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This is the author’s version of ‘Revisiting (and revising?) sports boycotts: from rugby against South Africa to soccer in Israel’ forthcoming in The International Journal of the History of Sport in 2014. It appears here in its pre-publication format in lieu of the publisher’s version of record. Author: Malcolm MacLean

Revisiting (and revising?) sports boycotts: from rugby against South Africa to soccer in Israel

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Abstract

For the first time in nearly 30 years, 2013 has seen increasing public awareness of calls for a comprehensive boycott of and sanctions on a state based on questions of an “entrenched system of racial discrimination”. The call to boycott South African sport emerged in the 1950s as the apartheid state was developing and refining its comprehensive and systematic legal form amid growing international pressure for decolonisation. This is a different social and political context than the call 50 years later by Palestinian civil society for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel (BDS). This paper draws on analyses of international anti-apartheid movements’ campaigns against sporting contact with South Africa and the BDS call for the isolation of the Israeli state to propose a theory of sports boycotts. It looks at the anti-apartheid campaigns, especially those in the early 1960s, to consider ways in which the BDS campaign has an impact on existing historical understandings of cultural boycotts as a tactical and strategic campaign tool.

Keywords: boycott, sanction, embargo, anti-apartheid, Palestine, Israel, BDS, monopsony

Boycotts and related forms of political pressure have been a recurring element in the analyses of sport in international relations and international relations in sport. This paper does three things. First, revisit the anti-apartheid sports campaign to consider its form and character. This will inform a wider discussion of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions as political tactics and explore what it is about the characteristics of international sport that makes sports sanctions distinctive. Finally, a nascent theory of sports boycotts will be assessed through the campaign targeting the 2013 UEFA U-21 tournament to explore the extent to which we need to review or revise our analyses of bilateral sports boycotts in particular and cultural boycotts more generally.

The focus in the sports boycotts literature on the Olympic boycotts of 1980 and 1984 emphasising multi-lateral sports boycotts obscures key aspects of sport in international
relations, diverts attention away from the global distinctiveness of the IOC as a sports body and downplays the significance of differences between the organisation of Olympic Games and other forms of international sports events. The paradox of the Cold War focus on the 1980 and 1984 Olympic boycotts is that the 1976 Montreal boycott was part of the only time an international sports boycott was successful in achieving its long term goals – the ending of South African apartheid. Although not the most significant factor in the collapse of apartheid, the sports boycott was responsible for a series of significant blows against the cultural security of apartheid’s dominant groups. Analysis of the anti-apartheid boycott movement has tailed off in recent years, in part because there is only so much we can say about sports boycotts, in part because South African history is developing new areas of analysis focussing on the country’s sporting past and physical culture, and in part because there have been other pressing issues to explore.

The relevance and significance of sports boycotts changed in 2012/13 with the intensification of action in support of a 2011 call from within Palestinian civil society for teams to boycott the 2013 UEFA Under-21 championships to be held in Israel. This campaign invoked as one of its predecessors the anti-apartheid campaign’s call between the mid-1950s and 1992 for the isolation of South Africa. Other calls for sports and wider boycotts in the previous twenty years had been limited or, as we have seen in the recent call for LGBT athletes to boycott the Sochi Olympics over Russia’s recent antigay legislation, centred on individual athletes rather than sport systems. Public discussion of boycotts and similar kinds of pressure on states has been dominated by state-sponsored comprehensive sanctions activity, such as those directed at Iraq and Iran, or the so-called smart or targeted sanctions directed at members of the political élites in places such as Zimbabwe and Syria. Unlike state-sponsored action, this recent call for a cultural boycott of the Israeli state was a campaign grounded in the civil society networks of those peoples who are the subject of close and restrictive state control. There seem to be significant parallels with the South African case. The explicit invocation of the anti-apartheid campaign and its role as the most high profile of the bilateral boycotts campaigns means that the time is right to begin to revisit and review our analyses of sports boycotts.

While many may feel uncomfortable with calls for a boycott of Israel and the application to Israel of the apartheid label given the UN’s 1973 definition of apartheid as “inhuman acts for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group and systematically oppressing them”, we must also be wary of falling into the trap of equating apartheid with the South African situation only or reifying the South African system. Israel’s actions are contested in international law. The International Court of
Justice in 2004 issued an Advisory Opinion that the Separation Wall Israel is building across the Occupied Palestinian Territories is in violation of international law, while elsewhere it has been argued that Israel’s support for the West Bank settlement building programme is also in violation. Defenders of Israel point, in response, to alleged violations of international law by neighbouring states and assert Israel’s compliance with UN resolutions. The issue is not the legitimacy of either stance; the situation is hotly contested and advocates of the boycott can point to important critiques of the situation they are seeking to address. These questions of the validity of charges against Israel are secondary to the fact of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and the focus of this paper: how we might make sense of bi- and multi-lateral sports, and by implication cultural, boycotts in the light of this 2013 campaign.

Boycotting (South African) Apartheid Sport

The boycott campaign was one of the principal tools that the anti-apartheid movement had in its toolkit to dismantle the white South African government’s systematic racial classification and oppression. In discussions of anti-apartheid campaigns, it is common to identify 1959 as the year that the boycott movement came together into coordinated international activism. There had been boycott events before 1959; the All Africa People’s Conference in 1958 called for a boycott of South African goods and during the mid-1950s the white governing body of table tennis had been expelled from the international federation. It was the formation of the Boycott Movement Committee drawing together representatives of anti-apartheid groups from South Africa and the UK in London in December 1959 that marked a significant new level of co-ordination in the campaign coinciding with an emerging activist campaign in New Zealand focussing on the 1960 rugby tour of South Africa under the slogan ‘No Maoris, No Tour’. This campaign laid the base for one of the most sustained elements of the sports boycott – the movement to stop rugby union and other sports contact between New Zealand and South Africa that lasted until the mid-1980s.

The situation of South African sport under apartheid was complex. Although it was possible to point to systematic racial discrimination in South Africa from the time of earliest colonisation and the emergence of social practices from around the time of World War One that embedded that discrimination in legal and quasi-legal practice, the situation changed with the election in 1948 of a government led by the conservative Reformed National Party, replacing the more liberal New Democratic Party. Liberal is a relative term here; Jan Smuts, the Party’s leader defeated in the 1948 election actively supported segregation, arguing in 1929 that:
The old practice mixed up black with white in the same institutions, and nothing else was possible after the native institutions and traditions had been carelessly or deliberately destroyed. But in the new plan there will be what is called in South Africa "segregation"; two separate institutions for the two elements of the population living in their own separate areas. Separate institutions involve territorial segregation of the white and black. If they live mixed together it is not practicable to sort them out under separate institutions of their own. Institutional segregation carries with it territorial segregation.5

Where Smuts' government differed significantly from the incoming government was its support for the view that Black South Africans should be considered and treated as permanent residents of a white dominated South Africa, not as guest workers whose real home lay in the reserves. Although this difference anticipated the political distinctions to emerge with the formalisation of the Bantustan policy, the basic legal and therefore systemic elements of apartheid developed in the first few years of National Party rule; alongside key legislation including the Population Registration Act (1950) that required all residents to be registered as one of four racial groups, the various Pass Laws Acts (1952 and thereafter), the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950) and the Bantu Education Act (1953) the principal laws affecting sport were the Group Areas Act (1950) and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953).

These latter two pieces of legislation and the regulations and case law that flowed from them, along with several other Acts of Parliament including the Coloured Persons Communal Reserves Act (1961), divided the country into regions designated for occupation and use by the four identified 'racial' groups – White, Black, Indian and Coloured, where Coloured encapsulated most non-Indian Asians, people of mixed race descent and otherwise acted as a 'miscellaneous' category. This division overwhelmingly favoured the White group; 24% of the population who controlled 86% of the land, and the best land at that. Despite being popularly seen, externally, as a National Party programme, this legislation formalised the practice of territorial segregation Smuts had envisaged in 1929. By 1954 this separation then was both spatial – the Group Areas Act – and could be enforced in relation to individual structures, services and related facilities – the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act.

The effect of these developments on sport was profound, preventing informal or 'pick up' games while allowing 'inter-racial' sport between members of organised teams and leagues where a permit had been issued. At times this legislation led to moments of absurdity if they were not so offensive, such as the awards ceremony at the 1963 Natal Open golf
championship, which was won by the Indian Sewsunker ‘Papwa' Sewgolum. Sewgolum had been allowed to play, but the permit did not allow him access to the club house; the trophy was handed to him through a window and the South African Broadcasting Corporation suspended its news reporting of the tournament because its rules did not allow it to cover ‘mixed’ sport.

In the initial stages of the post-war era as organised international opposition began to emerge, the focus was on these exclusionary mechanisms that prevented ‘mixed sport’. Visiting sports teams habitually excluded athletes of colour from their teams, hence the campaign in New Zealand in 1960 around the slogan ‘No Maoris, No Tour’ while it was the controversy over the selection of the former South African ‘Coloured’ Basil D’Olivera as a member of the MCC (English) cricket team to tour South Africa in 1968 that was one of the crucial factors in South Africa’s isolation from international cricket. The international campaign for a sports boycott operated on two principal fronts, one focussed on multi-lateral sports settings with an emphasis on the Olympic Games and the second centred on bilateral sports contacts. While the initial emphasis of the campaign, as seen for instance in New Zealand in 1960, was to oppose discriminatory sports practices, towards the latter half of the 1960s this position shifted to one where anti-apartheid groups opposed the apartheid system, not just its effects on sport, invoking Hassan Howa’s (who became leader in the late 1970s of the South African Council on Sport) statement that there could be “no normal sport in an abnormal society”.

Olympic boycotts
The campaign aimed at Olympic participation scored early successes with the suspension of South Africa from the 1968 Mexico Games, although that has been overshadowed in Olympic memory by the Smith-Carlos salute and the Tlatelolco massacre that resulted in the deaths of 28 student protestors and wounding of several hundred of their fellow activists in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the lead up to the Games. Without wishing to understate the effect of the Tlatelolco massacre on Mexican politics, or arguably the study of sports history in Mexico, the decision by the IOC, under pressure from a threatened boycott by 50 nations as well as Black members of the USA team, to withdraw its invitation to South Africa had a profound effect on the boycott narrative. Although South Africa had not been invited to the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the IOC had side-lined demands to explore claims that the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC) violated the Olympic Charter by practicing racial discrimination – an allegation made to the IOC by the South African Sports Association in 1960. Debates in Mexico City forced the IOC to act. The IOC’s fact-finding mission to South Africa in 1967 had been instructed to address only whether SANOC complied with
Olympic regulations, not to judge apartheid; this instruction to limit the focus came after repeated accommodation of and adaptation to the structure of apartheid sport alongside denunciation of but no action against government interference in sport. The South African Government insisted that SANOC comply with South Africa’s ‘customary’ separation of sport along racial lines. This requirement along with increasing membership of the IOC from Third World and Eastern bloc states that resulted in a shift in the IOC’s power balance meant that in 1970 the IOC voted to expel South Africa. The vote was close at 35 to 28 with three abstentions, and may have been that a provocative and inflammatory speech by SANOC leader Frank Braun as well as the use of Olympic symbols during the 1969 and 1970 ‘South African Games’, devised as compensation for the expulsion form the Mexico Games, caused some IOC members to vote for expulsion instead of a less harsh penalty.9 Thereafter, as seen in Montreal in 1976, the focus of anti-apartheid boycott activity at the Olympics was directed at third party links, those states such as New Zealand, that maintained high level sporting relations, although the focus on rugby union and cricket has constrained analyses of the sport-apartheid nexus.10

While these changing geo-political conditions had a significant impact on the direction and effectiveness of the boycott campaign targeting South African sport in the 1960s, they must not be allowed to blind us to the other major factor in the process: the presence of a credible internal non-racial sports movement.11 Most sports had four officially sanctioned ‘national’ governing bodies, one for each ‘racial’ group – White, Black, Asian and Coloured. In many cases there was also a fifth non-racial governing body that, in being non-racial, rejected the confines and provisions of the apartheid structures. In addition, there were also representative campaigning bodies such as South African Sports Association and the South African Council on Sport. These non-racial sports bodies gave the international anti-apartheid movement and the boycott campaign institutions and groups they could identify as legitimate anti-apartheid voices in sport politics. For many in the international solidarity campaign, the voice of non-racial sport was the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC). An aspect of the debate, therefore, was over the credibility of various voices and the legitimacy both of apartheid and of the sovereign authority of South Africa to determine its own policies. While the international sports world debated these questions and while the South African government during the 1960s made adjustments to their sports policies and the rules governing visiting teams in particular, the geo-political shift associated with 1950s and 1960s decolonization and with the growing presence of Eastern bloc and Third World states in global cultural politics contributed to a shift in the political demands concerning apartheid sport. Whereas at the beginning of the 1960s debates around apartheid sport focussed on who was allowed to represent South Africa and limits
placed on membership of touring teams, by the latter half of the decade to focus was on the apartheid state itself.\textsuperscript{12}

This change in the political demands was more obviously seen in the single-sport campaigns that tended to be localised and focus on the participation by South African athletes in specific events or competitions but were often accompanied by successful campaigns to expel South African federations from international sports governing bodies. These campaigns saw South Africa expelled from or have its membership cancelled or suspended by a wide range of international sports bodies by the end of the 1970s, including men’s cricket, netball, football, basketball, amateur cycling and swimming. In two cases, table tennis and darts, the international governing body recognised a non-racial federation.\textsuperscript{13} Much of this was the consequence of behind the scenes lobbying and pressure developed through national governing bodies, while a key factor in some cases was the pressure seen in the IOC’s debates from Third World states and those aligned to the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China; early, if in some cases pragmatic, supporters of boycotts and sanctions.

\textit{Bilateral contact}

The vital role that governments, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, played should not be under-estimated. This was not, however, a factor in the handful of sports that carried the greatest cultural weight in White South Africa, most especially cricket and rugby union – although it was rugby union that mattered most, being both a vital marker of national dynamism and power and essential to the integrity of Afrikaner masculinity as the epitome of national vigour.\textsuperscript{14} Given the global distribution of rugby union and its dominant teams, its cultural significance in South Africa meant the most important sporting contacts were with the UK, Australia and New Zealand. During the 1960s these three national governments were committed to ‘bridge building’ or a policy of ‘constructive engagement’; a change in outlook in Australia during the early 1970s and a temporary shift in New Zealand between 1973 and 1975 weakened that consensus, but for most of the period of the organised boycott campaign, the governments of both the UK, especially during the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher, and New Zealand between 1975 and 1984 maintained a policy of engagement with the apartheid state. The demand for the sports boycott in all three countries, therefore, lay with civil society campaign groups such as Stop the ‘Seventy Tour and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK and Halt All Racist Tours and the National Anti-Apartheid Council (later, HART: NZAAM) in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Each of these organisations maintained close links with the network of non-racial sports bodies within
South Africa; in the case of HART: NZAAM there were also close working relationships with the South African liberation movements such as the ANC, PAC, BCM(A) and SWAPO.\textsuperscript{15}

The cultural politics of South Africa and the significance of rugby union in Afrikaner masculine cultures meant that, in terms of the sports boycott after 1970, the national governing bodies for rugby in the UK, Australia and New Zealand had a disproportionate influence. After the early 1970s when cricket ties were cut and the rugby unions in the UK and Australia suspended competition with South Africa the most important recalcitrant group breaching the sports boycott was the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. While other sports breached the boycott such as Masters athletics and other governing bodies held out such as the French rugby union in South Africa it was the NZRFU that mattered. This was seen, for instance, as early as 1970 when Maori and Pacific Islander members of the national rugby team, the All Blacks, were given ‘honorary White’ status for the duration of the team’s tour – although the South Africans asked that any Polynesians in the team not be ‘too dark’.\textsuperscript{16}

The global sports system
The final factor contributing to the cultural impact of the sports boycott in South Africa was the global sports system that sustained international tours. Maintaining the focus on rugby union as the most important international sports contact to the régime of power in apartheid South Africa and, in terms of the sports boycott, the most recalcitrant, South Africa’s sporting isolation lasted at most only six years: South Africa was readmitted to full international competition in 1992. The last notable rugby tour, a ‘rebel’ tour of a close to full strength New Zealand national team, was in 1986 (the 1989 ‘international’ tour had only limited significance and included no New Zealanders, widely seen as South Africa’s predominant rival to global rugby supremacy). Cricket, the other sport of significance in White South Africa, maintained a programme of ‘rebel’ tours until the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{17}

Official tours were organised by the international federation, in rugby union’s case the International Rugby Board (IRB), following a tightly planned programme known several years in advance; the only way for a match to be an official international ‘test’ was if it was sanctioned by the IRB. Timing, scheduling, rules, officiating, locations, eligibility and anything else to do with touring programmes all had to be endorsed by the IRB and were rigorously policed by national governing bodies. Other than national level competition, such as in rugby union national provincial-level leagues during the amateur era, these international tours were the only opportunity most people had to see élite competition. The tours also tended to be of a long duration. For instance, the South African rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981 lasted 56 days, plus travel time and two weeks of matches in the USA. Even the unofficial, ‘rebel’, New
Zealand tour of South Africa in 1986 lasted six weeks and included 11 matches. These events were rare, had a high profile and were of great cultural significance.

The anti-apartheid sports boycott, focussing on South Africa, had six distinctive features that were more obvious where the campaign focussed on single sport settings than the multi-sport context of the Olympic Games, but that are also distinctive in that the Olympic issue was resolved relatively early in the boycott era. The first feature was that sport mattered in that it was a major factor of White South African culture, but that some sports mattered more than others for reasons specific to the South African cultural order. The second distinctive feature is that the boycott call came from oppressed groups within South Africa. The third is that these oppressed groups and anti-apartheid allies within the country had, during the apartheid era, built credible internal alternatives to the apartheid-based sports governance system in the form of non-racial bodies. Fourth, the campaign gained strength during 1960s with decolonisation, the power of the Third World project and growing significance of Eastern bloc states. Fifth, during its first ten years the boycott campaign shifted emphasis from narrowly sport-focussed to anti-apartheid in general as the wider anti-apartheid movement and its related boycott campaigns matured. Finally, the campaign confronted an internationally regulated sports system where, for international purposes, the International Federation (IF) governed relations with many aspects of management delegated to National Governing Bodies.

These six characteristics influence the analytical fit with how the wider literature on boycotts can help shape explanations of this cultural boycott. This literature is limited. For the most part discussion of boycotts focus on two things: economic boycotts and, to a lesser extent, third party boycotts such as industrial or political action in support of another group’s boycott activity. The national focus of these debates means that this discussion is limited by the characteristics of specific jurisdictions. The following discussion will therefore draw on the economics-based literature centred on international economic and relations questions to propose a theory of sports boycotts in the context of a wider set of cultural boycotts. The starting point is that boycotts are only ever tactical or at best strategic; they are never an end in themselves but always a means to an end.

**The Boycott as a tactic**

The international relations and economics literature tends to conflate sanctions, embargoes and boycotts. Debates about the use of sanctions as a policy tool often assume a simple and direct relationship between political power and economic strength, whereas it is often the
case that boycotts are imposed by the relatively powerless – as seen in the US Civil Rights Movement’s Alabama Bus Boycott in 1954. Even with the presumption of power, the consensus in the literature is that economic sanctions work by attrition, are ineffective as a singular policy response and are more likely to be effective when invoked as a part of a broader strategy including diplomatic and other non-economic pressure.

Drawing on this literature produces an interpretation of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions shaped by a focus on formal state actions and measures of economic consequences. As a result, we can define sanctions as “actions initiated by one or more international actors (the ‘senders’) against one or more others (the ‘targets’) with either of two purposes: to punish the targets by depriving them of some value and/or make the ‘targets’ comply with certain norms the senders deem important”.\(^{18}\) We need also to consider legal and political theory to distinguish between three seemingly synonymous terms. Although ‘sanction’ also acts as a generic term, for the purposes of the remainder of this discussion, sanctions are penalties attached to transgression and breach of international law. Embargoes are a prohibition by one country or a group of countries of certain kinds of economic or other relations as a reprisal action designed to coerce political policy shifts or to injure a target nation taking a certain political stand. Finally, the boycott is the cessation or curtailment of contact or relations with a target nation on account of political differences, so as to punish a nation for a political position adopted or to coerce it into abandoning it.\(^{19}\) Given these distinctions, the campaign to isolate South African sport during the apartheid era was enforcing a boycott of South African sport in response to a call for an embargo of apartheid. When it comes to the recent actions focussed on Israel, this distinction is important.

The debate about sanctions faded after the early 1980s as scholars turned their attention to other issues of international economic relations and with the embedding of neo-classical dominance. By 1980 a consensus had been reached regarding sanctions, embargoes and boycotts. Scholarly debate of the issue since then has operated within the parameters of that consensus; there has been no significant reconceptualization of these models. The discussion embedded embargoes and boycotts within a general focus on sanctions. This is unreasonable in the case of sporting and other cultural boycotts. The use of sanctions as a policy tool relies on the assumption of a direct relationship between political power and economic strength. Although there is usually a simple reason for the invocation of sanctions there are always complex factors in any state’s decision to use them. These factors are often as much about relations with other third-party states as those with the target state. The crucial limitation in cultural policy on the applicability of this literature focussing on state actions in economic policy is that boycotts are often a tool of the relatively powerless.
While noting this limitation, the economics literature suggests that it is possible to draw some common conclusions from the application of sports embargoes and boycotts and of economic sanctions. Sanctions, and by implication boycotts or embargoes, can achieve their intended outcome. This outcome is possible because sanctions can maintain the perception that damage has been inflicted, can express a sense of morality and justice, can signify disapproval and displeasure, can satisfy the emotional needs of the sanctioner to be seen to be acting, can help maintain the sanctioner’s positive image and reputation, can relieve domestic pressure on the sanctioner, especially if there is a broad popular movement, and can inflict symbolic vengeance on the target. Debates in the UK in 2011 and the USA intermittently since 2003 over the calls for an academic boycott of Israeli higher education institutions show just how intense and fraught the perceived impact of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions can be. Furthermore, if there is no short term solution or compromise there is on-going inconvenience, target states become examples, and the sanctioner’s self-image and self-confidence can be restored.

The effectiveness of sports boycotts and embargoes relies on several distinctive features. The most important of these is product substitution. Just as the impact of economic sanctions needs to be seen in the light of access to other sources of or substitutes for goods being denied, consideration needs to be given to access to additional or alternative sports events. The organisation of international sport means that the product being denied could not be acquired from elsewhere, even if there are close alternatives. International sport is often described as a monopoly, that is, where a single ‘seller’ dominates the international sport ‘market’. For instance, the Commonwealth Games Association can be seen as providing a sports event similar to that provided by the IOC in that the Commonwealth Games and other similar events such as the Francophone or Pan-African Games emulate but do not seek to replace the Olympic Games. The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEO) in Indonesia in 1963 was an international multi-sport festival event emulating the Olympic Games and largely funded by the People’s Republic of China as an alternative to the Olympics, where the IOC had recognised Taiwan (Republic of China) as its Chinese member; GANEO may be seen as an attempt at product substitution. As in this case, very few attempts at product substitution have been successful although some, notably in cricket, rugby union and rugby league, have had significant effects. This dominance of Olympic-centred analysis means that international sport is often described as a monopoly, that is, where a single ‘seller’ dominates the international sport ‘market’. This approach overstates the agency of international sports organisations. Monopsony exists where there are several sellers but only one purchaser – it is the inversion of monopoly where a single
seller has multiple purchasers, and markedly shifts the balance of market power and relations.

While the argument that international sports governing bodies are monopolistic is correct in that they monopolise international sports provision, the full significance of analyses derived from international economics in relation to sports boycotts may only be seen if bodies such as the International Rugby Board and the International Olympic Committee are understood as cartels with either monopolistic or monopsonistic characteristics.\(^2\) Doing so requires a shift in emphasis in analysis of what can be seen as an international sports market away from a focus on the international body to focus on the national governing body (NGB). The tendency to focus on control by the international body belies an ideological dominance of Olympic studies where the IOC is, historically and currently, a top-down governance régime – the IOC predated National Olympic Committees. Seeing the IOC as a monopolistic cartel – that is, as a single seller – is correct, although the now defunct Friendship Games show that there are limits to that monopoly. This is not the case in most sports where international federations (IFs) – the IRB, FIFA, the IAAF, FINA and so forth – were at their moment of formation confederations of pre-existing national bodies meaning that they should be understood as monopsonistic cartels.

Effective analysis of non-Olympic sports boycotts requires that sport specific IFs are understood as cartels with monopsonistic characteristics. In the case of international competition by nationally representative teams, these international sports bodies are the only purchaser, in part because they have devised and organised the ‘market’ in international sports competition. Devising and organising international sport is part of what these IFs, as confederations of pre-existing NGBs, were set up to do, along with determining agreed rules of play and organising national competition. Furthermore, they are monopsonistic cartels of monopsonistic bodies: their market control as the single purchaser exists at both international and national level. Their effectiveness as a monopsonistic cartel relies on their ability to prevent the development of viable substitutes, which is in part why the creation of ‘rebel’ leagues in cricket in 1977, rugby union in 1995 and rugby league in 1996 had such a profound impact on the structure and organisation of each of those sports.

For reasons of space, further discussion of a detailed analysis of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions must be deferred. Issues essential to this more detailed analysis includes the extent to which target states have access to close alternatives, for example the ‘rebel’ tours of South Africa, as well as other counter leverages such as an increasing cultural emphasis on the significance of national level competition, for instance the status accorded cricket’s
Currie Cup in apartheid era South Africa once the boycotts began to take effect. Further analysis is needed of the extent to which the boycott campaigns can be seen to be effective, which will require a longer term view than that often taken by critics of the approach who seem to expect immediate or short term results. The existing literature that points to the place of boycotts, sanctions and embargoes as part of a wider suite of policy instruments and as attritional is crucial here.

There are several elements where common conclusions about economic and cultural boycotts do not exist. First, unlike economic sanctions, hinting at cultural and sporting boycotts is not more effective than imposing them. Second, there little evidence that the imposition of sporting and cultural boycotts imposes costs on sender states other than to the organising body.\textsuperscript{23} Third, other than in the case of some aspects of multi-lateral sports events, third parties seldom experience any costs or losses associated with sporting and cultural boycotts. Fourth, it is unlikely that sports-related sanctions will undermine the credibility of the sanctioner leading to them being seen as an unreliable supplier – in large part because international sport is monopsonistic – although the ‘unreliable supplier’ issue may limit action by individual NGBs, depending on the organisational reach of IFs.

There are two general points where common ground exists. First, the sanctioner needs to be fully aware of the potential costs. In analyses of economic sanctions these are relatively straight forward and direct costs may be comparatively accurately calculated.\textsuperscript{24} In sporting and cultural boycotts there is a far greater number of factors to consider ranging from the domestic political response to the effect on the cultural standing of particular activities or sports. Second, the target’s responses may lead to new sources of supply being discovered, the stimulation of conservation to reduce demand, or development of substitutes – in the South African sports case, these responses include the ‘rebel’ tours and the strenuous efforts on the part of the South African government and key elements of its civil society to circumvent the boycott.\textsuperscript{25}

Additional common conclusions may be drawn about the effectiveness of sanctions, embargoes or boycotts applied by international or multinational bodies.\textsuperscript{26} These tend to carry more moral power than action taken by individual countries but contain the potential to weaken the international body by causing withdrawals or attacks by powerful target states. The nature of multinational and international sport means that it is important to consider the compatibility of sports’ structures with the objectives of the campaign. Conclusions derived from consideration of Olympic boycotts, particularly Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984, do not fit the isolation of South African sport. By dealing with individual sports and a
single national organising body as well as having a focus on governments through domestic political pressures, the campaign developed a form different from the Olympic boycotts. It could be presented as a response to a call from within South Africa and as directly linked to South Africa’s conditions. The same could not be said for the Olympic boycott campaigns organised by the USA and the USSR. However, the idealist sentiment asserting a supra-political status of sport was still powerful and able to be utilised by governments in South Africa and elsewhere to oppose the anti-apartheid movements. This indicates that the issues on which to focus in considering the isolation of apartheid sport are the political structures of the protest movement as well as those of single sporting bodies and governments, the existence of a popular protest movement leading the call for a boycott, and the use of the apolitical sports argument and the anti-apartheid movement’s ability to counter that through the significance of rugby and cricket and the politicisation of South African sport.

The basic lesson to be learned from the economic sanctions literature is that sanctions, embargoes and boycotts may not achieve all their intended goals, but can still have a profound impact. As Daoudi and Dajani argue, “they have the power to cut fresh inroads, impose heavy sacrifices on the target, and inflict deep internal cleavages in the political fabric of the target regime – cleavages hard for the untrained eye to see on initial impact”.27 It is likely that only superpowers are able to bear the economic strain or impact of being a target in the short run, although there are many states which remain convinced of their ‘rightness’ when faced with challenges to their resilience as cultural isolation grows with non-economic sanctions. In the South African case there were changes in the boycott strategy following limited sporting integration in the late 1980s with the support of the ANC, which, in turn, held out the promise of return to international competition. Had the isolation of rugby union been more complete and in effect earlier there is little doubt that white South Africa would have lost a major aspect of its cultural strength.

The economics and international relations literature helps us fill out some conceptual gaps in discussing the South African sports boycotts, and leads to a three part model proposing that sanctions, embargoes and boycotts:

1) Are effective only as part of broader suite of isolating activities
2) Operate in a market determined by monopsonistic cartels, so analyses of likely and actual effectiveness must address
   a. access to alternatives in sender states
   b. access to alternatives in target states
3) Have an effect that tends to be cultural and to do with national psychological well-being, and determined by the significance of the sport in question.
In addition, the anti-apartheid campaign suggests that sports boycotts gain legitimacy and therefore solidarity/support from:

- being in support of an indigenous call
- being able to point to alternative representative sports bodies

Noting that the anti-apartheid campaign on which this model is based was played out in a global environment that, 20 years ago, was markedly different from the current one, the opposition to the UEFA Under-21 championships held in Israel in 2013, including a boycott call, provides an opportunity to revisit this analysis. Comparing one campaign – and so far the only time sport has been a significant factor in the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign currently targeting Israel – with developments over a thirty year movement is not a good basis for meaningful evaluation, so this discussion is tentative, exploratory and cautious in its conclusions.

**Israel, the BDS campaign and soccer**

The 22 June 2011 appeal to UEFA by 42 Palestinian football clubs, a further 18 players and managers and 19 other leading Palestinian sport figures to reverse its decision to hold its 2013 under-21 championship in Israel marked a shift in the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign. The call appears to be the first coordinated BDS attempt to address a multi-lateral sports event; the dispersed character of the BDS campaign means being any more definitive is unwise. The call for the tournament to be moved from Israel echoed the principal elements of the BDS campaign, charging Israel with practicing "a unique combination of occupation, colonization and apartheid against the indigenous Palestinian population". Noting the definitions earlier, this should be seen as call for a sporting sanction to be imposed on Israel in response to a call for an embargo on the grounds that it is held to violate international law and Palestinian human rights in its “occupation, colonization and apartheid”.

The 2011 letter highlights football-related evidence to support its charge of ‘occupation, colonization and apartheid’. The ‘occupation’ charge is sustained by reference to two factors; the destruction of large section of the Gaza Strip in 2008/09 during Operation Cast Lead including the destruction of the Rafah National Stadium, an action defended by Israel as targeting militants launching rockets, and the related deaths of footballers among the 1400 dead in Gaza. The call also identifies the proximity of the Separation Wall, ruled illegal in 2004 by the International Court of Justice, to the Faisal Al Hussein Stadium in Al-Ram and
the detention “without trial or … public explanation” of the Palestinian National Team member Mahmoud Kamel Al-Sarsak.

The ‘colonization’ charge is sustained by the reference to the siting of Ramat Gan Stadium, designated host of some games, on land seized from the Palestinian villages of Jarisha and al-Jammasin al Sharqi under the Absentee Property Law, 5710-1950, labelled in the call as the Absentee Property Owners Law (1950). The law, at Art 1(b), defined as absentee, every Palestinian or resident in Palestine who left their usual place of residence in Palestine for any place inside or outside the country after the United Nations resolution agreeing to the partition of Palestine29; this means anyone, including those non-combatants fleeing conflict in 1948, who left their property for anywhere else inside or outside pre-partition Palestine was designated absentee and their property liable to seizure by the state.

The ‘apartheid’ charge is the one that often jars with wider public opinion, given the close association of apartheid with the era of National Party rule in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. As noted earlier, in 1973 the UN defined apartheid as “inhuman acts for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group and systematically oppressing them”; legal scholars and others continue to debate the application of this definition to Israeli domestic law. The call to UEFA, however, identifies the Israeli permit system, seen as parallel to the South African Pass Laws, as placing limitations on Palestinian freedom of movement that denies footballers access to tournaments and other matches and to the opportunity to practice.30

The call to rescind the opportunity for Israel to host this tournament takes a form that links closely to the 2005 BDS call, and must be understood in that light. The BDS call is a right’s based call for action to build pressure on Israel “to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine”.31 The call, being rights based, does not envisage a specific political structure, but calls for action to address key issues for the three sections of Palestinian society – refugees, the occupied and Palestinian citizens of Israel. It therefore calls on its supporters to pressure Israel to recognise and act on its international obligations by:

1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall;
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.
The three aspects of sports’ call to UEFA, occupation, colonization and apartheid, parallel these three aspects of the 2005 declaration.

A broad suite of isolating activities
An accurate reading of the sports organisations’ letter to UEFA requires that it be placed in the BDS context. To do so means that there are two other key factors to consider; the first relates to the genesis of the BDS campaign; the second to the detail of the BDS call. The genesis of the call directs attention to the history of Israel and Palestine. For much of the 20th century, the politics of the region have been presented as one of national liberation, both in the form of the Zionist project of settlement and state-building, and the Palestinian resistance to occupation by and expulsion from that state. A Palestinian politics of national liberation may be seen in the federation of organisations that became the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Changes in geo-political relations and in Palestinian society meant that during the last quarter of the 20th century there were significant changes in Palestinian politics, including heightened military control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT, Gaza and the West Bank) and the emergence of new forms of civil society including social clubs, welfare and educational organisations. The era also reveals changes in political organisation, with a shift away from accommodation with the settler state through mechanisms such as the mukhtar (headman) system.32

Increasing frustration at limited change for the better for Palestinians within the Green Line, marking Israel’s borders, and in the OPT saw an outburst of resistance in 1987, now known as the First Intifada.33 This Intifada saw active resistance to Israeli policy and practice from Palestinian citizens and those living under occupation in a way that Israel had not experienced before, and the consistent but not always successful efforts that the Palestinians made to avoid armed conflict unsettled Israeli police and the Israeli Defence Forces in a way that meant some of the Israeli responses seemed to be excessive, at significant public image costs. In an effort to control the Intifada, and after considerable international pressure, Israel and the PLO entered negotiations leading to the Oslo accords of 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with jurisdiction over a range of social, security and civil issues in the OPT. The notable omission from the PA was many of civil society institutions that had filled an important need on the ground during that earlier era of armed national liberation struggle. This exclusion as well as with the problematic role of the PA as an agent of development under conditions determined by the occupation and therefore as an agent of the occupation led to a widespread Palestinian view that the PA was a corrupt organisation. The result was shifts in the political balance of forces in Palestinian society opening space for more active civil society; it was 171 organisations
comprising a major part of this civil society that issued the BDS call in 2005. This is the first significant difference from the South African case: the groups calling for BDS are not national liberation movements similar to those in South Africa but civil society institutions that are often critical of the ‘official’ national liberation groups, now dominated by those gathered around Fatah and around Hamas.

The second key aspect of the BDS call that is relevant to this exploration of the 2013 UEFA U-21 championship is its target. Although the 2005 call, and much of the discussion since, invokes the South African precedent, the terms of the call are different. Whereas the call for the total isolation of South Africa meant that there should be no contact of any form other than with the liberation movements, the Palestinian call is for BDS aimed at the State of Israel, not the total isolation of Israelis; this is clear in the inclusion of the invitation to “conscientious Israelis to support this call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace”. The sports organisations’ call sits alongside efforts to organise other cultural boycotts, an academic boycott and economic boycotts of Israeli business as well as companies investing in and sustaining the occupation. The economic and cultural boycotts have been more successful than academic and sports boycotts. BDS advocates are clear, time and again, that the focus is the state of Israel, not individual Israelis. Hence, the 2011 call was consistent with the broader BDS campaign in calling on UEFA to withdraw the championships from Israel; the target was not Israeli players in European leagues. In this sense there is a fundamental difference with the South African-focussed campaign.

This background to the U-21 championship campaign suggests that this case is consistent with the first element of the model. There has been a call for widespread BDS activity that has seen attempted and successful action in a range of economic sectors – transport, education, culture and others. The BDS campaign itself admits that it “had been slow to promote a sporting boycott” although there has been some BDS-related sport-focussed protest activity, such as during the 2009 Israel-Sweden Davis Cup match, sport-related BDS activity has been only a very small part of the campaign. This is likely to be a result of the ‘boycott Israel, not Israelis’ stance. There is a second strand related to the boycott call as part of a wider sphere of action linked to UEFA’s anti-racism work. UEFA, as is the case with most of its constituents, actively supports anti-racism campaigns; these campaigns, although designed to focus on structural racism as well as more overt racist acts, tend to gain most attention when addressing overt racism. Based on this focus and alongside the campaign against holding the tournament in Israel, critics also drew attention to manifestations of overt racism in Israeli football. Much of the criticism centred on the Jerusalem-based club Beitar, officials of which have been criticised within Israel for what
seems to be reluctance to confront some of the more overt and ostentatious displays of anti-
Palestinian, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic views among the clubs supporters, highlighting in
particular the actions of a fan group targeting two Chechen players signed by the team early
in 2013 – its first Muslim players. Others have argued that this is a minority of fans, although
minorities combined with club inaction has not stopped UEFA or national federation anti-
racism activity in other settings. This UEFA focussed anti-racism argument is best seen as in
parallel to but not part of the principal boycott call. It has, however, seemed to have a profile
that has overshadowed and distracted from the BDS aspects of the campaign.

International football tournaments
Considering international sport within a market determined by monopsonistic cartels means
that analyses of the likely and actual effectiveness of boycotts must address both the access
to sporting alternatives in sender states and the access to alternatives in target states. This
requires a focus on access to and the status of élite youth football in both likely sender
states and in Israel. It is on this point that the character of the international sports market as
monopsonistic becomes important. UEFA, as the only ‘purchaser’, can determine both the
character of exchange in the market and the participants in that market. This means that a
unilateral decision by one or a minority of the participating national associations to boycott
could have been extremely expensive in that they could have been seen as an unreliable
supplier and possibly in violation of membership and competition rules. In this multi-lateral
competitive context, the international federation is not only the single purchaser but also
organises the market, including determining the rules of market entry and participation;
under these conditions member associations are unlikely to act unilaterally. In this situation
where national governing bodies have a single ‘purchaser’ for international competitive
events a decision by UEFA as that ‘purchaser’ to withdraw the tournament from Israel would
have no significant effect on the senders access to élite competitive sport; there would be no
need to seek an alternative.

The effect on Israel, had UEFA acted on the BDS call, could have been catastrophic, for the
same reason that any other member association would be unlikely to act unilaterally. Israel
would lose access to élite international youth football played at home. Furthermore, the
control the international federations exercise over club football, such as the Champions
League, would threaten access to all forms levels of élite football should a general football or
sports boycott be successful. Given that the call was not for a comprehensive UEFA boycott
but for the tournament to be hosted by another UEFA member, should UEFA have agreed
the effect would have less severe but still significant. It is almost certain that Israel would not
have participated in the tournament, and it would not have had access to an alternative form
of competition at home. Under these circumstances, and noting the specific characteristics of international football governance including the control of élite club play, a decision by UEFA to relocate the tournament is likely to have been a major blow to Israeli football, leaving aside the political and psychological consequences of the move.

**National psychological well-being**

The third element of the model, that the effect of any boycott tends to be cultural, related to national self-perception, confidence and well-being and determined by significance of the sport in question, in this case, is unanswerable; there was no boycott. That the tournament took place, however, is presented by representatives of the Israel Football Association (IFA) as a significant advance for and benefit to Israeli football. The tournament director, Ronen Hershco, presented it as a success in terms of legacy even though the Israeli team did not progress beyond the group stage.38 It is reasonable to assume that had UEFA decided to shift the tournament the effect would have been significant, especially if there was no significant shift in the ‘security situation’, as the conflict is often euphemistically labelled. Given the counterfactual aspects of this proposition, it remains no more than an assumption although the combination of football’s cultural significance in Israel combined with Israel's powerful desire to normalise its global position and role as seen in the government’s 'Brand Israel' programme suggests that the assumption may be well founded.

**Solidarity and legitimacy**

In addition to these three aspects of the model, success and international support for the boycott relies on the legitimacy of any boycott activity, which relates to matters ‘on the ground’ in the Israel-Palestine sporting and political nexus. The protest action targeting the UEFA competition is clearly in support of an indigenous call from the Palestinian sports community with the 22 June 2011 letter signed by 42 sports clubs and a further 37 individuals. This is a marked change from the initial 2005 BDS call where there are no obvious sports clubs among the 171 civil society signatory groups. In the sports case there is legitimacy granted to the BDS activity in that it is in support of a call by Palestinian sports groups.

The more difficult aspect of legitimacy concerns the presence of alternative representative sports bodies. It may be that this is distinctive to the South African setting and has less resonance in the case of Israel/Palestine. The question of sports federations in historic Palestine shows the presence of several groups claiming representative status. The Palestine Football Association, for instance, cited by FIFA as the predecessor of its member organisations for both Palestine and Israel was founded in 1928 and admitted to FIFA in
1929, yet the current information page for Palestine shows its membership of FIFA beginning in 1998.39 The PFA initially had Arab members, in 1929 11 of its 69 teams were Arab teams, but after the mid-1930s until its transformation into the Israel Football Association it became increasingly Zionist group with only minimal membership of mandatory Palestine’s Arab population. Parallel organisations emerged from the mid-1940s in the form of the Arab Palestine Sports Association, also known as General Palestinian Sports Association, and the Islamic Sports Club.40 Palestine was only admitted to FIFA in 1998, 50 years after partition, in the wake of recognition of Palestine as a proto-state as part of the Oslo Accords and the emerging ‘two state solution’. The effect is that while Israel and Palestine exist as separate political entities, BDS campaigners are not able to point to alternative representative sports bodies in Israel because the Palestinians exist in three distinct formations – refugees in neighbouring states and, more widely dispersed, residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and citizens of Israel. In football terms, the latter are incorporated in the IFA while the PFA covers the OPT and some refugee camps. The distinction is based on the proto-state-like status of Palestine. Furthermore, while each remains identified as a distinct state/quasi-state the respective football associations are in different regional confederations – UEFA for Israel and the Asian Football Confederation for Palestine and the rest of region. The BDS call directed at UEFA was in the interests of groups that are not the concern of UEFA. The legitimacy of the campaign, therefore, relies on its status as an indigenous call for action.

BDS summary

Returning to the model:

1) The first element is that sports boycotts are effective only as part of broader suite of boycott activities; the call on UEFA to withdraw the 2013 under-21 tournament from Israel is clearly part of a wider BDS campaign, and the first time the campaign had ventured into multi-lateral sport. In this sense, the call is consistent with the campaign’s references to the South African focussed campaign and different from other boycott calls, such as the recent LGBT rights based call to boycott the Sochi Olympics which while based in LGBT activist groups remained distinct from either broader sport-oriented or civil rights focussed activism centred on Russia; that is, there is not a wider Russia- or sport-centred boycott activities in which the campaign could gain traction.

2) The monopsonistic cartel that controls football has more power than some other international governing bodies because of its influence over élite club play, including international club competition. This suggests that football’s national governing bodies would be unlikely to act unilaterally but had UEFA acted the impact on ‘sender’ states
would have been minimal in terms of access to alternatives while Israel would likely be excluded from access to any alternatives. There are two further factors to consider here, that also mark the campaign apart from its South African predecessor. The first is that changes in global geo-politics mean that individual state governments are unlikely to take action over a sports boycott. The second is that even in the case of sports boycott, the global sport media complex means that Israelis may lose access to live international sports events but not to televised or other mediated forms.

3) It is likely that action by UEFA to relocate the tournament would have had effects that were primarily cultural and detrimental to Israel's national self-image in part because of the significance of football but more so because of government efforts to normalise Israel's international image.

4) As with the South African campaigns, the 2013 campaign gained legitimacy among supporters from being in support of a call from within the Palestinian sport structure; that is, an indigenous call. Unlike the South African case campaigners are not able to point to alternative representative sports bodies, in part because of distinction between Israel and Palestine as states and proto-states.

The initial model is an argument based on a boycott tactic; in this case it can also be seen to be substantially appropriate in the case of an embargo – but more work and case study analysis is necessary to refine the elements related to the legitimacy question and the role of sport-specific international federations.

A significant challenge to the BDS campaign, when developing its sport aspect, lies in the organisation of sport in Israel and Palestine. Football presents the issues well. Noting the existence of the Islamic League in Israel, mainstream Israeli football is not explicitly or uniquely divided along ethno-nationalist lines, unlike much of the rest of Israeli society and politics. There is a compelling analysis by Tamir Sorek, that football is, in his words, an “integrative enclave” which he notes is a combined product of the “interests of the Hebrew sports media and state institutions… and the Arab soccer fans, players and bureaucrats” while also limiting its integrative power because it acts as a site for “the majority’s interest in maintaining the status quo, and the need of a discriminated-against national minority to maintain active protest while at the same time preserving proper relations with the majority society”. As with nearly every other site of social interaction in Israel/Palestine, football is layered, complex and wrapped in contested and disputed historical narratives and on the ground political power imbalances. This integrative element means that whereas, in many other respects, Israel might meet the UN’s definition of an apartheid state in the case of
football at least that is a more difficult case to make. This weakness may be seen in the way some campaign supporters have had to rely on the liberal framing of football’s official bodies’ anti-racism campaigns that tend to focus on individual and overt racist acts rather than structural or contextual racism. Development of a sport-focussed strand in the BDS campaign therefore suffers from a weak sport-specific analysis in dealing with Palestinian citizens of Israel: the situation is different for the occupation mainly because of its illegal aspects. The 22 June 2011 call by the 42 clubs pointed to the three aspects of colonisation, occupation and apartheid highlighted in the BDS campaign, but in the absence of sport-specific issues, a sport-focussed campaign may find it difficult to gain traction.

Conclusion
This paper explores the politics of international sports relations by proposing a model for understanding sports boycotts based in global sport structures. This model is related to analyses of economic boycotts but is also based in an analysis of the way the structure of international sports governance creates and shapes the market in international competitive sport. The call by 42 Palestinian sports clubs for UEFA to relocate its 2013 under-21 tournament from Israel made in line with the wider Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign targeting Israel allows exploration of the organisation and politics of sports boycotts, as a specific form of cultural boycott, in a new geo-political context. The analysis poses further questions concerning the extent to which the distinctive features of sports organisation and governance in Israel/Palestine influence the extent to which a sports boycott can be a meaningful tool in the BDS tactical repertoire. Football’s role as an integrative enclave in Israel and the separate existence of internationally recognised Palestinian sports bodies suggests that previous tactical approaches to colonial and post-colonising analyses will be of limited use. Second, the embedding of neo-liberal ideologies and the dominant role of market means of organisation means that international and national governing bodies exercise much of their control in less direct means than a generation ago. Third, the changing shape of global geo-politics, the decline of a bipolar world and growing influence of corporate institutions in international relations lessens the likely role of national governments in any wider sports or cultural boycott movement; as a result, analysis will need to focus on non-state and civil society institutions as factors in global sport politics.

The major mistake any analysis could make would be to take the BDS campaign’s statements that it is inspired by the South African anti-apartheid boycott to mean that it is the same as that boycott; this new campaign is focussed on relations with the state of Israel, not with Israelis – this means analysts and activists need to grasp the analytical distinctions between playing rugby against South Africa and playing soccer in Israel.
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1 Tilley Beyond Occupation.


26

East Jerusalem'(URL: 

Fieldhouse Anti-Apartheid, pp 1-20; Skinner The Foundations of Anti-apartheid, pp 162-70; Richards 
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16 Templeton Human Rights and Sporting Contacts, p 50


20 Barber and Spicer ‘Sanctions Against South Africa’; Hayes Economic Effects of Sanctions; Jenkins The 
Effects of Sanctions.

21 Connolly The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces; Field Re-Entering the Sporting World

22 Houlihan Sport and International Politics.

23 This difference in the perception of economic significance may clearly be seen in the debate during late 
2002 and early 2003 over an English World Cup cricket match against Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe where the 
England and Wales Cricket Board was faced with a £1 million fine. This became a major point of contention 
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29 Tilley, Beyond Occupation, 207; White Palestinians in Israel, 22-5; White Israeli Apartheid, 44-5;

30 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker Coffins on Our Shoulders, 46-7.

31 Lippe ‘Football, masculinities and health on the Gaza Strip’

32 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker Coffins on Our Shoulders.

33 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, esp. pp 75-98

34 Hever The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation, 14-17.

35 The growing profile of BDS economic action may be seen in the debates in early 2014 over the actor 
Scarlett Johansson’s marketing relationship with the Israeli company SodaStream, which maintains 
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36 Jonathan Cook ‘Israeli football, racism and politics: the ugly side of the beautiful game’ Scottish Palestine 
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40 Sorek Arab Soccer in Israel, 17-30.
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42 Davis Apartheid Israel; White Israeli Apartheid; Tilley Beyond Occupation.