Chapter One:

Overview of Themes and Context

Totality and Infinity was originally published in 1961. Ironically, considering its subsequent impact and fame, when Levinas first submitted the manuscript to the French publisher Gallimard it was rejected. Subsequently, through the support of the French philosopher Jean Wahl, he submitted it as a thesis for his Doctorat d'Etat (a French higher level qualification that allows one to teach at a university). The former was reputed to have said about the thesis that 'we are here to evaluate a thesis about which other theses will be written'.

His prophecy has not proved to be wrong. You only have to look at any bibliography to see that there have been countless theses, books and articles written about this work. Of course, in the end, a book has to stand on its own merits, and just because it is fashionable and read today does not mean it will be in the future.

What value does Totality and Infinity have? It reminds us of the importance of ethics by placing it in the concrete experience of the other. Today we might have the tendency to be suspicious of ethics because we are aware of the duplicity of our norms and moral codes that are the mask for political and economic power. When even corporations have ethical codes, we might think that the very basis of ethics has been compromised. Yet anyone looking for a formula to live would find Totality and Infinity disappointing. One of the great difficulties of reading this book is what Levinas means by ethics is not usually how we understand it. What is normally suggested to us by ethics I would call morality. Morality is the laws and principles you and I might live by, and through which we might judge others.
who have failed to do so. When we argue whether abortion is right or wrong, or distinguish between passive and active euthanasia, it is these rules we are debating. There are also the further philosophical arguments about what are the ultimate principles these choices depend upon. Do our moral laws have their source in our reason, such that they would be true of everyone, or our moral choices instead based upon our character that is socially and historical rooted? This is not what Levinas means by ethics, and nor will one find in his work a discussion of ethical principles and foundations that one would find in a traditional university course or textbook. This does not mean that there is no relation between ethics and morality for Levinas (he would probably call the latter 'justice' rather than 'morality'), but ethics, as the concrete experience of the other, is always first, and if our moral discussions are to have any basis, then they have their source in an ethical experience rather than in reason, or a particular history or community.

The big difference between Levinas's approach to ethics and the traditional way to think about morality, is that former begins with the experience of the other, whereas the latter starts with the self and works out wards. Let us imagine, for example, if we start with the rationalisation of a moral action. I first begin with an intention, and then subsequently determine, through a process of universalisation, whether such an action is moral or not. Even if I do not think morality is grounded in rationality but is a virtuous activity that evolves through moral experiences, then such a character is still a character of an individual. It is I who act morally, and it is I who must decide, tragically or not, whether my actions are moral. For Levinas, on the contrary, ethics begins not with the self but with the experience of the other. It is not I who decide to be ethical, rather I am forced to be ethical despite my wishes or intentions. Ethics has its source not in the will or freedom, but in the demand of the other who impels me to account for my actions, even in my refusal to do so. Whatever
moral codes I might live by or even fail to do so, and whatever moral decisions I have to make, have their source in this ethical reversal. We like to think, perhaps, that philosophers will tell us how to live, or will make our decisions for us in advance, but this is not what Totality and Infinity offers. It is not a moral guide.

Not only might the content of Totality and Infinity initially disturb our ordinary understanding of ethics, so might its style. Some might describe it pejoratively as poetic and literary because it does not put forward a standard philosophical argument. Rather than persuasively putting forward a case for ethics, it seems merely to describe repetitively the same experience of the other. Yet this is perhaps to misunderstand its methodology. Totality and Infinity is a work of phenomenology. Levinas does not really explain why this is the case (they are rare moments in the book where he actually reflects on his method). Moreover, he seems to take it for granted that his reader is acquainted with phenomenology, whereas it is more probable they are not. So the first task we must accomplish is a preliminary understanding of this phenomenological method. This does not have to be too technical (like most philosophical methods, phenomenology produces its own specialised vocabulary), because Totality and Infinity, does not depend on a detailed knowledge of phenomenology. However, we are never going to understand the evidence of Levinas's argument, even if in the end we reject it, if we do not have some grasp of its phenomenological claims.

One other fundamental objection against Levinas's work is that not only is it merely poetic but also prophetic (and perhaps for the critics of this work the two go together). Totality and Infinity is just a book of Jewish philosophy and therefore cannot be taken seriously as a philosophical work, since true philosophy should have a universal rather than
a dogmatic appeal. This accusation is not just that Levinas is Jewish, since every philosopher
must be someone, but his religious beliefs somehow infect his philosophical arguments (so
much so that they are not really arguments at all), and that anyone who agrees with them
but also share these beliefs. Totality and Infinity is, therefore, a Jewish book for Jews, rather
than for every reader. So not only do we have to explain why this book is universal, but also
why labelling it 'Jewish' in the pejorative sense misses the mark.

[B] The Phenomenological Method of Totality and Infinity

Phenomenology was a method of doing philosophy invented by Edmund Husserl.² Although
Husserl discovered phenomenology and his name is forever associated with it, it is perhaps
better to characterise it as a 'rediscovery'. Philosophy, unlike science for example, does not
discover new theories, for its questions and problems are perennial. It can, however, go into
periods of decline where the subject matter of philosophy appears only to be for philosophy
itself rather than the world outside of it. At such times philosophy can be dominated by
professors in the university, and charlatans and faith-healers outside of it. Phenomenology
is the demand for philosophy to return to its roots and its beginnings. This is not merely an
historical demand, which can end up in an empty historicism, but experiential. What is the
fundamental basis of our experience of the world, and how can we claim to know anything
at all? Husserl's answer to this question is subjectivity. The world only is because it is for
someone. If the world did not appear to me as already meaningful then it would not be at
all. The stone does not appear to the stone, or the supernova to the supernova. Things are
only to the extent that they manifest themselves to someone.

One of the greatest opponents of phenomenology is naturalism. Naturalism is the
belief that nature has a meaning in itself (stones and supernova exist independently of their appearing to someone) and that anything that exists can be explained by natural laws, which are in turn independent of the mind that thinks them, such that Newton’s laws would still be true even if Newton or anyone else had never thought them. The dominance of naturalism, Husserl believed, had to do with the success of the natural sciences. Because the natural sciences can explain much of the phenomena we can see, it seems quite reasonable to think that they can describe the being of these phenomena as well. Today, through neuroscience, we even think our subjective experiences can be explained naturally, so that the full circle of scientific explanation will be closed (as though the neuroscientist will be able to explain the natural laws that govern the physicist’s brain when she thinks about quantum mechanics). The danger of naturalism, for Husserl, is that it would lead to relativism and scepticism, which would destroy the very basis of science itself. But even if naturalism did not lead to such a disaster to thought, it is not true, Husserl would say, to the experience on which it itself, like any other theory, must ultimately depend. The successes of natural science have led to its forgetting its own experiential basis.

The natural sciences treat the world as a natural object, and so they must if they are to be successful. Nature is subject to the laws of cause and effect, but it itself is a projection. This projection must have an origin. For the world to be a natural object, it first of all must appear. Such an appearing of the world is not subject to the laws of cause and effect, but is originally present. The aim of phenomenology is to describe this original presentation. Not to explain it, because it is already given (you cannot get behind the ‘givenness’ of the world, since it is already ‘there’, so to speak). If there were not such a world, then science would not be able to begin. The world is given to intuition. ‘Intuition’ is loaded word in the history of philosophy, and for this reason liable to misunderstanding. Husserl does not mean by it
an idea or image in the mind accessed through introspection, but the way in which something is presented to me. This presentation can take different forms. I can perceive something, remember or imagine it. I can be angry about someone, or I can even make judgements about a state of affairs that could be true or false. There are many ways in which the world can present itself to me, and through his different analyses Husserl attempts to capture their differences and details. At the heart of every presentation, however, is the fundamental structure of intentionality.

It is at this point that Levinas’s phenomenology breaks with Husserl’s. The other is given, but it is not given in intuition, and because it is not given in intuition it is not constituted by the intentionality of the subject. The other, then, for Levinas is an ‘extraordinary’ phenomenon, and is not given in the way, for example, a cup or a mathematical idea is given. In rejecting the ‘principle of all principles’, which is how Husserl described the primacy of intuition, Levinas is not returning to naturalism (this is why if we are to describe his thought as a kind of ‘radical empiricism’, we have to be careful what we mean by this expression).³ Levinas would accept that any kind of scientific or even common-sense empiricism is susceptible to Husserl’s critique, either because it cannot adequately explain the phenomena it sees, or hidden within it is an idealism it presupposes but does not clarify. What he does not accept, however, is that the other is given in that way. One way of thinking about this difference is beginning with the opposite. What would it mean to think of the other as though it were like a phenomenon as any other? I see the other in front of me. I can see that the other is not like any other object, because it appears to act, speak and think like me. The key expression in this imaginary situation is ‘like me’.⁴ I treat the other differently because I empathise with them. I see they are like a subject just like me, though I cannot literally occupy their minds as so see the world as they do. What we notice in this
little story is that it is I who determine the other, and not the other me. The other is only other, because I relate to them in that way. I of course could fail to empathise with them and treat them as I do any other object.

This constitution of the other through the self, rather than the other way around, is repeated in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, though it could be argued that he too rejected, in a qualified way, Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’. Understanding the difference between Levinas and Heidegger here will help us grasp in what way Levinas is still a phenomenologist. Additionally, *Totality and Infinity* requires that the reader has some grasp of Heidegger’s arguments, since much of the book is aimed directly against them. The aim of *Being and Time* is renew the question of being, which Heidegger believed had fallen into abeyance. It is to convince us only that this question is worth asking rather than answering it for us. Because we are the only beings whose being is a question for them (stones do not ask who they are, and more controversially, for Heidegger, neither do animals), we are the route into the question itself. Most of *Being and Time*, therefore, is a detailed phenomenological analysis of the being of human beings (which Heidegger calls Dasein). The first division describes the everyday being of this being, and demonstrates the temporal character of this being, and the second repeats this description, but now takes temporality as its starting point. When we think about the first division in relation to Husserl, what Heidegger is rejecting is a presupposition about the subject who knows or intuits. First of all, by making this subject the starting point of his philosophy, Husserl does not sufficiently investigate the being of that subject (in that way he merely repeats the unquestioning starting point of Descartes). Who is the subject who knows or intuits? Secondly, if Husserl had taken this ontology seriously, he would have seen that the theoretical subject is founded rather than founding. In other words there is a deeper level of engagement with the world than the
theoretical one, and this theoretical subjectivity is dependent on it. This deeper level is the engaged subject, or what Heidegger calls 'being-in-the-world'. Such a self does not relate to things in terms of knowing or even intuiting them, but through use. I do first of all see the door in front of me, but use it to enter the room. Of course I can subsequently speak of seeing the door, but Heidegger shows that such a seeing is not the same as using, and in fact the former is dependent on the latter, for if there were not a world as such, then precisely the practice of seeing (which has its highest form in the theoretical sciences), would not be possible. In the same way, Totality and Infinity repeats this digging down to discover what the fundamental principles of being a self are (this might be described as its transcendental method, again being careful what we mean by ‘transcendental’ in this context). The difference is that Being and Time, argues that this ground is ontological (indeed will describe it as ‘fundamental ontology’), whereas Levinas will argue that it is ethical.

This difference between a foundational ethics and a foundational ontology can be seen in how both philosophers describe the relation to the other. Even though Heidegger rejects intuition as a basis of understanding the relation of self to the world, his description of being with others repeats Husserl’s. For in both cases, the other is an element belonging to the self-understanding of the self, rather than someone who radically calls into question and limits this self-understanding. In Husserl’s description, I realise that the other is like me, whereas in Heidegger’s the other belongs to the way I relate to my own being. I can, as Heidegger says, relate to other authentically or inauthentically. I can free them for their own possibilities or I can try and control and dominate them. Notice, however, in both cases, such a path belongs to my existential project. The other is internal to Dasein’s being, even though I might not treat them in the same way I treat other things. When we come to the section 'Interiority and Economy' in Totality and Infinity, where Levinas is engaged most
explicitly with Heidegger, we shall see it is not simply a matter of Levinas rejecting his
analysis of existence (basically Levinas will ask whether we have to accept that existence
must be thought of as a finality of goals), but also this relation to the other. There is, if you
like, another experience of the other in which the other is not just one element amongst
many constituted by my relation to the world, whether this relation is thought theoretically,
as it is in Husserl, or concretely, as it is in Heidegger. In this relation, it is not I who constitute
the other, but the other me, and it is not the other who is internal to my consciousness or
understanding, but I who am interrogated. In the first case, the self is sovereign. It
constitutes the world, including the others it encounters after the fact. In the second, my
being is usurped by the other, as though the beginning of my existence were already for the
other, before any act of comprehension or understanding. This latter structure of
subjectivity is very difficult to understand, because we tend to presume the former. Indeed,
when we think about the ethical subject in terms of rights, duties and virtues, it is precisely
this subjectivity we presuppose. One way of understanding *Totality and Infinity* is that it is
offering a different model of subjectivity, where the subject is already split from within (as
though the other occupied my place despite me).

How then does Levinas reject intuition as a basis for ethical subjectivity? In *Totality
and Infinity*, we might speak of a major and minor way. The first is major not only because
that is what Levinas himself focuses on and which is his 'principle of all principles', so to
speak, but also this is how most read and interpret this book. The second way, as the name
suggests, is marginal and subordinate, but not for that reason without interest. The difficulty
of re-reading *Totality and Infinity* is how these two ways relate to one another. Levinas
presents them as though they complementary, but it could be argued they present radically
different ways of thinking about the relation to the other, and thus the structure of
subjectivity.

The major way of reading *Totality and Infinity* is that the other ‘presents’ themselves in speech in a manner that is not the same as vision. It is only because the other speaks that Levinas can claim that my relation to the other is not based in intuition, even the intuition that is reformulated by Heidegger in *Being and Time* through Dasein’s self-understanding. This is why Levinas will say that the other ‘reveals’ rather than ‘discloses’ themselves in speech (p. 207). The ethical inversion of intentionality does not exist in the words or the objects they refer to, but the manner in which the other attends the words they speak, and in so listening to them I respond to the demand of the other. It is not that I first of all comprehend the other such that I see that they are like me (or not like me), or that I understand the other in terms of my own projects, but I respond before I comprehend or understand. Such a response, which is dependent on the presence of the other in speech, is what Levinas means by transcendence. This transcendence is not to be confused with any ontological commitment to a world hidden behind this one (which for Levinas is always the danger of mysticism), but an ethical one. On this demand is built the rest of the world, both the world of justice and morals, which is how we normally understand ethics, but also the world of science, reason and objectivity. It is not ontology that determines ethics, Levinas will argue in the third section of *Totality and Infinity*, 'Exteriority and the Face', but ethics ontology.

If the priority of speech is the major way of reading *Totality and Infinity*, what then is the minor? Our reading at this point becomes more difficult and uncertain, because Levinas himself, or at least the text that bears his name, is so. One possible way to think of the difference between the major and minor way is how Levinas uses the proper names of Plato
and Descartes, who are the most heavily cited and referred to authors in Totality and Infinity. Plato represents the major interpretation, Descartes the minor. The other of speech is supported by the authority of Plato. Indeed, the very definition of speech as the ethical moment per excellence, where one attends the words one speaks, is referenced by Plato’s description of the benefits of speech over writing in the Phaedrus (p. 73). The other of transcendence, of height and teaching, is the Platonic other. Yet this is not the only other of Totality and Infinity, even if supporters and critics of Levinas can take it to be so. There is also the other of immanence, interiority, and the flesh, which rather than calling into question the self from afar, already inhabits it from within. This is the other of habitation and 'beyond the face'. This is the other that Levinas will call the feminine. Why is this other Cartesian rather than Platonic? Because what interests Levinas in Descartes is not the objective of the argument itself, but its structure. He is not in the slightest bit concerned whether Descartes has proved the existence of God, but how, in this particular form of the ontological argument, the ‘I think’ is already inhabited by the idea of God, though it cannot have been the origin of this idea. The ‘in’ of the word ‘infinite’ does not signify the negation of the finite, but how the infinite in contained with the finite as its very condition yet which it only discovers subsequently. For Descartes, this argument is theological, but for Levinas it is ethical. The interiority of the other in the economic existence of the self (which is how Levinas will interpret the self in the broadest sense) is already inhabited by the other, and it is this exteriority within interiority, which Levinas describes as an 'extraterritoriality', that makes possible the 'openness' of the self to the demand of the other in speech (p. 150).

There is no doubt that for Levinas himself these two descriptions of the relation to the other are meant to supplement one another. The best way to think of this is in terms of the order of explanation. The narrative would begin with the self whose existence is
inhabited by the feminine other that acts as the condition for the ethical relation to the other proper. The difficulty, as we shall see when we progress through the book, is that this order of explanation breaks down, because (as Levinas himself describes it), the feminine other is ambiguous. It does not go as far as the ethical relation, so it is difficult to see how it might be a 'stepping stone' towards it, and it also goes further than the ethical relation, so it cannot possibly be its condition.

[B] Levinas as a Jewish Philosopher

The jump from phenomenology to the accusation that Levinas is only a Jewish philosopher (or worst not even a philosopher at all) is not a great as one might think, because one aspect, or version, of this indictment is that he is not a phenomenologist because he smuggles in religious content. Evidence in phenomenology is self-experience, how something appears to me. All cultural, historical, metaphysical, or even scientific theories, are to be bracketed, so that the phenomenologist only attends to what appears (or specifically the ‘how’ of what appears). Does not Levinas’s allusion to religious ideas, such as 'creation' for example, in *Totality and Infinity*, betray such a bracketing? Moreover, is not the description of the ethical relation to the other not really an account of a possible experience, but merely the importing of religious values (the Jewish commitment to the 'stranger, widow and orphan', for example, that Levinas refers to many times in *Totality and Infinity* (p. 215)) into an everyday affair? We solve the paradox of the phenomenological description of what cannot be described by retorting that what is inaccessible is not a reality at all but merely a religious ideal (which we might or might not think is important). Our denunciation appears even more valid when we go and read Levinas’s Talmudic writings,
which make no bones about their confessional status, and they seem to contain the very same ethical obligation to the other that his more apparent philosophical writings do.

There are many ways of answering this charge. You might argue that the purity of the phenomenological reduction is itself questionable. Does not every writer write from some place or other? Why should the fact that Levinas is Jewish be any more relevant than Heidegger is German, or Badiou French? There is no doubt there are some people who would make the very same negative attributions, but many philosophers would argue that despite these cultural peculiarities, the truth of what they write stands on its own right. Otherwise every philosophical dispute would be in the end *ad hominem*. In this regard, you might reply to those who attack Levinas as being merely a Jewish writer, that they are attacking the person and not the philosopher. I do not think, however, that this is what is at stake in their judgement. The real problem is the subject matter of his philosophy is in fact Jewish and its claim to truth has its source in Judaism, because there could be no other source, not whether Levinas is Jewish or not, since the answer to that is quite obvious. Ethical transcendence is nothing but the concealed authority of a Judaic revelation. It would be same as saying that there is no such thing as Dasein, and that Heidegger’s analysis is merely the introjection of a Germanic romanticism into a claim of a universal transcendental structure of human being, which no doubt some think so to.

The reply to this tribunal of reason has to be subtle and nuanced. When it comes to a judgement we want things to be black and white. Either Levinas is Jewish writer or not. Either Heidegger is a Nazi or not. It would be absurd to respond that Levinas is not Jewish. I do not even think Levinas defence that his philosophical and religious writing can be read apart is defensible. Not only is *Totality and Infinity* a Jewish work, but the more one
understands the Jewish Talmudic tradition the more one grasps the work itself. However, and this is the important fact, this does not mean that the experience of which it speaks, must itself be Jewish. This is even the case, if we assert, as Levinas himself does in many of his Talmudic interpretations, that this experience is spoken of and witnessed more in specifically Jewish writings than in Western philosophy.

The central theme of *Totality and Infinity* is that ethics is not first of all a normative practice where a rational self recognises certain principals or efficacy of moral behaviour, but the exposure to the exorbitant demand of the other who faces and speaks to me. To respond to this demand, which must be prior to any deliberation or weighing up of self-interest, is the ethical moment, without which even the most principled and efficacious morality could descend, at best, into an empty legalism, and at worst, as we have seen throughout our history, the most atrocious barbarism. The book itself circles obsessively around this ethical moment. Does this mean that this experience is merely one of words? I not think so. The analogy I would like to make here is to Heidegger’s ‘destruction’ in *Being and Time*, because I believe that the same method is at work in *Totality and Infinity*, though in the first case it is explicit, whereas in the second it is not. This is because they are both faced with the same problem: how is a phenomenology of what has been forgotten, repressed, and covered over, to the point of being invisible, possible?

It might seem perverse to attempt to explain *Totality and Infinity* by *Being and Time* when, at least in terms of the ostensible argument, they could not be more opposed to one another. The opening of *Totality and Infinity* asks the question whether we are not duped by morality (p. 21). In other words, does ethics exist? This beginning is analogous to the first pages of *Being and Time*, which asks whether it is at all possible even to understand the
question of being. Both authors are asking us to think about something they believe we have forgotten, no longer understand, or even accept is pressing anymore: one, the question of ethics, the other, the question of being. Both are faced with the same problem, how they can convince their readers of the significance of a question, when the tradition that has been handed down to them has rendered it invisible. The answer is the same in both cases, and it is given in Heidegger’s description of the ‘destruction’.10

First of all one has to show that there is an experience here of something we have forgotten. This is the phenomenological element of the method. Again in both cases, it is a matter of returning to the everyday (for what other evidence could there be?) to show what it is that the tradition has covered over. Phenomenology must reawaken the everyday to exhibit the strangeness that has been deadened by half understood and digested metaphysical and scientific explanations. Yet you cannot approach this experience empty-handed. For how could one describe it but from the tradition that has been handed down to you? What tools would you use if they were not there already? So the other side of this method of ‘destruction’ is to show that tradition that we thought was obscuring this experience from us is not as monolithic as we were first taught. The very tradition that concealed the question from us is fissured and cracked so as to let some light of this experience shine through. For Heidegger, this means we have to read the tradition in two ways (the famous deconstructive reading): one, to show how the dominate tradition determines in advance how we approach the everyday so as to close off certain questions, but the other, to dredge up from footnotes, marginalia, contradictions and paradoxes how there is another reading that opens up other ways of thinking. So to every Plato, there is another Plato, to every Kant another Kant, and so on. This is not just matter of an immanent critique of a tradition, but also that there are other ways of speaking about the everyday,
through poetry and art, for example, or other cultures outside of Western thought.

These two sides of the ‘destruction’ always go together: the phenomenological, as the appeal to the everyday, and the hermeneutic, as the deconstruction of the dominant tradition. This is same for Levinas as it is for Heidegger. The difference between them is that Levinas is a lot more coy, in a way that perhaps he should not have been, about the hermeneutical than Heidegger. It is as though Levinas almost pretends there can be an appeal to the everyday experience of the other without the hermeneutical work that would even make such an appeal meaningful to us. Yet it is there in *Totality and Infinity*, if one looks for it. So, for example, just as Heidegger might appeal to Kant as precursor to the temporal horizon of the question of being (even if Kant himself had misunderstood his own project at this point), so too Levinas calls upon Descartes and Plato to explain the transcendence of the other. Just as Heidegger would say that Kant did not ask the question of being, indeed he is part of the tradition that closed this question down, so too Levinas is not claiming that Descartes or Plato have described the experience of the other, but that there are resources within the text that would help us to do, because they are all that we have. However, and this is the important point, just as Heidegger, and more so in his later writing, will go beyond philosophical texts in order to elucidate the experience of being, the poetry of Hölderlin, Pre-Socratics, the paintings of Van Gogh, to name a few, so Levinas will turn towards the Bible and the Talmud.

What is crucial here is not to collapse the phenomenological and the hermeneutical, and this is exactly what those who accuse Levinas of being Jewish do. To evoke the meaning of the everyday that has been obliterated by sediments of worn out and half understood concepts, I might refer to a verse from the bible, or to a Talmudic teaching, but this is not
say that the everyday experience itself is Jewish and would only be of interest to Jews, just as it would be absurd to say that just because Heidegger quotes German poetry, then the experience of being is a peculiarly German. Such an assertion would destroy the very basis of philosophy as such, let alone phenomenology.

To distinguish between phenomenology and hermeneutics is not to say that they are not everywhere and at every time intricately involved and intertwined with one another and that their borders are not extremely porous. It would always be up to debate, for example, whether at a certain point in an argument hermeneutical material had not been pirated into a phenomenological description. This is the constant dogmatic temptation of philosophy, whether it is Jewish contraband or not. Equally, and this is perhaps Levinas's seduction, one can fall into the trap of an appeal to a pure phenomenology without hermeneutics. In this one instance, maybe, Heidegger was more aware of the dangers than Levinas.

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Notes


2 Two excellent introductions to phenomenology are: Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, (London: Routledge, 2008), and Michael Lewis and Tanja Staehler, Phenomenology: An Introduction, (London: Continuum, 2010).

3 For Husserl’s famous statement of the ‘principle of all principles’ and the primacy of intuition, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, (trans.)


