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**THE ETHOS OF SPORTING GAMES: FAIR PLAY AND ELITE
WOMEN'S CRICKET**

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Abstract

The recent intellectual movement away from universalism towards particularism can be witnessed in most divisions of social philosophical thought. Such a paradigmatic shift has radically transformed a number of theories including feminist ethics. In contrast, however, philosophical analyses of fairness in sport have retained allegiance to universalist accounts in that conceptions of fair play remain enshrined in formalist accounts of the nature of rules and laws that govern sporting games. In this thesis, it is argued that universalist accounts of fair play in sport are incomplete in so far as they fail to consider that what constitutes fairness in sport is more than just the interpretation of formal rule structures. The richer analysis of fair play in sport offered here highlights the importance of individual experiences and the structures that shape those experiences. The ethical investigation is compatible with certain feminist ethical commitments. In order to evaluate whether a given sporting ethos is ethical, the thesis is committed methodologically to a mixed model approach. The aim is to find out the beliefs, values and ideologies of the people involved. Hence, a context-respectful methodology collecting and utilising thick descriptions is employed. It is argued that an ethical ethos has no room for intentional rule violation. For a given ethos to be ethical its game must be practised in a certain way with a certain attitude. The evaluation in this thesis concludes that the ethos of English elite women's cricket is unethical. It is hoped that a potential outcome of the thesis will be a different understanding of fair play that may shape new forms of ethical enquiry and challenge existing methodologies.

Argument:

- (1) In sport philosophical literature fair play has been characteristically understood in one way: the formalist account of the nature of rules and laws.
- (2) While it is true that one can not talk about fair play without reference to the rules and laws of an activity, this account is incomplete since it fails to consider ethos.
- (3) Part of what an ethos means derives from the beliefs, values and ideologies of players themselves who have constructed agreements as to how the game ought to be enacted.
- (4) To understand fair play in elite women's cricket, therefore, one must understand the rules and laws but also, crucially, its ethos.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of Cheltenham & Gloucester College of Higher Education and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other education institution in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the college.

Signed .

Date.....August 2000.....

Acknowledgements

This philosophical endeavour developed partly from a growing dissatisfaction with analytical philosophy and from an extended reflection upon feminist ethics. It led me to the idea that a combination of conceptual and empirical research could be used to understand the ethos of sporting games. I'm relieved this idea is nearly past, but find with some regret that it has been barely investigated.

First, I wish to thank all those people from Cricket Week and the England women's cricket team who agreed to take part in this research. Their insights, stories and reflections were invaluable. I wish also to thank Professor Celia Brackenridge and Professor Jim Parry for their suggestions, comments, and other valuable advice on earlier drafts of this work.

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Chapter One

Introduction

1 Contextualisation of Study

Recent decades have witnessed a profound challenge to the method and styles of theory that have guided the social sciences since their late 19th century origins. As a result, confidence in the ability to describe and explain social reality accurately has been undermined echoing this point. Marcus and Fischer (1986) state:

. . . in every contemporary field whose subject is society, there are either attempts at reorienting the field in distinctly new directions or efforts at synthesizing new challenges to theory with established programs for research (p.vii).

It may be argued that this is the case in philosophy generally and more particularly in ethics. In a rapidly changing world, there are new controversies surrounding those problems associated with the representation of social morality. Moreover, it is important to recognise that it is not just the theories and ideas that are being challenged but the established methodologies and epistemologies that underlie them. Thus:

This reassessment is more salient in some disciplines than in others, but its presence is pervasive. It is not just the ideas themselves that are coming under attack but the paradigmatic style in which they have been presented. Particularly in the social sciences, the goal of organising disciplines by abstract, generalising frameworks that encompass and guide all efforts at empirical research is being fundamentally challenged (Marcus and Fischer, 1986, p.7).

The contemporary debate on this reassessment involves various academic disciplines ‘battling it out’ as to who can represent a multi-cultural, diverse, post-modern world in the most efficacious way. However, the idea here is not to present **the** definitive concept of fairness and, competitively to present it any more forcefully than anyone else. Rather, the aim here is to offer a different, subtler way of understanding fairness and ethos in sporting games in general and elite women’s cricket in particular.

Ethics as a branch of philosophy, characteristically asks the following kinds of questions: Why should we be moral? Are there any absolute moral values? Are there such things as universal duties and obligations? What ought we do in order to lead a flourishing, happy, and good life? Ethical questions in sport are, therefore, also concerned with topics of right and wrong. The predominant ethical ideal in modern sport is one of fair play. What is fair play? Why should we follow the rules of a game? Do we have a moral obligation to follow the laws? What kinds of things are required of us to be good sportspersons?

Within the field of ethics generally, it is widely recognised that there is a move away from universalism and descriptions of right conduct towards more particularity and descriptions and prescriptions for good lives. As Nussbaum (1993) suggests:

Anglo-American moral philosophy is turning from an ethics based on enlightenment ideals of universality to an ethics based on tradition and particularity; from an ethics based on principles to an ethics based on virtue; from an ethics dedicated to the elaboration of systematic theoretical justifications to an ethics suspicious of theory and respectful of local wisdom; from an ethics based on the isolated individual to an ethics based on affiliation and care; from an ahistorical detached ethics to an ethics rooted in concreteness and history (p.9).

Philosophers can also be criticised for favouring a more ‘justice’ oriented approach when examining moral actions within sport (Lumpkin, Beller & Stoll, 1994; and Fraleigh, 1984). As indeed Held (1993) maintains, we are in the grip of contractual thinking where realities are interpreted in contractual terms, and goals are formulated as instrumental, rational contracts.

When considering the nature of morality in sport, ethicists have predominantly concentrated on issues such as, fairness, equality, and justice. They have paid strict attention to right actions, rule adherence, and have appropriated the use of abstract frameworks and universal conceptual definitions. What is needed is an authentic account of the athlete’s experience of fair play within a particular sporting context. Sport has been historically and predominantly a male preserve. It should not, however, just be men’s experiences that are examined within the context of sport but women’s experience as well. Women’s experiences are plural – there is no singular

experience of women – they should be given an opportunity to share in the debate (DeSensi, 1992). Women’s experience is worthy of exploration in its own right and may lead to a consideration of issues that characteristically arise from women’s experience. It is this experience that can then be used to inform a fuller picture of fair play.

There is an obvious void regarding the concept of feminism in the philosophy of sport literature as well as a critical need for the exploration of a theoretical undergirding to viable questions and issues regarding gender issues, gender relations, and feminism in society and in sport (DeSensi, 1992, p.79).

2 The Research Problem

The main aims of this thesis, then, are: (1) to develop a philosophical analysis of the concept of 'ethos' with particular reference to the meaning of fair play; and (2) to explore how feminist ethical theories may contribute to our understanding of methodology and empirical research.

2.1 Research Questions

- 1) What is meant by the concept of ‘ethos’?
- 2) What is the ethos of English elite women’s cricket?
- 3) To what extent does a given ethos relate to fair play norms?

2.2 Objective

The objective of the thesis is to develop a philosophical analysis of the ethos of sporting games considering:

- (a) how the basic elements of ethos and fair play can be articulated and ethically justified;
- (b) how the ethos of English elite women’s cricket (hereafter EWC) can be understood and interpreted;
- (c) how the ethos of EWC relates to fair play norms;
- (d) how the above can be located in the context of an empirically informed understanding of EWC.

The successful juxtaposition of conceptual and empirical understanding provides the foundation for an examination of fair play. In order to secure this juxtaposition, a

particular theoretical position must be established. The potential of 'Immanent Critique' is explored and tied both to the theory and methodology adopted in the thesis. In doing so, this thesis offers a novel contribution to the existing body of sport literature. It puts forward an original mode in which to theorise fair play offering a partly empirical research approach that is philosophically justified by a mixed model analysis.

The starting point in searching for this position is the following premise: game formalism is wrong to insist that rules (on their own) ensure fairness in sporting games. Ethoses (or ethoi) within sporting games are not the same. Athletes play the same game with the same rules but the way those rules are applied illustrates that fair play is conceived differently in different traditions and sporting cultures.

3 The Structure of the Thesis

The purpose of Chapter Two is to provide a brief historical analysis of conceptions of fair play. In Part One, the periods of Homeric Greece, Historic Greece, Mediaeval Ages and Modern Britain are examined in order to establish the link that sports are contests. Part Two considers women's sport and their history within the game of cricket. The argument proposed is that key turning points in history have shaped our current conceptions of fair play.

Chapter Three examines the commitment of traditional moral theory to a principle of impartiality. Paradigmatic exemplars from deontological, consequential, and social contract ethics are outlined. In an attempt to show how feminist ethics differs from these distinct approaches, the diversity of feminist ethical approaches is considered. This chapter ends with an analysis of context-respectful theory and its relationship to a principle of impartiality. Discussion, here, sets up the preferred account that is used throughout the remainder of the thesis; that is, to develop a context-respectful theory of fair play and to consider its implications for understanding the ethos of EWC.

The review of feminist ethical literature, in this chapter, is a theoretical precursor for the adoption of a context-respectful approach and the rejection of universalism. An allegiance is formed to the importance of the embodied subject who is immersed in

the practice. The story of feminist ethics is, therefore, one that enables the position of formalism to be rejected. It provides a door to a certain kind of critique in which the formulation of the methodology is initially constructed.

Chapter Four critically examines previous approaches to the study of fair play and their philosophical foundations. Part One begins with a discussion on formalism and the role that rules play in defining the concept of fair play. It is concluded that what constitutes fairness in sporting games is more than just the formal rules. Next, the role of context-respectful theory in relation to fair play is explored. The concept of ethos is discussed in detail and the importance of empirically informed theory established. Finally, the chapter states the purposes of 'Immanent Critique' which then form the rationale for the methodology employed in the thesis.

In Chapter Five, 'Methodology,' a mixed model approach to the ethical investigation is defended. The idea for this approach arose through exploring the possibilities of feminist ethical theory. The aims of this chapter are: (1) to operationalise the juxtaposition of moral theory and empirical investigation; and (2) to provide a research design for how such a mixed model approach can be applied to fair play and ethos. The methodology seeks to incorporate empirical findings to structure a normative approach to the study of fair play. The main point will be to set about producing less distorted descriptions, explanations, and understandings of ethical conduct in game playing. To place women at the centre of a study is not of course new, but studying the nature of ethos in the particular context of elite women's cricket, from the perspective of the athletes' own experiences, is indeed original.

Chapter Six attempts to articulate the ethos of elite women's cricket. The empirical findings are presented and fair play is explored as a system of norms. Using the rich data acquired from one culture (EWC), this chapter examines the dynamic character of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the sources of that change may be. Part One begins with an explanation of interviewees' perceptions of fair play. Part Two considers, in more detail, the application of fair play and ethos within the game itself. This chapter concludes by arguing that fair play is context dependent, wherein the boundaries of ethos are continually re-negotiated between players, coaches, and administrators.

Chapter Seven examines the concept of ethical ethos in more detail and concludes the thesis. Three theoretical moves are made to secure the aims of the research: (A) The rejection of formalism as an adequate theory of game playing; (B) The merits of an empirically informed theory; and (C) The explication of an ethical ethos. An ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC is conducted using the reflective examples of the interviewees. Finally, it is argued that the ethos of EWC is unethical.

The next chapter provides the starting point for the thesis. The argument proposed is that key turning points in history have shaped our current conceptions of fair play.

Chapter Two

Historical Conceptions of Fair Play

Part One

1 Introduction

It would be naive to propose that this section presents a detailed historical analysis of fair play over the last three thousand years. Clearly, this is not the case. Moreover, it is important to be aware of applying a historically ethnocentric approach and misunderstanding the meaning of events and values. The aim of this chapter is to examine briefly historical conceptions of fair play and suggest that key turning points in history have shaped our current understandings of the concept.

It seems that, throughout history, there are various interpretations of fair play which are inextricably linked to the practices and moralities of different times. Part One provides a brief historical analysis of conceptions of fair play within 'sport.' Four time frames will be considered: (1) Homeric Greece, (2) Historic Greece, (3) Mediaeval Society and the Middle Ages, and (4) Modern Britain. Part Two considers the history of women's participation in sport and cricket.

2 Homeric Greece

Historically sporting games may be considered as contests of muscular agôn, whereby athletes confront their antagonists in a struggle to ascertain the victor. Agôn or competition refers to the nature of the contest. As Callois (1988) explains:

Agôn presupposes concentration, appropriate training, assiduous effort, and the will to win. It implies discipline and perseverance. It makes the champion rely solely on his (sic) own resources, encourages him (sic) to make the best possible use of them and forces him (sic) to utilise them fairly and within fixed limits which, being the same for everyone, result in rendering the superiority of the winner indisputable. The agôn appears as the pure form of personal merit and serves to demonstrate it (p. 9).

It may be argued that contemporary sporting games are also modelled on contests of agôn. The purpose of this section is to examine some of the events that took place in Homeric Greece to gain an understanding of how fair play was conceptualised.

Although sometimes disputed, both the Iliad and the Odyssey were compiled by Homer (Rieu, 1950). Little is known of Homer's life, or place of birth, but it is generally accepted that he lived between 750 and 700 B.C (Weiler, 1996). It may be said, however, that his writing depicts the Mycenaean Civilisation which existed five or six hundred years before this.

The Iliad is an epic tragedy that narrates the story of Achilles. It consists of twenty-four books about the Trojan War and Greek warriors. In total, it represents fifty days in a battle that lasted ten years. Although there was a place called Troy (Ilium) that was indeed destroyed, Homer inherited and embellished upon the idea of a ten year war. However, it can still be inferred that the author describes the social structure of that society, and the relations that took place between its citizens (Rieu, 1950).

Before we consider conceptions of fair play in this enacted story, it is first necessary to understand two features that characterise Homeric society identified by MacIntyre (1996). It is important to do so because interpretations of fairness will be inextricably linked to its context and social structure.

First, within Homeric society each citizen has a defined role and status that is delineated within a determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures within this framework belong to kinship and to the household. MacIntyre (1996) further suggests:

For the given rules which assign men (sic) their place in the social order and with it their identity also prescribe what they are and what is owed to them and how they are to be treated and regarded if they fail and how they are to treat and regard others if those others fail (p.123).

At this time in Heroic society, there is no distinction between morality and social structure. They are one and the same. It is likely that this feature has a significant impact on conceptions of fairness and what fair play means at that time. Without knowing one's place in the social order, a person would be unable to understand who they were and what their role in society comprised. The force and rule of kinship was all powerful. A person clearly understood his or her defined role – what duties derived from their status and what actions were deemed permissible. Conceptions of

fairness could not be divorced from their social structure. In other words, “there could be no standard external to those embodied in the structures of his (sic) own community” (MacIntyre, 1996, p.133).

Another feature that characterises Homeric society is that life is considered to be fragile. Each character in the Iliad, whether victor or vanquished, is subjected to impersonal brute force (Corlett, 1996). Thus, each citizen must have the:

. . . capacity not just to face particular harms and dangers but to face a particular kind of pattern of harms and dangers, a pattern in which individual lives find their place and which such lives in turn exemplify (p.125).

Homer illustrates this when he describes the scene where the ghost of Patroclus asks Achilles finally to bury him. Patroclus believes his life is predestined and tries to tell Achilles that the same is true for him also.

And give me that hand, I beseech you; for once you have passed me through the flames I shall never come back again from Hades. . . For I have been engulfed by the dreadful fate that must have been my lot at birth; and it is your destiny too, most worshipful Achilles, to perish under the walls of the rich town of Troy (Rieu, 1950, p.414).

Sports, like Homeric society itself, were Aristocratic. Homer regarded sports as a natural part of Aristocratic life where the principal events were reserved for the monopoly of the Nobles (Gardiner, 1955). Book twenty-three of the Iliad refers to *The Funeral and the Games*. The Games are in honour of the dead Patroclus. It is in this book that we can begin to understand the conception of fair play in Homeric society.

The first event was the chariot race. Achilles tells the warriors that he is mourning the death of his friend and will not take part in the event that he would undoubtedly win. The competitors include: Eumelus King of Men, Diomedes son of Tydeus, Menelaus son of Atreus, and the young Antilochus, son of King Nestor. During the race Phoebus Apollo (a spectator) knocks Diomedes' whip out of his hands allowing Eumelus to take the lead. But, the Goddess Athene was watching, and returned the whip and gave his horses a new fresh spirit. Moreover she chased Eumelus and used

her powers to break the yoke of his chariot. As a result he lost his horses and fell to the ground.

After Diomedes came Menelaus, and then Antilochus who was shouting at his horses to run faster. At a narrow point Antilochus dangerously passed Menelaus and succeeded in running him off the road. At which point Menelaus shouts after him:

Well, have it your own way; but all the same, you shall not carry off the prize till you have answered on your oath for this affair (Rieu, 1950, p.424).

Diomedes won the race, followed by Antilochus, and then Menelaus. Eumelus came in last dragging his chariot and driving his horses out in front. At this point Achilles, who feels sorry for Eumelus says:

The best driver of the lot has come in last. Let us give him a prize, as is only fair. Make it for second, for of course Diomedes takes the first (Rieu, 1950, p.426).

But, Antilochus refuses absolutely to abandon his claim to second place. There upon Menelaus protests that Antilochus has cheated him. He appeals to his Nobles to judge impartially between them when Antilochus says:

I am a much younger man than you, King Menelaus, and you, my senior and my better, know well enough how a young man comes to break the rules. His mind is quicker, but his judgement not so sound. Forgive me then, and of my own accord I will let you have the mare I won, I would rather give it to you at once than fall for ever out of your majesty's favour and perjure myself before the gods (Rieu, 1950, p.428).

The dispute is settled and Achilles provides a special prize for Eumelus. He gives a fifth prize to King Nestor as a memorial of Patroclus' death. It seems that the warriors have a conception of fair play within their event. Menelaus questions Antilochus' honour, and asks for a fair judgement to be made. Antilochus acknowledges that he has broken the rules and offers to return his prize.

It was believed that the intervention of a God often signalled that an injustice had been done (MacIntyre, 1996, p.124). An impersonal force, in the form of one of the

Gods, would interfere in an attempt to restore justice. In this case, the Goddess Athene intervened to correct an injustice served to Diomedes. In Homeric society, morality and the sense of fairness were often determined by the resolutions of the Gods.

The next two events, boxing and wrestling, are of interest because they are both specialised forms of sport that necessitate the existence of rules of conduct (Gardiner, 1955). The boxing contest was between Epieus and Euryalus. Epieus, who was a champion boxer, says that he will rip his opponent's flesh to bits and smash his bones. Euryalus indeed is knocked out, but his partner's threats were not sincere. In fact Epieus is praised by Homer when he writes, "His chivalrous opponent gave him a hand and set him on his legs" (Rieu, 1950, p.433). The notion of a chivalrous gesture is an important idea and will be discussed further below.

The wrestling competition involved Aias and Odysseus. The match was conducted under the rules of what the Greeks referred to as 'upright wrestling' in which the object was to throw your opponent to the ground (Gardiner, 1955). After some time neither opponent seemed likely to succeed. Thus, at the risk of boring the crowd, Achilles declared that both competitors had won, and were to share equal prizes.

Next was the foot race with Aias, Odysseus, and Antilochus. The race was very close and as they drew near the finish Odysseus prays to Athene, "Hear me, Goddess. I need your valuable aid. Come down and speed my feet" (Rieu, 1950, p.433). Athene responds and Odysseus wins. Aias becomes annoyed and complains that the Goddess has tripped him. His comments are laughed at, and Achilles says:

I'll tell you something that you know already. The gods still favour the old crowd; for though Aias is only a little older than myself, Odysseus over there is a product of an earlier generation, a relic of the past. But his old age, as they say, is green; and it's a hard job to beat him in a race - for any of us but Achilles (Rieu, 1950, p.433).

The fact that the Goddess favoured Odysseus is not seen as unfair. Her intervention was perceived as a fair and legitimate aid to Odysseus. It is Aias who is mocked and ridiculed.

The next event is the armed fight between Aias and Diomedes. After some time, the spectators plead with the two warriors to stop their murderous form of sport and share the prizes. They do so, but Achilles awards Diomedes the victory because he was about to slash Aias across the throat. The next sport is the discus, with Polypoetes, Leonteus, Aias, and Epieus, which Polypoetes wins easily. Then comes the archery competition between Prince Teucer and Meriones. To win, the competitor must cleanly shoot down a pigeon. Meriones succeeded. The last event is the javelin where both Agamemnon and Meriones wished to compete. But Achilles intervened and said that because no-one could beat Agamemnon the event should not take place. Achilles then awarded Agamemnon a prize and handed Meriones a bronze spear.

To summarise, conceptions of fairness in Homeric Greece seem to be largely determined by the Gods and by the Nobles. There are implicit rules that govern conduct. As previously discussed, these rules stem from knowing one's place in the order of society. People are judged by their actions and their actions are defined and shaped through their position and status within the order of the social structure.

3 Historic Greece

In Historic Greece a major change occurs in that Homeric values no longer define morality within Athenian society. Here, MacIntyre (1996) identifies a number of distinct transformations, all of which illustrate the changes between Homeric and Historic Greece. Two main features are identified which serve to demonstrate how conceptions of fairness may have changed at that time. First, virtue is no longer tied specifically to a particular social role or status. Secondly, whereas Homeric citizens had no external appeal to morality, for the Athenian an understanding of the virtues provided a distinct set of moral standards. These were then used to question whether certain acts, practices, or policies were just ones.

Ethics belonged to the community that in turn became the embodiment of reason. There was no place for any individual ethics or moral consciousness. Accordingly, it can be argued that this change would inevitably have had an effect on conceptions of fairness; that is, a shift from the internal Homeric conception to the external Athenian polis.

In order to exemplify the above notion further, it is helpful to consider the role of fair play within the Olympic Games. The Games began in 776 B.C and continued to 344 A.D (Weiler, 1996). They were announced three months in advance, and held in four different locations: Isthmia, Nemea, Delphi, and Olympia, the latter being the most prestigious whereby, under a truce, athletes made their way from Elis to Olympia. An oath was then taken in front of Zeus to signify an athlete's commitment to abide by the rules of the competition.

At the same time the Games began there was a notable increase in political influence on society and practice (Weiler, 1996). This serves to illustrate how notions of fair play may have changed and become more formal. For example, rules for different events intensified and Hellenodikai (judges) were included to referee the Games. They were responsible for organising age groups and categories and enforcing penalties for those athletes who violated the rules.

Olympic sports were still placed under the patronage of the Gods. Thus, any athlete who violated the rules of the Games was acting unfairly, and in doing so was seen as displeasing the Gods (Gardiner, 1955). The Olympic crown signified not simply the value of a prize but the feeling of honourable victory for the athlete and the state which he represented. This feeling has been assigned the name *Aidos* and is sometimes, perhaps incorrectly, equated with the modern term, sportsmanship (Gardiner, 1950). In the work of Pindar we can also see the emphasis given to the moral importance of abiding by the rules.

Pindar (522 – 448 B.C) was an important influence in ancient lyric poetry and his work included the "Epinikia Odes" which were poems that honoured Olympic victors. The fundamental character of the Odes was to praise moral virtue (Yiannakis, 1995). It is in his work that one can find important references to the idea of fair play. One of the most important moral values for Pindar was the significance of the athlete's oath. Directly connected to taking an oath is the idea of justice; that is, by keeping one's oath, man rises to the highest realm, that of "truth" (Yiannakis, 1995, p.17). Pindar writes:

I have contested rightfully, I have finished my race, I have kept my faith, I am waiting now for the wreath of justice, which will be given to me by the Lord (cited in Yiannakis, 1995, p.16).

The Eleans were concerned about the fairness of the regulations and rules of the Olympic Games. In an attempt to improve the fairness of the competition they sent an ambassador to Psammetichus, the King of Egypt (594-589 B.C) to see if he could suggest any improvements. The Egyptians replied arguing that their current method was already unfair because they allowed Greeks to compete in the Games. In order to make it fair they advised that only strangers should be allowed to compete (Gardiner, 1955). Although no such changes were made, in the fourth century, due to numerous scandals, it was deemed necessary to forbid judges themselves from entering the chariot-races (Gardiner, 1955).

One of the most gruesome Olympic events was the pankration. The object was to bring the opponent to a point where he must admit defeat or die. There were certainly rules that governed this event but they varied between cities. For the Athenians, biting and gouging were illegal, whilst kicking and hitting were allowed. However, the Spartans included biting and gouging, but unlike the Eleans, disapproved of strangling. Fair play was enforced by numerous Hellenodikai who hit the competitors with rods for any rule infractions. In spite of this, it seems that the rules were often broken (Harris, 1964).

The oplitodromia, or the armour bearing race, illustrates some important points about the notion of fair play that are worthy of consideration. The rules of the event stated that only an athlete of big stature could take part. This was to ensure that the runner could compete whilst wearing the heavy armour and carrying his shield. The athlete that could afford the correct equipment manifested that not only did he enjoy full political rights but that he was also an honest person (Yiannakis, 1994). Therefore, only a select number of athletes were eligible. The Greek state placed immense ideological importance on the honour of the shield bearer. This was:

. . . shown by the fact that the soldier who would throw his shield on the ground and abandon the battle, drawn by fear, enlisted in the list of the "dishonest" persons, and he was not allowed by the sacred laws to be buried (Yiannakis, 1994, p37).

This event helps to demonstrate the significance of an athlete being honest, fair, just, and truthful. In both the pankration and the oplitodromia there were rules and prohibitions to ensure fair competition. Even the Romans were inspired by Olympia; they also insisted on exact obedience to the rules of the Games and tried to eliminate corruption and unfairness (Gardiner, 1955). At this time, however, it appears that the idea of chivalrous generosity, which was described in the Iliad, seems to have disappeared. Gardiner (1955) explains that:

No Greeks ever shook hands after a fight, no Greek ever was the first to congratulate his conqueror; defeat was felt as a disgrace, and for this reason perhaps the Spartans forbade their citizens to take part in boxing competitions or the pankration, because it was disgraceful for a Spartan to acknowledge defeat. They could not feel that it was better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all (p.71).

Thus, we may conclude that the concept of sportspersonship is missing something that much later becomes an important element of the English conception of fair play.

4 Mediaeval Society and the Middle Ages (440-1485)

It may be true to suggest that the concept of fair play dates back to Ancient Greece. It seems that, however, there is a paucity of literature which acknowledges the Middle Ages and its role in developing the modern conception we have of fair play today. Many codes of British sport can be traced back along a distinguished lineage to the chivalry of medieval Europe.

We can rightly say that the modern fair play concept has its roots in ancient ethics, to the same or to a similar degree as other civilised fields in the long history of European culture. But except for this general dependency, no further. Contemporary sports ethics, with its rule of noble behaviour toward a partner has its real and direct roots not in the ancient world, but in the moral standards of medieval chivalry (Guttmann, 1986, p.4).

It is believed by many historians that the first individual ethics can be found in the 4th century A.D among the military troops of Caesar Gallien (Liponski, 1988).

These troops were organised solely for young nobles and the rich sons of wealthy Roman families. In an attempt to distinguish themselves from the masses, they produced a set of high moral standards. Consequently, during the Roman occupation, young romanised Celts also adopted these standards (Liponski, 1988).

At the beginning of the 5th century A.D, the Romans withdrew their troops from Britain and the "eques cataphractarius" tradition was born. This tradition was important because it signified the onset of two things. The first was the initiation of knight errants or wandering knights and the second, the subsequent development of chivalric rules (Liponski, 1988).

During the 5th century jousts and tournaments were favourite sports in which noblemen on horseback would run at each other with a lance or sword and try to knock their opponent from the saddle. Here there were strict rules which governed both activities (Hole, 1949). It has been suggested that this unique group of nobility aforementioned served to enhance the development of chivalric rules, including those of noble behaviour towards both sporting and military opponents (Liponski, 1988).

MacIntyre (1996) argues that Homeric society provides the background for mediaeval culture. This means that mediaeval society can be considered to have just made its own transition out of what MacIntyre also calls Heroic society. Albeit tenuous, the re-emergence of chivalry, which seemed to disappear during Ancient Greece, supports the claim that Mediaeval Society has links to Homeric Greece. Moreover this tradition, which began in the early 5th century, was strengthened and substantiated for over one thousand years. Thus the onset of chivalry became an important basis for future sports ethics (Liponski, 1988).

After Knights lost their importance within the social order, the principles of mediaeval chivalry were passed down through the social echelons of society. Chivalrous efforts, however, were no longer for war but for play and competition. During this period, Mediaeval England with its wide-open spaces became a paradise for the elite and sporting activity. The early Middle Ages saw increases in numerous hunting activities such as: otter hunting, river fishing, hawking, and stag hunting

(Hole, 1949). Further past-times included: skating, quoits, and rowing. Also a variety of rural games were played by all, mostly in county districts. They included: hoodman's blind, blind man's bluff, leapfrog, shuttlecock, hot cockles, and prisoner's bar's and hell (Hole, 1949). These games seem more appropriate to children whereas nine men's morris or merelles were usually played by Noblemen (Hole, 1949).

Games of strength and skill were popular such as: wrestling, running, leaping, riding, cudgel-play, quarter-staff, pitching bars, and tossing the hammer. Athletic prowess was certainly valued and, "even the most sober minded individual considered lawful sports to be a necessary part of a young man's education" (Hole, 1949, p.24). Foot racing was perhaps the oldest past time, and was usually included in every rural festival or country wedding. Furthermore, recreational past times included: chamber music, dance, cards, food, painting, gambling, plays, ballet, opera, church festivals, fairs, and markets (McLean, 1983).

5 Modern History: The Cult of Athleticism

Before the 1700s, local people organised and controlled games and competitions. As a result, rules for different sports were devised by localities. In contrast, during the 18th century, when social positions were fixed and patronage existed, rules for different sports were developed and eventually codified. For example, in 1743 the first rules for boxing emerged and in 1744 nationally agreed laws for cricket and golf were established and codified. In cricket this was largely in order to provide consistency for the sake of gambling which was prolific at that time (Munting, 1993).

At Cambridge University, in the 1700s, numerous sports were prohibited for moral or disciplinary reasons. Football was thought too rough and likely to promote violence and unruly behaviour. In short, it was deemed uncivilised and certainly unfit for gentlemen (Twigg, 1996).

Until the middle of the 19th century public schools actively discouraged most sporting activities. This was mainly due to the fear that an increase in gambling and drinking would lead to corruption and misconduct (Vamplew, 1988). By 1864, this attitude had changed and public schools reserved the word 'idle' for those boys who

did not care for games (Holt, 1989). Later in the century, social attitudes towards gambling also changed (Munting, 1993). For the upper classes the first rowing organisation was established in 1829 followed by the athletic union in 1864, whereas the working class followed soccer and in 1863 the Football Association was founded.

The Industrial Revolution brought economic growth and the subsequent improvement to transport. This enabled fans to travel easily throughout country in order to support their teams. By this time, in 1888, the Football league had been founded. The Industrial Revolution had a very significant impact on the growth and development of sport (Holt, 1989). By 1870 most workers finished at lunch time on Saturday. This meant that more and more people were free to take up their own recreational past times. The Rugby Union formed in 1871. The Education Act was established in 1870 making Elementary school compulsory for all children. This saw the introduction of organised physical activities. In state schools, as part of a daily routine, drill (Swedish gymnastics and rhythmic exercises) was part of the curriculum. Initially, this was an attempt to control pupil behaviour, but later saw the beginnings of Madam Bergman-Osterberg's philosophy.

Rather than drill exercises, the Public school system employed a different method. A combination of the rise of the gentleman amateur and the cult of fair play led to the idea that sport could be viewed as a form of moral education. Thus, the idea was conceived that moral lessons could be taught through physical education. It was believed that the best means to achieve this lay in the practice of games not in fives, or hare and hounds. This is because games were regarded as unselfish and ennobling; they were about winning for the team and not simply for oneself (Mangan, 1981).

According to McIntosh (1979), the term 'Muscular Christianity' was first used by T.C. Sandars in a review of Charles Kingsley's (1857) novel, *Two Years Ago*. Not only did Sandars believe that games had a moral basis but that fairness in sport guaranteed fairness in everyday life and practice. Many believed that noble muscularity was part of an English heritage that must be preserved. For example, Sir Theodore Cook's, *In Character and Sportsmanship* (1927) posited the view that Anglo-Saxon superiority was a result of games education. He states:

We must be worthy of our heritage. We shall keep it by that sense of fair-play which is bred in our bones and courses through our blood, which makes a boy play the game (p.xiv; cited in Mangan, 1981, p.203).

Thus, fair play became inextricably linked to the idea of patriotic male Englishness. The gentleman was no longer a man of "unalleviated leisure;" his gentility became measured by his conduct (Eassom, 1994). Moreover, games enshrined the meaning of fair play which ultimately became the "watchword of the gentleman amateur" (Holt, 1989, p.98). Fair play signified a new philosophy of loyalty, struggle, adversity in defeat, and subsequently a new attitude towards race, religion, and work.

The infamous phrase, 'Play the Game' is often seen as the most "moralistic exhortation" (Mangan, 1981, p.200). It meant to behave in a certain way, to act with dignity, decency, honesty, and above all, to play according to the rules. For example, consider the following Harrovian verse about cricket:

Play the Game! Play the Game!
Boys of Harrow,
Play the Game.
End each match as just beginning,
Bowl and field as sure of winning!
Meet your fate, but meet it grinning
Play the Game!
(From Harrovian, Vol. Xxvi, no. 5 (26 July 1913); cited in Mangan, 1981, p.200).

Cricket seemed to acquire its own moral identity which came to epitomise the essence of fair play. A cricketer required unruffled calm under attack, a sense of etiquette, elegance, modesty, and integrity (Holt, 1996). Cricket was thought to be the pure game where there was never a charge of cheating brought against the players.

The whites of the players reflected the pristine nature of the sport: indeed "it's not cricket" had entered the language as a cry against unfair conduct (Vamplew, 1988, p.264).

This comment embodies the meaning of unfair play and what it meant to infringe the ethos of proper conduct. Victorian attitudes towards cricket epitomised its reputation for character-building and instilling good, Christian virtues (Birley, 1995).

In 1891 there was disagreement over the legislation of the penalty kick in football which was awarded for an intentional offence in the penalty area. Public school masters argued that to suggest a player would intentionally foul another tarnished the reputation and honour of the person responsible (Dobbs, 1973). As the verse below demonstrates, to follow the rules with honourable conduct was of the utmost importance.

Rules that make you obey;
Courage to Honour is true;
Who is the fairest in play
Best and good temperedest, who?
Tom! (Second verse of 'Tom' by Edward Bowen in W. E. Bowen;
cited in Mangan, 1981, p.405).

The above illustrates why Tom was considered to be the ideal school hero, of both the football field and his House. In Association football, "The Code of Gentlemanly Conduct" was enforced as strictly as possible. For some time, there was no need for a referee. When the rules of the game were widened to include accidental penalties or misconduct, however, referees were enabled to punish any act considered to be "ungentlemanly conduct" (McIntosh, 1963, p.76). Interestingly this law remains a part of the game today although its title is now, 'unsporting conduct.'

These sorts of examples about fair play provide what Mangan (1981) calls the "ignoble rhetoric" of morality which,

. . . assisted in the development and reinforcement of individual role, collective habits and the institutional value system: they both created and reflected an ethos. They constituted, in short, a set of symbols for believing and acting (p.206).

The ethos of fair play involved more than strict adherence to the rules. It included the realisation that sports are a form of co-operative competition in which each contestant needs all the others (Guttmann, 1986). This idea of a sporting ethos marked the onset of the 'Golden Age' where a world of codified rules shaped not just 'playing the game' but also acting within the spirit of the game. For example:

. . . walking from the wicket without questioning the umpire and generally acting with magnanimity in victory and graciousness in defeat, playing in an entertaining, attacking style without gambling on the outcome or receiving payment (Holt, 1996, p.53).

The ethos of fair play also involved a code of conduct for spectators. To ignore the excellence of the opposing team was to give the home players an unfair psychological advantage (Guttmann, 1986).

The idea of the gentleman amateur and his adherence to a high standard of fair play was not, however, always the case. For example, W. G. Grace was well known to have violated cricket's conventions that umpires' decisions were never to be challenged (Birley, 1995). This famous cricketer had a reputation for intimidating umpires to the point that they were frightened to give him out. Moreover, his gamesmanship in international competition provides evidence of the ethos of fair play at that time. No longer was the unpaid gentleman amateur a world apart from the unethical behaviour of the sordid professional. Birley (1995) mentions a Test match of 1882 against Australia where England lost the first Ashes Series. He states:

W.G., having fielded the ball, had pretended to throw it back to the bowler, and then, when the batsman, thinking the ball was 'dead,' walked out of his ground to repair the pitch, threw down his wicket leaving the umpire no alternative but to give him out (p.23).

The gradual demise of the noble, honest amateur signalled a historical turning point for fair play. The British team accepted Grace's behaviour. Other members of the aristocracy, however, condemned Grace's double standards blaming the nasty and corrupting side of professionalism for his infractions (Birley, 1995). We can draw similar parallels here with the modern women's game. We will see the criticism of the corrupting effects of professionalism on the ethos of the game in Chapter Six. The next section provides a brief historical insight into the history of women's participation in sport and cricket.

Part Two

1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to provide some social analysis of how women's involvement in physical activity related to the prevailing social ideologies of the time. The aim is to explain how conceptions of fair play derived from the particular cultural and social belief systems of the day. In other words, notions of fair play and ethos were not hermetically sealed within the practice. They derived from the specific context of the practice community, its traditions and history.

2 The History of Women's Participation in Sport and Cricket

Throughout history the place of women everywhere in Europe was seen as inferior to men (McCrone, 1987). The law subsumed a married woman within her husband's identity so neither herself nor her children were hers by right, and divorce was practically impossible. The role of woman was defined further by her capacity to bear children. It is not surprising then that single women were mostly subject to the control of their male relatives (Ferguson, 1975). McCrone (1987 states:

Despite and because of their unique biology women were considered innately physically inferior to men, and that inferiority underlay fundamental presumptions of mental and social inferiority that were translated into masculine skepticism about women's abilities to secure independent action and partake in activities like sport hitherto monopolized by men (p.97).

Under this regime, however, not all women were excluded from sports and other active pastimes. Although little is written on their participation, it is possible, using a wide variety of sources, to get an idea of what life was like.

There is evidence of frequent and varied female participation in diverse sporting activities as both spectators and performers (Brailsford, 1999). In 1702 Anne became Queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland. At that time Britain had a strong sporting tradition and there are records of ladies playing nine pins at Epsom. Also bear baiting, bull baiting, and fights between other animals gained female interest. In fact, Queen Anne is said to have delighted in bear baiting (Hole, 1949).

At that time, English ladies hunted and there are numerous records of prize-fights between common women. These matches were often staged to attract the largest crowds possible and included heavy wagers. For example, Brailsford (1999) notes a match in 1722 between Elizabeth Wilkinson and Hannah Highfield for 3 guineas at Hockey-in-the-Hole.

In 1725 horse racing was considered an acceptable spectator pastime and the Ladies' Plate race became popular with £15 for the winning rider. In 1744 there is evidence of female participation in stool ball. This was invented by milkmaids and aped a feminine version of cricket. The bowler sought to strike a player's milking stool with a thrown ball. In another version the ball was driven from stool to stool. Prenderghast (1977) speaks of a whole mythology of meaning and explanation surrounding the application of the game. At this time, labour relations within an agricultural mode of life confined women to the private domestic sphere. Women found solidarity within the game in a culture where gender played a repressive structuring factor in social and economic life. Participation invoked a way of thinking and feeling about a particular image of femininity. These factors amounted to shared ingrained assumptions about how gender roles were to be reinforced.

At this time, "the only team game that could be considered to have attained such hallmarks of modern sport as rules and umpires was cricket." (Park, 1994). There were women participating in the game at this time as well. In fact, the first recorded women's match took place on 26th July, 1745, on Gosden Common. It is believed to have been between eleven maids of Bramley and eleven maids of Hambledon. Hambledon won by 127 notches to 119. Matches were often played between villages sometimes for the prize of a barrel of ale or eleven pairs of lace gloves or plum cake (Harris, 1996).

Cricketing games for women were governed by conventions rather than by written rules. The prevailing social and cultural codes of the day defined fair play. The organisation of games was very simple and the ethos of the practice played an important part in ensuring that the unwritten rules of fairness were followed. Women participants viewed their sport as inherently fair and co-operative; the ethos of the game subsumed idealised feminine virtues of gentility and honesty (Duquin,

1991). In Chapter Six we will see how traces of such an ideology can be found within the contemporary game.

The dominant prevailing social attitude at that time, however, was that physical activity for women signified ‘masculine tendencies’ whereby women were labelled as unruly feminists (Birley, 1995). At this time, cricket was thought to represent an inelegant appearance for women. Their participation was heavily criticised and ridiculed by men and women alike. Generally, then, women were not allowed to take part in the same activities as men. Organised sport and rigorous activity were major vehicles for defining male gender roles. Sport was the private domain of males. It served to establish, maintain, and sustain ideologies about the proper sphere of women and their prescribed duties and domestic roles (Mangan and Park, 1987). As McCrone states (1987):

In social systems dominated by men, such as that of Victorian England, a useful means of controlling women was a projection of the view that sport was essentially masculine, requiring physical and psychological attitudes and behaviour unnatural to women, and thus that it was beyond their proper sphere (p.98).

Despite this attitude, the second half of the 18th century saw many cricketing contests played between villages and between married and single women. Local parishes of married versus unmarried women also played each other in football – ‘marrieds’ were always said to have won. Matches were reported to have become quite boisterous affairs with crowds in the thousands – betting often took place on the result and also there were cock fights on the outfield (Harris, 1996). Females were occasionally spectators in cock fighting and there is evidence to suggest that women took part in skittles around the same time (Burke, 1978).

Men’s cricket moved and gained popularity from the south-eastern counties to London. Important matches attracted thousands of people. The Marylebone Cricket Club was formed in 1787 and is still claimed to be the moral conscience of the game (Plumb, 1973). The 1790s saw women rowing for cash prizes and in 1797 foot racing or smock racing became very popular for women who also participated in competitive walking or running.

As gambling by male spectators became more and more prolific within sport, growing criticisms of the moral tone emerged. This may have had some bearing on the significant change in female involvement in sport. For example, the introduction of Ladies' Plates may have been used to demonstrate that racing was polite and amenable to the fairer sex. This illustrates the important role that women played. For example, as this sport was considered acceptable for ladies it was seen to boast a high moral content (Brailsford, 1999).

In 1803 the beginnings of drill and gymnastic exercises appeared on the curriculum. Madame Bergman-Osterberg defined the role of physical education for women as health, beauty and moral consciousness (Mangan and Park, 1987). Her legacy paved the way for a distinct British female tradition in single-sex physical education teacher-training institutions.

Highly structured rule laden games, like cricket, did not emerge until the beginning of the 19th century. Often women became fashionable accessories to their menfolk as they strived to become notable spectators. For example, hunting events involved a splendid hunt ball and both archery and racing had similar attractions. Early prints of cricket matches show mixed groups of spectators who were well dressed and held influence. At this time, along with women's cricket, girls' cricket was gradually gaining a widening appeal (Brailsford, 1999).

In April 1803, *Sporting Magazine* published a letter from the then - late Duke of Dorset. He praised the Countess of Derby and her cricketing ladies:

Let your sex go on, and assert their right to every pursuit that does not debase the mind. Go on, and attach yourself to the athletic, and, by that, convince . . . all Europe how worthy you are of being considered the wives of plain, generous, and native Englishmen (Sporting Magazine, 1803, pp.13/14; cited in Brailsford, 1999, p.156).

His implicit chauvinism was ignored and women's cricket, now partly endorsed, continued to flourish. In 1811 the first contest between county sides occurred when Hampshire played Surrey. It is reported that the players ranged from 16 – 60 years of

age. The match was sponsored by two noblemen for 500 guineas per side and Hampshire won, after rain had disrupted play (Harris, 1996).

Polite pursuits such as archery, badminton, croquet, and lawn tennis provided access for upper class women to increasingly energetic forms of play. In this sphere, any notion of gambling was rejected and such games had strict ordering, where etiquette and rules of propriety determined the ethos of the activity and the proper, fair way to behave. Attitudes towards fair play derived from the prevailing social attitudes towards moral conduct; they did not originate wholly from within the practice.

Among the upper classes, wealth and privilege could give scope for individual sporting enterprise that went well beyond what custom allowed, while working class women, less restrained by convention, often had wider possibilities for play, if much less leisure to make use of them (Brailsford, 1999, p.142).

The above quote illustrates, however, that sporting opportunities were limited for upper class women in some ways. For example, they could not visit the pugilistic tavern, the fives court or make wagers (Brailsford, 1999). It may be argued that codes of unwritten conduct were applied differently in those sports practised by women of different social spheres or classes. Women who belonged to the lower classes participated in a number of activities, like running, where unfair play such as the sly trip of a foot-racer or the occasional ‘unladylike’ push were commonplace (Brailsford, 1999). This point exemplifies the notion that ideas of fair play are inextricably linked to the prevailing social ideologies of the time. They are contextually sensitive to a range of prevailing particularities and nuances of the sporting culture in question. In 1833 this comment appeared in the Nottingham Review:

Last week, at Sileby feast, the women so far forgot themselves as to enter upon a game of cricket, and by their deportment as well as frequent applications to the tankard, they rendered themselves objects such as no husband, brother, parent, or lover could contemplate with any degree of satisfaction (cited in Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, p.20).

Here, the female version of cricket’s ‘serene bucolic idyll’ was not always welcomed. Such a comment was probably due to the amount of alcohol consumed,

and reflected the tightening restraints that were emerging on women as this period drew to a close (Brailsford, 1999).

As previously noted, in 1870 the Education Act made Elementary school for all, compulsory for the first time. Prior to this the popularity of women's cricket had started to decline. It waned during the early years of Queen Victoria's reign but the late 19th century saw a revival particularly within the country manor scene (Harris, 1996). The first recorded women's cricket club was The White Heather Club founded in 1887 at Nun Appleton in Yorkshire. Eight noble women, who had time on their hands, formed the club. Women wore long dresses, with hooped skirts, hats, ribbons and stockings.

Stopping the balls with their petticoats, a favourite form of fielding with some lady cricketers but definitely 'bad form' and unworthy of 'real cricket' . . . and whatever decision the umpire gives you must implicitly acquiesce outwardly. We may swear inwardly as much as we like but if we are given out, out we must go! (cited in Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, p.86).

The above citation illustrates the influence of the umpire. There was no question of undermining the umpire's decision. If a player was given out then they must tacitly accept the umpire's decision. Fair play was to 'walk' from the wicket if one was given out. It is interesting to note the type of attire worn at the time. It is widely accepted that, as a result, women invented over arm bowling as a means to get round their long skirts. As Lady Milner of the White Heather Club said in 1888:

It is no uncommon thing to see a lady holding onto her hat with one hand, striving to catch a ball with the other and succeeding in doing neither! Boots are better than shoes! (cited in Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, p.86).

At this time it was not generally acceptable for women to undertake too much physical activity. This is partly because women's participation was seen as a direct threat to the cult of male athleticism. It was imperative, therefore, for women games players to present themselves as 'ladylike' and fair. Women did not want to give the impression that they were trying to infiltrate a masculine world, and, as a result, strived to retain a feminine image of gentleness, beauty and self-discipline (McCrone, 1987). Women took care not to violate behavioural rules and upheld the

strictest standards of propriety. Here we can see how the prescribed social rules of politeness and etiquette determined concepts of fair play for women's sport.

It was quite an achievement for women to have set up their own sporting clubs at a time when mind and body were seen as needing protection for the important task of domestic labour and child rearing. Men were concerned that women would try to emulate them and encroach on their male preserves (Birley, 1995). The church had a powerful influence on sustaining this ideology. Ideas that God had imbued woman with qualities to serve her man, nurture his children, and protect his home were prevalent (McCrone, 1987). Nevertheless, it was a few upper middle class women, who had time on their hands, who set up the Women's Cricket Association (WCA) in 1926 (Harris, 1996).

In the 1930s the English Women's Cricket Federation thrived in the industrial north of the country. This federation championed limited over league cricket, usually played in the evenings after work. At this time the WCA eschewed the concept of limited overs. This was probably because 'real' cricket was perceived as Test match cricket. The limited overs game was not accepted by the WCA until 1933 (Harris, 1996). In Chapter Six, we will see how the tension between limited overs and Test match cricket continues to resonate throughout contemporary elite women's cricket.

The first women's County Associations emerged in 1933. They had adopted the limited overs game. Principally this meant increased competition within a domestic programme which made the selection process for England and International matches easier. The first international women's test series was played in 1934 between England and Australia. Women had to find £80 in order to participate. The poem overleaf appeared in the press in 1951 when England toured Australia. It captures the moral sentiments of the time and provides an insight into the perception of the participation of women:

Bowl the googly, swing the bat,
Shout in unison "Owzzat"?
"Owzzat?" that screams from lovely lips
From beauty crouching in the slips.
Down the pitch and kill the spin

Played! And may the best girls win.
Keep the wicket, snatch the bails,
We can play as well as males.
Hold the the hot 'uns, hold the stingers,
Hold it, Mrs. Butterfingers.'

The game of cricket is no joke
To us who neither drink nor smoke;
Games are won and runs are made
By girls who stick to lemonade.
Moreover, if some wolf in flannels
Diverts our minds to other channels,
Then this would-be lady killer
Gets the works from Mrs. Miller.
Shapely legs concealed by pads
Shall not be looked upon by cads.
We play the game; we never yield,
On, or off the cricket field (Heyhoe Flint and Rheinberg, 1976, p.86).

Mrs. Miller was the Australian team manager and 6th Hon. Treasurer of the Australian Women's Cricket Council. The poem illustrates the importance placed on adhering to a strict code of conduct off the field. Implicit in the poem is the dominant ideology of femininity. The players are beautiful; they have 'shapely legs' and 'lovely lips.' They are graceful and would not dare to entertain the idea of such unethical conduct as drinking or smoking. Such immoral behaviour was discouraged by the team's chaperone who ensured that the women were saved from the debaucheries of alcohol and 'wolves in flannel.'

In 1958 the inaugural meeting of the International Women's Cricket Council was held at the Victoria Cricket Association in Melbourne. In 1973, England hosted the first ever World Cup in which they beat Australia. This time saw an emerging new trend assisted by government help and sponsorship. Shortly after the one-day game had been introduced into men's cricket, it emerged in the elite women's game in the 1970s. The concept of limited overs had a significant impact on the climate of the game. This point will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

It may be argued that for women to have experienced increased opportunities in sport and international competition, prevailing social attitudes towards women in general had had to change. This represented a significant turning point for women's participation. Gradually women's sport became an accepted sphere. The image of the

new sportswomen emerged. She would be unable to break free, however, from the masculinity of sport preserved as a male defined arena. As McCrone (1987) states:

Girls came to understand that they could play games but only if they took great care to demonstrate their basic femininity, and they learned that there would be no autonomous assessment of their real athletic worth as long as the standards of men were the universal criteria of excellence. Thus, women in sport remained the 'other,' the 'second sex,' well into the twentieth century (p.119).

3 Summary

Conceptions of fair play have undergone changes throughout different periods of history. It has been argued that historical turning points have shaped our current understandings of fair play. In order to understand the meaning and philosophical content of fair play today then it is vital to consider not just its recent historical past but Homeric, Ancient, and Mediaeval traditions also. It is also important to recognise the Eurocentric nature of the analysis offered in this section. Investigations of non-Western notions of fair play would be of considerable use to an analysis of fair play. It is sufficient to argue here, however, that the concept of fair play is socially and historically constructed and, as a result, should not be eschewed when formulating an account of ethos (Eassom, 1998). It is essential to recognise the contextual relationship in which these ideas were formulated.

Chapter Six defines the ethos of contemporary elite women's cricket. It examines the concept of ethos as 'dominant meaning' whereby inherited cultural norms from past traditions serve to form new meanings. Herein different interests are constantly re-worked, struggled over, and re-negotiated. Links between the history of women's cricket and the modern game are analysed.

The next chapter examines traditional moral theory and recent feminist ethical literature. It attempts to develop a context-respectful theory that takes into account the notion that fair play is a socially and historically constructed concept.

Chapter Three

Feminist Ethics

1 Introduction

The aim of the first part of this chapter is to examine the commitment of traditional moral theory to a principled requirement of impartiality. It has been the strict adherence to moral impartialism that has been the central target of feminist, and certain non-feminist, critiques of traditional ethics. The paradigmatic exemplars of deontological ethics, consequentialism, and social contract theory will be outlined.

The aim here is not to explicate in detail a complete exegesis of Kant's ethics, utilitarianism, or Rawls' theory of justice. Rather, the approach to moral theory offered by each proponent is examined with regard to its incorporation of a principle of impartiality. Then, virtue ethics, a non-feminist alternative to the dominant tradition, is explained. Next, in an attempt to show how feminist ethics differs from these recent critical alternatives, the diversity of feminist ethical approaches is considered. This chapter concludes with an analysis of context-respectful theory and its relation to a principle of impartiality.

2 Ethics

Most modern Western theorists pursue one of four distinct approaches to moral philosophy: (1) deontological ethics; (2) consequentialism; (3) social contract theory; and (4) virtue ethics. The paradigmatic exemplars of these approaches may be located within those traditions associated with Kantianism, Utilitarianism, Hobbesian philosophy, and Aristotelian ethics, respectively.

2.1 Deontological Ethics

Deontological theories are those that prescribe certain acts regardless, of the consequences of performing or not performing them. Consequently, certain acts are believed inherently to be right or wrong. For example, lying is seen as wrong in itself irrespective of the consequences of doing so.

Kantian ethics is probably the paradigm case of an impartialist ethical theory (Friedman, 1997). Kantian ethicists purport that moral obligation can be derived

solely from reason. For Kant, duty is the irreducible starting point whereby good intentions promote right action for its own sake; that is, duty for duty's sake (Louden, 1992). Kant attempts to identify the maxims, or fundamental principles of action, that moral agents ought to adopt. His central move is to construct the principles of ethics according to rational procedures. He begins by identifying a good will as the only unconditional good and uses an account of the principles of ethics to determine what it is to have a good will. He asks what maxims or fundamental principles can be universalised as nothing can be a moral principle unless it can be generalised for all. This idea is formulated as a demand, which he calls, "The Categorical Imperative."

Kant offered three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. The first is concerned with the form of the imperative (one 'ought' morally to do x), the second with its content (the standard of moral justification), and the third links both form and content together (Raphael, 1994).

- (1) Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law;
- (2) Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means;
- (3) Act as if you were the subject of all ends as every rational being is an end in himself (Kant, 1785, pp.429-432).

The first of these principles is often referred to as 'the formula of universal law' and is a method of avoiding partiality. Kant sometimes referred to this as: act as if you were laying down a universal law of nature. In other words consider your decision was taken by God and it would affect everyone (Raphael, 1994). The second formulation demands that people are not just treated as means but must be shown regard as ends-in-themselves. The last formulation connects both one and two. It states that people should act as if they are members of a realm or political State. Thus, each community member must recognise that other people are capable of universally legislating and hence, all men (sic) are to be considered equal.

The adoption of the Categorical Imperative is the keystone to Kant's ethics, and is used to classify which maxims agents may or may not adopt. According to Kant,

then, morality begins with a rejection of non-universalisable principles. He argues that the moral law transcends personal considerations.

The moral law is objective and not person dependent, it holds universally, without regard for any contingent conditions that may subjectively differentiate one person from another (Sullivan, 1989, p.1).

This point has been interpreted and misinterpreted within the body of feminist ethical literature. Sherwin (1991) contends that the above means the moral law is independent of the emotions of those people involved in particular applications. She states:

The moral evaluation he called for explicitly disallows consideration of the specific circumstances of the agent or of other parties affected. Rather, moral conclusions must be reached through reasoning that has been abstracted from the circumstances of application, whereby agents decide if the maxims under which they would act could be willed to be universally binding (p.6).

It could be argued that Sherwin (1991) has misconstrued Kant's position here. It is not that consideration for specific circumstances must be disallowed but that these circumstances must be considered in an impartial way. Impartiality, here, requires the purely rational apprehension of the moral law (Friedman, 1997). Thus, a sense of duty and commitment to the moral law itself provides the rational motivation to disregard one's own personal attachments and consider all persons as valuable ends-in-themselves.

Defenders of the impartiality requirement concede that impartiality plays a restrictive role as the close personal commitments we feel for particular others cannot be felt for all persons equally. Impartialists distinguish between the abstract viewpoint and the practical standpoint that a moral agent adopts when in a particular situation or context (Friedman, 1997). The abstract viewpoint, its defenders argue, is a stance necessary for the justification of moral judgement and not necessarily a formula that can be applied to concrete circumstances involving those people we may or may not care about. It ought to be the case, however, that it is considered morally acceptable to favour those special obligations and commitments we have to specific others. These loyalties must be justified from an impartial standpoint and not simply

endorse favouritism. So, although it may be morally permissible to care preferentially for our own children, the rightness of such care must be impartially recognisable and not simply seen as arising out of subjective preferences (Friedman, 1997). To care preferentially for one's own child is the morally right thing to do and hence provides the justificatory reason for doing so. Thus, impartialists espouse, a moral motivation to act in accordance with duty can accommodate the particular concerns of emotional attachments. Friedman (1997) argues that this is a new defense of impartiality, one that admits its limited position in moral deliberation but insists on its transcendent role in moral justification. As will be argued in detail later, feminist ethics has criticised this defense of impartiality and challenged whether the impartiality requirement really serves as an adequate standard of moral justification at all.

In summary, it may be argued that deontological ethics pay little attention to the specific details of individuals' moral experiences and relationships (Sherwin, 1991). Although these theories acknowledge that special obligations and commitments do arise from specific relationships, for example, to friends and family, they fail to account for the demanding effects this has on a required principle of impartiality.

2.2 Consequentialism

According to consequentialist theories, the morality of actions is determined by the results of those actions. Thus, acts should be judged as right or wrong according to the consequences they yield. For example, telling a lie is not wrong if it serves to produce a good outcome. Consequentialism is seen, for the most part then, in opposition to deontological theories.

Utilitarianism is a family of theories and is commonly accepted as the paradigm of consequentialism. It has its origins in the work of Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick who considered the maximisation of pleasure as the touchstone for all moral deliberation. Mill advocates the principle of utility that states that:

. . . actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure (Mill, 1861, p.7).

The fundamental command when deciding which action to take is to maximise utility. A central feature of utilitarianism is its incorporation of a principle of impartiality. Mill explains, “as between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator” (Mill, 1861, p.16). This principle gains its substance from happiness for it is in respect of happiness that all persons are to be treated impartially unless pertinent reasons for bias or discrimination can be provided (Barrow, 1991). When evaluating the possible consequences of different actions, each person’s interests are to be weighed equally; everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one.

One of the main reasons for rejecting consequentialism is the abstract notion of what is thought to constitute utility and the promotion of ‘good.’ The idea that agents could perform unethical actions if they hoped to maximise utility or promise best consequences in the name of the greater good is abhorrent. How do we try to measure what will maximise happiness? It would be unwise to require agents to have to calculate the moral prognoses of every option they might take. Furthermore, it is expecting too much to require that people always opt, even if they know how, for promoting the greatest interest for society as a whole. It is impossible to shed one’s personal commitments ignoring all relevant and particular circumstances to the ensuing context.

2.3 Contractarianism

Social contract theory was developed in the seventeenth century and may be attributed to such theorists as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and more recently, Rawls. For Hobbes morality could have no binding authority over behaviour unless it was backed by political authority. Hobbes argued that men (sic) should enter a contract with one another to restrict their liberty in the name of peace. There was, however, according to Hobbes, no moral obligation to uphold the nature of such a contract, so the sovereign enforced the contract in the name of everyone. It was mutually advantageous for everyone to accept those conventions designed to protect everyone’s interests.

John Rawls' social contract theory has dominated political philosophy as a paradigm of contractarianism. For Rawls the principles of justice, which form the basic structure of society, become the basis of the agreement of the social contract.

They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association (Rawls, 1994, p.362).

Rawls considers the role of impartiality as a hypothetical social contract, where the reasoner is positioned behind a 'veil of ignorance.' We must imagine ourselves in a position of equality, in which we do not know the significant features of our own standing. Then, we must agree what principles to adopt to further our aims and interests. Because we do not know what our own position is then we are driven impartially to consider the good of all those concerned. Rawls states:

Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows *his* place in society, *his* class position or social status . . . The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since *all are similarly situated* and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain (*emphasis added*, Rawls, 1994, p.363).

Most contractarians limit their assumptions about human beings to the characteristics that are assumed to define moral agency, those of rationality, autonomy, and self-interest (Sherwin, 1991). They do not allow any room for the particulars of a situation as they propose that the only relevant features are the abstract ones, common to all persons. Details of a subject's contingent circumstances are considered morally irrelevant and left out of the equation. Thus, the terms of the social contract are devised on the basis that we are all similarly situated. The 'reasoner' chooses to accept those principles of justice that any rational person would adopt in furthering the interests of all within society. Rawls portrays the subject, like Kant, as a disembodied observer, beyond the realm of experience (Hekman, 1995). Contractual thinking takes place as "isolated reflection" protected from the coercive and corrupting influences of subjective knowledge (Friedman, 1997, p.400). This constitutes a major problem for Rawls because it is unrealistic to

require that a moral agent abstract her/himself from the contingent particularities of everyday life in order to decide which principles should be followed for the attainment of an ideally just society.

2.4 The Impartiality Requirement of Traditional Ethics

Deontological, consequentialist, and social contract theories require moral agents to abstract themselves from their personal feelings and special commitments as all approaches reject the idea of allowing individuals' preferences to interfere with moral outcomes. Our obligations depend on an impartial assessment of the consequences of our actions, hence, "the details of the emotional lives and the relationships of the particular persons affected are rendered irrelevant from the moral point of view" (Sherwin, 1991, p.8).

This principle of impartiality necessitates that moral thinking is free from prejudice as everyone counts equally. A moral agent must assume the view from nowhere, she must become, "omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent, but in all respects, 'normal'" (Friedman, 1991, p.162). Sherwin (1984) contends that:

Virtually all contemporary moral theorists, despite their major areas of disagreement, assume a common meta-principle of abstraction which directs moral agents to disregard most of the special features of a particular moral situation, including, in particular, the actual identities and relationships of those concerned; morality is thought to require that agents concentrate on the essence of either the act in question or its likely consequences (p.705).

In varying degrees, the dominant ethical theory governing public life today pertains to all three of the above traditions. It is collectively referred to as the ethic of justice (or the rules view) in which universality, rationality, and impartiality serve as the stalwart foundations of contemporary theorising therein. This view is based on universal abstract principles, conformity to rules, legal elaboration of rights, and the rational resolution of conflict (Duquin, 1991). It is a formalist universal approach which focuses primarily on the logic of impartial moral reasoning, rights, duties, and issues of fairness and justice.

Lövlie (1997) explains that the rules view attempts to establish particular norms and maxims by applying them to universal or transcendental principles. These norms are justified on the basis that they serve the viewpoint of all. What characterizes the rules view of ethics is the search for a systematic approach to moral standards of justification. Philosophers are primarily concerned with determining which rules ideally should be followed and what justifications can be considered adequate to found such proposals.

In summary, it can be seen that the adherence to a principle of impartiality is articulated within the above different ethical traditions in different ways. Impartial reasoning involves the non-biased consideration of all relevant interests. Those theories that include an impartiality requirement claim an internal consistency when deliberating between moral cases. Manning (1992) describes such theories as, deductivist, mechanical, and foundationalist. They are deductivist because they prescribe that whenever A, then one must always do B. They are mechanical in that they presume that if the facts are described correctly then one principle can be automatically applied. Lastly, they are foundationalist because the judgments are taken to have the status of knowledge and not mere belief or caprice. This means that the principles themselves are considered to be *a priori* true. The essential picture is that when principles are applied to facts they yield specific judgments (Manning, 1992).

Recent trends in ethics have attempted to criticise the impartiality requirement central to Western philosophy. Next, virtue ethics is considered as a non-feminist approach that represents an alternative to this dominant tradition. Following this will be an examination of feminist ethics and the alternative approach of context-respectful theory.

2.5 Virtue Ethics

Arguably, moral philosophy began with the Sophists of the Greek world in the fifth century. They raised critical questions about the kind of moral life we ought to live, and what the nature of morality is. They began by asking the following questions: Why should we be moral? What kind of person is a moral one? So, for virtue ethics

the primary object of moral evaluation is agent relative rather than about acts themselves or their consequences.

Plato reflects Socrates to a certain extent in his search for the traditional definitions of the virtues. In, "*The Republic*," Plato argues that the four cardinal virtues (temperance, wisdom, justice, and courage) are those qualities essential for a good life. He suggests that the good life consists in the harmonising of the soul with the virtues. Together the soul and the virtues produce an underlying condition of psychic harmony. When we are in this psychic state we are happy and thus leading a morally good life, that is, one that is in accordance with the virtues.

Although there are some important distinctions between the philosophy of Plato and that of Aristotle, the latter continues to employ a similar framework. In the *Nicomachean ethics*, Aristotle claims that the ultimate end to all human action is happiness, or eudaimonia. He defines this goal in terms of aretê or virtue. Happiness is to be located in our capacity for reason which provides a basis for an account of the virtues. The virtues are dispositions in which our feelings are guided by reason so that our behaviour is appropriate to the situation. The guidance of reason requires the avoidance of excess or deficiency, and thus, each virtue is a mean between extremes.

As Prior (1991) states:

[v]irtue or excellence . . . consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean by reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency (Aristotle; cited in Prior, p.159).

Aristotle believed that there were different virtues for free women (those of obedience and silence) compared to free men (those required for freedom and political life) (Sherwin, 1991). The male virtues were considered to be the only ones that held genuine moral worth. To lead a happy and flourishing life, one was to strive to attain the median virtue as this signified excellence.

Initially, then, a virtue-based ethics was the way in which ancient moral philosophers attended to questions about morality. The rise of modern science, however, brought with it a skepticism that denied such a portrayal of ethical life. The focus for modern

science became the impartial commitments of a liberal individualism. Recently, there has been considerable renewed interest in virtue ethics and the Aristotelian approach. A major proponent of this movement is MacIntyre (1996) who offers a critique of the enlightenment by presenting a narrative of arguments from the Middle Ages to the present. His approach is historical and contextual and relates to intentions, motives, and character. He rejects a morality of universalising principles and doubts whether it can be used to settle rationally the types of moral disagreements that characterise ethical debate today.

MacIntyre (1996), like most feminist ethicists, criticises traditional ethical theory and the impartial standpoint it employs. He labels the abstract self of modern thought as the “emotive self,” a subject devoid of social identity and contingent circumstance. Emotivism argues that there is no rationality in ethics. It is the result of those failed attempts to provide a rational justification for an objective morality. In other words, emotivism attempts to replace the rational justification of objective morality.

MacIntyre’s alternative to the traditional transcendent self is the “narrative self” or the “narrative” character of human life. Our lives become enacted stories that find their construction in a narrative that links birth to death. It is through the practice of virtue that subjects find their identity and unity. And, the unity of human life lies in the unity of its “narrative quest.”

MacIntyre’s vision includes a return to local communities, and relatively shared conceptions of the good life. Here virtues operate in such a way that each individual has a specifically defined role and status. Moreover, it is virtue that sustains people in that role.

Every individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures are those of kinship and of the household. In such a society a man (sic) knows who he (sic) is by knowing his (sic) role in these structures; and in knowing this he (sic) knows also what he (sic) owes and what is owed to him (sic) by the occupant of every other role and status (MacIntyre, 1996, p.122).

MacIntyre's concept of self is defined by the roles that are prescribed in a given community. He claims that the roles that a society prescribes for its occupants are open to a plurality of definitions and that the narrative self emerges in the individual's own interpretation and adaptation of the role assigned to him or her. In essence, this means that an individual has the capacity to define selfhood within the narrative of a prescribed given role or status.

Hekman (1995) argues that there are a number of problems with MacIntyre's alternative account of selfhood. The virtue-based societies that MacIntyre describes are obviously hierarchical. Everyone knows what his or her prescribed duties and commitments are because everyone knows their place within society. The roles and dominant positions of power become fixed, thus, permanently ascribing to women an inferior role and status. As can be seen in Aristotelian accounts, these societies are thoroughly patriarchal, where the celebrated and recognised virtues belong dominantly to the male sphere. Hekman (1995) states:

MacIntyre's approach exemplifies a disturbing characteristic of much communitarian literature; in praising community, they ignore the hierarchy and oppression endemic to them. Narrative selfhood comes at a high price (p. 55).

So, although MacIntyrean ethics criticises the impartial standpoint that characterises traditional thought and situates the role of the individual in an ethics based on context, he leaves scant room for the plurality of other voices that become, once again, subjugated to the invisible realm of the periphery. In other words, issues of power, dominant moral discourses, and hegemony within particular cultural settings are ignored.

3 Feminist Ethics

Recent trends in feminist philosophy have paralleled the critical opposition to impartiality outlined above. However, feminist criticism brings to this movement a distinct concern for the cultural practices of gender, hierarchy, and oppression, and the role that impartiality has played in sustaining the subordination of women (Friedman, 1997).

It may be argued that, traditionally, women have been virtually excluded in the construction of moral theory. To varying degrees, the above versions of ethics do not express any specific interest in accommodating feminist concerns. Consequently these moral theories are considered incomplete for feminist ethicists, who explicitly focus on the contexts of individuals in their moral deliberations.

Contemporary 'feminist ethics' is now regarded as a legitimate family of approaches to ethics at all levels of theory (Card, 1991). Feminist philosophers pay attention to modern ethical issues, express their concern about traditional moral theory, and question some of the deep-rooted assumptions of moral epistemology. It is important to state, however, that despite a few common assumptions, feminist ethicists differ considerably on a whole range of theoretical, methodological, and conceptual issues. There is no **single** feminist ethical theory. Consequently, feminist ethics, like ethics in general, is characterized by disagreement and includes theorists who may be considered: Aristotelians, Humeans, Kantians, utilitarians, existentialists, contract theorists, virtue ethicists, communitarians, post-modernists, as well as carers and maternal thinkers (Jaggar, 1991). Thus, we must speak of feminist ethics in the plural.

Feminist ethics is not concerned with applying traditional ethical theory to contemporary problems. Neither does it seek to simply add a woman's perspective to moral theory. Rather, it is about challenging some of the fundamental ways in which traditional philosophy has conceptualised and investigated philosophical issues. As Garry and Pearsall (1989) state:

Feminist philosophers are trying in many diverse ways to reconstruct philosophy. We want to redefine the methods and subject matter of philosophy in ways that value women's experiences and enable women to move from the position of object to positions of subject, of knower, and of agent. We want to redeem philosophy, to "get philosophy right," recognizing the difficulty in even thinking about what standards, if any, there are for doing it "right" (p.xii).

Card (1991) claims that there are two sorts of history pertinent to the development of feminist ethics. The first is a sort of 'history of reflection' upon traditional ethical theory. The second approach has arisen from politically active experience whereby

feminists have striven to combat sexist society by building new relationships and engaging in new social practices (Card, 1991).

Within this genre of writing, feminist ethicists have tried to develop three general areas of concern. First, they have sought to find appropriate ways of knowing women's experiences. Secondly, they have examined the structures that shape those experiences, and lastly, they have attempted to develop theoretical accounts of knowledge that retain continuity with those experiences (Code, 1989).

In approaching problems of social life with a feminist consciousness, then, feminist ethics has enlarged the traditional conceptual domain, and enabled it to address new issues (Jaggar, 1991). Feminist ethics can be considered to comprise two distinct but not entirely separate perspectives, namely, 'Feminine Ethics' and 'Feminist Ethics *proper*'. The next sections will consider each distinct approach.

3.1 Feminine Ethics

Feminine ethics mainly consists of criticisms about how the traditional approaches to ethics fail to fit the moral experiences and intuitions of women. Here feminists have criticised and re-examined issues of epistemology and methodology. Some theorists have paid attention to particular ethical concepts, such as, justice, equality, rationality, and caring with a view to developing new formulations of these concepts (Held, 1993; Baier, 1994). While other research has presented philosophical critiques of traditional philosophers' views about women (Harding, 1987; Whitbeck, 1984; Elshtain, 1981; Okin, 1980;) or considered previous women philosophers and their work (Fallaize, 1998; Moi, 1987; Duchon, 1986; and Jardine, 1985).

Care-focused approaches to ethics, however, have dominated the feminine perspective. They stem from the work of Carol Gilligan, a Harvard psychologist, who in 1982 published the book, *In a Different Voice*, which challenges the influential work of Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development. This was an empirical and interpretive analysis of the moral reasoning of women when confronted with both hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas.

Formerly, the established orthodoxy among moral pedagogues was that the aim of moral education was to familiarise children with the prescriptive and universalisable form of moral statements which are to be applied impartially to particular areas of concern (Wringe, 1997). The paradigmatic exemplars of this style are Piaget (1932) and later Kohlberg (1981) who pioneered cognitive moral development as approaches that considered moral maturity to be the extent to which an individual respects rules and principles of justice.

Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development proposes that agents may progress through six distinct phases in order to reach moral maturity. The highest stage culminates in our ability to apply universal principles to the facts of moral dilemmas, which then yield judgements about how we should behave. Kohlberg (1981) argues that it is possible to test a person to determine at which stage their moral reasoning can be located. This is achieved by measuring the complexity of universal principles the agent appeals to when deliberating over the proposed hypothetical moral dilemmas.

Kohlberg shows that women's moral reasoning is to be consistently located in the lower stages of moral development whereas men's reasoning often reaches the highest level. Kohlberg (1981), thus, espoused in his studies that men were more capable of superior moral development than women. Gilligan (1982) criticises Kohlberg's research and argues that women do not deliberate based on this type of hierarchical moral pattern. She advocates that Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning measure *male* moral development as opposed to *human* moral development, and concluded that women, for a variety of cultural reasons, articulate their responses, in a "different voice."

Women's experience, Gilligan (1982) maintains, is vastly different from men's and has largely centered on nurturing, caring, and motherhood. It may be argued here that Gilligan offers an unacceptable generalisation of male and female experience. Neither men's nor women's experience should be considered as singular. Her initial premise, however, provides the foundation for a different model of ethical human relations, an 'ethics of care,' that stresses relationships and responsibilities over universal principles. Gilligan (1982) suggests that women are far more likely to call

on an ethic of care when trying to solve moral problems whereas, men are more likely to employ an 'ethic of justice' that stresses universal principles, rules, duties, obligations, and rights. Gilligan (1982) does not suggest that all men are focused solely on the justice perspective and all women on the care perspective, rather that while both men and women raise concerns in each perspective they tend to favour one approach.

An ethic of care characteristically grounds morality in relationship and response. In other words a care-focused approach rejects the impartiality requirement and embraces the concept of special obligations to particular others. Manning (1992) states that as moral agents people belong to and share moral networks within a community. In that sphere people have certain obligations to respond to those members who need our care within our network. Thus, one's own concern for the welfare of particular others itself defines the caring point of view:

In responding, we do not appeal to abstract principles . . . rather we pay attention to the concrete other in his or her real situation. We also pay attention to the effect of our response on the networks of care that sustain us both (Manning, 1992, p. xiv).

This is clearly in opposition to a Kantian perspective which requires an impartialist duty-driven moral motivation based on a fundamental respect for the moral law, whereas, a care-focused approach calls for a moral motivation based on a direct emotional concern for particular others.

Noddings (1987) similarly argues for a caring approach to ethics. Her ethics of care is embedded in personal relations and the relationships held between two parties: one that is doing the caring, and one that needs to be cared for. She places emphasis on the fact that we are dependently connected to concrete interactions between particular persons, and that we decide what we ought to do and value by asking ourselves what an ideal caring self would do in that situation.

Baier's (1994) views may also be considered compatible with a care-focused perspective. Morality, she explains, is about preserving the conditions of care and mutual care. Care ethics should be reframed as an ethics of love and responsibility

based on trust and obligation. In “appropriately trusting” relationships we find the model for good human relationships, a model that uses a language that can accommodate both male and female points (p.10). Baier (1994) states:

A moral theory that made trust its central problem could do better justice to men’s and women’s moral intuitions than do the going men’s theories (p.17).

Baier (1994) also discusses the nature of power within her approach to ethics (see below) as she criticises the justice perspective and its patriarchal past. She believes, “traces of the old patriarchal poison still remain in even the best contemporary theorising” (p.27). Baier (1994) concentrates much of her work on considering whom we should trust with coercive power. She analyses moral obligations from the point of view of those without power and advocates that trust relationships are better than contractual ones because the essence of trust relies on the good will of others. In trusting someone we make ourselves vulnerable, but we need to be able to trust others, because we are not self-sufficient.

Baier concludes that theorists should not become preoccupied with the justice perspective as justice is simply one virtue among many and not necessarily the primary virtue of social institutions. An adequate moral theory must leave room for other values and listen to “differences in tone of voice, ” as these differences do make a difference to the way we conceptualise moral problems (Baier, 1994, p.19). There is much more to be said on this point but it is not the purpose to elaborate further here in the thesis.

Closely related to this approach are the works of Ruddick (1989) and Whitbeck (1984) who assert that traditional theories have relegated the proper care of children to the private peripheries. Ruddick (1989) proposes that one type of specific relationship, that is, mothering person to child, provides the blueprint for the ideal model of human interaction.

Held (1994), Ruddick (1989) and Whitbeck (1984) criticise the notion of human relations founded upon equally informed and equally powerful adults as such transactions are mostly carried out between unequals. Tong (1997) also argues that

ethics is not gender-neutral because it has continued to favour theories like the contract model, which speak much more to men's experiences than to women's.

There are many criticisms of the feminine perspective of ethics. First, it must not be assumed that justice and care are necessarily gender-correlated. An ethic of care should not replace an ethic of justice. Both are important facets of morality. As Hekman (1995) states, getting it right in ethics will not mean a massive reconstruction of moral theory; it is self-defeating to suppose that **the** feminist ethics can counter the masculinist ethics. There is no singular truth. A feminist absolutism would be indistinguishable from the masculinist tradition it purports to critique. Hekman (1995) calls for a non-absolutist approach that welcomes pluralistic theories.

Secondly, many theorists argue that it is in women's best interests that this supposed gender-correlation is denied (Jaggar, 1991). It is problematic to assign to women the kinds of traditional gender stereotypical roles that they have fought for so long to break away from (Tong, 1997). As Sherwin (1991) states:

. . . it is necessary to be wary of the implications of gender traits within a sexist culture. Because gender differences are central to the structures that support dominance relations, it is likely that women's proficiency at caring is somehow related to women's subordinate status (p.18).

3.2 Feminist Ethics *proper*

Feminist ethics is different from feminine ethics. The notion of feminist ethics *proper* or power-focused ethics derives from the explicitly political perspectives of feminism and offers suggestions for how ethics must be revised if it is to understand the patterns of dominance and oppression as they affect women (Sherwin 1989). Hence, feminist ethics, in this sense, incorporates a critique of the specific practices that constitute women's oppression and is concerned with the elimination or modification of any structure or set of norms that contribute to this oppression.

Political critiques of the discipline of philosophy as a masculine and biased preserve form the substantive works of this approach. Theorists argue that dominant conceptions of equality, justice, rights, liberty, and autonomy are more or less

sublimated portrayals of a male rather than a gender-neutral mode of being. Feminists were initially concerned with specifying the nature of masculinist bias in moral and political theory. For example, Lloyd's (1995), *Man of Reason* and Okin's (1979) examination of women's exclusion from the political realm. The association of masculinity with rationality and objectivity effectively excludes women from both the moral and the political realms.

In her influential book, Lloyd (1995) considers the extent to which philosophy is deeply permeated with masculine values and how such values are indelibly imprinted on underlying methodologies and epistemologies. She explains that reason is promoted to the realms of masculinity and that this becomes reinforced and consolidated by particular social structures. Consequently, it is argued that traditional theories have neglected women's interests and favoured male experience.

Theorists consider how this bias can be corrected and how patriarchal modes of thought can be eliminated (Frazer *et al.*, 1992). Jaggar (1991) argues that it is imperative to acknowledge and critique the gender-biased character of most non-feminist approaches to ethics and to begin from the position that the moral experience of women is just as worthy of respect as men's.

Among recent power-focused feminist approaches to ethics are the so called lesbian approaches to ethics (Hoagland, 1988; and Daly, 1984). Here heterosexism rather than sexism in general is viewed as the primary cause of women's subordination Tong (1997). Daly (1984) argues that ethics must undergo a radical transformation of its traditional male values. She rejects the concepts of men's justice and women's care and proposes a model of morality based on Nemesis and the importance of retributive justice. Hoagland's (1988) book, *Lesbian Ethics*, is one of the strongest voices denying masculinist ethics. Her basic premise is that, if we embrace any part of a traditional ethics, then we will never escape bias or the grounding assumptions of traditional ethics. She argues that capturing ethics in terms of principles will always be considered necessary. Hoagland, however, champions the notion of attending to one another and individual needs. In doing so, she argues, we increase the capacity of our moral agency. The goal of such attending is not power or control, but, rather, empowerment and enablement. Although Hoagland's analysis is intended

only for lesbians, Hekman claims it makes a number of important points. Hekman argues rightly that Hoagland is elaborating a position frequently heard in feminist ethics today, that is, the claim that we need many theories of ethics to reflect the different situations of different women, not just one feminist ethic. For example, Hoagland (1988) believes lesbian women ought to create and celebrate their own particular values without insisting that anyone follow them.

Although diverse and often contradictory, feminist approaches to ethics have one thing in common: that is, they are sensitive to women's disempowerment morally and personally as well as politically, economically, and socially (Tong, 1997). Frazer, Hornsby, and Lovibond (1992) similarly identify that a common purpose involves the shared desire to understand the social reality of gender relations. Feminist ethicists, then, characteristically argue for the necessity of gender considerations in any adequate moral theory. For example, both Pateman (1988) and Eisenstein (1988) state that liberal political theory is rooted in a concept of the individual that is gendered rather than neutral. Moreover, they advocate that women can only achieve equality in a political world by denying their embodiment as women. Consequently, they both argue for an equality that can celebrate and encompass the embodied female.

Benhabib (1987) points out that very few theorists have overcome their 'gender blindness' when postulating theories of justice and the community. Held (1993) concurs when she alleges that none of the nonfeminist theorists have paid any attention to the different experiences of women.

Even the most cursory feminist review of the work of the leading moral theorists reveals that the existing proposals of philosophic ethics do not constitute the objective, impartial theories that they are claimed to be; rather, most theories reflect and support explicitly gender-biased and often blatantly misogynist values (Sherwin, 1991, p.10).

Thus, feminist ethicists say in a number of different ways that gender matters, even in very abstract theories. Moreover, in order to correct the gender bias, it is necessary to make gender an explicit element of ethical theorising (Calhoun, 1988). Feminist ethics should never begin by assuming that all men and all women are

similarly situated. As Gatens (1996) contends, we are culturally and historically situated in a society that is divided and organised in terms of gender. In this structure the male body and the female body have quite different social value in that male bodily experience is often a privileged site of significance where, “women’s experience is experience within patriarchy, and the male perspective is systematic and hegemonic” (Sherwin, 1989, p.27).

As a result ethics ought to be sensitive to the ways in which gendered norms affect different groups differently (Jaggar 1991). The concept of gender and an ensuing understanding of power relations should be made an explicit component of ethical theorising. Hekman (1995) states that issues of:

[p]ower and hegemony *must* arise, because within any given culture there will be a plurality of moral voices and, necessarily, a hierarchy of moral discourses (p.40).

It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider how gender influences the ethos of any given sporting practice. It does, however, form an essential component of further research on fair play. A consideration of the role that gender plays within the hierarchy of moral discourse that both determines and constitutes the boundaries of the concept of ethos will be paramount if new methodologies and ways of exploring fair play are to be adopted.

Feminist ethics is not entirely distinct from feminine ethics as they both share a number of important commitments. For instance, both approaches reject a morality based solely on purely abstract reasoning. They advocate the necessity of rooting ethical discussion in particular contexts, thus directing us to consider the specifics of experience when evaluating the morally relevant features of practices. Feminist ethics also shares with feminine ethics the rejection of the notion of moral subjects as isolated autonomous agents. As Sherwin (1991) explains:

In place of the isolated, independent, rational agent of traditional moral theory, feminist ethics appeals to a more realistic and politically accurate notion of a self as socially constructed and complex, defined in the context of relationships with others. Moral analysis needs to examine persons and their behaviour in the context of political

relations and experiences, but this dimension has been missing so far from most ethical debates (p.19).

In summary, feminist ethicists have challenged most non-feminist approaches to ethical theory in a number of general ways. They have criticised the concept of abstraction and argued that universalism cannot cope with the multiplicity of life contexts and situations with which we are confronted. They have denied the ideal of impartiality which traditional theory adopts as canonical in an espoused gender-neutral conception of moral personhood. But, although feminist approaches to ethics criticise the lack of previous consideration given to women's interests, not all feminist ethicists want to ignore men's interests (Tong 1997). A number of feminist ethicists want to try to re-focus non-feminist approaches to ethics providing theoretical frameworks, "that embody aspects of equity, empowerment, and social change for women and men" (Henderson, *et al.*, 1996, p.13).

A feminist approach to ethics ought not claim superiority over traditional ethics. A feminist approach considers questions about human conduct with specific reference to gender and to the liberation of women from sexual injustices. Hence, "the focus of feminism is on redefining the value of women's lives by empowering individual women and by making women visible in society" (Henderson *et al.*, 1996, p.13).

In the search for an alternative approach, then, some feminist philosophers argue that we should favour a more context-respectful theory over an abstract epistemology (Held, 1993). This thesis adopts the position that the nature of morality is founded in the particular. That is to say, moral systems are specific to particular cultural settings. More will be said on context-respectful theory later in this chapter.

Rule based ethical theories that are detached from concrete human experience and developed from the hypothetical point of view are incomplete because they represent only one 'voice' or theme within morality. Whereas theorists, such as Benhabib (1987), Hekman (1995), Young (1990), and Lövlie (1997) argue that context-respectful theory 'localises' ethics by legitimating norms on the basis of everyday practice. This point will be exemplified further in Chapter Six. This perspective places perception and particularity as central concerns because it involves those

special obligations and commitments that impartialist theories, even if they acknowledge as pertinent, fail to account for.

4 Feminist Morality

It is not the case, then, that there is a distinct feminist morality “out there” which is in some way superior to a ‘masculinist’ version of ethics or inaccessible to male theorists. As previously discussed, a feminine ethic that holds the key to understanding responsibility and obligation is also incoherent. Rather the case proposed here is that a feminist *understanding* of morality offers a more complete way to analyse and examine ethical dilemmas. In the context of sport, we need to distinguish what the purported inadequacies of previous moral philosophical accounts of fair play are, and what a context-respectful approach offers that a universalist perspective does not. More particularly, we may ask how the inclusion of a feminist perspective can help our understanding of the concept of ethos in sporting games? And how can this perspective help to paint a fuller picture of the ethics of sport more generally? What is new with feminist ethics? What can a feminist understanding of a context-respectful approach offer us that other theories cannot?

There have been many other theories that have challenged traditional ethics and rules based approaches to morality. A number of non-feminist moral philosophers have expressed objections to the claims of a universal, impartial, and impersonal standpoint (Held, 1993). For example, Williams (1973) criticises utilitarianism for its incorporation of a principle of impartiality and believes that such a requirement is both too demanding and flawed. He speaks of a loss of integrity arguing that impartiality rules out the commitments one has to personal projects which become a condition for the integrity of one’s own life. Impersonal demands undermine the commitments and special obligations to significant others which are conditions of love and friendship. It is this cost that Williams (1973) claims renders the theory too demanding. Impartiality means a loss of identity, and integrity, thus, utilitarianism alienates the individual from one’s own moral feelings. He says, “how can an I that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interest?” (Williams, 1985, p.69). Utilitarian morality cannot

adequately describe the complexity of the relations between people's and their actions.

It may be argued that feminist ethicists do share some commitments with present-day utilitarians. Whilst adopting the formal characteristics of utilitarian thought these theorists focus on the overall state of affairs which one can reasonably be expected to produce. This move adopts a form of direct utilitarianism which evades the charge of 'demandingness' as it includes an account of particular feelings and attitudes both of agents and of those affected by the actions in question. So, in this sense, a utilitarian analysis can focus on concrete experience within the particulars of a context.

Another example may be taken from the communitarian critique of the self as autonomous and isolated. Communitarians also emphasise the embedded and embodied nature of individuals rather than a picture of the self as a disembodied and abstract component of moral judgement. Communitarians, like MacIntyre (1996) espouse the value of tradition and practice. Thus, communitarian approaches share with feminism a commitment to considering moral judgments within an explicitly social context.

It might be argued that feminist ethics is simply a re-formulation of virtue ethics. However, this is not the case. Although both approaches adhere to the notion of the importance of character coupled with context, feminist ethics seek to situate and evaluate an agent's position within a hierarchy or plurality of moral voices. Louden (1993) suggests that virtue theory tells us little about specific moral dilemmas and the real positions that moral agents find themselves in. He states:

Due to the very nature of the moral virtues, there is thus a very limited amount of advice on moral quandaries that one can reasonably expect from the virtue-oriented approach. We ought, of course, to do what the virtuous person would do, but it is not always easy to fathom what the hypothetical moral exemplar would do were he (sic) in our shoes, and sometimes even he (sic) will act out of character. Furthermore, if one asks him why he (sic) did what he (sic) did, or how he (sic) knew what to do, the answer - if one is offered - might not be very enlightening (p.195).

The criticism of many feminist ethicists is that virtue theory does not allow people to speak about the self as they experience it; that is, the self in relation to power hierarchies (Addelson, 1991). So, while other criticisms of the ethic of universal rules are valuable, a feminist interpretation is apt to be different. Feminist theorists pay attention to the kinds of details that are so often missing from hypothetical, abstract examples, such as a consideration of gender. Held (1993) argues that previous non-feminist theories have failed to listen to other voices in their accounts. They have not considered their alternatives from the points of view of women, and they have not listened to the voices of women expressing our thoughts, our feelings, our concerns. These omissions make a difference (Held, 1993).

5 Context-Respectful Theory

The fact that moral theories primarily concerned with justice and rules have been favoured has served to fuel a growing dissatisfaction with ethical theories that are detached from concrete human experience and developed from a hypothetical point of view. The adoption of a principle of impartiality has led these theories into trouble. Why should someone who is not already committed to a recognition of another's interests take any account of them? Is such "disengaged reasoning" even possible (Benhabib, 1992)? This position neglects the importance of particularity:

Because persons do not exist in abstraction, apart from their social circumstances, moral directives to disregard the details of personal life under some imaginary veil of ignorance are pernicious for ethical and political analysis. These injunctions trivialise many of the most important moral facts (Sherwin, 1991, p.19).

It seems that impartiality includes a tension between an individual's own specific interests and the interests of others. In this regard, Allison (1990) recognises Hume's point, how do we square the impartiality requirement with the greater sympathy that most people feel instinctively towards their family and friends, compared to unknown others?

Nagel (1986) believes this criticism stems from an attempt to juxtapose the objective and subjective standpoint toward actions and their motives. It illustrates the clash between the personal viewpoint, and the objective, impersonal viewpoint with which the rules view of morality is connected. It must be recognised that each person has

desires and beliefs that stem from the perspective of her/his own life. These cannot provide reasons for all others. How can we secure fairness by reflecting no point of view?

It is important to include some more detail on the concept of particularity here. Blum (1994) argues that there are three aspects or modes to particularity: (1) perceptual particularity; (2) the particularistic attitude; and (3) detail particularity. Each term will now be explained.

Perceptual particularity involves the way in which we perceive particular situations. Particular situations come to have a particular character for different people. Blum (1994) explains that particular aspects of particular situations become salient for different people. In other words, we perceive the morally relevant features of situations differently. We will see this more clearly in Chapter Six when considering some of the conflicting views about acts of fair play in sport.

Blum (1994) calls the second mode of particularity the particularist attitude. This is the attitude that a moral agent has towards particular situations. It requires us to be sensitive to the morally relevant details of context and:

. . . not being quick to assume that a principle which has been conclusive in similar situations will be conclusive in the current one, and the like. This attitude corresponds to an injunction to keep in mind the particularity of situations (Blum, 1994, p.52).

The third aspect of particularity is called detail particularity. Here, Blum (1994) argues, adequate moral concern for intimates requires a more detailed understanding of the context. It involves the process of actually gaining detailed and specific knowledge of a situation. This is one of the reasons why the context-respectful approach offered here champions the importance of empirical research. It is crucial to find out the particular details of the ethos of EWC if we are to understand and situate the ethically relevant features of fair play within the practice.

In summary, it may be argued that principle-based theories cannot adequately account for moral perception or moral agency with particular contexts. Abstract

theories cannot recognise the personal point of view because agents do not typically view the world from an objective or impersonal standpoint. Moreover, their behaviour does not stem from the impersonal point of view. Consequently, feminist theorists, among others, have found the impartiality requirement of deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and social contract theory objectionable. Sherwin (1984) argues that, if we accept this impartialist structure, we must sacrifice the significance of our own personal feelings and attitudes towards particular persons and commitments. She believes that this leads to depersonalising in a serious way for we are required to generalise by abstracting ourselves as far as we can from the specifics of a particular context. Furthermore, Benhabib (1987) argues that impartial reasoning cannot deal with the indeterminacy and multiplicity of contexts and life situations with which it is presented. A context-respectful approach must be able to cope with conflicting feelings and interests. Here, in some cases, impartiality may be useful even necessary but this should not be at the expense of jettisoning contextual particulars.

Friedman (1997) states that the traditional impartiality requirement of ethical theory has contributed to the subordination of women in two distinct ways. First, impartiality underwrites modern moral theory's commitment to rationality which operates to the exclusion of moral emotions. Women have long endured the stereotype of being considered more emotional and less rational than men are. Thus, Friedman continues, impartiality defines a rational level of moral achievement which women have long been deemed incapable of achieving. The work of Kohlberg, rooted in the Kantian tradition, provides evidence to support this claim. Secondly, the fact that impartiality rejects any bias towards personal commitments demands that the moral agent detach her or himself from particular relations and special obligations. Consequently, Friedman (1997) argues, it is not surprising that the emphasis on impartial reason has coincided with a theoretical neglect of the morality of close personal relationships.

Feminist ethicists have criticised some impartialist theorists for what they consider to be their obsessive preoccupation with notions of distributive justice (Friedman, 1997; Young, 1990; Benhabib, 1992). For example, social contract theory is criticised as a deeply individualistic approach that has led to the cultural

marginalisation of women. Rawls' 'heads of households' are seen as male citizens reinforcing the notion of traditional stereotypical roles of men's dominance within the private sphere.

It is presumed that impartialist theories offer a high degree of conceptual consistency and clarity because norms are tested against universal principle rather than case. They fail in their approach, however, to capture the particulars of contexts (Lövlie, 1997). Even if universal normative principles were identified, they would have to be formulated in an abstract way. This, Jaggar (1991) explains, would mean that they would remain indeterminate and vague until they were interpreted in specific contexts. Whilst hypothetical abstract reasoning has assisted our ethical understanding, on its own, it lacks the depth and perception needed to capture the particulars of ethical dilemmas.

Rawls uses the idea of an imaginary veil of ignorance as a heuristic device. Appeals to imaginary cases, however, are problematical as examples ignore the contextual features of cases (Jamieson, 1993). It is not the case that we live in morally isolated vacuums under an imaginary veil of ignorance. The moral point of view does not emanate from nowhere but from somewhere within the narrative of the self as a socially constructed being that is part of a community, tradition, and history (Elanen *et al.* 1997). So, the justice perspective or the notion of a principally rule-based ethic is criticised with regard to what Blum (1994) calls, "its completeness as a conception of moral agency or the moral life itself" (p.38). The charge here is that impartialist theories fail to account for or emphasise appropriately the particularity of moral situations. Blum (1994) states:

The accurate or adequate assessment of particular situations – a knowledge or perception of particulars – is not accounted for, or guaranteed by, the mere possession of rules themselves . . . It is not the rule but some other moral capacity of the agent which tells her that the particular situation she faces falls under a given a rule (p.38).

Thus, it may be concluded that an abstract epistemology fails to incorporate the importance of needs and emotions, social relationships and responsibilities, and sensitivity to context-specific circumstances (Benhabib, 1987). Held (1993) explains:

Ideal theories of perfect justice or purely rational theories for ideal societies leave the problems of what to do and what to accept here and now unsolved, even unaddressed. They usually provide no way to connect moral theory with our actual experience (p.23).

Furthermore, Held (1993) maintains that moral behaviour arises in the context of particular lives that are embedded in particular kinds of relationships. Therefore, she believes ethics ought to deal with the nature of the relationships that hold between those involved in moral practice. Thus, a feminist understanding of morality should be seen as a recurrent modification of experience, and context-specific circumstance. Thus, in order to examine morality and the nature of ethical concepts we must direct our concern to particular concrete activities (Archetti, 1997). In doing so, it becomes possible to see how gender affects the concept of fair play and the plurality of contested meanings within a given ethos. The experience to be considered is that of real individuals enacting discourses embedded in history and tradition. Held (1993) explains:

The experience needed for morality is the experience of persons who are at least partly constituted by relations with other persons, not autonomous individual agents as such. What we may look to morality to provide is guidance as we navigate within our actual, embodied, historically located relationships. The morality that will then give us unqualified reasons to act, when it can give us reasons at all, will be quite different from what would be prescribed for innumerable autonomous but essentially abstract and timeless and non-existent individuals (p.38).

In this sense, moral analysis can be seen as a dynamic cultural code that informs, creates, and gives meaning to social relations within practices (Archetti, 1997). Whilst there is scope for disagreement with the above in terms of the problematic nature of defining particularity, it is enough to throw doubt on the adequacy of the rules perspective. The main point, then, is that while there are different emphases and inflections in moral theories there is a tendency for some feminist philosophers to doubt whether a total reliance on universal and impartial rules is appropriate for assessing fully moral problems. Few feminist ethicists regard the impartiality requirement of traditional moral theory to be an adequate or necessary standard of moral justification. There is more to an understanding of morality than the provision of a justificatory standard of moral evaluation. As Friedman (1997) states:

Many feminist philosophers argue either that (1) impartiality is altogether useless as an ideal of moral justification, or (2) that it is useful, perhaps necessary, but insufficient in some way, either because it needs to be supplemented by other moral capacities and resources, or because it applies only to a limited domain of morality (p.396).

It is the aim of this work to develop a notion of context-respectful theory that aligns itself with the latter position. The feminist understanding of morality advocated in this thesis will be used to situate the individual and to determine what it means to be an individual in a particular social context. In the next section, it is argued that a context-respectful approach can couple the necessary role that impartiality has to play on the one hand, with a strong commitment to particularism on the other.

6 Impartiality and Context-respectful Theory

The important question becomes how we can capture what is missing in theories which focus only on the universal or the general (Blum, 1994). Context-respectful theorists attempt to respect the role of impartiality and, at the same time, accommodate personal projects and commitments. Moreover, they recognise that morality is influenced by social context and its underlying structures.

There is quite clearly a tension with regard to the most accurate way in which morality and social practice can be represented. As Morgan (1994) recognises, the debate concerns advocates of impartiality on the one hand, and a socially and historically depicted identity on the other. But, as already shown, not only is this identity to be considered impartial, but remotely abstract and genderless also.

In order to offer a meaningful and critical account of any given social practice, the philosopher, whilst retaining a commitment to impartiality, must adopt a context-respectful approach. Impartiality is not an inherently flawed concept: rationality, rules, and principles must not be abandoned altogether. Impartiality plays an important role but it is not enough to champion impartiality at the expense of recognising the embodied agent situated within a hierarchy of moral discourse. Rather, rules and principles should be considered in the light of moral experiences offering a morality that encompasses normative principles whilst at the same time retaining a strong commitment to particularism.

If ethical theory is concerned with treating people as they ought to be treated, then a principle of impartiality must be incorporated. What is needed, however, is a theory that accepts impartiality, while at the same time allowing room for personal projects and commitments. Rules based views on ethics, however, do not have a monopoly on impartiality. So, although some ethicists have rejected the notion of the rules perspective altogether, arguing that such principles are vague in guiding action (Jaggar, 1991; Young, 1990), this is not the case here.

A context-respectful approach reflects partialities whilst at the same time advancing the interests of those concerned. Thus, in terms of fair play, a meaningful critical appraisal needs general principles of 'fairness' to throw light on the problematic nature of moral behaviour in sport. We need more than empirical observation of the social practice to construct a high quality evaluation (Saunders, 1995). A philosophical analysis is also required in order to conceptualise and interpret the moral complexities of the social practice in question. In other words, the conclusion of this approach is not that moral principles or rules have no significance at all for morality. Indeed, the importance of rules will be developed later in the thesis in Chapters Six and Seven.

Nussbaum (1985) argues that, in order for a moral theory to yield useful outcomes when applied to concrete cases, we appeal to general rules based on our previous experience rather than universal rules. Although, there may be occasions when rules need to be contextually sensitive, it is unwise to consider all rules as mere generalisations based on previous experience. Rules do provide guidance and must be applied impartially. Nussbaum (1985) argues for combined approach, one that links universal normative principles and contextual factors. Central to this premise is the notion of perception, "the ability to discern acutely and responsively the salient features of one's particular situation" (Nussbaum, 1990, p.95).

Most feminist moral theory rejects a pure reliance on particular judgments, and recognises that general principles are necessary and that 'vagueness' is not the inherent enemy. Sherwin (1991) argues that proponents of abstraction are right to

insist that we should guard against allowing personal preferences to always come first in ethical decision making. She says:

Morality must include respect for sentiments, but it cannot give full authority to particular sentiments without considering both their source and their effects (Sherwin, 1991, p.18).

Feminist ethics recognises that preferential concern for certain others may be problematic, for example, racism and sexism. A morality based solely on individual preference is not enough to guide adequately moral action but neither is the pure reliance on a principle of impartiality. What is needed is the incorporation of a principle of impartiality into the wider framework of a context-respectful approach. Thus the feminist position advocated throughout the remainder of the thesis is concerned with rules. It neither relies on an abstract account of justice nor endorses a relativist stance. Louden (1993) argues that:

Virtue theorists are correct in calling for some account or analysis concerning character/nature of persons, and that no ethics of rules, pure and unsupplemented, can do the job, but NO ethics of virtue, pure and unsupplemented, can be satisfactory. . . We need to be able to juxtapose irreducible strong notions of virtue along with irreducible or strong conceptions of the various act notions into our conceptual scheme of morality (p. 202).

A morality that encompasses normative principles and has a commitment to particularism is needed. The impartial standpoint requires that situations are conceptualised into general categories. But, as will be discussed in the context of fair play and sport, this leaves much rich detail unaccounted for.

Recently, some feminist theorists have attempted to re-formulate the concept of universalism. Elanen *et al.* (1997) argue that a re-formulation of universalism is possible by rejecting the abstract formulations of universalism and opting for a more contextually sensitive approach. They state:

Such universalism would be interactive not legislative, cognizant of gender difference not gender blind, contextually sensitive and not situation indifferent (Elanen *et al.*, 1997, p.3).

Such an approach is compatible with the type of context-respectful theory advocated here. Not only does it make the moral point of view gender-sensitive but also it allows for universalism and context specific moral judgements to live together. Ethics becomes situated, plural and local adopting general principles to challenge the inequalities of social justice. Elanen *et al.* (1997) argue that an interactive universalism incorporates the self as embedded and constituted narratively. It renders the abstract procedures of universalism to a continuum where morality extends from,

. . . universal respect for all as moral persons at one end to the care, solidarity and solicitation demanded of us and shown to us by those to whom we stand in the closest relationship at the other (Elanen *et al.*, 1997, p.3).

7 Summary

The theoretical background provided above has fuelled the approach offered in this thesis. This chapter has argued that context-respectful theory represents a significant critique to principled-based theories and their commitment to impartiality. An account of context-respectful theory and its implications for an understanding of fair play in women's cricket will be developed further in Part Two of the following chapter. Part One, however, examines current theories of fair play and their philosophical foundations. It examines the perspective of formalism and the role that rules play in defining the concept of fair play. Context-respectful theory and fair play will then be scrutinized. The importance of empirically informed theory will be established and the purpose and rationale of 'Immanent Critique' explored.

Chapter Four

Fair Play and the Ethos of Sporting Games

Part One: Theoretical Foundations of Fair Play

1 Introduction

Chapter Three examined traditional ethical theories and their commitment to a principle of impartiality. The area of feminist ethics was discussed and the notion of context-respectful theory proposed. The aim of this chapter is to critically examine previous approaches to the study of fair play and the philosophical foundations of these approaches.

Contemporary debates around fair play have concentrated on a number of different issues. What is the meaning of fair play? Which ethical principles, if any, has the concept of fair play been grounded upon? Has fair play been conceived as a normative ideal? Should we accept it? Can we achieve it? Is it empirical description? If so, are these descriptions accurate?

Part One begins with a discussion of formalism and the role that rules play in defining the concept of fair play. A consideration of those theories based on the virtues and the nature of character and sportspersonship follows. Next, Schneider and Butcher's (1998) recent approach to fair play as, "respect for the game" is analysed in detail. This leads to an initial examination of D'Agostino's (1981) concept of ethos. Fair play conceived as a social contract is discussed along with Loland's (1998) interpretation of fair play as a rational discourse ethic. Part One concludes by eschewing abstract accounts of fair play in favour of more contextualised versions of fairness in sporting games.

Part Two considers the role of context-respectful theory and fair play. This section provides a detailed account of the concept of ethos, and in particular examines Arnold's (1997) "moral ethos argument." Part Two also offers a defence of an empirically informed concept of fair play. What constitutes fairness in sport is more than just the formal rules of the game. This chapter concludes by arguing that moral behaviour in sport cannot be defined in universal terms. To appraise meaningfully

the concept of fair play, it is necessary to gain some first hand experience of the sporting practice in question.

2 Rules, Laws and Fair Play

It is of interest to note how particular games use either laws or rules to guide the sporting conduct of their members. In cricket, it is the laws of the game that have been developed and codified, whereas, in other sports, such as hockey, netball, and football, the concept of rules is employed. The term, 'Law' originates from Old English, '*lagu*,' meaning to be laid down or fixed. Laws of a game serve a variety of functions. We think of law in the sense of a legal code, constitution, or charter. In sport, laws are the accepted guidelines that govern, limit, and define the relations of game playing, thus setting up the basis for fair play. Laws are employed to control the actions of players by prohibiting what is considered morally unacceptable. They serve to maintain a state of fair play and to provide the means to resolve any disputes that may occur.

The rules of a game may be considered to function in a similar way. Rules have a binding force that requires players to conform to specific principles of action. They regulate and prohibit certain kinds of actions and are enforced by penalties. As Fraleigh states:

Rules specify the goal-within-the contest which all participants must necessarily pursue, the means all participants must use and are allowed to use in pursuing that goal, and the means all participants may not legally use to pursue the goal (Fraleigh, 1988, p.268).

Rules are mostly proscriptions of certain means. For example, in cricket, it may be useful to trip the incoming batter but it is proscribed. Constitutive rules prohibit the use of more efficient means in favour of less efficient means (Suits, 1978). For example it would be more efficient to decrease the length between the wickets but this is prohibited. Rules offer directives that are useful in achieving specific ends. For example, if you want to be a good cricketer then you must practise your bowling and fielding skills. Rules impose external limitations on the means of the given end that is sought. For example, do not verbally abuse an opponent. Players accept the

conditions imposed on the game and agree to obey the rules. In 1978, Suits proposed the classical definition of game playing:

. . . to play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by the rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such an activity [lusory attitude] (p.41).

The specific state of affairs that players try to achieve in cricket amounts to scoring more runs than the opposition. This is the prelusory goal of cricket, because it can be described independently beforehand. The lusory goal is to win the match by voluntarily accepting the formal rules of the game (to use means permitted by the rules to achieve the desired ends) (Suits, 1978). The lusory means account for those actions which are permitted and the limitations placed on players to achieve the prelusory goal. Players accept the rules because they make the activity possible and because obedience is a necessary condition of engaging in the activity. Players have a lusory attitude when they accept the rules and agree for the sake of playing the game to abide by those rules (Suits 1978).

Adopting Searle's (1969) use of the terminology of constitutive rules, Suits (1978) defines the same as those that specify the conditions of play within a game, "to break a constitutive rule is to fail to play the game at all" (Suits, 1978, p.38). The formal or constitutive rules of a game are those which prescribe and proscribe what can be done in the attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs. They dictate which acts may be considered permissible or impermissible, obligatory or forbidden. Thus, constitutive rules are those that set out the formal conditions necessary to play the game. For example, in cricket, an over constitutes either six or eight balls bowled from each wicket alternatively (1992, Law 22(1)). There are also other kinds of rules that are extensions of constitutive rules and may be deemed regulative rules (Meier, 1995). They make provision for sanctions in the event of rule-breaking and specify which penalties are applied when constitutive rules have been broken. For example, if a bowler bowls a 'no ball' a penalty of one run is awarded to the batting team (as long as no runs were made otherwise) (1992, Law 24(8)). Meier (1995) introduces the notion of a third type of rule; namely, auxiliary rules. These relate to conditions

that govern participation externally and regulate pre-contest requirements, such as: eligibility, age, training, court size and so on. For example, in women's cricket, the ball should weigh between 140 and 150 grams (1992, Law 5(1)).

3 Formalism

Formalism is a theory of games that claims many philosophical advocates. In this section, the content of formalism is explained. It is argued that formalism is an inadequate account of games. Proponents of formalism include theorists such as: Suits (1978), Pearson (1973), Delattre (1976), and Reddiford (1985). Formalism refers to accounts of games in which games are defined solely in terms of their formal rules. As Morgan (1987) explains:

According to formalism, the various derivative notions of a game are to be defined exclusively in terms of its formal rules. What it means to engage in a game, to count as a legitimate instance of a game, to qualify as a *bona fide* action of a game, and to win a game is to act in accordance with the appropriate rules of that game. All instances and actions that fall outside the rules of the game, therefore, do not count as legitimate instances or actions of a game (p.1).

The central tenet within formalism, then, is that a game is only realised if participants adhere strictly to the formal playing rules. Hence, what it means to be a particular game (G) can be defined strictly in terms of the formal rules of the game. As Pearson (1995) contends, "a game is identified, or defined, as being just that game by the rules which govern it" (p.183). Hence, games and game playing can be defined solely by their rules. D'Agostino (1981) proposes that the thesis of formalism includes four distinct statements. These are summarized as:

- 1) ***"is playing G"***
For a player to be playing a game she must follow the formal rules of the game.
- 2) ***"is action in G"***
Any action that is to be considered game playing must be action in accordance with the formal playing rules. If one of the formal playing rules is broken, the player ceases to play the game.
- 3) ***"is an instance of G"***
Any activity within the game that is to be considered in accordance with the formal rules of the game. Activity that

does not conform to the formal rules is to be discounted as an instance of game playing.

4) ***“wins G”***

To win means to succeed by activity in accordance with the formal rules. A player cannot win the game if she does not play by the formal rules (D’Agostino, 1981, p.7).

The most important element within formalism is the supposed logical incompatibility between winning and cheating (Morgan, 1987). This thesis states that a player cannot win if she resorts to cheating; that is, it is logically impossible to win a game if actions are not in accordance with the formal rules of the game (see D’Agostino’s claim, no. 2, cited above). D’Agostino (1981) takes issue with the formalist account on two points. First, he argues, it makes no sense to say that a player is not playing the game if she breaks a formal rule. Rather, it makes more sense to say that the player has ceased to play fairly, not that she has ceased to play the game in any form. This leads into D’Agostino’s second criticism; that is Platonism. He interprets the meaning of formalism in the following way, “no activity is an instance of some particular game G if any rule of G is violated during that activity” (p.9). So, if an athlete breaks a formal rule then they are not playing the game because the game is constituted, and made possible only, by the rules. Consequently, the problem with formalism is that games become Platonistic; ideal types that are never realised because of particular rule infractions. Games are rule-governed to the extent that the rules define the practice and what actions constitute fair play.

Whilst Morgan (1995) agrees that formalism is an inadequate account of games, he repudiates a number of the claims that D’Agostino makes. In particular he denies D’Agostino’s criticisms of the distinction between not playing the game and not playing fairly. He also throws doubt on the espoused Platonistic element of formalism. The notion that formalism implies a competitor is not playing the game if she/he breaks a formal rule of that game is rejected as a condition of formalism (Morgan 1988). This is because of the distinction already made between constitutive and regulative rules.

The unqualified claim formalism makes with respect to the observance of rules applies to only one kind of rule, namely the constitutive rules. It is only the latter [constitutive] kind of rule that

defines what a game is in the sense of setting out all the conditions that must be met in the playing of the game (p.51).

In other words, if players break the regulative rules of a game, then they are still considered to be playing that game. Thus, breaking the regulative rules does not count as an instance of not playing the game. Only constitutive rules count as defining rules of games. Morgan (1988) continues by arguing that the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules also resolves the problem of Platonism. If the violation of regulative rules still counts as game playing, then games do not become idealised types at all. However, although D'Agostino (1981) may have misinterpreted the exact nature of formalism when applied to game playing, there are three significant problems for the formalist position. The first is that formalism, on its own, remains an abstract account of games which has little explanatory power when it comes to defining the nature of games and fair play within particular games.

Secondly, formalism fails to account for the notion of ethos or social contexts in which games occur. Thirdly, formalism makes no reference to the fact that rules (both constitutive and regulative) are interpreted and applied in concrete circumstances within particular games. The foregoing claims will now be considered in that order.

It is not sufficient abstractly to define game playing in terms of strict adherence to different types of rules. Likewise, a satisfactory account of fair play will not be derived from a consideration based solely on the nature of rules themselves. The formalist account, on its own, serves only to provide a limited account of game playing that barely touches on the rich, multiplicity of diverse meanings within fair play. Games and conceptions of fair play have rich social histories that formalism ignores. For descriptions of sporting practices to be more than a consideration of abstract, formal rules the researcher must explore the meanings of an ethos in game playing and its contextualised constitution. For there is a multitude of actions that may be considered, 'non-game behaviour,' which influence fair play but which are devoid of all mention within a formalist account. We cannot find out about the nature of fair play in cricket, for example, by simply referring to the formal laws of

the game. Formalism leaves a void of unaccounted action that is vital to an understanding of fair play. As Leaman (1981) argues:

. . . if we are profitably to discuss the notion of the rules of the game, and of cheating and fair play, we must address ourselves to the ways in which players and spectators perceive those rules rather than to an abstract idea of the rules themselves (p.30).

The second criticism of formalism, then, is that it fails to account for the social context of fairness in games. Formalism, on its own, is an inadequate account of the nature of games as it fails to offer any understanding of how we say whether an action is to be considered fair or unfair. As Reddiford (1981), an advocate of formalism, acknowledges:

The reference to authority and rules settles questions about to whom, or to what, disputes concerning the laws and procedures should be referred. It does not logically rule out of court questions about the morality or immorality of the practices themselves (Reddiford, 1981, p.9).

Lehman (1981) also denies formalism and argues that before we can make judgments about cheating and fairness we must consider more than just the rule book and should look at the context in which the game is played. Similarly, Eassom (1998) argues that:

. . . rather than seeing the problem in terms of what is meant by cheating (via some sort of definitional analysis) or considering whether cheating is immoral or amoral, the approach ought to be one examining the appropriateness of the particular conceptions of fair play used in any such analysis and by examining what conception of morality is being assumed (p.58).

Adopting a formalist approach leaves so much rich detail about the nature of games unaccounted for. Following the rules of a game creates a minimal standard or framework for fair play but it is the case that fair play applies to those particular situations that occur within the context of the game but are outside the jurisdiction of the rules. Defining fair play in a formal manner does not allow for the multitude of actions that occur within the realms of fair play but which cannot be found pertaining to any formal rule. It must be supplemented, therefore, with an additional account of games as social practices. Consequently, it is argued that an interpretation of the

social context of games must be incorporated within a formalist approach if we are to understand what constitutes fair play in sporting games. As Leaman (1981) suggests:

The next step is to determine what notion of fair play is applicable within the context of the ways in which players actually participate in sporting activities. An injection of realism into philosophical discussions of cheating and fair play is long overdue (p.30).

This thesis hopes to ‘inject some realism’ into previous philosophical considerations of fair play. The third criticism aimed at formalism is the notion of rules and their interpretation. As Wittgenstein explained, a rule cannot determine its own application (McNamee, 1998). In other words, the meaning of a proposition must be understood in terms of its context; that is, in terms of the rules of the game of which that proposition is a part. Hence, the key to the resolution of issues of fair play is the process of examining and describing rule application in context.

Fair play includes not only formal rules but also social rules. They are both part of the framework where human standards of acceptability, values, and norms, become incorporated within the context of an ethos. Thus, what is seen to be fair play in sport can change historically and differ between groups within a sporting tradition. Thus, a consideration of practices surrounding the application of rules to games is of vital importance (Nilsson, 1997). An examination of the application of rules enables the researcher to determine what characterises a particular sport: their interpretation helps determine which characteristics will be emphasised and what will be overlooked (Nilsson, 1997). Reddiford (1998) refers to the interpretive nature of rule application when he states:

. . . the shape that the rule makes possible can be attained and preserved in the face of sporadic wrong doing provided the motivations of most players (and spectators, coaches, and management) are strong enough to exclude persistent defection, in response to persistent defection (p.229).

So, although games are partly defined by rules, these rules always have to be interpreted in practice. For example, the polymorphous character of laws in cricket often calls for the need for interpretation and judgement to decide how, if, and when,

a particular law should be applied. For example, consider the law in cricket that governs Leg Before Wicket (LBW). This law stipulates that:

1 Out LBW

A) The striker shall be out LBW if he (sic) first intercepts with any part of his (sic) person, dress, or equipment a fair ball which would have hit the wicket and which has not previously touched his (sic) bat or a hand holding a bat, provided that:-

(i) The ball pitched, in a straight line between wicket and wicket or on the off side of the Striker's wicket, or was intercepted full pitch.

and

(ii) the point of impact is in a straight line between wicket and wicket, even if above the level of the bails.

B) Striker Making No Attempt To Play The Ball

The striker shall be out LBW even if the ball is intercepted outside the line of the off-stump, *if, in the opinion of the Umpire*, he has made no genuine attempt to play the ball with his (sic) bat, but has intercepted the ball with some part of his (sic) person and if the other circumstances set out in (A) above apply (*emphasis added*, 1996, Law 36, p.40).

As will be examined in Chapter Six, this law, like many other rules in competitive games, calls for the subjective interpretation of the umpire. In summary, if no game can be completely defined by its rules then formalism fails, on its own, as an adequate account of games. Formalism cannot be used to define what is meant by fair play because fair play as adherence to rules does not account for the variety of sporting actions as played and practised. It is clear, then, that more than just an account of the formal rules is needed to ascertain the complex nature of fair play. Fair play concerns not only the formal rules of the game but also the context in which those rules are applied. Fair play in cricket, then, concerns both the formal laws that govern play and the ensuing cultural norms as to how those laws ought to be administered in practice. It is not that formalism is redundant but that it must be supplemented with an account of games that is situated and embedded in context. This is the linchpin of my argument, and, accordingly, will be defended throughout the remainder of the thesis. In an attempt to explain the nature of fair play, different authors have adopted different approaches. The following section briefly considers accounts of fair play based on notions of virtue, good character, and sportspersonship.

4 Fair Play and Virtue Theories

Within the body of sport philosophical literature, the notion that fair play is integrally bound to connotations of sportspersonship and good character is commonplace. Theorists look to the essence or purpose of sport and seek to generate, from that nature, the moral ideals of sportspersonship and fair play.

Schneider and Butcher (1998) after Kohlberg (1981) call this the bag of virtues approach to fair play. This is because theorists try to take a list of not necessarily related virtues (praiseworthy attributes) and associate them, or apply them to sporting conduct. For example, Bredemeier and Shields (1994) propose four elements of character: compassion, fairness, sportspersonship and integrity. The elements are derived from their developmental model of moral reasoning, and then applied to particular sporting situations. The point of defining character in this way is to allow the researcher operationally to define measurable behaviours. This means that data can be collected and analysed in different sporting situations. Fair play is defined positively. For example, shaking hands with opponents, congratulating teammates and so on, whereas actions such as violence, dissent, or abuse of other players is defined negatively.

Lumpkin, Stoll, and Beller (1994) adopt a similar approach. They offer us an analysis of fair play based on a Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning. They argue that the greater our ability to reason the better able we are to solve moral issues. Moreover, they propose we must develop an impartial reasoning system in order to be fair. Lumpkin *et al.* (1994) argue that moral character is made up of three different components: moral knowing, moral valuing and moral action. They also propose four fundamental moral values that underlie character: justice, honesty, responsibility and beneficence. Together these are proposed as the basis of a reasoning strategy for fair play behaviour. Schneider and Butcher (1998) state that the impetus to the above approaches comes from the desire to use sport as a vehicle to teach social values. Desirable character traits are identified and then sport is used to teach such values through structured sport programs.

Both Bredemeier & Shields (1994), and Lumpkin *et al.* (1994) argue that sports encompass ethical decision making because they are played by human beings. They

propose that universal moral rules apply to sporting situations. Investigations are made to discover what sort of behaviour is necessary if we are to be considered morally good sports persons.

Feezell (1995) uses an Aristotelian account arguing that sportspersonship is a mean between non-seriousness and dedication and commitment. He states that sportsmanship:

. . . is a mean between excessive seriousness, which misunderstands the importance of the play-spirit, and an excessive sense of playfulness, which might be called frivolity and which misunderstands the importance of victory and achievement when play is competitive (p.158).

In other words, sportsmanship is a virtue that is a mean between two extremes. Schneider and Butcher (1998) argue persuasively that we should dismiss the bag of virtues approach because it offers no defensible method of deciding which characteristics or actions should fall within the relevant definitions of sportsmanship proposed. Moreover, there is no way of deciding between competing claims. In summary, fair play in sport cannot be simply understood as set of praiseworthy attributes or virtues displayed by the performer.

5 Fair Play as Respect

The notion that fair play is fundamentally about respect is a common thread among philosophical accounts (International Council for Sport and Physical Education (ICSPE), 1996; International Council for Fair Play, (ICFP), 1994; Council of Europe, 1993; Schneider and Butcher, 1998). Fair play is defined as much more than a strict adherence to the written rules of the game. Such accounts employ the concept of respect to incorporate notions of, respect for the spirit of the rules, respect for opponents, and respect for the game itself.

For example, ICSPE (1996) defines fair play, first and foremost, as respect for the rules of the game. However, they suggest that respect for the rules is due to a respect for the spirit of the game, rather than for the letter of the rules. It is about the attitude

and conduct that players display. Similarly, ICFP (1994) incorporates the notion of respect when describing the meaning of fair play:

Fair Play does not only mean adherence to written rules; rather it describes the right attitudes of sportsmen and women and the right spirit in which they conduct themselves: showing respect for the other and care for his or her freedom from bodily or psychological harm (ICFP, 1994, p.12).

As a minimum requirement, then, fair play is about abiding by the rules of the game. But the concept of fair play implies that much more is required and expected. Rule following extends to include the concepts of respect for others' interests, and sportspersonship. For example, Keating (1995) examines fair play as sportsmanship. The idea of acting within the spirit of a game is central to the adherence of a legal code or list of formal rules. The Council of Europe (1993) speaks of fair play in much the same way, adding further the concepts of cheating, gamesmanship, unequal opportunities, and violence:

Fair play is defined as much more than playing within the rules. It incorporates the concepts of friendship, respect for others and always playing in the right spirit. Fair play is defined as a way of thinking, not just a way of behaving. It incorporates issues concerned with the elimination of cheating, gamesmanship, doping, violence (both physical and verbal), exploitation, unequal opportunities, excessive commercialisation, and corruption (Council of Europe, 1993, p.1).

The ICFP argues that fair play should be considered in two different ways; namely, individual and structural. The perspective of the individual refers to the personal responsibilities that participants have towards others. For example, respecting one's opponents, trying to achieve success, accepting the rules and decisions of the referee, self-control, and self-discipline. The perspective of structural fair play refers to the responsibility of governing bodies to make rules that are fair and also ensure sport is exciting and attractive (ICFP, 1994).

One of the most recent and comprehensive accounts of fair play employs the notion of respect and this will be considered in detail next. It is Schneider and Butcher's (1998) definition of fair play as respect for the game (RFTG). They offer an eclectic position but do not commit themselves to the importance of empirically informed

theory. They start by arguing that there are two similar senses to the notion of respect. First, one can respect merely by observing or following. For example, when driving, we observe and abide by the laws of the road. We wear our seat belts, pay our tax and insurance, and so on. In the second sense, respect involves connotations of honouring, holding in regard, esteeming, or valuing. This is the view operative in moral discussions of respect for autonomy, or equal respect for persons.

Schneider and Butcher (1998) contend, from a moral point of view, we should value the rights and preferences of others as we value our own. The authors propose that the two senses of respect run together within the context of sport. Their argument can be summarised as follows. Sports are games that are made up by their rules. As such, there is a requirement that we respect the rules of the game. We do not treat the rules of the game in the same way that we treat the rules of the road rather we honor or hold in esteem the rules of sport. Thus, they argue, fair play is best defined in terms of respect for the game. Moreover, if an athlete 'honours' her sport, she will want to exhibit fair play.

Schneider and Butcher (1998) believe that this provides a coherent conceptual framework for arbitrating between competing claims and actions. However, their distinction between respect and rules is unclear. Just because games have rules does not mean that athletes respect those rules in the manner described by Schneider and Butcher. Indeed, rules of games are treated in the same ways as rules of the road. For example, consider auxiliary rules. Such rules are not held in esteem or honoured in some way. Perhaps this is not intended. It seems that Schneider and Butcher are referring to the types of rules that preserve some kind of goodness or essence of sport that would otherwise be spoiled. If this is the case, then such rules may indeed be accorded greater weight. These rules might include honouring or valuing the law that stipulates the seam of a cricket ball must not be lifted or damaged by the fielding team. Leaving this distinction aside, the authors state further that:

. . . sports are practices and that practices are the sorts of things that can have interests. Respect for the game will thus entail respect for the interests of the game (or sport) as a practice (p.9).

The next part of their argument states that sports are games that have been artificially constructed from their rules. Schneider and Butcher (1998) suggest that sport participation is chosen and takes one outside of everyday life. They state that a game creates its own standards of excellence in that what counts as skill and winning is defined through the game. Rules make the game possible where activities of the sport are inherently worthwhile. Thus, the rules that make those activities possible are due honour and respect. Therefore, respect for the game entails respect for the rules of the game. The jump made between the notion that games create their own internal standards of excellence, that rules make inherently worthwhile activities possible, and that rules should be respected remains, at best, unclear. Schneider and Butcher (1998) fail to articulate the reasons why such rules should be respected. Rules are due honour and respect precisely because they are the means to preserving the internal goods of the practice.

Schneider and Butcher (1998) support the view that games can be defined using a combination of rules and ethos. Their use of the term ethos, however, implies that there must necessarily be one ethos of a game.

Because there are choices to be made about the way the game is to be conducted, we need to agree on what will count as fair and what will not. Otherwise we run the risk of engaging in different enterprises and thus failing to contest at all. If players wish to contest, they must agree on the precise nature of the contest (p.10).

Such a position implies that the very nature of ethos is a singular system of knowing that can be precisely agreed upon. It is argued here that an ethos consists of a plurality of different voices often in disagreement as to exactly what constitutes fair and unfair play. Despite such discord, however, it is not the case that teams are engaged in different enterprises or have ceased to compete at all. The latter point illustrates D'Agostino's (1981) criticism of formalism. The contested plural nature of an ethos will be illustrated with empirical evidence later in the thesis when considering internal and external disagreements within elite English women's cricket and their international competitors.

Next, Schneider and Butcher (1998) champion a MacIntyrean definition of sports as practices. The definition of a practice according to MacIntyre (1996) is:

. . . any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and the human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (p.187).

MacIntyre makes the distinction between external and internal goods. Internal goods are those benefits or goods only available through the practice itself, whereas, external goods may be described as money or fame. Practices have internal standards of excellence, rules, authority, traditions, and are living, dynamic, and changing entities (Schneider and Butcher 1998). Any changes that occur must originate within the practice itself. MacIntyre argues that, as a member of a practice, one's attitudes and preferences become shaped by the practice. Schneider and Butcher argue that this is most significant, since to respect the game requires that one takes on or assumes the interests of that game. They argue that to be engaged in a practice means you respect the practice and acquire and assume a new set of interests. The interests of the sport become the interests of the athlete.

One of the problems here is that the authors have not considered the sorts of interests that games have. Questions concerning the specific interests of games must be asked. For example, in this thesis the interests of elite women's cricket as a game and as an institution will be considered. Moreover, Schneider and Butcher (1998) argue that if you respect the game you honour the standards of excellence defined by that game. To accept the standards of the game is to act accordingly. The authors do not explain where these internal standards come from or elaborate on how they are to be justified. If the interests of the game provide a means of judging one's own actions in relation to the sport then an account of the means in which they do so ought to be provided. It is not clear in their account what it means to assume the interests of the practice and to strive for the good of the game. Furthermore, the authors suggest, taking the interests of the game seriously means that we ask ourselves whether or not an action we were contemplating would be good for the

game concerned, if everyone did it. This seems like a revised version of the categorical imperative discussed previously; namely, act in such a way that at the same time you can will your action to become universal law.

Lastly, Schneider and Butcher (1998) contend that fair play as RFTG has important practical implications. The first is on a personal level where RFTG offers a guideline for an athlete to decide which appropriate action she should take. The second concerns actions and decisions at the level of policy. Fair play as RFTG means that the institutions of sport make decisions based on the best interests of the game concerned.

The approach offered by Schneider and Butcher (1998) provides an excellent framework for asking some important questions. For example, what are the practices that make for better sport? Where do the internal standards for games-as-practices come from? The authors acknowledge the important role that an examination of the idea of ethos has to play for a contextually rich account of fair play. Moreover, the importance of rules, our attitudes toward them, and the notion of a particular discourse for fair play within games-as-practices represent significant developments in the way that fairness has been conceived in previous literature.

They argue that fair play as RFTG offers an alternative powerful conception that is a process grounded in sport that possesses its own sport-based motivations for fairness. Indeed, on the issue of intimidation, Schneider and Butcher (1998) admit that a sport-by-sport analysis is most relevant. However, what is missing is the conviction to the importance of empirical examination. Such an account must be present if we are to 'get at' a richer, deeper understanding of fair play. Later in this chapter, more will be said about the concept of an empirically informed theory and its importance for understanding fair play.

In summary, under the promising guise of offering a more realistic grounding of fair play in the gratuitous logic of sport itself, fair play as RFTG remains disappointingly an abstract and speculatively remote account. It is incomplete and leaves a whole range of considerations unaccounted for. What are the interests of sport that are to be held internally worthwhile and hence respected for the good of the game? The reader

(athlete?) is left wondering how RFTG can deal effectively with issues of fair play that occur not within the general sphere of sport but within particular games. Such dilemmas must be considered within context. The next section provides a preliminary understanding of the idea of ethos.

6 Ethos – A Preliminary Understanding

As previously discussed (Chapter 4, Part 2), following the rules of a game creates a minimal standard or framework for fair play. But, as Reddiford (1985) explains, rules leave a wide range of options open as they do not legislate for motives and purposes. Often, the interpretation of the rules, strategies, and tactics is left open for the players to decide the appropriate actions.

The notion ‘ethos’ has a relatively clear conceptual boundary. Within the fair play literature accounts of the idea of ethos attempt to explain the multiplicity of diverse meanings attached to practices that formalism cannot account for. For example, Midgley (1974) argues for an account of games that recognises more than just the formal rules but allows for the context or manner in which such rules are enacted. She states:

The restraining rules are not something foreign to the needs or emotions involved, they are simply the shape which the desired activity takes. The Chess Player’s desire is not a desire for general abstract intellectual activity, curbed and frustrated by a particular set of rules. It is a desire for a particular kind of intellectual activity, whose channel is the rules of chess . . . The Football player does not just want to rush about kicking things. He wants to do so in a special context of ordered competition with companions . . . (p.243).

In the literature on ethos and sports D’Agostino (1981) is the *locus classicus*. He coined the term ethos based on the idea that rules are applied in games within particular contexts and circumstances. He argues that the ethos of a game should be considered as those conventions in which the formal rules of a game are interpreted and applied in concrete circumstances. By introducing the notion of an ethos over and above the mere existence of game-defining rules D’Agostino attempts to capture the distinction between the acceptable and the unacceptable, the permissible and the impermissible. He states:

. . . any particular game has an ethos as well as a formal set of rules. By the ethos of a game I mean those conventions determining how the formal rules of that game are applied in concrete circumstances (D'Agostino, 1981, p.7).

D'Agostino (1981) advocates that game derivative notions of rules and fairness fail to account for the context in which such rules are applied. Formalism lacks understanding of the distinction between the game as a system of ideas and as a system of action (Loland, 1998). The former describes those actions expressed by the system of formal rules and the latter includes the conduct of persons within the particular context that the rules are applied. In other words, formalism, although able to define abstractly the permissible, fails to account for the multitude of actions outside its jurisdiction but within the boundaries of fair play. D'Agostino thus ends with the following revised position:

The ethos of a game G is that set of conventions which determines how the rules of G are to be applied in concrete circumstances. The ethos of G should thus figure in the definition of various game-derivative notions in the following way . . . “is an instance of G” should be understood as meaning “is activity in accordance with the formal rules of G” as these are interpreted by the ethos of G. Any alleged instance of some game G is, according to our non-formalists account, a genuine instance of G so long as it is activity within the limits jointly defined by the formal rules of G and the ethos of G . . . (D'Agostino, 1981 p.17).

D'Agostino (1981) criticises the strict formalist account and goes part way to offering an alternative framework for the role that the notion of ethos has to play in defining fair play in sporting games. However, Loland and McNamee (1997) believe two revisions of his thesis are required. First, we should avoid the formalism that D'Agostino incorporates in his own thesis. His account is incomplete as it presupposes an analytical interpretation of games as rule-governed practices. To interpret a game merely as a system of rules is to ignore its context: its social and historical situatedness. Secondly, the ethos of a game is more than the conventional interpretation of the rules; it is based in a larger framework concerning the significance and value of that practice in people's lives and within society. We may have a moral obligation to keep the formal playing rules but we must consider more

than this if we want to know about fairness. The rules alone do not constitute what the inner norms and values of that game may be. In Part Two of this chapter a more sophisticated account of the concept of ethos is offered, one that considers games as culturally constituted practices. Next, a brief examination of theories that interpret fair play as a social contract is offered.

7 Fair Play as a Social Contract

The use of social contract theory and the prisoner's dilemma to explain the nature of fair play in sport is commonplace (Shogan, 1988; Breivik, 1992; and Eassom, 1995). The basic idea is that athletes have an obligation to play fairly because they have accepted the contract to compete. It is in the interest of all athletes to accept the conditions of the contract as it is designed to ensure that competition is carried out in a fair and just manner. The Rawlsian notion of principles of justice as fairness becomes the basis of the agreement of the social contract. This perspective is similar to formalism's idea of fair play as respect for the rules of the game. Fair play as a social contract begins from the premise that games are created and maintained by their rules. To engage in playing a game is to accept the tacit contract to compete within the rules of that game. Athletes must agree what principles to adopt to ensure fair play. Thus, any actions that break the conditions of the contract are to be seen as unfair or even cheating. The content of the agreement is taken as the acceptance of the formal rules of the game. Thus, fair play is merely doing no more or no less than you said you would do. In this context, the importance of an ethos is virtually ignored.

Fair play is framed as a negative concept. In other words, fair play is the absence of unfairness or cheating, as unfairness is defined by breaking the contract to compete. But, issues surrounding fair play are not as simple as this. As Leaman (1981) states:

. . . it is not at all clear what "equality, fairness, and impartiality for all" means in a sporting context . . . It is not a simple matter to determine when the rules of a game are being kept . . . (p.28).

Notions of fair play are far more complex than the ideal notions of justice as fairness which are proposed as a re-formulation of the principles of a social contract (Eassom, 1998). Questions surrounding the nature of moral rules must be

considered. For example, in the context of sporting games, what counts as a rule in a moral sense must be examined. Also, the foundations of our obligations to obey the rules of the game need to be discussed. Eassom (1998) suggests that examples from sport history can be used to illustrate the potential in a critique of social contract theory. In doubting whether sports are really like social contracts at all, he argues:

Our understanding of playing fair and foul in sport must begin with an understanding of sport itself, through history, through sociology, and through participation and engagement. It is difficult not to see the contractarian project applied to fair play in sport as that of the ‘unphysically intellectual’ too far removed from the lived reality of the game (Eassom, 1998, p.74).

The use of game theoretical accounts, founded on the notion of hypothetical contracts, to explain the concept of fair play provides insufficient accounts of games as cultural practices. They are not concerned with the idea of ethos and consequently they leave out much rich contextual detail about the ethos of a practice. Such conceptions are incomplete as they do not allow any room for the consideration of the particular moral nuances of the sporting practice. This, we will see later, is crucial to an understanding of an ethos and fair play.

Fairness in sport is framed as a universal agreement; that is, all terms of the contract are to be applied to all sports in the same way. Hence, the only relevant features of the social contract are the abstract formal conditions of the rules. The details of athletes’ contingent circumstances are considered morally irrelevant and omitted from consideration. Ultimately these accounts remain remote and abstract. The following section looks at Loland’s (1998) formulation of fair play as a rational discourse ethic.

8 Fair Play as Discourse Ethics

Recently, Loland (1998) has constructed an account of fair play using Habermas’ notion of a discourse ethic. He tries to demonstrate how a common moral code of conduct can be used to govern sporting behaviour in a cultural setting of pluralism and diversity. Traditional ethical theories, he explains, aim to transcend local moralities by establishing general ethical principles that are valid for all human practice. Choosing the right theory is complex:

. . . the choice of one particular ethical theory or tradition often excludes proponents of other views at the very outset of the argument (Loland, 1998, p.80).

Loland (1998) contends that such abstract theorising fails to account for the historical and social dimension of lived human practices. Pluralism and moral diversity are taken seriously and discourse ethicists doubt the potential of moral philosophy to provide universally valid answers to fundamental ethical questions. Loland then goes on to ask, how a common moral code of conduct can be articulated.

Loland (1998) maintains that a principle of fair play is established through reasoned agreement among participants in a practical discourse. This may be considered as a type of contractualism. As a way of dealing with ethical issues in multi-cultural settings Loland (1998) does not consider the implications of a hierarchy of gender within a moral discourse. He begins by asking what norms the concept of fair play embodies. The point is to establish fair and impartial procedures in which conflicting interests can be accommodated and normative claims adjudicated. He establishes: (1) a fairness norm; (2) a norm for fair play; and; (3) that one must always play to win.

Pilz and Wewer (1987) first introduced the idea of formal fair play and informal fair play. The former describes adhering to the written rules of the game whereas the latter prescribes a certain attitude towards the game; do one's best and respect one's opponents. Formal playing rules provide a conceptual framework necessary to realise a game in practice. Loland (1998) argues that keeping the formal playing rules provides no justification for moral action norms. We need ethical reasons for abstaining from rule violations. Loland (1998) offers a Rawlsian interpretation of why it is necessary to keep the formal rules of a game. He says, when voluntarily engaged in a social practice we enter a tacit contract to abide by the formal playing rules of the game. This, he continues, is the core justification of the fairness ideal.

Loland (1998) asserts that the idea of an 'ethos' allows for a more dynamic understanding of the game. This is because:

. . . an ethos of a game draws distinctions between permissible acts which are in accordance with the rules, acceptable acts in terms of certain rule violations which are considered as 'part of the game,' and rule violations which are considered unacceptable (Loland, 1998, p.87).

Loland argues that, when voluntarily engaged in sport practice, athletes must keep the shared ethos of the practice. But what happens when the shared norms of the practice conflict? How does one decide which ethos to keep? How can we determine an ethically acceptable ethos? Such questions will be considered in detail in Chapter Seven.

For Loland, an ethically acceptable ethos is one that does not violate basic ethical principles. But how do we establish the content of these basic ethical principles? He does not elaborate on what such general ethical requirements on social practices might look like. What about breaking the unwritten rules of a practice, and as a result, contravening the ethos of the activity but not violating any basic ethical principles? He alludes to the possibility of Rawls' norm of upholding of justice. It is not exactly clear what he means by justice. Why pick justice? This leads Loland (1998) to conclude the fairness norm:

When voluntarily engaged in sport competitions, keep the shared ethos of the practice as long as the ethos does not violate basic, ethical principles and includes a sense of fairness! (p.90).

Loland raises a significant objection to his hypothesis: how can an athlete adhere to vague, tacit, unwritten norms, or to an ethos of a game that is unfamiliar to her? He explains the idea that an ethos arises through an interactive process between formal playing rules and the norms for their interpretation. A player learns and internalises the ethos of a practice through experience of the game.

Loland (1998) states that the fairness norm serves as a basis for reasoned agreement among free and equal parties in a practical discourse. This is one element in a common moral code of conduct for sport. Another element, he says, ought to be included: a norm on the realisation of good games. A good game is exciting, challenging, fun, dramatic, and joyful. To achieve these the game must be played

with intensity and devotion. This underlines Loland's (1998) description of an informal fair play norm: do your best and treat your opponents with respect. Finally, Loland (1998) argues that athletes should play according to the shared ethos of the practice to win. He calls this a rational action norm.

9 Summary

In summary, it is unintelligible to speak of **the** ethos of sport or **the** common moral code to govern sporting behaviour. We can only ever refer to an ethos as a particular set of constructed values belonging to a particular context within a sporting practice. To hanker after an essentialist definition of a moral code of conduct that is rationalised by reasoned agreement betrays the contextual integrity of the idea of ethos and signals allegiance to an inadequate abstract formalist interpretation of fairness in games. Part Two of this chapter examines context-respectful theory and the idea of ethos in more detail.

Part Two: Empirically Informed Theory and Fair Play

1 Context-Respectful Theory and Fair Play

In order, then, to provide a conceptually dense and detailed account of morality and fair play within sporting practice it seems evident that an alternative representation is required to that offered by traditional theorists. The need for an alternative arises due to the lack of a complete account of fair play that eschews a total abstract reliance and allows for an empirical consideration of precise meanings in context. As Fleming (1997) recognises:

. . . notions of fair play are enshrined in the rules and laws of many games, yet the precise meanings attached to these, are (at best) unclear; and whilst athletes might themselves be intuitively comfortable with the value and ethoses of the sport(s) into which they have been socialised, this does not serve as a useful, transferable, analytical conceptualisation (p.2).

The result is that most of the literature that deals with the concept of fair play is in a state of "conceptual limbo" (Wigmore and Tuxill, 1995) providing little guidance for practical application. Such a position seems odd when the idea of an ethical theory is presumably to offer some moral guidance about what one ought to do or how one ought to behave.

Adopting solely a rules-based perspective cannot adequately solve important issues of fair play. Moreover, if the rules view is unable to address the moral nature of these very different experiences, then further attention is needed if we are to consider actual moral problems as they arise for embodied human beings in specific contexts (Duquin, 1991). An alternative account is required that is able to embrace the significance of impartiality whilst appropriating the necessity of socially and historically constructed identities. Comprehending the particularities of a given ethos is crucial to a complete understanding of fair play in sport.

In order to achieve this our current conceptions of fair play must change. We need to couple empirical investigation - what is and what is not fair play in a particular sporting context – with critical philosophical analysis. This will ensure a deeper understanding of fair play. For, how can we develop a theory of fair play (how athletes ought to behave in sport) without seeing what such a theory looks like in context? Manning (1992) poses a similar question that is relevant here, “Why would anyone think that a theory, presumably about what one ought to do, could be worked out independently of its practical application?” (p.8). To conceptualise fairness in sporting games simply as a list of rules or principles oversimplifies and misrepresents the complex and dynamic character of an ethos.

A feminist approach to context-respectful theory and fair play offers an alternative account of morality and game playing and serves to re-draw previous philosophical perspectives outlined in Part One. The starting point for such an approach begins in the practice. Sport is understood as a moral practice within a particular cultural constitution that is embedded in a social and historical context. Instantiations of fair play are articulated by concrete particulars and legitimised through interpretive analysis. The norms of a practice are interpreted by examining contexts and concrete discourses.

Moral meanings in sport are thus considered as essentially indexical; that is, dependent on context. It is through their situated use in action and interaction that they become concretely meaningful in terms of fair play. In broadening our concept of fair play in this way, we are compelled to address issues that otherwise might

remain remote and abstract. As will be explained in the next section, the way to achieve this is through empirical analysis.

2 Empirically Informed Moral Theory

Such a theory of fair play will be context-respectful and empirically informed. It is necessary to distinguish exactly what is meant by the notion of an empirically informed theory. Louden (1992) notes that moral theories do not simply consist of high-order empirical generalisations about moral practice in that, “empirically informed moral theories are not the same as empirical generalisations about moral practices” (Louden 1992, p.127). The conjoining of moral theorising with empirical work, thus, provides a richer, deeper understanding of social reality. The adoption of such an approach ensures that empirically informed moral theory can derive understanding from accounts of social practice that are grounded in experience.

Louden (1992) maintains that moral theory must be empirically informed for two reasons. First, knowledge about individual social practices can be acquired empirically. The moral inquirer can gain insight and knowledge about the particular values and moral beliefs of the group under investigation. In this way an understanding of the practice originates from the deliberations of first hand experience (Saunders, 1995). Empirically informed moral theory, then, develops and constructs depictions of social practice.

Secondly, empirical knowledge is group or context-specific. Moral issues involve facts that are particular to either individual members or groups. Thus, empirically informed moral theory can situate these specific circumstances in deriving a context-respectful account of the social practice under study. Therefore, it becomes evident that the intention is not merely to provide a collection of descriptive generalisations about the moral beliefs or attitudes of a particular group. The normative commitment of moral theory ensures,

. . . that reflections and criticisms concerning how to live and act have a proper footing in who and where we are and what we are doing at present, rather than floating aimlessly above or beyond actual practices (Louden, 1992, p.142).

Louden (1992) is too harsh in his depiction of the rules view as aimlessly wandering, floating, and ignorant of all relevancies. Nevertheless, his point is clear; we need to situate moral action in context. Some might argue, however, that the adoption of such an approach amounts to nothing more than a descriptive account of experience which is embedded in the traditions and customs of a social practice. This is not the case as more than empirical observation is required for a successful analysis. The philosopher, when interpreting experience, has no cause to denounce the standpoint of critical reflection. Indeed, effective moral appraisal relies on critical reflection.

3 Ethos – Some further comments

Arnold (1997) proposes the “moral ethos argument” as a way of understanding fair play. He states that the rules of sport are based on the principles of universality and impartiality and that the ideal of sport is dependent upon those virtues that serve to define and sustain it. It will be argued that Arnold has used unsuccessfully a miscellany of traditional philosophical theory in an attempt to explicate an account of fair play.

Initially, Arnold (1997) offers a Kantian approach by arguing that the rules of sport, like the moral law, do not permit exceptions. They are universal and impartial because they are applicable to all people who compete in the same way. The principle of impartiality means that rules are to be applied in a disinterested manner where they do not favour one person or team. Arnold (1997) says that athletes must understand that not only are they obliged to follow the rules but also they must act in accordance with them.

The reason for participating in sport, Arnold suggests, is the attainment of a valued form of life, one which has “its own values and standards” (p.28). Such a premise, while laudable, seems nevertheless utopian when considering contemporary professional sport. The rules of sport, Arnold continues, are not just constitutive but moral. However, as already discussed, not all rules in sport are moral rules. In cricket, the Law that states the bat must be no more than 38 inches in length is not a moral rule. Moral rules, Arnold (1997) goes on to say in more detail, are those that are concerned with the manner in which players conduct themselves in relation to others.

. . . they are based upon such commonly accepted moral injunctions as: don't cause pain, don't disable, don't deceive, don't cheat, keep your promise, do your duty (p.28).

Arnold fails to explain why he has chosen these particular moral injunctions. It can be argued that the rules of sporting games are rarely framed in such ways. Arnold's use of the term, 'moral injunctions' illustrates the position on the nature of abstract accounts in the fair play literature. They are commonly employed to describe some kind of universal fairness criteria, considered attributable to all sports, when they should be considered as vague and unhelpful. Consider Arnold's first moral rule, "don't cause pain." He does not explain what this means or in what contexts it should apply. Do not cause pain to oneself, to others, or both? What about those sports that intrinsically require a considerable amount of pain to even train or compete? For example, sports such as gymnastics, endurance sports, rugby, and so on. Admittedly, this is probably not what Arnold means for he is referring to the intentional infliction of pain on one's opponent. So, what about the case of boxing, where arguably the intention is to inflict pain on one's opponent? One only has to listen to pre-match hype to hear of the pain (even death) that one boxer wants to inflict on another. Perhaps, Arnold would reply that boxing is not a sport at all. The point is to argue that the distinctive nature of an ethical ethos in sports cannot be captured by appealing to some kind of universal criteria. This is because an ethos is a plural, contested set of narratives that produce, sustain, and are constituted by the practices in which it lies. Games are played in different settings in different ways. The important point made here is that games are played in a particular context, a context that uses more than just the rules to define cheating.

There are moral rules in sport that specifically deal with the manner in which players behave in relation to others. But these cannot be simply described with a list of abstract "moral injunctions" that are of little use when considering particular games and their contextual makeup. Such rules are best examined through an empirical consideration of the ethos of the practice and an analysis of the rules or laws of the game.

Like many other theorists, Arnold (1997) argues that at the heart of moral rules in sport is the notion of respect for one's opponent. He contends that, for an ethos to be

preserved, goodwill and virtues are needed. By goodwill, he means, acting with good intentions and for athletes to agree to act in accordance with the rules. It is at this point that Arnold (1997) adopts a theory of virtue to support the notion that the ideal of sport (which he does not offer an account of) is founded on the principles of impartiality. Virtues are needed to save the practice from a “withering death” (p.29). By acting virtuously athletes continue to preserve the values, standards and best traditions of the practice concerned.

Sport as an ideal practice, in keeping with its best traditions, demands from its participants that they be fair, courageous, determined, as well as friendly, beneficent, and caring (Arnold, 1997, p.29).

The point that sport demands that athletes act fairly is a coherent one. Indeed, we shall see later, that Law 42 in cricket documents thirteen accounts of unfair play. It is difficult to see, however, how sport as an ideal practice **demands** courage, and care. Arnold (1997) continues:

To be fair and honest in sport is not only to act in accordance with the ethos of the ideal but to act virtuously in a moral way (Arnold, 1997, p.29).

Arnold confusingly talks about the essence of sport and its idealised ethos but he fails to offer an account of either. He speaks of the ethos of the ideal: however, it is unclear what he means by either of these terms. Hence, his nebulous choice of trustworthiness and honesty as the virtues integral to this ideal seem arbitrary. Moreover, Arnold fails to consider that the ethos of a sporting game may be considered ethically unacceptable.

Arnold (1997) advocates that sport is a universal phenomenon; that is, it is the same wherever it is played. He says that sport is founded on the principles of justice as fairness and that ideal performances come through an exhibition of virtues. Moreover, he argues that sport is a form of moral universalism. But, as can be seen through empirical investigation, sport is not universal in its practice or form. The Laws of cricket might be universal but the ethos or ethically evaluative components that constitute fair play are not.

In summary, Arnold (1997) argues for an account of fair play that is more than a consideration of the rules. He attempts to juxtapose a formalist account of games, served by universal moral injunctions, with a MacIntyrean account of practices and virtues. There is no elaboration on the content of the ideal of sport as a practice or the espoused universal morality that shapes and “demands” its assumed ethos.

What is at the heart of these injunctions . . . is a respect for the participant as a person to whom consideration should be shown, not only as a person, but because *the* ethos of sport as a practice demands it (Arnold, 1997, p.28 *emphasis added*).

Arnold speaks of **the** ethos of sport as if it is something singular, clearly tangible, and operating with a consciousness that demands respect for persons. To consider an ethos in this way is to misunderstand its dynamic, plural nature – one which cannot be defined abstractly as if applicable universally to all sport as one coherent practice. Next, it seems necessary to consider a more detailed analysis of the concept of ‘ethos.’

An ethos should be considered as an ethical discourse where many voices represent, and contest, different values, and norms. The basic assumption here is, that it is possible to speak of and to seek, “the characteristic spirit, the prevalent tone or sentiment, of a people or a community” (Nielson, 1997, p.2). The idea of ethos, then, in this context is a social concept tied up with attitudes, beliefs, principles, standards, and values. The Greeks considered this notion in a more individualised way whereby an ethos defined a person’s nature, disposition, and moral standard. Foucault (1987) argues that the Greeks believed:

Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject’s mode of being and a certain manner of acting visible to others. One’s ethos was seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc. . . The man (sic) who has a good ethos, who can be admitted and held up as an example, he is a person who practices freedom in a certain manner (p.117).

It is useful here to consider the idea of ethos as it derived in the Greek language; ἦθος (ethos) means one’s temper, character, manner, personality or attitude towards living (Crighton, 1960). It encompasses the values that a person holds, and the way

he or she faces problems in life and tries to find solutions. In Greek tragedy one of the basic elements of the story is that the hero's ethos must be revealed. As time progressed, ethos came to mean those characteristics that one must have in order to be a good Christian. This is the meaning which has survived in the modern Greek language today.

In the English language ethos is used both for the singular and plural. However, in Greek, ἠθῆ (ethe) is the plural of ethos (Crighton, 1960). The ethe of a society refers to many collective versions of ethos. The word, ἠθικός (ethicos) is an adjective. It is used when describing the moral content of a person's ethos. The word 'ethicos' is sometimes used to describe a conservative person. Interestingly, (ἀν) ἠθικός means immoral. We can see how the main stem of the word derives from ἠθικός or ethicos. To be immoral means to be lacking ethicos (Crighton, 1960). Furthermore, the word ἐθίμα (customs) refers to those habits used in the practical application of the ethe (Crighton, 1960). Next, it is important to consider the constituting elements of ethos.

McLaughlin (1991) offers five necessary interrelated elements constitutive of an ethos: (1) dominant; (2) pervasive; (3) established; (4) enduring; and (5) unitary. He argues that the values and norms that constitute a given ethos must be dominant and shared by most members. They must be pervasive and established and not negotiated or concocted. An ethos, he continues, is not directly taught. It is enduring and forms a coherent, unitary, stance. It may be the case that an ethos is maintained and established by dominant attitudes and by the concrete procedures and practices that sustain those beliefs but, as we will see in Chapter Six, McLaughlin is too conservative when he argues that the norms and values of an ethos are non-negotiable and unitary. To be established does not mean that the boundaries of an ethos never come up for re-negotiation. The concept of ethos, its ideas, values, and norms are constantly being tested, reworked, and re-negotiated. Thus, a sixth element should be added to McLaughlin's list; namely, the dynamic evaluative nature of ethos. The idea of ethos embodies a particular determinate and substantive set of values which incorporate stability and the homogeneity of value (McLaughlin, 1991). This does not mean, however, that that stability forms a set of values that are

rigid and steadfast. It is precisely because the dynamic evaluative character of an ethos can allow for change that it strengthens its ability to continue, adapt, and maintain its identity. The fluid nature of an ethos allows the practice to survive, and adapt to ensuing historical contexts. Roberts' (1997) Rortian understanding of cricketering lives illustrates this point further. He states:

. . . cricketering lives can be understood as a matter of progressively and, to ever more subtle levels of detail, more comprehensively acquiring those shared habits of action peculiar to the culture. Any change to the collection of beliefs that constitutes the practice will reconfigure the practice and what one is, believes, and does as a rational practitioner (p.70).

Roberts refers to shared habits of action. The idea of ethos can be understood in a similar way. The ethos of a sporting practice can be described as a set of shared habits of actions and beliefs. Loland and McNamee (2000) concur, when they describe an ethos as the relatively shared interpretation of the basic norms, rules, and values that justify and regulate behaviour in that game among its members. The ethos of a game incorporates a common perception of how the rules are to be applied in an ethically acceptable manner. Moreover, it includes common ideas of what it is that constitutes a good game and a good player. It also relies on a relatively shared understanding of the roles and duties of players, coaches, officials, administrators, governing bodies, and spectators.

The ethos of a game, then, has a strong moral evaluative element. It embodies the underlying attitudes and values that athletes have towards themselves and each other. An ethos provides the game with a distinct character, meaning, or guiding belief (Overman, 1997). In Walzerian (1994) terms, an ethos generates a "thick" set of values. The notion that ethos is a thick concept may be conceived as the culmination of generations of shared habits of action that have been worked out over a long period of time through complex social interactions. That is not to say, however, that a new game cannot have an ethos. The point is that an ethos develops with a practice and is sustained through complex interaction within. Together these shared interpretations constitute the ethos of a sporting game. As Roberts (1997) explains:

Collectively they form a highly textured, complex, and largely coherent web of beliefs which, as manifested principally in nonvoicing actions, largely constitutes both the practice of cricket and, to varying degrees, cricketing selves (p.69).

The idea of ethos, or the notion of a coherent web of beliefs, constitutes what it means to be a particular sporting self-engaged within a practice. Roberts (1997) suggests that we:

. . . think of a developing cricketing self also as a more or less complex web of beliefs and desires that is continually reweaving itself to accommodate new cricketing relevant beliefs and desires (Roberts, 1997, p.69).

The ethos of a practice, then, adapts, changes, and reinvents itself to accommodate new cricketing values, beliefs, and norms. In order to analyse fair play we must be able to describe what traditional values were upheld within the ethos of the practice. What was the social context in which the sport arose? We need to define which positions people hold in a certain social field and how those positions relate to dominant beliefs and value hierarchies within the field (Nilsson, 1997). What are the traditions, habits, and norms of this social field?

Rules form the stable core of an ethos and dictate the boundaries of that ethos. They are important instruments in stability and change. An ethos gets its sense of identity from the rules. Rules and their application become objects of struggle. As Morgan (1988) states:

But the formal rules, and the above specifications they stipulate, comprise as it were, only the outer shell of a game. It is the history of the game – its sustaining traditions, lively passions, storied commitments, and evolving standards of excellence – that flesh in that shell, and enliven it as the specific kind of human practice that it is. This is what makes up what I call the ethos of the game as a social practice (Morgan, 1988, p.61).

Thus, if an analysis of a given ethos is to be successful, it must uncover what Morgan calls the “flesh” of the practice. In Chapter Six specific examples will be discussed in an attempt to explain how the fluid, plural nature of an ethos operates. The passions, beliefs, and storied commitments of the people involved are explored.

4 Immanent Critique

It is essential to consider where the internal standards that justify a set of relatively shared web of beliefs originate. In his book, *Leftist Theories of Sport*, Morgan (1994) adopts the method of “Immanent Critique.” This method relies on the normative standards within a practice to provide the foundation of a critical appraisal therein. In other words, the resources for a potential critique originate from within the practice itself; it is immanent to it. Morgan rejects transcendent critique in favour of an ethnocentric approach whereby social traditions provide a frame of reference to evaluate sporting practices. This frame of reference provides the starting point or conceptual material used to bring to fruition a critical appraisal. Immanent critique subjects the sporting practice to critical appraisal by making explicit the normative standards inherent within. These standards are then used to examine the actual lives of the social actors involved within the practice community.

Morgan (1994) speaks of certain social practices, including sport, as possessing an internal logic. The internal logic of a practice consists of a fabric or network of what he calls cautiously, “deep structures.” Deep structures, a term borrowed from Chomsky (1970), are considered by Morgan to be those that inform, shape, and sustain those cultural narratives inherent to a social practice. They allow the researcher to ‘get at’ those norms and values that cannot be determined by a consideration of the formal rules but are the preconditions underpinning that sporting practice. Moreover, they provide the normative standards that a particular community should adopt at that time. Hence, Morgan’s argument that the reason embedded in the normative standards of a particular social practice is immanent to them. This is why, he continues, the acceptable normative standards of one social practice cannot be used exhaustively to define what those of another should be.

The moral enquirer takes the experience of the members of the social practice to consolidate and legitimise a critical appraisal therein. In this thesis, the experience of elite women cricketers provides the frame of reference for the moral enquirer to critique the normative standards of the sporting practice.

Our various experiences and conceptions of the social world are, therefore, to be examined and scrutinized by way of principles and

standards that are intrinsic to them, that are, in other words, not imposed on them from the outside (Morgan, 1994, p.10).

The immanent critique here, then, takes as its point of departure the sporting experience of elite women cricketers. It considers the ‘deep structures’ of EWC and the cultural standards that frame and support cricket as a sporting practice. These standards are then used to inform a critical appraisal of actual conduct within the practice. In this way the moral enquirer can examine the particulars of a practice to place moral issues within a wider context. Thus, allowing for a more conceptually detailed understanding of the relationship between fair play and ethos than has previously been explained. The researcher is able to explain which ethical standards of acceptability ought to apply; that is, she is able to determine whether a given ethos should be considered as ethically acceptable.

In a recent article Roberts (1998) criticises the foundation of Morgan’s reflective ethnocentric approach by arguing that the effectiveness of Morgan’s (1994) argument is weakened because he refuses to carry his position of ethnocentrism to its coherent conclusions. This is an important claim and will be explored throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Roberts proposes that Morgan’s ethnocentrism is founded incorrectly upon the search for “epistemic principles.” Epistemic principles (a notion borrowed from Geuss 1981) may be considered as a collection of rational standards of acceptability inherent within a given community. The search for epistemic principles entails the uncovering of second order, justificatory beliefs about the kinds of first order, beliefs actually held. The researcher seeks for those beliefs that it is rationally acceptable to hold within the traditions that frame sporting practices.

Within ethnocentrism, Morgan (1994) provides the distinction between, “vulgar ethnocentrism,” and “reflective ethnocentrism.” The notion, ‘vulgar’ is itself a value-laden term that conjures up connotations of the uneducated, distasteful, and crude account. It is not surprising, then, that Morgan rejects such an account in favour of a reflective ethnocentrism. Roberts (1998) argues the distinction between vulgar and reflective arises because Morgan is unwilling to accept the full coherent

(or vulgar) position of ethnocentrism; that is, one that goes “all the way down” (p.72). Morgan, however, remains steadfast that the only way to offer a critical appraisal of sport is to adopt a reflective ethnocentric approach and eschew a vulgar one. Both approaches share the same reliance on traditions and local practice, but it is reflective ethnocentrism only that allows the researcher to adopt a critical appraisal. This is because vulgar ethnocentrism has taken-for-granted, precritical standards that become internalised as the dominant prevailing beliefs, whereas, reflective ethnocentrism consists of those reflectively secured critical norms of a practice that can be used to criticise such beliefs (Morgan, 1994).

Morgan (1998) identifies three significant differences between these two positions that amount to the researcher’s necessary commitment to a reflective ethnocentric approach. The first concerns how the moral enquirer selects standards of acceptability. For vulgar ethnocentrists standards of acceptability are simply the prevailing dominant beliefs. There is no reason to accept them just because they are dominant. Whereas, for reflective ethnocentrists, standards are cultural beliefs that, “prove their critical mettle – that is, that survive reflective scrutiny” (Morgan, 1998, p.83). Here, Morgan uses the terms of vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism to distinguish between the right sorts of beliefs that form a starting point for examination and the wrong sorts of beliefs. The crucial point to be explained is how the moral enquirer knows what constitutes the ‘right’ starting point for a critical appraisal.

Roberts (1998) suggests that the distinction between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism is inherently problematic as it is impossible for the researcher to be able to distinguish between a principled conviction and a dominant belief. He states:

The distinction between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism is beset by practical problems: problems such as knowing when one has discovered a “principled conviction” as compared with a mere “dominant belief,” and with explaining how, in dynamic cultures, long-standing “principled convictions” are modified or replaced by what are thought to be more principled “dominant beliefs” (Roberts, 1998, p.73).

It is important, then, to clarify precisely what is meant by ‘principled conviction’ and ‘dominant belief.’ Principled convictions are those standards that may be considered justified beliefs; that is, there are good moral grounds for holding them. Dominant beliefs, on the other hand, may be considered as unprincipled if they do not pass or are not subjected to reflective critical scrutiny. Even though dominant belief may be shared belief, it does not necessarily mean it will be morally justifiable belief. Similarly, it may not be the case that shared dominant belief will be unprincipled or that justified belief will in fact be shared belief. For example, an ethos might not be dominant, it might only be shared by the minority but it may occupy the only morally justifiable position. In order for the researcher to conduct a critical appraisal, it is paramount that she can distinguish between those values that are shared and justifiable and those that are not.

For the vulgar ethnocentrist, justificatory belief is founded on ‘mere consensus.’ Argument and critical appraisal, however, play a large part for proponents of reflective ethnocentrism where justificatory belief is to be located in a “consensus based on good grounds” (Morgan, 1998, p.84). In order to criticise, the researcher must be able to appropriate the principled beliefs without being fooled by the dominant beliefs. So, using critical interpretation to search for normative standards, the researcher looks for starting points that can be justified on good grounds. The critical question, then, becomes how the moral inquirer decides what constitutes ‘good’ grounds.

The ethos of the practice is represented in the thesis through the voice of the interviewees. By scouring the experience of elite women cricketers and the formal rules, the researcher can assemble the justifications for standards of acceptability within the sporting practice. A checking procedure is obtained from the justifications for these internal standards and applied to the beliefs of those involved. Adopting a reflective, critical role, it is possible to evaluate whether an ethos may be considered as ethical. The researcher asks whether the beliefs of the social actors involved concerning fair play can be adequately justified; that is, are they based on ‘good’ grounds?

The second difference between vulgar and reflective ethnocentrism concerns the way in which epistemic principles are applied to actual beliefs. The vulgar ethnocentrist's views derive from normative standards that may be considered morally wrong. Consequently, they could prove incoherent in the search for epistemic principles; that is, when justificatory beliefs are called for in order to appraise critically actual beliefs. The reflective ethnocentrist, however, strives to identify and eliminate those inconsistent beliefs which are at the heart of society in order to ensure that dominant beliefs are not justified merely by reference to their extant status or just because they happen to be dominant.

Roberts (1998) believes that Morgan's account is pragmatically flawed because it promotes certain communities, irrespective of what their foundational beliefs might be. He goes on to say that the critical theorist is, thus, severely restricted when it comes to telling a 'we' whether their ethnos is ethical or not. Roberts uses the term, 'ethnos,' meaning Nation, rather than ethos. Nevertheless, his point is relevant also to the idea of ethos. He states:

. . . ethnocentrically inclined critical theorists are severely curtailed in what they can tell members of a given ethnos [read ethos] with respect to their 'true' and 'rational' interest (Roberts, 1998, p.77).

Thus, Roberts concludes, the critical theorist can only help communities to see and maintain their consistent beliefs. This is not the case, however, since the researcher is able to say what the interests of a community are because the critical appraisal has been derived from the interests of the actors-within-the-practice themselves. The account rests on the articulation of those interests that prove good interests for a community to hold. These interests, noted earlier, must be based on good reasons and not simply on an abstract appeal to transcendent criteria or the dominant interests just because they happen to be the dominant ones. Morgan (1998) replies by stating that it is not only whether communities' first and second order beliefs are consistent but what those beliefs are in the first place. It concerns the quality of substance of the epistemic principles. The interests of cricket stem from what it means to be a good player, a fair player, to play a good game, to play fairly, to be a good institution, and a fair institution. These critical issues are addressed in the empirical section of the thesis. The moral enquirer searches for the inside concrete

presuppositions of the practice to enhance a critical appraisal of fairness and ethos. The internal goods of cricket serve to drive the argument and an understanding of fair play.

The third difference, Morgan (1998) identifies, between these two types of ethnocentrism is the alleged “space they make available for argument” (p.84). Proponents of vulgar ethnocentrism juxtapose shared beliefs and justified ones. As these beliefs may be considered inconsistent or shallow they cannot be made explicit without jeopardising the hegemonic forces that hold them securely in place. Consequently, arguments that challenge the dominant, prevailing beliefs are given no space. Adopting a reflective ethnocentric approach, however, allows the philosopher to stand back from the particular context, along with its ensuing dominant beliefs, in order to achieve a perspective of critical reflection. Morgan (1994) states:

Because this second version of ethnocentrism requires the critic to stand back from the particular social relations of dominance and authority, and from the dominant set of beliefs of his (sic) culture, it can function in a genuinely immanent manner. And because it doesn't require him (sic) to retreat to some imagined point beyond the culture he (sic) occupies, it can function in a genuinely immanent manner” (p.190).

Morgan (1998) asserts that one can be a reflective ethnocentrist without resorting to a transcendental position. It is possible, once you have rejected transcendentalism, to show which epistemic principles are to be favoured. The researcher makes considered judgements about which epistemic principles are to be accepted on good grounds. She looks for good epistemic principles, that are internally consistent, explanatory, and point us to right actions in sport. The reasons for their ‘rightness’ are explained and can be extended to consider other examples of fair play and ethos.

Roberts' (1998) strongest criticism of Morgan's (1994) account is his incorporation of a universal, abstract understanding of sport. Morgan repeatedly refers to a generalised sporting practice community that appears ‘genderless.’ Morgan (1998) concurs that his initial account of sport was much too abstract and formulaic and states that there are many different and particular practice communities within sport. Although there is no specific mention of gender, Morgan acknowledges that power,

dominant beliefs, and hierarchies within specific communities, have strong implications for standards of acceptability.

Roberts (1998) takes issue with Morgan's insistence that the gratuitous logic of sport provides the right starting point for a reflective, critical appraisal. According to Morgan (1994) this gratuitous logic is "socially grounded, contingent, universal, and transcultural" (Morgan, 1994, p.215). Roberts (1998) contends, however, that while social groundedness and contingency are hostile to transcendentalism, universalism and transculturalism cannot be aligned with ethnocentrism. Thus, Roberts concludes, Morgan is left stranded between a transcendental approach and an ethnocentric approach that "goes all the way down." This is what Roberts calls Morgan's "half-way house: neither transcendental because socially grounded and contingent, nor fully ethnocentric because universal and transcultural" (Roberts, 1998, p.78). But, to frame the dichotomy in such a way is to miss the point. It is possible for beliefs to be specific to particular cultures (context-respectful) and at the same time be intrinsic to others (transcultural). There are some ideas that can be meaningful to a number of cultures without necessarily being universal. Such a combination may be aligned with ethnocentrism. As Morgan states:

For to claim that the values, beliefs, and standards of rational acceptability are internal to cultures and the traditions that house and sustain them, what I take to be the core premise of ethnocentrism, is not to claim that those beliefs, values, and standards are, and must be specific to those cultures (Morgan, 1998, p.87).

The right starting point is to be found in neither abstract transcendentalism nor vulgar ethnocentrism. Rather, it is located within the empirical investigation of the sporting community in question. It is not the case that the researcher subjects a sporting practice to a list of pre-established criteria in order to say whether a given ethos may be considered ethical. It is also, as previously noted, not the case that a given ethos would be considered ethically acceptable just because it was constituted by dominant belief.

In order to determine whether a given ethos is ethical, then, the researcher must consider more than just the rules or the social context of the sporting practice.

Neither the ethos, alone, nor the formal rules provide the capacity to distinguish standards of acceptability within a sporting practice. The moral legitimacy of certain practices can be found in an analysis that enshrines both considerations of ethos and formalism. Together they enable the researcher to access an internal perspective which provides the critical standards necessary to judge an ethos and what actions constitute fair play. An ethos gets its sense or identity partly from the formal rules of the game. The formal rules of a game are vital as they provide part of a critical standard necessary to judge ethos.

In this study, the empirical investigation has its starting point in the sporting experience of those involved within elite level women's cricket. A critique of fair play focuses on the moral issues constitutive of an ethos, and the formal rules of the game. The researcher establishes the normative standards of acceptability within the practice at that time. We must say, "at that time," because the deliberative force of a practice community endures only as long as the standards it prescribes are acceptable within these communities (Morgan, 1998). This illustrates the dynamic, fluid nature of an ethos and the changing perceptions of what constitutes fairness in sporting games. The empirical work here considers a number of important facets. It looks at what standards are considered acceptable within the deliberative forces of the ethos of elite women's cricket. Moreover, it examines what actions are believed to be "just not cricket" and what actions are deemed acceptable that may once have been prohibited.

5 Summary

It has been argued that a context-respectful approach to ethics and fair play offers many advantages. It provides an empirically informed theory of fair play, grounded in experience, recognising the plural contextual features of sporting games and not simply any strict adherence to formal rule following.

We will not get to the kind of ethical knowledge we require by defining moral behaviour in sport in universal terms. Sport, as a moral practice, is culturally constituted. Consequently, we must seek to understand what this contextualised constitution means. In order, therefore, to understand and investigate issues of fair play and the concept of ethos, for example, it is necessary to analyse the particular

cultural form of the sport in question. What is required is an account of how these constituting elements of an ethos can be explained and justified.

The next chapter outlines the rationale for the methodology used. It attempts to operationalise a different way of doing philosophy; that is, juxtaposing philosophical analysis with empirical investigation. This is an attempt, as Baier (1989) says, to get moral philosophers to escape the dogma of analytical philosophy. Manning (1992) concurs, when she states:

Moral philosophers seldom if ever feel the need to get out of their armchairs and do or even look at empirical research (p.22).

The process is not an attempt to discard completely analytic approaches to fair play. Rather, the point is to supplement such accounts with empirically informed analyses of fair play. Such an approach attempts to retain continuity with the actual practice and to safeguard theoretical insight from offering a solely abstract or remote perspective.

Chapter Five

Methodology

Part One

1 Introduction

The aims of this chapter are: (1) to operationalise the juxtaposition of ethical theory and empirical investigation; and (2) to provide a framework for how such a methodology can be applied. Part One offers a justification for the methodological approach used in the study. It examines the foundations of previous philosophical theory and considers the relationship between moral theory and experience. In doing so, a number of questions are considered. What does a feminist epistemology look like? How, if at all, is this approach any better than previous methodologies already available to us? Part Two details the construction of the analytical framework used to explore fair play and ethos in EWC. The method and process of constructing categories and codes for the analysis is described.

2 Paradigmatic Authority and Epistemology

The grounds for knowledge, how we begin to understand the world and communicate it to others is called “epistemology.” Epistemology (from the Greek *episteme*, meaning knowledge, and ‘*logos*’ meaning study) is concerned with the nature, scope and justification of knowledge claims. Epistemology seeks to inform us how we can purport to know the world.

The concept ‘paradigm,’ originally used by Thomas Kuhn (1963), is an ambiguous term that has been employed in different ways. Among many other claims, Kuhn argued that a paradigm provides a taken-for-granted way of looking at things. It may be considered as the basic belief system or worldview that underlies a particular methodology. Paradigms act as patterns or models for the conduct of research and, hence, consist of particular theoretical, and methodological commitments. Kuhn (1963) argued that those working within a paradigm share these commitments. Thus, a paradigm represents the distinct way in which a researcher makes sense of social reality.

Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue that over the past few decades ‘wars’ have raged regarding the superiority of one or the other of two major paradigms. These two models are known as positivist and constructivist.

In Western culture, the dominant paradigmatic authority in all philosophical enquiry has been, until recently, ‘positivism’. There are many uses and misuses of the term positivism. In this sense, it is Comtean positivism that holds that the Scientific Method can be applied to all objects of study including the study of morals. One of the assumptions made is that the social world exists as an external empirical entity. Positivism assumed the chimera of value-free, objective, rational observation in identifying and solving ‘scientific’ problems (Duquin, 1994). This explains why the epistemological task of positivism was taken to be the formulation of rules of inference guided by observable, objectively determined phenomena. Those working within this paradigm believed the only true knowledge was scientific knowledge.

Positivism prescribes that scientific knowledge must be capable of “intersubjective verification.” that is, it stipulates that trustworthy knowledge can be gained only by methods that neutralise value (Jaggar, 1989, p.129). The contention here is that researchers should strive to adopt a detached and impartial position from no-place-in-particular in the world so that their emotions and values do not influence the object or phenomena under study. The core of this logic is the desire for a certain kind of objectivity and its presumed epistemological superiority. As Jaggar (1989) explains:

The separation of supposedly natural fact from human value meant that reason, if it were to provide trustworthy insight into reality, had to be uncontaminated by or abstracted from value [where] the validity of logical inferences was thought independent of human attitudes and preferences; this was now the sense in which reason was taken to be objective and universal (p.130).

In other words, reason provides access to the objective structures of the world and hence is universal. Consequently, reason provides a safeguard against a depiction of reality distorted by intrusive emotions and subjectivity. A theory was therefore espoused as the rational formulation of some aspect of a pre-existing reality “out there”.

One of the last bastions of positivism can be found within analytical philosophy, where rationality, impartiality, and universalism serve as the stalwart foundations of theorising therein (Hekman, 1995). Under this position, Addelson (1991) argues, the goal of philosophy is objective knowledge; that is, the search for one world truth, a unity of morality for all humankind.

The philosophical enterprise is dominated by the analytic method that stems from abstract reasoning and the articulation of moral principles that are free from ideological constraint. There are generally two separate ways of theorising within this genre of writing. These are (1) “The adversary paradigm,” and (2) “The negative theses method.” Moulton (1989) explains that the adversary paradigm is an unimpassioned debate between antagonists who defend their views among counter-examples, through deductive reasoning. She asserts that this paradigm seems to dominate the methodology of philosophy. Moreover, it restricts philosophical reasoning as it strives to achieve abstract universality which is manifested in the enchantment philosophers seem to have with hypothetical and imaginary counter-examples (Moulton, 1989). The negative theses method attempts to disprove the analysis that someone else has offered. The logic of the argument becomes the most important feature of the philosophical position posited even more so than the credibility or plausibility of the claims being made. Proponents ‘battle it out’ to see who can represent the truth more clearly and forcefully than anyone else (Trebilcot, 1993).

The paradigmatic consequences of this method lead to the belief that reason rather than emotion is considered to be the essential capacity for attaining knowledge. Consequently, it seems that the philosophical method becomes trapped by positivism into the dogma that only scientific knowledge is true knowledge (Sockett, 1993). This approach is removed from the historical particulars of social practice. The adoption of such an isolated, abstract approach has met with increasing criticism:

The achievement of individuality is at the cost of a detachment from the particular, the specific, the transient, in order to turn one’s attention increasingly to the general, the universal, the unchanging, to what is common to all (Lloyd, 1989, p.119).

These sentiments are echoed by a number of theorists who assert that some moral philosophers have been too focused on rational principles, impartiality, generality, and abstract rules in ethics (Blum, 1994; Duquin, 1994; Nussbaum 1993; and Held, 1993). As we saw in Chapter Three, it can be argued that there is a current of intellectual thinking that rejects the adequacy of universal abstract principles in dealing with ethical considerations (Clarke and Simpson, 1989). This illustrates the beginning of a nascent movement away from the abstract universalism of positivist epistemology towards the concreteness and particularism of a subject situated in practice.

We experience the world as a complex web of interdependent relationships, where interacting with specific others in particular situations is integral to our moral experiences. Sherwin (1989) states, “the abstract reasoning of morality that centers on the rights of independent agents is inadequate for the moral reality in which they live” (p.14). This is precisely because such reasoning is divorced from the context that it purports to explain. Baier (1985b) also calls into question the value of a theory that commits itself solely to abstract reasoning and universal principles that are divorced from the context of actual experience. She advises us to abandon completely the search for a rationalistic impartial moral epistemology, based on purely theoretical terms, and to concentrate instead on the search for a more complete understanding of moral experience. However, perhaps this advice wrongly throws the impartial baby out with the positivist bath water. As Loudon (1992) asserts:

The philosopher’s quest for universal principles should not be dismissed entirely but it needs to combine forces with a genuine conviction that a wide variety of historical, psychological, and cultural forces are clearly relevant to any critical understanding of human morality (p.127).

The emergence of mixed model approaches attempts to make peace between the two paradigmatic positions of positivism and constructivism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Authors such as Howe (1988) and Reichardt and Rallis (1994) have presented the idea of a compatibility thesis, based on the paradigm of pragmatism.

Pragmatically oriented theorists use the philosophical and/or methodological approach that works for the particular research problem in question.

A distinction must be made here between mixed model and mixed method approaches to study. A mixed model approach refers to studies that combine the paradigms of positivism and constructivism. Mixed methods, on the other hand, refer to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods such as in the data collection phase of a study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). This thesis is committed to a mixed model approach. The ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC is in line with those feminist commitments to context-respectful theory outlined in Chapter Three. It retains, however, the tenets of those rule-based ethical theories that also aid the evaluation of fair play in sporting games. Brewer and Hunter (1989) argue that most major areas of social research embrace multiple models. It may be proposed, however, that this is not the case in philosophy generally or in the philosophy of sport in particular.

Some theorists may argue that, “researchers who try to combine the two methods are doomed to failure due to the inherent differences in the philosophies underlying them” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.11). To counter this claim, the model offered here investigates the efficacy of a combined approach that integrates different theoretical perspectives:

Pragmatism is appealing (a) because it gives us a paradigm that philosophically embraces the use of mixed method and mixed model designs, (b) because it eschews the use of metaphysical concepts (Truth, Reality) that have caused much endless (and often useless) discussion and debate, and (c) because it presents a very practical and applied research philosophy: Study what interests and is of value to you, study it in the different ways that you deem appropriate, and use the results in ways that can bring about positive consequences within your value system (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.30).

3 Moral Experience and Gender

Not only is reason associated with the rational and universal but also, feminist philosophers claim, with notions of ‘Man,’ and masculinity (Code, 1989; Card, 1991; Hekman, 1995). Conversely, emotion is juxtaposed with images of the irrational, the particular, the private, and the feminine (Calhoun, 1988). Lloyd (1993) describes the rationality attributed to the rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth

century. She argues that 'The Man of Reason' of rationalist moral theory promised a universal test for the correctness of fundamental ethical principles. Consequently, 'He' was thought to be detached from changeable objects of passion, and removed from the contingencies and vicissitudes of interactions with individuals (Lloyd, 1993).

Hekman (1995) argues that there is an increasing attack on the foundation of this epistemology that places 'Man' as the abstract, rational, constitutor of knowledge. More particularly, feminist philosophers suggest that the espoused universal norms of morality are in fact male norms and the result of generations of male-defined theorising (Calhoun, 1988). This amounts to a gender bias and often a denial of the ethical significance of the importance of women's experiences, perspectives, and concerns. To varying degrees, then, it can be claimed that previous moral theories have failed to account for the experience of women and the different structures that shape those experiences.

The same may be said for theories of fair play in sport. Sport has been conceptualised as masculine experience and, in turn, this has led to male experience being portrayed as human experience. Parratt (1994) argues that researchers have failed to tackle critical methodological issues; that is, they accept the assumptions and constructs of a male defined scholarship. This means that research design has proved insensitive and remote from women's actual lived experience in sport.

Held (1993) calls for moral theories to investigate those regions of experience that have been central to women's lives, but as yet, neglected by moral theory, an example of which is sport. She believes that new theories will be better as they will be applied to and tested in new domains of human experience. Our experiences should not be considered as antagonistic to, irrelevant to or detached from the search for ethical knowledge about fairness in sporting games. Rather, they should be used to assist our philosophical understanding of the concepts involved. Such an approach will broaden our concept of sport since grounding knowledge of fair play in human experience provides the framework for a more adequate epistemology, that is, one which illustrates the continuous interaction between who we are as people and how we understand the world (Jaggar, 1989). The important point here, then, is

that gender matters. This study develops a framework that enables the researcher to connect ethical theory to lived experience.

4 Feminist Methodology

Recent approaches to epistemology have called into question some of the rudimentary principles of the positivistic epistemological model outlined previously. Indeed Morgan (1994) believes:

. . . stepping back from practices like sport, dissociating ourselves from all of their cultural particulars, is less a way of getting a critical handle on them than it is a way of consigning ourselves to a superficial understanding of them (p.185).

An epistemology should serve to establish an account of how knowing connects with what one claims to know. MacKinnon (1989) argues that an epistemology is an approach to knowledge that sets up an account to tell whether what the researcher thinks is real, is actually real, and it is this connection that embodies methodology. She states, “method thus puts into operation a way of acquiring that knowledge that a particular epistemological stance approves as real” (MacKinnon, 1989, p.97).

Feminist epistemology uses different methodologies from different disciplines to investigate knowledge of women’s experiences (Garry and Pearsall, 1989). Consequently, Sherwin (1989) argues that, “by definition, feminists will rely on an eclectic methodology, having its roots in various disciplines, and will not restrict themselves entirely to any single disciplinary approach” (p.27). It is not, however, the case that just any combination of methods will suffice but rather new methodologies are formed to suit the phenomena under investigation.

Feminist epistemology strives to embody the shared feelings of people and their experiences. In this thesis an approach is developed that maintains continuity with experience. MacKinnon (1989) argues that it redefines the epistemological issue, from a scientific one, concerned with objectivity and impartiality, to a problem of the relation of consciousness to social experience. She states:

This stance locates the position of consciousness, from which one knows, in the standpoint and time frame of that attempting to be

known. The question is not whether objective reality exists but whether that concept accesses the is-ness of the world. Feminist epistemology asserts that the social processes of being a woman is on some level the same process as that by which woman's consciousness becomes aware of itself as such and of its world. Mind and world, as a matter of social reality, are taken as interpenetrated (MacKinnon, 1989, p.97).

Feminist epistemology has a time, place, history, and gender (Code, 1989). This stance provides knowledge that considers the prevailing social structures and is informed by a range of critical theories. A critical perspective attempts to ensure that the world is not just described but changed, and informed in an empowering way (Sparkes, 1994). In contrast, then, a feminist epistemology seeks to be collective and critical. This combined approach challenges some of the previously asserted epistemologies established within the positivist tradition. Its fundamental assumptions differ considerably as the methods employed seek to construct and define the reality that reflects the interests and values of a particular group. Code (1989) explains that:

This contrasts with methods of epistemological and moral theory construction that aim to transcend experience, to move beyond it, allegedly towards greater clarity and accuracy but at the expense, I believe, of the insight and understanding that a maintained continuity with experience can afford (p.166).

Thus, in order to escape the charge of 'remoteness,' it is argued here that moral theories must endeavour to include the neglected realm of particular others in the actual contexts of women's experience. This approach will enable the researcher to connect moral experience in sport with a theoretical examination of fair play and ethos. It permits the methodological flexibility that is essential for reflective exploratory research, and allows theoretical constructs to be partly grounded in the life of the 'actors' (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Here an alternative method for philosophy is proposed, where female athletes are given a 'voice' within the context of sport. In offering the opportunity for women to have a 'voice' in a male dominated sporting arena, it is hoped that these athletes feel they have contributed to a deeper understanding of fairness in sport. Their concerns and experiences are taken seriously and used to inform a philosophical understanding of fair play.

Emphasis is placed on the specific and the concrete; the universal, abstract is addressed but delayed. The methodology used takes its point of departure from women's thoughts where the analysis focuses on the detail of women's experiences, and then collectively moves on to a broader normative philosophical analysis of fair play. As Fleming (1996) states:

For it is only when those engaging in sporting encounters are able to articulate their understandings (or, quite conceivably misunderstandings) of fair play, that a grounded theoretical conceptualisation of fair play can be established (p.1).

Arguably, those who view feminist commitments as incompatible with 'real' academic philosophy may question the credibility of such an approach. This is not a predominantly sociological enterprise. The normative intent of such an empirically informed moral theory for fair play ensures that theoretical and conceptual issues remain philosophical. In the following section an outline is presented of how the above shapes the construction of the methodology used to examine critically the social practice of elite women's cricket.

5 Understanding Moral Experience in Elite Women's Cricket

It seems evident that critical appraisal of a social practice is both morally and empirically complex. We need to adopt a new methodological approach when considering moral issues in sport. Hence, it is proposed that in order to articulate and understand the nature of sport, we must similarly strive to connect moral deliberation with actual experience. This means that, "the theorised meanings attached to sports practices must be derived from the lived experiences of the athletes" (Fleming, 1997, p.4). It is relatively novel for philosophers of sport to concentrate on the experience of athletes in physical activity in general. In particular, it is even more uncommon to find philosophical research that focuses on the central experience of women in traditionally male-defined sporting arenas.

So, if the objective is to put forward an empirically informed moral theory of fair play then it is imperative that it is applied to some real, concrete issues. In this research the experience of women in cricket is used to advance the understanding of a philosophical analysis of the concepts of fair play and ethos. Having said this,

however, it is not the intention simply to add an account of female sport experience to philosophical literature, and construct a supposed female-based theory that is designed to supplant the traditional epistemological modes of thought. Rather, the purpose here is to produce a richer, thicker interpretation of fair play and ethos in sport in general.

The aim is to elaborate and refine previous theories of fair play. The embodied experience of women in sport can generate a theoretical understanding of fair play that is laden with conceptually rich information about both the tacit norms and the values that constitute the ethos of elite women's cricket. Vaughan (1992) refers to this methodological approach as, "theory elaboration." The researcher takes existing theories and develops them further in conjunction with qualitative empirical analysis. Such a process of elaboration allows a critical appraisal of fair play to relate directly to those specific circumstances in which the information derived. In this case an examination is offered as to exactly what the rule-governed practices are that define elite women's cricket, and whether the normative standards that preside are ethically acceptable.

This approach ensures that the moral analysis of fairness within elite women's cricket eschews a genderless and abstract position. Here, a meaningful interpretation of ethos in cricket is based on the embodied experience of the social actors situated therein. Morgan states (1994):

. . . the more abstract the account of sport, the greater the level of generality it aspires to, the less substance it possesses. . . the less content our descriptions carry and convey the less we are able to offer in the way of criticism (p.185).

It is not, as noted previously, that abstractness is in itself a problem, for it can be a great asset. What is important here, though, is that the account of fair play is not, "speculatively remote from the phenomena it purports to explain" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.113).

This study focuses on the conceptualisation and values that the interviewees recognised as belonging to their particular social practice of elite women's cricket.

Hence, the ensuing analysis of fair play is manifested and embedded in a particular culture, history, and social tradition. The 'voice' of the female athlete is used to elucidate and inform a moral conceptualisation of fair play. The ethos of elite women's cricket becomes apparent throughout the discourse of the interview whereby particular rules, values, and dilemmas are invoked and described in regard to specific cases and contexts. Holstein and Gubruim (1998) refer to this as an ethnomethodological stance. They argue that, by attending to the interpretive voices of social actors, the researcher can construct the social reality of the phenomena under study. The interviewee reveals particular guidelines for understanding the concepts of fair play within a specific ethos. Collectively, these 'voices' render it possible to construct and interpret an account of an ethos that is recognisable; that is, it represents the voices and perspectives of the contributors. This will be explained in detail in Chapter Six.

Fleming (1997) argues that research into ethos and fair play must necessarily be qualitative and interpretive as this enables:

. . . members of a cultural (or subcultural) group to communicate subjective meanings about that culture in order that meanings and actions can be fully and appropriately contextualised (Fleming, 1997, p.2).

In essence, this approach allows the researcher to combine empirical work with normative theory. It offers an empirically informed moral theory for sport. The theory of fair play grounds its normative stance in the collective perspective of those involved. Such an understanding throws light on the internal structures of elite women's cricket and the actions of those members within the practice.

Adopting such an approach ensures that moral theory accommodates context-specific cases. Using collective representation, however, is not without methodological constraint. Theories and interpretations from particular context specific circumstances are provisional and ephemeral. Holstein and Gubrium (1998) maintain they are ongoing accomplishments, which reflexively supply meaning to actions as those meanings maintain, elaborate, or alter the circumstances in which they occur. But to say they are transitory is not to deny that empirically informed

moral theory can throw light on issues of fair play in sport. Part Two explains and details the methods employed to construct the research design.

Part Two: Research Design

1 The Research Cycle

Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) argue that research on any given question falls somewhere within a cycle of inferences, known as the research cycle or chain of reasoning. They state:

The cycle may be seen as moving from grounded results (facts, observations) through inductive logic to general inferences (abstract generalisations, or theory), then from those general inferences (or theory) through deductive logic to tentative hypotheses or predictions of particular events/outcomes (p.24).

Research may start at any given point within this cycle. The theoretical framework outlined in Part One of this chapter was used as a basis for planning the research. Mixed model studies occur when both types of inferences are used together (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Indeed, when answering the research question one may be both subjective and objective in epistemological orientation:

At some points, one may be more “subjective,” while at others more “objective;” at some points the knower and the known must be interactive, while at others, one may more easily stand apart from what one is studying (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.25).

This point was developed in the discussion on Immanent Critique (Chapter Four, Part Two). The researcher uses an empirically informed analysis of fair play to supplement formalist accounts of games as rule-governed practices. We will see how the adoption of a subjective/objective approach informs the analysis of ethical ethos in Chapter Seven.

2 Elite Women’s Cricket

Cricket is regarded as an agency of moral deliberation. Even our everyday language alludes to notions of fairness derived specifically from a cricketing context (‘it’s just not cricket,’ ‘batting on a sticky wicket,’ ‘throwing a googley,’ ‘knocked for six’). The research questions were formed and guided by the researcher’s own value

system; an ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC was thought to yield interesting and important conclusions for a study of fair play in sporting games.

The practice of elite women's cricket was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it was considered necessary to investigate the concept of ethos within an established elite female sport. This is because it was thought that the elite level would exhibit a high degree of stress and moral agency. Secondly, when the research started, the women's national team had just returned from the World Cup in India, where throughout the tournament rich examples arose regarding the concept of fairness within the game. Moreover, the Women's Cricket Association (WCA) was on the brink of a potential merger with their male counterpart, the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB). This merger has subsequently been completed. Lastly, there was an opportunity to gain access to members of the team, administration, and coaching staff. Thus, elite women's cricket was chosen as an established sporting context in which to investigate the concept of fair play within a particular ethos.

After the research questions had been formulated it was necessary to decide how to investigate the topic in a way that was congruent with the researcher's feminist commitments to study. The next five sections of this chapter explain the way in which the research was conducted: Methods, participant observation, interviews, ethical considerations, and construction of analytical categories.

3 Methods

When planning the research it became apparent that many methods were available such as, surveys, questionnaires, interviews, life histories, and observations. The methods developed stemmed from the research questions posed, namely: What is the ethos of EWC? And, to what extent does a given ethos relate to fair play norms?

The ethos of EWC can be revealed through a constant comparison between observations, interviews, and analyses of particular incidents (Fleming, 1997). Then, a critical appraisal is developed through an iterative process between the empirical data and philosophical investigation. In this way ethical theory becomes grounded partly in the data and developed further by normative analysis.

The design of the study emerged as the factors for an analysis of fair play were identified. Data were gathered from different sources including observation, documents, and interviews. In order to obtain rich information about the tacit norms, values, and interpretations that constitute the ethos of EWC, it was felt necessary to explore through observation and semi-structured interviews.

The methods adopted in the first phase of the research involved: (1) attending and observing Cricket Week (see below); and (2) conducting semi-structured interviews with elite women cricketers, coaches, and administrators. Hence, there were two stages to data collection that will, in turn, now be explained.

4 Participant Observation

Cricket Week is an established tradition within women's cricket. It is an annual residential tournament for national and club standard players organised by the WCA. In 1997 seven teams competed and were captained either by a previous England player or a current county player. Throughout the competition all teams play each other. On arrival each player is assigned a particular team. After a written request, the WCA granted me permission to attend.

Participant observation at Cricket week formed the starting point for this research. Because this method makes no concrete assumptions about what is important it allowed the researcher to immerse herself into the day-to-day activities of the practice she was trying to understand (May, 1995). It was deemed important to participate in the context of Cricket Week and become involved in the environment. Time was spent in unfamiliar surroundings making field notes on ideas of fair play, and the day-to-day social interactions of people in the group.

When all the teams had arrived the organiser introduced me as a researcher. The interest in fair play was explained generally as the purpose for my presence at Cricket Week. As a naive observer, using what May (1995) describes as the role of the "fan," the researcher desired to know as much as possible from the women participating within the tournament. A particular team throughout the competition was followed and the researcher became an accepted member of that team. This

enabled a rapport to develop with one team in particular and ensured that all other teams could be observed during the week.

It was important to recognise the power relations within the group and between the observer and observed. All intentions were made open to the group asking particularly for the opportunity to talk to as many people as possible about their views and experiences of fair play. The nature of the field notes taken depended on the ensuing context to the observation or interview. Some were taken by hand during contact, others were taped privately, and some observations were recorded by memory onto tape as soon as an opportunity presented itself. The researcher was aware of the difficulties in trying not to impose one's own subjective interpretation on the social context. The field notes taken were subsequently studied to inform the second phase of the research. In other words, the observation of Cricket Week was used to acquire knowledge from practitioners about the concept of fair play within EWC in order to generate pertinent questions for the subsequent interviews. Moreover, documents concerning the Women's Cricket Association and the ECB were collected and analysed. Much more could be said here about the experience of Cricket Week but it would not be pertinent to the aims of the thesis.

5 Interviews

The structure of an interview ranges from unstructured and open-ended questions (inductive) to highly structured and closed questions (deductive). Open-ended interviews are used when information is not readily available. Open-ended interviews formed the basis for the field notes in the participant observation phase of the research. These 'items' were then used to formulate a more structured interview for the group setting of EWC. The aim was to understand the ethos of EWC from the viewpoints of its participants. The largest source of data came from the interviews.

Semi-structured interviews were used as it was felt that a flexible structure would allow the individual talking to voice their own concerns and personal examples. The idea was to look at the individual talking and to pay attention to the detail and content of their claims. Code (1989) argues that this is a necessary component of a

methodology that tries to maintain continuity with experience. The process of the research was, therefore, inductive.

One of the major disadvantages of interviewing is the risk of the interviewer affecting the responses of the interviewee (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Unknowingly the researcher might affect responses by approving gestures, mannerisms, verbal feedback or encouraging the responses that one would like to hear more of. The interviews were used to try to understand the sporting experience of women in elite level cricket. Their perceptions of what is considered to be un/acceptable within the ethos of the game were explored. It was believed that such individual experience may have been lost through a rigid and more structured interview. The researcher was cognizant of the impact she had on the interviewee.

Based on findings from Cricket Week, it seemed that information was required from players, coaches, officials, and administrators. The interview questions were constructed around a number of themes that were generated from discussions throughout Cricket Week. The type of questions and headings for the interview evolved gradually. They considered the following areas: (1) Notions of the good player and the well played game; (2) Particular virtues and qualities in EWC; (3) Concepts of fair play and cheating; (4) The influence of coaches; (5) The merger of the WCA and the ECB; and (6) The recent controversies that had surrounded the World Cup.


It was important to consider a cross section of the people involved within the “inner circle” of English elite women’s cricket. For this reason the following were chosen as an accessible population: a selection of six players, all four coaches (two male), and the team manager. Together the interviewees illustrated the range of experience within the squad. Some were young, relatively new members on the team, others were accomplished cricketers, and some were involved directly with the organisation of the WCA and the merger with the ECB. Such a group was indicative of the diversity of people involved within elite women’s cricket.

A gatekeeper acts as a conduit between the researcher and the potential participants in a study (Research Ethics, 1999/2000). The main gatekeeper used to gain access

was a coach to the elite women's team, and one of my interviewees. The researcher was introduced to a colleague of the coach who then acted as a further gatekeeper. A list of names of those people proposed for interview was provided. The gatekeeper telephoned each person and all agreed to participate in the research. All interviewees gave informed consent to the study. Interviewees offered a telephone number to the researcher so meeting times and locations could be arranged. Each person was then contacted. The nature of the research was explained fully and a convenient meeting time was organised.

Interviews ranged from one hour to two hours. The interview was recorded in full on tape. There were three similar schedules according to whether the interviewee was a player, coach, or manager (See Appendix 1). The tapes were later transcribed and the texts were coded. A framework was constructed so that the empirical data could be used to inform a philosophical understanding of fair play and ethos. The diagram below illustrates the rolling method used whereby one phase of the research merged into the next.

RESEARCH DESIGN



6 Ethical Considerations

Before the interview, the aims of the thesis were explained along with relevant personal information about the researcher undertaking the study, the possible consequences, and how the transcripts would be used. All were given the option of rejecting the use of a tape recorder. None of the interviewees, however, expressed discomfort with this method of data collection. In fact, all were keen to discuss the content of the interview.

In a relatively small, insular community like elite women's cricket, it is very difficult to guarantee complete anonymity. Unrealistic promises of anonymity, therefore, were not made. However, assurances were given at the beginning of each interview that all information and research records would remain confidential. It was explained that all names would be given anonymity and the author of the study and the supervisors of the research would only see the full transcripts. These assurances were given weight because the gatekeeper used to gain access initially was a trusted member of the squad.

It is important to give consideration to the power imbalance between researcher and researched (Research Ethics, 1999/2000). Care was taken to ensure that interviewees were not pressurised or made uncomfortable in any way. They were not obliged to discuss any particular subject but were encouraged to talk about the ethos of the practice from their own individual perspective. All interviewees were aware of their right to terminate the interview at any time.

All were offered a final transcript of the interview and asked for their consent to use any of the information in the final thesis. This enabled the interviewees to control all the information they had volunteered consistent with feminist research ethics (Trebilcot, 1993). The research was to be conducted **with** the interviewees and not **on** them or about them. There were no anticipated possible harmful consequences for the participants.

7 Construction of Analytical Categories

There are a variety of established ways for analysing qualitative data. Huberman and Miles (1994) argue that data are usually prepared by converting raw material

(interviews) into partially processed data (transcripts), which are then coded and subjected to a particular method of analysis. Analysis schemes may be distinguished in two different ways. The first way depends on whether the themes emerged from the data or were established a priori. The second concerns the degree of complexity of the analysis scheme (simple to complex) (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).

In this study a typology of themes emerged from the data. They were refined and modified as the transcripts were constantly compared and analysed. Constant comparative analysis involves two general processes: (a) unitising or breaking the information into units to serve as the basis for defining categories; and (b) categorising or bringing together emergent themes that relate units of information to the same content (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Kirby and McKenna (1989) use the term “bibbit” to describe a section of data or passage from a transcript. Coding refers to the identification of a particular idea or concept that identifies a piece of text or bibbit. Effective theoretical coding rests on the researcher’s sensitivity and familiarisation with the data (Kirby and McKenna, 1989). Throughout the coding procedure (including transcription) the texts were constantly read, re-read, studied, and reflected upon. This ensured that the empirical data were categorised and organised and not changed or re-defined in any way. The shaping and re-shaping of the codes gradually became more theoretically sensitive.

The interview texts were divided into bibbits so that they could be effectively organised and coded. Each bibbit was referenced so that it could be easily recognised and re-located within its original text. The bibbit below is an example from one of the interview texts:

RM:19 Urm okay good, what would you describe as fair play?
C1M:19 Playing within the rules of the game basically urm you know cricket has gone beyond that even with certain sorts of etiquette and things that you would not do even though they are within the rules of the game but I think you need to want to win but without cheating. Fair play is not cheating to me.

The letter 'R' indicates the researcher. 'C1' illustrates that this was the first interview conducted with a coach. 'M' refers to the name of the interviewee, and the number '19' represents where the bibbit occurs within the interview.

The bibbits were grouped together according to the themes that emerged from within the data. Each bibbit was allocated a code (which represented a theme) and placed within one of four general categories. Some bibbits were placed within two or more themes and allocated to different categories also. A point of saturation occurred when bibbits no longer formed new themes. The themes were contextualised based on four categories: Person, Game, Contract/Agreement, and Institution (Loland and McNamee, 2000) (see Table One, over leaf).

Table One:
Analytical Categories and Themes

Person	Game	Contract/Agreement	Institution
Personal	Characteristics	Fair Play	Structure
* Occupation	* Cricket	* Concept of	
* Motivation	* Overs Game	* Laws	WCA
* Involved in Cricket	* Declaration Game	* Rules	* Establishment
* Personal Experience	* Men's game	* Unwritten	* Acceptance
* England Career		* Umpire	
	Good Game		ECB
Role Model		Different Games	* Merger
Professional		Cheating	MCC
		* Concept of	
Player		* Trust	Media
* Good Player			* Press
* Not suited to EWC		Actions	* Television
* Good Captain		* Agreement	
* Characters/Attitudes		* Sledging	Sponsorship
* Regions		* Walking	* Finance
* Discipline		* Appealing	
		* Mankadding	Cricket Week
Identity		* Ball Tampering	
* Self		* World Cup	Winning/Losing
* Dress		* LBW	
* Men's perceptions		* Unacceptable	Competition
* Public perceptions			
		Sportspersonship	Professionalism
Opponent		Gamesmanship	
			Training
Coach		Spirit	* Psychology
			* Fitness
Umpire			
			Etiquette
			Tradition
			Niceties
			Old School
			World Teams
			England Team
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous

Rather than come up with a set of codes based on the interview questions, the interviews were read and re-read and responses were then used to produce a list of codes. The codes were placed into one of four columns. Previous drafts had led to a final placement of code within these columns.

The Person column concerned individual experiences and personal histories of each interviewee. Shared constructs of identity, their opponents, coaches, umpires, and what it meant to be a good player were also allocated to this column. Furthermore, information was placed on male and public perceptions of the elite women's game. The Game column consists of specific characteristics of the elite women's game and notions of the good game. It encompasses views on cricket generally and the different perceptions of the one day and test match game. The Contract/Agreement column includes the rich detail gained about ethos and the interpretive nature of the practice. Concepts of fair play, laws, rules, cheating, sportsmanship, and gamesmanship were placed here. Unacceptable, acceptable, and permissible actions of the practice were articulated as well as interpretations in respect of examples of personal experience. Lastly, the Institution column was constructed to define the organisational parameters of the practice. Information that concerned particular social convention and engaged notions of governance were allocated to this column.

This is an experientially derived framework based on the collective and relatively shared interpretations of the interviewees. It provides the means to analyse critically the concepts of fair play and ethos. Such a framework offers an account of sport-as-practice. The themes are inclusive of the multiple perspectives of the interviewees. Experience helped to generate and re-shape the theoretical framework and accounts of knowledge concerning fair play.

8 Summary

This chapter has provided a rationale for the methodological framework employed in the thesis. It has raised questions about the way in which theoretical models should be applied in philosophy and for the choice of methods employed in this research. In this study, a feminist research design is used to construct a mixed model approach in order to explore issues of fair play and ethos in EWC successfully.

The next chapter attempts to articulate the ethos of the practice of EWC and reflect the plurality of different ways of knowing. In order to understand the quiddity of ethos as an ethical enterprise the epistemological model outlined above is used to explore critically fair play as a system of value more effectively. Chapter Six will explore the dynamic character of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the sources of that change may be.

Chapter Six

Understanding Ethos as an Ethical Practice

Part One: Elite Women's Cricket

1 Introduction

The last chapter outlined the methodology employed in this thesis; that is, the incorporation of empirical findings to structure a normative approach to the study of fair play. In this chapter the aim is to present the empirical findings of the framework and start to explore critically fair play and ethos as a system of value.

The words of the interviewees provide a frame of reference to look at ethos where norms of acceptability are discussed in specific context and in relation to fair play. This is not just a descriptive account. Rather, the researcher looks at the concrete particulars grounded in experience to extract the normative standards within the practice. Interviewees are reflective and critical of themselves, each other, and actions within the game.

By using the voices of players, coaches, and managers, this chapter aims to articulate and explain the ethos of the practice of elite women's cricket. The initial task is to describe **and** comment upon the key issues that arise from the data concerning fair play and ethos. Using rich data from one particular culture, this chapter explores the dynamic character of ethos, how it changes and develops, and what the sources of that change may be.

Employing empirical findings enables the researcher to gain an inside and critical view of the practice. Here, the perceived internal goods of cricket drive the arguments for an understanding of fair play and ethos. The discovery of concrete presuppositions can then be utilised to form a thick account or description of fair play.

Part One begins with an explanation of interviewees' perceptions of fair play. This is followed by discussion of those actions that are considered unacceptable and unfair. Interviewees' views on the impact of the umpire and of their own team's conduct are then considered. Part Two examines in more detail the application of ethos and fair

play within the game. Differences between the one day game and declaration cricket are observed, followed by four key themes which emerged from the framework: Walking, Sledging, Appealing, and Mankadding. These terms will be explained precisely later in this chapter. Such discussion would be incomplete without reference to the notions of sportspersonship and professionalism. This chapter concludes with an argument that fair play is context-dependent: that is, the ethos of EWC is a constantly re-negotiated boundary dependent upon the context of the game in which it is applied.

2 Interviewees

After identifying those members of the inner circle of elite women's cricket, interviewees were chosen according to experience, their role within the squad, and knowledge of the ECB and WCA. As previously mentioned, six players, four coaches, and the then-present team manager were interviewed. It was decided to present the interviewees as characters in order to contextualise their backgrounds and to provide a more meaningful account of their perceptions about the ethos of elite women's cricket. All names are fictitious and, where possible, everything has been done to ensure anonymity.

2.1 M1J: Jane

Jane, a Southerner, is the England Team Manager. She has a full time professional career outside cricket. Although she has never played at the elite level, she has been proudly involved with women's cricket for a number of years. She says:

M1J:3 . . . A boy who starts to play cricket has little hope of meeting his cricket heroes but in the women's set up, meet them, I know them all urm it is getting a little more professional nowadays and better funded urm but when I started it was more or less having bazaars and doing the women's institute bit to fund the England team . . .

She has witnessed profound changes in women's cricket and is unsure of some the current attitudes at the elite level in sport generally. She considers herself to be a traditionalist and, as will be seen later, values the ideal of fair play.

M1J:17 . . . society is changing and perhaps this is just my age but all my generation think it was better twenty years ago. But the thought of materialistic avaricious urm Thatcher generations as we would call it

*spills into far more than those concepts as well as on the sports field
urm I think it is more the way people play today you know win at all
costs and less of the old fashioned it's the taking part and play up and
play the game. .*

2.2 C1M: Marie

Marie has been involved in coaching for many years. She boasts a distinguished England career. Like Jane, she has a full time professional career. She originates from the South of England and has been involved with cricket all her life. She says:

*C1M:5 I mean cricket it's been my life I suppose and you know well
I've had to go out and earn a living but I've got friends in Australia,
I've got friends in New Zealand, South Africa all because of cricket.*

2.3 C2A: Alexander

Alexander has been involved with women's cricket as a coach for many years. He has a full time professional career and served as one of the 'gatekeepers' of the research, providing initial means to gain access to interviewees. He said that there is a unity to the England team:

*C2A:21 Urm . . . a common theme is their commitment to the cause.
Everyone believes in women's cricket, urm I think everyone has a
certain level of confidence in England cricket. The manner in which
that is exploited or deployed varies . . . urm some train religiously,
others don't. . . but I think there is a pretty common theme of unity,
and cohesion and dedication to the cause.*

He made reference to the difference in attitudes among players. The 'Yorkshire factor' was an interesting way to examine how players perceive each other. Alexander said:

*C2A:22 . . . Yorkshire is a very strong county, and er, and probably
breeds that inherent competitiveness, and confidence that perhaps
some other counties don't have at this moment point in time . . . urm .
. . . that's probably all I'd say on that, actually . . . the Yorkshire thing
is a factor . . . I'm sure other people will have told you the same.*

2.4 C3R: Robert

Involved in coaching for many years, Robert has played a significant role in women's cricket. He is from the South and reiterated to me the division between Northern and Southern players.

C3R:13 . . . the North of England have the stronger set of players in terms of better players in the country and I think a little bit like the Northern hemisphere and the Southern hemisphere, the North of England and the South of England, there's always that divide, and I think, I think that, and I'm a Southerner, I think the North are more switched on to it than what they are down South . . .

RR:14 Switched on to . . .

C3R:14 Switched on to being more professional, more of a competitive edge.

2.5 C4H: Harriet

Harriet is from the South and also one of the coaches. She expressed her frustration with some of the players, other coaches, and their commitment to the game.

C4H:10 They are all verbally dedicated to what they do urm I would question the higher commitment of some urm . . . the coaches are very enthusiastic, but not open to criticism a lot of the time, urm . . . in general though they are all prepared to put their mouths on the line and say, 'yes we need to do this,' and 'yes we need to go to the gym.' But when it actually comes to putting it into practice, that's when it's not quite there. They are not actually intrinsically motivated to want to be as fit as they possibly can so they can beat Australia . . .

Harriet was asked if she thought there were any differences between Northern and Southern players. She felt very strongly about this and openly expressed her frustrations.

C4H:12 Well the scenario has always been that people from the North have a far more gritty approach, urm . . . I suppose there is a difference in the general make up of them as people. The last time I was up, I was increasingly irritated with people from up there because a lot of them think that they are brilliant, that they don't need to do anything, and y'know that is not the case. Yes it's all very well being arrogant and having this no-one can touch us attitude, but you have to have a degree of realism in there as well. They got up me nose, the Southern lot actually put a lot of effort in. I'm not saying they don't normally, but it's just a different, actually the Northern lot are perhaps more verbally aggressive . . .

RH:13 What did you mean by saying they were a different make up of people?

C4H:13 Yeah, urm . . . I'm trying to think . . . it's just this blasé attitude which they seem to have, casual. I don't need to do this because I'm good enough anyway. So in those terms they are not professional urm, so in terms of different make up of people, I think they are more aggressive as individuals and possibly more arrogant at times. That's not a sweeping statement, that's one or two but it er encompasses everybody else.

2.6 P1L: Louie

Louie is from Yorkshire, and is an experienced member of the squad. As she is a Northerner it was interesting to hear her views on the so-called 'Yorkshire factor.'

P1L:21 Urm . . . I just feel that there is a southern softie mentality. When the going gets tough, they don't seem to have this scrappin, y'know it seems to be all [puts on a posh voice] okay, well you know, "It's not the winning but the taking part" . . . they're quite happy to sit back and say, "ah well never mind," urm . . . but, well you play for Yorkshire and whatever else it's, well y'know it might not look pretty but sometimes you've gotta scrap . . . They seem to be a bit more reserved . . . It's a weird scenario . . . and it's not big-headedness on my part, I just feel that that's how it's like.

Here we can see the underlying tensions between the different geographic areas.

Valerie also from Yorkshire expressed a similar view.

2.7 P2V: Valerie

Valerie has been an experienced member of the squad since the 1980s. She is from Yorkshire, has a professional career and takes cricket very seriously. She was asked whether different attitudes created a tension at the elite level. She said:

P2V:15 No, they normally take the Mickey, and we give it back. It normally creates a good bit of banter urm and, I think it's good, people from different counties, I'm sure that they'd never admit it but, I'm sure that they'd aspire to having a set up like we've got in Yorkshire, you know there is so much for young kids coming through.

2.8 P3C: Charlotte

Charlotte is one of the most experienced members of the team. She is a top order batter and has played for England for a number of years. She comes from the South

and has a professional career. When asked about different players' attitudes she laughed and argued that while Northerners are arrogant, Southerners are confident.

P3C:10 Definitely [laughs]. Well if you're Northern then you know they're arrogant and we're confident [laughs] . . . the Northerners are closer to the Australians and the Kiwis than the southern softies, as they'll call us. There is a sort of additional confidence that they seem to exude urm and may be it's mental toughness but they seem to sort of have a stronger focus than we do but whether that's just a load of coincidence but you can definitely, you know, tell a difference.

2.9 P4G: Gill

Gill is also a top order batter. She is relatively new to the squad, is from the South and heavily involved with women's cricket. Cricket, she told me, is in her blood. She praised the 'Yorkshire factor' and the Northern players in the squad.

P4G:43 . . . To be fair to Yorkshire they are doing so well because they have a good development system, they are consistently producing more good players than any other county, so it's quite right that they are winning, but they do have a very tough image y'know we take no prisoners. Nobody is good enough to beat us y'know, and a kind of arrogance goes along with it which to some degree is well you might say probably necessary, and at the England level it's helped us because there's about six of 'em in the England team y'know . . .

2.10 P5S: Shauna

Shauna, another Southerner may be considered an all rounder. Like Gill, she is also heavily involved with women's cricket and is an experienced England cricketer. She agreed that there is a difference in the mentality of players from different regions.

P5S:10 Yes [laughs] I do [laughs] yes I do and I think it's really because of the level of cricket that they play week in and week out urm Yorkshire are very strong urm they have had international players galore in the last few years . . . Whereas we've struggled in the last four or five years . . . we've dropped down the division urm and down South I don't know urm they're a different breed [laughs] . . .

P5S:11 Urm . . . you know the Yorkshire lasses are normally quite loud and they like to be heard whereas the Southerners are very urm quite shy . . .

2.11 P6R: Rebecca

Rebecca is one of the newest members to the squad. She is an all rounder, has little Test match experience, and is also from the South. Like all of the other interviewees she acknowledged a regional difference in players' attitudes.

P6R:13 I've seen that in Yorkshire urm knowing that they can win knowing that they are the best urm self-belief which obviously all comes from winning experience urm they are more aggressive, they are more self confident, their body language is better. They are in a way I suppose more professional because they know how to win urm. .

It is now hoped that the reader has familiarised themselves with the characters chosen for interview. In the next section these interpretations are used to describe the notion of fair play that is applicable in elite women's cricket. It is argued that no game can be completely defined by its rules. These rich data are used to present an examination of rule application in context.

3 Fair Play and Elite Women's Cricket

3.1 The Game of Cricket

Cricket is played both indoors and outdoors with a ball and bat, between two teams of 11 players each. The cricket field can range in size from about 450 ft. by 500 ft. to about 525 ft. by 550 ft. In the centre of the field is an area called the *pitch*. The pitch contains 'two *wickets*', 66 ft. apart and each wicket consists of three wooden stumps, 28 in high, placed equidistant in a straight line. On top of the stumps two strips of wood, known as '*bails*,' are placed end to end in grooves. The wicket is centred length wise in a white line, and is known as the '*bowling crease*'. Another white line, called the '*popping crease*', or simply the crease, is drawn in front of and parallel to each bowling crease (Eastaway, 1993).

The central action of the game takes place between the '*batsman*' or '*batswoman*' who stands behind the popping crease, and the *bowler*, who delivers the ball from the opposite end of the pitch. The rules of cricket are somewhat complicated. The team that bats first, a privilege decided by the toss of a coin, sends two batters out on the field, one to each wicket. The opposing team then sends a bowler to one wicket and a wicketkeeper behind the other wicket. The remaining nine players are

placed about the field in positions from which they are deemed best able to catch or stop the ball after it has been hit. This is called fielding.

Two umpires control the game. One stands directly behind the wicket at the bowler's end, and the other stands about 30 yards away from the wicket at the batter's end, 90° to the line between the two wickets. Bowlers bowl the ball, and batters try to hit it in any direction. They can elect to run to the opposite crease if they think they have hit the ball far enough to do so. If the batter runs, the partner runs for the crease the batter has just left. If both runners reach the opposite creases before either of them is put out, a run is scored. The batting team also scores runs as penalties for various infractions by the bowler and fielders (Eastaway, 1993).

Batters may be 'put out' of the game in various ways. One way, called bowled out, occurs if the ball delivered by the bowler goes by the batter and knocks either bail off the wicket. Another is to be caught out, if the ball is caught before it reaches the ground. A fielder who stops a batted ball may throw it to the wicketkeeper, who then attempts to knock off the bails on the near wicket before the runner reaches the crease. Alternatively, the fielder may throw the ball at either wicket for the same purpose, or else throw it to the bowler or another fielder, who then attempts to knock off the bails of either wicket. When put out by the wicketkeeper, without help from another fielder, the batter is said to be stumped; when put out by a fielder, the batter is said to be run out. The batter is also out if, in playing the ball, the bails are knocked off of the wicket with the bat or with any part of the batter's body (called hit wicket). A player is deemed out if the batter's leg intercepts a straight bowled ball and thereby prevents the ball from striking the wicket (called leg before wicket or LBW); or if any of several other rules are violated. A batter who hits the ball to the boundary of the field scores four runs without having to run for them; if the ball is hit over the boundary without bouncing (on the fly), the batter is credited with six runs. The same batter continues to bat until put out (Formhals, 1984).

Each batter remains at the wicket reached during the last run; thus, when play resumes, a different batter may face the bowler. When the bowler has delivered a so-called over of six balls a second bowler bowls from the opposite end. Since the new bowler faces in the direction opposite that faced by the first one, the wicketkeeper and the fielders shift their positions accordingly. When the second bowler has delivered an over, the first bowler resumes bowling. No bowler may bowl two consecutive overs (Formhals, 1984).

A team's innings ends when 10 of the 11 batters have been put out of the game or when a predetermined number of overs has been completed, or when the captain of the batting team chooses to declare the innings finished. The game can consist of Test matches, which are usually played over four days, or can be limited overs games where each team is restricted to a fixed number of overs and games are played in a day (fifty overs at international level). The team that scores the most runs in either game is the winner. The one-day game cultivates different skills and tactics than the four-day game.

Structural differences between the one-day and four-day game made a significant impact on interviewees' perceptions of fair play. Each type of game was considered to hold a different ethos and represented a separate entity. This supports the work of Heinilä (1978) and Nilsson (1993) who argue that interpretations of fair play are dependent on a number of key variables, including: sporting culture, gender, historical tradition, level of performance, and socio-cultural context. Moreover, a case can be made to suggest that ethical systems are specific to particular cultural settings (Held, 1993).

Shauna argued that one-day matches have more appeal as there is always a result at the end.

P5S:69 Urm totally different thing urm one day matches are one day and Test matches are four days so the game is a lot slower more tactical more technical and you've got time to play your shots whereas one day you've only got fifty overs to spray it around the park so then people like to watch one day cricket because it's over in one day.

There was a tension between the perceived value of each type of game; attitudes differed as to which one constituted 'real' cricket. It seemed that the older, more experienced players preferred Test match cricket whereas newer players to the squad found Test match cricket often boring and uneventful. Shauna preferred Test match cricket.

P5S:72 Urm I think so urm you know cricket is more of a cricket game urm there's too much improvisation in the one day game you know some of the shots the guys play these days you'd never play in a Test match never urm for bowling in one day cricket you just bowl it line and length. Whereas in Test match cricket you use the ball more, you do different things with it and . . . can experiment in the field, you can change the field around easy. Whereas in one day cricket you can't do that cos you'd probably give them twenty runs in the mean time. So I think one day cricket is really about who scores the most runs on that day really.

Other players, like Louie, felt that one-day cricket is more exciting.

P1L:98 I think that's the way it will go and I prefer that . . . cos at least you get a result at the end of it . . . batters have got to go out and try and score runs, bowlers have to try and get wickets. I've played in Test matches where I've just stood there for two hours, not going for runs, cos you've just gotta stay there . . . to save a Test match, not even to win it, just to get a draw. Y'know you'll get the purists who'll say well, that's all part of it . . . but if you are going to market it as a viable financial thing then the only way you're gonna make that happen is to make it more exciting.

The purists were seen as the traditionalists, known as the 'silver tops' because of their white hair. They only ever played Test match cricket and raised sponsorship by selling chocolate on the boundary as opposed to signing lucrative deals with multinational companies.

RL:99 Who are the purists?

P1L:99 Y'know all the one's who have played Test match cricket. I think that's why you're getting, well the Aussies are trying to do it, and the English, a Test match team and a one day team . . . with captains for each.

Louie wanted to see two separate teams; one for Test matches and one for one-day cricket. Younger interviewees like Rebecca argued that the one-day game is more

intense and competitive than traditional Test match cricket. She argued that the different games required a different way of thinking.

RR:68 Okay urm would you say there is a winning is everything ethos?

P6R:68 Urm yes winning is everything ethos in one day cricket completely urm nothing else matters in four day cricket you do everything you can not to lose because a draw is a respectable result urm and a draw is okay you know you try to win but if not then definitely not lose but in one day cricket winning is everything, definitely.

P6R:65 . . . it's a different way of thinking, you've got to really really switch and you've got to play a different game urm and it would be such a shame if it went . . . the whole ethos is different it's every single ball, or what the sports psychologists say is, every ball is an event you know three hundred events per innings and urm Test match is about patience, guile, and out thinking the opposition. . .

Louie believed that one-day cricket was easier.

P1L:100 Yeah, it is two separate completely different games now, and it is difficult for girls who have only played one day stuff to concentrate for a Test match and tactically it's hard is a Test match . . . urm one day is easier, y'know you've gotta go out there and score the most runs, same in a Test match but there are different ways to get there.

Test match cricket was viewed as 'true' cricket by the coaches and manager of the squad. Players needed to be tougher mentally and, to win, the opposing team had to be bowled out. Jane said:

RJ:57 Is true cricket declaration cricket to you?

M1J:57 Yes and I think that's a traditional view because in a way you have to be old enough to remember it. . .

Charlotte agreed. She argued that the Test match game required tougher players mentally than the one-day game.

P3C:58 Yeah urm I think that there is a mental toughness that Test match cricket enhances that one day cricket doesn't. One day cricket, yes there are game plans, but it's all a bit spontaneous you know it's, whereas in Test match cricket the tactics and the mental side of the game comes into it far more than one day cricket. So I think it would be a shame, I mean I understand the attractions of the fifty over thrash and the runs and that and the inevitable result at the end of it.

But urm I think it's important that the game makes space for the two types of game.

Marie also believed that Test match cricket was 'real cricket.'

C1M:61 I would not want one day cricket to be more important than Test match cricket because there is more to Test match cricket. I think one day cricket is fantastic and I think it's got a wider scope for the general public and there's more entertainment to those who are not so entrenched in cricket but in terms of the skills and the challenge of declaration cricket to me that is the true Test of who is the best, that's real cricket.

C1M:62 Urm because real cricket has so much more scope urm because clearly it's a bigger area and if we're talking real cricket then we're talking Test match cricket you know bowlers have to get the batsmen out to win the game urm I mean the batsmen could stay there and never score a run but it'll end up being a draw

C1M:63 . . . the beauty of proper cricket is that you don't win unless you bowl the other team out so you've gotta be aggressive, you've gotta be competitive.

A good game was viewed by all as one that is closely contested and which boasts a tight finish. No interviewees wished to see a one sided game where one team was winning easily. For a game to qualify as good it had to be competitive, exciting, and full of uncertain tension. Some players referred to Test match cricket in their description; others referred to cricket in general. Marie also mentioned the ability of teams and a close finish.

C1M:60 . . . When two sides are evenly matched. A good cricket game is one that is evenly contested and that's close and that's what makes it . . . the game can swing from one side to the other and that is to me that type of cricket where you've got to bowl a side out and because it's over such a long period of time it can change you know one team can be on top and then the other one is and so what makes a good game of cricket is that you don't know the outcome until the end. The one day game is definitely in the last two or three overs but a Test match is enthralling throughout because it keeps changing whereas the one day game doesn't have that.

Shauna argued that not only was a close finish essential but the quality of umpiring had to be good.

P5S:71 . . . a nice game of cricket between two good teams on a good track with two good umpires really.

Louie, Harriet, and Robert talked of personal performance, technically good batting and fielding, and uncertainty of outcome.

P6R:63 Urm personal performance, winning, a tight finish . . . there's no point in annihilating someone, it's no fun.

P1L:97 Urm . . . one that's to-ing and fro-ing all the time . . . One that's close with some technically good cricket, y'know good bowling and batting, and fielding.

C4H:61 Urm when it's exciting [laughs]. A bad one is where you beat someone hands down, basically, and it goes on and on and on. Good games are when you know you can comfortably get what you want but the other side is actually playing quite well. I like it when there is a bit of competition, a bit of a challenge between them that makes it quite good.

C3R:57 Well I'd like to see everybody playing to the best of their ability, the tension around the game, that sort of thing.

3.2 Fair and Foul Play

First, it is important to explain the conceptions of fair play that were in operation. Each of the interviewees was asked what fair play means. Although the responses were varied, a relatively shared perception arose. Understandably, as Charlotte identifies, the central tenet to this perception was the notion of rules and rule-adherence.

P3C:16 Urm . . . I think it's urm . . . you know . . . urm, it's good honest commitment to the game, urm . . . that you're, I would say play within the rules or urm to the rules urm . . .

Jane, on the other hand felt that fair play was an old fashioned concept:

M1J:16 Urm . . . I'm old fashioned enough to have that concept that there is no point in competing if you don't choose to do it by the rules, every rule, the spirit of competition . . .

This can be linked to further beliefs about traditions of etiquette, and the notion of a spirit of the game. Gill, Marie, and Rebecca all made reference to the idea of fair play as rules with accompanying traditions and etiquette.

P6R:17 Fair play urm respecting the rules and traditions of the sport urm . . .

C1M:19 Playing within the rules of the game basically urm you know cricket has gone beyond that even with certain sorts of etiquette and things that you would not do even though they are within the rules of the game but I think you need to want to win but without cheating. Fair play is not cheating to me.

P4G:75 [sighs and laughs] Fair play . . . playing to the spirit of the laws not just the letter.

Harriet and Valerie felt that fair play meant to play to the limit of the rules without harming anyone. Here, fair play included beliefs about self-respect and personal responsibility.

C4H:18 Fair play, playing to the limits of the rules . . . probably without harming anybody or I guess playing to the limits I'd say.

P2V:22 . . . Urm fair play is to me, my interpretation is not only playing within the rules of the game but also having some self respect and honour if you like when you are playing the game. I s'pose there's certain things that you just don't do, except against the Aussies [laughs].

Implicit was the idea that fair play is different depending on which team you are playing and on which sport. Louie suggested that cricket was seen as 'more' fair as it held definite rules with boundaries which were seen as 'harder to push'.

P1L:30 Urm, fair play is playing within the rules . . . in cricket, there's definite rules, and it's harder to push the boundaries of those rules.

The idea of 'gentle cricket,' included Shauna and Charlotte's views about cricket not being so competitive so therefore being 'more' fair in some way.

P5S:32 . . . cos I think it's the level of competitive cricket that you play urm more kind of soft cricket say you know gentle cricket so it doesn't really matter if something happens or not they just take it in their stride and that's it . . .

RC:55 Would you say there is more fair play in cricket than in the other sports you play?

P3C:55 Urm . . . yeah I would say that. That's the nature of the game, you know it's not acceptable to argue with the umpire, whereas in hockey people do, and you know I think that again the adrenaline and the nature of the game are different. I mean you'll hear far more 'talk' on a hockey pitch than you will on a cricket pitch and certainly to the officials.

Louie felt that England were too nice on the pitch. She wanted to see a tougher mental attitude and less 'friendliness' towards the opposition. Here issues of class become apparent. The idea of playing fairly was linked to being 'nice' and viewed as an inherent part of belonging to an upper class community.

P1L:48 It is, it's sticking by the rules and it's not the winning but the taking part kind of thing . . . it's more, well [puts on a soft, 'posh' voice] "At least we played, but at least we played fairly."

RL:76 Do you feel you have to behave properly in cricket then?

P1L:76 . . . Yes, it's a reserved game, the ethos of cricket is totally different to football . . . football is like rowdy . . . I can't really think of anything on a cricket pitch, total idea of cricket is a lot more [puts on a posh voice] "Oh, well done, absolutely super."

A link may be established here with historical notions of the role of upper class women and sport. Louie implies that behaviour in modern EWC stems from the reserved, polite, proper conduct of traditional upper class participation. This serves to illustrate the idea that the ethos of EWC is contextually sensitive to a range of particularities that are historically situated and embedded within the practice.

In summary, the concept of fair play was defined by the following considerations: rule adherence, etiquette, not cheating, abiding by a spirit of the game, not causing harm, and having self respect and honesty. As we saw in Chapter Four (Part One) both ICSPE (1996) and the ICFP (1994) defined fair play in this way. Immediately it becomes apparent that fair play is more than simply following the rules of the game.

When asked about those actions that could be considered as not fair play, initial responses included, taking drugs, ball tampering, or feigning injury. None of these actions were seen as particularly relevant to women's cricket. Louie suggested that the reason for this was because the stakes in cricket are not that high; women do not earn any money by playing for England.

RL:62 Is there drug testing in women's cricket?

P1L:62 Yes, for urm about seven or eight years now, no-one's ever been done in cricket though. I'm not being awful but the stakes aren't that high, they're not high enough to want to go and do that. We're amateurs at the end of the day. I mean the World Cup is important to us, but to me if you've got to go to those lengths to win it, then no.

Valerie said that whether actions are considered unacceptable depends on the viewpoint a player holds. She felt that the only way a player can cheat is to alter the condition of ball in some way.

P2V:41 In cricket, well they've got to be tampering with the ball or something . . . I mean it totally depends on your view point. If somebody gets nicked behind and doesn't walk, well, there would be several people on that pitch who would say that that person has cheated, by not walking. It's up to the umpire you know, it's not the batsmen's decision, or the bowler's decision, or any player's decision on the field, it's the umpire, so for me, you've got to have cheat blatantly, and for me that's the only way that you can honestly say, in cricket, that that person has cheated. If you get a bottle top and start lifting up the seam, to me that's cheating cos you're tampering with the ball, and doing all sorts of unfair things, and that's gives an unfair disadvantage to your opponents.

Here, the notion that players have no responsibility to own up 'to nicking a ball' is an interesting one to which I will return. Louie defined cheating, then, as breaking the laws in a blatant, intentional way, or going against the spirit of the game. Other interviewees, like Alexander agreed:

P1L:60 Urm . . . it's blatantly going out to win or change the course of a game by doing something that's not in the rules.

C2A:52 To break the laws of the game.

Although a clear theme of fairness emerged, all interviewees felt that many competitors, including themselves, did not always follow the laws of the game. As Alexander said:

RA:53 Do competitors always follow the laws of the game?

C2A:53 Nope.

RA:54 Why?

C2A:54 Why they don't . . . because they think they can get an advantage by breaking the rules of the game.

Valerie indicated the difficulty in determining whether an action is an intentional rule violation or an accident. She said:

P2V:32 . . . If, for example, you make sure you push somebody out of the way, so say the bowler has released the ball and on the follow through, they have taken a quick single, the ball is in between the bowler, so the batsman is, it's difficult to describe, basically the ball

is very close to the batsman and the bowler, and the bowler like pushes the batsman out of the way to get the ball and runs them out, and like if it's blatant. The problem is, it's very difficult often to distinguish what is blatant and what is pure accident, do you know what I mean?

Alexander provided another example that included not owning up when a player has taken the bails off.

C2A:56 Urm, well I haven't seen it . . . urm but I'm sure it must have happened, which would be a run out decision. The ball comes into the keeper, the keeper accidentally knocks the bails off first, and then breaks the wicket's bails out of their ground. Out, because the umpire was indecisive or something, and the player didn't own up, to say the bails dropped off . . .

A blurred distinction became more apparent between the notion of bending the rules and breaking the rules. Gill felt that there was a distinction between cheating and bending the rules.

P4G:115 What does it mean . . . urmwell it means [laughs] doing anything possible to win urm to win urm . . . and cheating as opposed to bending the rules . . .

She argued that appealing for a catch that has come off the pad is an instance of cheating.

P4G:122 Well now, I think cheating is well really, and particularly, they had this in India, spin bowlers bowling, quite a lot of close fielders round the bat, and urm appealing for catches when they know full well it's come off your pad. I see that as cheating, because again it is very difficult for an umpire from there, y'know from this sort of distance away [makes gesture] and you've gone forward bat and pad. It is very difficult but we had a lot of people given out like that, and we don't appeal. Really, honestly we don't appeal in those situations.

The notion of appealing will also be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. Interviewees were asked whether they would cheat if they had the opportunity. Responses were varied. Marie said that although she would not coach or sanction a rule infraction ordinarily she might approve of it afterwards if it meant that the team ended up winning.

Interviewees identified a number of actions that they defined as unacceptable. These included: abuse, dissent, intentional breaking of the rules, whacking the stumps in temper, physical contact with another player, gesticulating at the umpire, not supporting the captain, swearing or distracting the bowler before she commences her run-up by 'chatting in the slips.' The last example occurs when fielders who are in close proximity to the bowler (in the slips) distract her as she is preparing her run-up. Another example refers to the tacit agreement between batters when not to attempt to take a possible run. The batters may be in the process of taking a quick single when the opposition misfields the ball. The fielder throws the ball in to the wicket keeper but it hits a batter in the process and is then deflected into an open space. Technically, the batters could take an extra run if they desired, however, it is an unwritten rule that no such runs should be taken. The above actions were all deemed unacceptable but many players admitted to behaving in such a way. Alexander argued that some actions should never be ruled out:

RA:73 Is there something that players do that you would never approve of them doing?

C2A:73 Never approve, urm . . . yeah, I would never ever approve of them doing what Chris Broad did once when he was bowled out which was getting his bat and whacking the stumps with it . . . urm . . . never approve of physically confronting another. . . but within the subtleties of the laws of the game, i.e. not walking, bails dropping off, etc. etc. never say never is what I say. . .

Louie suggested that it depends on the pressure to win:

P1L:70 Again, you can sit here and there's loads of things you could do . . . but y'know it's difficult to say, y'know like if you're fielding on the boundary, and you know damn well that you might have slid to save it but your foot's over and you tap it back in, and without hind sight in the women's game, and it's the last over, and they need one run to win, are you gonna put your hand up and say it went for four.

Similarly, Gill, who believed that competition within the game had intensified, echoed this view:

P4G:61 I think as the whole thing gets much more competitive, I mean I think it's quite likely that things will be said during the Australia series this summer urm I think as urm . . . not that it matters more, because it's always mattered but that the competition is intense. The one day game is intense urm y'know people are more willing to express how they feel these days I think than previously, they are less

likely to just say oh well that's the umpire's decision, thank you very much sir, I'll go off quietly, y'know urm I have said words to an umpire [laughs] particularly in the World Cup urm all out of very deep frustration, urm but not really acceptable.

She said that she was more likely to question an overseas umpire:

P4G:136 . . . I think more things are said to umpires these days and I know this is going to sound dreadful but I guess I'm more willing to say something to an overseas umpire but well I did say something to that Indian umpire in the semi-final, and I think that was because of the situation.

RG:137 What did you say?

P4G:137 I said, 'that's fucking crap [laughs].' Well when I say I said it to him I said it in his general direction, and he probably couldn't even understand me.

P4G:139 . . . I just could not believe it but urm he probably wasn't even aware that I said it to him y'know so I'm not saying I would never do it again . . .

Rebecca proposed that a player could do anything within her means:

P6R:50 . . . I don't know I think it just all comes from the desire to win and the level of the competition and may be things which aren't considered so fair urm I suppose it comes down to the survival of the fittest. I suppose you do anything you can, don't you?

In summary, players saw a difference between breaking the rules and cheating arguing that ideas have changed over time. This illustrates Held's (1993) point that that moral behaviour arises in the context of particular lives that are embedded in particular relationships at different times. Thus, we need to look at these relationships if we are to understand ethos and fair play in the context of modern sport. It is not enough to consider whether a particular action satisfies a formal rule but to master the relationship between principle and situation (Lövlie, 1997).

Some interviewees, but not all, felt that the pressure and responsibility to be honest was dependent on the competitive level of the game. The idea that it is acceptable to cheat sometimes was present. Players felt that, because decisions often go against them, it was acceptable to seize those opportunities 'to inadvertently break the rules' as all actions even themselves out in the end.

3.3 The Role of the Umpire

As the game becomes more professional and competitive, the rules of etiquette or politeness gradually become less evident. Players identified the umpire as one of the key variables concerning fair play. The umpire's role was viewed primarily as one of law enforcement. Most of the players stressed that they themselves could not be held responsible if an umpire made the wrong decision. This confirms the recent findings of Bredemeier and Shields (1994) who also found that players in elite sport deny their autonomy when confronted with an ethical decision.

Alexander indicated the power of the umpire and the impact that they can have on the 'climate' or ethos of the game.

C2A:90 Urm, law enforcement agency, er pretty significant role because of the power they've got in that little finger . . . urm . . . I'm not sure. Well I guess they have a general input into the climate of the outfield . . . but I wouldn't go overboard on that. I mean to me the massively significant role they've got is in the decision making.

Players looked to the umpire to set the tone of the game and establish control and consistency. As Charlotte said:

P3C:52 Urm, yeah I mean that I think they set the tone in terms of their professionalism. I think it's annoying if you've got an umpire that dithers, they're the key to setting the tone of the game. You know you like an umpire to sort of be consistent and urm perhaps more so than in other sports, but you are aware that the umpire should be consistent, with signals and that sort of thing. I think as players you are quick to pick up on the officials of the game. There's nothing more annoying than an umpire who isn't in control.

It was apparent that players' attitudes towards the umpire and quality of umpiring have significantly changed over the last ten years. As noted previously, players are far more likely to question an umpire's decision or make derisory comments to an official in today's climate of accountability. This point is made by one of the coaches, Alexander.

RA:92 Why, what's changed?

C2A:92 I would imagine forty years ago, it would have been unheard of for a player to question an umpire's decision, still you're not allowed to do that within the laws of the game but you do see it now and again.

Players and coaches had a lack of respect for international umpires. Marie and Harriet felt that they had been on the receiving end of blatant match fixing by some referees in the past whose perceptions of administering the laws were different. The responsibility to control this was seen as a problem for the governing body of cricket itself. This is particularly relevant when one considers the recent scandal in the men's game over allegations of match fixing and improper conduct.

RM:59 So their perception of rule bending is different?

C1M:59 Yeah, not what I would find acceptable but then it's up to the rules of the game and the people in control of it to stop that happening.

All interviewees felt that a poor umpire resulted in an unfair game. They also argued that opponents could not be trusted to be fair. Players did not expect or trust the opposition to play fairly. There was no contractual understanding that players were abiding by the same tacit agreements of competition. This illustrates the limited explanatory power of the use of social contract theories to explain fair play.

The umpire has the power to control and define the climate of the game, thus, trust should be placed in the officials. As Louie stated:

RL:68 Do you always trust your competitors?

P1L:68 Urm . . . trust them to walk and things like that . . . urm I think really in any game you've got officials in charge . . . those are the one's you've got to trust and if they get it wrong then they get it wrong. So I think more, you've got to trust the officials rather than your opponents, you can't trust your opponents to walk because that's entirely up to them.

To reiterate then, players consistently denied their autonomy in umpiring decisions; players argued that the responsibility to 'own up' and 'walk' was taken away from them. Charlotte saw the decision making process as the umpire's sole responsibility.

P3C:16 . . . but at the same time you know you've got an umpire or you've got a referee, you've got people there to actually make that decision, and urm you must abide by the decision that they make urm but I wouldn't, urm I'm not averse to pushing that rule beyond if it's to my advantage. But if you know they rule against how I have gone then I must accept that decision.

The umpire has the power to define how the laws of the game are to be interpreted and applied. In this sense he or she becomes the dominant force on the field; they are the sole adjudicators of fair and foul play. The umpire's right to exercise discretion when applying the laws of the game will have a significant impact on the ethos of that game.

3.4 England and their Opponents

Members of the squad all believed that they played fairly. They liked to think that other teams operated within the same code of fairness but acknowledged that they did not trust their opponents. Some players argued that, if the necessity arose, they would, grudgingly, have to break the laws of the game. The notion that 'old school' players were seen to be 'more' fair was apparent as was the importance of the level and type of game. Players argued that they do follow the laws of the game, but to be competitive they must stretch those rules to their limits. Alexander argued that if another team started to break the rules then it would be acceptable to match that behaviour.

RA:65 Let's take the mankadding example. If someone did that to you then would it be okay to do the same thing back?

C2A:65 Well, it would for me, yeah.

C2A:66 . . . I'd say, if the only way to deal with this is to break the rules ourselves, between you, me, and the gate-post, I'll deny this ever, I'd say fine go and break the rules.

C2A:70 But, I would never advise players to break the rules, with the exception of, this is the World Cup or a serious match here, and there is no other way out.

Gill accepted this view.

P4G:134 Well, I guess I've said that already. Again at international level, or at a very competitive level that if someone does that and gets away with it then you are just going to have to play the same game even if you don't like doing it.

The level of competition significantly influenced whether players saw breaking the laws as acceptable or not. Unacceptable actions that were defined in relation to cheating were seen as open to change. Rebecca implied that she may change her view on actions that she considered unacceptable now.

RR:46 Is it okay to break the laws if your opponents do?

P6R:46 Urm . . . break the laws. There isn't many ways you can break the laws in cricket, what do you mean . . . urm if they tamper with the ball then no it's definitely not okay for us to tamper with the ball, I'm completely anti that. There are plenty of things you can do to the ball, you can put sun cream on the ball, you can lift the seam, if it hits the seam it moves off the pitch and there's more chance of there being a wicket but I don't think you should alter the condition of the ball . . . and may be my views on that will change.

This illustrates the potential dynamic, changing nature of ethos. When perceptions on the concept of fairness change, in turn, the ethos is re-negotiated and redefined. Bredemeier and Shields (1995) use Haan's concept of moral balance to understand the changing nature of fairness in sporting games. What is fair becomes the product of unique contextually conditioned negotiations that are carried out within a discourse that has a particular past and an anticipated future (Bredemeier and Shields, 1995). As Lövlie, (1997) states:

Judgement is not confined to finding the fit between an action and its rule, but to sorting out the threads of the moral web, taking both social, psychological and moral facts into consideration (p.30).

Although some players saw fair play as both playing to the spirit and to the letter of the laws of the game they acknowledged that there is a dividing line where rules can be pushed to their limits. For example, Harriet believed:

RH:45 Urm do players always follow the laws of the game?

C4H:45 [phone rings] . . . well I don't think they do because my perception of cricket is that there's certain ways you can push the laws to suit your advantage.

Robert identified an example of this:

C3R:20 Well urm you might try and wind someone up in an indirect way. If say someone comes out to bat you might say, c'mon on let's get them back in the pavilion straight away, you know not talking to him but talking to your mates so he can hear what you say.

Louie held the perception that the WCA acted as the Establishment by setting certain traditions and attempting to maintain set standards. The lack of money in the women's game was also seen to be a contributory factor in fair play. Most significantly, the recurrent variable was the level of the game.

P1L:78 Urm again with me it's a heat of the moment thing. I'd like to sit here in all honesty and say that I wouldn't cheat, but scenario A, it's the World Cup final, and they need two to win, y'know the ball comes back in and you flip the bail off with your finger before the ball's got there, and the umpire's given then out, are you going to go up to the umpire and say, I'm sorry but I've taken the bail off with me finger.

RL:79 And what would your captain say if you did?

P1L:79 I think I think you'd get a big bollocking from the captain.

Louie's comments support MacIntyre's (1996) claim that, as a member of a practice, one's attitudes and preferences become shaped by the practice. The context of the game shapes the player's response to fair play. The interpretation of rule following is left open to the player to decide on the appropriate action (Reddiford, 1985).

Part Two: Application of Fair Play/Ethos within the Game

1 Laws and Ethos

The idea that the laws of cricket promote fair play was a strong one. Sporting behaviour was seen as a direct consequence of the laws of the game. Robert felt that the establishment of the elite women's game was the WCA. He believed they ran and controlled the game and, as a result, had defined the laws and their interpretation. This illustrates the MacIntyrean notion of the institution; that is, the institution becomes the foundation for sustaining practices.

C3R:42 I think so, yeah I mean I think that urm the establishment of this country basically run the game and they've made the laws?

Other players, Valerie and Charlotte, noted the effects of etiquette and tradition. Cricket was seen to be proper and civilised.

P2V:52 Yeah, because you've got some rules, well they're not really rules, but you've got things that have been handed down traditionally like, mankadding, like you don't kick it off your pads to get that extra run, so yeah, they do.

P3C:50 Yeah, yeah, urm it's a game where there are lots of laws and it's something that people would have to have a bit of depth of knowledge about especially the higher you go and I think it's you know there's so much tradition in terms of going out and tossing the coin. Then there's tea, and the whole sort of make up and the

structure of the game. It is very civilised, you know you are with the opposition all the time, you are not in isolation, and you know you're all having a cup of tea together. Whereas in hockey and football you're in separate dressing rooms and there's not the hype in the game.

Rebecca gave a specific example where the law had been changed to enforce sporting behaviour.

RR:54 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship?

P6R:54 Urm . . . urm . . . the laws urm . . . yeah I guess so urm the 'no ball' law has changed to stop negative bowling you know where the bowler can just roll it along the ground and in effect stop the other side from winning so that's changed . . .

Alexander made an interesting point on the idea that a captain can offer a sporting declaration. This occurs when one of the captains feels that her team has scored just enough runs to secure a draw. To declare provides an opportunity for an exciting and close finish.

C2A:80 I don't know. I mean we could go off on a tangent for a minute, the declaration laws are interesting . . . urm . . . because you get this concept of a sporting declaration.

He also drew attention to the point that the laws of cricket may actually discourage sporting behaviour.

RA:79 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship?

C2A:79 Urm . . . to an extent I think they do urm . . . but on the other side of it, the laws discourage sporting behaviour. I mean if you take the appeal rule, law. . . . There are many many LBW appeals that are made which is damn obvious they are not going to be given out . . . but there's a psychology in that, it's intimidating the batsmen, and the umpire. But you have to appeal for an LBW decision . . . now if the law of the game was that there was no appealing and the umpire just sits there, and when they think it's out they give it out urm you'd have a very different climate, because the law says you've got to appeal.

As we continue it is clear that the rules merely provide the minimum framework within which players operate. This supports the claim that, formalism, on its own, as a theory of games cannot cope with multiplicity of actions and contexts in which

players find themselves. The abstract nature of formalism does not account for fairness.

2 Walking

Law 32 states that:

The Striker shall be out Caught if the ball touches his bat or if it touches below the wrist his hand or glove, holding the bat, and is subsequently held by a Fieldsman (sic) before it touches the ground (Law 32 (1) Out Caught).

If a player has been caught out, and after an appeal from the fielder, the umpire will signal out by raising his finger above the head. 'Walking' is where a player does not wait for the umpire's signal and effectively dismisses herself from the game by walking off the pitch. Such a noble act was once seen as an inherent part of cricket and fair play. It may be the case that the batter has just touched the ball and it has deflected into the hands of the wicket keeper. In such cases, it is difficult for the umpire to judge whether a player has touched the ball with the bat or glove, and hence, been successfully caught out. A player is under no obligation to 'own up' and say whether they made contact with the ball. To walk indicates that the player does not need the umpire to give her out; she has taken responsibility and been honest. On the other hand, a fielding team may appeal for a player to be given out even when they know she has not touched the ball with bat or glove. Such occasions provide a rich context in which to examine players' attitudes towards fair play.

Robert explained that, in his day, a player was cheating if she knew she had hit the ball and did not walk.

C3R:27 . . . I mean in my day as a player if you hit a ball and you got caught behind the wicket then you walked or you'd be expected to walk. Nowadays, and there's a lot of justification for it, if you nick a ball behind and get caught you wait for the umpire to give you out, even if you know that you've hit it.

In cricket today, Robert argued, perceptions are changing. He believed that the umpire should take responsibility for such decisions. Collett's (1977) concept of permissive rules is of significance here. Permissive rules empower people to act in certain ways if, and only if, they wish to do so. In the case above a player 'may'

walk but is not compelled to do so by Law 32. The obligation to 'walk' that a player may once have felt is weaker in the professional game today. Thus, the value surrounding 'walking' carries less ethical force within the ethos, now, than it may once have boasted. These changing perceptions have an impact on the simulacra of fair play.

C3R:28 Urm . . . yeah the umpire's there, let him give you out, that's his job. But in my day if you'd have nicked a ball and waited for the umpire and he would've given you not out and everybody heard it and you knew you hit it, then that's a form of cheating.

Other coaches of the squad had mixed views. Jane argued that players should walk unless they are in any doubt. She acknowledged and accepted, however, that that was not the advice players were given. Alexander saw 'not walking' as inadvertently breaking the rules of the game. If players were given 'not out,' then they were not 'really' breaking the rules rather they were 'only' breaking the rules inadvertently. For Alexander, it was acceptable for players to break the rules in this case.

Marie argued that some players saw walking as a way of undermining the umpire. This is another example of how norms become legitimised through practice. Here, players rationalised their decision to not walk as a way of according respect and authority to the umpire. She believed that the right thing to do in such situations is to walk but would leave it up to the individual player to decide for herself. She said:

C1M:22 I personally don't agree with it but I'm sure there are people in England who do the same. It's a delicate one isn't it?

C1M:23 urm . . . but then again what do you do if you're the last wicket in and you get a snick, do you walk then and the team is going to lose. It's a very difficult one.

Harriet, on the other hand, held a different view. She believed that players were within their rights to stand their ground and wait for the umpire to give the decision. There was uncertainty as to whether this action was actually fair. Harriet acknowledged that it might include trying to deceive the umpire.

C4H:51 . . . in the women's game, if you've got the confidence, and you've got the body language y'know then why not. Well I s'pose that's when you're pushing the rules isn't it. In theory, people think you're out, but you can sway the umpire's decision about the way you

come across. So, well, I think you have to give it a go, and the responsibility is on the umpire to say you are out, that's what they're there for. If it's blatantly obvious, walk, but in some respects I think you'd be a bit silly if you did. I think if there's been some dubious quality that has gone on, then I think you're well in your rights to say, well I think I was in, you make the decision urm . . . and you're gonna get some people who'll stand there regardless of what's happened. I guess you wouldn't have the umpires there if there wasn't that pushing the limits because it's not written in stone that you walk. We haven't thought about this recently . . . it used to be a group kinda thing. If you're not sure then stand your ground . . . we're trying to say, y'know you've got to be confident at the crease anyway and project a positive body language and an arrogant body language urm . . . so if they have that anyway. . . if they're . . . So if you can stay in for a bit longer and you've given off the right signals then I don't think, well are you playing fair?

RH:52 What do you think?

C4H:52 Well [laughs] Australia and New Zealand would do it . . . so it's not unfair is it. It's this unwritten thing again.

Harriet saw not walking as fair play because other teams, such as Australia and New Zealand would not walk. The notion that pushing the rules, or inadvertently breaking the rules was considered acceptable. This illustrates Schatzki's (1997) point on acceptable actions. He argues that a practice establishes not only certain acts are correct but also that other actions are acceptable, even if they are not how one should proceed. For example, the player who understands walking grasps not only the correct procedures for acknowledging the appeal of others, "but also a range of actions that can be performed in response . . . without incurring correction, remonstrations, and punishment" (Schatzki, 1997, p.102). Harriet saw this as 'pushing the rules' to their limits.

Charlotte, Gill, Shauna and Louie all believed that a player should walk if it was obvious that she was out. They acknowledged, however, that the decision became harder depending on the context and level of the game. Shauna admitted that she felt awful after choosing not to walk in an international match.

P5S:21 . . . urm [laughs] talking about fair play I'll give you two instances where twice I've not walked as a batsman . . . and I can tell you [laughs] I've never felt so bad in my entire life you know I thought I was going to have to hide myself away for a year or so.

When asked why she had felt so terrible she said:

P5S:24 Because I've been brought up to if you've done something like that then you walk, the batsman walks and that's how I've always played my cricket urm but if I was the bowler then I would be right miffed and you know I've had it too I've had it as a bowler so you know so you do feel miffed.

Shauna felt that being fair had something to with 'being English.'

P5S:34 Urm I think we're very competitive we play a lot of international cricket urm but we are also quite fair I think being English.

RS:35 Something to do with the character of being English?

P5S:35 Yeah urm reserved polite you know urm "Very nice shot," that type of thing yeah I think we are to some extent.

She argued that Yorkshire people do not walk and that whether you are a walker or not depends on who you are and where you come from. This supports Held's (1993) idea that we are embodied beings in particular discourses with particular backgrounds. How we act depends on how our narrative selves have been socially constructed as part of a community with a particular tradition and history.

P5S:36 . . . urm but you know two or three of the Yorkshire lasses are different to me. They'll probably you know give it a bit of this sometimes [makes lip sign] or not walk or whatever urm I mean again it's different people from different areas and it's a different way of life really.

Louie, who is from Yorkshire, argued that she would walk if she thought she had nicked it.

P1L:35 Well, yeah it's more of an establishment game anyway, isn't it, cricket. It's the old stiff upper lip thing in't it . . . a gentleman's game and whatever else. . .

She was asked whether she would feel differently if in a crucial situation.

P1L:36 Yeah, I mean it's easy for me to sit here and say that I would definitely walk and if it's a club game and there's nothing hinging on it, then yeah I'd but like you say if it's a World Cup final and you're the last batter in, and you know you only need one run to win yeah, so what are you going to do and I think realistically in the heat of the moment, whether you are a walker or not you're gonna do it in that situation . . . so again, yeah, well it's all down to the situation you find yourself in.

Gill argued that she hated the moment where you have to make a decision about whether you are going to be honest or not.

RG:91 So, in some ways the professional attitude almost means that you are allowed to be dishonest?

P4G:91 Yeah, in a way it has become that and it's y'know it's a shame I think because that's . . . urm the game was that you played the game and if you knew you were out you went. It would be great if it was like that but life isn't like that anymore, people aren't like that anymore . . . It becomes a very individual thing . . . if it came to it and it was a real marginal decision and there was doubt I'd have to wait, I'd hate it but I'd have to wait.

Rebecca argued that fair play is to walk. She said that she would not walk, however, and that fair play needs to be given a lower status or consideration in the professional game.

This illustrates the point that players do not always accept the contract to compete or accept that they have an obligation to play fairly. The use of the social contract as a way of understanding fair play is limited. When we consider context-specific examples we can see that athletes do not perceive the contest as a contractual agreement in which they are obliged to conduct themselves in a fair and just manner. The content of the agreement is negotiated in a way that considers more than just the formal rules of the game; it is context-specific. In this way, then, details of athletes' contingent circumstances are relevant to the contract to compete and, as a result, they should not be ignored. Rebecca's justification for not walking, she explained, is a new attitude within the game.

RR:20 What makes you say that?

P6R:20 Well for example if you're out by being caught behind and you don't walk . . . but I wouldn't walk either cos if I'm not given out then I wont walk so I suppose urm I think that is fair play urm fair play is to walk. But I think there are times when fair play has to be put aside a little bit and you've got to be a little bit more practical when you're given out so many times by what you think are dodgy decisions by umpires and if you're given an extra chance to stay in unless it's very very obvious and the umpire has been deaf and stupid then I would walk but if it was a very very faint edge to the wicket keeper and I wasn't given out then I wouldn't walk.

Rebecca perceives fair play differently than any other interviewee. She argues that fair play should be accorded a lower status in the professional game. The way Rebecca perceives the role of fair play in the game is crucial. She perceives ethical situations differently than other players. Blum, (1994) argues that different parts of one's moral makeup are brought to bear in 'seeing' (and not seeing) different features of ethical situations. He states:

In fact, one of the most important moral differences between people is between those who miss and those who see various moral features of situations confronting them (Blum, 1994, p.30).

It may be argued that Rebecca, one of the younger members of the squad, brings a new perspective or competitive outlook to the team. This will be seen in later examples.

The onset of professionalism and recent sponsorship has meant that players face greater pressure to resist walking from the pitch. Robert suggested that although players may say they would walk, the reality is different.

C3R:29 I don't think many players in the professional game, if they hit a ball then they will wait for the umpire . . . that's my opinion. They might tell you something different but I would say they would wait for the umpire . . .

He argued that it is cheating for a player to stay at the wicket if it is obvious she has touched the ball with bat or glove. But, it was acceptable to not walk if the player got the faintest of edges and the offence was less obvious. Louden (1992) reminds us to situate moral action in context. Here, an instantiation of unfair play is internalised and embedded in a particular context. It is **only** cheating to stay at the wicket if the offence was obvious. This norm becomes legitimised and concretely meaningful in terms of the accepted ethos of the practice. Furthermore, norms become internalised and then shared habits of action (Roberts 1997). Robert states that he would advise players to stay at the wicket and wait for the umpire's decision:

RR:30 And would you advise players to wait for the umpire?
C3R:30 Yes, I think I would say, let the umpire give you out but I mean if it's really obvious then that is cheating . . .

In summary, whether you are seen as a ‘walker’ or not was considered a personal thing. In the past, not walking from the crease was viewed as cheating. Before the 1980s a walker may have been highly respected. Today, however, the situation is different. Not walking has become an accepted part of the professional modern women’s game. It is not considered as cheating to wait for the umpire’s decision. Here we can see a working example of how norms of fair play have become legitimised based on everyday practice (Lovlie 1997).

Fair play is more than just following the rules. To be a fair player or display sporting conduct demands more than mere rule adherence. What counts as fair in cricket here is more than just an interpretation of the Law – whether a player is caught out behind or not. The roots of such noble, chivalrous actions like ‘walking’ can be traced back through public schools and what has been deemed the cult of fair play in male sport (Mangan 1981). The example offered here shows how fair play is a socially and historically constructed idea. The notion that playing cricket is about expressing gentility and femininity through morally praiseworthy behaviour is a facet of the game that is fast eroding. The concept of ‘sledging’ can be used to illustrate this point further.

3 Sledging

The laws of cricket refer to the unfair nature of incommodiousness. In other words, it is unfair for a member of the fielding team to trouble or annoy a batter while she is waiting to receive a ball. The law states:

6. Incommoding the Striker

An umpire is justified in intervening under this Law and shall call and signal “dead ball” if, in his opinion, any Player of the fielding side incommodes the Striker by any noise or action while he is receiving a ball (Law 42, (6), p.44).

This is known as sledging. Although this term can not be found in the laws of cricket, reference is made to the term in the International Cricket Council’s Code of Conduct which states:

Players and Team Officials shall not use crude or abusive language (known as 'sledging') nor make offensive gestures (Regulations of the International Cricket Council 1998, Code of Conduct, 1.5, p.8).

Sledging is a term used in cricket to describe certain verbal behaviour of players when out in the field. Both Robert and Alexander said that sledging in the women's game was less harsh than in the men's game. Valerie gave an example where a player had made derisory comments about her batting ability.

P2V:27 Urm . . . I toured Australia . . . as I was at the non-striking end she turned round and said, "Don't worry mate, you won't be fucking stood there for a long time" . . . so urm you know okay then . . . but that was my sort of welcome to Australia. . . . and to me that's over stepping the line from healthy banter, in my view.

Interestingly, Jane argued that English girls were far too polite to sledge and furthermore that middle class girls were not good at it. She said:

M1J:26 . . . it's not in their nature and we're not used to it and we're not, we're far too polite, a cautious a people for that.

Here is an example of gender stereotypes that are reinforced through the social construction and cultural make up of the practice. For Jane any kind of sledging was unfair. Alexander, on the other hand, argued that there are different levels to sledging; sledging in women's cricket was fair.

C2A:34 Well, I wouldn't say sledging is unfair . . . 'cos it's not against the rules of the game, certain types of sledging are against the rules of the game, that doesn't go on in women's cricket.

C2A:35 I haven't come across sledging in women's cricket that transgresses the rules of the game. So by my definition, it's fair game, fair play.

Harriet agreed and argued that sledging is an inherent part of the game.

C4H:23 I think it's part of the game, I think it's quite a mental thing . . . But, there's nothing in the rules that says you can't do it so I think it's one of those of things that makes the game a little bit challenging . . . say the, well Australia, New Zealand, South Africa are good at it.

For Valerie sledging becomes unfair when it is nasty. She said:

P2V:23 Urm . . . I would do a lot of chat on the pitch, not questioning people's parentage, not nasty, but encouragement, a little bit light

hearted occasionally. That is my idea and there's a fine line because there's nothing wrong with a little bit of cheek and a little bit of humour but as soon as you start stepping over that line, and I s'pose becoming nasty, to me that's not fair.

Sledging was seen as an inherent part of the game. Southern hemisphere sides were viewed as particularly good at it. It was seen as an inevitable consequence of the game becoming more professional and competitive. As Robert said:

C3R:37 Yeah I think it is and it's all part of the game. It certainly goes on a lot more in the Southern hemisphere than it does in this country. But I think you know I think that when it all comes down to it, that is all in the mental side of the game and how you can in this day and age urm the players have sport science people that go all through that side of things with them, playing in front of the cameras, the media, and all that. Again it's playing at the higher level and all that.

For the England team, Louie thought that one or two of the players could sledge but that it was not really part of their cultural makeup. Harriet argued that sledging was a result of who coaches a particular team. Differing perceptions regarding sledging illustrate the contested, plural nature of ethos. Within the social field of ethos, views about whether norms become acceptable are continually contested and negotiated.

4 Appealing

As already mentioned, players can be dismissed for several reasons. However, a batter can only be given out if a member(s) of the fielding team appeal(s) to the umpire.

1. Time of Appeals

The umpires shall not give a batsman out unless appealed to by the other side which shall be done prior to the Bowler beginning his run-up or bowling action to deliver the next ball.

2. An appeal "How's That?"

An appeal "How's That?" shall cover all ways of being out.

(The Laws of Cricket, Law 27 (1,2), p.33).

So, to reiterate, this law means that fielders must appeal if they want an umpire to give the batter out. Fielders are expected to make genuine appeals where they believe the batter is truly out. A shared perception within the game is the concept of excessive or aggressive appealing. This is where fielders appeal for decisions that they know to be unfair. For example, the wicket keeper may appeal for caught out

when she knows that it has come off the pad of the player and not off her glove or bat. The bowler, wicket keeper, and other fielders may appeal together for an LBW decision knowing that the player should not be deemed out LBW. Jane felt strongly about the kind of appealing that occurs for LBW decisions.

MIJ:27 . . . I mean I'm not happy. If you're the bowler and you think you've got them, then of course you should appeal and the wicket keeper should support the bowler and appeal urm but if you're down at square leg and behind the umpire then I think it's damn rude and just not cricket to be appealing for something you can't see.

The coach, Marie, however, saw things differently.

C1M:44 . . . I mean I actually think girls don't appeal enough on LBW. I mean for LBW you might as well shout hadn't you, if it's hit the pad first then that's up to the umpire, it's his decision, and you might as well have a shout. Of all the things and this might sound outrageous but you might as well appeal for that one 'cos sometimes they give em and sometimes they don't . . .

Alexander argued that appealing for decisions known to be unfair is part of the psychology of the game.

C2A:79 There are many many LBW appeals that are made which is damn obvious they are not going to be given out . . . but there's a psychology in that, it's intimidating the batsmen, and the umpire. But you have to appeal for an LBW decision . . . now if the law of the game was that there was no appealing and the umpire just sits there, and when they think it's out they give it out urm you'd have a very different climate, because the law says you've got to appeal.

Valerie saw excessive appealing as a fair and accepted part of the game. Louie said that England, as a team, planned to appeal aggressively for every decision because they knew the New Zealand team would be doing the same.

P1L:83 Yeah, there's that. I mean like New Zealand we were playing in the semi-final, and we knew damn well New Zealand were going to appeal for everything because the Indian umpires are like that. And we thought, right if they are going to do it, then so are we. It was a conscious thing before we went out y'know.

Charlotte admitted using the same tactic. The idea here is to influence the umpire's decision by practising, as a team, how to appeal effectively in order to make it look good.

P3C:68 . . . And the appealing I mean there's some countries where we would make a point of going all up together to make it more convincing, like India and Pakistan, and if we can influence in any way, then let's do that.

Charlotte said that England probably would not use the same tactic against New Zealand. She explained that the way England appeals depends very much on where they and who they are playing.

P3C:70 I think because you tend to, again you're always assessing where you are, who you're playing, in your analysis and game plan. I think that in India they're used to a lot of appealing. I mean whenever we play them they appeal for everything. So rather than miss out, you say okay then, it's an aspect of their game that is important that we try to include. So it's an analysis of where you are and how it's done, so it's assessing where you are, and yep, in Rome do as the Romans do.

Gill explained how a well-timed appeal might be used to unsettle a batsman.

P4G:83 What we would say is, if we are going appeal then we all appeal, then it's a loud appeal. We don't just leave it to the bowler to say [quiet voice] y'know how's that but because there is an element of it that is unsettling to the batsmen so y'know you want the people behind the bat to be loud in their appeal y'know to shake someone up even if they are not out it shakes them up.

This was seen as an accepted part of the game and not seen as unfair. Excessive appealing may be considered as an example of where there is incongruity between the purposes of rules and their application. As Russell (1999) explains, “. . . the application of rules may be at odds with the purposes that the rules are intended to serve” (p.30). The purpose of the law, here, is that a fielder must ask the umpire if a particular action warrants the dismissal of the batter from the game. This derives from the notion that it is polite to ask as sporting players do not need an umpire. The law states that an umpire cannot give a player out unless there is an appeal by the fielding team. This has gradually come to mean that fielders seek to appeal for

anything that may seem ‘worth’ a shout just in case the umpire agrees and gives it out.

Players’ conceptions of fair play differed depending on the context in which the game was played. Players constructed notions of fair play based on the context specific circumstances in which they were playing. There was an implicit understanding that teams will test opponents out.

5 Mankadding

Law 42 is dedicated to factors concerning unfair play. One of these citations concerns the unfair stealing of runs, otherwise known as mankadding, after the batsman, J. Mankad, who first tried to steal a run. In this example the non-striker may try to gain a few yards by leaving her crease early, when the bowler has just started her run-up. This allows the non-striker to gain a head start on scoring a run. The laws state that such an act is unfair play.

12. Batsman Unfairly Stealing a Run

Any attempt by the batsman to steal a run during the Bowler’s run-up is unfair. Unless the Bowler attempts to run out either Batsman the Umpire shall call and signal “dead ball” as soon as the Batsmen cross in any such attempt to run. The Batsmen shall then return to their original wickets (Law 42 (12), p.47).

The umpire may call dead ball when he intervenes in a case of unfair play. This means that the ball is not in play. To unfairly steal a run, then, is accounted for in the formal rules of the game. However, the application of this rule, and crucially the ethos surrounding its application is bound with unwritten rules of etiquette. Within the formal rules of the game, the bowler is entitled to knock the bails off as soon as a player leaves her crease thereby putting her out of the game. To do so, however would contravene the ethos of the unwritten rule, where the accepted etiquette is; first, to warn the batter that if she continues the bowler will whip the bails off. If the action is repeated then the bowler is deemed within her rights to put the player out of the game. Marie explains her view on mankadding and sees it as a form of cheating:

C1M:25 . . . another thing in cricket that is etiquette urm that if the backing up batsman urm as the bowler comes in if they leave the crease before the bowler has released the ball, you can actually not bowl the ball and take the bails off and the batsman would be out. It’s

called Mankadding because that's where because the chap who did it first was Mankad, that was his name. Now in cricket what you're supposed to do but well it's not in the laws of the game actually but it's the etiquette, you see if someone does that . . . you stop and you go urm and threaten the stumps and you say if you do that again then we'll take the bails off. Now having done that then you are entitled to do that. So what I actually tell players to do now is if you know someone who is basically cheating by running early which is what they are doing then you must stop and threaten the stumps and the chances are they won't do it again then and at least you'll stop them cheating.

It is considered polite for the bowler to warn the non-striker first.

RJ:47 Are there any unwritten laws of the game?

MIJ:47 Urm yes probably hundreds cos that's the tradition and etiquette . . . urm like Mankadding, it's polite to warn . . .

Traditionally, as we noted in Chapter Two (Part Two), the laws of cricket in the women's game are supposed to be applied with courtesy and politeness. Harriet saw this as unwritten law:

C4H:46 . . . you see the problem with cricket is that there is a lot of courtesy, which is not necessarily a law that is written, it is unwritten law. So yeah, I would say it's done out of courtesy but in an odd way urm . . .

Rebecca saw mankadding as cheating. She did not believe that a bowler should warn another player. Although she acknowledged that it was seen as fair play to warn she did not believe that she should have to warn out of politeness to another player.

P6R:39 . . . there's not many ways you can cheat in cricket urm you can there's like taking a yard when you're backing up as a batsman . . . Mankadding . . . is that cheating urm yeah in effect that's cheating and whether you can get away with it or not urm I suppose that's up to the individual urm but it is cheating in that it's going against fair play in cricket because you can do it and get away with it and probably if you did it nine times out of ten you would get away with it and you would get a head start and I suppose that is cheating urm . . . as a bowler if you catch someone Mankadding I think you should be able to stop in your run up and take the bails off and it's out and I don't believe in warning . . . although that has been held in cricket as fair play cos it's fair play to warn and to not take the bails off and to pretend and say to the batsman, you're out of your crease and if you do that again then I'm going to take the bails off then she's out and say to the umpire, look I've warned her. I don't believe in that. I don't think that's urm well if it was an inexperienced player who didn't

realise she was doing it then fair enough but in an international situation when so much is hinging on it and they need one run and they are going to gain by that then you shouldn't and I really think that urm yeah . . .

Rebecca felt strongly about mankadding as she had recently played in a game where a batsman had unfairly stolen runs. She wanted to take the bails off and not warn but felt compelled to refrain from doing so. She argued that to forego warning was not cheating but, at the same time, may also be considered as not fair play.

RR:41 So would some people say that if you had run her out and not warned her that would be cheating on your part?

P6R:41 It wouldn't have been cheating but it wouldn't have been fair play so not cheating but not fair play.

RR:42 What do we call that area then?

P6R:42 Urm cheating you're in the right though I mean cheating essentially is you're doing something wrong to gain an advantage yeah urm the batsmen is cheating in that situation but I had spotted them doing the wrong thing and I had warned them so that is fair play urm if I run them out then it isn't cheating because they've done the wrong thing and I've given them their just reward but it can be seen as not fair play . . . it's quite a grey area isn't it . . . and it's such a big issue because a side only has ten wickets and they are very important especially the fact that they are pinching a yard means that they are probably in a tight situation and urm by warning them you let them get away with it and I really really believe that you should run them out . . . But what I say about the old school in women's cricket, well not just in women's cricket but in cricket, had I done that . . . and we also discussed this, had I done that then the powers that be in the Women's Cricket Association then all hell would have broken loose probably.

Rebecca had a compulsion to contravene the ethos of the game; do not warn the offending player, whip the bails off. The fact that she refrained from such an action indicates her reluctance to go against her perceived view of the WCA at that time. In fact, all of the team shared this perception, and believed that the 'Establishment' would have been horrified if England had not warned the non-striking batsman. This illustrates Nilsson's (1997) point that rules and their application become sites of struggle where norms are constantly re-negotiated and standards are changed. Rebecca's attitudes are shaped by the ways in which the institution of EWC governs. The institution of a practice principally coordinates factors that governs participants' actions (Schatzki, 1997).

As Gill explained:

P4G:119 What mankadding, oh it would cause a storm urm and we wouldn't do it, we just wouldn't do it. You would warn them but why because it's not against the rules because the etiquette is so embedded in that sense that it's such a dreadful thing to do that, it's so terrible. But, I'm not saying that the Australians wouldn't do it, they might, I would be surprised, but they might.

Valerie also agreed that not warning goes against the rules of fair play.

P2V:34 I think if you did that without a warning, although it's not actually cheating, urm it is within the rules, it's not within the rules of fair play.

The ethos, then, directs players to warn the other team before taking the bails off. To contravene this was seen as not fair play. The decision to uphold the ethos, to continue to warn a player, may be seen as an example of the prescriptive force of ethos previously discussed in Chapter Four. The institution played a crucial role, here, in defining the way players applied the rule in context. This exemplifies Addelson's (1991) point about the way in which selves are positioned in relation to power hierarchies. Here, players reflectively positioned their beliefs in relation to the beliefs of the WCA, the perceived power hierarchy. Meanings that may be assigned to actions within the context of a game, then, are dependent on the pre-existing forces that govern and sustain ethos. The view on what may be considered right or wrong stems from the lives of cricketers and their relationships with institutions that are embedded in cultural notions of what is allowed or deemed acceptable. It is in this way, then, that we can see how fair play is tied up with not only the formal rules of the game but the ensuing cultural norms of the practice. Moreover, these rich data would have been completely missed if an empirical investigation had been eschewed.

Gill believed the attempt to steal runs was using the rules to your advantage and not cheating. She explained that the team is coached, 'to pinch a yard' until you are warned.

P4G:117 Yeah, yeah, y'know you're not supposed to leave your crease until the ball has been bowled, y'know you start your walk up with the bowler but your bat has to be in the crease, but you try and reduce the distance as much as you can so you are running a shorter

run, now urm we did a session with [mentions name] and he said now pinch a yard . . . y'know come out of your crease just a little bit before the bowler, and y'know if they notice and you get told off well stop it but if you manage to get two singles out of that then you manage to get two singles. Now I don't think that's cheating. I think that's using the rules to your advantage which is that if the opposition doesn't notice that well they've not noticed it, and urm y'know in cricket y'know the etiquette, and this still happens, is I'm warning you. Now you wouldn't have that in most other sports, y'know I'm going to score a goal in a minute, I'm going to get off side in a minute, do that again and I'm going to go and score a goal y'know doesn't happen but generally we warn people but the next time you should take the bails off. . .

Players are socialised through the cultural norms of the practice (Nilsson, 1997). Notions of fair play become established and perpetuated whereby the ethos of a practice becomes shared habits of action that are peculiar to that culture (Roberts, 1997). Changes may occur within the normative standards of acceptability. Norms will be set and reset when something occurs within the context of the game but is outside the jurisdiction of the rules and shared ethos. Norms are legitimised and re-negotiated constantly to challenge the existing perception of the way it is deemed acceptable for players to actually participate. As Roberts (1997) explained cricketing selves are continually reweaving themselves to accommodate new beliefs and desires.

6 Sportspersonship

Each of the interviewees was asked for his or her view on the concept of sportspersonship. Jane said that sportspersonship involved the values and ideals of competition.

M1J:20 Sportspersonship is upholding all the values and ideals and competing within all the agreed rules and framework and not trying to put one over on the opposition.

Robert made reference to the 'Establishment' of cricket and their role in running the game.

C3R:42 I think so, yeah I mean I think that urm the establishment of this country basically run the game and they've made the laws?

Marie believed that the laws of cricket do not have an influence on sportspersonship. She argued that sportspersonship concerns the 'bit that goes' with the laws. This is ethos; the way in which the laws of the game are applied. Both ICSPE (1996) and ICFP (1994) argued that fair play is playing with the right spirit.

C1M:43 . . . Urm the laws are the laws and I don't know if any of them encourage sportspersonship but the bit that goes with it does, doesn't it. Cricket encourages sportspersonship I think, but the laws I don't see how they can encourage sportspersonship because they are just the laws . . .

Alexander mentioned the notion of gamesmanship (sic) as a negative version of sportspersonship.

C2A:49 I guess it means two things. On one level sportspersonship is, what a good sport, plays by the rules of the game, never tries to bend the rules of the game, urm . . . a good sport would not involve him or herself in sledging, "Y'know what a jolly good egg . . . y'know blah blah, blah." The other angle of sportspersonship is actually overtly or covertly manipulating within the rules of the game . . . urm so pushing the rules as far as you think they can possibly go . . . urm, "Y'know the old thing of, that's just not cricket," using the negative version of sportspersonship to not do cricket.

Louie made the same connection. She felt that gamesmanship (sic) was an inherent part of all sport.

RL:53 What does sportspersonship mean to you?

P1L:53 Urm . . . well to me there's like sportspersonship and then there's gamesmanship. Sportspersonship is playing hard and fair . . . because you are there for the love of the game and the enjoyment of it. Whereas, gamesmanship is y'know is you're winning one nil and there's like a minute to go and er you've got a throw in and you're deliberately wasting time, y'know, ref, where is it? Now to me that's gamesmanship, that's totally different to sportspersonship . . .

RL:54 Is gamesmanship okay?

P1L:54 Yes, it is because you know if the boot was on the other foot the other team would do exactly the same. It frustrates the hell out you though . . .

Valerie talked of being a good sport.

P2V:40 . . . gamesmanship to me is when you are almost on the verge of cheating in terms of etiquette and in terms of fair play, whereas sportspersonship is good healthy competition. It's being a good sport I suppose.

Charlotte and Shauna spoke of the structure of the game and the way in which tradition and courtesy have an impact.

RC:50 Urm would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship?

P3C:50 Yeah, yeah, urm it's a game where there are lots of laws and it's something that people would have to have a bit of depth of knowledge about especially the higher you go and I think it's you know there's so much tradition in terms of going out and tossing the coin. Then there's tea, and the whole sort of make up and the structure of the game. It is very civilised . . .

Shauna made a connection between cricket, sportspersonship, class, and being English.

RS:59 Would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship?

P5S:59 Yeah I would because cricket is a very English game played by the you know the upper class I suppose for a start, and I don't know it's just heaped in tradition and with that tradition comes the rules and regulations and urm I suppose it does encourage sportspersonship yeah.

Gill said that sportspersonship involved respect for other players.

RG:110 What does sportspersonship mean to you?

P4G:110 . . . Urm I guess that's the principle of fair play, of respecting . . . respecting everybody even your opposition respecting them as players basically . . .

Rebecca, on the other hand, reiterated that she thought fair play and sportspersonship were antiquated terms.

P6R:35 Urm . . . urm . . . sportspersonship . . . that's another really sort of weird concept isn't it sportspersonship urm . . . being a good sport being a good loser what does all that mean urm . . . [laughs] I mean when you're playing in the World Cup of course you're not going to be a good loser you sulk don't you urm sportspersonship urm . . . I don't know that's a bit of an antiquated term as well I think urm sportspersonship . . .

Here is an example of tension between the laws of cricket and their intended purpose. Rebecca recognises that sportspersonship means something more than just playing by the rules but does not consider this as the right way to play the game.

7 Professionalism

During the time the interviews were conducted the WCA had just voted to merge with the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB). All interviewees saw women's cricket becoming more competitive and more professional.

C3R:56 Yes, I do. I think it's becoming more competitive because of er sponsorship coming into the women's game now, television, and they you know want to do well.

The onset of professionalism meant that standards of acceptability were changing; the parameters were beginning to be re-negotiated and re-defined. Rebecca argued that what was once considered acceptable may no longer be the case.

P6R:26 Well I think they're becoming more acceptable because in women's cricket I think now after having made that jump to international cricket the standard of cricket is getting better. . . but when you're in such a competitive environment then things do come out, you do say things which taken in isolation might be seen as not very nice and I think it surprises people because not only is cricket such a traditional game but women playing cricket shouldn't be involved in that . . . and I suppose it's the whole cricket ethos that says it's not fair play, you know the traditions of cricket.

Marie stated that women's cricket was becoming more competitive both internationally and domestically. She spoke of the difference between winning and winning at all costs.

RM:56 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive?

C1M:56 Yes I do and I think it needs to be . . . we need to get in our domestic program in England more and more competitive cricket. I think we have a fear in England of competitive means nasty doesn't it. . . so anyone who wants to be at that elite level you are competitive aren't you, that's what makes you play, you play to win, but you don't play at all costs to win, there's a difference isn't there?

Charlotte argued that the stakes are now higher than they ever have been before. In the future she wanted to see England winning more matches, thus, raising the profile of their game. She saw this as a way to legitimising their status within the ECB.

RC:56 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive?

P3C:56 Yeah, I think that you know the stakes are getting higher, you know for, for example, if we want to be taken seriously with the ECB and the lottery, we've got to win matches and urm be seen on TV.

Rebecca echoed these thoughts emphasising that there are younger players in the team and that there is more prestige in playing for England.

RR:62 Do you think the game is becoming more competitive?

P6R:62 Yes definitely without a doubt. There's more competition domestically, more counties, more prestige to play for England than there used to be. The average age has decreased on the national side, so definitely yeah.

Loland and McNamee (2000) argue that practices have internal standards of acceptability which are partly driven by notions of the good game and the good institution. The examples offered here in Part Two are indicative of how elite women's cricket, as a practice and as a tradition is under going many changes. Ethos is a fluid, changing entity where those changes occur within the practice itself.

8 Summary

The main conclusion to be drawn is that fair play is particular; it is context-dependent. Hence, ethos is context-dependent; that is, its structure and form changes according to the context of the game. Rebecca's comment sums this point up nicely; she argues that her concepts of right and wrong change depending on the context on the game.

P6R:53 No urm no . . . it's up to you as an honest player I think not to urm I mean if you knew the ball had gone over the boundary then you'd have to signal four it's part of sportspersonship isn't it. But it all comes down to concepts because if I batted and I was batting and I didn't walk I could go on to make eighty and end up getting sixty more runs than the time when in effect I was out urm so the people said I didn't walk so I cheated I'd gained my side sixty more runs which is enough to win by a long way so I think it is really really ethical like the example of chasing the ball round the boundary you know if I have just said to you that if I hit the ball and get an edge then I'm not going to walk in an international game which I'm not but then yet I've said I'm honest enough to say, oh yes this ball has crossed the boundary and urm Australia have got four urm it's odd isn't it how we change our concepts of what's right and wrong.

To understand fair play in sport we must look beyond the formalist structure of rules and examine the ethos of the game. Rules leave open a whole range of motives that an examination of ethos can provide. Part of what an ethos means is to understand

the beliefs, values and ideologies of players themselves who have constructed agreements as to how the game should be played. As Sherwin (1991) argues, we must re-conceptualise the concept of the individual. People have historical roots; they develop within specific human contexts that are embedded in particular traditions and histories.

Players positioned themselves reflectively within the game; they were critical of themselves and actions within the game. The interviewees are reflective because they bring a body of knowledge to the game. To different degrees, they reflectively position themselves within the ethos of the practice. The description of the ethos presented here examined that shared collective policy. The idea of ethos is a continual moral discourse that is enacted within a practice. It represents the plurality of contested meanings, values and norms within the game.

It is not only the laws of the game that provide a framework for fair play but also the rich tradition and etiquette which constitute the ethos of the practice. They are mutually inclusive; *together* they form the basis for normative agreements of standards of acceptability. The formal rules, on their own, are inadequate in cases of personal moral conflicts where it is necessary to take the particulars of the case into consideration (Lövlie, 1997). Fair play is more than simply following rules. An understanding of fair play, therefore, requires exploring different cases and ethical discourses. If we do not explore the particularities of ethos then we leave a wide void of uncharted territory in an examination of fair play.

The purpose of this chapter was to present the empirical findings of the thesis. The interviews provided a frame of reference in which to examine how norms of acceptability were enacted in relation to fair play. An inside, critical view of the practice was used to form a thick account or description of fair play. The next chapter will consider whether the ethos of EWC is an ethical one.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

1 Introduction

The central aim of this thesis has been to develop a philosophical analysis of the concept of ethos with particular reference to the meaning and content of fair play. The main contribution included the implementation of a different methodological approach. The goal was the successful juxtaposition of empirical work and conceptual analysis. To understand the ethos of EWC and fair play in this way necessitated a commitment to the theoretical stance posited.

Chapter Two provided a brief historical description of conceptions of fair play. The purpose of this section was to illustrate how fair play is inextricably linked to the moralities and practices of particular activities. This served to exemplify the contextual feature of fair play; that is, fair play is a socially and historically constructed concept. Links were established between the historical traditions of cricket as a practice and the concept of fair play in contemporary EWC.

Chapter Three was a cursory explanation of traditional ethical theories. To show how feminist ethics differed from traditional theories, a number of alternative approaches were considered. The notion of a context-respectful theory for fair play was proposed. The link between Chapter Three and Four is considered important. Chapter Four explained how those traditional ethical theories have been instantiated in the philosophy of sport literature and continued with a detailed explanation of how a context respectful approach can be implemented to understand fair play and the concept of ethos in sporting games. The methodology employed was philosophically justified by adopting a certain feminist epistemological position. In an attempt to secure the stance taken, Immanent Critique and its possibilities for research were explored.

Chapter Five outlined the methodology of the thesis in more detail and explained how the research was conducted. The construction of the analytical categories was also proposed. Chapter Six used the rich data acquired from the practice to articulate the ethos of EWC. In this chapter, three theoretical moves are made to secure the

aims of the thesis: (A) The rejection of formalism as an adequate theory of game playing; (B) The merits of an empirically informed theory of fair play; and (C) The explication of an ethical ethos. Each point will now be considered.

2 The Rejection of Formalism

It has been established that, in sport philosophical literature, fair play has been characteristically understood in one way: Formalist accounts of the nature of rules and laws that govern the practice of sporting games. To recap, formalism proposes that actions within games can be defined solely in terms of their rules. But, the constitutive rules that set out the formal parameters for the way a game should be played neither account for nor define the practice fully. As Schwyzer (1969) argues, “The rules of a practice do not tell us *what* the practice is of which they are the rules” (p.464). In other words, the rules of the practice do not specify what the practice is. The sporting game is not solely constituted and made possible by the rules. For example, some of the cricketers interviewed did not always know the formal playing rules, but certainly knew how to play the game and play it excellently.

Striving to keep the formal rules of the game is a necessary condition of game playing but this, on its own, does not provide a rich account of fair play. This is because the rules governing games cannot always be relied upon as definitive guides to the regulation of conduct. As Russell (1999) states:

. . . rules may be vague or indeterminate as to meaning, intent, or scope; they may conflict; they may simply fail to foresee situations that must be regulated to ensure the good conduct or integrity of a game (p.30).

So, Russell (1999) argues, rules, on their own, remain “instructively imprecise” or abstract. The formal rules of a game are not definitive guides to ensure fair play. Sports have to have some agreed core of meaning of when, how, and in what circumstances rules are to be applied. As discussed previously in Chapter Four, rules cannot determine their own application and do not ensure that fairness is secured in games.

Other contemporary theories of fair play, however, have also refuted the explanatory power of game formalism proposing alternative approaches for a more complete understanding of fair play (Schneider and Butcher, 1998). Although such theories provide a coherent, defensible, and articulate account of fair play they are not actually descriptive of any particular sporting game. This means that the precise meanings attached to notions of fair play are left unclear and perfunctory. Formalism does not provide a thick account; there is a need to look at the internal goods of the practice and how players work within the rules to achieve their ends. In order to do this, it is necessary to consider the influence of a given ethos and the notion that rules are applied in specific circumstances. Moreover, the role that an ethos plays in prescribing how a player acts during play demands examination.

Accounts of fair play, as we saw in Chapter Four, grapple with the notion of ethos but do not effectively scrutinize its impact and influence on norms of fair play. For example, D'Agostino (1981) argued an ethos was important but his account did not examine the crucial role that a given ethos may play. A philosophical account of ethos and its role in the construction and articulation of fair play is proposed but has no empirically informed grounding for how it may actually work in practice. In other words, an account of social practice grounded in experience is omitted from his theoretical outline. It captures part of what is constituted by the abstract notion of ethos but leaves out a whole range of considerations and particularities specific to sporting games. A given ethos and its ensuing tacit agreements will not be the same in every practice. This has implications for the notion of fair play as a universal concept. As McNamee and Loland (2000) argue, if norms of fairness in games are incompatible then this represents a challenge to the meaning of fair play as a universal moral ideal.

Formalism, then, provides the researcher with the minimum set of preconditions for a game to take place. One cannot, of course, talk about fair play without reference to the rules. Nevertheless, as has been established, those actions not covered by the rules must be considered or such accounts will remain abstract, as they will fail to consider the ethos of the practice. Accounts of fair play must look at players' conduct and competing motives within games taking into account what governs

behaviour and the extent of deviation therein. This will facilitate a thick description of fair play.

None of the philosophical accounts of fair play reviewed in Chapter Four gave an examination of fair play in context. Indeed, Schneider and Butcher (1998) call for more sport-by-sport analyses. This thesis provides a snapshot of what such an analysis might look like. More detailed studies need to be conducted to gain a fuller picture of fair play across all sporting genres.

In Chapter Five, the link between a criticism of formalism and the proposal of an empirically informed theory of fair play becomes apparent. Formalism, as a theory of games, exists in the abstract notion of rules themselves. Players should not be treated as disembodied, abstract components of fairness. An epistemological commitment to empirically informed theory stems from the insights gained through a study of feminist ethics in Chapter Three. People do not exist in abstraction; they are embodied selves within particular discourses or nexuses of practices. To play sport, to play for one's country, has significance and value in people's lives. Players' thoughts and feelings are crucially linked to ideas of fairness whether they may be considered ethically acceptable or not. For example, one only has to look at the current match fixing scandal in men's cricket as an illustration of unethical practice. The point is that we must look at how players perceive rules rather than an exposition of the written form of the rule on its own.

Fair play is a contextualised constitution. Thus, an account of fair play must not ignore the social and historical situatedness of games as particular social practices. We must look inside the practice to see what counts as ethical behaviour and to determine what the social actors therein believe constitutes right and wrong, acceptable, and unacceptable behaviour. Considerations must be given to judgments in a social context. Only then can we begin to consider a richer, thicker understanding of fair play in sport.

3 Empirically Informed Fair Play

Thus far, a variety of ways of theorising fair play has been examined. None of these have sat comfortably with the following premise: if we do not ask those people

whose beliefs partly constitute fair play, then how are we going to know which conception is the most fruitful? The adoption of an empirically informed approach allows the researcher to gain an insight into the practice whereby the ethos acts as a guide to action. In summary, to analyse fair play we must consider: (1) the formal rules of the game; (2) how they are applied and; (3) the beliefs, values and ideologies of players themselves who have constructed agreements as to how the game will be enacted.

The mixed model approach employed here is more than mere empirical observation. A descriptive study of the ethos of EWC identified the perceptions held and described common understandings within the ethos. Chapter Six offered a further explanatory approach which discerned those independent variables that can account for the findings of such descriptive studies. Empirical facts are relevant and purposeful for normative discussion.

Of course this is not a well-used approach in sport philosophy. This is not how philosophy is commonly understood. It is argued, however, that this approach, by using data to achieve a grounded narrative, leads to a richer understanding of fair play. The reference point for fair play stems from the rules but is crucially examined from a context-specific and particular ethos. Fair play is partly constituted by the ethos, thus, comprehending the particularities of ethos is crucial to an understanding of fair play. As a result, the thesis provides more than just empirical generalisations. Rather, substance is given to the concepts of ethos and fair play and the precise meanings that are attached to fair play are made clearer.

This methodological approach necessitates an examination of precise meanings in context. Theorised critical description of elite women's cricket, based partly in the voices of actors themselves, furnishes a thick account of fair play. In order to do this the researcher has to go and ask players what they think and feel about fair play. Such accounts can supplement previously theorised descriptions because the players have given rich information over and above what could have been achieved from a thin account. An inside vantage-point gets at how players perceive the rules; what notion of fair play is applicable within the context of the game; and which actions of an ethos are peripheral to the process. We may be informed by what people fail to

do, for example, not walking when they know they are out or unfairly stealing yards during the bowler's run-up.

To reiterate, a normative study of fair play requires more than simply a collection of descriptive premises. Theorised critical description on interpretations of fair play allows researchers to examine those tacit norms at the very core of rules and ethos. The researcher gains access to the preconditions underpinning the sporting culture to come up with a normative analysis of fair play or exactly what does or does not count as an ethical ethos. The crucial part of the discussion now becomes how we decide who has the relevant experience to validate such claims of ethical or unethical conduct. So, if to understand practice we must be inside **and** critical, then we must start with the following questions: Where do the internal standards for games as practices come from? How do we get a critical edge?

If we follow Roberts' (1997) line then the following is true: if only actors know the ethos, and if fair play is partly constituted by the ethos, then only actors can give an informed account of fair play. This, Roberts concludes, is vulgar ethnocentrism at its very worst where 'anything goes.' Not so. It is simply wrong to imply that only those within the practice can determine what shape an ethical ethos may take. Indeed, had a vulgar ethnocentric construction been presented here, then the ethos of EWC would have been deemed as ethically acceptable solely because the interviewees therein believed it to be so. A vulgar ethnocentric approach condones unethical actions simply because they constitute dominant beliefs.

It is more felicitous to offer a MacIntyrean (1996) explanation here: that is, only those who have *relevant* experience of a practice are thereby competent judges of the practice. To become a competent judge one does not have to belong to the practice but to gain the relevant inside experience to be able to critique the practice. Whilst it may be the case that actors as 'knowers' are able to give an informed account of fair play, this is not the only requirement for an immanent critique. We can use these accounts to occupy the position of a competent judge. It is not just about playing the game but understanding the traditions, internal goods, and roles of institutions within practices. We are to gain this knowledge from a wider background in sport

philosophy coupled with observing games and talking to elite women cricketers, coaches, and managers.

In order to critique a practice reflectively, immanent criticism requires that we must evaluate both the internal and external standards of the practice. The internal standards of an ethos may be accepted by players but unethical; what is fair is not necessarily the same as ethical. An ethos can operate with fair agreements and at the same time be unethical. For example, players from both teams can agree to take bribes for fixing the results of matches. Such agreements can be arranged fairly where each player may receive 'their fair share' of the money and yet such actions are unethical. The idea of ethos is not, therefore, coterminous with justice or fairness.

The next section examines whether the ethos of EWC is ethically acceptable. Here, the critic must be able to gain distance from the practice whilst using balanced principled judgment within context. Attention is paid to both the internal goods of the practice and the fulfillment of those actions that serve to sustain them. Once we have established those goods we do not remain solely within in order to critique whether they are being adhered to.

4 Ethical Ethos

It has been argued, then, that an interpretation of the social context of games, based partly on a thick description of the actors themselves, must be incorporated within an analysis of fair play. Morgan (1995) suggests that:

. . . the ethos tells us in explicit terms what we already know on an implicit level: namely, it tells us what social standards and norms we presently use to understand and judge the games we play and watch (p.56).

The game of cricket provides the *opportunity* for a moral climate to thrive where players can pursue the prelusory goal of the game. This climate must embrace an ethical ethos if fair play is to flourish. So what should fair play in cricket demand of a player? What should the descriptive content of an ethical ethos comprise and how can it be appraised? These are not purely philosophical questions but sociological ones as well. Such questions have provided the rationale for the descriptive part of

the thesis. We need to consider what counts as fair play when there are different interpretations of how the rules should be applied. How do we decide which interpretation ought to be favoured? How do we come up with criteria to evaluate different interpretations of rule violation? Such complex notions provide an argument for exploring a given ethos: what counts as meaningful performance in a sporting game concerns the context-respectful nature of the practice itself. Brown (1995) defines practices, like cricket, as complex social activities:

We may suppose that they are typically organised in terms of sets of rules that make explicit their purposes and regulate the means acceptable for achieving those purposes . . . They also tend to determine the goods or benefits to be achieved by the practice. In this sense such goods, such things deemed good to achieve by the practice, are internal to the practice itself (Brown, 1995, p.240).

We need to be able to ascertain exactly what the normative standards of a social practice are and where the critical appraisal of a social practice originates. Furthermore, a critical examination of an ethos must be able to evaluate whether a given ethos is ethical. What are the moral prescriptions we want to place on actions in sport? Who mitigates how we should behave in sport? What kind of sportspersons do we want to aspire to? Does the ethos of EWC instantiate fair play? What should we do when there is a choice to be made that is not logically explained by the rules, like walking? As Loudon (1992) reiterates, "how do we meaningfully criticise moral practice outside of our community without appealing to principles that carry more-than-merely-parochial-weight (p.128)?" Sufficient responses to such concerns are obviously complex. The question now is the way in which one can critically gain access to the moral issues under study.

The starting point for such an examination originates within the practice itself. Cricket as a cultural construct embedded in a particular social and historical frame was examined to get at how fair play is legitimised through practice. The central premise when competing is to be able to achieve the internal goods of the game. They can only be achieved fairly and by those involved in this or that *particular* kind of practice (McNamee, 1997). As previously discussed, these are realised within the practice itself. They make up the experiential values of the game, including: the pleasure of hitting a ball; taking a catch; bowling a clean wicket; the excitement of a

tight finish; or the guile needed to strategically out think the opposition. External goods, on the other hand, can be attained from participation in a number of activities. They include, fame, prestige, money and medals (McNamee, 1997). Brown (1995) argues that these external goods may be in conflict with the internal goods of a practice. Other external goods, such as entertainment or education may not be. McNamee (1997) argues that for practitioners to attain the internal goods of a practice they must display a range of virtues. He states:

The cheat may gain the prize, the wealth, the adoration but never the internal goods. Individuals become enjoined to others in a practice; they seek a common good in athletic excellence. To achieve this they must display commitment to understanding its ways, rituals, skills, history and to see the good of the practice as partially definitive of their own good (p.29-30).

An ethos gives meaning to those actions that are performed or suppressed according to the rules (formal and unwritten) of the game. An ethos informs players how a particular rule should be applied. It assigns meanings generally to actions within the context of the game as a whole. There are different alternatives that can be taken when playing a game and when a rule is to be applied in particular circumstances. The question remains how to determine which actions belong to an ethical ethos. If the internal goods of a practice are to be sustained then authoritative, respected 'voices' of that practice must provide good reasons to behave in a certain way. Such good reasons are based on their experience and knowledge of traditions, practices, and institutions. Providing good reasons for conduct should help to sustain an ethical ethos if the interests of the internal goods of the game itself are valued. What actions are accepted and considered within the interests of the game will be constantly challenged, re-negotiated and re-worked depending on the ensuing context of the practice itself.

The internal standards of acceptability, then, will stem partly from those social actors who hold a position of 'authority' or dominance and are considered experts within the game. Authority here means 'accorded respect' by those involved within the practice. They are respected performers or 'moral experts' within the practice because of their knowledge about the game. Other practitioners respect their values and ideologies. Louden (1992) states:

Moral experts are persons of good moral character who, through experience, upbringing, exposure to older exemplars, and continuous reflection, have developed the requisite practical skills to know how to deliberate well about what is good for themselves and for their communities” (p.137).

Set standards are legitimised through the history and tradition of both the practice and the institution in an attempt to uphold the internal goods of the game. Practices weave together agents and settings through the understandings and articulations of those experts who organise and govern activities (Schatzki, 1997). Whether or not the ethos occupies an ethically justifiable position depends on whether the beliefs of those designated experts are based on good grounds.

Loland (1998) argues that the question of whether a game or an ethos may be considered ethical can only be dealt with in practical discourse. The consequences of actual rule violations, which serve the development of the players’ sense of fairness, must be examined. Loland (1998) argues that intentional rule violations must be rejected as part of an ethos of any sport. Here, Loland is referring to intentional formal rule violation. It would be more rigorous, however, to argue that both intentional formal rule **and** unwritten rule violations must be rejected as part of an ethos of any sport.

An example of an unintentional rule violation is when the bowler oversteps the bowling crease on her run-up and bowls a no ball. This is where some part of the front foot whether grounded or raised was behind the popping crease (Law 24 (3), p.30). An intentional rule violation, on the other hand, is to be considered as cheating. For example, taking drugs, tampering with the ball, or sledging. Loland (1998) argues that violations of formal playing rules can be ranked according to their increasing negative influence on degrees of fairness within a game. He states:

1. Unintentional Rule Violations – unfair advantages are eliminated or compensated for.
2. Unintentional rule violations – unfair advantages are not eliminated nor compensated for.
3. Intentional rule violations – unfair advantages are eliminated or compensated for and additional penalty is imposed.
4. Intentional rule violations – unfair advantages are eliminated or compensated for but no additional penalty is imposed.

5. Intentional rule violations – unfair advantages are not eliminated nor compensated for (and no additional penalty is imposed).
(Loland, 1998, p.90).

The above hierarchy espouses that there are differing degrees of fairness when rules are broken. This has strong implications for the survival of an ethical ethos. The use of Immanent Critique as a methodology is able to provide the means for an ethical evaluation of a practice. By using the reflective examples of the interviewees it is possible to conduct an ethical evaluation of the ethos of EWC enabling the researcher to show how judgements can be made on whether a given ethos may be considered ethical. In order to determine whether the ethos under study is ethical, six categories were examined. These emerged from the data and represent the relatively shared understandings of the social actors involved. We need to evaluate the content of each category.

- (1) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules;
- (2) Impermissible acts that break the formal rules;
- (3) Acceptable acts that break the formal rules;
- (4) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rule;
- (5) Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule; and
- (6) Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rule.

4.1 Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules

First, consider those acts which players deemed permissible and are in accordance with the formal rules of the game. For a game to be played at all both teams have to agree on a number of the formal playing rules of the contest. For example, that there are to be six balls in an over, eleven players in a team and so on. Moreover, if unintentional violations do occur then players agree that unfair advantages must be rectified. For example, when a bowler delivers a no-ball a 'free' run is awarded (if no runs were scored) to the batting team and an extra ball is assigned to the over. This sets the initial standard of acceptability for the contest to be played where formal rules are accepted. Here we can see how theorists have attempted to use the idea of a social contract to explain the nature of fair play. Athletes must accept some of the formal conditions of the contract to ensure that competition can be played.

4.2 Impermissible acts that break the formal rules

Next, players acknowledged that there are unacceptable acts that break the formal rules. Examples here included, abuse, physically assaulting an opponent, tampering with the ball, taking drugs to improve performance or fixing matches and accepting bribes. All of these acts were considered ethically unacceptable and irrelevant to the practice of EWC. There were no desires to break the formal rules in this way.

It must be noted, however, that a small number of interviewees argued that if the opposition were to act unfairly then so would they. Gill and Alexander believed that the level of competition dictated whether ethical actions were upheld. Coaches may advise players to break the formal rules of the game when competing in a World Cup match. Furthermore, Rebecca argued that her views on ball tampering might change.

Normative standards of excellence are those external standards that serve the interests of the game. They may be considered principled beliefs. Normative standards of acceptability are those internal standards that are adopted by members of the practice. They may or may not be principled beliefs. In this category, the dominant shared beliefs of EWC may be considered principled beliefs. They are based on good grounds that serve the interests of the practice. In other words, if the actions mentioned above were adopted they would corrupt the ethos of EWC and deny players the possibility of achieving the internal goods of the practice. Consequently, it can be argued that, at present, the ethos serves to sustain high ethical standards in this category.

4.3 Acceptable acts that break the formal rules

EWC considered sledging to be acceptable in terms of a formal rule violation. Although the interviewees did not feel that they were particularly good as a team at intimidating other opponents, they felt this was a necessary and accepted part of the game. Sledging was legitimised and given credibility under the pretext that it was a necessary component of a competitive attitude. It was seen as a skill that the national team of Australia had perfected and the English team needed to work on. The act of sledging can be placed on a continuum ranging from 'light hearted banter' to the 'aggressive intimidation' of a batter. It may be argued that those acts of sledging legitimised by the ethos of EWC are to be found on the side of 'light hearted banter.'

Nevertheless, the dominant shared beliefs on sledging cannot be considered as principled convictions. They are not based on good grounds. Attempting to intimidate members of the opposition using verbal abuse of any form is contra to maintaining a normative standard of excellence that serves the interests of the practice.

Players considered it acceptable to break Law 42 (13): a formal rule concerning player conduct. This law states that players must not question umpires' decisions. The idea that the umpire's decision is final (or correct) is, however, less evident today than in previous years. Players do question specific decisions made by umpires. Denying the authority of the umpire will have a negative effect on the practice. We have witnessed similar concerns in other male sports recently, such as football and rugby.

An ethically sound ethos has no room for intentional formal rule violations of this kind even if actions form part of all players' shared understandings. Consequently, it can be argued that the ethos does not promote high ethical standards in this category.

4.4 Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rule

This category forms an important part of determining where the internal standards for games as practices originate. It would have been impossible to comment here without gaining an inside view of the ethos. Players construct agreements as to how the unwritten rules of the game should be applied. Such examples provide rich opportunities to consider what happens when formal rules are not broken but shared norms or tacit understandings are.

In the example of mankadding players believe that it is permissible to try to steal a few yards while the bowler is attempting her run up. Although, as we have seen, this is documented in the formal rules of the game, it is an unwritten rule that the bowler ought to warn a player before she puts her out of the game. Such an act is an accepted and frequent part of the international game. To take the bails off without warning a player would contravene this unwritten rule and would be viewed with disgust. The internal standards of acceptability are prescribed and perpetuated by the dominant beliefs of those in 'authority.' They sustain the practice of the unwritten

rule. At present, these beliefs are considered justified and represent the attitude that players value and respect. There were signs, however, that these norms were likely to be contested. For example, consider Rebecca's comments:

P6R:39 . . . as a bowler if you catch someone Mankadding I think you should be able to stop in your run up and take the bails off and it's out and I don't believe in warning . . . although that has been held in cricket as fair play cos it's fair play to warn and to not take the bails off and to pretend and say to the batsman, you're out of your crease and if you do that again then I'm going to take the bails off then she's out and say to the umpire, look I've warned her. I don't believe in that.

In the case of walking the dominant belief is no longer one that can be considered justified or principled belief. For example it used to be the case that not walking from the wicket when you knew you were out was cheating. The dominant belief in the ethos of contemporary EWC is somewhat different. The boundaries concerning standards of acceptability have been re-negotiated. Permissive rules do not carry much moral weight here: a player does not feel obliged to do anything she is not compelled to do by the formal playing rules of the game. To stand one's ground, show positive body language, and not walk is seen as an accepted part of the game. Players rationalise their decisions in a number of ways: to walk would undermine the umpire; nobody else walks; or it's inadvertently breaking the rules of the game but not really breaking the rules. Under the guise of professionalism and competitiveness, principled dominant, shared belief has become unprincipled dominant, shared belief. This does not serve the interests of the internal goods of the practice and, as a result, should be viewed as an unethical facet of the ethos of elite women's cricket.

4.5 Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule

Interviewees identified a number of acts that were unacceptable because they were considered to break the unwritten rules. Here we may also include the example cited previously of not warning a player in the mankadding illustration or distracting the bowler before she commences her run-up. Another example refers to the tacit agreement between batters when not to attempt to take a possible run. Here the internal standards of acceptability appear to sustain the interests of the game. They seem to be in line with the normative standards of excellence that are required to

sustain an ethical ethos. It is in the interests of the practice to uphold the unwritten rules.

On closer examination of players' attitudes, however, it may be argued that the ethos of one-day cricket directs players to eschew some of the unwritten rules of the game. A tension became apparent between the one-day game and Test match cricket. The 'winning is everything' attitude of the one-day game meant that players were more likely to break the unwritten rules. In the pressurised, competitive situation of the 'fifty over thrash' players acknowledged that they would be less likely to uphold the unwritten rules of the game. Test match cricket was viewed, however, as less competitive because a draw is considered an acceptable result. The importance placed on the internal goods of the two types of game is different. The context and ethos of the *particular* type of game influenced whether players would behave ethically. It may be argued again that, under the added pressures of sponsorship, increased competition, and 'professionalism,' principled, dominant shared belief is in danger of becoming unprincipled, dominant shared belief. In the one-day game, as opposed to Test match cricket, there was a greater gap between the normative standards of excellence and the normative standards of acceptability.

4.6 Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rule.

This is a crucial category as it exemplifies that players intentionally break the unwritten rules of the game whilst knowing and believing that they should be adhered to. Players know what is right and 'proper' conduct but they do not act in such a way. Here the ethos sanctions acts that break the unwritten rules. It is ethically wrong to prescribe adherence to the ethos of a game if that ethos accepts and perpetuates intentional violations of its unwritten rules. This is, of course, assuming the unwritten rules are ethical.

An example here is the concept of excessive or aggressive appealing. The shared dominant view saw aggressive appealing as an accepted part of the game. The idea is to influence an umpire's decision based on the team's ability to make a convincing appeal. This skill is practised and used in the game situation. The justification for such an approach stemmed from the idea that, because other teams would 'shout' for anything, then it was acceptable to do the same.

In this example, the normative standards of acceptability have been re-defined and are in conflict with the normative standards of excellence. We may argue that it is ethically unacceptable to appeal for a wicket when it is known that one's appeal is founded intentionally on breaking the unwritten rules. Elite women cricketers are not ignorant actors when they are breaking the rules in this situation. They have consciously practised how to appeal effectively whether they believe the batter is out or not. The appeal, whilst it may be unsuccessful in putting a player out of the game, will at least unsettle or intimidate. Players know what actions others may label as unfair but that they themselves consider to be acceptable within the ethos. Within the practice they gain an awareness of 'what goes' and subsume what seems to be legitimate practice as internalised norms for fair play.

Here, players do not act in the way that Schneider and Butcher (1998) propose; they do not contemplate whether an action they take would be good for the game as a whole. Agents do not typically view the world from an objective or impersonal standpoint thus, behaviour does not stem from the impersonal point of view (Sherwin, 1984). Players have definite ideas as to the way in which rules should be applied in particular circumstances. In some cases, this means that their ethos is ethically unacceptable.

5 Summary

The evaluation offered here concludes that the ethos of EWC is unethical. There are degrees, however, of ethical unacceptability. Standards of acceptability can be ranked according to their negative influence on the formal and informal rules of the practice.

Formal Rules

- (1) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the formal rules
- (2) Impermissible acts that break the formal rules
- (3) Acceptable acts that break the formal rules

It may be argued that the ethos of EWC retains a moderate standard of ethical acceptability within the formal rules of the game. Dominant shared beliefs, however, cannot always be considered as principled convictions. Here, the ethos directs players to accept most of the formal rules (1). The ethos did not sanction a number of

unethical acts that would break the formal rules (2). For example, violence, taking drugs, bribery and ball tampering were all considered unacceptable. Players considered a version of sledging and dissent to be acceptable acts that break the formal playing rules (3).

Unwritten Rules

(4) Permissible acts that are in accordance with the unwritten rules

(5) Impermissible acts that break the unwritten rule

(6) Acceptable acts that break the unwritten rules

Mankadding and not walking were viewed as permissible acts in accordance with the unwritten rules (4). In the case of the former, the ethos directs players to adhere to the unwritten rule: the bowler must warn a player before she puts her out of the game. Rebecca's comments illustrated, however, that such politeness should not be awarded to a batter. Here we can see the initial signs of a potential re-negotiation of the unwritten rule and a lowering of the players' standards of ethical acceptability. The same may be said for the case of walking. No longer is the morally praiseworthy cricketer one that walks from the wicket when she knows she is out. Players deny their own autonomy in ethical decision making and are more likely to blame the umpire for not making the correct decision.

Acts considered impermissible by players because they break the unwritten rule included talking before a bowler commenced her run-up, and taking a quick single when the opposition had misfielded the ball (5). The ethos directs players to observe the unwritten rules here. Consequently, high ethical standards are adopted in this category. It is argued that ethical standards are compromised when the ethos sanctions acts that break the unwritten rules of the practice (6). This indicates that traditional ethical facets of the ethos are eroding and leads to the conclusion that the ethos of EWC is unethical. The example considered here was excessive or aggressive appealing.

In summary, this investigation argues that the internal standards of acceptability of the ethos of EWC are unethical. The internal goods of the game do not always serve as a driving force to sustain and promote an ethical ethos. Norms of fair play are not wholly adhered to. An ethically sound ethos has no room for intentional rule

violations (formal and unwritten) even if actions form part of players' shared understandings. For example, appealing for an edge that has missed the bat or sledging an opponent constitute intentional rule violations and, as a result, serve to sustain or promote an unethical ethos.

It is important to note that this evaluation has inadvertently denied the position of a vulgar ethnocentric approach by rejecting a prevailing ethical climate based on dominant belief. Dominant belief has not been cited and accepted merely because it happens to be dominant, shared belief. Vulgar ethnocentrism argues that a game should be played the way those involved at the time think it should be played. It is argued here that players know what an ethical ethos should look like but sometimes refrain from acting in a way that would sustain it. In some instances what players say about fair play is laudable but is certainly not adhered to within the practice itself. Actions are often rationalised or sanctioned under the guise of the increasing pressure to be more competitive and 'professional'. This point illustrates Collett's (1977) claim that although rules may be espoused and valued by a community they are not always followed. He states:

Just as the attitudes that subjects express to social psychologists may not always be those upon which they act, so too the rules that one might uncover concerning people's conceptions of appropriate behaviour need not be those that are followed in actuality (Collett, 1977, p.19).

Normative standards of excellence are determined by reference to the formal playing rules of the game and their ethos (when ethical) as to what actions preserve good conduct in sporting games. The formal rules of the game offer the moral minimum. They lay the foundations for fair play. Crucially the role of an ethos comes into existence when interpretations are incorporated. Fair play, first and foremost, is about adhering to the rules of sport. It is tied up with notions of how the good game is to be contested and what an ethical ethos looks like. This means that for a given ethos to be ethical its game must be practised in a certain way and with a certain attitude.

It may be argued that the ethos of EWC offers players different notions, standards and uses of rules that they may or may not observe in deciding on a particular action. Whether a player adheres to an ethical ethos depends on her understanding of the situation (perception of the morally relevant features) and whether they are motivated to want to behave ethically. Hence, a number of criteria must be satisfied for a player to abide by the ethos of the game. First, they must be able to articulate and recognise the shared understandings of the practice. They also must be able to recognise what constitutes breaking those tacit agreements. Finally, players must recognise when a rule violation has occurred and which sanction is to be employed. Fair play must be present in order to achieve the internal goods of a contest; that is, in the production of a good sports contest. McNamee (1995) argues that, in order to sustain an ethical practice, we must find the proper balance between internal and external goods. He states:

This will not be done by denying the place of external goods in those practices and in our lives but by ensuring their subordination to our prior commitments to the internal goods but by keeping them in their place (p.78).

If we want our young sportspeople to strive for an ethical ethos then we must teach the importance and value of abiding by both the formal playing rules and the unwritten rules of the game. This means that initiation into a practice must take into account the values espoused for an ethical ethos. Players should be taught not only the formal rules of the game but also how to keep the ethos of the game and respect the internal goods of that game. Supererogatory actions, that is, good actions over and above the rules are to be applauded. As Loland and McNamee (1999) argue:

. . . a sense for the good game permeated by uncertainty of outcome and in which the participants perform and act according to the set standards of excellence of the game in which they take part. (Loland and McNamee, 1999, p.24).

Morgan spoke of the deliberative force of a practice community. This force endures only as long as the standards it prescribes are acceptable within the community. In EWC the practice community has now changed. The institution of EWC (WCA) has now merged with the institution of men's cricket (ECB). Thus, as we have already started to see, the ethical standards of acceptability will be re-negotiated. Further

research could be done to explore the effects that a change of institution on the sporting practice may have.

6 Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to develop a philosophical analysis of the ethos of sporting games considering:

- (a) how the ethos of EWC can be understood and interpreted;
- (b) how the ethos of EWC relates to fair play norms;
- (c) how the basic elements of ethos and fair play can be articulated and justified and;
- (d) how the above can be located in the context of a feminist understanding of sport.

The accepted view of fair play is that games are rule-governed practices whereby the rules are thought to define the practice of game playing. Fair play should not only be thought of in a formal way. As we have seen in Chapter Six, we cannot get to the kind of rich detail required by looking at fair play solely as a formalist account. The rules of the game do not articulate the meaning and diversity of fair play. We must look to the ethos of sporting games to uncover more about fair play.

The methodology employed has posed wider questions for the way in which we look at sporting practices in general. It has provided evidence to show that this is a legitimate way to analyse ethical dilemmas in sport. The mixed model approach in this thesis offers explanatory power when it comes to defining fair play as a thick concept. The examination of fair play sought to be less vague than previous accounts by attempting 'to capture' the particulars and evaluate the moral perceptions of the social actors involved. Feminist approaches to fair play view morality from the ground up as a kind of social practice rather than from the top down as an expression of theory. This is a way to finding out about good sportpersonship.

The context respectful approach, derived from the feminist ethical literature, can offer us an empirically informed theory. Part of what fair play means in sport is what those athletes and coaches involved think it means. Thus, a case is made for the proper recognition of 'feminist ethics' and their encompassing epistemological standpoints. It is argued that a feminist understanding of ethical dilemmas within

sport will rely necessarily on an eclectic methodology that connects theories to experience. This thesis concludes that an approach that can maintain continuity with experience is better than the abstract universalism of positivist epistemology. As Held (1993) states:

Feminist morality will develop its principles with awareness of the differences between the contexts for which such principles are deemed suitable and with attention to the moral experience of those actually in such contexts. It will be more open than theories which rely on a single, simple, universal moral principle that can be invoked for every moral problem (p.40).

It is important to stress that acknowledging the contextuality of fair play should not hamper the attempt to theorise the formal features of rules. This is a formalist account coupled with an instantiation of rules and the players' beliefs and actions within the practice. This does not mean that a vulgar ethnocentric approach must be adopted. If we fail to consult the people involved it is not possible to unmask those tacit agreements crucial to the concept of fair play. Therefore, to determine what fair play may look like in a given practice we must not only look to the formal rules of that practice but also, crucially, we must examine its ethos. Whilst fair play is about adhering to the rules of the game, its ethos, as a dynamic cultural code informs, creates and gives meaning to sporting practices.

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Appendices

Appendix One

Interview Schedule for Coach/Player/Manager

Background

- What is your occupation?

Who are your role models in sport generally?

- Which cricketer/s do you admire the most and why?

What makes a professional?

- So, would you say that you are a professional?

Can you describe the type of person who would not be suited for elite level cricket?

- Do you think players from different regions have different attitudes?

Fair Play

What do you think fair play means? Can you describe an example?

- Does everyone play fair?
- Do you think that the England team has a fair play ideal?
- Do other countries have the same ideal as England?
- What does sportspersonship mean to you?

Cheating

What does it mean to cheat?

- Do players always follow the laws of the game?
- Is it okay to break the laws if opponents do?
- Do players always accept their opponent's attitude during the game?
- Do players always trust their competitors?
- What actions do you think are not acceptable in the game?
- Is there something in the game that you would never approve of doing?
- If you knew your team could cheat, and get away with it, would you approve? Why?

Laws

Would you say the laws of cricket encourage sportspersonship? (If so, how?)

- Are there any unwritten laws of the game?

What role does the umpire play in a game?

- What status do you accord the umpire?

Dress

How do you feel about the team wearing trousers instead of clots?

- Some people think that the traditional "whites" are old fashioned, what is your opinion?

Game

- Is there 'more' fair play in cricket than in other sports?

- Do you think the game is becoming more competitive?
- What makes a good cricket game?
- Some people argue that the game will suffer if it favours limited overs matches rather than traditional declaration cricket? What is your opinion?

What makes a good coach/player/manager?

- Do you place pressure on your players to win?
- Does the coach place pressure on you to win?

What values are there for you in cricket?

- Is there a “winning is everything” culture?
- Has the psychology of the game changed over time?
- What things, if any, would you say are the niceties of the game?

• How has sponsorship affected the game?

- **How do you feel about the ECB and the WCA coming together?**
- Will it be a good thing?
- What would you like to see happen in the future?

Personal Experience

- Describe what has been your best experience at the elite level so far . . .
- And your worst experience . . .

Can you think of a controversial incident that you have witnessed in your sport?

- Describe what happened . . .

How do you feel about the following actions?

- Sledging
- Acting/Appealing for LBW
- Not walking when you know you are out
- Ball tampering
- Slips clicking fingers
- Appealing
- Shouting
- Gamesmanship

Closure

- Are there any other things you can think of which might be of relevance?
- Thank the interviewee for his/her time, and finish.