

Spain

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This chapter examines the development of urban planning and city growth in Spain in a roughly chronological fashion, from the early eighteenth-century attempts at planned development up to the 1980s. For several reasons, Madrid and Barcelona feature as the major illustrative examples throughout the chapter. They have been Spain's two foremost cities since medieval times and have today populations three and four times greater, respectively, than Bilbao, the next largest city[1]. Further they have been the major arenas within the country for the development and application of new planning concepts and they have exhibited, more than any other city, the problems associated with rapid urban growth. Concentration on Madrid and Barcelona has also facilitated a certain degree of continuity which would not otherwise have been possible if examples from other cities such as Valencia and Bilbao[2] had been included.

Town planning origins

Until the mid-nineteenth century, Spain's cities were by and large confined within their medieval walls. It was only then that the Madrid government decreed that the walls were no longer necessary for defence purposes, and permitted city expansion beyond the old medieval quarters. The subsequent plans of expansion (*ensanche*) marked the first attempts at city-wide planning in the country, but the origins of town planning in Spain are to be found in the earlier plans for reform and development within the old medieval cities, above all those of Madrid and Barcelona.

Madrid and Barcelona grew around early Greek, Roman, and Visgoth settlements, and by the Middle Ages, comprised walled enclosures of several hundred hectares. It was in the eighteenth century, however, with the advent of Bourbon rule, that the first significant attempts at urban planning were made. In Barcelona, this was precipitated by the destruction of over 1300 dwellings in 1717 to make way for the citadel ordered by Felipe V. According to Bruguera[3] over 6300 people (out of a total population of 35,000) were made homeless, but there seems to have been little attempt at planned resettlement in the years immediately after the construction of the citadel. By 1740, haphazard development of wooden huts (*barracas* – to act as both living quarters and store), which housed the local fisherfolk, had taken place on the spit just south of the citadel. It is likely that the fisherfolk had formally lived in the Ribera, the area of the old city destroyed to make way for the citadel. In 1753, however, the military governor ordered the planned construction of a new settlement on this sand-spit to accommodate those living there. This new *barrio* – named Barceloneta (little Barcelona) - was the first extramural expansion of the city, and well illustrates the main features of Baroque architecture which dominated planning under the early Bourbons – straight streets intersecting at right angles, uniformity in building styles and dominance of the military square and barracks (figure 5.1).



Figure 5.1. Cerdà's Topographical Plan of Barcelona, 1855.

The citadel and Barcelona are to the right of the old city, and the outlying settlements inland. The foothills of the Tibadabo mountain run across the top of the plan.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.

In the 1760s limited reform within the old cities of Madrid and Barcelona was undertaken by the military authorities, against a background of agricultural crises, increasing country-city migration and a general air of corruption within the old local administrations in face of rapidly deteriorating urban conditions. Mesonero Romanos provides a graphic description of the living conditions in Madrid at the time: ‘In the streets of Madrid ... think nothing of the misalignment or uneven heights of buildings, nothing of the narrow width or tortuous nature of streets and nothing of the lack of public facilities ... The streets are inundated by beggars in the day and by pickpockets at night’[4]. In an attempt to confront such problems, King Carlos III, on the advice of his military staff, implemented a reform programme in Madrid which was matched by similar developments in Barcelona. Major streets were widened and straightened (figure 5.2), new *paseos* were opened up, and new public buildings – including the Prado Museum in Madrid – were erected. Administrative changes brought the introduction of the *serenos* (nightwatchmen) service to keep law and order at night; and the building permit cession procedure was tightened up in an attempt to stamp out corrupt practices.




Figure 5.2. The Ramblas, Barcelona, in 1772 and 1807.

The straightening of the Ramblas in 1779 was accompanied by the destruction of the medieval wall running along its eastern (lower) side and the construction of a central walkway.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.

The last thirty years of the eighteenth century saw a construction boom in the major towns and cities as the incipient industrial bourgeoisie flourished in a period of economic liberalism. Madrid and Barcelona, having expanded horizontally to their walled limits, now grew upwards, with new floors and extensions being added to existing buildings to completely fill their accompanying medieval land parcels. Capmany i Montpalau, writing of Barcelona in the 1790s, noted that the ‘rising up of new buildings constructed to house the ever increasing population in small spaces’ had meant that ‘the old plots with spacious yards have been reduced, and with the narrowness of its streets, the city has come to be like a pine forest of houses, towers, domes, balconies and roofs’[5]. Although existing building regulations did attempt to limit the upward growth of buildings and room subdivision, property speculators, with the acquiescence of sections of the council, found loopholes in, or ways around, them – a pattern that was to be repeated in later eras. In particular, the upper floors, often technically outside the scope of building regulations, were built with low ceilings and minimal room dimensions. According to Lopez[6], a house of 15 metres height built in or before 1771 would have four floors in total, whereas in 1791 a new or extended dwelling of this height would have six floors. This reduction in average floor height usually only affected the upper floors, whilst the lower floors, frequently the living quarters of the landlord, remained the same height as before. In this way, the classic contrast between high and low which existed in the medieval house was accentuated, but changed from a functional difference within the family house to a class difference within a rented property – what Bohigas[7] has called the ‘eighteenth century urban house’.

The second half of the eighteenth century saw the first stages of the Industrial Revolution in Spain, and the consequent expansion of industrial activity had direct effects on the urban morphology of Spain’s major cities. The larger manufacturers needed new types and sizes of buildings for factories and workshops, and houses for their workers, and thus the medieval parcels of land often had to be regrouped to form frontages of 20 metres or more. Indeed, at the end of the century, the industrialists Camps and Bastero drew up plans to build seventy to ninety dwellings respectively, in Barcelona, to house their workforces. Although there is no record of these estates having been built, they represent early attempts at planned developments which, according to Grau[8], acted as models for nineteenth century industrialists.

From 1793 until 1814 Spain was involved in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and there then followed a period of repressive government under Ferdinand VII, culminating in the first Carlist Wars in the 1830s. During this era, and following the initiative of Jose I (Josef Bonaparte), many new *plazas* were created in the country’s major urban areas. Lack of space and overcrowding, however, remained constant features of urban life, and following cholera epidemics in the 1830s, large areas of monastery and convent land in Madrid and Barcelona were annexed by the

municipal authorities for building purposes. The populations of these two cities continued to expand rapidly, Madrid's increasing from 167,000 in 1797 to 275,000 in 1853, and Barcelona's from 111,000 in 1787 to 216,000 in 1857, with population densities as high as 1500 inhabitants per hectare in some zones. The need for a spatial expansion of these cities beyond their medieval walls was greater than ever.

The plans of *ensanche*: planned expansion beyond the medieval walls

In 1854, the new Madrid government declared that the walls which constrained the country's major cities were no longer necessary for security purposes, and thereby authorized their destruction. Since the 1840s, the military authorities in Madrid and Barcelona had drawn up a series of plans for piecemeal development beyond the medieval walls (which were never implemented), but now far more ambitious plans of expansion became feasible. These early plans of *ensanche* represented a conceptual advance in the evolution of planning thought in Spain; new homogenous, well-defined cities could be planned and built around the old medieval centres. This type of planning was seen as a global solution to the problems of urban growth, in which every element of city life was accounted for in the new planned development. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Ildefonso Cerdà's 1859 *Plano de reforma y ensanche* for Barcelona, usually referred to as the Plan Cerdà.

Cerdà's plan was officially approved by the Madrid government in 1859, despite the fact that the Barcelona Council had held its own competition and selected an alternative plan – that of Rovira i Trias (figure 5.3). Cerdà was a civil engineer who had meticulously studied Barcelona and the surrounding plain, and only in the past decade has the significance of his contribution to planning thought been studied in depth. His 1855 Topographical Plan of Barcelona (figure 5.1) laid the groundwork for the 1859 plan (Figure 5.4) which attempted to link the old city with the ring of outlying settlements inland. The new city comprised some 900 octangular blocks of development (*manzanas*), and a great deal of recent research has concentrated on identifying the underlying idealized model in which all services are distributed in a polycentric hierarchy of zones, districts, and sectors (figure 5.5) The *manzanas* were to be built-up on two sides only, to a depth of 20 metres and with a maximum height of 16 metres. Despite certain ambiguities in the plan which Grau[9], for example, has drawn attention to, there seems much to support Garrut's assertion that 'Barcelona lost the opportunity of becoming a city that, even today, would be one of the most modern and most beautiful in Europe[10]; and when one takes into account the depth and rigour of Cerdà's major works[11], then Domingo's view that 'in many ways he was the founder of an urban science preceding Baumeister (1876), Stubben (1893), Unwin (1908), Triggs (1909) and Haverfield (1913)'[12] seems reasonable. This is particularly interesting, given critical assessment of Cerdà's work by earlier urban historians such as Puig i Cadafalch[13] inside Spain, and Gutkind outside[14].




Figure 5.3. The plan of *ensanche* for Barcelona of Antonio Rovira i Trias, 1859.
Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.

The other major plan of *ensanche* drawn up in this era was that of the engineer Carlos Maria de Castro for Madrid. The Plan Castro (figure 5.6) was based on an extension of Madrid to the east, south and, above all, to the north of the old city in a series of *ensanches* delimited by the external *rondas* (rather like the French *boulevards*), and by a series of major roads radiating out from the old city. A number of large green spaces and community service buildings were included within the regular grid pattern of block development, but the plan was not as all-embracing as Cerdà's nor was there such a technically or conceptually advanced underlying model.




Figure 5.4. The Plan Cerdà, 1860.
Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.




Figure 5.5. The distribution of macro and micro services in Cerdà's underlying model.

In both Madrid and Barcelona, the *ensanches* were developed with scant regard to the approved plans. The *manzanas* were built up on all four sides and within (figure 5.7), parks and gardens were encroached upon or disappeared altogether, and *manzanas* destined for schools, markets and social centres in the plans were used for house construction and commercial and industrial buildings. Speculative development saw the cities grow in radio-centric form (see figure 5.8) in fits and starts, reflecting the economic and political climate of the time. The first rail links (Barcelona-Mataro and Madrid-Aranjuez) were built in 1860. As these and the tramway network were extended within the *ensanches* (figure 5.8), a functional and social segregation[15] was established in which the working classes remained encamped in the old city centres or in the 'mixed zones' (residential/industrial) of the *ensanche*, while certain areas – around the Paseo de Gracia in Barcelona and in Salamanca in Madrid – became the main residential areas of the moneyed classes.

The population growth of the two cities continued apace with Barcelona reaching the half million mark by the turn of the century, at which time Madrid had a population of 576,000.




Figure 5.6. The Plan Castro, 1860.

The streets, 15 or 30 metres wide, are orientated N-S and E-W to avoid acting as wind tunnels. There are a significant number of green space areas and blocks demarcated for public buildings. The Plan Report includes a land zoning not shown on the plan itself, with the upper classes living to the north, the middle classes in the north-east and the working classes to the east and south.

Source: de Teran, F. (1978) *Planeamiento Urbano en la España Contemporanea*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili




Figure 5.7. The infilling of Cerdà's *manzana* (block).

The built-up space in the average *manzana* increased from 67,200 m³ in the Plan Cerda (top left) to almost 295,000 m³ in 1972 (bottom right).

Source: *Construcción de la Ciudad*, 1972.




Figure 5.8. Barcelona, 1903,

Expansion out from the old city has been in radiocentric form whilst the old settlements on the plain have grown in anarchical fashion with scant regard to the dictates of the Plan Cerdà.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona,

The plans of *ensanche* in the smaller towns and cities of Spain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally less ambitious in scale and content than those of Madrid and Barcelona. In San Sebastian, following the opening of the Madrid-Paris railway in 1864, the medieval walls were demolished and the architect Cortazar's plan won the ensuing municipal competition to find a plan for the city. His plan comprised some fifty new 'blocks' of development similar to those contained in the Plan Castro for Madrid, but much of the detail of the plan was lost in subsequent modifications made by the municipal authorities. Meanwhile, in Bilbao, the multiplicity of municipalities bordering the old city led to inter-council disputes on the nature and location of town expansion. Finally, in 1876, the council's plan was approved by Royal Decree. It was based on a population projection of 70,000 inhabitants (cf. 6000,000 for Barcelona) and was again essentially a grid street pattern encompassing new blocks of development, crossed by some diagonal roads, and also incorporating some rather more irregularly shaped blocks of development. Provision was made in the plan for park areas, but, as in the San Sebastian Plan, few community service buildings were included. Nevertheless, between 1876 and 1926, the bulk of the area covered by the 1876 plan was built-up with the addition of some isolated development on the city periphery.

The early plans of *ensanches* brought with them a body of legislation which was aimed at guiding their implementation. The 1864 City Expansion Act facilitated the provision of road and service infrastructure in the *ensanches* by empowering councils to expropriate the necessary land and by making financial and technical assistance available to carry these works out. It also recommended that councils should establish special boards to administer the development of the *ensanches* and offered financial incentives for landowners who developed their land there. The special boards, however, were dominated by landowning interests and as Miller has remarked with reference to Barcelona, 'the whole area, fully serviced and cleared for building, was handed over on a plate to speculators'[16]. The 1892 Act was modified in 1876 when the special boards were replaced by commissions consisting solely of councillors; and the approval of new building regulations to govern development in the *ensanches* was also authorized. Finally, in 1892, a special Act was passed clarifying the legal framework for development in the *ensanches* of Madrid and Barcelona; this Act was later applied to other cities.

In summary, then, the plans of *ensanche*, and above all the Plan Cerdà, represented a landmark in the conceptual development of urban planning in Spain. By the end of the nineteenth century they were seen as providing the master solution to the problems of city growth, and other cities followed suit in adopting such plans (Zaragoza 1894, Valencia 1907, Pamplona 1915 and Murcia 1920). But gradually, as new and old problems were encountered in the development

of the *ensanches*, so new theoretical developments appeared, leading to more open-ended, heterogenous concepts and providing pluriform answers to the different demands of city formation. It is to these, then, that we now turn.

Advances in planning thought and practice 1890-1931

Around the turn of the century, a series of new planning concepts were beginning to find expression in the urban plans of the day, as overcrowding and congestion in Spain's old city centres remained, and powerful external influences came to bear on planning ideology and practice.

Ironically, however, Arturo Soria's 'Linear City', which subsequently received widespread acclaim overseas, found only lukewarm support in Madrid. Indeed, writing in 1901, Soria reflected that 'the architects of Madrid have, as a rule, shown no enthusiasm at all for our linear city, and some have opposed it ferociously'[17]. The fundamentals of his linear city were relatively simple: city growth was to be developed in linear fashion, around an axis of high-speed, high-intensity transportation; and such development, ideally only several hundred metres deep on either side of the main communications line, was to be separated from the countryside beyond by belts of woodland or green areas. He suggested that the major cities of Europe could be joined by such linear growth and proposed an initial link between Cadiz in Spain and Leningrad in Russia. In fact only a short stretch of a few kilometres was ever built – outside Madrid in the period 1892-1930 – and it is difficult to recognize this today because it has been enveloped by the peripheral expansion of the city.

In 1892, the Madrid government approved Soria's project to construct a new rail line circling the city and linking up the outlying settlements. In 1894 the Compañía Madrileña de Urbanización (Madrid Development Company) was founded, with Soria as director, to construct a 'linear city' around this transportation axis. By 1905, 18km of rail line had been laid (used at first for horse drawn carriages) to the north-east of the capital, and 300 houses built; by 1913, 4000 people were living in 680 dwellings, mainly in the Chamartín-El Progreso section (figure 5.9). In the 1920s, the linear city concept was further developed by Soria's followers, the most notable of whom was probably Hilarion Gonzalez de Castillo. He viewed the linear city as a form of garden city and was much influenced by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association in Britain. He also modified some of the extremes of Soria's ideas in answer to criticisms from Garden City proponents outside Spain.




Figure 5.9. The Linear City (*Ciudad Lineal*) of Arturo Soria y Mata, built outside Madrid in the 1890s.
Source: *Ciudad Lineal*, No. 120, 1902.

Gonzalez de Castillo's work included plans for major cities both inside and outside Spain. In 1919, at the Brussels Reconstruction Exhibition, his plans for a Belgian 'Linear City' were limited to a maximum length of 10km and were of greater depth than in Soria's earlier plans. A civic centre was planned at the crossing-point of the longitudinal and transverse axes of the city with parallel zones of urban, industrial, agricultural and forest land around the major lines of communication. Proposals for city growth within the London Region were also put forward, in which linear cities linked the city core with satellite cities beyond the green belt. The plan, which thus combined the Linear and Garden City concepts, was published by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association in 1931[18].

Proposals for the new application of the linear growth concept to planning in Madrid[19] and Barcelona appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, and Gonzalez de Castillo continued to work assiduously up until the Civil War. The linear concept appeared in the work of several renowned planners and theorists outside Spain, including Le Corbusier, Miliutin and Hilberseimer[20], and in the 1943 Mars Group Plan for London and in the 1965 *Schema Directeur* for Paris, amongst others. It was a concept of genuinely Spanish origin which had surprisingly little impact on the content of urban plans or patterns of urban growth within the country, remaining a largely theoretical formulation in need of refinement and further development, but which received more recognition outside Spain than within.

By the later stages of the nineteenth century, it had become clear that new measures were needed to attack the urban problems of the day. The plans of *ensanche* were blueprint plans – in some cases exceptionally advanced and well thought out – that failed to get to grips with the processes involved in implementing development. Thus, although the basic road networks in these plans provided a physical framework for development, the development which took place often differed drastically from that specified in the respective plans; and away from the *ensanches*, in the old medieval cities and beyond in the outer periphery, redevelopment and continued growth brought a new set of old problems.

In Barcelona, Baixeras's 1881 plan had attempted to open up three major new roads running across the old city, but the ensuing battle between reformist elements in the council and property-owning interests (both inside and outside the council) thwarted its implementation, despite the approval in 1895 of the Inner Areas Reform Act which gave councils greater power to expropriate the land necessary for such intervention. It was only, in fact, in 1916, when the socialist reforming elements for once overcame the landowning interests in the council, that one of Baixera's new roads – the Via Layetana – was constructed, cutting through one of the most densely populated areas of the old city (figure 5.10). At the same time, in Barcelona, an international competition was held in 1903 to find a plan to link the *ensanche* with newly annexed suburbs which remained outside the ambit of the Plan Cerdà. The winning entry by the French architect Leon Jaussely (figure 5.11) also attempted to transform Cerdà's quadricle street pattern by the incorporation of geometric layouts (diagonals, radials, curves and right angles) that epitomized the French *belles arts* school at the time. Jaussely's proposals were hardly realistic, and only a much watered down version of the plan was approved in 1917 (known as the Plan Romeu-Porcel after the two municipal architects who modified it). Jaussely's proposals for the *ensanche* were dropped and only the peripheral roads linking the city with the outlying settlements were included.



Figure 5.10. A section of Barcelona's old city at the end of the 1920s. Via Layetana, opened in 1916, is running right to left across the photo.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.

Meanwhile, in Madrid, the rapid growth of unplanned construction beyond the limits of the *ensanche* produced a ring of new settlements cut off from the city centre and generally deficient in basic service infrastructure. This peripheral zone, which became known as the *extraradio*, lay outside the control of the Madrid Council, and outlying councils often tended towards a *laissez-faire* attitude as regards development within their municipal limits.




Figure 5.11. The Plan Jaussely, 1907.
 Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona




Figure 5.12. Nunez Granes's project for the extension of Madrid, 1910.
 Source: de Teran, F. (1978) *Planamiento Urbano en la Espana Contemporanea*.
 Barcelona: Gustavo Gili.

In 1908, the Madrid Council commissioned the civil engineer Nunez Granes to draw up a plan to link the city with the outlying settlements, and in his accompanying report he noted that the only legal obligation on developers in these municipalities was that they submit plans of alignment and gradient to the local council. Indeed, in 1910, only 5210 of Spain's 9266 municipalities had approved building regulations.

Nunez Granes's 1919 project (figure 5.12) proposed to extend the radial roads of the Madrid *ensanche* and the construction of new ring roads and blocks of housing on three sides of the city, forming an inverted 'C' around it in similar fashion to some of the late-nineteenth-century German projects of expansion. The project was not accompanied, however, by the legal and administrative measures necessary for its implementation, but it did emphasize the need for

supra-municipal planning in the capital. It was, in any case, conceptually and technically poor, particularly in comparison with the body of planning ideas produced by the Garden City movement which was beginning to filter into Spain at this time, and which was eventually to have a major impact on the shaping plans for Madrid.

The Garden City movement was introduced into Spain[21] almost single handed by Cebriu Montoliu in Barcelona, where he founded the 'Garden City Society' in 1912. The new theoretical vision of a city integrated with its rural surrounds was propounded at a series of conferences and exhibitions in Spain, and although Montoliu went into voluntary exile in 1920, the seeds of change had been sown. We have already seen how Gonzalez de Castillo linked the Garden and Linear City concepts; and in 1924 the architects Aranda, Garcia, Cascales, Lorite and Sallaberry presented a report to the Madrid Council, in which they stated the necessity of overcoming the blinkered peripheral view of planning evident in Nunez Granes's project, and suggested a land-use zoning of the Madrid built-up area and the location of satellite cities beyond its central nucleus[22]. In 1929 the Madrid Council employed Aranda and Garcia Cascales as a team to draw up the brief for an international competition to find the definitive urban plan for the capital. The winning *Plan de Extensión* of 1929 by the Spanish architect Zuazo and German Planner Jansen (figure 5.13) was an adaptation of the radiocentric decentralizing model that stemmed from Howard's work. It consisted of radial and ring roads enclosing the central urban core, surrounded by a green zone beyond which were situated satellite cities linked by a peripheral ring road. The plan also included proposals of the reform of the old city, principally aimed at easing traffic congestion. This plan was subsequently approved during the Second Republic (1931-36), and provided the basis for the planning of Madrid up until the 1960s.




Figure 5.13. The *plan de extensión* for Madrid, 1929.

The plan, drawn up by Zuazo and Jansen, won the international competition held to find a new plan for the city. A greenbelt isolates the central core from the planned satellite cities beyond.

Source: de Teran, F. (1976) *Notas para la Historia del Planamiento de Madrid. Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 2/3, Madrid: IEAL.

This influx of new planning ideas emphasized the need for the revision of existing planning legislations, which remained anchored in the disparate Acts of the previous century. The Municipal Statute of 1924 synthesized, re-ordered and consolidated previous planning legislation, but failed to introduce new measures to facilitate supra-municipal planning. The Statute did, however, establish that urban planning was the responsibility of individual councils, in accordance with the general spirit of municipal autonomy that characterized its text, and specified that councils of municipalities which had experienced a population increase of 20 per cent or more in the decade 1910-20 were legally obliged to draw up a plan of *ensanche* or *extensión* within the following four years. Here, then a new type of plan was recognized. Whilst plans of *ensanche* (expansion) were to accommodate city growth beyond the old city walls, plans

of extension (extension) were to cover the areas between the *ensanches* and the territorial limits of the municipality, precisely the area where the *extraradio* settlements had sprung up in Madrid. However, as Bassols[23] has pointed out, the concept of one development plan encompassing the entire municipality was not evident in the Municipal Statute, which rather recognized a series of different plan types – expansion, extension, and inner-city reform – to be used according to the needs and individual circumstances of each municipality.

The Municipal Statute was severely criticized at the Eleventh National Architect's Congress in Madrid in 1926 at which Nicolau Rubio, Secretary of Montoliu's Garden City Society of Barcelona, introduced the theme of regional planning into Spain, probably for the first time, taking largely from British and French developments that had been set out at the International Federation of Garden Cities Congresses in Amsterdam (1924) and New York (1925). The principal conclusion of the Madrid congress was that there was an urgent need for a General Planning Law to recognize the modern concepts in urban and regional planning, which continued to appear in the urban plans of the 1920s and 1930s entered in competitions held by the councils of major cities to find new plans of *extension*. These competitions attracted entrants from abroad; Stubben, for example, entered the Bilbao competition in 1926; Zuazo y Jansen, as we have seen, won the 1929 competition for Madrid (figure 5.13); and Le Corbusier's Plan Macia won the 1932 Barcelona competition, in a period of intensive urban planning activity and citizen participation under the Second Republic.

The Second Republic and after

With the fall of the monarchy in 1931 and the advent of the Second Republic, a period of intense but short-lived urban activity was inaugurated, led by GATEPAC[24] a radical Spanish architect/planning group, in collaboration with similar bodies from outside Spain (CIAM and CIRPAC). Nevertheless, as Teran[25] has pointed out, there is a certain degree of continuity in the evolution of planning in Spain from the pre-republican era through to the postwar era, even if the pace of change was heightened during the Republic; and, as before, planning remained strongly influenced by developments in the international planning arena.

The new council in Madrid drew up a further plan for the city in 1931, based very much on Zuazo and Jansen's 1929 plan. The accompanying plan report also recommended the extension of the Madrid municipal boundaries and stressed the importance of the necessary expropriation powers for such plans to be implemented effectively. The *plan de extensión* was finally approved by the central government in 1933, but only that part of the plan falling within the confines of the Madrid municipality. The stern opposition of the outlying municipal councils meant that enlargement of the Madrid municipality had to wait until after the war (when it was extended to encompass the surrounding fourteen municipalities), and the prospect of effective supra-municipal planning in the capital was again thwarted.

Nevertheless progress towards supra-municipal planning was made in other ways, and here again the influence of outside ideas played its part. Following the publication of the second report of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee in 1932, the Madrid Council began preliminary studies for a *Plan Regional* for Madrid. Fernando Mercadal, founder of GATEPAC and Spanish delegate to CIRPAC, who had done much to bring European planning ideas and influences to bear on the planning of Madrid since the 1920s, was again a key figure, as was Julian Beisteiro, president of the Comité de Reforma, Reconstrucción y Saneamiento de Madrid that drew up and finally published the plan in 1939. From the references and terminology used in the accompanying report, it seems that the Comité collaborated with the Greater London Planning Committee throughout the 1930s. The report justifies the regional approach because of the need to 'embrace the extensive zone of influence of Madrid and improve living conditions in the already existing satellite cities, and to create new ones in areas specially chosen because of their natural conditions'[26]. In the plan, the growth of the city was limited by a green ring beyond which satellite cities of essentially industrial/residential nature were situated, there being four new nuclei (figure 5.14). The whole region was served by a functional network of radial and ring roads, and land-use classifications were extended to cover the entire region. The plan also included proposals for the protection and utilization of the large recreational areas outside Madrid – the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Guadarrama, and the Jarama River Valley – and finally the report stressed the need for a management body – Comité de Plan – with the necessary authority and capacity to control and manage subsequent development in the region, in accordance with the plan.

In Barcelona, GATCPAC, the Catalan wing of GATEPAC, which included such international figures as J. Lluís Sert and J. Torres Clave, worked with Le Corbusier on trying to provide a new planning framework for the resolution of the city's appalling problems of overcrowding, old decaying housing and abject poverty, above all in the old city. The population density remained over 1000 per hectare in 1932 in the infamous Distrito V of the old city (figure 5.15), with a mortality rate in some streets as high as 20 per cent a year[27].

Both the population density and mortality figures were the highest among the thirty-one cities studied at the 1932 CIRPAC conference in Barcelona. Outside the old city, the central section of the *ensanche* consisted almost entirely of luxury and middle-class housing, but to the east and west lay the so-called 'mixed zones' of working-class housing and industry, which had grown almost without control since Cerdà's time, albeit within the road pattern of his plan (figure 5.16). And beyond these, a ring of *barracas* – a term used two centuries before to describe the wooden huts on the sandspit overlooking the port – had sprung up to form the zones of *autoconstrucción*, the slum dwellings built by their

inhabitants, which still exist in some parts of the city today. This form of accommodation was the spontaneous response of the 100,000 migrants that arrived in Barcelona between 1924 and 1930. In 1931, Barcelona's population reached 1 million (c.f. Madrid 950,000 in 1930), and migration into the city continued to increase throughout the 1930s.




Figure 5.14. The Regional Plan for Madrid, 1939.

Source: de Teran, F. (1978) *Planeamiento en la Espana Contemporanea*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili

GATCPAC's response to the rapidly declining urban situation was its 1932 five-point Reform Programme (table 5.1) which was embodied in the 1934 Plan Macia (figure 5.17). This plan included proposals for radical renewal in the old city, a functional zoning of the existing built-up area and new segregated zones of industry and housing to the east and west. Although the Plan Macia found increasing support amongst the general public, the Reform Programme was disrupted by the onset of Civil War (1936-39) and very little of the Plan Macia was carried out.

It is also worth noting the publication of Rubio i Tuduri's 'Regional Plan for Catalonia' in 1932, in which many of GATCPAC's proposals were recognized. The plan gave macro-zonings to an area that encompassed the lower Llobregat Valley and the Tibidabo mountains inland, and attempted to limit the sprawling growth of the city. The most radical proposal of the plan was perhaps the creation of a new decentralized tertiary and industrial centre inland beyond Tibidabo. Although the plan never became executive, it was generally regarded as the first example of a regional plan in Spain, and also provided the basis for subsequent planning at this level in postwar Barcelona.

The Republican era closed with considerable progress in the development of ideas concerning what reforms were needed in the institutional framework of urban planning. These were expressed in the major reports[28] which followed the Municipal Congress held at Gijon in 1934, and are of particular interest because of their recurrence in the postwar era. The major recommendations of the Gijon Congress may be summarized as follows.

1. Legal obligation of all municipalities to draw up development plans to cover the entire municipal area, with state subrogation in case of default.
2. Urban plans to be revised after 15 years in force.
3. Regional plans to be drawn up to provide guidelines for the development of the country's major city regions.
4. Land-use classifications to be used in all plans; each classification to specify land use and maximum building volume, and to have clear and precise regulations to be binding on all developers.
5. Land re-division procedure to be revised and standardized to facilitate smooth plan implementation.
6. Activities and responsibilities of national, regional, and municipal planning authorities to be co-ordinated.
7. Creation of a Central Planning Authority to work in conjunction with a National Economic Planning Board.

8. Creation of regional planning authorities with their own planning offices.
9. Formulation of municipal land values indices, as guidelines for land expropriation by municipal councils.
10. Introduction of legislation to give municipal councils the necessary powers for expropriation of any land deemed necessary for the successful implementation of municipal development plans; alternatively, 'collective associations' could be formed to act as development agencies, in which landowners would be represented according to the value of their property.



Figure 5.15. Barcelona's old city from over Mont Jüich, in the late 1920s. Distrito V is in the middle third of the photograph between the two major roads – the Ramblas and Marques Duero – running left to right. Note also the very straight roads running the other way, opened by the military authorities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.

In April, 1939, the Civil War ended; Madrid lay in ruins, and under the new Fascist regime, planning was initially concerned with reconstructing the Capital de Imperio along the lines of Hitler's Berlin and Mussolini's Rome, with long wide avenues for triumphal marches and processions, large assembly areas for military gatherings and symbolic representations of Religion, Culture and the National Party. Elements of the 'falangist city' were evident in the Plan General de Urbanización de Madrid of 1941 (for example the Fachada de Manzanares consisting of the Cathedral, Royal Palace and new Falange headquarters, and the great avenues of Via de Europa, Via de Victoria and Via del Imperio), but the plan was essentially a continuation of the 1929 and 1931 plans for the capital. The 1941 Plan was approved in 1946 (figure 5.18) with the central core of the city enclosed by a green ring with satellite settlements beyond. Some industrial zones were added to the south of the city and an attempt was made to divide the central core into individual units separated by open spaces. The outline of the 1946 Plan is reminiscent of many of Eliel Saarinen's proposals for 'organic decentralization' in the inter-war era[29] and at the same time has much in common with Abercrombie's London Plan of 1944. There was, however, one new theoretical undercurrent that stemmed more directly from within the Fascists regime – that of segregation and division of the working class. For example, a member of the planning team explained that 'the distribution of industrial zones has responded to the need to localize the working classes in satellite settlements that constitute true defensive nuclei against the invasion by the inactive masses encamped in the periphery, forming the suburban belts of misery against which we fight with difficulty'[30].

The 1946 Plan for Madrid drew the distinction between the *general* (municipal or sub-regional) plan and the *local* plan. The general plan was to provide the structure for urban growth of the city, providing land-use classifications for the entire plan area' local plans were to 'be in accordance with the outline structure of the General Plan, and must specify the design, volume and use characteristics for all buildings and free space zones within the area covered by the Local

Plan'[31]. As we shall see, this distinction was subsequently included in the National Planning Act and became of paramount importance in planning and development in Spain in the postwar era.




Figure 5.16. A section of the outlying *ensanche* of Barcelona in the late 1920s. Nearly all the *manzanas* are fully built-up in this mixed zone of housing and industry. Some of the buildings pre-date the Plan Cerda as suggested by their alignment.

Source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona.




Figure 5.17. The Plan Macia, 1934.

Source: Wynn, M. (1979) Barcelona: planning and change 1854-1977. *Town Planning Review*, 50(2) (drawn by J. Harvey).

The first postwar decade (1940-50) also saw significant advances in the establishment of upper-tier planning authorities in Spain. The General Directorate of Architecture was created in 1939 as part of the Home Office, with the

specific task of directing the reconstruction of settlements destroyed or damaged in the war, as well as co-ordinating and regulating architectural practice in the country. The National Reconstruction Plan revived prewar initiatives to draw up a National Urban Plan, and to this end an Urban Planning division was established in 1949, to function within the General Directorate of Architecture. It was empowered to direct all urban planning matters in the country and to carry out preliminary studies for the drawing up of a National Urban Plan. This process had already been put in motion through the creation of provincial planning commissions[32] in the 1940s. These were to function as part of the provincial governments (*Diputaciones*), and were not only to draw up outline development plans for each Province to act as a guideline for lower tier (municipal or sub-regional) planning authorities, but also to contribute towards the formulation of planning policy at the national level and the configuration of the National Urban Plan.

In the housing field, the National Institute of Housing was founded (as an arm of the Ministry of Labour) in 1939 to instigate and regulate state-subsidized house construction within the framework of the National Reconstruction Plan, and the 1939 and 1944 Housing Acts made central government monies available for state housing. During the 1940s over half a million new houses were built, over 120,000 of them by central state authorities; but nearly all were located in the 'devastated regions' of the south and west, where whole villages had been destroyed in the war. In Barcelona, for example, only 15,000 houses were constructed in the 1940s of which 13,500 were financed by the private sector. In 1950 the housing deficit was estimated at 80,000 in Barcelona and 30,000 in Madrid, while, according to Teran[33], by 1955 the deficit for the country as a whole was 1.5 million.




Figure 5.18. The Madrid 'Plan General' of 1941, approved in 1946.

In major urban areas, public order and political control were seen as all important and the effervescent spirit of urban reform, public participation and democratic citizen politics of the Republican era became things of the past. An anti-urban ideology was preached by certain state or state-controlled institutions – the Church, the press, and schools – in which the city was portrayed as the centre of vice and evil (communism, separation, prostitution, crime) and the rural base of the country was exalted as being the essence of Spanish civilization. A series of urban problems was tolerated or ignored by the central authorities, despite the continuation of planning activity and the approval of new urban plans for many of Spain's major cities including Madrid (1946), Valencia (1946), Bilbao (1946), Barcelona (1953-figure 5.19) and Santander (1955-figure 5.20). The deterioration of the old city centres, the increasingly high densities in the central *ensanches*, the mixed zones on the city peripheries, the housing and service deficits and the growing areas of shanty development throughout the country's major urban centres, all contributed to the grim legacy bequeathed to future planners.




Figure 5.19. The 1953 Barcelona sub-regional plan.

The sub-region of twenty-eight municipalities was viewed as a collection of individual nuclei, rather than one urban continuum; and land-use classifications were introduced for the entire area, there being thirty such classifications in all.




Figure 5.20. Part of the 1955 Santander sub-regional plan. Land-use classifications were normally accompanied by regulations governing building type, use and volume.

The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act

The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act was the cornerstone of planning legislation in Spain for the next two decades, during which time the country's major cities experienced a construction boom unparalleled since the immediate post-*ensanche* period. Although the Act was passed in 1956, a committee was set up as early as 1949, within the General Directorate of Architecture, to work on the Act, which established a planning system that was clearly inspired by many of the ideas and aspirations contained in the reports of the Municipal Congress held at Gijon in 1934. It was described by Pedro Bidagor as 'one of the most complete and up-to-date of all the planning acts in Europe'[34], and was based on the Italian, French and Belgian models[35]. We shall return in the subsequent section to review the overall functioning of the Act in the years following its approval; first, however, let us look in some details at the planning system embodied in the Act itself.

Plans and planning authorities

The act made provision for a tiered hierarchy of urban plans and planning authorities at the national, provincial, sub-regional, municipal and local levels. The National Urban Planning Council (NUPC), was to be set up within the Home Office as the 'upper level planning authority in the country ... to co-ordinate the plans and projects of the different Ministries that intervene in urban planning'[36]. It was made responsible for the overall direction of a National Urban Plan, which was to set out the 'major guidelines for urban development'[37] in all Spain. Within the NUPC, a Central Urban Planning Commission (CUPC) was to be created to 'act as a Standing Committee for the NUPC, to implement and administer the NUPC's policy directives'[38]. Within the General Directorate of Architecture, the Urban Planning Division was expanded and the Directorate Planning (GDAUP), to act 'as a permanent authority charged with the preparation, management and implementation of the directives of both the NUPC and the CUPC'[39].

At provincial level, provincial planning commissions, some of which already existed, were empowered to draw up provincial plans 'to provide the basic structure for urban planning in the Province'[40], whilst at the level of the municipality, the larger councils[41] were made responsible for producing general development plans, giving land-use classifications to the entire municipality, to be binding on all developers and development. Councils could combine together to form sub-regional planning authorities, and draw up sub-regional general development plans, some of which, as we have seen. Preceded the 1956 Act.

Table 5.2. The plan approval process established in the 1956 Planning Act.

<i>Plan-making Authority</i>	<i>Initial Approval</i>	<i>Public Information Stage</i>	<i>Audience of Local Corporations Stage</i>	<i>Provisional Approval</i>	<i>Definitive Approval</i>
1. Local council or private enterprise	By the local council	Opened by the local council, to last one month, during which time members of the public and affected development agencies may put their case either for or against the plan	—	By the local council	By the sub-regional or provincial planning authority
2. Other planning authority or state agency	By the plan-making authority	As above but opened by the plan-making authority	Opened by the plan-making authority, to last one month, during which time the local council (and other public agencies) may put their case either for or against the plan	By the plan-making authority	By the sub-regional, provincial or other upper-tier planning authority (e.g. General Directorate of Urban Planning)

At a local level, plans were seen as an instrument for the implementation of general plans. They were 'for the development of General Plans'[42] and were to contain the detailed design and lay-out of new development, and building regulations based on density and volume limits set in the land-zone classifications of the general plan. Similarly, roads and service projects were to design, programme, and cost out the provision of road and service infrastructure (roads, drainage, sewerage system, street lighting) in the local plan areas. Local plans and roads and service projects could be drawn up by any planning authority, and 'along with municipal plans, these can be drawn up by private individuals'[43]. The four-stage plan approval process (table 5.2), however, gave planning authorities the responsibility for giving definitive approval to urban plans, without which they were not executive.

Land use classification

The land-use classification system was based on three broad types of division of land into which all classifications were to fall – ‘urban land’, ‘urban reserve’ and ‘rural land’. As a rule, all land within the existing built-up area at the time of plan approval was given ‘urban land’ status, ‘urban reserve’ comprised those areas earmarked for the possible future expansion of the built-up area, and all other terrain was classified as ‘rural land’.

Through this classification system, the Act attempted to impose strict conditions on development. On ‘rural land’ all development was prohibited except that which conformed with the particular rural land use (e.g. farm houses, forestry administration buildings etc.). For development to take place on ‘urban reserve’, a local plan would first have to be drawn up and approved, providing detailed plans of the proposed development, and changing the land-use classification(s) as necessary, thereby giving the area the generic status of ‘urban land’. Even then, however, development could not take place until the necessary services infrastructure had been provided, which was stipulated as ‘road surfacing and paving, and water, sewage and street lighting systems’[44]. This meant, then, that any development on green-field sites would have to follow a strictly regulated procedural course in which local council and sub-regional or provincial planning authorities could exert a planning and development control role at the local plan, roads and service project, and building permit cession stages (figure 5.21). It is worth noting here that sub-regional plans for most of the country’s major cities pre-dated the 1956 Act and that in these plans more complex land-use classification systems had been used (figure 5.20). Whilst the 1956 Act recognized these plans and their land classification systems, it left each municipality within the sub-region to superimpose the three -way generic division of land onto the established classifications, subject to approval by the sub-regional authority. In practice, this became a mere technicality, as the rural classifications were self-evident, and in these zones non-conforming development was prohibited; if basic service infrastructure did not exist in areas classified for development, then by definition these were ‘urban reserve’, and a local plan and roads and service project had first to be drawn up and approved before development could proceed.




Figure 5.21. Plan approval and control procedure in the residential development of a green-field site by a private sector developer.

The implementation of plans and development

The 1956 Act emphasized that urban growth should proceed through the controlled development of new estates (*poligonos*):

For the implementation of General Plans, the plan area may be divided into so many estates, to attend the necessities of urban development. These estates will normally comprise several blocks (manzanas) of development and will be planned for one or more of the following reasons:

- To create an integrated nucleus of buildings and services.
- To create a homogenous area of development in a zone characterized by a predominantly different type of development.
- To facilitate the development of an area by public or private enterprise[45]

The legislators, then, envisaged a model of urban growth in which the sprawl of the central core was arrested, and new development, carefully planned and controlled through the local plan mechanism, would take place in the ‘urban reserve’ areas surrounding the central core (figure 5.22).




Figure 5.22. The model of urban growth envisaged in the 1956 Planning Act (after Teran).

The Act also devised four ‘systems of intervention’ in which landowners and local authorities could combine to finance and manage the implementation of new development. Under the *co-operative system*, owners of land to be developed had to cede, without payment of compensation, the land on which roads, public parks and gardens were to be built, and also ‘finance and manage the provision of roads, paving, drainage, sewage, streetlighting, water, gas electricity networks, and such tree, shrub and flower planting as there may be ...’[46]. Councils and other public bodies were empowered to declare development to be of ‘immediate importance’ and bring the co-operative system into effect, or alternatively, proceed by compulsory purchase through the *expropriation system* and undertake development themselves. Landowners could also join together to form development boards to finance and manage the plan-making for, and development of, their land. Members of the council and other local corporations could be co-opted onto the board, which became responsible for working out compensation payments for landowners affected by the proposed development. For this reason, this form of management, which allowed for the planning and development of completely private estates, was called the *compensation system*. Finally, the *cession of roads system* was similar to the co-operative system, except that the local authority, rather than the developers, took responsibility for financing and managing the provision of service infrastructure (roads, pavements, sewage system, drainage, street lighting etc.), once land had been ceded to them. The local authority, however, could then charge landowners benefiting from the infrastructure ‘special contributions’ to cover 80 per cent of the capital expenditure.

In practice, the two most common forms of intervention have been the ‘co-operative’ and ‘cession of roads’ systems and we shall examine below just how this has affected the urban growth process. As regards the other two systems, local authorities have, as a rule, been limited by lack of finances from using the expropriation system, although development by central state authorities has often involved expropriation on a large scale. The compensation system has been used for financing and promoting private estates, but these have constituted a relatively minor component in the growth of Spain’s cities.

Summary

There are many other aspects of this Act that could be discussed, and this brief account has attempted to cover the fundamental components only. We can summarize the most significant features of the Act as follows:

1. The Act established a tiered hierarchy of urban plans and planning authorities at the national, provincial, sub-regional, municipal and local levels.

2. It established the distinction between general (municipal or sub-regional) plan and local plan. Local planning authorities were made responsible for drawing-up and approving general development plans. Local plans were to be used for the detailed planning of 'estates', which constituted the major physical form of urban growth.
3. A land-use classification system was to be used in general plans, as a means of controlling development. New 'estate' development was to take place in the areas of 'urban reserve', but a local plan had first to be drawn up and approved. Systems of intervention were set out to provide further guidelines for co-operation between the various agencies involved in the development process.
4. The Act accepted that private enterprise could play a leading role in the plan-making and development processes, although plan approval remained in the hands of planning authorities within the Public Administration.

Let us now turn to examine how this machinery functioned in practice.

State housing policy and the application of the 1956 Planning Act

There seems to be little doubt that the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1957 and the government pre-occupation with housing policies and programmes in the 1950s and 1960s contributed significantly to the rupture of the tiered hierarchy of planning authorities which was central to the functioning of the planning system laid down in the 1956 Act. As already noted, the shortage of houses in the major urban centres led to the rapid spread of shanty towns in the city peripheries, constituting something of a crisis situation. The masses encamped in the shanty areas represented an ever present threat to law and order, and the General Strike in 1951 in Barcelona was repeated elsewhere in the early 1950s; the *resistencia de la población* more or less forced the central government to intervene more directly in the housing sector.

From the early 1950s onwards, the General Directorate of Architecture (then part of the Home Office) worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour and the sub-regional planning authorities on the planning and development of the early housing estates in the major cities. In 1954, the Limited Cost Housing Act introduced new subsidies[47] for private and public promoters of limited-cost housing, and the majority of housing estates constructed in Madrid and Barcelona over the next twenty-five years drew on the state aid and subsidies made available in this Act, and its 1957 Amendment Act[48]. The first National Housing Plan was launched in 1955 with the objective of constructing 550,000 houses between 1956 and 1960, and was followed in 1961 by a more ambitious Housing Plan with a target figure of 3.7 million houses in the period 1961-76, a figure passed in 1975.

The provision of housing, then, through direct intervention by state housing authorities, but above all through subsidies made available to the private sector, was a major concern of successive Franco governments from the early 1950s onwards. This tended to divert attention within the Cabinet away from creating the upper-tier planning authorities which featured in the 1956 Planning Act, which in turn resulted in a general lack of control, co-ordination and direction of urban planning practice and machinery in the country as a whole. In October 1956, just five months after the passing of the 1956 Act, a Decree was issued setting out the guidelines for collaboration between the National Institute of Housing and the General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning (GDAUP) on the acquisition and preparation of urban land to be used for the construction of state housing estates. This role was reinforced with the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1957 and the removal of the GDAUP from the Home Office to function within the new Ministry as two separate Directorates – the General Directorate of Architecture and the General Directorate of Urban Planning (GDUP). Similarly the National Institute of Housing was taken from the Ministry of Labour to become part of the General Directorate of Housing within the new Ministry (figure 5.23).

This reorientation of the GDUP meant that little attention was given to creating the other upper-tier planning authorities referred to in the 1956 Act. Neither the National Urban Planning Council nor the Central Urban Planning Commission were ever created, with the GDUP theoretically taking on all upper-tier responsibilities assigned to these two bodies in the 1956 Act. But in fact, the ministerial reorganization destroyed the coherency of the country's planning machinery with the GDUP functioning within the Ministry of Housing and the local councils still directly answerable to the Home Office. The GDUP became increasingly concerned with the acquisition of land for the construction of state-financed (and subsidized) housing estates, acting independently of the local councils, often without consultation, in the programming of state housing estates. Work on the National Urban Plan did not start until the early 1960s, following the creation of the National Institute of Urban Development in 1959 (within the Ministry of Housing) to take on some of the land acquisition responsibilities of the GDUP[49]; but even then, only preparatory studies were undertaken before the whole project was shelved after the World Bank report of 1962 recommended the adoption of four-yearly national (regional-economic) development plans[50], three of which were subsequently drawn up and approved for the periods 1964-66, 1968-71, 1972-75, based very much on the French growth poles model.

In this changing political-economic and planning context, the provincial planning commissions which, as noted above, were supposed to have played a crucial role in strategic and regional planning as a link mechanism between the National Urban Plan and the general plans, found themselves over-shadowed by Ministerial investment programmes and central state intervention that by-passed the provincial governments, or at most, used them as rubber stamp




Figure 5.23. Internal structure of the Ministry of Housing, 1957

authorities. At the same time they received ‘increasingly less economic support from the Local Corporations, which had previously felt under some obligation to co-operate when the General Directorate of Urban Planning was part of the Home Office,’[51]. Only two provincial plans (Barcelona 1963, Guipuzcoa 1964) were ever approved, both drawn up by Doxiadis Associates, the international consultants, and both plans soon became obsolete because of changes in the economic policies to which they were closely tied. At the national and provincial levels, then, neither the planning authorities nor the plans for which provision had been made in the 1956 Act fulfilled their attributed responsibilities and roles.

At the general (sub-regional and municipal) plan level, however, the story is not so bleak. In a study published in 1974, Capel[52] noted that there existed 1116 general plans in all Spain (the vast majority of which had been drawn up since 1956), 738 having been definitively approved and 378 being in various stages of preparation. Although these general plans collectively encompassed only 1389 municipalities out of a national total of over 9000, nearly all the country’s major urban areas were covered. Teran[53] has pointed out how, in the drawing up of these plans, the ministerial schism between the GDUP and the local councils, alluded to above, resulted in councils adopting a much more autonomous line than would otherwise have been the case, with the procedural and technical demands of the 1956 Act often being misunderstood or even deliberately ignored.

As regards the local plan level, we have already noted that the 1956 Act laid particular emphasis on the ‘estate’ as the major morphological form of peripheral growth and that planning law demanded that a local plan and a roads and services project be drawn up and approved before estate development could take place. This, then, would enable planning authorities to exercise a development control role at this level, as well as at the building permit level. Studies undertaken on the role of local plans in the expansion of metropolitan areas (Ferrer[54], Herrero[55], Ribas Piera[56]) reveal that the local plan mechanism was indeed a key element in the planning and development of peripheral growth, even though these plans were not always definitively approved by the planning authorities. At the same time, studies such as those of Montero[57] and Wynn[58] in Barcelona show that local plans were often used to bring about changes in land-use classifications established in general plans, usually with resultant increases in residential and/or building densities compared with those specified in the general plan. Additionally, the desire of municipal councils ‘not to appear a village’ (*no parecer un pueblo*) and inter-municipal rivalry tended to favour high-rise construction by private developers, and a recent study of Can Serra[59] reveals how local level planning instruments and regulations were often circumvented or used in the bargaining process between developer and council. As Teran has said ‘a rivalry between Councils and cities sparked off a chain reaction benefitting the innoble career of so many developers that in this era exploited to the full their El Dorado. How many prestigious avenues did they create in this way, with the ensuing congestion from which those same cities suffer today?’[60].

The resultant poverty of the urban environment can also be explained by the fact that development had not always been carried out in accordance with the dictates of the local plan for a specific zone, as is witnessed by the lack of made-up roads, green spaces, schools and other facilities in many of Spain’s peripherally-located housing estates. Teran[61] has suggested a model for city growth in Spain in which housing and industrial estates (with or without local plan approval_ and haphazard shanty development have been built on land classified as ‘urban reserve’ and ‘rural land’ in the general plan, and increased building densities in the centre (‘urban land’) have resulted in congestion and overcrowding (figure 5.24).

There are a number of interconnected factors which have contributed to these forms of development. The local level planning machinery established in the 1956 Act had certain inherent weaknesses. The Act was extremely vague on the local plan-general plan relationship, stating that local plans were for ‘the development of’[62] general plans but not specifying to what extent land-use classifications might be changed. This loophole in the Act was made all the worse because of the rigid system of checks and controls which the Act introduced for the regulation of estate development proved to be unworkable in practice. It is often unrealistic to expect all road and associated service infrastructure to be completed in an entire zone prior to all construction, given the fragmentation of property boundaries, the speculative




Figure 5.24. Teran's model of urban growth in Spain since 1956

retention of land[63] by some landowners, and the impotence of financially-weak local councils to intervene as effective development agencies. The inadequacy of the local level planning instruments in practice reflects the fact that planning law in Spain, in the Franco era, was ill-equipped to deal effectively with the wide range of political and economic variables that play such an important part in conditioning the functioning of the development process. The 'cession of roads' and 'co-operative' systems of intervention were often hamstrung in practice by the interplay of a number of factors – lack of local authority finances and loan facilities; multiplicity of private sector development agencies; local authority-private sector corruption and collusion; and non-co-ordination and general inadequacy of macro-service provision (schools, hospitals etc.) by government ministries.

This combination of circumstances meant that the provision of road and service infrastructure through the 'co-operative' and 'cession of roads' systems was unlikely to take place, if it took place at all, prior to house and factory development, and that the statutory planning machinery was unlikely to play a major role in the regulation and co-ordination of development. Once local plans had been approved, the local council and private sector developers



Figure 5.25. Part of the Princess Triangle in the Pozos neighbourhood of Madrid, where office and commercial development replaced old city residences in the 1970s

embarked on the *ad hoc* implementation of development, in which behind-the-scenes collaboration played a major part in directing the course of change. At the same time, the by-passing of plan procedure by central state housing authorities[64] has only added to the lack of credibility given to the formalized planning system, and reinforced a *status quo* in which the local planning authorities openly collaborated with private sector agencies in the ‘bending’ or open contravention of planning procedure.

The resultant urban growth process has been one of piecemeal anarchic sprawl in the city periphery and increasing building densities in the old city centres and central *ensanches*, as tertiary activities have replaced residential properties[65] (figure 5.25). Above all, however, it is the deficit in basic services which have constituted the major problem with which the new administrations in the post-Franco era have had to grapple. Some impression of the magnitude of the problem is given by the Financial Economic Survey[66] undertaken as a preliminary study for the revision of the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan. The survey found that to meet *existing* deficits in schools, water supply, drainage and sewerage networks, road infrastructure, health centres, markets etc., in the sub-region, the public administration would have to find 64,000 pesetas (£420) for every person (3.2 million) living in the sub-region. To comply with the minimum service standards set by statute and incorporated into the 1976 Sub-Regional Plan, the local councils alone would have to buy 1500 hectares for urban parks, 450 hectares for collective service buildings (schools, hospitals, libraries etc.) and 1800 hectares for roads. It is worth noting also that 16,500 hectares in the sub-region have been affected by local plans, almost one-third of the entire area, and Sabater Cheliz[67] has shown that this raised the population potential of the sub-region to 7½ million in 1974, compared with 4.1 million estimate in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan.

Finally, it is interesting to note that in the 1960s attempts were made to draw up and approve metropolitan area plans for Madrid and Barcelona, a level of planning for which provision had *not* been made in the 1956 Act. In Madrid, five industrial/residential decongestion estates had been designed outside the city in 1959 and these were reinforced in the Madrid Metropolitan Area Plan, drawn up in 1963, which was a further extension of the decentralization theme embodied in the 1933 and 1946 plans. The growth of the centre was to be contained by a forested green belt and new industrial growth centres in the Tajo and Henares valleys were to transform the capital into a ‘pole of impulsion’ for the future growth of the central region. New out-of-town commercial, social and cultural centres were to be created to serve the city periphery and counterbalance the pull of the established centre. The plan was approved in 1964 and a new urban management body – COPLACO – was established to manage and supervise plan implementation and the co-ordination of sectoral investment in the metropolitan area. In practice, however, the autonomous intervention of different ministries has prevented COPLACO playing any effective co-ordinating role and at the same time has failed to provide the basic service infrastructure included in the plan. The urban management role of COPLACO has in effect been reduced to a weak development control function in which a wide range of modifications to the plan’s zonings have been accepted, as the private sector has been left to play the dominant role in the development process. As such the 1963 Metropolitan Plan soon became out-dated and lost credibility as a framework for the growth of the capital.



Figure 5.26. The Plan Director for the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Meanwhile, in Barcelona, the Sub-regional Planning Authority (created in 1953), whilst undertaking the revision of the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan in the early 1960s, suggested that the effective planning of the Barcelona conurbation demanded planning at metropolitan area level. The resultant *Plan Director* (figure 5.26), covering half the province (193 municipalities), was technically more advanced than its Madrid counterpart but was in fact a compromise between two main decentralist schools of thought. Where the conflict was clearest was in the location of commercial, service, and administrative centres. On the one hand, the diverse components of these activities, belonging to spheres of influence of different magnitude which generally centre on Barcelona, suggested their concentration in one centre. On the other hand, the interdependence of such activities suggested comprehensive decentralization of all activities. The first option, which led to criticism on the grounds of resultant congestion of the centre and high costs of renewal, was in many ways an extension of the decentralization model that formed the basis of the plans for Madrid in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s: the metropolitan fabric, composed of a series of satellites, needs a 'core' body of distinct and superior character. In the final version of the *Plan Director*, the *centro direccional*, located not in Barcelona, but beyond the mountain mass of Tibidabo between San Cugat and Sardanyola, fulfilled this purpose. On the whole, however, the plan was closer to the city-territory structural model based on the decentralization of all activities. It aimed principally at stimulating secondary poles in the metropolitan system, by means of the retention of higher levels of 'directional' and tertiary activities in each centre, some of which were clearly to function as 'propulsion' nuclei for their surrounding sub-regions, some as 'rehabilitation' centres, aimed at bringing about a restructuring and improvement of ill-equipped peripheral areas, whilst others had certain characteristic functional specializations (transport, commerce, administration). It was this more radical form of decentralization, based on the city-territory model, and catering more for social-equity goals, that characterized the Metropolitan Area Plan for Barcelona which was finally approved by the central government in 1968 as a partial modification to the 1963 Provincial Plan. In the early 1970s support for the plan was subsequently withdrawn by the Madrid government, whilst it gained increasing support amongst industrialists and economists as the diseconomies of agglomeration, particularly congestion in and around the city, began to outweigh the external economies. It remains an interesting technical document that might well yet be resurrected as the basis for subsequent planning at this level in the near future.

Developments in the 1970s

By the end of the 1960s, the urban situation in Spain's major cities was reaching a crisis point. Migration in Madrid and Barcelona (table 5.3) continued on such a scale (in early 1970s the growth of Madrid and Barcelona each averaged over 100,000 a year, constituting almost half the national annual demographic growth) that new measures were clearly needed to plan and control their growth effectively. This was all the more so because the planning machinery embodied in the 1956 Planning Act had failed to function efficiently at all levels, and the development of new planning concepts abroad only served to emphasize the need for alternative planning forms and solutions in Spain. Such change, which occurred in different ways throughout the 1970s, brought about the introduction of new planning concepts in a revised National Planning Act, in individual plans for different cities, and in *ad hoc* initiatives at both the macro and micro levels.

Table 5.3. Inter-regional migration 1900-1970 (The figures strikingly reveal the increasing dominance of the north east and Madrid as the main migration 'gainers' in the country this century.)

Region	Net Migration ('000)		
	1901-30	1951-60 average per decade	1961-70
Galicia	- 109	- 227	229
Cantabrico (centring on Bilbao)	- 12	121	168
Western Duero	- 103	- 196	- 276
Eastern Duero	- 70	- 153	- 190
Madrid	150	412	687
Western Tajo-Guardiana	- 32	- 302	- 618
Eastern Tajo-Guardiana	- 30	- 167	- 217
Western Ebro	- 41	- 35	48
Eastern Ebro	- 51	- 79	- 46
North East (centring on Barcelona)	190	484	806
Levante	- 66	5	201
Western Andalusia	32	- 156	- 435
Eastern Andalusia	- 106	- 413	- 409
Canaries	10	-6	19
Whole country	- 238	- 712	- 491

Source: Richardson, H. W. (1974) *Regional Development Policy in Spain*. Farnborough: Saxon House

The most dramatic of these initiatives was the New towns policy introduced in 1970 by Antonio Linares, the new Director of Urban Planning in the Ministry of Housing. The Urgent Development (ACTURS) Act of 1970 gave the Ministry of Housing new powers to expropriate land to develop green-field new towns and short-cut statutory planning procedure in the plan approval and implementation stages. Eight new towns (or 'integrated urban units') were designated, 10-30 kilometres outside Barcelona (three projects), Madrid, Valencia, Seville, Zaragoza and Cadiz, covering more than 11,000 hectares in all with a total population projection of 800,000. It was in many ways an implicit recognition by the central government that they had little time for a planning system that demanded forms of co-ordination and management that they could not provide. Instead, they were substituting an autonomous, heavy handed, intervention which cut right across existing statutory plans (but which ironically coincided to some degree with the *Plan Director* in Barcelona which the central government had shelved) and which attempted to provide a rapid solution to the urgent need for new housing, new land and decongestion in Spain's urban centres.

The new town destinations met opposition from several quarters. Planners attacked the ACTURS as anti-planning because of the scant regard paid to statutory procedure and the general absence of an overall planning framework. Noguera, for example, wrote that 'it needs great ingenuity to see how a vast estate of housing and industry, created autonomously by those who choose to ignore the basics of the urban growth process, has anything to do with planning or the strategy of development'[68]. The 1970 Act also provided for private enterprise to play a leading part in planning, financing, and managing the new towns once the state had expropriated the land, and many were concerned at trusting the large capital promoters with these responsibilities: the form and content of the programme led many to believe it would only encourage peripheral sprawl on an even larger scale than before.

Affected landowners, including the councils, fought the expropriation orders tooth and nail, taking their case to the supreme appeal courts, which invariably upheld the order but often increased compensation payments. The court hearings so held things up that the momentum of the ACTURS programme in general was lost, and by the mid-1970s only in Gallecs (1472 hectares), near Barcelona, and Tres Cantos (1690 hectares), outside Madrid, had much progress been made in acquiring the land, and in none of the new towns had building been started.

This loss of momentum was compounded by political changes in the Ministry of Housing in Madrid and a general weakening of support for the ACTURS policy in the Cabinet, following strong opposition from the property-owning lobbies of Madrid and Barcelona. In 1975, however, in the first government of King Juan Carlos, the new Minister of Housing (Lozano Vicente) revived the ACTURS projects, and the following year two 'mixed companies', founded with public and private capital, were created by decree, one in Madrid to manage Tres Cantos, the other in Barcelona to try to revive the flagging Gallecs project. Since then, however, the protracted devolution of power to the Catalan Parliament has left the Gallecs issue somewhat in limbo[69] and only in Tres Cantos is construction going ahead. Thus, over a decade after the approval of the Urgent Development Act, not one of the eight new towns is yet built and the future of all except Tres Cantos must remain in doubt.

Long before Linares had embarked upon the ACTURS new towns initiative, the GDUP had started work on a series of studies to provide the basis for the revision of the 1956 Planning Act. At the upper-tier levels, the provincial plans had failed to provide the necessary link between national economic planning and 'general' urban planning, and the Third National (Regional-Economic) Development Plan (1972-75) called for a new type of regional plan to fulfil this role. At the general plan level, there was a general feeling amongst the planning profession that the 1956 Act was inadequate, in that it was too rigid to accommodate new planning concepts and techniques, with its emphasis on blue-print, land-zone classification plans. In general plans of Logroño, Elche, Santiago and the revision of the Barcelona plan (figure 5.27), planners were incorporating new techniques that were contradictory to the planning concepts underlying the 1956 Act. General criticism of the Act was only reinforced by comparison with the new planning ideas and concepts introduced in the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act in Great Britain and the 1967 *Loi d'orientation foncière* in France.

It was, however, at the local plan level that many planners felt the law should be tightened up. The vagueness of the 1956 Act on the local plan-general plan relationship and the freedom given private enterprise in the plan-making process had meant, as we have seen, that in some cities private and public developers had been permitted to make radical changes in land-use classifications in general plans through the local plan mechanism. At the same time, direct intervention by state housing authorities in the construction of housing estates had not always followed 'local plan' regulations and procedure, only compounding the 'credibility problem', with the GDUP finding it increasingly difficult to enforce planning law at the local level when other state authorities were known to have contravened planning procedure themselves.

Land speculation, as part cause, part effect, of the failure of the 1956 Act, remained a major feature in determining the pace, cost and nature of urban growth. Lasuen, one of the main architects of the 1979 Reform Act, wrote in 1972 that 'the critical factor is not so much whether or not there is a monopoly of land, but rather the series of conditions that determine the elasticity of the supply of, and demand for, land. What is needed is a policy directed at increasing the effective availability of land for development'[70].

In the end, however, following a series of drafts and amendments in the Spanish Parliament, the modifications introduced in the Act were essentially technical. At the upper-tier level, a new type of plan – *Plan Director de Coordinación* (PDC) was introduced to replace the old provincial plans. The PDC could be on provincial or supra-

provincial scale and was intended to set general planning regulations to act as guidelines for the drawing up of lower-tier (general) plans. At the same time, it was to establish ‘the physical framework for the implementation of national, economic and social planning, and in particular regional development policy’[71]. This, then, represented a new conception of the role of regional planning to link physical planning with national economic planning, and to co-ordinate sectoral intervention. Unfortunately, however, the Act did not introduce any new planning authorities to take responsibility for this level of planning, and, to date, no PDC has been drawn up in Spain.




Figure 5.27. A section of the Barcelona ‘Plan General Metropolitano’ of 1976.

These land-use classifications in and around the Tres Turons hill area, north of the city are an area of shanty and ‘marginal’ dwellings. Of particular significance are classifications 6b (new park areas), 14a (public remodelling), 16 (urban renovation/rehabilitation) and 17-6 (urban renovation: change of use)

Source: Wynn, M. (1976) Barcelona: Planning and Change 1854-1977. *Town Planning Review*, 50 (2) (drawn by J. Harvey).

As regards general plans, the Act gave them a more open, flexible role that did not have to be so closely tied to strictly defined land-use zonings. Nevertheless, general plans had to ‘classify the plan area to establish the corresponding legal framework for development; define the fundamental elements of the general structure for the ordering of the area; and establish a programme for its development and implementation’[72]. On the crucial issue of local plans, the Act stated that ‘they [local plans] cannot be drawn up unless there is an existing General Plan, and in no case can they modify the specifications of the General Plan’[73]. At the same time, minimum standards for green zones and service provision were established for local plans, and a general prohibition on all buildings of more than three floors high, unless special provision was made for such in plans and planning regulations, was introduced. The Act also introduced the concept of ‘Special Plan of Interior Reform’ (SPIR) to be used for the ‘improvement of the urban and rural environment and the city suburbs’[74], at local level. More specifically, they could be drawn up and approved with the ‘objective of carrying out operations in urban areas aimed at the decongestion of crowded zones, the clearing and improvement of unhealthy area, improving traffic circulation, environmental conditions or public services, or achieving similar objectives’[75]. The concept of special plan had, in fact, been introduced in the 1956 Act, but had been scarcely used in the urban areas, and the emphasis on improvement and renewal, a concept poorly developed in Spanish planning history, was new to the 1976 Act.

In summary, the 1976 Reform Act undoubtedly had its limitations, and should perhaps best be seen as an attempt to rationalize and control the urban growth process, which those who worked on the Act generally accepted as being necessarily linked to the evolution of Spanish capitalism at the time. As Ribas Piera has said:

Clearly one law cannot stand-out as being radically different from the general legal system of the country, which is a faithful reflection of the social-political structure which it attempts to regulate[76]

In comparison with the 1956 Act, the 1976 Reform introduced certain new positive measures to improve and update the potential functioning of the planning and control system, but today, in a changed political climate, a more radical reform of the law may soon be required. This is particularly the case with regard to the machinery for incorporating

resident opinion into the planning process in an era when conservation, rehabilitation and renewal are emerging as major new themes in both local and national politics.

The residents association movement in Spain is one of the most advanced in Europe in terms of organization and political activity. The widespread 'mobilization' of residents associations is nevertheless a relatively recent phenomenon, and Borja in fact identifies the mid-1960s as the turning point on the history of the movement:

The relative passivity of the working classes up until the mid-1960s manifested itself in a general acceptance of the disorderly growth of the city and the scant publicity given to the role of Local Plans in the development process. But from the mid-sixties onwards, the working classes and certain elements of the press adopted more active stances, as witnessed in recent years in increasingly successful campaigns against the lack of collective service installations[77].



Figure 5.28. Resident protest in San Cosme outside Barcelona.

This was one of several marches organized by the Residents Association in a state housing area infamous for its poor quality construction.

(Photo: M. Wynn, see: Wynn, M. (1980) San Cosme, Spain: planning and renewal of a state housing area. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, January.)

By the mid-1970s, the political and academic left were hailing a number of victories by residents associations in their fight against housing agencies, local authorities and developers. In many of the public housing areas, residents demanded house repairs (figure 5.28), the provision of missing schools, roads and green areas, and the drawing up of missing tenancy agreements[78], but the protest campaigns were not only limited to the public housing estates. Castells notes that:

In recent years, new social classes have become involved in these disputes, especially those in the residential complexes in the immediate suburbs, which were constructed by private promoters for skilled workers, officials and technicians. Their main concerns are with urban facilities and services, particularly schooling, where there is an insufficient number of places. In other cases, demands concern the quality of the environment, proposed increases in population density and the preservation of park areas[79].

Berriatual[80] has recently published his survey of resident association campaigns in Bilbao, and he notes how the association moved from an essentially defensive stance in the early 1970s to a more positive involvement in the planning and development processes in the post-Franco era, formulating (often with the help of consultants) its own proposals for renewal and improvement, and this impression is borne out by the accounts of Castells[81] and Borjal[82] referring to Madrid and Barcelona. Nevertheless, as Wynn's studies[83] in Barcelona reveal, existing legislation makes no adequate provision for the incorporation of resident preferences into the decision-making process in an era when the demand for new housing and development has begun to slacken, and improvement and renewal of existing peripheral estates have increasingly become major aspects of housing management. The legislative frameworks for planning, and above all, for financing such schemes were largely non-existent in the Franco era, and although the 'special plan of interior reform', introduced in the 1976 Planning Reform Act, has been used to good effect in some instances, such schemes generally rely heavily on the *ad hoc* co-operation and collaboration of varying central state agencies.

In Madrid, COPLACO produced a number of interesting studies relating to the revision of the 1964 Metropolitan Plan[84], including the Madrid-Gudalajara corridor (figure 5.29) in the 1970s, but rapid political change and divergent non-co-ordinated ministerial and local council policies have thwarted its attempts to secure any new executive planning




Figure 5.29. The Madrid-Guadalajara Corridor, 1972.

This development of Soria's Linear City concept arose from post-doctoral research undertaken at Cornell University in the early 1970s. Whilst it stimulated a great deal of interest in Madrid, it was never accepted as a formalized plan.

Source: Menendez de Lurca, J. (1976) El Corredor Madrid-Guadalajara. *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 2/3.

framework for the Madrid region (despite the merging of the Ministries of Housing and Public Works to form the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Affairs in 1977). At the local level, however, conservation of historic buildings in the old city and the *ensanche* (figure 5.30) had become an important issue in local politics[85], and COPLACO has also




Figure 5.30. La Corrala in the Lavapiés district of Madrid.

These two buildings comprise sixty-five houses in which over 500 people live. Made of adobe brick and based on a wooden structure, the buildings were declared a ruin (thus facilitating demolition) by the owner in 1975 and only saved after a long campaign by the residents and the Madrid College of Architecture.

(Photo: M. Wynn).

initiated a series of Immediate Action Programmes (PAI) aimed at providing short-term service provision in the capital to coincide with, and contribute to, the drawing-up of *Plan Director de Co-ordinación* at regional level[86]. It must be said, however, that the planning of Madrid at this upper-tier level poses enormous problems and that radical political initiatives and administrative reform will be required if any real change in current trends is to be achieved. This was borne out by the subsequent devolution of planning powers to the Madrid municipalities in 1980, following a series of

disagreements between the local and central administrations in Madrid, and the drawing up of a new series of general plans, by the Madrid municipalities in 1981-82. Time will tell if these new plans, reflecting a firm new initiative by the democratically-elected local governments, prove any more successful in controlling the growth of the capital than their numerous predecessors.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, it is perhaps worth some re-emphasis of the plans and events which emerge as being of particular significance in the evolution of planning and urban growth in Spain in modern times. The expansion of the old medieval cities beyond their walls in the middle of the last century ushered in a new era in planning and urban growth in the country, centring on the planning and development of the *ensanches*. Of the plans of *ensanche*, the Plan Cerdà stands out as technically and conceptually far in advance of the equivalent plans of other Spanish cities. Following recent research by Domingo[87] and Tarrago and Soria[88], little doubt now remains about the scientific rigour with which Cerdà approached the urban problems of his time and the importance of the idealized model, involving a functional specialization and an egalitarian hierarchy space, on which he based his plan.

In the early years of this century, the speculative development of the *ensanches* and the periphery beyond, and the ever present old city problems (overcrowding, congestion, poor sanitary conditions) saw the adoption and adaptation of a range of new planning ideas in the plans and projects of the time. Of these, Arturo Soria's Linear City had received widespread acclaim as the first formalized expression of a concept which has reappeared in a welter of plans and planning documents ever since, although ironically it has had relatively little impact on planning within Spain. And the Garden City concept features strongly in the plans for Madrid from the 1920s onwards, during an era straddling the second Republic, in which the exchange of ideas and experiences between European planners and their Spanish counterparts had a marked impact on the development of planning in the country.

The development of a body of national legislation to regulate the functioning of the country's planning machinery lagged behind advances made in individual plans. The 1924 Municipal Statute *did* make local authorities responsible for urban planning but was conceptually and technically of little consequence. Not until the approval of the 1956 Planning Act were all the disparate pieces of legislation affecting planning and development in the country drawn together in one Act. The failure of this Act to regulate urban growth effectively in the country was, as already discussed, the result of the interplay of a number of factors. The Act itself was vague and open to interpretation on certain critical issues, and the planning machinery was inflexible and inadequate in certain aspects. Ministerial schisms and rivalries, non-coordinated state intervention that often contravened approved plans, local political rivalry, corruption and collusion – all contributed to the malfunctioning of an Act which was drawn up in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the massive country-city migration, the increase in personal mobility and the urban and coastal construction boom of the 1960s and early 1970s were not foreseen.

A further factor, and an issue of utmost importance today, concerns the devolution of political power to the local level and the financial, human and technical resources available to local government. The financial weakness of most councils has meant they have had to rely almost entirely on the private sector or central state agencies to finance new development. Clusa[89] has pointed out that council budgets in Spain have rarely totalled 10 per cent of the gross public sector budget over the past forty years, compared with average figures of 18 per cent for West Germany, 27 per cent for Great Britain and 38 per cent for Holland. Furthermore, gross public sector expenditure in Spain has averaged about 25 per cent of the GNP, compared with figures of around 50 per cent for these other countries. Clusa also notes that staff salaries alone account for up to 50 per cent of a typical council budget and that investment in new development and infrastructure is generally limited to 10-20 per cent of the budget (table 5.4).

Table 5.4 The council budget – the four major elements.

1.	Staff salaries	30 – 50%
2.	Municipal services: maintenance and provision	30 – 40%
3.	Annual interest payments and repayments on loans	10 – 20%
4.	Investment ('special budgets')	10 – 20%

It is clear that for local authorities to exercise, effectively, a planning and management function appropriate to today's urban problems, both their financial and administrative structure, and the planning and legislative framework within which they operate, will require substantial reform. Many councils' reforms remain woefully inadequate to plan and manage the operational intervention necessary to ensure the provision and maintenance of an acceptable range and standard of services and infrastructure. Technically multi-disciplinary, as well as politically pluri-ideological, local governments are needed, far removed from the air of corruption, collusion and dependency in which the two or three-

man committee and elementary technical services sections carried out their planning and management functions in the 1960s and early 1970s.

New legislative machinery is also required both to make greater finances more systematically available to local authorities[90], and to enable the general public to play a more participatory role in the planning process at local level, without having to resort to the pressured confrontation strategies and *ad hoc* collaborative channels that still epitomize resident association activity in local planning. Only then, when Spain's planning machinery is seen to operate effectively at the local and municipal level, will effective planning at the upper tier levels become feasible. To this end, Spain's legislators and professionals must attempt constructive adaptation and amendment of the current machinery in the light of experience gained in recent years, to offset the lack of credibility from which planning in Spain now suffers – a reflection of the general failure of urban planning to channel and control city growth affectedly in recent times.

Notes

- 1 During the nineteenth century, both Madrid and Barcelona expanded from less than 200,000 each in 1800 to over half a million each in 1900, whilst the population of the country as a whole increased from 10.5 million to 18.5 million. In 1975, the Barcelona Metropolitan Area contained a population of over 4 million, that of Madrid 3.3 million. The Metropolitan Area of Bilbao, the next largest city, contained 1 million people in 1976.
- 2 de Teran, F. (1978) *Planeamiento Urbano en la Espana Contemporanea*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gili.
- 3 Bruguera, M. (1862) *Historia del Memorable Sitio y Bloque de Barcelona*, Volume II. Barcelona.
- 4 Mesonero Romanos, R. (1860) *Nuevo Manual Historico-Topografico Estadistico de Madrid*. Madrid.
- 5 Capmany i Montpalau, A. (1961) *Memorias Historicas sobre la Marina, Comercio y Artes de la Antigua Ciudad de Barcelona*, Volume I. Barcelona.
- 6 Lopez, M. (1975) Vivienda y segregación social en Barcelona 1772-91. *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 19, May/June.
- 7 Bohigas, O. (1963) *Barcelona entre el Plá Cerda i el Barriquisme*. Barcelona.
- 8 Grau, R. (1973) La manufactura algodonerá y la ciudad. *Construcción Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 19., May/June.
- 9 Grau, R. (1974) La Barcelona industrial en la obra de Cerda. *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 100, January/February.
- 10 Garrut, J. M. (1963) Ildefonso Cerda, su ensanche y la satira de ambos. *San Jorge*, No. 51, July.
- 11 Cerdà's known works include:
 - Statistical Information on Barcelona* (1855)
 - Topographical Plan of Barcelona and its Suburbs* (1855)
 - Statistical Monograph of the Working Class in Barcelona* (1856)
 - General Theory of Construction of Cities, applied to the Project of Reform and Expansion of Barcelona* (1859)
 - Theory of Urban Movement and its Application to Inner City Reform in Madrid* (1862)
 - Theory of Linkages between Land and Sea Communications and its Application to the Port of Barcelona* (1865)
 - General Theory of Urbanization* (1867)
 - Project of Regionalization and Provincial Communications Network of Barcelona* (1873)Of these works, large sections of many remain undiscovered. In addition, much of Cerdà's unpublished work has not yet been found.
For a more in-depth examination of his work see Wynn, M. (1980) Ildefonso Cerdà, his 1859 Plan for Barcelona and Egalitarian Urban Science. *Trent Papers in Planning*, No. 16, Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic. See also Wynn, M. (1979) Barcelona, Planning and Change 1854-1977. *Town Planning Review*, 50, (20).
- 12 Domingo, M. (1973) Consideraciones sobre el plan Cerdà. *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 19, May/June.
- 13 Puig y Cadafalch, J. (1927) *La placa de Catalunya*. Barcelona: Llibreria Catalonia.
- 14 Gutkind, E. A. (1967) *Urban Development in Southern Europe: Spain and Portugal*. New York: The Free Press.
- 15 A social and functional segregation was envisaged in the plan report of Castro's Plan for Madrid. It notes that the factory area would be Chamberi, and the upper classes would live to the north on both sides of the Paseo Castellana, the middle classes in Salamanca, and the working classes to the south and to the side of the Retiro park. As for the Plan Cerdà, there is some disagreement amongst urban historians about Cerdà's intentions. Some, like Grau (see above, note 9.), consider that Cerdà intended the working classes to live to the east in and around the old *pre-ensanche* settlement nuclei and to remain in the old city, with the monied classes occupying the central *ensanche* and Gracia.
- 16 Miller, B. (1977) Ildefonso Cerdà: an introduction. *Architectural Association Quarterly*, 9, (1).
- 17 Soria y Mata, A. (1901) Un triunfo de la Ciudad Lineal. *Ciudad Lineal*.
- 18 Gonzalez de Castillo, H. (1931) A Spanish view of London's future. *Garden Cities and Town Planning*, London, December.
- 19 See, for example, Gonzalez de Castillo, H. (1933) Urbanismo, planes regionales el plan regional de Madrid. *La Construcción Moderna*, Madrid, September.
- 20 See Ortiz, A. (1976) Perspectiva y prospectiva desde Cerda: una linea de tendencia. *2C Construcción de la Ciudad*, No. 6/7.
- 21 See Wynn, M. and Smith, R. J. (1978) Spain: urban decentralization. *Built Environment*, March.
- 22 Sallaberry, J., Aranda, P., Lorite, J., and Garcia Cascales, J. (1924) *Plan General de Extensión de Madrid y su distribución en zonas*. Madrid.
- 23 Bassols, M. (1973) *Genesis y Evolución de! Derecho Urbanistico Español: 1812-1956* Madrid: Editorial Montecorvo, pp. 85-90.

- 24 'GATEPAC'-The vanguard Spanish architect/planner group - stands for 'Grupo de Arquitectos y Tecnicos Españoles para el progreso de la Arquitectura Contemporanea'.
- 25 de Teran, F. (1976) Notas para la historia del planeamiento de Madrid. *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 2/3.
- 26 Comite de Reforma, Reconstrucción y Saneamiento de Madrid (1939) *Esquema y bases para el desarrollo del Plan Regional de Madrid*. Madrid.
- 27 'In the streets of Amalia, Arco de Teatro, Berenguer, Cadena, Carreras, Cera, Cid and Conde de Asalto, there exist dwellings with a 20 per cent annual mortality rate'. Public lecture by Dr. Aguade, Mayor of Barcelona, quoted in *A/C* (GATEPAC's official journal), No. 6, 1932.
- 28 Congreso municipalista (1934) Ponencias. *Tiempos Nuevos*, No. 10/11, Madrid.
- 29 Saarinen, E. (1943) *The City, Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future*. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press.
- 30 Martinez de la Madrid, A. (1948) La creación de zonas industriales en Madrid. *Gran Madrid*, No. 3
- 31 Presidencia del Gobierno (1946) Decreto Ley sobre el Plan General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, July, Article .3.
- 32 A provincial planning commission sat under the presidency of the civil governor of the province and was made up by representatives of the Ministries of Public Works, Industry and Agriculture, plus specialist planners, engineers, architects and surveyors drawn from local authorities, consultancies, and else- where.
- 33 Teran (1978) *op. cit.*, p. 342 (see note 2).
- 34 Bidagor, P. (1967) Situación general de urbanismo en España. *Revista de Derecho Urbanístico*, No. 4, Madrid.
- 35 According to private conversations between F. de Teran and P. Bidagor. See Teran (1978) *op. cit.*, p. 334 (see note 2).
- 36 Presidencia del Gobierno (1956) Ley de Regimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, May, Article 198.
- 37 *Idem*, article 7.
- 38 *Idem*, article 199.
- 39 *Idem*, article 200.
- 40 *Idem*, article 8.
41. Only those councils of municipalities with a 50,000 population, and councils of provincial capital cities, were made legally responsible for drawing up development plans. In other municipalities it was the overall responsibility of the provincial or sub-regional planning commissions to do so.
42. Presidencia del Gobierno (1956) *op. cit.*, article 10 (see note 36).
43. *Idem*, article 40.
44. *Idem*, article 63.
45. *Idem*, article 104.
46. *Idem*, articles 115-117.
47. The 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act introduced two categories of state aid. For 'Group 1 houses' no direct state subsidy was given, but constructors were conceded low-interest loans and exemptions from local rates. In addition to these benefits the constructors of 'Group 2 houses' (for which construction costs were regulated) could claim 20 per cent grants from the state for their construction, but the sale or rent return to the promotor was strictly limited. This limitation on profits restricted the uptake of grants by house promotors in comparison with the 'fixed subsidy' system introduced in the 1957 Amendment Act. For more detail, see Wynn, M. (1984) Spain, in Wynn, (ed.) *Housing in Europe*. London: Croom Helm.
48. The 1957 Housing Act introduced the category of 'fixed subsidy dwellings', for which a 30,000 peseta per house direct state grant was made available. Loans from the Construction Credit Bank were also made available at low interest rates with fiscal exemptions. In 1963 certain incongruities between the 1954 and 1957 Acts were smoothed out in a further amendment Act.
49. By 1976, the National Institute of Urban Development (INUR) had 128 residential and 46 industrial estates throughout the country, occupying over 7000 hectares, with a further 7000 hectares under construction. See: INUR (1977) *La creación de suelo urbanizado-informe*. Madrid: Arce & Potti S.A.
50. For the history of national development in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s see: Richardson, H. W. (1975) *Regional Development Policy and Planning in Spain*. Farnborough: Saxon House; Naylor, J. (1975) Iberia, in Clout, H. (ed.) *Regional Development in Western Europe*. New York: Wiley; and Alonso, L. and Hebbert, M. (1982) Regional planning in Spain and the transition to democracy, in Hudson, R. and Carney, J. (eds.) *Regional Planning in Europe*. London: Pion.
51. Bidagor (1967) *op. cit.* (see note 34).
52. Capel, H. (1974) Agentes y estrategias en la producción del espacio urbano español. *Revista de Geografía*, (1-2), University of Barcelona, pp. 19-56.
53. Teran (1977) *op. cit.*, p. 506 (see note 2).
54. Ferrer, A. (1974) *Presentación y Estadística de los Planes Parciales de de Barcelona*. Barcelona: COACB.
55. Herrero, A. (1972) El desarrollo de nuestras ciudades después de la ley de Huelva. *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 4, IEAL, Madrid, pp. 15-34.
56. Ribas Piera, M. (1976) Ante el nuevo plan de ordenación de Murcia. *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 1, IEAL, Madrid, pp. 29-62.
57. Montero, J. (1972) El planificación parcial en la Comarca de Barcelona. *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 87, January/February.
58. Wynn, M. (1980) The Planning and Implementation of development in the Barcelona Periphery (A Case Study Approach). Ph.D. Thesis, CNA/Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic.
59. Wynn, M. (1981) The residential development process in Spain -A case study. *Planning Outlook*, 24(1).
60. Teran (1978) *op.cit.*, p. 507 (see note 2)

61. *Idem*, p. 569.
62. Presidencia del Gobierno (1956) *op. cit.*, article 10 (see note 36).
63. Every piece of planning legislation since the Civil War has made some reference to the need to combat the vicious circle of speculation, but none has succeeded in doing so. Maragall's study of land prices in the Barcelona Sub-Region shows that the real price of land increased an average 6.13 per cent per year during the period 1951-78, or a forty times increase over the period as a whole. See Maragall, P. (1978) *Els preus del sol (el cas de Barcelona)*. Doctoral thesis, Barcelona University.
64. See, for example, Wynn, M. (1980) San Cosme, Spain: Planning and renewal of a state housing area. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, January; and Wynn, M. (1979) Peripheral urban growth of Barcelona in the Franco era. *Iberian Studies* (University of Keele), Spring.
65. For an examination of the increase of tertiary activities in the centre of Madrid, see Alvarez Mora, A. (1979) *Madrid, las transformaciones del centro-ciudad en el modo de produccion capitalista*. Madrid: COAM.
66. Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona (1976) *Estudio-Economico-Financiero del Plan General Metropolitano*. Barcelona: CMB.
67. Sabater Cheliz, S. (1977) Proceso de urbanización en Barcelona y su traspais. *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 3, IEAL, Madrid.
68. Noguera, J. (1972) Nueva ciudad de Riera de Caldes. *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 87, January/February.
69. See: Wynn, M. (1980) Gallecs New Town, Spain. *Town and Country Planning*, November.
70. Lasuen, J. R. (1972) La politica de suelo urbano. *Arquitectura*, No. 162, Madrid: COAM.
71. Ministerio de la Vivienda (1972) *Proyecto de Ley de Reforma de la Ley sobre Regimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana*. Madrid.
72. Presidencia del Gobierno (1976) Ley Sobre Regimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana. *Beletin Oficial del Estado*, April, Article 11.
73. *Idem*, Article 13.
74. *Idem*, Article 22.
75. *Idem*, Article 23.
76. Ribas Piera, M. (1976) La practica del planeamiento urbanistico y la reciente ley de reforma de la del suelo. *Cercha*, No. 18, p.48.
77. Borja J. (1977) Urban social movements in Spain, in Harloe, M. (ed.) *Captive Cities*. Chichester: Wiley.
78. The 1954 and 1957 Housing Acts made possible both the sale and renting out of state subsidized housing. In the 1960s there was a general tendency towards sale and away from renting-out by both public and private sectors alike. In the public housing estates, most residents associations demanded that they paid fixed rents (at no more than 10 per cent of average salary), rather than long-term mortgage payments. Acceptance of a sale contract would invariably mean accepting responsibility for the repair of what were often poor quality dwellings.
79. Castells, M. (1978) Urban social movements and the struggle for democracy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(1), p. 139.
80. Berriatua, J. M. (1977) *Las Asociaciones de Vecinos*. Madrid: IEAL.
81. Castells, M. (1978) *op. cit.* (see note 79).
82. Borja (1977) *op. cit.* (see note 77)
83. Wynn, M., *op. cit.* (see notes 58, 59 and 64).
84. COPLACO (1977-78) *Colección: Analisis de problemas y oportunidades*, Documentos Monograficos, Nos. 1-12. Madrid: Coplaco.
85. See: Wynn, M. (1980) Conserving Madrid. *Town and Country Planning*, February.
86. See: *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 1, 1981, which focuses on recent planning initiatives in Madrid.
87. Domingo (1973) *op. cit.* (see note 12).
88. Soria y Piug, A. and Tarrago Cid, S. (1976) *Ildefonso Cerdà (1815-1876) Catálogo de la Expsición Comemorativa del Centenario de su Muerta*. Barcelona: Colegio de Ingenieros.
89. Clusa, J. (1978) Algunos problemas economicos y administrativos de la gestion publica urbana. *Butlleti*, No. 5, CEUMT, pp. 4-9.
90. During the Franco era, purely local sources of revenue, collected by local authorities, were gradually replaced by taxes collected by the Finance Ministry, which thus assumed the role of paymaster, dictating to the local authorities how monies should be spent rather than leaving them free to raise and spend money in accordance with their own perception of local needs.