.1 Recommendations

This is an exploratory study which is not concerned with any right or wrong approaches of the movements, however, the study can make some recommendations in the light of the data collected from the movements to reflect their actions and required effectiveness. Islamic movements are playing a huge role at different levels for the socio-political and material development of the AJK state. These movements are striving to strengthen the moral attitudes of the people while and filling the lacunas of the government's duties. Organisations of the movements are serving the people and society at a large scale, whereby, the quality and services delivered are articulated and well maintained when compared to those provided by government institutions. However, there is still a lot to be done by all parties, especially from the state and the movements, which will be presented in the following recommendations.

- The government can work with some projects of the movements where they require a little more help to serve the communities and state better, such as offering expertise and resources for the movement's religious institutions. With such assistance, the movements can play a more effective role, where it is well known that Islamic movements spend funds honestly. Even this is well tested itself in AJK when the US Aid gave funds to some banned Islamist movements and came under the limelight from the international media. Furthermore, this can help to share ideas and approaches amongst the movements, which can create an exploratory type of activists in the movements, whereas, staying closed in a shell only helps to develop foreclosed minds.

### **8.1.1 Jamat-e-Islami:**

Jamat-e-Islami has well-developed institutions of different types. The Jamat is well aware of its motives through these networks, and instead of building perceptions and creating recruitment incentives, the movement has potential to extend its reach and involve members with the wider community more effectively.

- Jamat-e-Islami has been successful by marking its presence in the wider society and assert its relevance in the political system. Nonetheless, it has attracted very few committed members. In any democratic system, the parties need to attract a maximum number of people, rather than choosing an elitist approach and making an exclusive circle. It needs to open its arms to the common people. This requires a change in the framework of the movement, where other people with good character, or senior politicians and influential people from the *biraderis*, can start from the front rows.
- Jamat needs to understand the local realities of the *biraderism* and religious differences. AJK observes a special culture and attitudes of the people. Jamat needs to use very local language for explaining an Islamic system and Islamic ideals, terms such as *Iqamat-ul-Deen* and *Islamic Nizam*, don't resonate well in the local culture of AJK. In the local religious culture of AJK, the Movement requires a change in its existing religious attitude towards society, which is either its own or borrowed from Deobandi or Salafi approaches.

### **8.1.2 Minhaj-ul-Qur'an:**

- Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is comparatively a new movement in the state which is just building its institutions. The speed of building these institutions is slow because it has not come across any good opportunity, such as JI had the chance to lead the *jihad-e-Kashmir*. However, it has not shown a specific Kashmir centric approach, as all it's

institutions circle around other areas of Pakistan, including, Islamabad and Lahore. Although the movement lacks resources it has a huge opportunity to establish very good institutions in some of the cities in AJK with the help of its overseas members by adopting Kashmir centric approaches.

- The movement is very active in Pakistani politics which helped to frame its image in society. The framework of the movement facilitates fast-tracking new members. While, at the same time, it needs many influential people from the state in the movement. The activists showed a charismatic link with the leader, although some activists need the training and confidence, rather than a mere emotional attachment to the movement and the Pakistani leadership.

### **8.1.3 Gulhar Sharif Movement:**

- The GS Movement appeared as a popular form of Islam in AJK, but over a period, it was transformed by different circumstances. The movement seemed popular and has a good grip on society, and exerts influence, which is a lesson for similar Sufi movements in the state to learn and involve the society in the building of the state.
- Where the movement has influence and hegemony in the society it has some opportunities. GS has well-established religious institutions, such as mosques and *madrassa* networks. Social legitimacy is itself a resource, which needs to be utilised purposefully, and the movement can expand its networks more systematically. It has potential to establish further networks of modern educational institutions, such as schools and madrasas using modern tools and approaches to develop special personalities.

In the light of the social movement theory, it can be concluded that social movements (conventional) spread their networks and expand when they are offered opportunities

whereas, Islamic movements are different when it comes to their emergence, being based on grievances, or the openness or closed nature of the political system. However, movements do expand or grow when the opportunities are created by the state or political system, but for a religious movement, *Da'wah* is enough of a tool for the emergence to prevail, along with legitimacy for the promotion of their true Islamic beliefs.

## **8.2 Future Research:**

This research is an opening chapter in possible future research in the state of AJK, although, the research has no claim to bring the overwhelming findings of all related aspects discovered during the research journey. However, many elements were identified for future research in the geographical area, regarding different aspects and using several other approaches.

- ❖ As asserted, this research is an opening for further research; each movement of the study requires a separate study. Hence, there are many other Islamic movements (2.4.1) that are using several approaches and strategies to work in AJK which may be explored. Future research can be on the historical, theological and demographics of the AJK Islamic blends, however, it is predicted that Islamic movements will change with the passage of time, and subject to different internal and external factors.
- ❖ This research used a qualitative research methodology. Future research can be compiled using quantitative methods to explore impacts of the NGOs and other Islamic networks. Psychological models of religiosity can be very effective tools to study Islam and related phenomenon in the AJK, including the arrival of Islam from other parts of the world, such as, from the Middle East, India and Pakistan.
- ❖ In the second chapter of the study, different aspects were touched upon, all those aspects require separate studies, such as *biradrisism*, and its role in the AJK, nationalist

movements, and pro-accession movements including their approaches and attitudes towards AJK.

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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS:

Adab.....	Respect
Adhan.....	Call for the Prayer
Ahl-e- Sunnatwa al-Jama'at.....	Barelvi Sunni
AlaiheRahma.....	Blessings upon Him
Alim.....	Islamic Scholar
Amir.....	Leader of the Islamic Movement
Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam.....	A Student Movement (ATI)
Asabiyah.....	Prejudice based on grouping
Awliya.....	Saints
Awrad.....	Plural of Wird
Awrad.....	Daily litany.... plural of <i>Wird</i>
Awwami.....	Mass
Azizam.....	Dear
Bahai.....	Brother
Ba'iya.....	Oath taking
Baradari.....	Extended family
Barakah .....	Benediction/ blessing
Bid'a.....	Innovation
Biraderi.....	Caste
Bismillah .....	In the Name of God
Da'wah h .....	Inviting people to Islam
Dar al-Ulum.....	Madrasa/ Islamic College

Darbar .....	Court-Shrine
Ders-e-nizami.....	The syllabus of Farangi Mahall -18 <sup>th</sup> Century India
Dawat-i-Islami.....	A Bareilvi Tablighi Movement
Derbar.....	Shrine
Din .....	Religion
Du ‘a .....	Pray
Dua .....	Supplication
Dua.....	Supplication
Dunya .....	World
Durud Sharif .....	Salutations on the Prophet
Ehtedal Pasand.....	Moderate/ Who likes Moderation
Falah-e-Amma.....	Public Welfare
Fard .....	Compulsory
Fatawa .....	Legal Rulings by a qualified Islamic scholar
Fikri.....	Thoughts
Fiqh .....	Jurisprudence
Fitna .....	Discord
Fuqaha .....	Islamic Jurists
Gheebah.....	Back biting
Giyarvin Sharif .....	Monthly gathering
Gujjar .....	Farming caste
Gustakh-i-Rasul .....	Insolent towards the Prophet
Hadhrat.....	His Highness
Hadith .....	Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad

Hafiz .....	Someone who has memorised the entire Qur'an by heart
Hajj .....	Pilgrimage
Halaqa.....	Circle
Haram .....	Unlawful
Haram.....	Forbidden
Hasad.....	Jealousy
Hazar o Nazar .....	To be spiritually and physically present
Hifz.....	To memorise
Hikmah.....	Wisdom
Hujra .....	Chamber
Ibadat .....	Religious practices
Ijtihad .....	Independent interpretation
Ijtihad.....	An individual's interpretations of Islamic law
Ikhlas .....	Sincerity
Ilm .....	Knowledge
Inqilab.....	Revolution
Ishq .....	Love
Ishq.....	Adore
Jaat .....	A farming caste
Jahil .....	Ignorant
Jahiliyyah .....	Ignorance
Jalsa .....	Gathering
Janaban.....	His Highness
Janaza.....	Funeral

Jihad .....	Holy War/Struggle
Jum ‘ah .....	Friday
Juma .....	Friday prayer
Jumah khutbah.....	Friday sermon
Kachehri.....	Court
Kafir .....	Disbeliever
Kalima .....	Islamic Creed
Khalifa .....	Vicegerent
Khaliq.....	The Creator
Khanqah .....	Sufi retreats/ Shrine
Khanqah.....	Shrine
Khatam .....	Conclusion: Prayer for the deceased
Khateeb.....	The one who gives Khutba
Khidmat .....	Service
Khutbah.....	Sermon
Kirdaar Sazi.....	Character Building
Kirdaar.....	Character
Kuffar .....	Disbelievers
Kufr .....	Disbelief
Langar .....	Food offered at shrines
Madhab .....	The path/Method
Madina-tu-al-Masajid.....	The City of the Mosques
Madrasa.....	School
Madrasah .....	Religious School
Maktubat .....	Letters

Masajid.....	Mosques
Maseeti Ale.....	Those who belong to the Mosque
Mashriq .....	East
Maslaha .....	Common good
Maslak .....	Creed/Way
Maslak.....	Theological position
Mawlana .....	A religious scholar
Mawlana .....	Our master/ A Title for an Islamic Scholar
Mazars .....	Shrines
Mehfil.....	Gathering
Merkaz.....	Centre (Headquarter)
Merkazi.....	Central
Milad Sharif .....	Birthday of the Prophet
Milad un-Nabi .....	The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad
Minhaj al-Qur'an .....	Way of the Qur'an/ an Islamic Movement
Mohtadil.....	Moderate
Mohtram.....	Respected
Molvi.....	Islamic Scholar
Mu ‘amat.....	Social transactions
Mufti .....	A qualified scholar who issues legal opinions
Muhabbat.....	Love
Muharram .....	First Islamic month
Mujaddid .....	Renewer
Mujaddid-i Alf-Thani .....	Renewer of the second Millennium
Mullah .....	Cleric

Mu'min .....	Believer
Mureed.....	Follower
Murid .....	Disciple
Murshid .....	Guide
Mushrik .....	A person attributing a partner to Allah
Mustafavi Revolution.....	Revolution of the Prophet Muhammad
Muttaqi.....	Fearful of Allah
Nabbaz.....	Expert to Check Pulse
Nafs .....	Ego
Namaz .....	Prayer
Namazi .....	Who offers prayers
Na't .....	Poetry sung in praise of the Prophet
Na'tkhwan .....	Reciters of poetry in honour of the Prophet
Neindra.....	Small amount paid at marriage meal
Nikah .....	Marriage contract
Niyaz .....	Offering
Nizam-e-Mustafa.....	System of the prophet
Nur .....	Light
Pardah .....	Veil
Pirs .....	Sufi masters
Qaed.....	Leader
Qa'id-e-Inqilab .....	Leader of the Revolution
Qari.....	Someone recites Qur'anic verses or poems
Qasidat-al Burda .....	Poem of the Cloak

Qawwali (.....)	Devotional music
Qibla.....	Highness
Qittal.....	War/ Killing
Qurbani.....	Sacrifice of animals
Rabi al-Awwal .....	Third Islamic month
Rahma .....	Mercy
Rahmah .....	Blessing
Rajput .....	Land owning caste
Rak `ahs .....	Units of Prayer
Roza .....	Fast
Ruh .....	Soul
Sadaqa.....	Charity
Sahabah .....	The friends/companions of the Prophet Muhammad
Sahib.....	His Excellency
Sahiba.....	Her Excellency
Sajjadahnashin .....	Successor
Salat .....	Prayer/worshipping
Salat o salam .....	Greetings and Prayers
Sangee.....	A companion, friend
Sawab.....	Credit
Sharabi.....	Alcoholic
Shari'ah.....	Islamic law
Sharif .....	.Respectable
Sharif/ Shareef.....	Noble

Sheikh .....	Sufi leader
Sheikh al-Islam.....	The grand religious leader
Shifa .....	Cure
Shirk .....	Polytheism
Shirk .....	Associating Allah with someone or something
Shirni.....	Offerings
Shoyeb.....	An Ancient Prophet (Jetro in Bible)
Shu' ra .....	Consultation
Silsilah.....	Chain of authorities
Sira.....	Model of the Prophet
Sirah.....	The biography of the Prophet Muhammad(s)
Suluk .....	Path
Sunnah .....	Practice of the Prophet
Sunnah.....	The acts, sayings, and approvals of the Prophet Muhammad
Sunni .....	The main branch of Islam
Tabarruk .....	Blessed offerings
Tabligh .....	Calling people to Islam
Tafseer .....	Qur'anic exegesis
Tajdid .....	Renewal
Takfir .....	To blame someone for being infidel
Tanzeem.....	Organisation
Taqwa .....	Piety
Taqwa.....	Fear of Allah
Tarbiyah.....	Training
Tariqah .....	Sufi Path

Tasawwuf .....	Sufism
Tasawwuf.....	Sufi way of life
Tasbeeh.....	Beads
Tawaba.....	Repentance
Tawassul .....	Intercession
Tehreek.....	Movement
Thana.....	Police Station
Ulama .....	Scholars
Ummah.....	Universal Muslim community
Urf.....	Custom
Urs .....	Death anniversary of a Saint
Usul .....	Methodology
Wahdat al- Wujud .....	Unity of Being
Wahdat al-Shuhud .....	Unity of Witnessing
Wasatiyya .....	Moderation.
Wasila .....	Means
Wird .....	Daily litany
Zakah .....	Alms-giving, one of the five pillars of Islam
Zat .....	Caste mainly used for sub-caste

## Appendix I Consent Form

Principal Investigator	
Mr Muhammad Ishaq PhD Research Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gloucestershire Oxstalls Campus, Oxstalls Lane, Gloucester, GL2 9HW Ph. +44 (0) 1242 715200	Joint With Markfield Institute of Higher Education Ratby Lane Markfield Leicester LE67 9SY Ph. +44 (0) 1530244922

### **Title of Study: Socio-Political impacts of the contemporary religious movements in AJK Pakistan and their role in building an Islamic society:**

Dear Participant,

I am a social science researcher at the University of Gloucestershire. I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. The study is voluntary and you will only be included if you provide your permission. The purpose of this study is to explore the frame works of the Islamic activism in the social sciences field.

I would like to invite you to take part in the semi-structured interview. The purpose of the discussion is to know your experience and feelings you are going through while working for the Islamic and welfare causes.

I will keep all the data private and secret. I will keep data in a locked office and only the researcher will have access to the data. I will keep data for five years after the study has finished. After five years, I will destroy the data. Once I have finished the study I will present the results in the PhD thesis, in my research work no participant will be identifiable by name. There are no known risks associated with taking part in this study.

The University of Gloucestershire faculty research ethics panel has approved this study. Please contact Dr Malcolm MacLean, chair of the research ethics subcommittee for the Faculty of Applied Sciences at the University of Gloucestershire, if you have any concerns. (Tel: 01242 715200, Email: [mmaclean@glos.ac.uk](mailto:mmaclean@glos.ac.uk)). Dr MacLean has no direct involvement in the study.

**If you would like to participate in this study, please read and sign the informed consent form.**

Many thanks

Muhammad Ishaq PhD Researcher.

### Informed Consent Form

**Title of Project:**  
Socio-Political impacts of the contemporary religious movements in AJK Pakistan and their role in building an Islamic society:

**Principal Investigator:**

Mr Muhammad Ishaq PhD Researcher	Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gloucestershire Oxstalls Campus, Oxstalls Lane, Gloucester, GL2 9HW	Joint With Markfield Institute of Higher Education Retby Lane Markfield Leicester LE67 9SY. Ph. +44 (0) 1530244922
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Do you understand that we have asked you to participate in a research study?	Yes	No
Have you read and received a copy of the attached information letter?	Yes	No
Do you understand the benefits and risks involved in taking part in this research study?	Yes	No
Do you understand that you are free to contact the research team to take the opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?	Yes	No
Do you understand that you are free to refuse participation, or to withdraw from the study at any time, without consequence, and that your information will be withdrawn at your request?	Yes	No
Do you understand that we will keep your data confidential? Do you understand who will have access to your information?	Yes	No

**I wish to take part in this study:**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Preferred Contact number: \_\_\_\_\_

Email: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX II

### **Jamat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir**

Interviewee Name ASHRAF

Theme: Recruitment:

**Will you describe your educational, occupational and family background?**

**Answer:**

My name is Ashraf, in education; I have done masters in 6 subjects. In Islamic studies; my M.Phil leading to PhD is in progress, also doing M.Phil in education.

If I talk about education and social fields then, I have worked 7 years in READ Foundation which is a largest Educational organisation in Pakistan. I have performed different responsibilities, such as the head of research and development officer, as education and training officer and as a head of the college.

I am also a Homeo doctor, have practised it, however, my main field of interest is social work.

**How did you get introduced to the movement?**

I was inspired by the movement in 1998, some activists of the movement gave me some literature of the movement, at that time I was a member of a nationalist student movement JKLF, I had many concerns about Jamat-e- Islami, I shared them all, most of them were the religious, and they cleared many concerns.

When I started reading the literature I had the same emotions as many youngsters, the first book of Sayyid Mawdudi I read was *Deeniyat* which appealed me a lot. Especially his quote; “I ask for a broken heart which can take broken boat of a broken heart into the sea”.

It appealed me a lot, that I should read this man; I started studying him though I was nationalist, however, I was inspired by the Jamat. Regarding independent Kashmir and intercession to Pakistan, I remained in a clash with Jamat for 7 years.

### **Were you in the Jamat at that time?**

No, I have been studying Jamat for 6 years but did not join the Jamat. Till 2004 I was in the hardest critics of the Jamat. Meanwhile, I got an edge of reading the literature of the movement critically so see their shortcomings and problems.

Meanwhile, I was doing M.A in Islamic Studies, I studied Mawlana’s books, “Islamic state”, “*khilafat wa malookiyat*” and “*tankeehat*”. These things appealed me, it is fact that this thought is an Islamic thought, and then from leaving the small circle to adopt the Islamic culture and after reading *Tanqeehat*, I came to the point to join the concept of *ummah*.

You (one) should make efforts for this (*Ummah*), should get out of these small circles of Kashmir and Pakistan.

So it started in 1998 to take the effects unconsciously till 2004 when I became a regular member of the movement.

### **What you have to do to become a member?**

Friends or the people of the Jamat do everything to make you join. In this matter sometimes a couple or few people remain in contact with a person for 10 years even, and they don’t tell you, in the same way, they kept me in the contact. When I was fully impressed then in a

function some people said to me to take membership then I said to give me some time, but they put some questions in front of me and asked if I agree with these points of *Dawat*, I said yes I agree, then from there I became member of the Jamat on 24th Oct 2004.

**If I can ask What was in your mind about the movement when you decided to join only this movement?**

If we see politically; it is the only political party which has a proper political process. Where from the Amir of the constituency to the central Amir there is a process of change. This is the only party of which its founder left the leadership in his life and someone else was appointed the leader.

This is the only party where a common member of the party can ask or audit the Amir of the Jamat, and he has to answer. Every member of the Jamat will vote for the election of the Amir either he has any rank or not. And in here; no one can present himself for the leadership of the movement. There is no election campaign whoever members like the majority will elect as Amir others will accept it.

This is a special thing because you are doing research in this area, Jamat-e- Islami is the only movement in Pakistan which has no groups, this is not broken like Peoples Party and Muslim League, one family occupied and then it carried on dividing.

But it doesn't happen in the Jamat if anyone had an issue he raises at a proper forum, and then the person was removed with the vote of no confidence. There is no family monopoly like Mawlana Mawdudi established the Jamat but his son did not become Amir of the Jamat.

He arrived from India, and then Mian Tufail was from Lahore Punjab, he became Amir of the Jamat, Qadhi Hussain was from KPK, then SayyedMunawar, he was from Delhi, like Siraj-ul-Haq became the Amir, so there is a process of the change.

On the religious side, as I have studied the Qur'an, Islam and Muslims are called the best *ummah* because of the work of Da'wah and to establish the Deen of Allah. In the nutshell the Qur'an which I have understood is that; the human is the (*Khalifah*) vicegerent of Allah and Messenger, so to play this role your base should be Qur'an and *Sunnah*.

And the third thing that inspired me was that; Jamat is an Islamic movement, not a religious group. There is a very thin difference between a religious movement and a religious group, Islamic movement gives the concept of *ummah* and collectiveness, it has all sects and schools of thought. For instance, in Jamat, we have Hanafi, Ahl-e-hadeeth and Shia Muslims too, also Barelvi and Deobandi. The only compulsion is that they should belong to an authentic Muslim sect, they can practice accordingly but cannot criticise others.

A religious group or sect revolve in a special circle, a question arises if I have a love for the *Deen* why I didn't join any other movement? But others are not movements they are religious sects or groups. For instance, if we talk about Jami'atulma-e-Islam; they are of Deobandi school of thought. Jami'atulema-e-Pakistan is of Barelvi School of thought. Same is about Ahl-e-hadeeth as it appears from their name and *FiqhJ'afria*.

But you don't see a movement, like Tahir-ul-Qadri making efforts they also present a school of thought. This situation doesn't exist in Jamat, it is moving as a movement with the concept of *ummah* and like as of a movement.

**What are those things which government or other political parties could not do for you and the movement did?**

When I joined the movement, at that time Kashmir Jihad was at its peak that attracted me a lot, secondly the social affairs of the people; such as police station and courts. In this regard I could not see other political leaders, however, we can see Jamat people there, (helping people

at the police stations and courts) though in these days because of competition we can see them before they used to come at the elections times.

But Jamat leadership either the constituency level or district level they live amongst the people that's how people are attracted towards them.

**What you say; Does Jamat understand your affairs better or was it a protection?**

Yes, you can say this protection and they give the due respect to their members.

**Theme 2 Ideology and vision of the Movement**

**What is the concept of the ideology for you?**

Jamat is not offering any alternative ideology, Jamat says our ideology is Qur'an and *sunnah*, there is no other ideology. Like other parties some are inspired by secularism, some are by Marxism, this is not in Jamat.

In the article 2 of the Jamat's ideology, it is mentioned that there is no God but Allah, Muhammad is His Messenger, is our basic belief. Meaning ideology and belief is same for us. The second ideology is; which is the aim of the human life that is the establishment of the deen of Allah. The Holy Prophet saw and his companions and later ones all spent lives for this purpose.

Its process is; one starts from his own, then he goes on the social level and then to the government if you are not doing this even if you are doing personal worship you are still neglecting a huge duty.

Establishment of the *deen* is as *fardh* as offering the compulsory prayer, we consider it a part of the belief. Mawlana Mawdudi the founder and his 75 companions, none of them gave any of his own ideology. This is the same ideology which is ongoing from the beginning of the Islam. If you have studied Muslim scholars you must have seen Mawlana Mawdudi's name comes on the top of the list, in India, after Shah Wali Allah and Iqbal he is the third name, in our *ulama*, there are many *muffassareen* but their names don't come like this. They don't come under political thinkers because they didn't do any achievements, they didn't discuss the political aspect of Islam. So Jamat's ideology is part of our belief.

**Ok, do you have any base from the Qur'an and *Sunnah* about the establishment of the *Deen*?**

When you recited the *kalima* like you have made a commitment that from yourself to as far as possible you will implement the *din*.

Prophet's whole life was dedicated to the establishment of the *din*. This is an important point to note; *Jannat* was created for the holy Prophet (saw), Aisha was appointed the leader of the women in the *Jannah*, His grandsons were appointed the leaders of the *Jannat*. His *Sahaba* were titled as AshraMubbasharat, (10 those who were given the good news of *Jannah*) then what was the need to get stoned in the field of the Arafat, yes there was competition with the people.

If we see the history the biggest issue the people of the Makkah had with the Holy Prophet was the political one, though there was a religious too. Abu Jahal was the member of the pre-Islam assembly of Makkah, he was a capable person he conceived Him as a threat to himself.

Same was the reason by the Abdullah bin Oba'i, when He went to Madina his throne was ready to announce himself as a king.

When the Prophet's final time came, His nurtured men first do the political decisions, who will be their political leader then buried Him.

We believe that the establishment of the deen of Allah is the purpose and all the messengers came for that. And those 15000 people were martyred were because of this purpose.

You can see as Shoyeb (AS); He said to the people that you don't use scale honestly, mean don't do business properly, He interfered in the social system of the people, people asked Him to sit in the mosque, and same is the meaning of the Qur'anic verse. Same like other messengers all were telling about the establishment of the deen, we believe that establishment of the deen is the purpose of the human life.

**Theme 3: Resource Mobilisation.**

**If we talk about personal gain, what do you want to achieve for yourself while in the movement?**

If we talk about the worldly things then self-development attracted me a lot, it is a disciplined life. I gained some skills such as self-confidence, communication skills, leadership and organisational skills. Though when I joined the movement I didn't think about these, this was a forum which gave me chance to work where there is not any other such place.

**How will you feel if it is accomplished?**

I have planned for 2020, both for myself and Jamat, I will win or gain an assembly seat for the Jamat, at this level I am performing my efforts at limited level but when I reach the high level I will be doing things at that level.

**Well, the seat from anywhere of AJK or from your own constituency?**

No, will win from anywhere in my District, my second field is social work, which I have started, which will be linked to the politics, that is education, health, basic needs and emergency relief work. I am starting this work through an NGO with some other friends, this work will be like Justice & Development Party in Turkey which gave a model, first, we will do work and then will reach the people that we have done this.

**The NGO you are establishing will be of Jamat or an independent?**

That is my own but its objectives such as education department in that we will develop the concept of *ummah*, and Islam as a code of life, which are Jamat's two basic concepts, we will be developing and promoting those two. Same way, want to promote Islamic culture and civilization, will strengthen the love for the homeland. We have set its 4 core objectives.

Through health facilities we will be helping the people and serving them at the same time will be doing work of *da'wah*.

For instance, my efforts will be individualistic but its ultimate benefit will go to the Jamat because my identity is because of the Jamat.

**What do you think how the society should be?**

In our society we need two types of developments, one is of material resources and facilities, grooming of the people, like food, cloth and house are the bodily needs.

Same is needed for the soul; those can come through spiritual nourishment, so our society needs the both, our society is on two extremes.

Yesterday I was in a programme. A Dr said very beautifully, that sometimes we become a victim of low self-esteem, when don't get something then we say that we didn't get this because of Islam. Islam doesn't stop you from legitimate earnings and business; it doesn't stop you from enjoying good status.

But with all this when you are going in a field do some work there for the spiritual life too, like our body that needs cleanliness.

### **What do you mean by grooming?**

Grooming (appearance) is mainly linked with our external needs, some people might mean it internal change but in my view I mean doesn't matter how he is internally, but how he wears the clothes, the face is washed, hair is combed, how his organisational level is. Like if one person is groomed then persons and then the whole society will groom. For example, you are from Britain; there from a child to an old man, everyone is loyal to the country. But we have a problem if we see a public property; I give an example if we see a window of a public school, if one glass is broken we will break the other one on the way.

Our national attitude has not developed yet, there are some internal and some external aspects which are necessary for the spiritual cleansing. In British society the scenario is different, people don't discuss others much. But in our society, there is leg pulling so both types of development are needed.

### **What do you think what role Islam should have in the society?**

In my view, we need to adopt Islam as a code of life which was the base of my inspiration from the Jamat. Islam is not the combination of the worships, politics, finance, education,

social life and family system all should be under the Islam, all should be under the control of it.

Samuel and Dickinson had mentioned about the Islamic civilization, that Islam is not only an ideology, it has been practised in the world for 1000 years, and they are still conceiving it as a threat. But Communism was only an ideology which did not survive for 100 years even, but Islam has been like a system, it is not that I am a Muslim and I am biased. Its reason is that history tells us this so the scholars and non-Muslims also admit it.

Arab Society before the Islam and the society after the Islam like it have a financial system I mean communism which made the poor as a victim. And this capitalist system which lifted the selected people it created another lower class.

But Islam offered equal opportunities for all poor and rich, like, Abdul Rahman bin Awf, who had 70000 dinars and Ali who was not able to have a servant, but it was not a class system. It was stated responsibility to fulfil people's basic necessities.

I think this was more successful as a social system than religion which can benefit the people.

**You mentioned the importance of Education for the social change and system, can you explain it?**

Brother! As you know, Information and knowledge are two different things; knowledge is to know yourself and Allah. Otherwise, these are mere information.

**Yes, you are right, how is Jamat doing in this field?**

Jamat is doing in this field in different ways, its people and some of Jamat's trusts (charities) are working, like Alghazali Educational Trust in Pakistan which has 100000 students,

including needy and orphans. Same way Jamat's inspired people have Dar al-Arqam schools they have 100000 students (both in Pak and AJK).

Also is Read Foundation in AK which was set with the decision of the central shura, we are bringing change through education in the evolutionary process. Same is Hira and Iqra school system these are 5/6 systems. Two of them are run by the Jamat and others are by Jamati people, this is to bring about a change.

**How do you motivate people to join your institutions, so they leave other private or governmental institutions and join you?**

Instead of motivation, we give the quality, when our institutions were small we offered a good environment and gave special attention to the students. One teacher for one class, in the government system there were 2 teachers for 10 or 7 classes. We are giving good results in the boards so people are attracted to us.

We compete with city and beacon house, our syllabus will be like them but will teach Qur'an and Islamic values too so people will come to us.

**Right, what you think that how your qualified people can change the society?**

These people will go on different posts and the society is made of different people, if he is in the administration he will be a D.C, A.C, (Depty and Assistan comossioners) a land revenue officer or S.H.O (A police officer incharge of the Police Station). We are teaching these people values and giving them Da'wah h of good. When these people will go into the field the system will be fixed, that will be a change.

Like our mayor of Karachi, he performed and the world saw same like Mian Aslam in Islamabad. Those people are in Muslim League went from the Jami'at they have the credibility.

Like it a collective thought and culture, when D.C will treat people equally and an S.H.O will not consider himself a king and will give relief to the people, we are preparing the people on these thinking. We have many examples of that, READ Foundation prepared a student, later he got a seat, we didn't have a medical university, but READ arranged further sponsorship for him. When he became a doctor, now he is in a big hospital, he pays 20% of his income to the READ. He was one but from his 20% may be 50 students are benefiting.

If you prepare people like this then this is a change that we can see in the society.

#### **Theme 4    Maintaining the Process**

##### **If we talk about today's AJK what you think should be and that should not be?**

I think we need to fix our educational system because to change any system education is a basic factor, we need to have our think tanks those can set our national objectives until our national objectives are not set we cannot do anything.

And things those should not be; one of them is our political system based on *biraderism*, we should get out of it, it should be based on the ideology, like in Punjab there is feudalism but here we have biraderism, we should promote politics based on the ideology.

##### **How much change you want in the society?**

We think it is a Muslim society, we don't consider it as a non-Muslim society, there is a good amongst the people, people are much closer to the Islam, and little work is required to include them into the collective system. I mean not through a *KhooniInqilab* (bloody revolution) but to present the message of Islam in front of them and attract them towards Islam.

**Which type of the problems do you face while you carry out movement's responsibilities?**

Lack of resources is one of the problems, you are working in the movement as a volunteer but you have to think about your job, and time for the movement. If you give more time to your job then the objectives of the movement are affected, and if you give much time to the job then your job will be affected.

**How do you *biraderism* in Azad Kashmir?**

*Biraderism* is the biggest hurdle in way of our movement, and another one is sectarianism. Our society is divided into different classes these both are harmful to our movement.

**Do you think is there anything that Jamat is not doing but you want to do or change?**

I think we need to change our existing model of the movement because our existing model has completed its natural age, this experience of change was done by Ikhwan they succeeded, Nahda party in Tunis did they succeeded same was about the Hizb-ur-Rifa's forward block in Turkey.

For instance, it is a condition to be pious and fearful to become a member, but on the basis of piety you can enter into the Jannah but not into the Assembly.

For this we need to use some different techniques, it is like, it doesn't matter how pious is someone when he falls ill he will go to the doctor.

For the present situation, we need to understand the challenges and need to take the things. In all other fields our work is good, like social area *Al-Khidmat*, in student our ideological work is good, but as a political party, we could not succeed yet.

One reason is that the culture of the movement is not of a political party, the person you want to declare as your candidate you should tell him 5 years before the elections. Our problem is if someone has abilities he is not allowed to present himself that he wants to go into this field, if he tries himself he will be disqualified, so I think our existing model should be reshaped.

**You mean for the politics you have to prepare politicians separately?**

I mean you will choose from your own people because politics is a choice, someone can be very good or pious but not a politician. Basics of the movement will be the same, to become member of the Jamat piety will be necessary, but need to think, is that person capable of contesting the elections, or even does he himself wants to contest the election.

One example is that of Dr Waseem from Punjab, where from Muslim League has done clean sweep, he contests the election and wins, another example is of Siraj-ul-Haq, the reason is that they have the political *mizaj*(quality) that's why they win, otherwise there are people of big calibre but they could not win because their *mizaj* is not political.

## APPENDIX III

### Minhaj-ul-Qur'an Interview:

Zubair                      A Central Level Leader in AJK / Politician/Organiser

### Recruitment

**Would you like to describe your background like, education, job and family?**

I have a religious background and linked with a Sufi *tariqa*, I joined ATI from my college time, I think it was 1979 I reached on senior leadership level of ATI. Dr Sahib (Tahir-ul-Qadri) started to come to the programmes of ATI to give lectures. He was also giving lectures on the PTV, what happened was that;

Dr Israr was giving lectures against women's (*Jiddat*) moderation with extreme views but Dr. Sahib dealt with *Hikmat* (wisdom), so Dr Israr was replaced by Dr. Sahib on the PTV. That programme became very famous, everyone wanted to watch that.

Dr Sahib established a movement "Karwan-e-Islam" which I joined that, later they established a centre in model town Lahore and started sending *qaflas* (delegates) to different cities using links to deliver messages through links. Because I was in link with him, in our district we gathered some people to deliver the message. Then audio cassettes were delivered and made arrangements to spread the message.

However, ATI was a link to join Minhaj-ul-Qur'an which I joined from the very beginning, after listening to him at many programmes.

## **Do you remember anything when you joined the movement?**

The main motive for the established was a reunion or *Ittihad-e-ummah* and reassertion of the supremacy of global Islam. This was written on the papers which I signed to join the movement. Dr. Sahib had a very special way of teaching about the teachings of the Holy Prophet and all purpose of the Din.

Dr Sahib taught us this very scientifically that “the Prophet (saw) brought about a revolution, which he referenced from the verses of the Qur’an, one of them was that (verse) *the Prophet was sent to assert the supremacy of Islam on all other religions*”. This was the target of the holy prophet when he gave da‘wa, he nurtured people then in the response a welfare state was set at the time of Umar that was continuity of the same message, but there are many other details.

You must have read that; 13 years Meccan work could not give that results, He (saw) challenged the two thrones of the world Qaiser and Kisra, If we can reflect that; if the *Din* was only about *Namaz* (Prayer) and *Roza* (fasting) then there would have been no fight at all, could have an agreement between *kuffar* and Muslims to perform hajj and other ibadat, but they knew this religion will not remain into the mosque but will establish a state. They were defeated and an Islamic state was established,

Ideology and Vision:

### **Q. What was special about this movement to join?**

ATI was established in the reaction of JTI for the love of the Holy Prophet. JTI was making people Ahl-e-Hadith or Deobandi. It (ATI) was based on sect with no clear target to achieve. They had no political party at upper level so either they will end into Muslim Hands or to Al-

Mustafa welfare networks. ATI didn't want to be the kid of any political party. JUP was established later than ATI.

I joined Minhaj-ul-Qur'an because it was bigger and wanted to re-establish Islamic supremacy of 1100 years of the Muslims over the world.

My aim was to revive global Islamic supremacy through the reunion of *ummah*. There are 57 Muslim countries worthy enough to rule the world not the US. They (Muslims) have the resources and Muslim scientists were the one who initiated scientific experiments later others have developed the technology on that basis. We lost our legacy. Dr Shib had clear goals and strategy to achieve something for the Muslim *ummah*.

**But there are many other Jmatas working on the same lines?**

Organisation, party and movement are different things. An organisation can be inside the movement but party and movement are totally different. A party wants to win an election and loot the resources.

Movement members may not have any worldly achievements, for example, I have a significant role in the movement I went to *Inqilab* (Revolution) March and didn't try to lead or show off but stayed there very quietly under a tree for 60 days. I didn't try to take selfies later with some friends from England met with Quaid-e-Mohtram.

If today, we get the power I believe none of us will ask to accommodate in the system or ask for a position in the government. Media people were asking questions to the lay men and they were getting ideological answers then they sat in the talk shows and discussed the ideology. If we have a revolution in Pakistan its effects will be on the whole Muslim world.

We have two slogans, one is *Mustafavi Inqilab* and other is a reassertion of global Islamic supremacy. (*Aalmgeer bahaliy-e-ghalba-e-Islam*). Our centre is in Pakistan and we want a

revolution in Pakistan like Bhutto. He united all Islamic countries in Lahore later he was killed like Shah Feisal. He was with Russian block but we don't want to be with any block but with (Gumbad-e-Khizra) the green dome.

## **Resource Mobilization:**

### **So if we may explore this further; How do you define the Revolution?**

All the other revolutions in the world were bloody. The only revolution of the Holy Prophet was without bloodshed and it is our ideal revolution we will follow that. We will discourage violence even we have been the victim of violence. We want to set up a national government that will do reforms and then conduct the election, we are preparing people mentally and ideologically for this cause.

In 1989, we established our political party. If today, you listen to Dr Sahib's speeches, he criticised the present political and electoral system. He further said this system can not bring good to the people. There is no qualification for the members of the provincial or national assembly.

Constitution says a person cannot become a member of assembly if he commits (*Gunah-e-Kbeera*) great sins but we have no effective election commission for scrutiny. Dr sahib said we participated in two elections and could not win but on the other hand, those who one who spent millions won the election.

After US arrival in Afghanistan Dr Sahib said we will not win now, only those under the Americans will win. He moved to Canada and wrote to remove the tag of terrorism from the Islam. Fatwa was translated into different languages Dr Sahib gave briefings to American

generals and think tanks. We worked at the local level to spread the message at union council level using different tools.

We used few tools. One was to deliver Dr Sahib's speeches on the big screens. The second was to have monthly Qur'an lessons, workshops, a programme "let's learn the Deen" for schools and colleges. We try to correct basic leanings of Islam that gave our introduction to the people this was done by the Minhaj-ul-Qur'an.

Next, we established our school network and a chartered university which is affiliated to many universities in the world. We have a welfare system which includes collective marriages, relief at calamity, Qurbani project, ambulance, medical centre, eye camps and different other projects. Our networks are available in 100 countries. This all is part of *Mustafavi Inqilab*, which will happen, *insha'Allah*.

We organised a programme at Minar-e- Pakistan there Dr Sahib presented his agenda and highlighted the ills of the system and the country is facing, he was positive about the support of chief justice and army for our this good agenda but it turned to be a (*Khushfehmi*) false hope.

Then, we went to Islamabad for a sit in. We had an agreement with (PP) Peoples Party government on some issues. One; the election commission will be empowered, sections 62 and 63 of the Constitution will be practised and the election commission will be impartial It did not happen otherwise 80% of sitting members would not have been elected and we gave one more year to the government.

## **Minhaj-ul-Qur'an is a religious movement; which role Islam should have in the society?**

We don't have proper knowledge of Islam. Our education system is not suitable for the needs of the Muslims of a country. After school, we should have knowledge of basic Fiqh. We all must have knowledge of *Din*, 300 years ago the knowledge was multi dimensional. There was no concept of selected professional knowledge in Islam like in Al-Azhar, everyone used to learn everything.

Separating role of *din* and *dunya* is a jahiliya in the Islam, Prophet set an example from a family member to state man to show that nothing is out of *din* it is a whole. We limit it to prayer and fasting, *din* is also comprised of like economics and finance and foreign policy etc. *Din* should be everywhere in the office like doing your job and not taking a bribe.

## **Maintaining the Process:**

### **What vision you have for Azad Kashmir?**

Azad Kashmir can be run by a president and two advisors and BD (Basic Democracy) system if we do required reforms everything can be done, easily.

### **If I can ask; what are the issues you are facing today?**

People have made their mind that system will not change and the rule is only right of the elite class and their families, they understand what is wrong but have no belief in change. Now, media gave us chance to take Dr Sahib's message to the people, we have hope for a positive response. Actually; people have mentally defeated that nothing can change. You have seen lines on the CNG stations for the gas our (*sathi*) members went there and asked the people to join us that is the way they will get their rights and they refused because they have to work on the daily basis to provide food to their families.

**Ok, can we precisely focus on Azad Kashmir issues?**

Everything will happen in Azad Kashmir which will happen in Pakistan. Our PMs are dummies, three times people were made fool. Once by Bhutto then by *Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa*, that movement had no agenda only slogans. Zia used Islamic sentiment he started system of Salat and Zakat but it was a fraud and against the essence of Islam. He appointed illiterate mullas in the Islamic ideology Council this *Adha teeter and adha bateir* ( a hybrid bird) system destroyed our system.

Third time by the Imran Khan, he activated well off people but had no real agenda or plan of change, he could have worked in the KPK for change. Personally, he is a good person but has no team and agenda; we collaborated with him to get a broad aim. To solve the problems of the people like in the Western countries.

We have a practical agenda, not a slogan. If we get power we will sort everything out in the first three months. Once Dr Sahib met Nawaz Shareef when he was CM and asked him to appoint three officers in the Punjab who are honest and capable.

Few honest people are at top level then they can change the system.

**Can't you set an example in AJK which is small in scale and easy to bring about change at a small level and then can set an example?**

There is a problem in AJK you can do something only when you have a favourable government in Pakistan. All policies come from their ministry of Kashmir affairs which is federal based and AJK Council is there. All taxes go to Islamabad; its head is PM of Pakistan.

### **But on the other hand, you also want to change minds of the people?**

No, the philosophy we follow is not individual nurturing like Tableeghi Jamat which has no results. Those who are working for about 100 years now, or Dawat-e-Islami in Sunni Islam, they believe that change a person and society will change, it is against the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. His Sunnah is to make a team and purposefully target the people no matter how long it takes. Like a team of the Holy Prophet who did not ask any question when problems arose. They worked and established a state in Madina where there were Jews but they gave a system which captured the world. You need power with the good people but the current political system will not let it happen.

However, about AJK we have a written agreement with Minhaj-ul-Qur'a Pakistan that when the revolution will occur there, we will not spare Kashmiri government and its looting as we will bring change here too. Same is about Kashmir policy according to the UNs resolutions that are a realistic solution to Kashmir.

### **How about bringing change through winning elections in AJK?**

The election process is too expensive, for example, a local politician who has 30 million can contest the election; we can only contest when election reforms are done.

### **How do you view *Biraderism* in AJK?**

We teach people with the example of the Prophet (s) that when people from Madina invited him and help Him to succeed but before people told Him that they have a concern when He becomes successful He (remembers) turns to Hi tribe in Makkah. He said; you will be my tribe. We tell people these are for identity real things are other.

There are problems of *biraderism*, but we are trying to change it. Our members are getting married out of caste, for instance from our village a *tehriki* brother got married to another female member from Punjab.

**But in Punjab there is not a big issue about this, it is very much local?**

Yes, but still it will make difference insha'Allah if we bring change in Pakistan and we are hopeful, it will change. Derbarsharifis playing a role to break this and arranging out of caste marriage in the local area, people will get used to it.

**Do you want any change in the movement structure?**

No, I don't think we need any change and neither I can change it without the command of the central executive, however, the strategy can be changed when it is needed, but goals are set that is our *mazil*. I think we should not go into the elections yet, but top level made a decision I don't know what is in their minds.

## APPENDIX IV

### **Pir Sahib of Gulhar Sharif or Gulhar Sharif Movement (GS)**

**Interviewee..... Jameel.**

#### **Recruitment:**

**Will you tell about yourself such as family background education and profession?**

Alhamdulillah, I come from a well-educated family, myself I am a lawyer by profession, but this is a part of the material life. But Allah has given me *Sharf* (blessed opportunity) to be introduced with the Khanqahi Tariqa. There is not much to describe.

**How did you join the *tariqa* or if I call it a movement?**

Well, from my childhood, because my grandfather and father had a relationship with Hadhrat Sahib I used to go to the mosque and see and meet. This is a spiritual path and everyone has a share so, we happen to be where we have a share its relationship is with Sufism and spiritualism. Spiritualism and Sufism they work in a different way, their example is like a tree in the desert where a seed is thrown by nature in severely unfavourable circumstances it bursts and becomes a tree then it has environmental impacts in the desert where there is no trees or greenery people come and sit under its shade.

No one can study a Sufi movement and its impacts in short time such as 10 to 30 years it takes many decades, for example, look at Indonesia or Malaysia no Muslim military commanders went there. It is true for India too people did not embrace Islam through military

commanders but they embraced Islam and divine teachings of Islam in masses by the teachings and character of the Sufi.

You will be amazed to see that Delhi and Agra have always been political centres of Muslims but in these both cities even today, population wise Muslims are less in numbers than Hindus but in a far area where a Sufi dervish was, there the Muslim population is comparatively large in number. In Ajmer or U.P. may be a Sufi is sitting in a desert or in a corner, people came from far areas to embrace Islam and returned to their areas. Well sometimes Muslim population in the surroundings of the *khanqah* was not overwhelming but people came from far areas and went back.

## Ideology and vision

### **How will you describe teachings or way of the movement?**

To study a movement started by a Sufi, you need to study and focus on the history.

Hadhrat Sahib and his elder like Qadhi Fataha Ullah sahib's main focus were on the mosque and Qur'an's Taleem(teaching) and its memorization is a base of their work. If the system of the mosque is not a proper mosque is not clean and people don't pray then according to them it is not working.

“His method focuses individual's character building. When you do character building of many individuals, when they come together they make a society. His method is not concerned with any modern movement's method because they don't believe or practise in any type of propaganda or publicity nor believe in it they don't want to get any political edge of change through the political endeavour. Well, if any political person comes under individual character building then that's very good because he can has more influence in the society or

on more people like a teacher a religious leader a social worker or a political leader and tens and hundreds of people listen what they say, so, they have more following and influence and how they connect people to individual character building that will definitely cause a positive change. So this is the one way, *Janban's* (Pir Sahibs') method is not of the 1980s but family's history and tradition is of 1400 years, so with time and places their family heads have been changing and also places, because Hadhrat Sahib of Kotli they come from Hadhrat Abu Baker's family, they come from Abd Rahman bin Abi Baker. Their family history begins from the time when after the Holy Prophet (s) Abu Baker was chosen the first Caliph of Muslims and later perhaps in the time of Umar someone from their family became governor of Yamen until the time of Ali (RA). When the political chaos came they left the governorship and established a school of hadith in Medina in the Prophet's Mosque, still, some people are there from his family, they are *hubaeb* and people of al-Bakri al-Siddiquee family, they are Sayyeds.

They continued their school of *hadith* and individual character building, you must be amazed to know that Hadhrat Bhau-ul-Deen Zakaria graduated from that school of *hadith*. When Iran was conquered new Muslim rulers of Iran requested them to settle down and teach and preach the people there. In Seestan which was a province at that time, they became judges and remained for generations on academic posts.

Later in India when Tughlaks got power, kings of the Tughlak family requested them to send someone from their family to India to teach because it was a new domain for us and people don't know true and peace based teachings of Islam, we need to give them a true divine message of Islam. One member of their family came on their request and became chief justice and built their forts in Rohtak and Haryana which still exist. One person from that family at the time of Janangir, Qadhi FatahaUllah Siddique came to Punjab Bhera, he studied with a scholar and was sent to Jhelum for spiritual lessons by his teacher to Hadhrat Muhammad

Hassan Rohtasi, where today is Rohtas fort. As you know that Jhelum is a very ancient city from the time of Alexander the Great.

At that time here Ghakhers were ruling, Sultan Fateh Muhammad was the ruler of this area (Kotli and Mirpur), It was a semi autonomous state under the rule of AurangzeibAlamgeer. They requested Qadhi Fateh Ullah Siddiquee, to come to the area to decide rightfully between Hindus and Muslims. A member of well-known Qadhi Family was invited to the Kotli Mirpur region to become a first Muslim chief justice and he set foundations of mosque and *madrassa* and started his work and he also married to the daughter of the ruler. They settled in Chechyan which submerged under the dam now.

During the Mughal Empire, they had big titles in the fields of academic and Judiciary, and religious leanings. Their family fought against the British 1857 mutiny, many of family members revolted and martyred. Law was passed and properties were confiscated along with their hand written historical documents which were most expensive and are still in all India library.

Then they worked for Pakistan movement with the Pakistan Muslim League.

**You mentioned impacts of the Sufi teachings, what the movement has changed in the local context?**

Though Sufism has a spiritual impact on people, however, this District was one of the poorest regions in the AJK. Janaban arrived and made it their centre. There is no industry in Kotli even today some small units may exist but not industry. It's consumer based economy which was too poor 50/60 years ago. There were a couple of mosques when he arrived here and

slowly and gradually he developed this area and worked with his hands in the construction work.

His focus was to build the character of the people and to teach people to earn even less but halal as it has more Barakat ultimately you all have to die. You have to spend this life with a purpose and that purpose is based on the spiritual enrichment.

I tell you one thing about social impact people of Kotli if they want to do something good or social work they come to Janaban for advice and blessings, PCP, Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy report 2002/2005 says, most of charitable work or charity is done in Sehnsa sub Division of Kotli and then in Kotli itself. People have constructed roads and bridges on their own and make channels of economic well-being in abroad. They send money here for charity. This is number one.

Two, with Allah's blessing crime rate in Kotli, is lower even today; it is one of the reasons that every second family has connected with Hadhrat Sahib. When they have any quarrel it comes to Hadhrat sab they sit and solve their issues as he says this is a huge impact on the society. Since, the money came in Kotli, if Hadhrat Sahib was not there people of Kotli would have slaughtered each other.

There is a negative effect of *biraderism*, when everyone has a lot of money there is an increase in ego when money increases that increases quarrel among people.

## Resource Mobilisation

### **What responsibilities do you have to carry out in the movement?**

Whatever he orders to do and sometimes do translations, research related interpretation from Arabic to Urdu or English and occasionally travel with him (Pir Sahib) for a chat or to accompany him.

### **Which projects they have or running at the moment?**

They have so many projects sometimes, I look at construction related projects, attend some meetings with architects, one used to come from Aljazer, Janaban himself gives guidance of architecture of Muslim type such as Turkish.

### **How they build mosques what is the criterion or principle?**

Actually, there are three types of mosques from the time of Qadhi Sahib and *Bare janaban* (elder), there is one guiding principle that the mosque should be better than your home. Wherever you go you will see mosque is the most beautiful construction of that community. If the community is poor may be their mosque is not big but will be beautiful if the community is rich like housing scheme their mosque is prominent than any other building there. The grace of the mosque should not be affected in any community in any way.

Three type of mosques one, people come to Janaban to ask for the construction of a mosque he will see how many people are there are they *namazi* and how far they come from. Some people will say they can give land but the community is poor they can't afford construction, then it is built on the expenses of *janaban* and under his management.

Second is where some people give land and then they contribute some money and some by Hadhrat Sahib.

Third, we buy land where a mosque is needed if someone is not even able to donate land or he has financial requirements (we help for the construction). In this case we buy land to build or expand a mosque such as our ders shareef where we purchased the land after assessment.

In every mosque we try our best to have a Qur'anic memorization *madrasa* or ders. They have many mosques in England, He constructed Mazarat in central Asia there are about 750 mosques in District Kotli and Mirpur under his supervision, and where in about 80% have Ders for the Qur'an.

## **Maintaining the Process:**

### **How do you view biradrism in AJK?**

If it is positive, then it is good and if is negative then it is very bad. This is one aspect of his teachings he discourages prejudices based on biraderism. One is positive discrimination, and other is negative or prejudice which is strongly discouraged here. People from all *biraderies* are connected with *Derbar Shareef* to keep check and balance and it has a big impact on the society.

Social work like Kashmir welfare society, blood bank and many other institutions are affiliated with Hadhrat Sahib. They have dialysis centre in Kotli and centre for widows and orphans; they contribute at the time of marriages of orphans.

Then some youngsters come, they get guidance to establish a welfare organisation. There are so many organisations of those youngsters they may work somewhere but do social work for the society. They give books to the poor kids they get advice and blessings, even sometimes Janaban contributes with them sometimes they give less or more but the main thing is that people look to this centre for guidance and blessings and that is the most important.

Two people built hospitals and got advice from Hadhrat Sahib. Few people built a bridge on advice from Hadhrat Sahib and these are multi-billions projects.

**Do you have any target to achieve or time frame for it?**

Darwesh have no targets to achieve in worldly matters they have no targets. They just want to please their Allah he works for His pleasure if you go to the masjid shareef you will read a sign board, “When a human makes an intention, then Allah also makes an intention, if human hands over his intention to Allah’s intention, then it happens what intention he had”.

**Any changes you observed in the people because of Hadhrat Sahib?**

So many changes, I know many people who were *sharabi* (alcoholic) they did great sins they fight, not to respect parents, beat mothers they were a burden on the society on the basis of their acts then they were inspired by the teachings of Hadhrat Sahib, some changed in days and others took time. There were people working in the public departments and used to take bribes though they were not asked verbally to quit bribery the environment they were in let them quit slowly and gradually if you say this is not a change?

This is indeed is a big change. This is a change which came without any poster, propaganda or a big rally. According to the report; the reason for this is the system of Sufism that brought change in people over the time in the Kotli region and increase in charitable activities.

If the change is the name of development of the civic sense in the people, civic responsibility, and people perform civic responsibility in a better way where they do service they perform it with responsibility then this change is happening with Allah’s blessings. Once I was in the sermon of Hadhrat Sahib he asked not to violate any law of the government if you are driving a car you are not supposed to break traffic laws. Law is always a command of the sovereign backed by the sanctions his command is not with the stick but if a man feels that he is

attached with *darbar* Shareef and he should not do such an act that people raise finger on *darbar Shareef* and it's a valuable change.

You are living in the society peacefully and contributing to the society, you are eating *halal* and giving *halal* to your kids, you understand good and bad, respect your parents, and fulfil duties towards your family and relatives if an individual does like this, will the change not occur into the society??

Yes, it is true, the method of the change and way is different than the typical or established social and political movements by holding big rallies or by creating stunts this is different from those.

**Are there any specific aspects of the society you want to change?**

Every good thing should remain in the society and every bad thing should not be. Every society has some cultural and social perspectives by looking at when the society thinks something is good it should prevail and society progresses by taking each other together. If Islam asks you to give *zakat* and *sadaqat*, one aspect is that you should be able to give charity if not that then you should be in the position to give the compulsory charity. People don't give shares to women or daughters in inheritance it is not with the Islam but with their cultural or personal practices or personal greed. If they are affiliated with the Khanqahi system and recognise divine teachings that the daughters have a share in the inheritance and they start giving it, is it not a social change? It had no concept in the last 50/60 years but now people recognise it.

There are big issues like forced marriages, *Janaban* has very strict teachings about this and that is based on the teachings of Qur'an and Hadith. Britain has problems about this, *Janaban*

strictly discourages this. From where you are coming these are very relevant issues which has an impacts on the society. This in fact is an intellectual development and development of a vision that there should be charity and corruption should be discouraged these are social impacts.

For all this *Janaban* did not ask 20 or 40 thousand people to sit down for a night or did not mobilise a rally or event a mass social development programme is not of one or two nights this is a continues process.

The social impact of a *derveish* is different it is not contentious with the society it is not contentious it changes the bad from inside and slowly, slowly.

Appendix V

**LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR**  
**ALONGWITH NAMES OF THE PARTY HEADS.**

S. No	Name of Party	Party Head	Contact Number	General Secretary Name & No.
1	All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference	Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan, (President) Mujahid Munzil 83-A/1, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi	051- (Fax Mujahid Manzil)	Ms. Mahr-un-Nisa
2	Pakistan People's Party Azad Kashmir	CHOUHARY ABDUL MAJEED, (President) House No. 167, Sector F-2, Mirpur.	0300-	Ch. Latif Akbar 0300-9856966
3	Pakistan Muslim League (N), Azad Kashmir	Raja Farooq Haider Khan, (Chief Organizer) Shoukat Line Muzaffarabad.		Shah Ghulam Qadir 0333-5138112
4	Pakistan Muslim League Jammu & Kashmir.	Sardar Mansha Jamal Advocate, (President) Kotli Bar Azad Kashmir.	0302-	Malik Aftab
5	Jammu & Kashmir Liberation League	Justice (R.) Abdul Majeed Malik, (President) House No. 38, Sector B-2, Allama Iqbal Road, Mirpur, AJK.	0333-	Ghulam Akbar Advocate
6	Jammu & Kashmir People's Party.	Sardar Khalid Ibrahim Khan, (President) 35 Park Road F8/1, Islamabad.	0301-	Zahid Akram Advocate

7	Jami'at-ul-Ullema AJ&K.	Sahibzada Attique-ur-Rehman Faizpuri, (President) 122-A-F/2, Sector Faiz Pur Shareef House, Mirpur,AJ&K.	0344-	Moulana Muhammad Imtiaz Ahmed Siddique
8	Jamat-e-Islami AJ&K	Abdul Rasheed Trabi, (Ameer) 415 Poonch House Complex Sadar Rawalpindi.		Mahmood-ul-Hassan Chaudhry
9	All Jammu & Kashmir Justice Party.	Professor Maqsood Jaffri, (Chairman) NW-706/A, Saidpur Road Rawalpindi.		
10	Swad-i-Azam Ahlay Sunnat Wa Al Jamat AK.	Mollana Mufti Mahmood-ul-Hassan Shah Masoodi, (Ameer) Jamaia Abu Hurrara Muhallah Sadiq Abad Ranjata Muzaffarabad.	0300- (Gen Secretary)	Qazi Mahmood-ul-Hassan Ashraf
11	Jammu & Kashmir Awami Tehreek.	Sardar Mansoor Khan, (President) Silver Line School System Opp. Ayub Park GT Road Rawalpindi.		
12	Kashmir Freedom Movement,	Choudary Khaliq Hussain Advocate, (President) Muslim Bazar Bhimber, AK.	0355-	
13	Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front,	Sardar Sagheer, (Chairman) District Courts, Rawalakot.	0333-	Sardar Shamas Kashmiri
14	Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front	Shoukat Maqbool Butt, (President) C/O Minhas General Store, Ghari Pan Chowk, Muzaffarabad AJ&K.		
15	Jammu Kashmir Islamic Democratic Party, AJ&K.	Syed Ghulam Raza Naqvi, (President) Tehsil Sehnsa, District Kotli.	0300-	
16	Kashmir Freedom Front.	Mufti Sana-ul-Haq Bukhari, (President) Mufti Kashmir House, Muree.	0301-	Farooq Wani
17	Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto) AJ&K.	Munir Hussain Choudary, (President) House No. 14 Sanwala Sector F/2, Mirpur.	0300-	Professor Muhammad Hanif Khawaja

18	Nazaam-e-Mustafa Conference	Sahibzada Syed Muhammad Nadeem Ahmed Gillani, (President) Jamia Gosia Rizivia Sethi Bagh, Muzaffarabad.	0321-	Yasir Mughal
19	Pakistan Jami'at Ullema-e-Islam J&K.	Mufti Muhammad Younas Choudary, (Markazi Ameer) Akbar Road B-5, Mirpur, Azad Kashmir		
20	Suni Tehreek AJ&K	Sardar Abdul Shakoor Ladhavi, (Convener) Devisional Office Sunni Tehreek, Tehsil Nakyal, District Kotli.		
21	MQM Azad Jammu & Kashmir.	Muhammad Tahir Khokhar, (Parlimani Leader) 5-C Sunset Line-3, Phase ii DHA, EXT, Karachi.	0345-	
22	Jami'at Ullema-e-Islam J&K.	Moulana Saeed Yousaf, (Ameer) Darul Aloom Taleem-ul-Qur'an, Palandri, J&K	0300-	Maulana Imtiaz Abbasi
23	Jammu & Kashmir Milli Tehreek	Syed Muhammad Ali Raza Bukhari, (Chairman) 137 Faisal Colony Near Airport Rawalpindi.		
24	Markazi Jami'at-e-Ahllay Hadees AJ&K.	Mollana Muhammad Anwar Ruknudin. (Ameer) Allama Iqbal Colony, Bagh City.		
25	UN Parh Party AJ&K.	Muhammad Ismail Chohan, (Chairman) Ward #9 Tariq Abad Near Water Supply Pump Muzaffarabad A J & K.	0322-	
26	All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim League	Muhammad Sajjad Advocate, (Markazi President) Old Secretariat Muzaffarabad A.K.	0300-	
27	Jamat-e-Falah-e-Insaniat AJ&K.	Muhammad Mudassar Afzil Choudary, (Chairman) Tehsil Dodyal, Mirpur. Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0342-	
28	Peopls National Party, United Kashmir. (PNP,UK)	Syed Waqar Hussain Kazmi, (Chairman) Bar Council Muzaffarabad.A.K	0301-	


29	Jammu & Kashmir Public Rights Party	Usman Haider Sony, (Chairman) Bill Damaas Tehsil and District Kotli.	0345-	
30	Jaffaria Supreme Council AJ&K	Syed Shabir Hussain Bukhari, (Chairman) Imam Bargah Takiya Bari Imam Shoukat Line Muzaffarabad	0300-	Raja Anwar-ul-Saqlain Advocate Murpur
31	Pak Kashmir National League	Nisar Ahmed, (Chairman) Office No. 7 Usman Ghani First flour District Kachehri Rawalpindi	0300-	
32	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Kashmir	Barister Sultan Mahmood Chaudry (President) 22, Main Margala Road, F-3/6, Islamabad.		
33	Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan	Syed Tasawar Hussain Jafri, Secretary General (Head), Near Boys High School Narul, Domail Syedan Muzaffarabad.	0315-	Syed Abdul Rehman Shah Kazmi Deputy Secretary General
34	Al Jammu & Kashmir Jami'at Ulma Islama	Mahmood-ul-Hassan Ashraf, (Markazi General Secretary) Jamaia Daraul Aloom-ul-Islamia Muzaffarabad.	0300- (Gen Secretary)	Qazi Mahmood-ul-Hassan Ashraf



Appendix VI, MQ Political Mobilisation



Appendix VII, A GS Mosque in AJK



Appendix VIII. AJK MAP