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EDITORIAL

Special issue of Photography, Archive and Memory

Photography, archive and memory are intimately connected. Recording devices and archives provide the means of recalling the past. Memory itself is often characterised as an archive: a store house of things, meanings and images. This gives the impression that one can appeal to memory in order to recover the past. Memory, however, does not take material or physical form in the way that photographs and archives usually do. It is not a photograph or a series of images to be gazed upon and it is not a library or database where records might be retrieved. Rather, memory, as we prefer to see it here, is mediation. It is the set of processes through which the past comes to us, but not just the uninterrupted transit of the past to the present. Memory is, in a sense, designed and shaped by the laws and practices of the present, which provide the structures for remembrance to take place.

This special issue aims to consider some of the ways that memory has become a tool for critically theorising photography and the archive. We recognise that there is nothing new in claiming the significance of memory, but the nexus of photography, archive and memory is yet to be fully explored. The essays presented here attempt in their own way to elucidate how memory as a concept can become useful in further understanding photography and the archive. In particular, the contributors to this special issue locate memory in the photograph and the archive but recognise their partial and fragmented forms. Indeed, photography and its archives are structured around remembering and forgetting. Memory is also partial, imaginative and problematic. Memory, remembrance and testimony are therefore active in the archive, becoming the tools of intervention and analysis. But like any other concept used in the theory and practice of photography, memory here is subject to scrutiny and is not used in a simple or unproblematised nostalgic form. In bringing together these complex existing debates it is clear that there is considerable existing theoretical groundwork upon which to draw. Before considering what the nexus of photography, archive and memory brings it is useful, in the space of the editorial, to revisit some of these aspects of photography theory.

The conundrum that photography works to both enact and destroy “mnemonic experience” is now familiar (Buchloh). On the one hand, photography promises to create the conditions for social consciousness and remembrance, furnishing us with a potentially indiscriminate store of images. According to Benjamin photography is an “optical unconscious” mechanically fixing views of things that might otherwise evade the eye. On the other hand, photography filters and mediates what is preserved. Through its association with mass culture, photography has been viewed as a process that results in the devastation of memory. It has been claimed that photography produces alienation from capitalism’s mode of production, but at the same time it possesses the capacity to stand as a witness to the devastation of culture at the hands of social dogmas, including capitalism (Kracauer).

The photographic archive is bound up with these processes of remembering and forgetting. Concerned with this double action, theorists such as Allan Sekula and John Tagg in the 1980s examined the role of photography in social institutional settings. Their aim was to extend photography history beyond the art-historical paradigm and address the absence of reflection on the social uses of photography. Taking their lead from Foucault and his account of the primacy of visuality in the control of the social body, they elaborated how the mechanisms of photography and the archive in tandem served to support positivist governmental and professional discourses that
increasingly came to dominate and underpin society in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Focusing on anthropometry, policing, psychiatry and documentary for social reform, they regarded photography as an apparatus of surveillance. Claims to realism were problematised. Promising visual evidence and social description, photography in fact naturalised state intervention and control. It collaborated in the maintenance of the status quo and reinforcing “the social terrain” of class relations and social division (Sekula, “The Body in the Archive” 6). Away from home, similar processes assisted anthropology’s net-like capture of other cultures, which motivated support for colonial expansion (see Lalvani and Pinney, for example). Photography in partnership with the archive delineated the boundaries of what Benedict Anderson in relation to printing has termed an “imagined community” through which a narrative of the nation and the self were installed.

Given such a history, Sekula is justified in his claim that “archival ambitions and procedures are intrinsic to photographic practice” (“Reading an Archive” 194). This approach has become a central organising perspective in photographic theory (Sekula’s essay appears in Evans and Hall 1999 and Wells 2003, for example). But what Sekula’s, along with Tagg’s, approach implies is that the “archival ambitions” of photography work solely in terms of hegemony and are in their essence a product of a repressive state apparatus. This perpetuates the view that photography and its archives have achieved little more than the normalisation of existing power relations and the maintenance of traditional property laws. With such a perspective having been installed in photography theory, it has become difficult to conceive photography and the archive to involve anything other than the negative operations of power. Having said this, the point of critically analysing photography and its archives is to provide the grounds for a reconfiguration of knowledge, its ownership and modes of production. The motivation of the broader critique of photography and the archive, such as that enacted by Sekula, is to make way for the expression of counter-memories.

Photography and its archives are structured by remembrance and forgetting, in which certain futures are promised and others excluded. Sekula’s focus is the historical exclusion of the working-class. He claims that the archive does not generally seek to represent the history of this group, and, what is more, the archival perspective is not a working-class one. The working-class may have provided the subject of the photographic archive but there has traditionally been an absence of working-class subjectivity and perhaps structures of remembering that reflect working-class consciousness and preoccupations. Significant attempts have been made to address these absences, such as in the Greater Manchester County Record Office, even though the structures of knowing are not necessarily altered by its contents. There is a growing desire to salvage images produced in ordinary and everyday circumstances by ordinary people. Snapshots, and other amateur images, also frequently appear in news stories and can be found for sale at second-hand antique and retro markets. Images and perspectives previously denied space in the archive are now readily incorporated into its spaces and the normalising archival perspective Sekula confronts in his work is now fractured.

It is not yet clear how to respond to such images as they are left to history. Mundane snapshots, for example, seem to bring us something new but they are in many ways a product of modernity, representations of lives limited by its structures. As they are piled up in archives and demand recognition a range of possibilities exist. As a historian or analyst one might become like the figure in Paul Klee’s painting “Angelus Novus”. The Angel of History, as Walter Benjamin relates in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, stands with his face turned towards the past while the
wreckage of history grows before him. The storm in which he is caught is called “progress” and the angel is propelled backwards towards the future. A sad figure, he “would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole again what has been smashed” (249). But the storm is too violent. In light of this allegory we might begin to question: what is the use in being turned longingly towards the past? The angel is not able to breathe life into the debris and reassemble the wreckage that is left behind, but can at least be a witness to the past and its destruction. But there are other possibilities. The historical materialist, unlike the angel, is turned toward the future in the hope of change to come. The aim is not to reassemble the past as it was but rather to “seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” (247) and arrest the image of the past in order to confront the past with its own creations. The task of the historical materialist, having witnessed the “barbarism” of the document and its transmission, is to “brush history against the grain” (248). In response to this proposal Sekula argues that the photographic archive be “read from below” (Photography Against the Grain, 127). The archive—and the terms under which it reproduces knowledge—becomes open to scrutiny and is confronted with its own history, the memory of its inclusions and exclusions. Moreover, the gesture of the materialist is revolutionary and the aim is to wrest history from conformism when it is on the verge of its own destruction. The archive is opened to the threat of memory: the memory of its exclusions. Everyday and ordinary forms of image making may be confronted in the same way.

Although the photographic archive acts as a “‘clearing house” of meaning’ (“Reading an Archive: Photography Between Labour and Capital” 445) in which photographs become liberated from their contingencies of use, the archive may be subject to politicised readings where residual and potential meanings emerge. Archives do not traditionally seek to foreground their own conditions of meaning making, yet theorists might nonetheless try to elaborate the traces of the past—the ruins—that remain in the archive in order to reflect on the politics of the archives’ formation and uses of photography in general (Edwards and Hart, “Mixed Box”). The archive can also become open to new strategies of memory where the aim is to “prevent the cancellation of testimony” (Sekula, “The Body and the Archive” 64). One might take on the position of a witness in the archive seeking to expose the control of memory on the part of institutions. Past practices of positivism, for example, can be newly envisioned and the archive becomes open to new interpretations, uses and configurations. Social material relations, the materiality of the medium and the institutional nature of archiving are potentially revealed and contested. The photographic archive may become a site from which the narration of history rather than its censorship takes place. Indeed, the narration of censorship can begin to happen in the archive.

This cultural politics of photography and the archive provides the conditions for older institutional archives to become subject to critique, but it is also possible that new archives are formed. “The everyday” has been designated as an important site for the working through of some of these concerns. Family and snapshot photography have become particularly significant in this regard. As forms of personal history, they offer a way of testifying to the voices previously marginalised in history and have become important archives of cultural knowledge. Feminist socialist analyses have proposed that such images are often involved in the reproduction of heteronormative and stereotypical visions of family life (Williamson). Most poignantly, Jo Spence, through re-enacting her own personal family album, sought to construct a counter-memory through which the relationship between the personal and political is articulated. She used her personal snapshots as a departure point for working through feelings of trauma, her memories of her own class-
consciousness and anxieties around social status. In doing so she performed a critique of the family snap and exposed the masking of memory which normally takes place within its frame. Through a process of re-staging, Spence enacts a contest of meaning in which the question of who gets to define one’s identity and memories is raised.

Whilst this earlier work sought to construct a critical perspective on how family photography is bound up with the larger structures of regulation and social control associated with more formalised public institutions, conceptions of the family album and personal snapshots have subsequently shifted direction. Attention is now more focused on proving the cultural significance of these forms rather than reflecting on how they are ideologically problematic. Snapshots and albums have become located as otherly forms that have suffered exclusion from history. But whilst they have been somewhat marginalised within academic study, snapshots and family albums are not automatically resistant cultural forms. Geoffrey Batchen in the second issue of this journal, for example, argues that the snapshot serves to disrupt the usual routine categories of art history and its definitions of photographic meaning. This transformation in critical perspective has been able to take place with a wider “material turn” in photography, which has resulted in cultural forms being recognised separately from the images’ ideological content. As a result, the personal snapshot appears to perform the function of memory within the familial context, but has also come to represent the lost and forgotten history of photography itself: a memory form to be remembered.

This redefinition of the terms under which the past is thought about and understood forms part of what has been termed “the turn to memory” (Radstone). Whilst the body of work that has emerged as a result of this “turn” is diverse, complex, and often contradictory, it is characterised generally by the expression of disillusionment with traditional modes of history writing and ways of structuring knowledge. At times this has resulted, for example, in a backlash against the professional photographer and has brought about a renewed interest in the amateur and forms assumed to be “de-legitimated” (Sturken). But whilst there has been an investment in objects that appear to be associated with personal memory or with mass culture as an antidote to the silences of history, actually a defining feature of memory work is that it recognises just how impossible it is to claim possession of the truth or the ability to fill the holes of history. In many respects, memory work attempts to negotiate the impasse left by earlier propositions around the “crisis of representation”; an attempt to recognise the proliferation of meanings rather than a shutting down of truth entirely. As such, the methods of witness and testimony have been taken to be important but such methods, it is recognised, do not necessarily enable the past to be reached or known. Rather, memory must be understood to be highly mediated and “actively produced, as representation, and as open to struggle and dispute” (Radstone, 7). The persistence of such tension is what makes the terms of memory so important.

However, the incitement to memory comes with a warning. In his essay “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémorial” Pierre Nora argues that “we speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left” (7). In a break with the past, its rituals and ancestry, memory appears to have been torn and as a result we busy ourselves with defining “sites of memory” and attributing objects of the past with symbolic significance. Modern memory, Nora claims, is “archival”: “It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image” (13). More importantly, the shift to memory is marked by a vogue for the collective and the materialisation of history in decentralised forms. A history of history has emerged, but this critical
history seizes upon memory and its sites, assiduously collecting the remains, testimonies, documents, images, speeches and any visible and tangible signs that have been left behind. Nora argues that through this process we are not simply remembering the past—recuperating it—but remembering memory itself, where it appears to have slipped away. That such remembrance is now taking place through the salvaging of popular culture is highly significant and it is assumed that popular culture is to be defined in terms of memory. The structuring principles of memory are swiftly becoming the organising paradigm of history. The production of archives is acutely effected by this paradigm shift. Institutions and the methods of history are informed by the politics of representation. Identities are buttressed onto the foundations of history and the past is secured through the solidity of the sites constituted as locations of memory. Claiming the significance of sites represents an attempt to fix identities just as they are becoming unstable. Identity categories, such as “working class”, are subject to change and are not as coherent as once assumed. In light of this, one might question the purpose of seeking to elaborate further upon more “sites of memory”. Surely, as Pierre Nora suggests, what might now become important is a reflection on reasons for the stabilisation of recuperative memory forms such as the snapshot. If we are obliged to follow the injunction to archive (Derrida) that marks modern society, then it is clear that the impulse to archive enables us to safely process a fear of forgetting, of the destruction prompted by the death drive. The compulsion, or drive to archive, prompts us to ask, what are we archiving? And, further, what is the cultural significance of memory?

Visual means of relating the past possess a high level of popular appeal (Samuel, *Theatre of Memory*), but the visual can also potentially highlight the complex nature of retelling the past. Through the use of images, the past can possibly be revealed in more accessible forms, but this changes the way in which we encounter stories and which aspects of the past get narrated. Popular forms of memory have seemed particularly valuable in that they provide access to decentralised forms of knowledge, although they all too easily become incorporated into the “infrastructure of popular memory” (Samuel, “People’s History” xxii) which can be incorporated into dominant narratives of history. In this framework popular and family photography lose their “dangerous ambiguities” and become appropriated into larger dominant narratives of history (Spence and Holland 13). Such appropriations of popular memory are possible today but through new forms, such as digital networking spaces and through new discourses. “Creativity”, a neoliberal paradigm that stresses individuality, freedom of expression and commodification, and the so-called democratized forms of knowledge production become conflated. Indeed, new forms are not necessarily effective at challenging dominant forms of communication as the narratives proposed are sometimes all too familiar.

The privileging of the self and life moments in photosharing can be viewed as an attempt to impose some kind of stability and order in a context where the sharing of experience and cultural memory has become threatened through its proliferation and our incapacity to make sense of it all. But as Joanna Zylinska argues in “On Bad Archives, Unruly Snappers and Liquid Photographs”, there are few intrinsic differences between analogue and digital photography and she draws parallels between the invention of photography and electricity and the binary presence and absence of light that is intrinsic to photography’s operations. In this way, Zylinska claims, we have always been digital. Aiming to avoid the hysterical and melancholic lamenting for the passing of more “fixed” analogue technologies and the melting away of all that was once solid and stable, she evokes the notion of “liquidity” as an enabling condition. Following Derrida, and observing the nature of flux
and flow that is instated through photographic technologies, we are challenged by the absence of order that has characterised the impulse to archive. Although the overwhelming number of photographs questions whether we should persist in the futility of archiving, Zylinska argues that we are in need of archives as they provide “a safe space for exploring the liquidity of culture without drowning in its fast-moving waters” (Zylinska, in this volume).

Electronic information is subject to new methods of ordering and management, but also new modes of access and interaction between other kinds of archive or information. Daniel Palmer in “Emotional Archives: Online Photosharing and the Cultivation of the Self” reflects on these very issues in relation to “thisMoment” a photosharing website oriented towards narrating personal memories and emotions in relation to broader public histories, future desires and aspirations and the consumption of consumer goods. The archive has become fluid and memory is realised as a performative process that can be revisited and updated to incorporate new events and to reflect changing preferences for what is included in narratives of the personal past. Ultimately there appears to be little, however, that distinguishes the commodification of the passing of time and the normalising forms of socialised storytelling promoted by Kodak and new websites such as thisMoment. Whilst digital photosharing signals a shift in temporal relations, thisMoment resuscitates, Palmer argues, a more conventional relationship between photography and memory. This questions whether open access “sites of memory” can really be politically enabling because commodity exchange and larger historical narratives dominate.

More optimistically, new technologies and photography can benefit communities who have found it difficult to maintain familial ties and maintain cultural identity and this can, in turn, affect institutional practices. Jane Lydon’s article shows how institutions in Australia now actively seek to engage with the views of Indigenous populations. The ownership and control of photographs of Indigenous Australians held in institutions are contested as it is not simply a matter of who owns the physical photograph, or who owns the rights to reproduction, but also who owns the cultural knowledge contained in the photograph. The concerns of Aboriginal communities are diverse and current protocols for allowing access to photographs, based on research conducted in remote communities rather than communities based in urban contexts, sometimes mean that photographs of Aborigines become inaccessible in ways that prevent Indigenous Australians engaging with their own histories. This has led to the reformulation of the protocols for access to photographs used by institutions such as the State Library of Victoria (Melbourne). What emerges from Lydon’s research is the knowledge that Indigenous Australians’ use of photographs are not dissimilar to settler uses of photographs: they are used for strengthening family ties, for illustrating family histories, for establishing “blood line” and genealogy, and for establishing historical attachments to place. When photographs can be accessed or are allowed to circulate, they can support Indigenous memory and the telling of alternative histories.

Familial uses of institutionalised photographs are one example of how photography is increasingly being constituted as a site for the working through of personal and collective memory (Kuhn, Kuhn and McAllister, Hirsch). Barthes’ work on photography in Camera Lucida has been instrumental to this development in many respects; his approach has been taken as confirmation not only of the importance of personal photography, but also as confirmation that the photograph is open to the play of personal and collective interpretations. These aspects of Barthes’ later work have largely underpinned the recent work on personal and familial forms of photography which is
especially evident in Marianne Hirsch’s *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory*, in which the instability of memory in children of Holocaust survivors is explored.

Barthes’ notion of the *punctum* (26-7) has become crucial to understanding how photographs representing loved ones, or now distant family members, act in the future in unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable ways. Barthes points to the traumatic force of certain photographs caused by the details contained within the image that “pierce” or “prick” us (26). We become, through this force, responsible to the past. The demands that are placed upon us by the *punctum* are different to those imposed upon us by the image through the structures of History: the *punctum* instead points towards the structures of memory or “postmemory” (as well as, perhaps, psychoanalytic interpretations). Personal subjectivities, memories and feelings become more pressing than the “accurate” or “objective” recounting of facts. While the structures of memory lead us to the personal, images do not offer straightforward representations of history or subjectivity: it is impossible to bear witness and testify to the past in any transparent sense (Burke, Hirsch). We come to the realisation that the past comes to us always in narrative form and that narratives of the past are inflected by the present’s concerns. Moreover, the past is always in conversation with the present, maybe even the future, in a bid to ensure its reproduction. The past demands more than a simple form of remembrance or bearing witness, but must proceed rather, as Giorgio Agamben suggests, with “a perpetual commentary on testimony” (13). This requires a continual interrogation of testimony and a consideration of what remains unsaid as much as what can be said or articulated through the processes of memory.

Annette Kuhn and Kirstin Emiko McAllister in *Locating Memory: Photographic Acts* discuss how theorists of photography and its archives have increasingly adopted strategies of “memory work” (9) in order to contest and dismantle the past’s structures. Memory work involves an active seeking out and an interpretive and reconstructive approach to the past (Kuhn 4) in a process that enables the weaving together of the public and private:

... if memories are one individual’s, their associations extend far beyond the personal. They spread into an extended network of meanings that bring together the personal with the familial, the cultural, the economic, the social, the historical. Memory work makes it possible to explore connections between ‘public’ historical events, structures of feeling, family dramas, relations of class, national identity and gender, and ‘personal’ memory. In these cases histories outer and inner, social and personal, historical and psychical coalesce; and the web of interconnections that binds them together is made visible.

(Kuhn 5)

Following Kuhn’s earlier elaboration of “memory work” Kuhn and McAllister investigate how lives lived on the borderlands—and their photographic representations—can be brought to life (Kuhn and McAllister 1-2) using an “ethics of engagement” (15) that accounts for the differing points of view: that of the photographer, and that of the viewer. Indeed it is in the uncertainties of interpretation and the disjuncture between the past and future that hope for transformation exists. Past practices
of positivism can be newly envisioned; archives potentially become opened to new interpretations, uses and configurations (Edwards). Social material relations, the materiality of the medium and the institutional nature of archiving, are potentially revealed and contested. The photographic archive becomes a site from which the narration of history, rather than its censorship, can take place (Langford).

The productive nature of reappropriating the past through a conscious and purposeful staging of “memory work” is undertaken by Michael O’Brien in his visual essay “Mum’s Got to Sell the House”. The collaborative action research project undertaken with his mother focused on a dialogic renewal of the family. The family archive is utilized in the project to allow O’Brien to revisit the family’s former selves. The decaying home rendered in O’Brien’s photographs stands in stark contrast to the warm glow of stereotypical family albums, and his representations of home are far from idealized in this way. Maybe home is no longer the refuge it once used to be. The camera functions here to repeat, re-inscribe and subsequently release the family into a new space of dialogue and in this process, a new family archive is reflexively and consciously constituted for the future. O’Brien demonstrates how the sometimes difficult process of negotiating memory with other family members can bring into relief differing versions of the past. It is the process of creating a space for a psychodynamic negotiation of making meaning that enables the idealised family album to become contested and for memory to be interrogated in the present. For O’Brien, photography becomes the vehicle for the critical examination of where and what “home” is, and by extension, his identity and history.

The question of how to constitute memory, historical memory or “postmemory” is particularly problematic in situations where there has been a systematic destruction of accounts and images of traumatic events. “Postmemory”, distinguished by Marianne Hirsch from memory by generational distance, is marked by “deep personal connection” and “imaginative investment and creation” (22). “Postmemory” also highlights the experiences of those who grow up “dominated by narratives that preceded their birth” (22). “Postmemory” features vividly in Holocaust studies but also in relation to other overlooked appalling circumstances. In her essay “Image, Displacement, Prosthesis: Reflections on making visual memories of the Armenian Genocide” Marie-Aude Baronian considers the absence of archives and the politics of recognition when traumatic historical events go unrecorded or are actively and purposefully forgotten. Baronian focuses specifically on the denial of the Armenian genocide: there are no records in the Ottoman Archive of the genocide, and the Turkish government continues to deny the genocide ever happened. There is an absence of images of the past events that can assist in defining and constructing identity, ethnicity and memory for the Armenian Diaspora; this material is important in that that it potentially informs and creates imaginative starting points for reflecting upon origins, traumas and subsequent journeys of displacement. In the face of this denial Armenians feel continuously compelled to provide evidence of the atrocities, which, in Baronian’s view, prevents mourning from taking place. Proposing that fiction can usefully be brought into play, Baronian investigates Atom Egoyan’s and Gariné Torossian’s films that utilize “aesthetics of displacement”: that is, both filmmakers draw upon obsessive, repetitive imagery that obliquely refers to the forgotten and overlooked event. In Atom Egoyan’s film A Portrait of Arshile (1995), for example, Baronian argues that it is the absence of images that proves the denial of the genocide. Intimate connections between the private and public are built into the film through the use of amateur footage. The film acts as a confirmation of the ethnic identity of the child Arshile but also announces the incompleteness of representation and the
problem of reconstructing the event through the processes of memory and “postmemory”. Through Egoyan’s and Torossian’s fictional films memory becomes a prosthesis.

How to structure an archive and who subsequently possesses the rights to define its use and meaning is a contentious issue. This is especially the case in the instance of housing and sorting a homeless archive. Anthony Luvera, in this collection, situates the debate on institutional remembering within the tradition of critical theories of representation that question how Othered and marginalised subjects can be pictured and archived in a way that fully acknowledges and contests the social power of representation (Rosler, “Post-Photography, Post Documentary?” 209). As an artist, Luvera is concerned with the future of the “assisted self portraits” of homeless people, which have been produced in a number of locations and at different times. Given the convincing and compelling nature of the images, outside organisations have wanted to use the photographs for social and commercial purposes. However, Luvera faces a number of dilemmas around the framing of the work, and his desire is to see the social context of production retained in later uses of the images. In its archival form, Luvera’s collaborative projects become a museum-like object where the sole aim is to preserve the images and the social context of the project (including personal recollections of the participants’ earlier lives and their memories of taking part in the project). But this denies the possibilities of the archive’s use beyond the function of preservation. Questions arise around how new uses of the photographs can retain the integrity of the production of the work and remain true to the notion of collaboration embedded in the original projects. Indeed, whether or not the photographs should be archived remains a question since, as Stuart Hall has argued, future uses of archives can never be foretold (Hall 92).

Against what he views as a backdrop of claims around photography’s failure to accurately remember (in that much remains unseen or unsaid in any photograph), David Bate in this collection focuses on how photography functions positively as memory. Bate identifies how the photographic archive is not of the past, but a part of the future, enacting a promise and a responsibility toward the future. Through the use of the work of Jacques le Goff, who along with Nora was one of the leading figures in the nouvelle histoire, we see that museums, archives and monuments are memory institutions. Bate argues that photography, since its inception, has taken on the task of documenting these sites of memory and uses as an example William Henry Fox Talbot’s photograph of Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square. Photography in this instance industrialises memory, turning memory into reproducible commodities and functions as a meta-archive through proliferating the signifiers of memories.

Memory and photography are fundamentally connected. Remembering functions much like photography, returning to us fragmented remains of the past. But photographs, Bate argues, work in the way that Freud’s screen memories do in that the photograph is a memory that displaces another memory that is forgotten or suppressed. Although photographs (like screen memories) are like empty shells they may be subject to fruitful analysis as our responses to them are both voluntary and involuntary. In the case of the Fox Talbot’s image of Nelson’s Column, the column serves to implant an image of Nelson, who is already dead, in the nation’s memory. The image of Nelson’s column is meant to commemorate the nation’s superiority but hides the memory of the trade wars. Unexpectedly, however, it also acts as a device that spurs Bate’s memories of his childhood tours of HMS Victory, Nelson’s flagship now dry docked in Portsmouth. In this way, Bate argues that photographs can belong to personal and public memories bringing about a collapse of the binarism
between cultural and individual memory; this in turn prompts analysis rather than reverie in relation to photographic material.

Most of the essays published in this edition were originally presented at a symposium held at Roehampton University on 5th June 2009. The event was organized by Karen Cross and Julia Peck, the guest editors for this issue. Our hope is that many of the issues raised here will provoke further debate and critical reflection on the uses of the concept of memory both in terms of how it might extend but also limit the theoretical horizons of work on photography and its related archives. The aim here is not to claim that memory offers a simple and unproblematic means by which to frame photography or is a basis upon which to interpret and reformulate photography’s archives, although there may be clear instances in which this is the case. As demonstrated by the articles here, memory is already inscribed in the photograph (if only in a partial and fragmented form), and remembering (and forgetting) structures the archive. Memory, however, has to be an active remembering, where intervention and analysis takes place. Within that, the partial, imaginative and problematic aspects of memory and testimony need to be acknowledged as well as its uses. Through the special issue, it is our hope that memory, like any other concept used in the theory and practice of photography, will continue to be subject to critical reconsideration, and that the theoretical foundations and guiding principles installed through its use remain perpetually challenged.

**Works cited**


In The Art of Interruption: Realism, Photography and the Everyday John Roberts notes how claims to realism were demoted with rise of post-structuralist perspectives on photography during the 1980s. The conflation between realism and positivism this produced is noted as problematic. Particularly important he argues is how ‘questions of social reference have been suppressed in the interests of privileging the avant-garde critique of representation’ (3).

In their introduction to Photographs Objects Histories: on the materiality of images, Edwards and Hart outline the shift from the issue of representation to a concern with the image as a social object which shifts its meaning depending on context. This signals the need to pay attention to the image as a material object, but materiality here is constituted by the physical form of the image, namely its plasticity and display.

“Sites of memory” for Nora are commonly the symbolic objects of memory which include things such as monuments, museums and archives but also things such dictionaries, calendars, commemorations and days of celebration in which where memory becomes embodied.
“Memory work” was defined by Annette Kuhn in *Family Secrets*, yet it is clearly informed by some of the strategies developed around phototherapy in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in *Family Snaps: The Meanings of Domestic Photography*, Spence and Holland identify both how the unconscious can disrupt the meanings of photographs and how family snapshots can be used to “make sense of the wider world” (10).

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